Peace Dialogue: Confronting Violence in the Deep South of Thailand, 1991–2011

A report to promote understanding on the background, development, lessons and stories along the path toward peace dialogue in the southern border provinces of Thailand Policy Paper Peace Dialogue: Confronting Violence in the Deep South of Thailand, 1991–2011

Authored and Published by Strategic Nonviolence Working Group (SNWG), Thailand Research Fund (TRF) Faculty of Political Science Building, Thammasat University, 2 Prachan Road, Pra Nakorn, Bangkok 10200

First edition in Thai, December 2018 First edition in English, June 2020 ISBN 978-616-417-148-0

Member of Strategic Nonviolence Working Group: Chaiwat Satha-anand, Mark Tamthai, Somkiat Boonchoo, Chantana Banpasirichote Wungaeo, Chalidaporn Songsamphan, Danai Musa, Nipot Anyakun, Banthorn Ondam, Praves Wasi, Pichai Ratanapol, Anuchart Puagsalee, Sorapong Sriyanondha, Chatchai Bangchuad Research Assistants: Romadon Panjor, Chaowat Moonpakdee Translator: Supapohn Kanwerayotin English Editor: Emma Potchapornkul

Contact: 979/17–21, 14th Floor, SM Tower Building, Phaholyothin Road, Samsen Nai, Phya Thai, Bangkok, 10400 Email: [email protected]

Layout Design: Deddeaw Laosinchai Cover Design and timeline: Sakolchanok Puenpong Production Coordinator: Sarun Wongkhajit

National Library of Thailand Cataloging in Publication Data Strategic Nonviolence Working Group. Peace Dialogue: Confronting Violence in the Deep South of Thailand, 1991–2011. – – Bangkok: Strategic Nonviolence Working Group, Thailand Research Fund , 2563. 112 p. 1. Peace-building. I. Title. 303.62 ISBN 978-616-417-148-0 Contents

Foreword 5 Preface 9

1. Introduction 20 2. Background 24 3. The Problem and its Resolution 28 The Problem 28 Separatism vs. Uneasiness in One’s Homeland 31 Transforming the Violent Struggle 34

4. From Negotiation to Peace Dialogue 40 Agency-Initiated Negotiations 43 1) 1991–1994 43 2) 1995 46 3) 2002 47 4) Post 2004 48 Individual-Initiated Dialogue 51 Policy-Mandated Dialogue 54 Thaksin Shinawatra Government (2004–2006) 55 Surayud Chulanont Government (2006–2007) 58 Abhisit Vejjajiva Government (2008–2011) 60

Peace Dialogue 3 5. From “Opponent” to “Conflict Transformation Partner” 62 Framework 63 Direction 64 Insights from the Dialogue 65 Handing over the Geneva Process 67

6. Stories along the Path to Peace 70 The Army’s Position vis-à-vis the Role of Civilians 72 in Peace Dialogue Concerns over Conflict Escalation and Internationalization 75 The Role of the Initiator and the Importance of the Connector 79 The National Security Council’s (NSC) 80 Technical Working Group The Government and Political Sector 82 Paranoia and Tests of Trust 86 Words Overheard: Fighting for Independence or 90 Some Other Goal The Last Word but not the Final Word 92

7. Conclusion 94

About Strategic Nonviolence Working Group 101 (formerly Strategic Nonviolence Commission)

4 Peace Dialogue Foreword

Peace Dialogue: Confronting Violence in the Deep South of Thailand, 1991–2011 is intended to inform readers of the journey towards peaceful resolution of Thailand’s southern border conflict and the evolution of this worthwhile approach and mission. The report explicitly identifies the problem in the southern border region as being political in nature. Far from being a case of run-of-the-mill criminality, the problem is rooted in unequal power relations, specifically the balance of power between citizens and the state. It is somewhat similar to past and current political conflicts that have beset Thailand, including the ideological conflict between the state and the Communist Party of Thailand or the yellow-versus-red shirt polarization. At root, these conflicts are political in that they call for a change in the balance of power. Use of violence or terrorist attacks are intended to increase the bargaining power of weaker parties in negotiations with a view to changing policy, positions, and behavior. The use of violence is not aimed at bring about change through the seizure of power. It is worth asking what of the majority of people who do not use violence, who wish to live in peace, or who advocate for change through nonviolent means? For those who rise up and call for self-rule; for the power to manage their own affairs—what are they to do? They don’t have any leverage. State policies have long been understood as reflecting an aversion to change that is underpinned by a deep fear of losing power. Thus the state resorts to an emergency response. The problem- solving mechanisms that are employed are those that exist within the patronage system. Ultimately, the wish is that people remain dependent on the state. This goes against the aspirations of the people to think and

Peace Dialogue 5 act on their own accord, to determine their destiny and that of their country themselves. Some military officers recounted to us how bridges built by local people, or which local people helped to build, were never bombed. Not once. The state believes that only economic development and prosperity that can bring about positive change. And yet experience to date has shown that economic development alone will not address the root causes and sentiments underlying the problem. Things may go quiet for a while but this calm never lasts. A military officer, who once played a part in peace negotiations, remarked that, “We have tried the same old approach for a long time. We tread water without making any progress and just go round and around in circles. We need to change our approach.” Many esteemed peacebuilders say that it is high time to stop being short-sighted and reactive and to tackle the root causes, that is to adopt a conflict transformation approach. When Thailand was grappling with the Cold War, a group of military officers tried to rouse the powers-that-be at that time. They made a public statement acknowledging that, “The harder the suppression, the bigger it grows.” That reality-check led to a key shift manifested in Policy 66/23. At that time, the Communist Party of Thailand had success- fully infiltrated over 50 provinces as a result of its relentless guerrilla campaign which began in 1965 and lasted well into the 1980s. Over a period of 15 years, more than 2,000 lives were lost. In the Southern conflict, over a comparable stretch of time between 2004 and 2017, over 6,000 people have been killed and an additional 12,000 injured despite the over 300 billion baht spent and the enforcement of three “special laws.” With the Thai government attempting to transform the country into “Thailand 4.0,” we are presented with an important opportunity to

6 Peace Dialogue change the conceptual framework underpinning the management of the Deep South conflict. We need to study the conflict’s root causes and work to transform it now instead of waiting until an impasse is reached. This means striving for the long-term goal of peaceful co-existence rather than seeking only short-term solutions. I wish to commend those who have contributed to Peace Dialogue: Confronting Violence in the Deep South of Thailand, 1991–2011, particularly former chief of the Thai Peace Dialogue Committee Associate Professor Mark Tamthai, former National Security Council (NSC) Deputy Secretary- General Jiraporn Bunnag, former NSC Deputy Secretary-General Somkiat Boonchoo, and everyone involved in making this piece of peace advocacy into something tangible. Most importantly, I wish to commend the Strategic Nonviolence Working Group as the report creator. Going forward, the Working Group should build on this report and continue formulating policy recommendations and collaborating with agencies keen on building peace.

Pichai Ratanapol Strategic Nonviolence Working Group Former Deputy Secretary-General, National Security Council

Peace Dialogue 7

Preface

As this report was being published, the path to Thailand’s general election was becoming clearer. The popular question is not whether, but when the election will be held. Regardless of the murky short-term outlook, political parties and groups have started electioneering, using whatever leeway is allowed by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), which has ruled the country since the military coup d’état on 22 May 2014. The Deep South, the site of a deadly conflict which re-emerged in January 2004, has been no less vibrant as politicians begin to regroup and stir themselves to action. The Wadah faction, a group that enjoyed some renown in the past, formed the “Prachachat Party.” Featuring several prominent Malay-Muslim personalities, the party has unveiled a policy platform centered on resolution of the Deep South conflict. Interestingly, Prachachat’s Buddhist secretary-general is well-known in the region following his tenure as secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC). His renown stems from the instrumental role he is said to have played during the peace talks under the government of former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra.1 Following the 22 May 2014 coup d’état, the NCPO-led government headed by General Prayut Chan-o-cha continued to support the idea of a peace dialogue between the Thai government and the Pattani Movement albeit with some slight modifications. The emphasis now is to highlight

1 Bangkok Post, August 25, 2018.

Peace Dialogue 9 the “domestic” nature of the talks as a buffer against the risk of the conflict’s internationalization. In keeping with this change of emphasis, an executive order was issued to change the terminology used during the Yingluck Administration so that “peace talks” (พูดคุยสันติภาพ) became “happy talks” (พูดคุยสันติสุข). General Prayut explained to the Thai public that “peace” implies the end of war, understood as forces battling over control of physical territory. From the NCPO’s perspective, the Southern Border problem is not a war; it is a matter of criminality and the government is simply trying to maintain law and order. Thus, it is more appropriate to refer to the talks as “happy talks” rather than “peace talks.”2 Yet there is a theoretical problem; Peace is not merely the absence of war. Peace entails an end of all forms of violence be it individual, structural, or cultural. In the Deep South, depending on who you speak to, peace may be understood as the end of war or the end of the “low intensity conflict” as it is characterized by some. However, it may also be understood as the end of the military’s control of the region, a control that is applied more stringently in the Deep South than anywhere else in Thailand. Another interesting linguistic point is how Thai authorities prefer to use the term talks rather than negotiations. At the end of a negotiation lies an agreement between conflicting parties on certain contentious issues. Negotiations are a formal business wherein signatories have a clear mandate to put their names on an agreement. However, a peaceful

2 Please see Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “Celestial Axe: On the Politics of Naming,” Center for Southeast Asian Studies, CSEAS Newsletter 76(Spring/Summer 2018), p. 020, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3240390.

10 Peace Dialogue conversation is more about trying to build rapport and establish mutual trust by bringing conflict parties face-to-face. Each side is armed with pens, paper, and electronic devices instead of weapons. They encounter each other in the meeting room and around the dining table instead of mountains and jungles. The term “peaceful” in peaceful conversations is suggestive of all the efforts prior to and that have continued with the NCPO government. “Conversation” is a valued form of human communication that is not concerned with establishing facts, answering some profound question or winning an argument. Conversation is not propaganda. Its intention is not to persuade those with different opinions to come round to your point of view. The basic idea is that parties engage in a conversation whereby they can “differ without disagreeing.”3 This is a feature of peace processes everywhere in the world. Let us consider the lessons of peace processes elsewhere: Northern Ireland’s peace process, for example, could be said to have spanned some 400 years starting with the first wave of Scottish and English migrants arriving on the shores of Ulster in 1609. We can draw at least 10 key lessons from the Irish peace process: 1) Each party learns different things during a peace process and the identities of stakeholders evolve along with the dynamics of the process; 2) Representatives from all stakeholder groups must be included in the process; 3) No preconditions must be imposed ahead of talks; 4) The safety of those involved in the peace process must be guaranteed; 5) The importance of the third party must be recognized but not overemphasized; 6) Economic aid is helpful

3 Michael Oakeshott, “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind,” Rationalism in Politics and other Essays (London: Methuen & Co., 1962), p. 198.

Peace Dialogue 11 for a peace process; 7) Although those who sit at the negotiation table tend to be the elite, they must address the issue of reconciliation among ordinary people; 8) All those involved must engage intensively and sincerely with all the issues raised at the dialogue table; 9) A space must be made for moderate factions within the conflict parties because they risk their well-being to advocate for peace. At the same time parallel efforts must be made to contain “spoilers”; 10) There needs to be an awareness of how global developments and internal political dynamics may contribute to the success or failure of a peace process.4 Those working in peace and conflict are no doubt familiar with these lessons, many of which can be drawn from other peace processes. Yet the Northern Ireland case is particularly noteworthy because of many confounding factors underlying its peace process; namely, counterinsurgency and counter-espionage. Covert forms of warfare lurked in virtually every nook and cranny of the peace process. These factors operated under the radar to steer the process above ground towards what was considered to be the most favorable point for either one of the parties.5 Because a peace conversation operates under such conditions, the path of the peace conversation is inherently tortuous, time-consuming, rugged, and obstacle-ridden, yet all the while it may also be both colorful and captivating. Peace Dialogue: Confronting Violence in the Deep South of Thailand, 1991–2011 is the story of the peace process in Thailand, written by “insiders” to a process, which did not just magically appear in 2013. In

4 Timothy White (ed.), Lessons from the Northern Ireland Peace Process (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013). 5 Henry McDonald, “Unspoken Lessons from Northern Ireland Peace Process,” The Guardian, October 18, 2011.

