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Peace Dialogue: Confronting Violence in the Deep South of Thailand, 1991–2011

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Peace Dialogue: Confronting Violence in the Deep South of Thailand, 1991–2011 Peace Dialogue: Confronting Violence in the Deep South of Thailand, 1991–2011 A report to promote understanding on the background, development, lessons and stories along the path toward peace dialogue in the southern border provinces of Thailand Policy Paper Peace Dialogue: Confronting Violence in the Deep South of Thailand, 1991–2011 Authored and Published by Strategic Nonviolence Working Group (SNWG), Thailand Research Fund (TRF) Faculty of Political Science Building, Thammasat University, 2 Prachan Road, Pra Nakorn, Bangkok 10200 First edition in Thai, December 2018 First edition in English, June 2020 ISBN 978-616-417-148-0 Member of Strategic Nonviolence Working Group: Chaiwat Satha-anand, Mark Tamthai, Somkiat Boonchoo, Chantana Banpasirichote Wungaeo, Chalidaporn Songsamphan, Danai Musa, Nipot Anyakun, Banthorn Ondam, Praves Wasi, Pichai Ratanapol, Anuchart Puagsalee, Sorapong Sriyanondha, Chatchai Bangchuad Research Assistants: Romadon Panjor, Chaowat Moonpakdee Translator: Supapohn Kanwerayotin English Editor: Emma Potchapornkul Contact: 979/17–21, 14th Floor, SM Tower Building, Phaholyothin Road, Samsen Nai, Phya Thai, Bangkok, 10400 Email: [email protected] Layout Design: Deddeaw Laosinchai Cover Design and timeline: Sakolchanok Puenpong Production Coordinator: Sarun Wongkhajit National Library of Thailand Cataloging in Publication Data Strategic Nonviolence Working Group. Peace Dialogue: Confronting Violence in the Deep South of Thailand, 1991–2011. – – Bangkok: Strategic Nonviolence Working Group, Thailand Research Fund , 2563. 112 p. 1. Peace-building. I. Title. 303.62 ISBN 978-616-417-148-0 Contents Foreword 5 Preface 9 1. Introduction 20 2. Background 24 3. The Problem and its Resolution 28 The Problem 28 Separatism vs. Uneasiness in One’s Homeland 31 Transforming the Violent Struggle 34 4. From Negotiation to Peace Dialogue 40 Agency-Initiated Negotiations 43 1) 1991–1994 43 2) 1995 46 3) 2002 47 4) Post 2004 48 Individual-Initiated Dialogue 51 Policy-Mandated Dialogue 54 Thaksin Shinawatra Government (2004–2006) 55 Surayud Chulanont Government (2006–2007) 58 Abhisit Vejjajiva Government (2008–2011) 60 Peace Dialogue 3 5. From “Opponent” to “Conflict Transformation Partner” 62 Framework 63 Direction 64 Insights from the Dialogue 65 Handing over the Geneva Process 67 6. Stories along the Path to Peace 70 The Army’s Position vis-à-vis the Role of Civilians 72 in Peace Dialogue Concerns over Conflict Escalation and Internationalization 75 The Role of the Initiator and the Importance of the Connector 79 The National Security Council’s (NSC) 80 Technical Working Group The Government and Political Sector 82 Paranoia and Tests of Trust 86 Words Overheard: Fighting for Independence or 90 Some Other Goal The Last Word but not the Final Word 92 7. Conclusion 94 About Strategic Nonviolence Working Group 101 (formerly Strategic Nonviolence Commission) 4 Peace Dialogue Foreword Peace Dialogue: Confronting Violence in the Deep South of Thailand, 1991–2011 is intended to inform readers of the journey towards peaceful resolution of Thailand’s southern border conflict and the evolution of this worthwhile approach and mission. The report explicitly identifies the problem in the southern border region as being political in nature. Far from being a case of run-of-the-mill criminality, the problem is rooted in unequal power relations, specifically the balance of power between citizens and the state. It is somewhat similar to past and current political conflicts that have beset Thailand, including the ideological conflict between the state and the Communist Party of Thailand or the yellow-versus-red shirt polarization. At root, these conflicts are political in that they call for a change in the balance of power. Use of violence or terrorist attacks are intended to increase the bargaining power of weaker parties in negotiations with a view to changing policy, positions, and behavior. The use of violence is not aimed at bring about change through the seizure of power. It is worth asking what of the majority of people who do not use violence, who wish to live in peace, or who advocate for change through nonviolent means? For those who rise up and call for self-rule; for the power to manage their own affairs—what are they to do? They don’t have any leverage. State policies have long been understood as reflecting an aversion to change that is underpinned by a deep fear of losing power. Thus the state resorts to an emergency response. The problem- solving mechanisms that are employed are those that exist within the patronage system. Ultimately, the wish is that people remain dependent on the state. This goes against the aspirations of the people to think and Peace Dialogue 5 act on their own accord, to determine their destiny and that of their country themselves. Some military officers recounted to us how bridges built by local people, or which local people helped to build, were never