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By Bradley Disilvestre The Effects of the Cold War on Lan America BY BRADLEY DISILVESTRE Post WW2 Adjustments (Ideology) The United States rose in the West as a democrac superpower The USSR rose in the East as a communis2c superpower USSR aempted to spread communism with post-war influence US aempted to limit the expansion, leading to indirect conflicts “the war had been won by a coali2on whose principal members were already at war - ideologically and geopoli2cally if not militarily - with one another.” 6 Gaddis Post WW2 Adjustments (La4n America) Lan American countries con2nued developing with import subs2tu2on industrializaon, creang more factories as to limit import reliance US opened trade with Lan America, many were afraid the trade would destabilize or slow the growth of their economies Many in Lan America saw the new superpowers as a way to upheave the current systems US Lan America Policies Containment Policy Focuses on stopping the growth/spread of the USSR through economic, diplomac, and military power Implemented primarily by the US, first applied in Truman doctrine but used repeatedly by various presidents The applicaon is reminiscent of Ta’s Dollar Diplomacy in how money was distributed to greatly further internaonal influence/relaons Truman Doctrine March 12, 1947 President Truman declared immediate economic/military (400mil) assistance to Greece and Turkey to protect from Soviet expansion in their area Massive outreach is supported by Truman’s Domino Theory where the fall of one Naon into communism would cause a cascade of revolu2on in the surrounding areas, so communism must be stopped before it is firmly established Set precedent for predecessors Truman Doctrine OPCVL h8p://www.history.com/speeches/the-truman-doctrine Origin and Purpose O) March 12, 1947 speech from United States President Harry Truman about his 400 million dollar doctrine of aid for Greece and Turkey P) To give raonale for his doctrine as to convince congress and inform the American people “Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the en2re Middle-East. Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this faithful hour the effect will be far reaching to the west as well as to the east.” Value and Limita4ons V) Supports the idea that US presidents will go to great lengths to contain and suppress the USSR “I therefore ask the congress to provide us authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of 400 million dollars for the period ending June 30th, 1938.” L) Posi2on may have been supported to curry favor from the red-fearing populace. True beliefs may be diluted when put before a congressional audience, prohibi2ng unabridged ideas. Eisenhower Doctrine Very similar to the Truman doctrine in that it promised aid to protect from Soviet expansion, but this 2me to Middle Eastern countries S2ll developing containment and showing that the US intends to interfere wherever Communism is involved Kennedy Doctrine Also a con2nuaon of containment but not focusing on the Mediterranean or the Middle East, but on the less developed countries below the equator Gave more aen2on to Lan American countries through organizaons Alliance for Progress- Program between US and 22 Lan American Countries for aid in reform and growth Brought US into Cuban affairs What’s up with Cuba?? Pre-Revoluon In 1933 Fulgencio Basta came into power in Cuba, he con2nued the local tradi2ons of corrup2on and disparity Numerous issues like: ØHuge wage gap ØHigh unemployment ØLack of public services ØNo distribu2on of poli2cal power Fidel Castro Cuban Revolu2onary that became the face of Communism in Lan America Born August 13, 1926, Castro aended Catholic boarding and high school before studying law in university In school he did poli2cs and par2cipated in violent groups and riots before aemp2ng to do poli2cs officially When this failed, he con2nued aemp2ng revolts with varying degrees of failure Revolu4on! APer being released from prison, Castro retreated to gather forces in Mexico before directly opposing the Basta regime in December 1956 Using guerilla and psychological warfare with a miniscule force of 800, Castro frightened and wore down the Cuban military before seizing Cuba on January 1st 1959 Communist Aermath APer Castro concluded the revolu2on the Communist Party of Cuba was in power Changes: ØEliminated Capitalism and naonalized industries ØBegan working with the USSR ØDeveloped similarly to other Communist satellites in Europe US Response US was like “no man that’s not cool” Because Cuba seized hundreds of millions in US property/business and because THERE IS A COMMUNIST COUNTRY LIKE RIGHT THERE Many US congressmen denounced Castro and President Eisenhower set up a trade embargo on everything except food and medicine Bay of Pigs Invasion Later on, the US aempted to remove Castro from power by funding and facilitang an uprising 1,500 armed Cuban exiles landed on the “Bay of Pigs” in April 1961 This didn’t work out causing many insurgents to be captured, the US/CIA to be indicated, and later it was revealed that people from the wrong fac2ons were selected for the plan anyways Cuban Missile Crisis Another incident occurred