12 Peace Dialogue reality, it had already come a long way thanks to the initiative and perseverance of many individuals. Civilian and military bureaucrats worked discreetly to create entry points for the state to meet and communicate with Malay-Muslim fighters with a view to reducing and/ or ending the violence which had occurred long before it resumed in January 2004. This report contains much valuable and new information that sheds light on how certain critical issues such as autonomy was understood, referred to, and positioned in the southern peace process. This report documents how state officials grappled with challenges of the peace conversation and their efforts to foster mutual trust between adversaries who had been fighting a long and bitter armed struggle. We may say that the experiences of individuals involved in the peace talks highlights two qualities essential for any peace process. First, to overcome the hurdles, patience is required from those on both sides of the conflict from the policy level down to the civic level. Second, an understanding of how a peace process reaches maturity is needed. Considerations of a peace process’ maturity typically focus on the political maturity of the resistance movement insofar as it is ready to end its armed struggle against the state.6 However, this report of the Strategic Nonviolence Working Group considers the issue from the peace workers’ point of view. Those involved in peace talks should also develop and mature in their knowledge and awareness of how a peace

6 Penetrante, Ariel Macaspac, Facilitating Intractable Political Transformation of Armed Rebel Groups: Bridging Gaps between Transformation and Peace Agreements (March 28, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract= 2030274 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2030274.

Peace Dialogue 13 process functions, in the attentiveness they show to decision-making processes that are conducive to strengthening a peace process, and finally in exploring ways to manage spoilers. First established in 2001, the Strategic Nonviolence Commission was a committee within the National Security Council (NSC). Reporting directly to the prime minister, the Commission was tasked with investigation, analysis, early warning and policy formulation for the Thai government and the public on how to peacefully prevent, manage and transform conflicts. Another aspect of the commission’s work involved awareness-raising and advocacy to mainstream conflict transformation and embed it in stakeholders’ collective consciousness. The commission was terminated when the NSC decided that the conflict transformation approach had been sufficiently mainstreamed as demonstrated by the reformulated 2007–2011 National Security Policy. The Strategic Nonviolence Working Group now exists as a strategic working group under the Office of the Thailand Research Fund. Its role is to collate the resources and experiences from national security work, collaborate on peace and conflict transformation research, and coordinate engagements between the state and the civic sector with the aim of exploring conflict management options for Thai society.7 The Strategic Nonviolence Working Group believes that charting the long, arduous and vibrant path to peace that occurred before the “peace talks” under the Yingluck Shinawatra government and before

7 For details of peace work from the State’s security perspective see Danai Musa, “Nonviolence in Thai Security Perspectives,” in Chaiwat Sath-anand (ed.), Nonviolence Space/Thai Pathways: Knowledge, Secrecy, and Memory (Bangkok: Protestista, 2016), pp. 252–256. [in Thai]

14 Peace Dialogue the peace dialogue under General Prayut Chan-o-cha’s government should contribute substantially to current policy and help steer future peaceful conversations, regardless of the shape and form of the future government.

Strategic Nonviolence Working Group October 2018

Peace Dialogue 15

Peace Dialogue: Confronting Violence in the Deep South of Thailand, 1991–2011

1 Introduction

This report presents the untold stories of nearly two decades of southern border peace dialogue work (1992–2011). Insights and reflections on the covert pursuit of dialogue are valuable, in large part, because of their implications on what we may call the latest dialogue phase beginning in 2012 when the exercise was carried out in the open. These untold stories offer a more complete picture of the facts and greater clarity in terms of background and rationale. We hope this report will be a resource for stakeholders and observers, including the younger generation, to study and explore with an open mind and with a view to overcoming the mindset and hurdles that have so far held back progress in conflict transformation. It is our hope that presenting the realities to the public will enhance Thai society’s understanding and awareness of the southern border provinces trouble as

20 Introduction Presenting the realities to the public will enhance Thai society’s understanding and awareness of the southern border provinces trouble as the national agenda.

the national agenda. Thai citizens must not stand idly by as their compatriots remain trapped in a cycle of conflict that has endured for nearly half a century. We hope to see more actively engaged Thai citizens form a critical mass to advocate for a space in which the conflict can be trans- formed. This space has to be inclusive of all stakeholders. It must be a space where grievances and concerns can be aired, where feasible arrangements that allow for culturally and ethnically diverse peoples to live together in dignity and with genuine equality can be explored. This feat has been achieved once already following the ideological conflict of the Cold War. The report starts by diagnosing the problem at the heart of the conflict and which fuels the violence in the region. If we misdiagnose the problem then we will not identify the right solution and no amount

Peace Dialogue 21 of money and resources will put an end to the violence. The following section recounts stories of the efforts of various actors at different points in time to encourage non-violent instead of violent struggle. By showing how these initiatives began, what results they produced, and what measures were undertaken when dialogue stalled, we hope to illuminate the underlying rationale and process logic of the state. We also recount the perspectives and opinions we have heard from some If we misdiagnose the members of the movement. The problem then we will consequences, be they problems, obstacles, or challenges, are lessons not identify the right for stakeholders today. solution and no The report consists of five parts. amount of money and The first part captures how various resources will put an individuals tasked with tackling the end to the violence. conflict understood the problem and how they addressed it. The discrepancy between policy and implementation is shown to be another driver of the conflict. The accounts in this part reveals how mainstream measures to address the conflict were rooted in a conventional security mindset that was extremely sensitive to any alternative approaches. Even though dialogue had been included in the national policy agenda, the conventional security mindset prevailed and non-violent approaches were relegated to a secondary role. The second part unpacks the efforts related to contacting and communicating with members of the movement. It explores the background and origins of the work, the actors involved, the underlying logic, as well as the substance of the talks. It highlights the challenges and obstacles that derailed or stalled the talks at various junctures.

22 Introduction The third part presents the insights from the dialogue phase where the movement was positioned as a partner in collaborative conflict resolution. It describes how this concept crossed over to the NCPO-approved peace talks which led to the dialogue being pursued openly and as part of national policy. The fourth part offers behind-the-scenes stories of the peace talk process between 2006 and 2011. These stories describe the challenges that were experienced by the civilian-headed peace dialogue committee as they pursued government-mandated talks. At the heart of the challenge was the military’s lack of confidence in dialogue and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s (MFA) acute concerns over internationalization of the conflict. We share details of the important role played by connectors, the issue of paranoia and tests of trust, and the whispers from the movement that hinted at the goals which they sought. Finally, the conclusion offers the author’s thoughts on what is required to keep the dialogue moving along the path to durable peace.

Peace Dialogue 23 2 Background

We put together this report for two reasons. Firstly, the recent peace dialogues1 for the Southern Border Provinces have been the subject of numerous and varied media reports. Yet this dialogue process, which really began to emerge at the end of 2012, is the result of a long chain of efforts from a range of actors spanning the previous two decades. These efforts were shielded from the glare of the media spotlight and little

1 Peace dialogues in Thai under Prayut Chan-ocha’s government is equivalent to พูดคุยสันติสุข (pood kui santi suk) whereas previously it was referred to as พูด คุยสันติภาพ (pood kui santipab). Discussion on terminology can be further explored in Chaiwat Satha-Anand, "Celestial Axe: On the Politics of Naming," Center for Southeast Asian Studies, CSEAS Newsletter 76(Spring/Summer 2018), pp. 11–13, https://newsletter.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/nl76/76_05_seasia_key note.html (accessed November 29, 2018).

24 Background To identify where the peace dialogue fits in the overall efforts to resolve the southern border problem.

known beyond a small circle. This report hopes to address the gaps in public knowledge surrounding this period of discreet peace dialogue work. Secondly, the current peace dialogue is no longer a discreet process. The information in the public domain from the dialogue parties, scholars, civil society and the mass media has generated a momentum that keeps the issue alive and stirs interest among a wide audience. This momentum heightens expectations and serves to either garner support for or opposition to the dialogue process. With the hiatus that occurred following Malaysia’s general election and change of government, observers have been keenly monitoring how developments will unfold in light of Malaysia’s political transition and its appointment of a new facilitator.

Peace Dialogue 25 With this report, the Strategic Nonviolence Working Group hopes to identify where the peace dialogue fits in the overall efforts to resolve the southern border problem. It is hoped that all stakeholders, regardless of their positions or views, will see the situation with greater clarity, thus providing some hope that an end to the violence and a resolution to the conflict is attainable. The scope of the report covers only the formerly classified work undertaken prior to 2012. We deliberately steer clear of any sensitive details related to the current talks, which are a work-in-progress. The report begins by providing an overview of the causes of the violence. Next, the report outlines how policies have evolved and how contact between the parties developed. It includes stories along the path towards peace. Through these accounts this report attempts to answer five key questions: 1) What factors eventually led the peace dialogue to assume more prominence in national policy and why? 2) Who did what in the dialogue policy work? 3) What behind-the-scenes stories are there that have a bearing on the linkages between and the continuity of the dialogue phases?

In light of this, the Strategic Nonviolence Working Group has instead decided to recount the experiences of people who, at one time or another, directly participated in negotiations with members of the movement or who were involved in the policy formulation process.

26 Background 4) Can dialogue pave the way for a complete resolution of the conflict as in conflicts elsewhere? Why? 5) Who makes the final decision on the concessions the state can make vis-à-vis the demands of the local populace including members of the armed groups? On what basis, legal or otherwise, can such a decision be made? The report does not apply any methodology due to the restrictions on citing classified material and the need for discretion on the part of some individuals still actively involved in the current dialogue process. In light of this, the Strategic Nonviolence Working Group has instead decided to recount the experiences of people who, at one time or another, directly participated in negotiations with members of the movement or who were involved in the policy formulation process.

Peace Dialogue 27 3 The Problem and its Resolution

The Problem

Although a variety of different views may be expressed whenever violence in the Southern Border Provinces is discussed, when it comes to the rationale behind these different views, no one view or definition of the problem deviates substantially from the reality of the problem. It is a matter of perspective and one’s perspective is also informed by the role that one has to play with respect to addressing the problem. The truth or reality of the conflict may be explained with reference to either the causes or the effects of violence. To clarify this point, it is necessary to examine the process of formulating security policy for the Southern Border Provinces. An ex-high-ranking National Security Council (NSC) officer, who had been responsible for resolving the problem, observed

28 The Problem and its Resolution Although a variety of different views may be expressed whenever violence in the Southern Border Provinces is discussed, when it comes to the rationale behind these different views, no one view or definition of the problem deviates substantially from the reality of the problem. It is a matter of perspective and one’s perspective is also informed by the role that one has to play with respect to addressing the problem.

that different factors emphasized in each of the policy phases highlighted different perspectives regarding the origins of the violence. During one phase, policies focused on the region’s underdevelopment and so resources were directed towards economic and livelihood assistance. In another phase, the idea that some returning Middle-East educated students were fomenting the rebellion gained prominence. Thus, the response was to tightly regulate studies abroad. At various times, the policy focus seems to suggest that the problem is caused by religious education, external interference or clandestine support from abroad. In any case, the underlying constant at the policy and operational levels is the view that the violence is perpetrated by an armed separatist movement. On this basis, a whole host of suppression measures have

Peace Dialogue 29 Why relentless suppression year-in-year-out, which has resulted in a number of arrests and some convictions, has not succeeded in deterring fresh-faced individuals from joining the armed groups, who are called “criminals” by Thai authority.

been resolutely imposed over the years. Since 2004, which marked the beginning of the latest wave of violence now in its fourteenth year, policy measures have attempted to address the problem through multi- faceted interventions. However, all these interventions have proceeded under the blanket enforcement of special security laws and under an internal security rubric that suggests the state still views the problem through the lens of criminality. As such, the state sees itself as legitimately enforcing these laws against suspects or offenders. Yet it must be asked why relentless suppression year-in-year-out, which has resulted in a number of arrests and some convictions, has not succeeded in deterring fresh-faced individuals from joining the armed groups, who are called “criminals” by Thai authority. An alternative view is that the violence is linked to grievances and resentment towards individual officers or specific agencies, who disregard civil rights and liberties, demonstrate cultural insensitivity, and behave inappropriately towards the majority Malay-Muslim population. Compounding this issue is a legacy of past policies which have prioritized the state’s security over human security. Such a policy orientation has given rise to perceptions of injustice. If the actions of people who think differently from the state are viewed as security

30 The Problem and its Resolution threat, then the appropriate policy response which follows is to “control and suppress” this threat so that it is either contained or eradicated.

