Learning to Leave • Brown to Leave Learning the 3 DREW PER PA S
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September 12, 2006 the Honorable John Warner, Chairman The
GENERAL JOHN SHALIKASHVILI, USA (RET.) GENERAL JOSEPH HOAR, USMC (RET.) ADMIRAL GREGORY G. JOHNSON, USN (RET.) ADMIRAL JAY L. JOHNSON, USN (RET.) GENERAL PAUL J. KERN, USA (RET.) GENERAL MERRILL A. MCPEAK, USAF (RET.) ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, USN (RET.) GENERAL WILLIAM G. T. TUTTLE JR., USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL DANIEL W. CHRISTMAN, USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL PAUL E. FUNK, USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT G. GARD JR., USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAY M. GARNER, USA (RET.) VICE ADMIRAL LEE F. GUNN, USN (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL ARLEN D. JAMESON, USAF (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLAUDIA J. KENNEDY, USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL DONALD L. KERRICK, USA (RET.) VICE ADMIRAL ALBERT H. KONETZNI JR., USN (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHARLES OTSTOTT, USA (RET.) VICE ADMIRAL JACK SHANAHAN, USN (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY E. SOYSTER, USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL PAUL K. VAN RIPER, USMC (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL JOHN BATISTE, USA (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL EUGENE FOX, USA (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL JOHN L. FUGH, USA (RET.) REAR ADMIRAL DON GUTER, USN (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL FRED E. HAYNES, USMC (RET.) REAR ADMIRAL JOHN D. HUTSON, USN (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL MELVYN MONTANO, ANG (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL GERALD T. SAJER, USA (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL J. SCOTTI JR., USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVID M. BRAHMS, USMC (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES P. CULLEN, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL EVELYN P. FOOTE, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVID R. IRVINE, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN H. JOHNS, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL RICHARD O’MEARA, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL MURRAY G. SAGSVEEN, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN K. SCHMITT, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL ANTHONY VERRENGIA, USAF (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL STEPHEN N. -
The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003
THE REGIME CHANGE CONSENSUS: IRAQ IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 1990-2003 Joseph Stieb A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the College of Arts and Sciences. Chapel Hill 2019 Approved by: Wayne Lee Michael Morgan Benjamin Waterhouse Daniel Bolger Hal Brands ©2019 Joseph David Stieb ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT Joseph David Stieb: The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003 (Under the direction of Wayne Lee) This study examines the containment policy that the United States and its allies imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War and argues for a new understanding of why the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. At the core of this story is a political puzzle: Why did a largely successful policy that mostly stripped Iraq of its unconventional weapons lose support in American politics to the point that the policy itself became less effective? I argue that, within intellectual and policymaking circles, a claim steadily emerged that the only solution to the Iraqi threat was regime change and democratization. While this “regime change consensus” was not part of the original containment policy, a cohort of intellectuals and policymakers assembled political support for the idea that Saddam’s personality and the totalitarian nature of the Baathist regime made Iraq uniquely immune to “management” strategies like containment. The entrenchment of this consensus before 9/11 helps explain why so many politicians, policymakers, and intellectuals rejected containment after 9/11 and embraced regime change and invasion. -
Caspar Weinberger and the Reagan Defense Buildup
The University of Southern Mississippi The Aquila Digital Community Dissertations Fall 12-2013 Direct Responsibility: Caspar Weinberger and the Reagan Defense Buildup Robert Howard Wieland University of Southern Mississippi Follow this and additional works at: https://aquila.usm.edu/dissertations Part of the American Studies Commons, Military History Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Wieland, Robert Howard, "Direct Responsibility: Caspar Weinberger and the Reagan Defense Buildup" (2013). Dissertations. 218. https://aquila.usm.edu/dissertations/218 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The University of Southern Mississippi DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY: CASPAR WEINBERGER AND THE REAGAN DEFENSE BUILDUP by Robert Howard Wieland Abstract of a Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School Of The University of Southern Mississippi In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy December 2013 ABSTRACT DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY: CASPAR WEINBERGER AND THE REAGAN DEFENSE BUILDUP by Robert Howard Wieland December 2013 This dissertation explores the life of Caspar Weinberger and explains why President Reagan chose him for Secretary of Defense. Weinberger, not a defense technocrat, managed a massive defense buildup of 1.5 trillion dollars over a four year period. A biographical approach to Weinberger illuminates Reagan’s selection, for in many ways Weinberger harkens back to an earlier type of defense manager more akin to Elihu Root than Robert McNamara; more a man of letters than technocrat. -
