DOCSLIB.ORG

Descent Into Chaos RIGHTS Thailand’S 2010 Red Shirt Protests and the Government Crackdown WATCH

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Descent Into Chaos RIGHTS Thailand’S 2010 Red Shirt Protests and the Government Crackdown WATCH Thailand HUMAN Descent into Chaos RIGHTS Thailand’s 2010 Red Shirt Protests and the Government Crackdown WATCH Descent into Chaos Thailand’s 2010 Red Shirt Protests and the Government Crackdown Copyright © 2011 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-764-7 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org May 2011 1-56432-764-7 Descent into Chaos Thailand’s 2010 Red Shirt Protests and the Government Crackdown I. Summary and Key Recommendations....................................................................................... 1 II. Methodology ........................................................................................................................ 28 III. Background .......................................................................................................................... 29 The People’s Alliance for Democracy and Anti-Thaksin Movement ....................................... 32 September 2006 Coup ........................................................................................................ 34 The 2008 Yellow Shirt Protests ............................................................................................ 36 The 2009 Red Shirt Protests ................................................................................................ 40 IV. The Red Shirt Movement ...................................................................................................... 42 Red Shirt schools and preparation for 2010 ......................................................................... 42 Forming the Red Shirt Guards .............................................................................................. 43 The “Black Shirts” ............................................................................................................... 44 V. Bangkok’s Descent into Chaos .............................................................................................. 47 Start of the “Million Man March” ......................................................................................... 47 The April 7-9 Confrontations ................................................................................................ 49 The April 10 Clashes ............................................................................................................ 52 April 16 Attempt to Arrest UDD Leaders ................................................................................ 64 The April 21-22 Confrontations at the Saladaeng Junction .................................................... 64 The April Raids on Chulalongkorn Hospital ......................................................................... 68 VI. Deadly Days of May: Breakdown of Negotiations and “Live-Fire” Zones .............................. 74 Role of Maj. Gen. Khattiya Sawasdipol ................................................................................ 77 “Live-Fire Zones” ................................................................................................................ 80 VII. The Final Assault: May 19 ................................................................................................... 86 The Army Assault................................................................................................................ 86 UDD Leadership Surrenders and Arson Attacks ................................................................... 89 Deaths at Wat Phatum Wanaram ......................................................................................... 92 VIII. Protests and Violence Outside Bangkok ........................................................................... 102 Ubon Ratchatani ............................................................................................................... 104 Udonthani ......................................................................................................................... 107 Khon Kaen ......................................................................................................................... 113 IX. Aftermath: Arbitrary Detention and Surveillance ................................................................ 120 Arbitrary Arrests and Detention ......................................................................................... 120 Ill-Treatment of Detainees ................................................................................................. 126 Surveillance and Harassment in the Provinces ................................................................... 131 X. Rolling Censorship of the UDD ............................................................................................ 136 Lese Majeste Charges ....................................................................................................... 140 Censorship of Community Radio ........................................................................................ 142 Censorship of Publications ................................................................................................ 145 XI. Recommendations ............................................................................................................. 