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Chronological Table 1895 25 June Salisbury's third administration 29 December Jameson raid 1896 3 January Kaiser's telegram to Kruger 1898 17 January Salisbury's unsuccessful overture to Russia for co-operation in China 25 March Cabinet decides to lease Wei-hai-wei from China 29 March Chamberlain's bid for Anglo-German al- liance 10 April Reichstag ratifies First Naval Law 4 May Salisbury's 'dying nations' speech 13 May Chamberlain's bid for friendship of U.S.A. and Germany (Birmingham speech) 14 June Anglo-French convention over West Africa 30 August Anglo-German agreement over Portuguese colonies 2 September Battle of Omdurman 18 September- December Anglo-French crisis over Fashoda 1899 21 March Anglo-French convention over Central Af­ rica: France excluded from Valley of Nile 18 May- 29 June First Hague Peace Conference 12 October Boer War begins 14 November Anglo-German agreement over Samoa 30 November Chamberlain proposes Triple Alliance (Leicester speech) 10-15 December 'Black Week' in Boer War I goo January Bundesrath affair 27-28 February Formation of London Representation Com­ mittee 17 May Relief of Mafeking CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 259 13 June- 14 August Boxer rising in China 14 June Second German Naval Law 16 October Anglo-German agreement over China (Yangtze) November Salisbury relinquishes Foreign Office to Lansdowne 1901 22 January Death of Victoria; accession of Edward VII 12 March Lansdowne's draft alliance for German co­ operation in Far East 15 March Bulow denies China agreement's application to Manchuria March-May Anglo-German discussions continue 29 May Salisbury's objections to a German alliance 25 October Chamberlain's Edinburgh speech defending British policy in South Africa 16 December U.S. Senate approves Hay - Pauncefote Treaty with Britain 19 December Lansdowne again approaches Germany un- successfully 1902 30 January Anglo-Japanese Treaty 31 May Peace of Vereeniging in South Africa 28 June Triple Alliance renewed by Germany, Austria - Hungary and Italy II July Salisbury retires, succeeded by Balfour 9 August Fourth Colonial Conference December Venezuelan crisis 18 December First meeting of Committee of Imperial Defence 1903 1-4 May Edward VII's state visit to Paris 15 May Lansdowne warns Russia ofT Persian Gulf 6-9July Visit of Loubet and Delcasse to London 2 October Murzsteg programme (Russo-Austrian) for Macedonian reforms 190 4 8 February Outbreak of Russo-Japanese War 8 April Anglo-French Entente 7 September Anglo-Tibetan Treaty signed at Lhasa 21 October Sir John Fisher becomes First Sea Lord 21 October Dogger Bank incident 12 December Redistribution of British fleet 260 BRITAIN & ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 190 5 2 January Fall of Port Arthur to Japanese 22 January Outbreak of revolution in Russia 31 March German Emperor visits Tangier 27 May Destruction of Russian fleet at Tsushima 6 June Delcasse resigns 24 July German and Russian emperors sign agree­ ment at Bjorko 12 August Anglo-J apanese alliance renewed 5 September Treaty of Portsmouth ends Russo-Japanese War 4 December Conservative Cabinet resigns I I December Campbell-Bannerman forms Liberal admin- istration 15 December Anglo-French staff talks begin 1906 January General Election; Liberal victory IO January Grey authorises General Staff conversations 16 January Algeciras Conference opens IO February Dreadnought launched 7 April Algeciras Act signed 5 June German Third Naval Law (Novelle 1906) ratified 15 August Edward VII, accompanied by Hardinge, meets William II at Cronberg 190 7 15 June- 18 October Second Hague Peace Conference 3 1 August Anglo-Russian convention 27 November C.I.D. subcommittee to reconsider question of invasion 1908 16 February William II writes to Lord Tweedmouth about Britain and German navy 5 April Asquith becomes Prime Minister 22 April Campbell-Bannerman dies 23 April Baltic (Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Russia) and North Sea (Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, France, the Nether­ lands and Sweden) Conventions 12 June Edward VII and Nicholas II meet at Reval 14 June Fourth German Naval Law (Novelle 1908) ratified Young Turk Revolution CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 261 I I August Edward VII and Hardinge meet William 11 at Friedrichshof 16 September Buchlau agreement between Isvolski and Aehrenthal 25 September Casablanca affair between Germany and France 6 October Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzo­ govina 28 October Daily Telegraph affair (publication of in­ discreet remarks by Emperor William) 3 December C.I.D. subcommittee on military needs of Empire as influenced by Continent 4 December London Naval Conference 190 9 8 February Franco-German agreement over Morocco February- March Cabinet discussions on naval estimates 12 March Commons debate on shipbuilding pro­ gramme 22 March German ultimatum to Russia over Austrian annexations 29 April Finance Bill introduced in Commons 14 July Bethmann Hollweg replaces Bulow 30 July Lloyd George's Limehouse speech 19 August Imperial Conference on Defence August- November Anglo-German negotiations 30 November Lords reject