Separatism vs. Uneasiness in One’s Homeland

Religious scholars and academics from the region that had studied in Saudi Arabia said they felt little pride in being citizens of Thailand. In their minds, state officials treated ethnic Malays as less than human. One scholar described how, upon returning home to Thailand, he had to choose whether to join the path of violence or the path of nonviolence as guided by his faith. While acknowledg- They felt little pride in being ing that the majority chose citizens of Thailand. In their the first path, he and some minds, state officials treated friends had instead decided ethnic Malays as less than to use their knowledge and human. faith to shape a new generation of religious adherents who could live in peace with people of different faiths and cultures. Despite choosing the path of non-violence, even today, he could still feel the watchful eyes of some state officials directed at him. To get a clearer picture of the situation, it is worth examining past attempts to address the troubles in the Deep South. The use of violence is intimately linked to the conditions imposed by the state that have reinforced the belief, inherited over generations, that the only way to effect change is through armed struggle. If we compare accounts taken from the reign of King Rama VI with more recent accounts, we see that

Peace Dialogue 31 The use of violence is intimately linked to the conditions imposed by the state that have reinforced the belief, inherited over generations, that the only way to effect change is through armed struggle.

conditions present nearly a century ago remain in existence today. On 6 July 1923, a set of public administration regulations for Monthol Pattani was formalized with Royal Consent. The regulations es- sentially called for “the repeal or amendment of procedures or practices that make citizens feel as if Islam is being circumscribed…officials should treat citizens fairly. They should be punished for any misconduct. Officials to be sent to the region should be carefully selected and given proper training before deployment so they understand the local culture.” It is understood that the Royal Court had listened to the grievances expressed by citizens of Monthol Pattani and responded by promulgating the abovemen- tioned regulations. On 2 November 2006, shortly after assuming the premiership, Gen- eral Surayud Chulanont made a historic speech in Pattani province when he apologized in front of an audience of over 1,000 people, which included religious leaders and the families of those killed in the Takbai massacre. “I apologize for the previous government and on behalf of this government. I apologize on behalf of the previous government for what happened and I would like to raise my hand and say that I am also guilty. I utter these words of apology with all sincerity.” He added, “I tried to oppose several of

32 The Problem and its Resolution Public statement from a former army commander-in-chief, Privy Council member and sitting prime minister explicitly acknowledging the mistakes made in policy and conduct is a testament to the state actions that have sown the seeds of hate, resentment and retribution amongst a victimized populace.

the previous government’s policies and I failed to do so. Instead, I was labelled as uncooperative. So today I reiterate my apology.” Such a powerful public statement from a former army commander-in-chief, Privy Council member and sitting prime minister explicitly acknowledging the mistakes made in policy and conduct is a testament to the state actions that have sown the seeds of hate, resentment and retribution amongst a victimized populace. These two accounts reveal how the conditions for violence that were created by the state almost 100 years ago remain alive and real today. The 2017–2019 Southern Border Provinces Administration and Development Policy also emphasizes the need to eliminate the conditions that lead to violence as its foremost objective. A pertinent part of the policy reads as follows; “[It is important to] promote trustworthiness and collaboration between the State and people, by focusing on recruitment and development of State officials from all agencies with awareness, attitude, personality and behavior towards peace and respect for human rights, to be assigned to perform the duties in the Southern Border Provinces; introducing a mechanism for collaboration between the public sector and the people to monitor and examine the State officials’ operations

Peace Dialogue 33 If one is adamant that all these conditions have been met, then what continues to motivate a younger generation to join the armed struggle and wage violence? Why are complaints of injustice and human rights violations still being made?

in strict compliance with the legal framework.” This policy also prioritized, “effectively building people’s confidence in the justice system in all dimensions…ensuring that State officials realize their commitment to strictly comply with the laws, regulations, traditions, conventions, and respect the principles of legal state, rule of law and human rights.” Surely, frontline agencies must have implemented at least some of these policies to reduce the conditions for violence and yet many issues still persist. If one is adamant that all these conditions have been met, then what continues to motivate a younger generation to join the armed struggle and wage violence? Why are complaints of injustice and human rights violations still being made?

Transforming the Violent Struggle

After 1997, policy-making became less top-down and Bangkok- centric and more participatory. People of all stripes came forward to share their fears, their suspicions, and their views on the causes of the insecurity. The 1999–2003 Southern Border Provinces Security Policy offered an avenue to address citizens’ concerns and the policy was

34 The Problem and its Resolution widely accepted by local people. Nevertheless, seasoned observers asked why conditions for violence persisted and intensified after 2004. Findings from a study conducted by the Strategic Nonviolence Commission (SNC) indicated that the prevailing conditions for violence were hostility and prejudice on the part of some state officials as well as a lack of respect for different cultures, historical narratives and beliefs. In addition, the state’s efforts to “solve the problem” have rather increased the problems and complicated the situation further. If the policy is implemented inconsistently or not in the way that it was intended, it could be because the implementer believes their method to be more effective although we cannot know for sure what would explain their behavior. An army general noted that, “security agencies’ codes of conduct, especially the military’s, prioritize the execution of orders. Regardless of an individual soldier’s conscience and regardless of the progressiveness of a policy, whatever order is received must be complied with.” When implementation fails to align with policy, in particular with a policy that was so participatory in the making, people feel deceived. That feeling cuts deep in the aftermath of incidents, such as

The state’s efforts to “solve the problem” have rather increased the problems and complicated the situation further. If the policy is implemented inconsistently or not in the way that it was intended, it could be because the implementer believes their method to be more effective although we cannot know for sure what would explain their behavior.

Peace Dialogue 35 State agencies had identified the separatist ideology as the underlying motivation for and goal of the armed struggle, not once did any agency seek to ask why a portion of the population wish to separate from the Thai state?

the Tak Bai massacre or the mosque massacre. It cuts deep in the aftermath of extrajudicial killings, torture and the like. People believe that officials commit these atrocities with intent and such incidents spark the desire for revenge. They help the armed movements to recruit a new generation of combatants. A retired high-ranking NSC officer in charge of policy formulation, who played an instrumental role in re-orienting Southern Border policy after 1997, noted that despite the leadership changes and fragmentation of the armed resistance movement, their rationale for the struggle remained constant. The violent campaign’s longevity is a testament to the success of the generational transmission of ideology and the dynamic evolution of combative strategies and tactics against the state. Although in the past, state agencies had identified the separatist ideology as the underlying motivation for and goal of the armed struggle, not once did any agency seek to ask why a portion of the population wish to separate from the Thai state? In the first half of 2004, the SNC attempted to communicate with members of the executive branch to open their eyes to an alternative interpretation of the situation. The SNC wrote three memoranda to the then-prime minister to stress that the incidents were crimes with

36 The Problem and its Resolution political implications. Yet the government’s understanding was that the escalation of violence at that time was nothing like the politically- motivated violence of the past. The government had previously dissolved two bodies—the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC) and the 43rd Joint Civilian, Police and Military Command that had once been effective in addressing the politically-motivated violence. The dissolution was on the basis that the problems were of a criminal nature and so had to be addressed through policing solutions. This paved the way for a series of oversights which further fueled suspicion and widened the gap between the state and the local population. The solution proposed to the then-prime minister was to reconsider ramping up military and law enforcement power. Instead of simply arresting criminals, it was suggested that a new form of security be cultivated based on a culture of peace and reflecting the region’s diversity. In essence, the proposal was to enable local people to carry on living as Muslims in the Thai State, an approach similar to the one outlined in the 1999–2003 Southern Border Provinces Security Policy. A culture of peace has to prioritize the cultural elements that alleviate hate and give less credence to the idea that suppression and arrests will make the problem go away. The elements of a culture of peace can also function as a crucial indicator of state-society relations as it offers people the space to accept or reject the actions of the state. Besides the SNC’s recommendations to develop a culture of peace as per the 1999–2003 policy, advocacy for a change of approach was exerted via other channels. A change of approach was proposed by Minister Chaturon Chaisang as well as by the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC). Following the 2006 Coup d’état, the NSC continued advocating for a culture of peace and it eventually appeared in Prime

Peace Dialogue 37 Efforts to make dialogue in search of peaceful co-existence in the southern border region a national policy priority faced an uphill battle. For a start, the idea went against the grain of mainstream conventional security imperatives.

Minister’s Office Order 206/2549 on the Southern Border Provinces Peacebuilding Policy. The order stated that the insurgency had its roots in people’s desire for participation and co-existence on the basis of their unique identity. For the first time, guidelines were developed on how to promote and support platforms to cultivate better understanding with groups that think differently and that employ violence. Efforts to improve engagement was to be pursued among target groups at all levels. This particular policy had far-reaching implications on the pursuit of peace talks approved by the then-prime minister. Until only recently, efforts to make dialogue in search of peaceful co-existence in the southern border region a national policy priority faced an uphill battle. For a start, the idea went against the grain of mainstream conventional security imperatives. Some viewed the situation as under control and so felt there was no need to hold talks. Others voiced concern that this would amount to internationalization of a sub-national conflict and would therefore lead to external interference. Some suggested that such a move could be interpreted as a sign that the state was on the verge of defeat. Thus, the predominance of conventional security thinking and the fear of public opposition from an unsympathetic Thai public posed a challenge for translating the well-articulated policy into practice.

38 The Problem and its Resolution It is time Thai people ask themselves whether they can stay indifferent to violence that has taken over 6,000 lives, injured tens of thousands more, and inflicted unspeakable mental trauma causing no end of lost opportunities. The Thai people must ask themselves if they are content to allow the violence to continue simply because they view those people who think differently from them as enemies. Would they rather not change their perspective and see them instead as friends and compatriots? It is important to consider which perspective should be adopted because they each lead to very different approaches, actions, and outcomes.

Peace Dialogue 39 4 From Negotiation to Peace Dialogue

Most people probably think that peace dialogue with the armed resistance movement began in 2012 given the media attention that surrounded the process. Some may have heard about talks prior to 2012 but were unfamiliar with the background and key stories. Some may assume that the groundwork leading to the formal talks involved unsanctioned, covert operations. Any of this is likely. In some cases, it was not clear how the contact or talks originated or what purpose they served. This chapter presents an account of what occurred from the point of first contact, to the initial talks with the armed resistance groups, and up until the peace dialogue as we know it. Negotiations with the armed resistance groups initially followed the success of the Peaceful South Policy (Nayobai Tai Rom Yen) and the success of dialogue with individual leaders of the Communist Party of

40 From Negotiation to Peace Dialogue Negotiations with the armed resistance groups initially followed the success of the Peaceful South Policy (Nayobai Tai Rom Yen) and the success of dialogue with individual leaders of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT).

Thailand (CPT) by the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) Region 4. ISOC Region 4 also played an instrumental role in brokering the trilateral peace agreement in 1989 between the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and the Malaysian government. With their experience and a high-caliber team working out the deals that ended the armed struggles of the CPT and CPM, ISOC Region 4 tried the same approach with separatist groups in the Southern Border Provinces. The idea of talking to the separatists, as they had been branded by the state, was grounded in the belief that the threat was under control. It was hoped that dialogue would simply accelerate the end of violence. After 1987, the 4th Region Army Command initiated negotiations with a view to convincing separatists to turn themselves in as “Partners

Peace Dialogue 41 The idea of talking to the separatists, as they had been branded by the state, was grounded in the belief that the threat was under control. It was hoped that dialogue would simply accelerate the end of violence.

in Development of the Thai Nation.” However, the program folded soon after due to minimal uptake. Between 1991 and 1992, the 4th Region Army Command appointed two working groups staffed with many of the same individuals who had worked on the CPM negotiations. The two working groups were tasked with reaching out to members of PULO and BRN. Representatives held a series of secret meetings with movement leaders at locations where they wielded influence and in several other countries. These talks were about persuading the movement’s upper echelons to return and participate in the development of their homeland. According to a former top NSC officer responsible for the Deep South, talks prior to 2002 were pursued with the aim of changing their ideology or encouraging surrender. There were offers of assistance with criminal cases. However, the movement did not believe the military’s desire to engage in negotiations was genuine. They saw it as a ploy to gather intelligence and undermine the movement’s strength. In 2005, roughly a year after the latest round of violence re- emerged, senior members in government revived contact with a view to resuming talks. Although they were merely testing the waters, such initial contact produced a tangible outcome. The government leadership endorsed the talks. The objective was shifted from competition to

42 From Negotiation to Peace Dialogue confidence-building and collaboration to de-escalate confrontations Talks prior to 2002 with a long-term resolution in mind. were pursued with To unpack the evolution of the the aim of changing peace talks’ torturous development, their ideology or we describe the work carried out by encouraging the many different actors under different mechanisms. surrender.

