Naval Competition and Great Power Politics in the Mediterranean, 1904-1914
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"We Are Now a Mediterranean Power": Naval Competition and Great Power Politics in the Mediterranean, 1904-1914. Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Jon K. Hendrickson, M.A. Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2012 Dissertation Committee Jennifer Siegel, Advisor John F. Guilmartin Alan Beyerchen Copyright By Jon K. Hendrickson 2012 Abstract The geopolitical situation in the Mediterranean before the First World War has been generally ignored by historians. However, in the years before the War, the fact that the Mediterranean was shifting from British control to a wide open, anarchic state occupied the minds of many leaders in Austria-Hungary, Italy, France and Great Britain. This change was driven by three largely understudied events: the weakening of the British Mediterranean Fleet to provide more ships for the North Sea, Austria-Hungary's decision to build a navy capable of operating in the Mediterranean, and Italy's decision to seek naval security in the Triple Alliance after the Italo-Turkish War. These three factors radically altered the Mediterranean situation in the years leading up to the First World War, forcing Britain and France to seek accommodation with each other and France to begin rapidly building ships to defend both British and French interests. However, all of this activity has been largely obscured by the July Crisis of 1914 and the ensuing World War. Traditional history has looked backward from these events, and, in so doing, ignored the turbulent seas building in the Mediterranean. Conversely, this dissertation seeks to understand these events as they unfolded, to understand how policymakers understood the changing Mediterranean world. Ultimately, this dissertation seeks to redress the imbalance between historians, who have viewed the history of the ii Mediterranean in the early 20th century as a largely stable one, and policymakers in the Great Powers, who viewed the Mediterranean as a highly unstable region, and struggled to come to terms with that instability. iii Acknowledgements I would like to thank Dr Jennifer Siegel, Dr. John Guilmartin, and Dr Alan Beyerchen for their assistance and advice in producing this work. Without their help, this project would have never succeeded. I would also like to thank the archivists in London, Paris, Vienna and Rome for their assistance in helping a young, none-too- bright historian find the documents that he needed. Finally, I would like to thank the Tyng Fund, the Bradley Foundation, the Mershon Center and The Ohio State University for financial assistance. iv Vita 2000............................................................................................The Saint Paul's School 2004...............................................................................B.A. History, Williams College 2008................................................................M.A. History, The Ohio State University Fields of Study Major Field: History v Table of Contents Abstract..........................................................................................................................ii Acknowledgements......................................................................................................iii Vita................................................................................................................................iv List of Figures...............................................................................................................vi List of Tables...............................................................................................................vii Introduction....................................................................................................................1 Chapter 1: The Mediterranean Equilibrium.................................................................22 Chapter 2: The Calm Before the Storm.......................................................................60 Chapter 3: The Austro-Italian War Scare..................................................................101 Chapter 4: The Italo-Turkish War and its Consequences..........................................154 Chapter 5: Britain's Mediterranean Crisis..................................................................197 Chapter 6:The Austro-Italian Combination...............................................................242 Chapter 7: The French 19e Corps and Mediterranean Control:.................................282 Conclusion.................................................................................................................323 Appendix A: Gun Data Tables...................................................................................337 Bibliography..............................................................................................................339 vi List of Figures Figure 1: Mediterranean Naval Budgets, 1904-1914.....................................................6 Figure 2: Total Displacement Tonnage, Mediterranean Fleets, 1904..........................70 Figure 3: Total Broadside Throw Weights of Mediterranean Fleets, 1904.................71 Figure 4: Adriatic Fleet Total Displacement, 1906-1911..........................................117 Figure 5: Adriatic Fleets Total Broadside Throw Weight, 1906-1911......................118 Figure 6: Mediterranean Navies: Total Displacement, 1 June, 1912.........................215 Figure 7: Projected Total Tonnage of Mediterranean Combinations........................328 Figure 8: Projected Broadside Throw Weights of Mediterranean Combinations......329 vii List of Charts Chart 1: Mediterranean Naval Budgets, 1904-1914......................................................6 Chart 2: Adriatic Fleet Total Displacement, 1906-1911............................................117 Chart 3: Adriatic Fleets Total Broadside Throw Weight, 1906-1911.......................118 Chart 4: Projected Total Tonnage of Mediterranean Combinations..........................329 Chart 5: Projected Broadside Throw Weights of Mediterranean Combinations.......330 Chart 6: Austro-Hungarian Gun Data........................................................................337 Chart 7: Italian Gun Data...........................................................................................338 Chart 8: French Gun Data..........................................................................................338 viii Introduction The Mediterranean Sea has long been one of the world's crossroads. A place where climatic zones, cultures and trade routes meet, it has played a major role in the history of numerous civilizations. Its relatively calm seas and numerous ports made it a place for humanity to begin its efforts to go down to the sea in ships. A hotbed for shipping, the fortunes of people and nations were won and lost along the shores of the Narrow Sea. For the majority of history, the Mediterranean was anarchic, without a single power controlling passage through the region and guaranteeing the safety of merchant traffic on the Mediterranean. However, in 1904, the Mediterranean had enjoyed nearly a century under the virtual control of Great Britain, with the free movement of ships and general peace enforced by the power of the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy had won control of the Mediterranean from a series of rivals in a century of war, culminating with the destruction of the Franco-Spanish squadrons at Trafalgar that ended Imperial France's bid to topple Great Britain on the seas. However, Great Britain's dominance of the Mediterranean was, by 1904, starting to unravel. It would not have been obvious at the time, since the Royal Navy seemed as indomitable as ever. However, the slow, almost unnoticed rise of Austria-Hungary from the status of a coastal defense power, content to control the waters along it's shoreline, to a Mediterranean-wide power, combined with the strain of protecting British home waters from the German Navy, threatened to break the Royal Navy's hold on the Mediterranean. The collapse of British 1 power in the Mediterranean, ultimately averted by the unexpected outbreak of World War I, combined with the rise of the Austrians to a major regional power, would have ushered in a new Mediterranean equilibrium, a new order that was well on its way to becoming established by 1912. Britain gained dominance in the Mediterranean during the Age of Sail. Using wind powered ships made of wood armed with smoothbore cannon, the Royal Navy defeated first the Spanish and then the French, the Mediterranean's traditional powers. In these wars, the British gained control of numerous, well fortified bases across the Mediterranean. The most significant of these, Gibraltar, Malta and Alexandria, gave Britain a chain of fortified, mutually supporting naval facilities that allowed them to station and support ships permanently in the Mediterranean, and to base them close to any sort of crisis zone that might develop. Not only did Great Britain establish control over the Mediterranean, no small feat in itself, but the British managed to maintain that control in a period of immense technological change. By the 1850s, the products of the Industrial Revolution had come to the navies of the world. Steam engines replaced sails. Steel became cheap enough to serve as a replacement for wood. Improved metallurgy allowed for rifled guns that could be larger, longer and withstand