147 To the Government of Thailand .......................................................................................... 147 To Leaders of the UDD, PAD, and Other Opposition Political Groups and Political Parties ... 148 To Foreign Governments and Intergovernmental Institutions, including the UN Human Rights Council ............................................................................................................................. 149 Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. 150 Appendix: Timeline of Thai Political History through the Election of Thaksin Shinawatra ......... 151 Summary and Key Recommendations Human Rights Watch | May 2011 Surrendered Red Shirt protesters are blindfolded and have their hands tied behind their back by soldiers on May 19, 2010 in Bangkok. © 2010 Jan Grarup/NOOR There will be blood on the street if the government does not call off the dispersal operations. Our patience is running out. We will take more serious measures to retaliate. The dark sky will turn red, red like blood. Jatuporn Prompan, Red Shirt leader, Bangkok, April 10, 2010 It is hard for the army to give explanations about every single dead body in Bangkok. Col. Sansern Kaewkamnerd, Center for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES) spokesman, Bangkok, June 7, 2010. DESCENT INTO CHAOS Thailand’s 2010 Red Shirt Protests and the Government Crackdown Thai soldiers fire live rounds into the air During the mass political mobilization from March (background) and rubber bullets at Red Shirt protesters (foreground) at the Phadung Krung to May 2010, Thailand endured the most violent Kasem intersection in Bangkok, during the confrontations since the protests against military dispersal of the Phan Fa Bridge protest site on April 10, 2010. rule in 1992. At least 90 people died and more © 2010 Agnes Dherbeys/VII Mentor Program than 2,000 were wounded in clashes between security forces and anti-government protesters led by the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), also known as “Red Shirts.” Arson attacks in Bangkok and elsewhere caused billions of dollars of damage. 4 Descent into Chaos An apparent member of the Black Shirt militants is seen with an fatally shot at least four people, including a medic treating the AK-47 in a back street of Soi Tanao, near Kao San Road and the wounded, in or near a temple in Bangkok on May 19, despite Democracy Monument in Bangkok, April 10, 2010. army claims to the contrary. The extensive casualties also © 2010 Agnes Dherbeys/VII Mentor Program resulted from deliberate attacks by militant armed elements of the UDD, whose leaders contributed to the violence with inflammatory speeches to demonstrators, including urging their supporters to carry out riots, arson attacks, and looting. While the political protests, which paralyzed the capital for The heavily armed “Black Shirt” militants, apparently three months, received global coverage, many of the deaths connected to the UDD and operating in tandem with it, were and injuries occurred beyond the view of news cameras. responsible for deadly attacks on soldiers, police, and Fueled by a lack of information, the UDD and government have civilians. traded claims and counterclaims about who was responsible During and after the protests, the government adopted for the loss of life. various measures that seriously infringed on fundamental Based on investigations conducted in Bangkok and in
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Thailand's Red Networks: from Street Forces to Eminent Civil Society
    Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Freiburg (Germany) Occasional Paper Series www.southeastasianstudies.uni-freiburg.de Occasional Paper N° 14 (April 2013) Thailand’s Red Networks: From Street Forces to Eminent Civil Society Coalitions Pavin Chachavalpongpun (Kyoto University) Pavin Chachavalpongpun (Kyoto University)* Series Editors Jürgen Rüland, Judith Schlehe, Günther Schulze, Sabine Dabringhaus, Stefan Seitz The emergence of the red shirt coalitions was a result of the development in Thai politics during the past decades. They are the first real mass movement that Thailand has ever produced due to their approach of directly involving the grassroots population while campaigning for a larger political space for the underclass at a national level, thus being projected as a potential danger to the old power structure. The prolonged protests of the red shirt movement has exceeded all expectations and defied all the expressions of contempt against them by the Thai urban elite. This paper argues that the modern Thai political system is best viewed as a place dominated by the elite who were never radically threatened ‘from below’ and that the red shirt movement has been a challenge from bottom-up. Following this argument, it seeks to codify the transforming dynamism of a complicated set of political processes and actors in Thailand, while investigating the rise of the red shirt movement as a catalyst in such transformation. Thailand, Red shirts, Civil Society Organizations, Thaksin Shinawatra, Network Monarchy, United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship, Lèse-majesté Law Please do not quote or cite without permission of the author. Comments are very welcome. Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction and rights should be addressed to the author in the first instance.