when the USSR placed nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962 that could hit much of the US In response, president Kennedy decided to set up a naval blockade to prevent further shipments Kennedy and Khrushchev nego2ated that the USSR would rescind the missiles and the US would not invade Cuba, in addi2on to rescinding missiles in Turkey Castro got angry that the USSR backed down and nego2ated and would no longer associate with them Cuba Summary vA8empts at US interference in Lan America have varied results vThe presence of a Communist country did not cause the Domino Effect vUS would con2nue to enforce containment and the Monroe Doctrine vTension between the US and the USSR rose What is non-Alignment? Movement where a country does not become aligned with a geopoli2cal/military structure The requirements include beliefs such as: ØRespect for fundamental human rights ØRecogni2on of movements for naonal independence ØRefraining from acts of aggression against the integrity/independence of any country Lan-American Members Include but not limited to: ØCuba - 1961 ØChile - 1973 ØPeru - 1973 ØBelize - 1976 ØPanama - 1976 Impact of CIA on Lan American Polics Guatemalalalalalalalalalalalalalalalalalala Guatemala is a good example of how the CIA interfered with the poli2cal atmosphere Jacobo Arbenz was elected Guatemalan president in 1950, He made an Agrarian Reform bill which let the Government buy land off of plantaons (like eminent domain) Plantaon owners and workers were upset at the loss of land Communists were encouraging uprisings but Arbenz wouldn’t stop them because they helped him come to power United Fruit Company The United Fruit Company (UFC) was the largest conglomerate in Guatemala, worked in farming and controlled the Puerto Barrios port that was integral for Guatemalan involvement with internaonal trade. Under prior leaders they received some tax exemp2ons but the new reforms hurt them in par2cular because the company severely undervalued their land to avoid remaining taxes United Fruit Company The UFC was known to bribe/manipulate their opposi2on and poli2cians to stay powerful, was influenced by foreign donators like the US When the government aempted to buy UFC land for $600,000 the UFC responded by asking for $15,000,000 instead (20x counter offer) This offer would not be accepted work so the UFC and its US supporters for upset US Media Response US correspondents got in contact with media specialists and had them vilify the Arbenz administraon, making every ac2on look bad to the public They claimed the Arbenz administraon was dangerously an2-American compared to his predecessor and Communis2c for keeping Communist officials Glass Half-Empty When the Arbez administraon was concerned and afraid of uprising they purchased weapons from Czechoslovakia Media specialists spun this as a clear connec2on to the USSR because of the Czech’s Communist leader Through applicaon of the Containment beliefs, Domino Theory, and the Monroe doctrine the US now had jus2ficaon to interfere with the suspected USSR meddling Enter: Operaon PBSUCCESS The CIA ini2ated an operaon to remove Arbenz from power Operaon PBSUCCESS included: ØSpecially training 150 exiles for insurgency ØEstablishing communicaon lines and jamming for radio ØAggressively using psychological warfare through the radio ØOrchestrang an overthrow and installing a more “cooperave” leader Guatemalan Revolu4on CIA selected Cas2llo Armas to lead the rebellion because he was of small stature, humble in temperament, and stupid While receiving orders from the CIA, Armas led a small force against the Guatemalan troops Rebels only won a few bales but the US used radio to give them informaon and to demoralize the opposi2on President Arbenz quit and was replaced by Colonel Diaz who faced similar propaganda and guerilla warfare un2l defeat Aermath of Guatemala Cas2llo Armas became provisional and then full-2me president, then he established an2-Communist laws and incrementally took power and rights from the people (burned books, abolished par2es) With Guatemala now facing a dictator and the UFC never returning to prosperity, US interven2on destabilized yet another country to oust Communism America’s Involvement with Allende and Chile In Chile a Socialist party aempted to run for presidency with candidate Salvador Allende Gossens The US, fearing another Cuba, leaped into ac2on with President Nixon trying to influence the elec2ons and organize a coup Unlike in Guatemala, these plans did not succeed and Allende won the Elec2on in 1970 Aermath of Chile When Allende came into power he implemented new economic policies and was aemp2ng to stop plumme2ng copper prices The USSR saw the chaos and decided to wait for a be8er 2me to take them under their wing This hesitance backfired when in 1973 a different rebel army overthrew Allende and established an authoritarian regime Summary vDemocrac US vs Communis2c USSR vContain the USSR by throwing money around vTry to stop every Communist domino vMany naons went unaligned vFrequent US interven2on frequently caused problems Works Cited "Containment." Britannica School, Encyclopædia Britannica, 26 Nov.
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