Our Brothers Across the Ocean? Unionist Diplomacy, the Lansdowne Foreign Office, and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship', 1900-1905 BY Iestyn Michael Adams Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of PhD. The University of Leeds Department of History February 2002 The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS During the conception and preparation of this thesis, I have received valuable assistance from my postgraduate supervisor, Dr. Keith Wilson, who has offered me encouragement and guidance throughout the last four years. He clearly understood my goals and interests, and has frequently given me much needed advice. Without his help, needless to say, this book would not exist I am also indebted to the staff of the Public Record Office, the British Library and the Brotherton Library of the University of Leeds. I particularly wish to thank Robert Smith - the Curator of the as yet uncatalogued Lansdowne collection in the British Library - who gave me his time, and who suggested further research avenues. On a personal note, I gratefully acknowledge the support from friends and family, especially my parents and Colette Maher. My final words of thanks go Andrea Myers, Peter Myers and Richie Lane who, together, helped to provide accomodation during my frequent trips to London. 1 ABSTRACT This study is intended as a detailed exploration of British diplomacy with the United States in the first five years of the twentieth century, that is, the period during which the Marquis of Lansdowne presided at the Foreign Office. Without doubt, this was a critical time in the readjustment (both in substance and style) of Anglo-American diplomatic relations, initiating the amicable 'special relationship' which, broadly speaking, has endured to the present day. The efforts made by Lansdowne and the Unionist Administration to 'clear the slate' of nagging Anglo-American disputes, and to encourage a closer diplomatic bond, helped to bring to an end decades of mutual suspicion and antagonism, whilst representing a significant change of course for British foreign policy. In this light, the study here presented aims to provide a close analysis of the Unionist Government's American diplomacy, their motives and diplomatic ambitions, in the appropriate imperial and strategic contexts. An examination of this topic prompts the conclusion that, although Lansdowne fully appreciated the importance of Anglo-American friendship, he approached each dispute with a separate agenda, always gauging the strength of American feeling before committing himself to a set policy. Lansdowne was perfectly prepared to concede non-vital interests to the United States in the Western Hemisphere when serious tension arose, and this was particularly evident during the Isthmian canal and Alaskan boundary negotiations. With these two issues successfully concluded, the rapprochement was effectively ensured. Thus, Lansdowne's determination to uphold British interests (and those of her Western Hemispheric colonies), while occasionally placing a strain on Anglo-American relations, threatened no lasting danger. Above all, Britain relied upon vocal protestations of friendship, both for the United States and the Monroe Doctrine, to extinguish the risks of serious diplomatic tension and to cement a permanent friendship. The major successes of Anglo-American relations, however, came to an abrupt end after the Alaskan verdict of late 1903, and a barren period followed. The relationship had been set upon an entirely new course, but hopes for an Anglo- American partnership, sadly, remained hazy, naive, and frequently ill-conceived. In the Far East, where British and American interests broadly coincided, no joint policy emerged; instead, the two nations became separated over their responses to the Russo- Japanese conflict. Equally, the outstanding issues in North America proved incapable of settlement. Although these final stages of Lansdowne's American diplomacy were marred by diplomatic inactivity and occasional friction, the Unionists' contribution to the Anglo-American 'special relationship' left an impressive and lasting legacy. By 1905, Britain and the United States, while not formally allied, had at least become mutually sympathetic. This was an essential factor in the readjustment of British global strategy, allowing Britain to abandon her defences in the Western Hemisphere and despatch her forces to more pressing areas of the globe. CONTENTS Acknowledgements i Abstract ii Introduction 1 Part One Canal Rights and Debt Collection in Latin America 1 Great Britain, the United States, and Negotiations for the Construction 15 of an Isthmian Canal, 1900-1901 2 That Disrepubable Little Republic: Great Britain