Agency-Initiated Negotiations

This section deals with the negotiations and academic exchanges initiated and implemented at agency level without direct orders from government although with the knowledge of the executive branch. These efforts deserve to be mentioned because they form a crucial part of the development of the process and highlight the role that specific actors played.

1) 1991–1994 The 4th Region Army Commander Lt. Gen. Kitti Rattanachaya sent the PULO negotiation working group on a mission to talk to the PULO leadership twice: first in Cairo, Egypt and then in Damascus, Syria. These two rounds were significant because they secured the participation of PULO Secretary-General Tenku Bira Kotanila. The task was executed in three stages: The first stage occurred between 1991 and 1992. Military intelligence officers were sent to meet the top leadership. They began by meeting the commander of PULO’s armed unit in the mountain range bordering Ja-nae and Sri Sakorn. The commander, however, said

Peace Dialogue 43 negotiations were beyond his level of authority. The second stage took off following contact established with PULO’s political leader during his journey from Sweden to Kuala Lumpur. The back-and-forth coordination took over three months. PULO’s political leader consulted with various others until a final decision was reached. PULO’s top decision-making body (Maktab Tertingi) convened a meeting in Mecca, Saudi Arabia and agreed to negotiations with representatives of the Thai military. PULO’s political wing was tasked with mobilizing cooperation from other groups. After informing the PULO secretary-general, it sent a representative to meet the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), ostensibly to inform the body and implicitly to seek its endorsement. Coordinators from each side prepared a document outlining the details of the negotiation framework as agreed by both parties. The third stage consisted of two plenary meetings. The 4th Region Army delegation was led by a military officer who had played a role brokering the CPM agreement with the Malaysian government. The PULO side demonstrated a united front by bringing their military and political wing leaders along with their head of international affairs to attend the meetings, led by the secretary-general on both occasions.

The 4th Region Army delegation tried to sensitize the PULO group as to how the country’s situation, policies and rules had changed insofar as opening up space for people who think differently to advocate for change through a political process.

44 From Negotiation to Peace Dialogue The 4th Region Army delegation tried to sensitize the PULO group as to how the country’s situation, policies and rules had changed insofar as opening up space for people who think differently to advocate for change through a political process. In the second plenary meeting, the 4th Region Army delegation invited the PULO secretary-general to come to Thailand for medical treatment. The PULO delegation did not offer any formal proposal but hinted that they might put forward at the next round something in reference to the proposals of Haji Sulong Abdul Qadir. The secretary-general turned down the offer of medical treat- Orders to cancel the ment in Thailand. The military’s third round of talks reading into this was that he was with PULO were issued concerned his peers might inter- from above upon pret an acceptance as being discovery that PULO bought-off by the Thai authorities. Orders to cancel the third had been capitalizing round of talks with PULO were on the dialogue to issued from above upon discovery boost their profile that PULO had been capitalizing on internationally. the dialogue to boost their profile internationally. It emerged that PULO had taken photographs and information from the negotiations to claim to the OIC and Islamic countries that the Thai government recognized the group’s status. PULO had also made public statements to the effect that the Thai government were not sincere in negotiating a solution. Thereafter no talks were held whatsoever with PULO. Nevertheless, some individuals maintained sporadic contact through a coordinator who kept open a channel for communication.

Peace Dialogue 45 2) 1995 Attempts to negotiate with the armed resistance movement were revived under the initiative of the then-Commissioner General of the Malaysia Police Tan Sri Abdul Rahim Mohammad Noor, and the then- Commander of Malaysian Special Branch Datuk Norian Mai. They visited Thailand and met the NSC secretary-general, the Thai police chief, and the 4th Region army commander. The Malaysian delegation offered to help Thai authorities resolve the conflict as a gesture of goodwill and to express gratitude to Thailand for its assistance in ending the violent conflict between Malaysia and the CPM. The Malaysian side proposed to facilitate negotiations between representatives of the Thai government and the movement on the condition that the peace talks would not be exploited to advance any other interest of the military, police or intelligence agencies. The negotiations aimed primarily to end the separatist struggle but would also address the issue of criminality. A joint working group was appointed to work out the details and two target groups were identified; 1)Pro-violence intellectuals and thought leaders and; 2) Criminal elements who were members of the movement. En- gagement with the first group would involve meetings and negotiations to find peaceful solutions while evidence of criminality would lead to

The Malaysian delegation offered to help Thai authorities resolve the conflict as a gesture of goodwill and to express gratitude to Thailand for its assistance in ending the violent conflict between Malaysia and the CPM.

46 From Negotiation to Peace Dialogue judicial measures, agreed between the two countries, being applied against the second group. Through Malaysia’s Special Branch, which had access to movement leaders residing in Malaysia, different groups were invited to a meeting at the Malaysia Although the Police headquarters in Kuala Lumpur. Malaysian side Movement leaders were informed of the insisted that it had forthcoming cooperation and were re- talked to various quested to come together to collectively groups wishing to negotiate with Thai authorities. How negotiate with the ever, the plan was aborted before it even began. Although the Malaysian side in- Thai government sisted that it had talked to various as a collective, the groups wishing to negotiate with the Thai military Thai government as a collective, the Thai preferred to talk to military preferred to talk to individuals individuals rather rather than with a group as proposed than with a group by Malaysia. An order was subsequently as proposed by issued calling off the cooperation with Malaysia. Malaysia at the same time that the 4th Region Army Command underwent a change in leadership.

3) 2002 The Southern Border region appeared calm during this period. However, beneath the quiet surface were a group of active Malay-Muslim scholars based in neighboring countries, who were thought leaders and part of the movement’s intellectual wing. They were influential

Peace Dialogue 47 in indoctrinating and motivating youth to wage the struggle. In anticipation of a new round of violence, the SNC sought to evaluate the situation and to identify the core reasons why this group of intellectuals still believed that violence should be adopted to achieve the change they desired. Against this backdrop, the SNC organized a platform for Hoping to build rapport academic exchange hoping and mutual understanding to build rapport and mutual understanding between Thai between Thai academics academics and Malay-Muslim and Malay-Muslim intellectuals who were the sep- intellectuals who were the aratist movement’s thought separatist movement’s leaders. In addition, the SNC thought leaders. believed it could benefit from learning more about the attitudes and positions of these Malay-Muslim intellectuals based in Malaysia so as to inform the design of preventative measures. A technical working group was established to conduct the exchange. A meeting was held to meet the target group in Kuala Lumpur. A second exchange, to be held in Bangkok, was put on hold due to a change of heart on the part of the leadership. Support for this undertaking was, therefore, ended.

4) Post 2004 In the aftermath of the early 2004 violence, the NRC proposed that instead of armed struggle the Thai government endorse peace dialogues as an alternative nonviolent conflict resolution approach. In 2005, former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, in his capacity

48 From Negotiation to Peace Dialogue The NRC proposed that instead of armed struggle the Thai government endorse peace dialogues as an alternative nonviolent conflict resolution approach.

as chair of Perdana Global Peace, and his son Dato Seri Haji Mukhriz bin Mahathir developed a cooperation framework known as the Langkawi Process together with NRC Chair former Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun and the Armed Forces Security Center Commander, an NRC member. The Malaysian side liaised with movement members leading to two rounds of meetings in Langkawi. The commander of the Armed Forces Security Center led the Thai side. The movement was represented by an older generation of leaders from BERSATU, BRN-Congress, GMP, BIPP and PULO. The facilitator of this process was Datuk Shazryl Eskay Abdullah, a Malaysian businessman serving as Honorary Thai Consul in Langkawi. The movement representatives had tabled a Roadmap for Peace in Southern Thailand prior to the military coup which took place in September 2006. The proposed roadmap put forward eight issues to be discussed. It included several confidence-building measures and number of a proposals; 1) Appointment of a Minister for Islamic affairs; 2) Recognition of Malay as a working language; 3) Introduction of a quota to boost the number of Muslims in civilian and military units; 4) Education reform;

Peace Dialogue 49 5) Investment and economic development; 6) Amnesties; 7) Establishment of a commission of inquiry into human rights violations; 8) Establishment of an implementation monitoring team.

The Thai side did not respond to the roadmap and the cooperation framework ended because the Malaysia Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi did not support the role played by his predecessor Mahathir. However, Badawi did intend to move the process forward. It had already been decided that once the Thai government agreed, a foreign intelligence agency would step in and take over the role played by Mahathir’s NGO. In the end, although the plan was incorporated into the militaries’ cooperation framework, the talks failed to gain any traction. In 2006, the Thai and Malaysian military established a counterpart mechanism. The Malaysian side set up Task Force 2010 headed by a former military intelligence chief. The Thai side activated Task Force 960 led by the assistant chief of staff for Intelligence in the Thai army. The agenda pursued by this counterpart mechanism included efforts to contact the armed movement to talk peace. Yet this mechanism stalled

The Thai side did not respond to the roadmap and the cooperation framework ended because the Malaysia Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi did not support the role played by his predecessor Mahathir.

50 From Negotiation to Peace Dialogue The Malaysian side set up Task Force 2010 headed by a former military intelligence chief. The Thai side activated Task Force 960 led by the assistant chief of staff for Intelligence in the Thai army.

after it emerged that the Malaysian side had tried to expand the remit of Task Force 2010 beyond the agreed terms of reference. In November 2007, Task Force 2010 founded SuTERA (Southern Thailand Welfare and Education Foundation) and raised 100,000 Malaysian Ringgit from Thais and Malay-Muslims living in Malaysia with a view to implementing projects in the border provinces. In addition, the Malaysian side unilaterally arranged for movement representatives to meet the OIC. The Thai side took issue with the perceived overreach of the Malaysians and the cooperation framework was terminated leading Badawi to dissolve Task Force 2010.

Individual-Initiated Dialogue

Several groups of individuals attempted to kick start a peace dialogue process by reaching out to individuals claiming to represent the movement outside Thailand. These individuals included academics as well as former politicians who had served in the army. Some of these attempts made headlines and generated public interest. Away from the spotlight, however, numerous contacts had been established at the micro-level and formed part of the tactical work executed by military, police, and civilian officials. A few such examples are discussed below.

Peace Dialogue 51 Numerous contacts had been established at the micro-level and formed part of the tactical work executed by military, police, and civilian officials. A few such examples are discussed below.

Ex-Army Commander-in-Chief General Chetta Thanajaro, in his capacity as a political party leader, gave an interview to Army Television Channel 5 in mid-July 2008. Images accompanying the interview showed a ceasefire declaration by a group claiming to represent the Southern Thailand United Underground Group or Lankasuka. Media reports indicated that talks with the movement had been ongoing “for some time” although the Thai government had not been informed. Following the media attention, progress along this path stalled. While holding political office, formerth 4 Army Region Commander General Kwanchart Klaharn and a group of army officers initiated dialogue with a group called the Patani Malay Consultative Congress led by an individual named Wahyuddin. Several meetings took place towards the end of 2008 mediated by Indonesia’s Vice President Jusuf Kalla and coordinated by Kalla’s political staff. The process ended after Indonesian television broadcast coverage of a meeting at the Bogor Presidential Palace, which was then picked up by the Thai media. The publicity upset both Thai and Indonesian authorities. In addition to these two examples, there were countless secret meetings and encounters. Prior to this, in 2002, a former prime minister sent a senior military officer as an envoy to meet movement representatives in Kuala Lumpur. Politicians from the southern border

52 From Negotiation to Peace Dialogue region also contacted and met movement members residing in Malaysia every once in a while. It was not clear what objective those meetings served. Within the academic realm, the late Ahmad Somboon Bualuang, an independent scholar active in peacebuilding, received support from a German NGO to travel and meet PULO members in Germany and Sweden. Following these meetings, Somboon collaborated with King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI), with the support of a Japanese NGO, to organize academic exchanges with movement members residing outside Thailand. The driving force behind this process was a former NSC deputy-secretary general, who acting as an advisor to KPI’s Office for Peace and Governance, was working with the institute’s academics and peacebuilding alumni network. These activities broadened outreach to engage a new generation of the armed resistance movement. The idea was to open up a quasi-formal channel, the so-called Track 1.5, to support Track 1 and Track 2 peace efforts to ensure that movement members could still be reached in the event of Track 1 stagnation. KPI’s role remained outside the media spotlight and after 2012, was also linked with ISOC’s working group on peace talks.