    [Show full text]
  • Thailand White Paper
    THE BANGKOK MASSACRES: A CALL FOR ACCOUNTABILITY ―A White Paper by Amsterdam & Peroff LLP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY For four years, the people of Thailand have been the victims of a systematic and unrelenting assault on their most fundamental right — the right to self-determination through genuine elections based on the will of the people. The assault against democracy was launched with the planning and execution of a military coup d’état in 2006. In collaboration with members of the Privy Council, Thai military generals overthrew the popularly elected, democratic government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, whose Thai Rak Thai party had won three consecutive national elections in 2001, 2005 and 2006. The 2006 military coup marked the beginning of an attempt to restore the hegemony of Thailand’s old moneyed elites, military generals, high-ranking civil servants, and royal advisors (the “Establishment”) through the annihilation of an electoral force that had come to present a major, historical challenge to their power. The regime put in place by the coup hijacked the institutions of government, dissolved Thai Rak Thai and banned its leaders from political participation for five years. When the successor to Thai Rak Thai managed to win the next national election in late 2007, an ad hoc court consisting of judges hand-picked by the coup-makers dissolved that party as well, allowing Abhisit Vejjajiva’s rise to the Prime Minister’s office. Abhisit’s administration, however, has since been forced to impose an array of repressive measures to maintain its illegitimate grip and quash the democratic movement that sprung up as a reaction to the 2006 military coup as well as the 2008 “judicial coups.” Among other things, the government blocked some 50,000 web sites, shut down the opposition’s satellite television station, and incarcerated a record number of people under Thailand’s infamous lèse-majesté legislation and the equally draconian Computer Crimes Act.
    [Show full text]
  • Thailand's Moment of Truth — Royal Succession After the King Passes Away.” - U.S
    THAILAND’S MOMENT OF TRUTH A SECRET HISTORY OF 21ST CENTURY SIAM #THAISTORY | VERSION 1.0 | 241011 ANDREW MACGREGOR MARSHALL MAIL | TWITTER | BLOG | FACEBOOK | GOOGLE+ This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License. This story is dedicated to the people of Thailand and to the memory of my colleague Hiroyuki Muramoto, killed in Bangkok on April 10, 2010. Many people provided wonderful support and inspiration as I wrote it. In particular I would like to thank three whose faith and love made all the difference: my father and mother, and the brave girl who got banned from Burma. ABOUT ME I’m a freelance journalist based in Asia and writing mainly about Asian politics, human rights, political risk and media ethics. For 17 years I worked for Reuters, including long spells as correspondent in Jakarta in 1998-2000, deputy bureau chief in Bangkok in 2000-2002, Baghdad bureau chief in 2003-2005, and managing editor for the Middle East in 2006-2008. In 2008 I moved to Singapore as chief correspondent for political risk, and in late 2010 I became deputy editor for emerging and frontier Asia. I resigned in June 2011, over this story. I’ve reported from more than three dozen countries, on every continent except South America. I’ve covered conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and East Timor; and political upheaval in Israel, Indonesia, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma. Of all the leading world figures I’ve interviewed, the three I most enjoyed talking to were Aung San Suu Kyi, Xanana Gusmao, and the Dalai Lama.
    [Show full text]
  • Macro Report Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 4: Macro Report September 10, 2012
    Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1 Module 4: Macro Report Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 4: Macro Report September 10, 2012 Country: Thailand Date of Election: July 3, 2011 Prepared by: King Prajadhipok’s Institute Date of Preparation: June 2011 NOTES TO COLLABORATORS: . The information provided in this report contributes to an important part of the CSES project. The information may be filled out by yourself, or by an expert or experts of your choice. Your efforts in providing these data are greatly appreciated! Any supplementary documents that you can provide (e.g., electoral legislation, party manifestos, electoral commission reports, media reports) are also appreciated, and may be made available on the CSES website. Answers should be as of the date of the election being studied. Where brackets [ ] appear, collaborators should answer by placing an “X” within the appropriate bracket or brackets. For example: [X] . If more space is needed to answer any question, please lengthen the document as necessary. Data Pertinent to the Election at which the Module was Administered 1a. Type of Election [x] Parliamentary/Legislative [ ] Parliamentary/Legislative and Presidential [ ] Presidential [ ] Other; please specify: __________ 1b. If the type of election in Question 1a included Parliamentary/Legislative, was the election for the Upper House, Lower House, or both? [ ] Upper House [x] Lower House [ ] Both [ ] Other; please specify: __________ Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2 Module 4: Macro Report 2a. What was the party of the president prior to the most recent election, regardless of whether the election was presidential? - 2b. What was the party of the Prime Minister prior to the most recent election, regardless of whether the election was parliamentary? Democrat Party 2c.