budget November- December Gwinner - Cassel negotiations over Bagh­ dad Railway I9IO 15 January General Election; Liberal administration retained 27-28 April Budget passed 6 May Death of Edward VII; accession of George V 16 June Constitutional conference over Lords reform 3 September Lock-out in Lancashire cotton mills 4-5 November William II and Nicholas II meet at Potsdam 7 November Tonypandy miners riot, troops sent December General Election; Liberal administration retained IgIl 21 February Parliament Bill introduced 262 BRITAIN & ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 21 May French occupy Fez 14 June Seamen's strike 27 June Caillaux becomes French Premier I July Panther sent to Agadir 20 July Parliament Bill passed by Lords 21 July Lloyd George's Mansion House speech I August London dockworkers' strike 18 August Railwaymen's strike 23 August C.LD. meeting decides between naval and military strategies 28 September Outbreak of Italo-Turkish War 4 November Franco-German accord over Morocco 8 November Balfour resigns as leader of Conservative party 19 12 14 January Poincare becomes French Premier 8-1 I February Haldane visits Berlin March Miners' strike 13 March Serbia and Bulgaria form Balkan League 18 March Churchill proposes redistribution of fleet I I April Third Irish Home Rule Bill introduced 23 May Dockers' strike 4 July C.LD. meeting on naval dispositions 22 July French fleet at Brest moved to Toulon August Beginning of Marconi scandal 15 October Treaty of Lausanne ends Italo-Turkish War 18 October Outbreak of First Balkan War 2 I -22 October Grey-Cambon letters exchanged 3 December Armistice between Turkey and Balkan states 5 December Triple Alliance renewed 16 December Ambassadorial conference opens in London 1913 January Poincare elected President of France 26 March Churchill proposes 'naval holiday' 30 May Treaty of London ends First Balkan War 29 June Outbreak of Second Balkan War 7 August French Army Bill ratified (3-year military service) I I August Treaty of Bucharest ends Second Balkan War. Anglo-German agreement over Por- tuguese colonies initialled 18 October Churchill again proposes 'naval holiday' CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 263 November- December Liman von Sanders crisis 1914 20 March Curragh incident 22-24 April George V and Grey visit Paris 26 May Home Rule Bill passed for third time 14 June Nicholas II and Sazonov visit Constanza and Bucharest 15 June Anglo-German Baghdad Railway agree­ ment initialled 23 June Home Rule Amending Act introduced (ex­ clusion of Ulster without time-limit) 28 June Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo 20-23 July Poincare and Viviani visit St Petersburg 23 July Austrian ultimatum to Serbia 21-24 July Buckingham Palace conference on Irish pro­ blem 24 July Grey consults Cabinet on Austro-Serbian CriSIS 28 July Austria declares war on Serbia 29 July Grey's warning to Lichnowsky. Bethmann Hollweg's bid for British neutrality 30 July Austria - Hungary orders general mobilis­ ation for 31 July. Russia orders general mobilisation for 31 July 3 1 July Kaiser proclaims 'state of imminent war'. German ultimatum to Russia 1 August Germany declares war on Russia and mo­ bilises 2 August Cabinet agrees to protect north coast of France and Channel against German at­ tack. Germany invades Luxemburg, sends ultimatum to Belgium 3 August Germany declares war on France. Belgium rejects German ultimatum. British mo­ bilise army. Cabinet agrees to send ulti­ matum to Berlin 4 August Germany invades Belgium. British ulti­ matum sent; expires at midnight 6 August Austria - Hungary declares war on Russia. Cabinet agrees to send B.E.F. Jo France 12 August Britain declares war on Austria - Hungary Bibliography I. BASIC BACKGROUND READING STUDENTS should refer to the bibliography in F. H. Hinsley (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey (Cambridge, 1977) for general diplomatic sources and official publications which are not included here. For further details relating to British diplomatic history, special attention should be given to the following: L. ALBERTINI, The Origins of the War of 1914 (London, 1965) V. R. BERGHAHN, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (London, 1973) L. GEISS (ed.), July 1914: Outbreak of the First World War-Selected Documents (London, 1967) J. A. S. GRENVILLE, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century (London, 1964) C. HAZLEHURST, Politicians at War: July 1914- May 1915 (London, 1971) F. H. HINSLEY (ed.). British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey (London 1976) C. J. LOWE AND M. L. DOCKRILL (eds), The Mirage of Power, 3 vols (London, 1972) G. W. MONGER, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900-1907 (London, 1963) I. NISH, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907 (London, 1966) A.J. P. TAYLOR, TheStrugglefor Mastfry in Europe, 1848-1914 (Oxford, 1954) S. WILLIAMSON, The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Preparefor War, ]904-]914 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969) For further information on the domestic situation during the Edward­ ian period, the following remain indispensable: E.
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