The London School of Economics and Political Science Great Britain and Naval Arms Control: International Law and Security 1898-1914 by Scott Andrew Keefer A thesis submitted to Department of International History of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International History, London, December 30, 2011 1 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgment is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 99,939 words. 2 Abstract: This thesis traces the British role in the evolution of international law prior to 1914, utilizing naval arms control as a case study. In the thesis, I argue that the Foreign Office adopted a pragmatic approach towards international law, emphasizing what was possible within the existing system of law rather than attempting to create radically new and powerful international institutions. The thesis challenges standard perceptions of the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 which interpreted these gatherings as unrealistic efforts at general disarmament through world government, positing instead that legalized arms control provided a realistic means of limiting armaments. This thesis explores how a great power employed treaties to complement maritime security strategies. A powerful world government was not advocated and was unnecessary for the management of naval arms control. While law could not guarantee state compliance, the framework of the international legal system provided a buffer, increasing predictability in interstate relations. This thesis begins with an account of how international law functioned in the nineteenth century, and how states employed international law in limiting armaments. With this framework, a legal analysis is provided for exploring the negotiations at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and in the subsequent Anglo-German naval arms race. What emerges is how international law functioned by setting expectations for future behaviour, while raising the political cost of violations. Naval arms control provided a unique opportunity for legal regulation, as the lengthy building time and easily verifiable construction enabled inspections by naval attachés, a traditional diplomatic practice. Existing practices of international law provided a workable method of managing arms competition, without the necessity for unworkable projects of world government. Thus failure to resolve the arms race before 1914 must be attributed to other causes besides the lack of legal precedents. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 5 Chapter 1 Arms Control Antecedents in the Nineteenth Century 14 Chapter 2 International Law in the Nineteenth Century 47 Chapter 3 The First Hague Peace Conference 79 Chapter 4 Naval Arms Control and the Argentine-Chilean Experience: Precedents, Issues, and Implications 117 Chapter 5 Preparations for the Second Hague Peace Conference 146 Chapter 6 The Second Hague Peace Conference 167 Chapter 7 Law and Arms Control up to 1914 193 Conclusion 236 Bibliography 243 4 INTRODUCTION The historian’s art lies in conveying how those in the past perceived their present and imagined their future. The history of arms control before 1914 reveals more about what statesmen expected from the future than how that future unfolded. To the British Foreign Office, the limitation of naval armaments was a realistic possibility, and a way of removing a significant contention with an increasingly erratic and aggressive Germany. To understand how these statesmen perceived their world, the historian must seek a fuller comprehension of the strategic situation, and the tools at the disposal of policy-makers. While the diplomacy of the pre-war era has been exhaustively studied, as have many of the tools of policy-making, such as naval strategy and war planning, one crucial element remains neglected – international law. Without this foundational knowledge of law, our understanding of treaties – from arbitration and arms agreements to alliances, guarantees of state neutrality, and rules of war – reflexively reverts to commonplace misunderstandings about how law functioned. In turn, if historians fail to grasp how statesmen expected law to work, then arguments built around key treaties lose critical theoretical foundations. Mistaken impressions about international law arise honestly, as often international lawyers, comfortable working within their discipline, assume an understanding of core legal concepts and omit them in their discussions. But the absence of discussion of these core concepts has left historians to speculate about the nature of law. When candidly expressed, historians’ misconceptions significantly undermine the validity of their claims, as when Avner Offer summarized the exclusive three functions of law in wartime as offering pretexts for war, justification for atrocities, and rationalizations for punitive peace treaties.1 More often, historians equate the international legal system with its domestic counterpart by focusing on legislative, judicial, and executive institutions. Thus, when analyzing a treaty, historical accounts often seek evidence of a world court or international police powers for enforcement, and assume that no treaty could function as law in their absence. In discussing disarmament at the First Hague Peace Conference, Arthur Marder judged “[t]here was no possible means of guaranteeing 1 Avner Offer, “Morality and Admiralty: ‘Jacky’ Fisher, Economic Warfare and the Laws of War,” Journal of Contemporary History 23, no. 1 (1988): 114-15. 5 that such a self-denying ordinance would be observed, except perhaps through an army of international inspectors, and this would lead to friction.”2 Similarly, a leading historian of arms limitation, Merze Tate, wrote “[i]n the European society of the nineteenth century, without an international executive to enforce engagements on recalcitrant states, disarmament was impossible.”3 In reality, statesmen were perfectly comfortable working without such a safety net. What the layman seeks in courts and cops, the international lawyer metes out in prose and cons. Beneath the florid language of treaties lay assumptions of political costs and power relationships. By going to the trouble of formalizing an agreement in a treaty, vested with symbolic significance and an aura of permanence, statesmen increased the political costs of violations, making breaches less likely. Yet violations remained possible and good lawyers anticipated them. While law could not eliminate the possibility of violations, it could make behavior more predictable. Additionally, law could enshrine national interests. Under sweeping statements of universal humanitarian sentiment, more often than not lurked cold calculations of national interest. Well-crafted treaties betrayed little of these calculations, appearing more as moral platitude than diplomatic bargains. Within all treaties lay estimations of power, questions of who could enforce what obligations under which set of circumstances; and legal instruments provided a veneer of legitimacy to these machinations. Law is a struggle for power, and states engaged in treaty-making to legitimize their national interests. “[T]he majestic equality of the laws . forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.”4 Law functioned as an element of foreign policy-making, employing recognized diplomatic practices for resolving disputes and pursuing national interests. International law, as understood and practiced by statesmen in the nineteenth century, functioned without powerful legal institutions. This thesis aims to correct some of these misassumptions about international law and its role in foreign policy decision-making. In doing so, it argues that law was employed by statesmen in order to advance national goals, and when utilized pragmatically, recognizing its limitations, law could contribute to national security. 2 Arthur J Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre- Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905, 3rd Edition 1972 ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1940), 342. 3 Merze Tate, The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments to 1907, 2nd ed. 1971 ed. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1942), 347. 4 Anatole France, The Red Lily (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1917), 75. 6 The Foreign Office acted rationally by acknowledging that law alone could never guarantee security, but in the words of one statesman, could serve as “an obstacle rather than a barrier.” Arms limitation presents a unique case study, highlighting an effective role for law in strengthening national security. Unlike prior studies of arms limitation, the focus here is squarely upon rational state interest, rather than popular pacifist movements or other non-state actors. While nineteenth-century academic legal writing provided much of the basic source material, these writers often served as government legal advisors,