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Stateness and Democratic Stability

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Stateness and Democratic Stability STATENESS AND DEMOCRATIC STABILITY David Delfs Erbo Andersen STATENESS AND DEMOCRATIC STABILITY PhD Dissertation Politica © Forlaget Politica and the author 2017 ISBN: 978-87-7335-217-5 Cover: Svend Siune Print: Fællestrykkeriet, Aarhus University Layout: Annette Bruun Andersen Submitted November 9, 2016 The public defense takes place February 3, 2017 Published February 2017 Forlaget Politica c/o Department of Political Science Aarhus University Bartholins Allé 7 DK-8000 Aarhus C Denmark Table of Contents Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... 7 Chapter 1. Introduction .............................................................................................. 9 PART I: THEORY ..................................................................................................... 29 Chapter 2. Conceptual Distinctions of Stateness and Democratic Stability ............ 31 Chapter 3. The Role of Stateness for Democratic Stability ...................................... 55 Chapter 4. Developing Mechanisms ........................................................................ 83 PART II: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS .......................................................................... 115 Chapter 5. Stateness and Democratic Stability in the ‘Frontier Zone’ of Interwar Europe ...................................................................................................... 117 Chapter 6. Constructing a Dataset of Causal Process Observations ...................... 175 Chapter 7. Attributes of Stateness and Democratic Stability: A Statistical Appraisal ................................................................................................................. 199 Chapter 8. Stateness and the Interwar Democratic Breakdowns ......................... 229 Chapter 9. Stateness and the Cold War Democratic Breakdowns .........................255 Chapter 10. Stateness and the Post-Cold War Democratic Breakdowns ............... 277 Chapter 11. Discussion and Conclusion ................................................................. 298 Bibliography (incl. online appendix) ...................................................................... 315 Appendix I: Coding Rules and Ambiguities............................................................ 419 Appendix II: Additional Statistics for Chapter 7 .................................................... 431 Summary ................................................................................................................ 443 Dansk resumé ......................................................................................................... 447 5 Acknowledgements As a child, I studied world maps and country histories and read random en- cyclopedia articles. These exercises were certainly never intended to practice for any school test, let alone prepare myself for one day defending a PhD dis- sertation. Until the day I began studying at Aarhus University, my primary concerns in life were the well-being of my football team favorites of Odense Boldklub and Manchester United and, later in high school, my band’s next gig. But in the spring 2010, I wrote my bachelor thesis about state repression in Colombia. This not only connected well with my childhood’s rudimentary study of comparative politics but also kicked off an academic love affair with the state and democracy that has lasted ever since. However, interest and care, or outright love, are merely small parts of the engine that has brought me this far in academia. I am deeply thankful to my main supervisor Svend- Erik Skaaning, who, since he supervised my bachelor thesis, has been my mentor in doing research and teaching. He has grabbed the steering wheel when I needed guidance; he has shown me how to change gears when I needed to improve; and he has filled the engine with petrol when I needed motivation. Being a part of this department for the last three-four years has been a privilege. Many colleagues deserve my thanks for giving me constructive crit- icism when I presented parts of my dissertation or working papers. This also covers the small, seemingly innocent discussions and talks I have had in the hallways or at the coffee machine. All the inputs from the brilliant people at the department have expanded my views and corrected the choices that I made in doing research. In particular, I want to thank the awesome PhD group as well as members of the comparative politics section for delivering equal amounts of field-specific criticism and diverging perspectives from other research fields. For showing particular interest in my work, I want to thank Kim Sass Mikkelsen, Fenja Møller, Henrikas Bartusevicius, Matilde Thorsen, Michael Seeberg, Merete Seeberg, Jakob Tolstrup, Agnes Cornell, Karin Hilmer, and Jørgen Møller. I must give a special word of praise to Anne Mette Kjær, my secondary supervisor, whose expertise on African poli- tics brought me out of my European comfort zone while keeping me focused on the comparative lessons. In the last phase of writing the dissertation, An- nette Andersen managed to improve my English grammar and writing style immensely. Lasse Lykke Rørbæk and Suthan Krishnarajan have been the best officemates you could think of. Not only have they been my “partners- in-crime” since TA’ing comparative politics. They have also enriched my aca- demic thinking and social life immensely during the PhD – Lasse, by his ana- 7 lytical rigor and support of the Spurs, and Suthan, by his statistical fetishism and showing interest in the life of an old guy like me. By example, their pro- totypical Jutlandic personalities have drawn out the worst forms of phleg- matic behavior that persons from Funen tend to have. From outside the department, I want to thank Allan Toft Knudsen for co- authoring with me in my master-level assignment on stateness and democra- cy. In 2015, I was so lucky to visit Michael Bernhard at the University of Flor- ida for five months. This was a game-changer in my project. Michael’s in- credible wit, his openness and pleasant personality made the stay rewarding on all levels. A special thanks to Victor Olivieri, a PhD student there, who took care of me in all other aspects. For reading and commenting my work, I want to thank John Gerring, Daniel Ziblatt, Sheri Berman, and Cathie Jo Martin – and Victor Lapuente for inviting me to the Quality of Government Institute in Gothenburg as well. Finally, I want to thank my old friends from Assens, my high school friends and band members of [eKy], and my old university study group (aka. “The Drøbeltur Group”) for helping forget about my project when needed. I also want to thank my own and Gitte’s family for all their love and support. In particular, I want to thank my father and mother’s brother for nurturing my interest in history and politics and my mother and sister for balancing it all. My girlfriend Gitte and our daughter Katrine, without whom academia would be of no value to me, deserve the last words. Gitte, you have endured much from me but the last year was particularly demanding of you with the arrival of Katrine and the many hours that I spent at the department. Every working day seemed merely a struggle to get home to you. No matter the hour, I was always welcomed with your love. Despite complaining, all my concerns are put to rest by you. Aarhus, January 2017 David Andersen 8 Chapter 1. Introduction [S]cholars have barely begun to grapple with the various ways in which the state – or more accurately, dimensions of the state – might be considered as causes of democracy, as consequences of democracy, and/or, […] as constitutive of democracy (Munck 2011: 337-338) The intimate relationship between the state and democracy is a classic within political theory. The state is here a two-edged sword which can be the protec- tor as well as suppressor of political liberties (Holmes 1995). In comparative politics, this insight is at the heart of the fundamental contributions of Hun- tington (1968) and Skocpol (1979). Skocpol found the state to be a key insti- tutional player in the protection against social revolutions and later co-edited the volume Bringing the State Back In (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). However, democratization studies have not appreciated this call suffi- ciently, as the above quote from Munck indicates (see also Berman 2014). First, systematic large-n analyses of the state-democracy nexus are surpris- ingly scarce given their fundamental importance (for a few examples, see Bratton and Chang 2006; Møller and Skaaning 2011), and small-n studies of democratic destabilization, although more profound, often only implicitly connect the state with democratic stability leaving the reader to connect the dots (for a more general critique of the democratization literature, see Bermeo 2016). Second, state-democracy studies typically suffer from an ec- lectic or unidimensional view of the state even though it is elsewhere recog- nized as a multidimensional phenomenon (see Linz and Stepan 1996: Chs. 1- 2; Hendrix 2010; Saylor 2013; see also the Bertelsmann Transformation In- dex, BTI 2016).1 There is thus a need for systematic theorization and empiri- cal investigation of the state-democracy nexus that takes stock of its multiple dimensions and connect these with a basic theory of how the state relates to democracy. In this study, I seek to improve our knowledge of the state-democracy nexus by focusing on one side of it – that of the state. I thus ask whether
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