and Venezuela, 1901- 36 December 1902 3 The Diplomacy of the Venezuela Blockade, December 1902-March 55 1903 4 A Marvellously Elastic Doctrine: The Search for Anglo-American 73 Concord in Latin America, 1903-1904. Part Two The United States and Canada 5 Imperial Responsibility, Strategy and Paranoia: Anglo-Canadian 92 Issues, 1896-1905 6 The Last of the Great Disputes: The Alaska Boundary, 1901- 111 February 1903 7 Alaskan Settlement, February-October 1903 129 8 Alaskan Epilogue: Imperial Relations and the Future of Pelagic 149 Sealing in the Behring Sea, 1903-1905 Part Three The Limits of Rapprochement: Unresolved Disputes 9 Reciprocity and the Fisheries Question in Newfoundland, 1901- 159 1905 10 Claims against the Government of Hawaii: an Appeal for 181 Anglo-American Arbitration, 1895-1905 Part Four Side by Side in the Far East 11 Great Britain, the United States, and the Balance of Power in the 196 Far East, 1901-February 1904 12 This Wretched War: Conflicts in British and American Diplomacy 223 during the Russo-Japanese War, February 1904-April 1905 13 Russo-Japanese Peace: the Treaty of Portsmouth and the Renewal 246 of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, April-September 1905 Conclusion 267 Bibliography 276 Illustrations Lord Lansdowne frontispiece Map of the Alaska Boundary Dispute 113 INTRODUCTION The opening five years of the twentieth century - when Lord Lansdowne presided at the Foreign Office - was a critical period in the reconsideration and adjustment of British foreign relations. After the enthusiastic imperialism that had marked the previous century, a growing anxiety began to prevail that Britain's resources were over-stretched and, more significantly, that her sprawling Empire could no longer adequately be protected. The recognition, that British global hegemony was under increasing attack, had been a gradual process. By 1894, however, the major European Powers, eager for imperial adventure and busy with naval expansion, had formed into two opposing blocks while Britain remained perilously isolated.1 Traditionally evading entangling alliances, the abortive attempts of the late 1890s to join the Triple Alliance (primarily advocated by Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office) represented one aspect of a new policy of accommodation, a policy that gained added impetus once Lansdowne was appointed as Foreign Secretary on November 12 1900. Under Lansdowne, foreign affairs would primarily be governed by a rueful acknowledgement of Britain's relative decline (particularly the vulnerability of her scattered and ever-expanding Empire during a period of exceptional turbulence) and the consequent necessity for international allies.2 Lansdowne arrived at the Foreign Office at a particularly sensitive and anxious time. In South Africa, a long, bitter and internationally unpopular war against the Boers still raged, while, in China, British interests were threatened in the wake of the Boxer uprising. By 1905, however, much had changed. Two important international agreements had been concluded - with Japan in 1902 and France two years later - which served to lessen the immediate danger. At the same time, the Foreign Office made strenuous attempts to remove long-standing causes of friction with otherwise friendly 1 Powers, most significantly the United States. For the first time, the attempt to effect some kind of understanding between the two 'Anglo-Saxon' races was regarded in high Government circles as a serious policy objective. Great hopes were held that the Americans, suddenly emerging after the Spanish-American war of 1898 as a major world Power, might be induced to become Britain's unofficial global partner, safeguarding British interests in the Western Hemisphere whilst ensuring freedom of commerce in the East. More than any other nation, then, the United States became increasingly viewed as Britain's natural, and potentially most rewarding future ally. This thesis will reconsider the motives and attitudes with which Lansdowne, the Foreign Office and the last pre-war Unionist Government approached Anglo- American diplomacy. A re-evaluation of this subject has become necessary. Not only is the majority of previous research well over thirty years old, but Lansdowne's influence on the Anglo-American rapprochement has hitherto excited insufficient interest3 Considering the key role of the Foreign Secretary in the formulation of foreign policy, it is a little surprising that no historian heretofore has systematically examined Lansdowne's personal approach to American affairs. He was, after all, a pivotal figure during an extremely important period in Anglo-American relations, a man who fully understood the requirements of the age and,