The idea was to open up a quasi-formal channel, the so-called Track 1.5, to support Track 1 and Track 2 peace efforts to ensure that movement members could still be reached in the event of Track 1 stagnation.

Peace Dialogue 53 Policy-Mandated Dialogue

Following the resurgence of violence in 2004, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) approached the Thai government with a proposal. Headquartered in Geneva and funded by Swiss and European governments, HD is a peacebuilding organization. It offered to work with the Thai prime minister to conduct an assessment of the Deep South conflict and to open up dialogue with the movement. The HD study produced three key findings: • The armed resistance movement had members deployed throughout the sub-region and it was difficult to pinpoint the identity of the leadership; • The older generation of the resistance movement were unlikely to have any direct involvement in commanding the violence on the ground; • No group whatsoever had come forward to claim responsibility for the violent attacks.

After HD received the green light from the Thai government in mid-2005, they initiated secret talks with the armed resistance movement. The process was stopped temporarily and re-started in early 2006 following a re-shuffle of delegation members. Talks continued up

After HD received the green light from the Thai government in mid-2005, they initiated secret talks with the armed resistance movement.

54 From Negotiation to Peace Dialogue until early 2008 and resumed again at the end of 2008 until mid–2011. These talks spanned three Thai administrations. Here we unpack the series of talks according to the administration in which they occurred.

Thaksin Shinawatra Government (2004–2006) Under this administration, peace efforts were controlled by a tightly-knit circle around the prime minister. The prime minister assigned tasks to a political team, headed by an experienced ex-high-ranking army officer, to contact and sound out the movement. In October 2004 soon after the Takbai incident, HD received the prime minister’s go-ahead to reach out to the armed groups regarding talks with Thai government After two rounds of representatives. In June 2005, a parlia- talks held in Geneva, mentarian from a major political party, the process ended who had previously been a senior mili- without any tary intelligence officer, was sent as the special envoy to attend talks in Geneva. agreement. The movement side consisted of representatives from BERSATU, GMIP, BRN Congress and PULO. HD facilitated and funded the undertaking. After two rounds of talks held in Geneva, the process ended without any agreement. The same prime minister that had approved the talks also decided to end them but requested that HD continue monitoring the movement’s activities. HD declined the request on the grounds that it fell outside its organizational mandate. Direct contact between HD and the government ceased. HD nonetheless continued to monitor and assess the conflict from both sides of the border. Although the dialogue had stalled, HD was of the view that it had at least demon-

Peace Dialogue 55 strated that discreet attempts to reach out to the armed groups to initiate talks was feasible. In early 2006, HD’s regional director for Asia contacted SNC member Mark Tamthai to explore the possibility of reviving the dialogue. Mark arranged a meeting between the HD regional director and NSC secretary-general to discuss the possibility of reviving talks with the armed groups. The NSC secretary-general agreed and instructed the SNC to function as a mechanism to advance the talks. Before proceeding, it was requested that they consult the army commander-in- chief, who was responsible for dealing with the southern insurgency. Conditions imposed on the dialogue included the need to respect confidentiality and that scope of HD’s role was limited to that of facilitator not a mediator. The NSC secretary-general informed the deputy prime minister in charge of national security and explained that it was a policy-mandated mission.

The NSC secretary-general agreed and instructed the SNC to function as a mechanism to advance the talks.

Immediately after the military coup in late 2006, the peace talks were put on hold while a new government was formed and until a clearer policy direction had started to emerge. During this hiatus, the facilitator ensured that contact and communication between the two parties was maintained.

56 From Negotiation to Peace Dialogue HD’s efforts and the Thai delegation leader’s credibility, the head of the BRN-C delegation agreed to meet him in private in Medan, Indonesia.

The peace dialogue under the aegis of the NSC and with HD as facilitator came to be known as the Geneva Process after the location of the first meeting between the Thai government and the group now referred to as “the Pattani Movement”1. Initially, PULO representatives from Ma- laysia, Sweden and Syria joined the talks, together with senior BIPP leaders. PULO later brought in BRN Coordinate (BRN-C) representatives, in numbers which matched PULO’s. BRN-C had only participated re- motely during the first two rounds of meetings as they were worried about being tailed if they attended in person. However, thanks to HD’s efforts and the Thai delegation leader’s credibility, the head of the BRN-C delegation agreed to meet him in private in Medan, Indonesia. That meeting facilitated the ensuing round of plenary talks and secured the physical presence of the BRN-C. The SNC continued the Geneva Process until the September 2006 military coup.

1 The issue of how to refer to the armed movement is a contentious one because it is related to the term used to refer to the geographical area of the conflict. While the state refers to the area as “the Southern Border Provinces”, or in this case “Pattani”, the armed movement prefers to refer to themselves with reference to “Patani”. This report uses the term “the movement” gener- ically with the intention to allow for various interpretations.

Peace Dialogue 57 Surayud Chulanont Government (2006–2007) The peace dialogue under this government made significant head- way in terms of confidence-building, in securing BRN’s participation, and ensuring the participation and support of both the security and intelligence arms. For the first time, a high-level mechanism with the mandate to pursue dialogue was instituted. In terms of confidence building, Prime Minister’s Order No. 206/2549 on the Southern Border Provinces Peace- For the first building Policy signaled the government’s time, a high-level commitment to peaceful resolution of mechanism with the conflict. The order prescribed com- the mandate to munication with people who think pursue dialogue differently and who choose the path of violence. In other words, the policy for- was instituted. malized dialogue as an operation within the national policy framework making dialogue a transparent pursuit, although actual talks remained discreet. The move was a positive step for those participating in the dialogue. Moreover, the government allocated funds to finance the expenses of dialogue-related missions. Previous processes had had to count on partial support from third-parties. Another major confidence boost which signaled the government’s commitment occurred when a top leader of the executive branch travelled to meet and talk in person with the Movement’s representatives in Bahrain at the end of 2007. Although he explained to movement representatives that he was there simply as a concerned citizen, the presence of a high-ranking government official was well-received. Regarding the dialogue, the prime minster, as NSC chair, ordered

58 From Negotiation to Peace Dialogue A top leader of the executive branch travelled to meet and talk in person with the Movement’s representatives in Bahrain at the end of 2007.

the formation of a Peace Dialogue Committee to act as an accountability mechanism for the talks. In addition, an informal, high-level steering committee was established, chaired by the PM. The steering committee included the foreign affairs minister, the defense minister, and the permanent secretary of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, the army commander-in-chief, the NSC secretary-general and the director of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA). The steering committee provided policy direction for the NSC-implemented peace dialogue framework and ensured the harmonization and complementarity of the dialogue with other previous measures that had been undertaken by the military in cooperation with Malaysia. When Thailand underwent yet another change in government in early 2008, the peace dialogue ground to a halt because the new NSC secretary-general, appointed by Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, did not support the process. The PM ordered the dissolution of the NSC

The PM ordered the dissolution of the NSC Peace Dialogue Committee and the Geneva Process was terminated until the end of PM Somchai Wongsawat’s government.

Peace Dialogue 59 Peace Dialogue Committee and the Geneva Process was terminated until the end of PM Somchai Wongsawat’s government. The Pattani Movement was all-to-familiar with such ebbs and flows in policy. They fully recognized that the political turmoil in Bangkok wreaked havoc not only upon the southern border peace process, but on a host of other issues too.

Abhisit Vejjajiva Government (2008–2011) The peace dialogue was put on hold for almost a year and only revived during the premiership of Abhisit Vejjajiva at the end of 2008. Through the efforts of Kraisak Choonhavan, Deputy Leader of the Demo crat Party, an informal consultation was held between Prime Minister Abhisit with the NSC secretary-general, the permanent-secretary of foreign affairs, the army commander-in-chief, Mark Tamthai and a team of top NSC officers. They discussed the possibility of picking up where the Geneva dialogue had left off. In the end, they decided to proceed. On 18 July 2009, the prime minister, as NSC chair, issued an order to establish the Southern Border Provinces Peace Dialogue Committee. The committee included the same group of individuals appointed under General They discussed the Surayud Chulanont’s administration possibility of and was chaired by Mark Tamthai. The picking up where committee was to function as a mechanism to research and evaluate the the Geneva attitudes and perspectives of groups dialogue had left that think differently from the state. off. In the end, Included in this designation was the they decided Pattani Movement together with to proceed. those members who exercised control

60 From Negotiation to Peace Dialogue The talks under the Geneva Process ended with the end of Abhisit’s government as the incoming administration decided to forge their own path.

over the violence in the region. In this way, the committee’s work would support the peace process in accordance with and as outlined in the Southern Border Peacebuilding Policy. The NSC’s Southern Border Provinces Peacebuilding Policy had the full support of the heads of security-related agencies, including the permanent secretary of foreign affairs, the permanent secretary for justice, the NIA director, and the army commander-in-chief. Moreover, the active engagement of these agencies had incremental benefits. The fact that the Thai army and NIA sent representatives to participate in the committee and also allocated a budget to cover travel expenses for Movement representatives to attend meetings was a major confidence- building measure and an important signal to reassure the Pattani Movement of the Thai government’s sincerity. As with the process under General Surayud’s government, the talks under the Geneva Process ended with the end of Abhisit’s government as the incoming administration decided to forge their own path. Under this new phase, it was decided that instead of having an international organization perform the role of facilitator, the Malaysian government would be invited to take over the duty.

Peace Dialogue 61 5 From “Opponent” to “Conflict Transformation Partner”

Over the course of the Geneva Process, what conceptual framework and guidelines did NSC officials use when conducting the peace dialogue? Equally important, what sort of outcome did it produce? This chapter addresses these questions by providing details of how the NSC’s proposed strategy to advance the dialogue process evolved into the strategy which has been adopted and implemented by the current government of Prayut Chan-o-cha. Although this strategy has been adopted by the current government, it is difficult to foresee what the outcome will be and it is possible that the outcome aimed for may not be achieved since much depends on how the strategy is implemented in an environment of shifting dynamics and factors.

62 From “Opponent” to “Conflict Transformation Partner It is important to bear in mind that the peace dialogue is not a panacea for the Deep South’s ills. It is, rather, a path towards convening a space for two parties to communicate, build mutual trust, and generate options to fight the ideological conflict through peaceful means.

Framework

The NSC-initiated dialogue aimed at something totally different from the past. Talks had previously focused on convincing insurgents to come home, rejoin the fold, and work out a resolution with the state. The framework for the talks this time, however, aimed to build trust with the resistance movement and lay the groundwork to encourage peaceful co-existence and collaborative conflict transformation. The goals were as follows: Short-term Goals: Reduce tensions and confrontations on the ground; Generate knowledge; Raise awareness that the armed groups’ struggle to forcibly bring about change may not necessarily align with the change that local people aspire to.

Peace Dialogue 63 Long-term Goal: Collaboratively define appropriate options for peaceful co-existence, tolerance and recognition of diversity. It is important to bear in mind that the peace dialogue is not a panacea for the Deep South’s ills. It is, rather, a path towards convening a space for two parties to communicate, build mutual trust, and generate options to fight the ideological conflict through peaceful means. A third party is required at this initial stage because the state has not been able to reach the target group. The third party acts as a “facilitator” not a “mediator.” However, once the dialogue process moves beyond the confidence-building phase, it is possible that the third party could be phased out or could assume a different role.