Army Downsizing Following World War I, World War Ii, Vietnam, and a Comparison to Recent Army Downsizing
ARMY DOWNSIZING FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I, WORLD WAR II, VIETNAM, AND A COMPARISON TO RECENT ARMY DOWNSIZING A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Military History by GARRY L. THOMPSON, USA B.S., University of Rio Grande, Rio Grande, Ohio, 1989 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2002 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burder for this collection of information is estibated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burder to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) 31-05-2002 master's thesis 06-08-2001 to 31-05-2002 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER ARMY DOWNSIZING FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I, WORLD II, VIETNAM AND 5b. -
World Powers Rivalry in Afghanistan and Its Effects on Pakistan Muhammad Karim
World Powers Rivalry in Afghanistan and Its Effects on Pakistan Muhammad Karim Abstract Afghanistan, a landlocked country, has been the focus of great powers since 19 th century due to its strategic locations. Soviet Union and Great Briton were engaged in Afghanistan before the World Wars. After Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the U.S. led West with the support of Muslim countries compelled the Red Army to withdraw in 1988. The country became a battle field of proxy wars among the regional and extra regional powers, creating instability in entire region. In aftermath of the 9/11, Afghanistan once again attracted attention of the world powers. Nature and complexity of Great Powers’ rivalry in Afghanistan has changed overtime. Instead of fighting against a nation state the world powers are fighting against the potential threats of extremism, terrorism and drug trafficking that makes the war more complicated, problematic and challenging. Currently, apart from Al-Qaeda and Taliban, Islamic State (IS) is also becoming an active stakeholder in Afghanistan. These developments make the Afghan problem more complicated and ripening the grounds for another civil war. The study argues that since Pakistan not only shares long borders but also history, culture, interests, happiness and sorrows with Afghanistan, therefore situation in Afghanistan always have direct bearing on the security matrix of Pakistan. US and NATO forces withdrawal from Afghanistan has provided an open field to Al-Qaeda/Taliban and IS in one hand and encourage regional and international players on another, creating security dilemma for Pakistan. Keywords: World powers rivalry, Afghan war, Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Islamic State (IS), Pakistan. -
Presidential Foreign Policy Doctrines
20 July 2015 Presidential Doctrines, the Use of Force and International Order Did the US’ military and legal reactions to the 9/11 attacks fundamentally transform its foreign and security policies? Joseph Siracusa doesn’t think so. He argues that the so-called Bush and Obama Doctrines have had more in common with previous presidential approaches than most people realize. By Joseph Siracusa for ISN In the ever-changing landscape of international relations, the extent to which the actions of the United States contribute to justice and order remains a source of contentious debate. Indeed, it is difficult to find a point in recent history when the United States and its foreign policy have been subject to such polarised and acrimonious reflection, both domestically and internationally. Notwithstanding recent ‘decline’ debates and the rise of emerging powers, the United States continues to hold a formidable advantage over its chief rivals in terms of formal power assets more than twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War. Few anticipated this situation; on the contrary, many assumed that, after a brief moment of unipolarity following the collapse of the Soviet Union, international affairs would soon regain a certain symmetry. Instead, US hegemony is still par for the course. In this context, because the foreign policy ‘doctrines’ of American presidents remain an important driver of the outlook of the United States, these doctrines continue to play a significant role in shaping international order. Though they have veered from isolationist to interventionist to expansionist over the years, these doctrines in fact exhibit a remarkable continuity – even in the post 9/11 era. -
America's Longest
AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR I. Why did the U.S. send troops to Vietnam? A. Ho Chi Minh defeated the French in 1954 and Vietnam was split into North and South. B. North Vietnam was led by Communist Ho Chi Minh- South Vietnam was led by U.S. backed Diem. C. Many South Vietnamese opposed U.S. backed Diem. D. Vietcong were South Vietnamese guerrillas who were backed by the North and fought against the South’s government E. President John F. Kennedy believed in the Domino Theory, the idea that if one Southeast Asian country fell to communism, the rest would also, like a row of dominos. F. In 1961, he sent military advisors to help Diem fight the Vietcong G. 1963- Lyndon Johnson became President and sent more aid to South Vietnam H. 1964- Gulf of Tonkin Resolution- after a U.S. ship is attacked, Congress passed this which allowed President Johnson to take “all necessary measures” to prevent another attack I. Thus, the war escalated and by 1968 there were over 500,000 troops fighting in the Vietnam War. J. American soldiers faced many hardships fighting a “guerilla war” in jungle terrain, going on search and destroy missions. A Viet Cong prisoner awaits interrogation at a Special Forces detachment in Thuong Duc, Vietnam, 15 miles (25 km) west of Danang, January 1967 Troops of the 1st Air Cavalry Division check houses while patrolling an area 25 miles (40 km) north of Qui Nhon as part of Operation Thayer, October 1966. The mission was designed to clear out a mountain range where two battalions of North Vietnamese were believed to be preparing for an attack on an airstrip. -
Use of Force in Bloc Situations
IDEOLOGY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE THE USE OF FORCE IN BLOC SITUATIONS Ross R. Oglesby* My task is to examine the use of force in bloc situations and to discover, if possible, whether there are "rules of the game," or norms of international law, which govern such use. In analyzing the question, two incidents will be examined in particular-the United States use of force in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the Soviet use of force against Czechoslovakia in 1968. From a study of these two incidents, as well as others not presently under examination, it appears that a pattern is developing. It will be necessary in this context to employ the word "intervention" frequently; hence, it should be mentioned at the outset that the word "intervention" will be used to describe the phenomenon of international life in which a state sends military men and materiel across another state's boundaries.' This use of the word is not to imply that intervention of this nature is the only kind that exists or matters; rather, it implies that such intervention is the only kind congruent with the use of force in bloc situations. This type of intervention is not only the most trau- matic for the international system, but illustrates with the greatest lucid- ity and forcefulness what appears to be the development of a rule gov- erning the use of force in bloc situations. Since the Second World War, both the Soviet Union and the United States have engaged in intervention on a somewhat continual basis. -
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact: Indra Lusero, Assistant Director
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact: Indra Lusero, Assistant Director, 303-902-9402, [email protected] SCHOLAR ASSESSES COLIN POWELL'S LATEST REMARKS Powell is Second Joint Chiefs Chair to Urge Review of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Date: December 15, 2008 SANTA BARBARA, December 14, 2008 – General Colin Powell said this week that the nation “definitely should re-evaluate” the current ban on openly gay troops. “It’s been fifteen years and attitudes have changed,” he told CNN in an interview. Powell, who was Secretary of State under George Bush, was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1993 when “don’t ask, don’t tell” became law. The policy requires gay and lesbian troops to conceal their sexual identity and remain celibate. Dr. Nathaniel Frank, a historian and senior research fellow at the Palm Center, says that Powell’s remarks reflect a small but important change in the General’s public position. “In previous comments,” Frank said, “Powell called for reviewing ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ at the same time that he said he was not ready to advocate its elimination. This time is different: in the wake of Obama’s victory, repeal has a real chance, and Powell’s slightly stronger remarks—that we should, instead of could, reconsider the policy, add more to the momentum for change.” Frank’s forthcoming book, Unfriendly Fire: How the Gay Ban Undermines the Military and Weakens America, includes a chapter on Powell’s participation in the 1993 debates, and documents Powell’s central role in assuring the legislating of the ban. -
The French Strategy in Africa: France’S Role on the Continent & Its Implications for American Foreign Policy
