DOCSLIB.ORG

The Provision of Naval Defense in the Early American Republic a Comparison of the U.S

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Provision of Naval Defense in the Early American Republic a Comparison of the U.S SUBSCRIBE NOW AND RECEIVE CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN* FREE! “The Independent Review does not accept “The Independent Review is pronouncements of government officials nor the excellent.” conventional wisdom at face value.” —GARY BECKER, Noble Laureate —JOHN R. MACARTHUR, Publisher, Harper’s in Economic Sciences Subscribe to The Independent Review and receive a free book of your choice* such as the 25th Anniversary Edition of Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government, by Founding Editor Robert Higgs. This quarterly journal, guided by co-editors Christopher J. Coyne, and Michael C. Munger, and Robert M. Whaples offers leading-edge insights on today’s most critical issues in economics, healthcare, education, law, history, political science, philosophy, and sociology. Thought-provoking and educational, The Independent Review is blazing the way toward informed debate! Student? Educator? Journalist? Business or civic leader? Engaged citizen? This journal is for YOU! *Order today for more FREE book options Perfect for students or anyone on the go! The Independent Review is available on mobile devices or tablets: iOS devices, Amazon Kindle Fire, or Android through Magzter. INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE, 100 SWAN WAY, OAKLAND, CA 94621 • 800-927-8733 • [email protected] PROMO CODE IRA1703 The Provision of Naval Defense in the Early American Republic A Comparison of the U.S. Navy and Privateers, 1789–1815 F NICHOLAS J. ROSS he War of 1812 began badly for British ocean-going commerce. Although the United States had a pitifully small navy, it did have a large merchant T marine fleet keen to make a profit. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, the London Times lamented, “American merchant seamen were almost to a man con- verted into privateersmen and the whole of our West India trade either has or will in consequence sustain proportionate loss” (Letters from New York State 1812). Although the wars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries typically evoke images of large public armies and navies created to wage warfare for the state’s political goals, privateers also played an important role. By licensing ships of the merchant marine to legally plunder from other nations’ ships, governments could reduce their enemies’ trade at very little direct cost to themselves and have a viable alternative to the public provision of naval defense. In providing naval defense during the early republic, the U.S. government faced a trade-off between a relatively versatile navy at high direct cost and privateers at little direct cost. Given the incentives facing merchants in the shipping industry, however, Nicholas J. Ross is a graduate student at George Mason University. The Independent Review, v. 16, n. 3, Winter 2012, ISSN 1086–1653, Copyright © 2011, pp. 417–433. 417 418 F NICHOLAS J. ROSS privateers were relatively inflexible. In this article, I analyze the three major naval conflicts during the early republic and answer the question: Why did the United States rely heavily on public provision of naval defense during the Barbary Pirate Wars and the Quasi-War with France but rely more heavily on private provision of naval defense during the War of 1812? Analytical Framework Historian Wade Dudley succinctly summarizes the role of sea power as “protect[ing] a nation’s assets and extend[ing] national policy” (2003, 23). Naval forces could serve specifically by weakening the enemy’s economy by interrupting its seaborne com- merce and by transporting land forces to invade the enemy’s territories. Naval forces could also serve to counter the enemy’s attempts to do the same. Table 1 summarizes the four major missions in naval warfare and the ability of public and private navies to execute these missions. The Royal Navy, generally considered the world’s best for much of the eigh- teenth and nineteenth centuries and a benchmark against which other navies can be evaluated, abounds with examples of a public navy that executed all four missions. Public navies could facilitate invasion by transporting armies or by escorting invasion armies. The Royal Navy’s transportation of land forces to raid the Chesapeake Bay area, to assault New Orleans in 1814, and to support the war against Napoleon on the Iberian Peninsula are examples of naval forces facilitating invasions. Public navies also had the capability to reduce coastal fortifications to allow for the invasion of cities. The Royal Navy’s assault on Copenhagen in 1801 to destroy the Danish fleet provides a successful example of this type of mission. The Royal Navy also succeeded in preventing invasion of Great Britain by engaging the French and its allies in battles to destroy their navies, such as Trafalgar in 1805, and by maintaining a fleet in the English Channel to deter invasions. The Royal Navy attempted to weaken its enemies’ commerce through naval blockades and capture of enemy merchant vessels. It could also protect Great Britain’s commerce by escorting merchant vessels in a system of convoys. Table 1 Capabilities of Public and Private Navies Capability Public Navy Private Navy Facilitate invasion of enemy X Defend against invasion X Protect own nation’s commerce X Weaken enemy’s commerce X X THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW THE PROVISION OF NAVAL DEFENSE IN EARLY U.S. HISTORY F 419 Privateers, in contrast, focused almost exclusively on raiding an enemy’s com- merce. They supported their own country’s commerce by bringing in captured goods for sale. However, privateers generally did not engage in ship-to-ship combat to gain control of the seas or to invade enemy territory. To understand why they were much more limited in their operations than were public navies, one needs to