Direction

The NSC proposal lays out a thorough and detailed procedure that is, unfortunately, too sensitive to be shared here. The author therefore summarizes seven thematic steps which demonstrate how the conceptual framework has been put into practice: 1) Impress upon movement members that separation is a non- negotiable issue. The state is prepared to convene a space to discuss and mold suitable governance models for coexistence under the framework of the constitution. 2) Avoid discussions on conditions for reciprocity. Focus on unilateral measures – each side doing their things separately. 3) Establish an information exchange channel to prevent misunderstanding or third-party interference. 4) Do not allow any formal written document. The facilitator shall

64 From “Opponent” to “Conflict Transformation Partner” Separation is a non-negotiable issue. The state is prepared to convene a space to discuss and mold suitable governance models for coexistence

summarize key points in a note that will be mutually endorsed by both sides. 5) Cooperate with the third party to support the government’s efforts at finding a resolution. 6) Establish measures to build confidence and to verify the movement’s ability to contain violence through, for example, the establishment of a ceasefire zone at a designated location for a specified period of time. 7) Protect the confidentiality of the talks, which is of utmost importance at this crucial juncture of mutual trust and confidence building.

Insights from the Dialogue

From the peace dialogue efforts which spanned 2006 to 2011, three major insights were gleaned. Firstly, the representatives of the movement who participated in the dialogue demonstrated the ability to command and control violence in some areas of the Southern Border Provinces. The movement enforced a unilateral ceasefire for one month between June and July 2010 in three districts of Narathiwat province with the full recognition of the Thai government and army.

Peace Dialogue 65 Secondly, the structure of the armed resistance movement no longer represents a single chain of command. It is highly probable that leaders of each faction are able to exert influence or control over micro- cells active in specific zones. This assessment derived from the fact that there was found to be a time lag in communications between the movement and its armed units. Since many of the movement representatives were not able to enter or move freely within the area due to the fear of arrest, a longer timeframe was required to communicate and coordinate with frontline operatives. This explained the movement’s request that the state provide “special measures” to protect movement representatives when they had to enter the area. Finally, members of the movement living outside Thailand were not entirely up to speed with the changed political landscape for a number of reasons. They were not fully aware of the numerous other stakeholders actively participating in peacebuilding. An initiative for a

An initiative for a group of civil society representatives, including local Buddhists, to meet and talk with movement members on three occasions thus resulted in an increased awareness of this dynamic. The movement members learned that they did not have a monopoly over the claim that they represented or were acting on behalf of the people of the Southern Border Provinces.

66 From “Opponent” to “Conflict Transformation Partner” group of civil society representatives, including local Buddhists, to meet and talk with movement members on three occasions thus resulted in an increased awareness of this dynamic. The movement members learned that they did not have a monopoly over the claim that they represented or were acting on behalf of the people of the Southern Border Provinces. Local people themselves were also advocating for change using methods other than armed struggle. That is to say, civil society was eschewing violence as a means to effect change.

Handing over the Geneva Process

From the point of view of a former NSC deputy secretary-general, even though the Geneva Process did not manage to reduce the violence in the Deep South, this did not mean that no progress had been made. This is because conflict is not reducible to violence. So although de- escalation matters, the reduction of violence alone does not mean that a conflict is over and it is not the only measure of success. Some achievements from the dialogue work included acquiring evidence of the movement’s ability to control violence on the ground as demonstrated by the month-long ceasefire, the development of plans to scale up the dialogue process should it continue to be supported by the new government, greater flexibility towards the goals of the movement on the part of the government, more recognition of the importance of civil society’s involvement, and the opportunities that had been created to talk directly to local civil society organizations. Together these elements formed a solid foundation to pave the way to better address the conflict at its core and for an eventual resolution of the violence.

Peace Dialogue 67 The change of governments after 2011 also led to a new composition of members in the Peace Dialogue Committee. Handover notes from the outgoing committee members to the incoming committee members made two recommendations: First: Sustain and support the peacebuilding components that are already in place. Second: Initiate intra-dialogue among different armed factions with a view to getting them all on board with the dialogue process. This task was very important in the next stage because even though there had been successful interactions with groups attending the dialogue meetings, these groups only partially controlled the armed units on the ground. In spite of the goodwill shown and the previous efforts made, should there remain factions opposed to the dialogue, the containment of violence would be limited and untenable.

The peace dialogue was carried over and sustained through the original mechanism albeit with a new composition of members, who continue to be involved in the process up until the present.

Although the Geneva Process had ended by mid-2011 with the departure of the Abhisit government, there had been a momentum generated by the fact that dialogue held a prominent place in both the 2012 - 2014 Southern Border Administration and Development Policy and its successor policy. These policies may be seen as building on the

68 From “Opponent” to “Conflict Transformation Partner” 2006 Prime Minister’s Order by expanding on the substance and by making dialogue a national priority, thereby increasing its visibility nationally and internationally. Moreover, the peace dialogue was carried over and sustained through the original mechanism albeit with a new composition of members, who continue to be involved in the process up until the present.

Peace Dialogue 69 6 Stories along the Path to Peace

Government transitions that disrupt the fluidity of the dialogue process highlight the types of obstacles that can impede progress. Looking at the overall picture of the peace dialogue, such obstacles are a reality that must be accepted even if responsible parties were not always aware of how similar issues were disrupting the process in the past. The authors of this report believe that there is no government anywhere in the world that would talk to an armed movement seeking self-determination if that government had the situation fully under control or was able to maintain the upper hand in the struggle. It is not an unusual perspective to view talks with the resistance movement as a sign that the government is losing ground, bogged down in the mire of defeating the resistance. The case with the Southern Border Provinces is no different. Talks in the past were geared towards finding a way to win

70 Stories along the Path to Peace Government transitions that disrupt the fluidity of the dialogue process highlight the types of obstacles that can impede progress.

or gain the upper hand. In any case, the new round of violence that erupted from 2004 onwards has created a dilemma for policy-makers. Is more military might in the form of beefed up safety and security measures, coupled with a range of development schemes, enough to secure a victory against the armed resistance movement or not? In the end, a policy shift has occurred. The priority now is to create an environment that is conducive to building trust among the people, engage a broad stakeholder base to participate in conflict transformation, and lastly to find ways to dialogue with members of the armed groups as demonstrated by the post-2006 dialogue attempts. Still, creat- ing an environment that is conducive to dialogue does not mean that there are not any challenges in terms of garnering support for such policy. Nevertheless, even if the road along the way is potholed there is

Peace Dialogue 71 still valuable knowledge to be Nevertheless, even if gained and lessons to be learned. the road along the way Stories of the Southern is potholed there is still Border Provinces’ peacebuilding journey, specifically during the valuable knowledge to period between 2006 and 2010, be gained and lessons are a critical element that should to be learned. be studied by those involved in whatever capacity. All inputs to shape constructive approaches for future work are welcomed if it helps lead to the creation of a fluid process that can ultimately lead to a durable solution being found, no matter how long it takes.

The Army’s Position vis-à-vis the Role of Civilians in Peace Dialogue

It goes without saying that the Thai army commands and controls military operations in the southern border region. As such, initiating dialogue with the armed resistance movement amidst the extensive violence after 2004 required explanation and advocacy directed at the military’s highest echelons i.e. the Army Commander-in-Chief. Otherwise, any results produced by the dialogue that required implementation on the ground would be hard to synchronize with the actions of the armed forces. The movement fully recognised the power wielded by the army to influence changes on the ground in whichever direction. The NSC Peace Dialogue Committee sought meetings with the army commander-in-chief in 2006 and with his successors as a matter

72 Stories along the Path to Peace of course. This contributed substantially to the civilian side’s confidence- building efforts for the mission. These meetings provided an opportunity for the Peace Dialogue Committee to explain the concept, goal, scope, and direction of the dialogue all of which had already been endorsed by top policy-makers. At the same time, the committee was able to provide reassurances with respect to confidentiality and the conduct of the dialogue. The Thai army always responded with positive gestures. A high-ranking army officer was sent to join the Peace Dialogue Committee. In addition, an internal order for combat units on the ground to suspend offensive security operations was issued in order to build an enabling environment for the unilateral ceasefire by the Movement in three districts of Narathiwat for one month in mid-2010. It had not been easy for the civilian arm to convince the military arm of its capacity to conduct peace talks, traditionally the mainstay of

Initiating dialogue with the armed resistance movement amidst the extensive violence after 2004 required explanation and advocacy directed at the military’s highest echelons i.e. the Army Commander-in-Chief. Otherwise, any results produced by the dialogue that required implementation on the ground would be hard to synchronize with the actions of the armed forces.

Peace Dialogue 73 It had not been easy for the military. It was, therefore, the civilian arm to convince not unusual to have to respond the military arm of its to questions concerning the capacity to conduct peace team’s perspective on the Deep talks, traditionally the South, how dialogue fit in the scheme of conflict resolution mainstay of the military. efforts, how to access the target dialogue partners, prevention or risk mitigation measures against the movement internationalizing the conflict, and the likelihood of internationalization actually happening. These questions were, in fact, extremely valuable entry points to offer alternative viewpoints as a counterpoint to the military’s traditional mindset. Aside from the regular exchange of opinions, there were other, no less important factors that enabled the Thai army to accept and support the talks. That the prime minister, who was also the ex-officio head of the NSC, had appointed an academic as head of the Peace Dialogue Committee no doubt demonstrated to the army the The lack of an official level of trust placed upon this status likely lent an air individual who was without any of informality which official status. Moreover, the lack helped to reduce the of an official status likely lent an concern that any air of informality which helped unexpected outcome to reduce the concern that any unexpected outcome of the dis- of the discussions cussions would be binding upon would be binding the parties. upon the parties.

74 Stories along the Path to Peace That said, the most important factor that led to the buy-in and support of the Thai army for the peace talks was the fact that the prime minister took the time to chair the meetings that were held immediately before and after dialogue meetings, thereby demonstrating the importance he placed on the process. Also present during those meetings were the army commander-in-chief, the MFA permanent secretary, the NIA director, the NSC secretary general and the head of Peace Dialogue Committee.

Concerns over Conflict Escalation and Internationalization

A recurring concern has been the fear that the movement would exploit the dialogue process to seek international support thereby leading to external interference in the conflict. This fear was fed by past attempts on the part of the movement to enlist international organizations in support of its cause. The concern around internationalization warrants the attention of relevant agencies because it has important implications for policy-making. In short, what must be considered is which side should initiate contact with the other. Should the government be the one to initiate contact with the movement or should it allow the movement to pull in international organizations to help them put pressure on the government to open up the talks? Rounds of advocacy on this issue have been made periodically with crucial stakeholders, including with the Thai army as already described, as well as with the MFA and with intelligence agencies. The agency with the most sensitivity to this issue was the MFA, understandably so, given the MFA’s mandate to prevent external

Peace Dialogue 75 Should the government be the one to initiate contact with the movement or should it allow the movement to pull in international organizations to help them put pressure on the government to open up the talks?

interference in the country’s domestic affairs. Concerns over the internationalization of the southern conflict have been voiced repeatedly by MFA officers across all levels of the agency. An ambassador to a European country once reached out to a visiting peace dialogue delegation upon hearing that they were travelling to meet the organization facilitating the peace talks. The ambassador understood that the delegation was being exploited to advance the interests of the organization that was facilitating the talks and the armed movement. It was requested that the delegation return to Thailand immediately. This incident was only resolved after the background of the mission and the government’s policy on the matter was explained to the ambassador. Even though the explanations were unable to assuage the ambassador’s concerns, it was nevertheless a useful lesson of the need to sensitize the MFA leadership to such issues in the future. The Peace Dialogue Committee proposed five key reasons as to why fear of internationalization should not obstruct the dialogue process. Discussion of these five points took place between the committee and members of the executive branch and MFA during that particular period. Firstly, members of the armed resistance group are not external enemies. They are people living in and sharing the same country for a

76 Stories along the Path to Peace Members of the armed resistance group are not external enemies. They are people living in and sharing the same country for a very long time. They are Thai citizens struggling and fighting because they have different views on politics and governance, and because they feel marginalized, discriminated against, and deprived of justice.

very long time. They are Thai citizens struggling and fighting because they have different views on politics and governance, and because they feel marginalized, discriminated against, and deprived of justice. Secondly, dialogue with this group of people amounts to the opening up of a space to listen to their grievances and to share thoughts on collaborative solutions to resolve the conflict. This alternative is preferable to allowing the continuation of violence that has inflicted unspeakable ills and extracted a horrific toll on the affected area and on society as a whole. Thirdly, although past experience has demonstrated that there is a risk of the peace dialogue being exploited in terms of international ization and foreign interference, this risk can be mitigated. In order to do so, it would be necessary to establish objectives, draw boundaries, and institute clear measures to position the talks squarely as the pre- serve of the dialogue parties, making clear from the outset that the mission requires an organization only for facilitation purposes and as a risk management measure. Nevertheless, even the best efforts cannot entirely prevent attempts by an international third party to engage with the process because there still remain other groups that have yet

Peace Dialogue 77 to join. At the same time, these other groups may also want to continue waging their struggle using violence, as briefly touched upon in the previous chapter. Fourthly, just as a small individual, when bullied by a bigger one, would instinctively seek help from others, so it is for the movement in this asymmetrical conflict. From the perspective of the movement, approaching international organizations is about levelling the playing field so that they may have better prospects of attaining their goal. If the state is able to open up dialogue, demonstrate sincerity, and offer reassurances that their policy will be sustained and in sync with ground operations (provided there are no recurrence of serious negative conditions) then there would be less recourse to and justification for international third party involvement. Finally, regular contact with international donor organizations could diminish the urge to intervene. Regular contact could provide a channel for the government to share any changes in policy and to update them on progress with the dialogue or other measures, especially those pertaining to issues of international concern.