    [Show full text]
  • Intelligence Memorandum
    Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02962544 ,E .._, ....,, TolLSect:ef: -1L_____ -------' 3.5(c) DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Memorandum CAMBODIAANDTHE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS ... 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 29 January 1968 I Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02962544 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02962544 Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02962544 3.5(c) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 29 January 1968 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Cambodia and the Vietnamese Communists A Monthly Report Contents I. Military Developments: Communist battal~ ion and regimental size units continue to operate in Cambodian territory (Paras. 1-5). It is clear that North Vietnamese forces have had bases in the Cam­ bodian salient since mid-1965 (Paras. 6-8). The salient, however, has never been one of the major Communist base areias .in Cambodia (Paras. 9-12). A 3.3(h)(2) Cambodian~-----~ reports Communist units in South Vietnam are receiving Chinese arms and ammuni­ tion from Cambodian stocks (Paras. 13--16) . More reports have been received on Cambodian rice sales to the Corru:nunists (Paras. 17-20). Cambodian smug­ glers are supplying explosive chemicals to the Viet Cong (Para. 21). II. Poli ti cal Developments: Sihanouk"' con­ cerned over possible allied action against Communists in Cambodia for sanctuary, has reverted to diplomacy to settle the cris:is (Paras. 22-27). Sihanouk has again attempted to get a satisfactory border declara­ tion from the US (Para. 28). Cambodia, still believ­ ing the Communists will prevail in South Vietnam, sees short-term advantages to an opening to the West (Para.
    [Show full text]
  • Development and Promotion of the Utilization of Vetiver Grass According to His Majesty's Initiative Under the Responsibility O
    Development and Promotion of the Utilization of Vetiver Grass According to His Majesty’s Initiative Under the Responsibility of the 11th Infantry Regiment King’s Guard Lt Colonel Songwit Noonpakdee Commander 11th Infantry Regiment King’s Guard, Thailand Abstract: To fulfill His Majesty’s initiative concerning the development and promotion of the utilization of vetiver grass, the 11th Infantry Regiment King’s Guard has initiated a program based on: 1. Planting of vetiver to prevent soil erosion within the army unit; 2. Setting up a centre to provide knowledge on vetiver among the army officers and their families, as well as the public and private agencies; 3. Launching a campaign among the officers and their families encouraging them to acquire the knowledge on vetiver ecotypes, maintenance, and benefits, and to extend the results among the soldiers, who are about to leave the army, so that they can adopt the knowledge gained on their own land at home; 4. Establishing a propagation center to supply vetiver tillers to other units and government agencies in the nearby areas. So far the program achievements included: 1. Building demonstration plots of vetiver cultivation in various patterns and methods according to the royal initiatives beginning with the unit’s main road; 2. Studying the ponds within the unit and the areas with soil erosion problem, as well as planting vetiver to conserve the areas; 3. Establishing the 11th Infantry Regiment King’s Guard vetiver demonstration centre to extend the results and implement public relations activities to encourage the army officers, their families as well as the interested public to acquire the knowledge; 4.