examine how the history of privateering influenced their incentives. Privateering had its origins at least as far back as the Middle Ages and appears to have begun with the merchants of Italian city-states. In the absence of an interna- tional governing body, merchants could seek a “letter of marque and reprisal” from their government that allowed them to steal from another party for failure to pay debt, for theft of property, or for similar grievances (Garitee 1977, 3–4; Starkey 1990, 20–21). The tradition of the government’s paying merchant ships for service as naval vessels during the Middle Ages and early-modern period may be another origin of the activity. However, the practice of hiring merchant ships to serve as warships had died out in the 1660s as “purpose-built warships” made the use of merchant ships in these duties impracticable (Starkey 1990, 21). Aside from a few exceptions, such as the British government’s payment of bounties for the capture of enemy warships (Starkey 1990, 253) or merchants’ payment for a ship to cruise the waters in the vicinity of its port to guard against enemy privateers (Swanson 1991, 51), privateers in the eigh- teenth and early nineteenth centuries received no direct financial support from the government. These historical examples of private warships in noncommerce raiding roles provoke a counterfactual question: Why did the federal government not provide financial support to privateers to engage in the first three missions of naval defense listed in table 1? Indeed, during the War of 1812, the U.S. Congress provided bounties for prisoners captured by privateers engaged in commerce raiding (Garitee 1977, 168). Perhaps the federal government could have reallocated resources from the U.S. Navy to fund an extensive system of bounties to give privateers an incentive to engage in missions other than commerce raiding. Economist Alexander Tabarrok provides an answer to this question by identifying privateering as a type of piece-rate system and arguing that navies, like many business firms, can capture benefits by employing bureaucratic production instead of piece- rate production when output is difficult to measure (2007, 574–75). Although for commerce-raiding missions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries output could be readily measured in terms of captured ships and men, the complexity of the other three missions in table 1 made it very difficult to establish the bounty needed to give privateers an incentive to accomplish the state’s objectives. Tabarrok contends that public navies had an advantage over privateers in this regard because “governments could order navy personnel to do what they wanted them to do without having to change piece rates on the fly” (575). For the specific case of the U.S. Navy during the early republic, multiple historical examples of inefficiencies do exist. Nevertheless, the ultimate success of the U.S. Navy in accomplishing a variety of difficult tasks in the VOLUME 16, NUMBER 3, WINTER 2012 420 F NICHOLAS J. ROSS Barbary Pirate Wars and the Quasi-War with France as well as decisive victories on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain during the War of 1812, tend to support Tabarrok’s view that bureaucratic production of naval defense was indeed a viable alternative to giving privateers an incentive through government piece-rate bounties. The lack of direct financial support meant that privateers depended on capturing enemy vessels in order to gain revenue. Therefore, privateers provided naval defense only in the form of commerce raiding because this mission was the only form of naval defense from which they could obtain revenue. To understand the extent to which merchants would invest in privateering, one needs to examine their legal environment and the major factors that influenced the profitability of privateering. By the time of the early republic, privateering relied on a developed legal system provided by the federal government. American merchants who wished to engage in privateering needed to obtain a letter of marque and reprisal from the federal govern- ment and to post bonds that the privateer’s owners would forfeit if the privateer broke the law (Petrie 1999, 9–10; Tabarrok 2007, 570).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • War at Sea: Nineteenth-Century Laws for Twenty-First
    International Review of the Red Cross (2016), 98 (2), 419–447. War and security at sea doi:10.1017/S1816383117000418 War at sea: Nineteenth-century laws for twenty-first- century wars? Steven Haines* Steven Haines is Professor of Public International Law at the University of Greenwich and a retired British naval commander. He chaired the Editorial Board of the UK’s official Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2004) and co-authored its chapter on “Maritime Warfare”. He had previously written the Royal Navy’s maritime strategic doctrine (British Maritime Doctrine, 1999). Abstract While most law on the conduct of hostilities has been heavily scrutinized in recent years, the law dealing with armed conflict at sea has been largely ignored. This is not surprising. There have been few naval conflicts since 1945, and those that have occurred have been limited in scale; none has involved combat between major maritime powers. Nevertheless, navies have tripled in number since then, and today there are growing tensions between significant naval powers. There is a risk of conflict at sea. Conditions have changed since 1945, but the law has not developed in that time. Elements of it, especially that regulating economic warfare at sea, seem outdated and it is not clear that the law is well placed to regulate so- called “hybrid” warfare at sea. It seems timely to review the law, to confirm that which is appropriate and to develop that which is not. Perhaps a new edition of the San Remo Manual would be timely. Keywords: naval warfare, conduct of hostilities at sea, sea control, economic warfare, power projection, maritime hybrid warfare, San Remo Manual.