If the state is able to open up dialogue, demonstrate sincerity, and offer reassurances that their policy will be sustained and in sync with ground operations (provided there are no recurrence of serious negative conditions) then there would be less recourse to and justification for international third party involvement.

78 Stories along the Path to Peace Nevertheless, the MFA’s fears persist. Since the movement consists of an array of different groups, The MFA was some of those outside the dialogue deemed a key party process may press ahead with whose engagement efforts to internationalize the con- in the dialogue flict. Even certain representatives process was critical. in the dialogue groups have tried to seize any opportunity to meet representatives of international organizations. This is understandable since they are not entirely confident that dialogue with the government will achieve their desired outcome. Thus, it is incumbent upon the state to build confidence and inspire trust so that the dialogue process is both credible (i.e. that it is not seen as an exercise in intelligence gathering) and sustainable. To do this, the state should also recognize the status of the movement and provide safety assurances. The MFA leadership’s input contributed to enhanced prudence and deliberation at the dialogue table on issues such as the role and movement of actors at various levels in neighboring countries as well as feasible options for future co-existence. The MFA was deemed a key party whose engagement in the dialogue process was critical.

The Role of the Initiator and the Importance of the Connector

Successful advocacy to adopt a peaceful approach led to formulation of a new national policy. The dialogue process came about because of the efforts of individuals and groups at many levels. Advocacy work

Peace Dialogue 79 Stories from this area of work were little known beyond a small circle given the political dynamics and prevalence of the conventional security mindset.

included initiating contact, broadening buy-in, and identifying experts to come up with policy recommendations. Connectors worked actively to sustain the work at times of government transition and turmoil. Sto- ries from this area of work were little known beyond a small circle given the political dynamics and prevalence of the conventional security mindset. The connector plays an important role in shepherding the dialogue process to the point where Thai society is able to and can begin to recognize its importance. Even without the endorsement of a critical mass of the Thai public, the dialogue seems to be gaining traction in different quarters. We would like to commend the groups and individuals that have contributed to initiating, supporting and joining the dots to make dialogue possible.

The National Security Council’s (NSC) Technical Working Group After 1997, the Office of the NSC, under the initiative of Deputy Secretary-General Pichai Ratanapol, recognized the signs that the domestic conflict was escalating. Divisions were deepening between people and the state and between people to people. Such divisions could not be managed without the involvement of non-state actors. Naturally, it is hard for non-state actors, such as academics or civil society organizations to trust a security agency. However, with time and the

80 Stories along the Path to Peace demonstrated commitment and openness of the NSC leadership, the trust of non-state actors improved gradually. Scholars and technical experts with conflict management expertise worked together as part of the Technical Working Group and over time this body evolved to become the Strategic Nonviolence Commission. Working to create a new security paradigm was not easy as it was difficult to go against the grain of traditional security orthodoxy. Still, by approaching state actors, in particular senior commanders of the armed forces and civil service, and by adopting a style of close collaboration, opportunities were presented to listen and learn about the reality of the conflict as understood and experienced by academics, activists, and civil society advocates. Despite a number of failed attempts, there were several successes with respect to support provided and the sensitization of stakeholders to the changing security context. As for vertical advocacy, meeting the executive branch including the prime

By approaching state actors, in particular senior commanders of the armed forces and civil service, and by adopting a style of close collaboration, opportunities were presented to listen and learn about the reality of the conflict as understood and experienced by academics, activists, and civil society advocates. Despite a number of failed attempts, there were several successes with respect to support provided and the sensitization of stakeholders to the changing security context.

Peace Dialogue 81 minister, required a variety of approaches that ranged from the submission of written communications to presentations and finally meeting requests. Managing the southern border conflict was often contentious as part of the work necessarily entailed dealing with supporters and opponents. Even within the NSC itself, not everyone saw eye-to-eye. During leadership changes, the peacebuilding work sometimes faltered. More than twice, disruptions occurred when the Peace Dialogue Committee, appointed by the previous premier as ex-officio NSC chief, was dissolved or replaced without due regard given to the delicate nature of dialogue work.

The Government and Political Sector Peace talk work deals with multiple interconnected factors. It is vital that all possibilities are explored to find any potential openings that can facilitate the creation of communication channels. Internal communication is particularly important within the government and with those who have direct access to the prime minister. Given the lack of consensus on the use of dialogue as an approach, it is only the prime minister who can breathe life into a process by giving the green light to forge ahead and to ensure that relevant agencies lend their support, or at the very least, refrain from blocking the initiative. Just as important is the need to reassure the resistance movement that peace talks will no longer be an ad-hoc exercise as had been the case in the past. Under the administration of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, although dialogue was at a nascent stage, the progress made during this time could be described as a leap forward. Prime Minister Surayud’s crystal clear comprehension of the Deep South conflict and his own direct experience with undertaking secret negotiations among three

82 Stories along the Path to Peace warring Khmer factions during the Cambodian conflict contributed to the unprecedented strides made in the dialogue work. Another key ingredient was his attentiveness to the process and his receptiveness to advice. This led to a convergence between the executive branch and army leadership and greater harmonization in addressing the conflict. A steering committee was established It is only the prime consisting of the MFA permanent minister who can secretary, the permanent-secretary breathe life into a of Ministry of Justice, the NSC secre- process by giving tary-general, the NIA director, the the green light to army commander-in-chief and the forge ahead and to head of the Peace Dialogue Commit- ensure that relevant tee. The prime minister personally attended and chaired every single agencies lend their steering committee. support, or at the The fundamental groundwork very least, refrain described led to the NSC Chair’s from blocking the order to establish a Peace Dialogue initiative. Committee under the NSC as a mechanism to talk to people who think differently from the state. The move to formalize the dialogue aligned with the policy to convene a platform to engage people who think differently and who adopted the use of violence as per Prime Minister’s Order No. 206/2549 on the Southern Border Provinces Peacebuilding Policy. These developments had far-reaching implications as they lent credibility to the dialogue process and helped build trust with the dialogue partner to the extent that they brought members of the movement to join the talks.

Peace Dialogue 83 At the start of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s government, the process had been on hold for a full year due to the Samak Suntoravej administration’s aversion to dialogue. Prior to Abhisit giving the green light to revived the dialogue process that was initiated in 2006, an interesting development occurred in the form of a “connector” appearing from the political sphere. Seasoned parliamentarian and former senator Mr. Kraisak Choonhavan was, at the time, a deputy leader of the Democrat Party and a keen observer of the conflict. Kraisak discreetly liaised with top NSC officials and the former chief of the Peace Dialogue Committee while the Democrat-led government was being formed. The overtures gained the support of some Democrat MPs from the southern constituencies. Importantly, the then-army commander- in-chief met the former chief of the Peace Dialogue Committee on several occasions and expressed “no problem with offering [his] support.” With all the elements in place, the NSC sought the greenlight to pick up the peace dialogue work from where it had left off. During the revived talks, Kraisak, as a Peace Dialogue Committee member, participated in meetings with members of the Pattani Move- ment for almost a year. With his open and frank manner, the Pattani Movement members came to be appreciate Kraisak’s long-standing commitment to social work and this helped build trust. Perhaps because some Pattani Movement members had served as “politicians” in their political wing, the interaction with a fellow politician helped establish rapport and speed up communication. Kraisak later voluntarily excused himself from the Peace Dialogue Committee after the Thai army sent a representative to join the committee. However, even after his departure he remained supportive of the process. Abhisit was an open-minded and respectful leader when it came to listening to opinions and recommendations about dialogue. He would

84 Stories along the Path to Peace Perhaps because some Pattani Movement members had served as “politicians” in their political wing, the interaction with a fellow politician helped establish rapport and speed up communication.

not hasten towards a decision on his own but would only do so after consultation with the leadership of security agencies. The steering committee active during Surayud’s government was revived and the prime minister himself presided over every single meeting. As such, command and execution by operational units became more coherent. When the Movement agreed to prove its commitment and sincerity to the dialogue process by observing a unilateral ceasefire in three districts of Narathiwat province for a month in mid-2010, the army commander- in-chief ordered frontline units to suspend military offensives over the same period as gesture of goodwill towards the Movement. Most certainly the public were unaware of all these efforts. Another instance where Abhisit demonstrated bold and decisive leadership was when he approved a proposal to have an individual whom the Movement deemed appropriate join a consultative body set up by an agency on the ground to raise awareness of the state’s efforts to address the Deep South conflict. Details of this remain classified. However, the key lesson here is that discussions at the table must be realized and implemented on the ground. Despite the secretive nature of the talks, signals could still be transmitted through actions on the ground when the executive

Peace Dialogue 85 The key lesson here is that discussions at the table must be realized and implemented on the ground. Despite the secretive nature of the talks, signals could still be transmitted through actions on the ground.

branch and the agencies in control of frontline operations worked closely and saw eye-to-eye on issues. A final point worth mentioning regarding the Thai government under the premiership of Surayud and Abhisit is the clear understanding each leader had over the sensitive nature of the peace talks. This understanding distinguished them from other administrations. The two prime ministers fully recognized how important it was to personally steer the process rather than delegate the task to a deputy or other minister. They valued the input of operational units, whether inputs were supportive or dissenting, and they did not rush to issue policy directives or orders until the dust had properly settled.

Paranoia and Tests of Trust

Trust is the prime ingredient in a dialogue between conflicting parties but establishing trust is one of the biggest challenges of a peace process and it is constantly tested. At the start, one party may not even be aware that they are being tested. Moreover, these tests became harder and more profound over time.