bombed. Not once. The state believes that only economic development and prosperity that can bring about positive change. And yet experience to date has shown that economic development alone will not address the root causes and sentiments underlying the problem. Things may go quiet for a while but this calm never lasts. A military officer, who once played a part in peace negotiations, remarked that, “We have tried the same old approach for a long time. We tread water without making any progress and just go round and around in circles. We need to change our approach.” Many esteemed peacebuilders say that it is high time to stop being short-sighted and reactive and to tackle the root causes, that is to adopt a conflict transformation approach. When Thailand was grappling with the Cold War, a group of mili- tary officers tried to rouse the powers-that-be at that time. They made a public statement acknowledging that, “The harder the suppression, the bigger it grows.” That reality-check led to a key shift manifested in Policy 66/23. At that time, the Communist Party of Thailand had success- fully infiltrated over 50 provinces as a result of its relentless guerrilla campaign which began in 1965 and lasted well into the 1980s. Over a period of 15 years, more than 2,000 lives were lost. In the Southern conflict, over a comparable stretch of time between 2004 and 2017, over 6,000 people have been killed and an additional 12,000 injured despite the over 300 billion baht spent and the enforcement of three “special laws.” With the Thai government attempting to transform the country into “Thailand 4.0,” we are presented with an important opportunity to 6 Peace Dialogue change the conceptual framework underpinning the management of the Deep South conflict. We need to study the conflict’s root causes and work to transform it now instead of waiting until an impasse is reached. This means striving for the long-term goal of peaceful co-existence rather than seeking only short-term solutions. I wish to commend those who have contributed to Peace Dialogue: Confronting Violence in the Deep South of Thailand, 1991–2011, particularly former chief of the Thai Peace Dialogue Committee Associate Professor Mark Tamthai, former National Security Council (NSC) Deputy Secretary- General Jiraporn Bunnag, former NSC Deputy Secretary-General Somkiat Boonchoo, and everyone involved in making this piece of peace advocacy into something tangible. Most importantly, I wish to commend the Strategic Nonviolence Working Group as the report creator. Going forward, the Working Group should build on this report and continue formulating policy recommendations and collaborating with agencies keen on building peace. Pichai Ratanapol Strategic Nonviolence Working Group Former Deputy Secretary-General, National Security Council Peace Dialogue 7 Preface As this report was being published, the path to Thailand’s general election was becoming clearer. The popular question is not whether, but when the election will be held. Regardless of the murky short-term outlook, political parties and groups have started electioneering, using whatever leeway is allowed by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), which has ruled the country since the military coup d’état on 22 May 2014. The Deep South, the site of a deadly conflict which re-emerged in January 2004, has been no less vibrant as politicians begin to regroup and stir themselves to action. The Wadah faction, a group that enjoyed some renown in the past, formed the “Prachachat Party.” Featuring several prominent Malay-Muslim personalities, the party has unveiled a policy platform centered on resolution of the Deep South conflict. Interestingly, Prachachat’s Buddhist secretary-general is well-known in the region following his tenure as secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC). His renown stems from the instrumental role he is said to have played during the peace talks under the government of former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra.1 Following the 22 May 2014 coup d’état, the NCPO-led government headed by General Prayut Chan-o-cha continued to support the idea of a peace dialogue between the Thai government and the Pattani Movement albeit with some slight modifications. The emphasis now is to highlight 1 Bangkok Post, August 25, 2018. Peace Dialogue 9 the “domestic” nature of the talks as a buffer against the risk of the conflict’s internationalization. In keeping with this change of emphasis, an executive order was issued to change the terminology used during the Yingluck Administration so that “peace talks” (พูดคุยสันติภาพ) became “happy talks” (พูดคุยสันติสุข). General Prayut explained to the Thai public that “peace” implies the end of war, understood as forces battling over control of physical territory. From the NCPO’s perspective, the Southern Border problem is not a war; it is a matter of criminality and the government is simply trying to maintain law and order. Thus, it is more appropriate to refer to the talks as “happy talks” rather than “peace talks.”2 Yet there is a theoretical problem; Peace is not merely the absence of war.
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