The French Strategy in Africa: France’s Role on the Continent & its Implications for American Foreign Policy Matt Tiritilli TC 660H Plan II Honors Program The University of Texas at Austin 11 May 2017 ____________________________________________________ J. Paul Pope Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs Supervising Professor ____________________________________________________ Bobby R. Inman, Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.) Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs Second Reader Abstract In the post-World War II era, the nature of military interventions by traditional powers has changed dramatically due to changes in political priorities and the kinds of conflicts emerging in the world. Especially in the case of the French, national security interests and the decision-making process for engaging in foreign interventions has diverged significantly from the previous era and the modern American format. France has a long history of intervention on the African continent due in part to its colonial history, but also because of its modern economic and security interests there. The aim of this thesis is to articulate a framework for describing French strategy in the region and its implications for American foreign policy decisions. Contrary to the pattern of heavy-footprint, nation building interventions by the United States during this time period, the French format can instead be characterized by the rapid deployment of light forces in the attempt to successfully achieve immediate, but moderate objectives. French policy regarding Africa is based on the principles of strategic autonomy, the maintenance their status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and the ‘Europeanization’ of future initiatives. In order to achieve these objectives, France has pursued a foreign policy designed to allow flexibility and selectivity in choosing whether to intervene and to maintain the relative balance of power within their sphere of influence with itself as the regional stabilizer. -
Power Projection and Force Deployment Under Reagan
Chapman University Chapman University Digital Commons War and Society (MA) Theses Dissertations and Theses Fall 12-20-2019 The Ladle and the Knife: Power Projection and Force Deployment under Reagan Mathew Kawecki Chapman University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/war_and_society_theses Part of the Political History Commons Recommended Citation Kawecki, Mathew. The Ladle and the Knife: Power Projection and Force Deployment under Reagan. 2019. Chapman University, MA Thesis. Chapman University Digital Commons, https://doi.org/10.36837/ chapman.000095 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in War and Society (MA) Theses by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Ladle and the Knife: Power Projection and Force Deployment under Reagan A Thesis by Mathew D. Kawecki Chapman University Orange, CA Wilkinson College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in War and Society Studies December 2019 Committee in charge: Gregory Daddis, Ph.D., Chair Robert Slayton, Ph.D. Alexander Bay, Ph.D. The thesis ofMathew D. Kawecki is approved. Ph.D., Chair Eabert Slalton" Pir.D AlexanderBa_y. Ph.D September 2019 The Ladle and the Knife: Power Projection and Force Deployment under Reagan Copyright © 2019 by Mathew D. Kawecki III ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Greg Daddis, for his academic mentorship throughout the thesis writing process. -
US Foreign Policy Traditions and Cold War Interventions
FOREIGN POLICY TRADITIONS Alexandra Homolar AND University of US COLD WAR INTERVENTIONISM Warwick CONTENTS ¡ Background: § Research Focus § What is Foreign Policy Analysis? ¡ US Cold War Interventionism § US Military Interventions (overview) § US Cold War Doctrines § What Drives US Foreign Policy? ¡ Questions? Answers? RESEARCH FOCUS Speaking International Security § The Uncertainty Doctrine § Enemy Addiction Collaborative Projects § Benchmarking in Global Governance § Crisis Leadership in International Politics WHAT IS FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS? ¡ FPA is : ‘the study of the conduct and practice of relations between different actors, primarily states, in the international system’ ¡ Focus: State conduct and sources of decision rather than workings of the international system (1st & 2nd image/level of analysis not 3rd image/level of analysis) ¡ Key Concern: decision-making (processes, actors, contexts, influences, outcomes) ¡ Normative Position: improving FP decision-making to achieve better outcomes and more peaceful relations Alden & Aran 2012: Foreign Policy Analysis: New approaches US COLD WAR INTERVENTIONISM The World According to America? US COLD WAR INTERVENTIONISM Early Cold War (1946- 1953; Truman) IRAN 1946 Soviet troops told to leave north. YUGOSLAVIA 1946 Response to shoot-down of US plane. URUGUAY 1947 Bombers deployed as show of strength. GREECE 1947-49 U.S. directs extreme-right in civil war. GERMANY 1948 Atomic-capable bombers guard Berlin Airlift. CHINA 1948-49 Marines evacuate Americans before Communist victory. PHILIPPINES 1948-54 CIA directs war against Huk Rebellion. PUERTO RICO 1950 Independence rebellion crushed in Ponce. KOREA 1951-53(-?) US/So. Korea fights China/No. Korea. Stalemate; a-bomb threat (1950), against China (1953). US COLD WAR INTERVENTIONISM Cold War (1953 – 1960; Eisenhower) IRAN 1953 CIA overthrows democracy, installs Shah.