86 Stories along the Path to Peace The Movement representatives went by aliases and deployed their own people around the At the start, one party meeting venues and accommoda- tion because of their suspicions may not even be aware of state surveillance or intelli- that they are being gence gathering. However, the tested. Moreover, these state dialogue team took a clear tests became harder and position from the outset, a posi- more profound over time. tion endorsed by the government of the day that peace talks would not serve intelligence gathering purposes. To test whether the team were sincere, movement members would volunteer snippets of per sonal information during conversations outside of the meetings. They talked about their families and their home communities. At first glance, volunteering such information should not seem unusual, particularly when attempting to establish rapport. Yet the movement members were using this as a test to see if their family members suffered any negative consequences as a result of such information being revealed to state officials. Another case involved a senior movement member living in Damascus, who used his Thai passport to travel in and out of Syria. When his presence was required for talks in 2007 the movement requested assistance with renewing his passport at the consular section of a Thai embassy in a Middle Eastern country. This was the first time that Thai authorities had got hold of a passport copy and household registration details of a movement member for the purpose of coordinating with other relevant agencies. Three years after the passport had been renewed, the same individual joined the 2010 peace

Peace Dialogue 87 With a valid Thai passport, he was able to travel abroad without fear that his travel document had been suspended and without fear of detention. This was proof that the Thai side was sincere in its promise not to collect intelligence over the course of the peace talks.

talks in Jakarta. At the meeting in Jakarta, he expressed sincere gratitude for the assistance. With a valid Thai passport, he was able to travel abroad without fear that his travel document had been suspended and without fear of detention. This was proof that the Thai side was sincere in its promise not to collect intelligence over the course of the peace talks. In one notable case in 2007, the movement requested that the state consider the unconditional release of three senior leaders as a sign of their commitment to peace. The executive branch gave the go-ahead to proceed albeit on the condition that it remain within the confines of the legal and regulatory framework and subject to consent of the prisoners themselves. After some deliberation, the three prisoners decided not to withdraw their appeal with the Court of Justice as they were confident that the court would ultimately rule in their favor. This turned out to be another test. The movement members were attempting to gauge whether the state had taken their request seriously and what action would be taken. They did not expect a release to occur so readily and were simply looking to see when and how often the Peace Dialogue Committee would meet the three prisoners. In 2010, the Movement asked for help in tracing one of its members,

88 Stories along the Path to Peace who had been arrested by police, and had disappeared shortly after being released. It later emerged that the person had been working as an informant for military intelligence. This created a dilemma. If this was revealed to the movement, the individual would be at risk of targeted assassination. However, withholding the knowledge would jeopardize the trust gained thus far. It was eventually decided to inform the movement. It transpired that the movement had been aware of this for some time but had simply wanted to test the state’s sincerity. Once an individual is identified as being a member of the movement, they have little choice but to end up as informants given the pressure they then face from the state. Such was the case with this individual.

It transpired that the movement had been aware of this for some time but had simply wanted to test the state’s sincerity.

There were other types of trust tests. One of the movement representatives expressed the desire to experience firsthand the status accorded to them by their dialogue partner. A notable occasion were the secret talks in the Middle East in 2007. A top government official attended the talks in his capacity as a Thai citizen concerned about the well-being of his fellow compatriots. It was a meaningful gesture particularly when compared with past gestures. There are numerous other tests which are too sensitive to be shared at this point in time. Movement members themselves have also

Peace Dialogue 89 been subject to tests by their peers, chiefly because of suspicions arising over the level of familiarity they may have developed with state officials. It is feared this may lead some of them to become too sympathetic towards the state.

Words Overheard: Fighting for Independence or Some Other Goal

The goal of the movement’s struggle has never been on the dialogue agenda on the basis that confidence building is the first order of the day. Still, the Movement members have raised the importance of talking about the conflict’s root causes. They have tried to make the state aware of their need to discuss the power relations between Bangkok and Patani and the question of self-rule, instead of only talking about development, which is anyway the duty of all governments everywhere.

Some members shared stories of their personal transformations when, having previously only talked about revolution, they grew to be more realistic.

Some members shared stories of their personal transformations when, having previously only talked about revolution, they grew to be

90 Stories along the Path to Peace more realistic. When asked casually why messages through the movement’s online platforms deliberately tried to persuade and inspire a new generation to join the armed movement, a member answered that if you wanted to recruit combatants, nothing could be more powerful than promises of achieving this goal. He himself was not so sure where the struggle would lead but stories about the behavior and misconduct of state officials continued to feed and nourish the cause. The Movement had studied thoroughly the salient points of self- rule they aspired to including provisions for decentralization under the constitution and within the bounds of legal interpretation. Movement members had been especially attentive during a session on local governance. A civil society activist from the Deep South had presented a model of local governance that could potentially be responsive to local people’s needs and demands. Under this model, innovative measures could be generated outside the usual government framework. Such engagements with the Movement demonstrated the movement’s flexibility and readiness to pursue dialogue for conflict transformation. Nevertheless, despite this flexibility and readiness, it was acknowledged that there were still some younger, more hardline combatants who remain tied to the violent struggle against the state.

It was acknowledged that there were still some younger, more hardline combatants who remain tied to the violent struggle against the state.

Peace Dialogue 91 The Last Word but not the Final Word

The most sensitive question of all from the Movement to the state was what concessions the Thai government was prepared to give in response to calls for change in the southern border region/Patani. Neither the government nor any security agency could come up with a clear answer. Although a sensible option would be to promote and support an enabling environment for talks with the armed movement and to raise the exercise to the level of national policy, one gets the impression that dialogue has been pursued with a view to reducing violence and to enabling all sectors to pursue collaborative development. Yet the real question remains: What is a suitable model of governance for the Deep South? The closest one ever gets to a final answer from the top of the government and military is that any arrangement must stay within the bounds of the country’s constitution. This response then is immediately followed with another question: Surely the constitution can be amended and updated to incorporate any changed realities? Until such a day arrives, no one knows who and what mechanism would be able to answer these questions.

Until such a day arrives, no one knows who and what mechanism would be able to answer these questions.

92 Stories along the Path to Peace

7 Conclusion

The conflict in the Southern Border Provinces has been a challenge to Thai governance for over half a century. When a section of society organizes an armed struggle in the hope of bringing about political change, it is a challenge to the state’s authority and so the state seeks measures to placate, stem or end the violence arising from this contestation. Nonetheless the policies and strategies adopted at different stages of the conflict have not yet been successful. Moreover, it seems that all the while, success is measured only by the increase or decrease in the number of violent incidents. When the number of violent attacks decrease, then the situation is seen as under control. This is a familiar pattern. Meanwhile, although the armed resistance movement’s capacities and strength may fluctuate they maintain a relentless determination to

94 Conclusion Nonetheless the policies and strategies adopted at different stages of the conflict have not yet been successful.

continue their struggle as demonstrated by the consistent and varied forms of violence which they inflict upon the region. Initially, talks with armed groups were pursued in the hopes of getting to know the enemy with a view to bringing them back into the fold. The belief was that if the state opened up opportunities for collaboration towards a resolution, the armed groups might be inclined to give up armed struggle, as had been the case with previous conflicts. In reality, things did not play out the way the Thai government had planned. First, the armed groups did not trust the state’s sincerity. This deep-seated mistrust was based on experience. Actions on the ground were indicative of the state privileging national security over human security. The dialogue process has not been implemented in a sustained manner and the reality on the ground does not align with expectations.

Peace Dialogue 95 This deep-seated mistrust was based on experience. Actions on the ground were indicative of the state privileging national security over human security.

These two elements often end up going in opposite directions. The conceptual shift from negotiation to peace dialogue between state-appointed representatives and representatives of a conflict party who are Thai citizens holding different political and governance views was intended to cultivate trust and pave the way for long-term collaboration. This work began in 2006. The dialogue occurred amid the concerns of many stakeholders regarding the conflict party’s status, the involvement of international organizations and the risk of the conflict’s internationalization. Those concerns turned out to be extremely useful as they made the persons involved in the dialogue work proceed with greater caution. Furthermore, these concerns reflect an acute awareness that unless we invest our best efforts to resolve the domestic conflict on our own, should the violence get out of hand and spread, then there is a risk that an external party would step in. By then, internationalization would be too difficult to prevent. The lack of continuity of dialogue work, the skepticism with respect to the approach, and the mismatch between actions on the ground and professed policy are major factors impeding direct access to the armed movement’s leadership. Aside from the issue of trust, subterfuge is a characteristic of underground armed movements that prevents the state from gaining access to the leadership. This subterfuge is a neces-

96 Conclusion sary form of protection against state surveillance and monitoring. Coordinating with an international third party trusted by the movement was therefore the only feasible way to make contact with key movement players. This was the case with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue between 2006 and 2010. This is the case with the Malaysian government now. Many other international organizations and actors have tried to get involved in the dialogue process in one way or another.

The lack of continuity of dialogue work, the skepticism with respect to the approach, and the mismatch between actions on the ground and professed policy are major factors impeding direct access to the armed movement’s leadership.

Dialogue is an essential task in the broader peace process. However, dialogue with a conflict party without an enabling environment on the ground to nurture the talks cannot lead to a durable solution. Although talks after 2006 progressed well in terms of trust-building, the covert nature of the work and the fact that knowledge was restricted to a small group meant that it could not influence changes on the ground. Ultimately it was not part of a comprehensive and well-integrated process. Simply put, it was not the way a peace process ought to be. All told, what have we got out of the peace talks from 2006 on? Perhaps the best answer is the acknowledgment that an approach

Peace Dialogue 97 Perhaps the best answer is the acknowledgment that an approach where the dialogue party is recognized as compatriot and not an external enemy is a more effective way to build confidence and mutual trust.

where the dialogue party is recognized as compatriot and not an external enemy is a more effective way to build confidence and mutual trust. Moreover, it has highlighted the need to secure government buy- in and the need to make dialogue visible, either as part of the national policy agenda or via its inclusion in the Southern Border Provinces Administration and Development Policy. At minimum, a peace process that genuinely leads to resolution should consist of a design and demonstration of how the different dots are connected; a nexus of measures to reduce violence, prioritize tasks, and promote greater inclusivity in development, education, religion, culture, and justice. These measures must demonstrate the respect and equality which all stakeholders on the ground and the movement reaffirm as a matter of importance. Furthermore, a peace process should be fluid and continuous. It should not aim to end the violence only. The long-term goal should be forged collaboratively and designed with the idea of co-existence in mind. Citizens should be able to visualize a society where everybody can live together peacefully. The society that people aspire to can only be realized when all are prepared to invest in its creation. This starts with a change in attitude and improved social rules to make space for people

98 Conclusion A peace process should be fluid and continuous. It should not aim to end the violence only. The long-term goal should be forged collaboratively and designed with the idea of co-existence in mind.

with different ideas and ideologies to realize their own dreams, without the use of violence and without destroying the lives of others as is the case now. Over the years the peace dialogue has had different objectives at various stages. At certain points, the focus has been on intelligence gathering. At others, it was an insincere endeavor and intended only to buy time. Yet where the genuine goal is building peace, what could be called “a sincere peace dialogue” may still have variations in the finer details. That said, the state and the movement may view the peace dialogue as nothing more than finding a mutually acceptable agreement. Alternatively, the state and the movement may view their dialogue parties as peacebuilders helping to facilitate a process that leads to peace. Peace dialogue is about formulating a mutually- acceptable roadmap for peace among parties. In the latter scenario, civil society in the Deep South could be brought on board to join the Track 1 peace talks as mandated by each side. The goal of a sincere peace dialogue will vary according to the circumstances and the contours of the peacebuilding process. Nevertheless, at the start of each fresh round, the opening questions should always be, “what stage are we in?” and “what are the goals of peace dialogue at this stage?”

Peace Dialogue 99

About Strategic Nonviolence Working Group (formerly Strategic Nonviolence Commission)

The Strategic Nonviolence Commission (SNC) was established in 2001 and tasked with analysis, inquiry, early warning, and policy formulation to prevent and manage the conflict. The commission reported directly to the prime minister. It was mandated to disseminate, sensitize and advocate for peaceful conflict resolution approaches to foster a culture of peace that could be inculcated into the national psyche, making Thailand a learning hub for peace and nonviolent conflict resolution. The NSC decided to disband the commission on the basis that the commission’s mandate had been met. This was evidenced by the incorporation of peaceful conflict resolution approaches into policy, namely the 2007–2011 National Security Policy. The renamed Strategic Nonviolence Working Group now operates under auspices of the Thailand Research Fund’s “Strategic Nonviolence for 21st Century Thai Society” program. As a strategic think-tank the working group draws insights from national security work, conflict transformation research, and from interactions with the state and civic sector to generate non-violent solutions and measures to resolve conflict.

Peace Dialogue 101

“A peace process should be fluid and continuous. It should not aim to end the violence only. The long-term goal should be forged collaboratively and designed with the idea of co-existence in mind. Citizens should be able to visualize a society where everybody can live together peacefully. The society that people aspire to can only be realized when all are prepared to invest in its creation. This starts with a change in attitude and improved social rules to make space for people with different ideas and ideologies to realize their own dreams, without the use of violence and without destroying the lives of others as is the case now.”