    [Show full text]
  • The USS Essex Was an American Naval Frigate Launched in 1799 and Served in the Quasi- War with France and the Barbary Wars
    The USS Essex during the War of 1812 The USS Essex was an American naval frigate launched in 1799 and served in the Quasi- War with France and the Barbary Wars. But it was in the War of 1812 where the Essex under the command of Captain David Porter achieved legendary status as a raider wreaking havoc on British whaling ships. The wooden hull ship was built in Salem, Massachusetts, by Enos Briggs, following a design by William Hackett, at a cost of $139, 362. The ship was 138ft 7 in length by 37 ft, 3½ in width with a displacement of 850 tons. The fully-rigged ship was capable of speeds of 12 knots and carried forty 32 pound carronades with a crew, which varied up to over 150 men and boys. Launched on 30 September 1799, the Essex was presented to the fledgling Unites States Navy and placed under the command of Captain Edward Preble. Joining the Congress at sea to provide a convoy for merchant ships, the Essex became the first American war ship to cross the equator and sailed around the Cape of Good Hope in both March and August 1800. After the initial voyage, Captain William Bainbridge assumed command in 1801, sailing to the Mediterranean to provide protection for American shipping against the Barbary pirates. For the next five years the Essex patrolled the Mediterranean until 1806 when hostilities between the Barbary States ceased. The American Navy was small when the war broke out—seven frigates, nine other crafts suited for sea duty (brigs, sloops, and corvettes), and some 200 gunboats.
    [Show full text]
  • Technology Strategy Integration
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2012-06 Technology Strategy Integration Carter, Keith L. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/7317 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY INTEGRATION by Keith L. Carter June 2012 Thesis Advisor: John Arquilla Second Reader: Doowan Lee Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2012 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Technology Strategy Integration 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 6. AUTHOR(S) Keith L. Carter 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943–5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10.
    [Show full text]
  • Mission: History Studiorum Historiam Praemium Est
    N a v a l O r d e r o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s – S a n F r a n c i s c o C o m m a n d e r y Mission: History Studiorum Historiam Praemium Est Volume 2, Number 1 HHHHHH 3 January 2000 1911: Naval Aviation is Born on San Francisco Bay; Aeroplane Lands on, Takes Off from Pennsylvania Feat Im presses Congress – $25,000 Voted to Develop Navy Aeroplane Program SAN FRANCISCO, Jan. 18, 1911-- Eugene Ely, an aviator in the employ of Glenn H. Curtiss, maker of aeroplanes, today landed a flying machine upon a makeshift platform built on USS Penn- sylvania, which was riding at anchor on San Francisco Bay. After discussing his feat with offi- cials and naval officers on board the armored cruiser, Ely climbed on his aeroplane and calmly took off from the ship, landing safely on Crissy Field at THE LANDING SYSTEM HAD IT ALL. The arresting cables were attached to 50-pound sandbags the Army’s Presidio of San Francisco. which were held off the deck by two longitudinal rails. The C urtiss D-IV airplane had a tailhook — i actually several tailhooks — to snag the cables. At the forward end of the “flight deck,” a canvas Ely’s feat might be called the first barrier was stretched to protect the ship’s superstructure in case the airplane didn’t stop. carrier operation. And though the previ- ous November he took off from a tem- 1944: Japs Splash Pappy – Marine Ace, Wingman porary platform built on the bow of the cruiser USS Birmingham, then in Shot Down over Slot While Leading Raid on Rabaul Hampton Roads, Va., the San Francisco When Marine Corps fighter squad- months later.
    [Show full text]
  • The North African Convoy Run the Daybook Volume 6 Issue 1 Fall1999 in This Issue
    I . I\ • I eDaybook , Volume 6 Issue 1 Fall 1999 • Breaching the Westwall: The North African Convoy Run The Daybook Volume 6 Issue 1 Fall1999 In This Issue ... Museum Events for the Year 2000, Page 3 HTTP://WWW.HRNM.NAVY.MIL, Page 4 Breaching the W estwall: The North Africa Convoy Run, Page 6 Features The Director's Column- L o < "l History. Wo r I J Even t s. On to the New Year .............................. 2 About The Daybook HRNM Staff The Daybook is an authorized publication ofthe Hampton Director Book Reviews .................................... 10 Roads Naval Museum (HRNM). Its contents do not Becky Poulliot necessarily reflect the official view of the U.S. Government, The USS Essex and the Birth of the the Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Curator American Navy by Frances Diane Robotti Marine Corps and do not imply endorsement thereof. Book Joe Judge reviews are solely the opinion of the reviewer. Education Specialist & James Vescovi. Reviewed by Joe The HRNM is operated and funded by Commander Bob Matteson Mosier Navy Region Mid-Atlantic. The museum is dedicated to the study of 225 years of naval history in the Hampton Exhibits Specialist Roads region. The museum is open daily from 10 a.m. to Marta Nelson Better Than Good: A Black Sailor's War 5 p.m. Admission is free. The Dayboo/(s purpose is to Museum Tech./Librarian by Adolph W. Newton with Winston educate and inform readers on historical topics and museum Ofelia Elbo related events . It is written by the staff and volunteers of Eldridge.
    [Show full text]
  • A British Perspective on the War of 1812 by Andrew Lambert
    A British Perspective on the War of 1812 by Andrew Lambert The War of 1812 has been referred to as a victorious “Second A decade of American complaints and economic restrictions action. Finally, on January 14th 1815 the American flagship, the rights and impressment. By accepting these terms the Americans War for Independence,” and used to define Canadian identity, only served to convince the British that Jefferson and Madison big 44 gun frigate USS President commanded by Stephen Decatur, acknowledged the complete failure of the war to achieve any of but the British only remember 1812 as the year Napoleon were pro-French, and violently anti-British. Consequently, was hunted down and defeated off Sandy Hook by HMS their strategic or political aims. Once the treaty had been marched to Moscow. This is not surprising. In British eyes, when America finally declared war, she had very few friends Endymion. The American flagship became signed, on Christmas Eve 1814, the the conflict with America was an annoying sideshow. The in Britain. Many remembered the War of Independence, some HMS President, a name that still graces the list British returned the focus to Europe. Americans had stabbed them in the back while they, the had lost fathers or brothers in the fighting; others were the of Her Majesty’s Fleet. The war at sea had British, were busy fighting a total war against the French sons of Loyalists driven from their homes. turned against America, the U.S. Navy had The wisdom of their decision soon Empire, directed by their most inveterate enemy.
    [Show full text]
  • International Law and Naval Operations
    JIJI International Law and Naval Operations James H. Doyle, Jr. N THE OVER TWO HUNDRED YEARS from American commerce raiding I in the Revolutionary War through two World Wars, the Korean and Vietnam wars, and a host of crises along the way, to the Persian Gulf conflict, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, there has been a continuous evolution in the international law that governs naval operations. Equally changed has been the role of naval officers in applying oceans law and the rules of naval warfare in carrying out the mission of the command. This paper explores that evolution and the challenges that commanders and their operational lawyers will face in the 21st century. The Early Years and Global Wars Naval operations have been governed by international law since the early days of the Republic. Soon after the Continental Congress authorized fitting out armed vessels to disrupt British trade and reinforcement, the Colonies established Admiralty and Maritime courts to adjudicate prizes.1 American captains of warships and privateers were admonished to "respect the rights of neutrality" and "not to commit any such Violation of the Laws of Nations."z The first Navy Regulations enjoined a commanding officer to protect and defend his convoy in peace and war.3 In the War of 1812, frigate captains International Law and Naval Operations employed the traditional ruse de guerre in boarding merchant ships to suppress trade licensed by the enemy.4 President Lincoln's blockade of Confederate ports satisfied the criterion of effectiveness (ingress
    [Show full text]
  • Black Sailors During the War of 1812 Lauren Mccormack, 2005 Revised by Kate Monea and Carl Herzog, 2020
    Black Sailors During the War of 1812 Lauren McCormack, 2005 Revised by Kate Monea and Carl Herzog, 2020 A publication of the USS Constitution Museum, Boston © 2020 USS Constitution Museum | usscm.org Black Sailors During the War of 1812 Lauren McCormack, 2005 Revised by Kate Monea and Carl Herzog, 2020 CONTENTS Introduction .............................................................1 Free Blacks in the Post-Revolutionary American North ........................2 Free Blacks in Boston, Massachusetts ........................................5 Black Participation in the Maritime Trade ....................................7 Life at Sea for Black Sailors in the early United States Navy ....................10 Black Sailors on USS Constitution ..........................................17 A publication of the USS Constitution Museum, Boston © 2020 USS Constitution Museum | usscm.org Introduction At the beginning of the nineteenth century, free black men from the northeastern United States, struggling to make their way in a highly discriminatory American society, went to sea in the merchant marine and the U.S. Navy, including aboard USS Constitution. By no means did shipboard life completely extract them from the prejudices of a white-dominated culture, but it often provided them with better opportunities than they had on land. Like their fellow white sailors, black seamen in the Early Republic could count on stable pay with the benefit of room and board. For many, sea service and its pay provided a path to a better life ashore. Because race was not specifically noted in U.S. Navy personnel records at the time, much remains unknown about these men. However, a survey of the status of life for free blacks on shore sheds light on why some may have found seafaring an attractive opportunity.
    [Show full text]
  • The War of 1812 Researching a Post-Revolutionary War Ancestor Debra Dudek, Bolingbrook, IL 60440 [email protected] © Debra M
    The War of 1812 Researching a Post-Revolutionary War Ancestor Debra Dudek, Bolingbrook, IL 60440 [email protected] www.debradudek.com © Debra M. Dudek, 2017-2020 – Not to be copied without permission Did They Serve? Analyze Birth Year of Male Ancestors 1726-1767 1762-1799 1811-1848 Revolutionary War War of 1812 Civil War (1775-1783) (1812-1815) (1861-1865) ‘Old War’ Veteran? Possible Service & Pension Records 1832 1836-1839 1835-1858 Blackhawk War Cherokee Seminole Wars Disturbances Black Hole of Records 1850-1900 1810-1877 1780-1833 • Census (1850 – onward) • Census (1810 – 1870) • Census (1790-1830) • Wills and Probate • • Wills and Probate Probate • Land and Legal • Land and Legal • Land and Legal • Military Service • Military Service (?) • Military Service (?) • Military Pension • Land Bounty • DAR Compiled Information • DAR Descendant Chart • Copy of Family Bible Records Where did our War of 1812 Ancestors Serve? . Near Canadian Border (1812-1815) . On Land - Michigan, Ohio, New York, Maine . Great Lakes, Lake Champaign, St. Lawrence Seaway . Creek War (1813-1814) . On Land – Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Florida (Pensacola) . Fighting later moved to New Orleans (1814-1815) . East Coast (1814-1815) . Blockade of Eastern Ports . Bombardment of Fort McHenry (1814) . Invasion of Maryland and Virginia . Burning of Washington D.C. (1814) . Northwest Territories (1812-1814) . On Land – Upper Peninsula of Michigan, Illinois, and Indiana . Evacuation of Fort Dearborn (Chicago) . Naval Battles on the Great Lakes . Sacket's Harbor (New York) 1812 & 1813 . Battle of Lake Erie (Put-In-Bay, Ohio) 1813 . Battle of Lake Champlain (New York) 1814 . Naval Battles in Harbor . USS Chesapeake vs. HMS Shannon (Boston Harbor) 1813 .
    [Show full text]
  • How Did the Military and Navy Based in Nova Scotia Participate in the War of 1812 and What Was the Battle Between HMS Shannon and USS Chesapeake?​
    Nova Scotia Museum HMS Shannon and USS Chesapeake How did the military and navy based in Nova Scotia participate in the War of 1812 and what was the battle between HMS Shannon and USS Chesapeake?​ Credit: ''HMS Shannon leading her prize, the American Frigate Chesapeake into Halifax Harbour, on the 6th June 1813'', by J.G. Schetly, Documentary Art Collection NSARM accession no. 1979-147 142.4 (tel:1979-147 142.4) / negative no.: N-2301 CN-1139 During the previous war with the United States, the War of American Independence, Nova Scotian towns had been raided and looted. This would not be the case during the War of 1812. In the years between the two conflicts, the colony had matured and with the arrival of Sir John Coape Sherbrooke as the new Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia in 1811, Nova Scotia was better equipped to defend itself and take the war to the enemy. After many recent victories in the Napoleonic Wars, the Royal Navy had expected to easily defeat the smaller and less tested American Navy. Initially, this assumption was proven false. The American Navy had newer, faster, and more heavily armed ships compared to the relatively few British vessels in North America, resulting in the Americans winning several single-ship naval battles during the first year of the war. The capture of USS Chesapeake by HMS Shannon in the second year marked a turning point for the Royal Navy. On June 1, 1813, Halifax-based HMS Shannon challenged newly refitted USS Chesapeake to a battle off Boston Harbour.
    [Show full text]
  • The Northern Mariner, XXIV, 1: Book Reviews
    BOOK REVIEWS J.P. Andrieux. The White Fleet. A History meet a number of scholarly standards, such of the Portuguese Hand Liners. St. John’s, as references, and includes little information NL: Flanker Press, www.flankerpress.com, beyond what is well-established knowledge 2013. xiv+361 pp., illustrations, among fisheries historians, it does a good bibliography, index. CDN $24.00, paper: job in preparing the stage for the second and ISBN 978-1-77117-236-3. main part of the book–the photographs. The 200 remaining pages are filled with For anybody interested in fisheries history, hundreds of black-and-white photographs it is obvious that the term “White Fleet” that provide an amazing insight into the refers not only to the fleet of U.S. Navy everyday life of the Portuguese dory- battleships that sailed around the globe fishery, the life and work onboard the dory- (1907-1909), but also to the Portuguese schooners, the ships seeking shelter in fishing vessels that worked the Grand Banks Newfoundland harbours, the interaction of with hand-lines up until the 1970s. While the dory-fishermen with local residents, the this “White Fleet” is mentioned in nearly strike of the dory-fishers in 1974, and a every historical analysis of the fisheries of number of other topics. the Northwest Atlantic, a comprehensive These briefly annotated historical analysis of the Portuguese distant- photographs have been drawn from various water fishing activities with hand-lines is sources, including a substantial number still missing. Although the title of from private collections that have never Andrieux’s book suggests an attempt to before been published.
    [Show full text]
  • Thomas Jefferson, Congress, and the Gunboat Debate, 1802
    IN SEARCH OF A MORE REPUBLICAN NAVAL DEFENSE: THOMAS JEFFERSON, CONGRESS, AND THE GUNBOAT DEBATE, 1802-1810 A Thesis Presented to The Faculty and Department of History Liberty University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in History By Ethan Zook December, 2019 1 Acknowledgements I was introduced to Thomas Jefferson in 2003, the two hundredth anniversary of the Lewis and Clark expedition. I was a member of a high school group which traced the route of the Corps of Discovery across the United States; we read Jefferson’s papers and considered themes like empire building and republicanism. That summer was my first encounter with his thought, and I was hooked. I’m grateful to Myron Blosser and Elwood Yoder, my high school teachers from Eastern Mennonite High School, who started my quest to better understand Jefferson. I’m also thankful for the assistance of scholars who graciously provided materials and suggestions. Craig L. Symonds, author of Navalists and Antinavalists, kindly (and completely unexpectedly) responded to my “out of the blue” email with encouragement and suggestions. Gene A. Smith assisted my search for a copy of his book For the Purposes of Defense. Christopher R. Sabick, Archaeological Director at the Lake Champlain Maritime Museum, provided a copy of Eric Emery’s archeological survey of the gunboat USS Allen. I’m especially grateful to my thesis advisors Troy L. Kickler and Carey M. Roberts who guided me through the research and writing process with extraordinary patience, and to David J. White who provided thoughtful suggestions for the later drafts.
    [Show full text]