    [Show full text]
  • COVID-19 Active Response and Expenditure Support Program
    Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors Project Number: 54177-001 June 2020 Proposed Countercyclical Support Facility Loans Kingdom of Thailand: COVID-19 Active Response and Expenditure Support Program Distribution of this document is restricted until it has been approved by the Board of Directors. Following such approval, ADB will disclose the document to the public in accordance with ADB’s Access to Information Policy after excluding information that is subject to exceptions to disclosure set forth in the policy. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (as of 7 June 2020) Currency unit – baht (B) B1.00 = $0.03173 $1.00 = B31.50 ABBREVIATIONS ADB – Asian Development Bank ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations BOT – Bank of Thailand CARES – COVID-19 Active Response and Expenditure Support CLMV – Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, and Viet Nam COVID-19 – coronavirus disease CPS – country partnership strategy GDP – gross domestic product GMS – Greater Mekong Subregion IMF – International Monetary Fund MOF – Ministry of Finance MOPH – Ministry of Public Health SMEs – small and medium-sized enterprises WHO – World Health Organization NOTES (i) The fiscal year (FY) of the Government of Thailand and its agencies ends on 30 September. "FY" before a calendar year denotes the year in which the fiscal year ends, e.g., FY2020 ends on 30 September 2020. (ii) In this report, "$" refers to United States dollars. Vice-President Ahmed M. Saeed, Operations 2 Director General Ramesh Subramaniam, Southeast Asia Department (SERD) Directors Jose Antonio R. Tan III, Public Management, Financial Sector and Trade Division (SEPF), SERD Ayako Inagaki, Human and Social Development Division (SEHS), SERD Hideaki Iwasaki, Thailand Resident Mission (TRM), SERD Team leaders Duong T.
    [Show full text]
  • The Government of Thailand's National Review
    1 The Government of Thailand’s National Review Implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) and the outcomes of the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly (2000) in the context of the twentieth anniversary of the Fourth World Conference on Women and the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 2015 October 2014 2 Section One: Overview analysis of achievements and challenges since 1995 Thailand as a member of the global community has ratified numbers of international agreements on women and the promotion of gender equality, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and endorsed Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BFPA) and the Millennium Development Goal (MDGs). These 3 agreements are definite, related, and corresponding to Thailand’s policies. The Thai government has attached great importance to the social equality and to mainstream gender perspectives in the national policy, giving priority to the promotion of gender equality, women’s role in politics and administration at all level, and the respect for human dignity. Major achievements in promoting gender equality and empowering women in Thailand since the adoption of the Beijing Platform for Action in 1995 can be identified as follows: National policy on gender equality and women empowerment Over the past few decades Thailand has implemented a total of nine short and long term women’s development plans. Thailand has developed long-term (20-year) and, on a regular basis, short-term (5-year) Women’s Development Plans , the national policy and guidelines on gender equality and the empowerment of women, as part of, and a key to integrate women and gender from the global, regional and national commitments into the mainstream of the National Economic and Social Development Plans.
    [Show full text]
  • Urbandignityvolume9 2014.Pdf
    Journal of Urban Culture Research Volume 9 Jul - Dec 2014 Published jointly by Chulalongkorn University, Thailand and Osaka City University, Japan The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the individual author(s) BOEEPOPUOFDFTTBSJMZSFÏFDUUIFQPMJDJFTPSPQJOJPOTPGUIFJournal (JUCR), it editors and staff, Chulalongkorn University, or Osaka City University. Authors authorize the JUCR to publish their materials both in print and online while retaining their full individual copyright. The copyright of JUCR volumes is retained by Chulalongkorn University. © 2014 BY CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY ISSN 2228 – 8279 (Print) ISSN 2408 – 1213 (Online) JUCR is listed in the Thai-Journal Citation Index – TCI 5IJTQVCMJDBUJPOJTBOPOQSPÎUFEVDBUJPOBMSFTFBSDIKPVSOBMOPUGPSTBMF Journal of Urban Culture Research Executive Director Suppakorn Disatapandhu, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand Editor in Chief Kjell Skyllstad, University of Oslo, Norway International Editor Alan Kinear, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand Contributing Editors Bussakorn Binson, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand Shin Nakagawa, Osaka City University, Japan Managing Editor Pornprapit Phoasavadi, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand Editorial Board Frances Anderson, College of Charleston, USA Bussakorn Binson, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand Naraphong Charassri, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand Dan Baron Cohen, Institute of Transformance: Culture and Education, Brazil Gavin Douglas, University of North Carolina, USA Made Mantle Hood, University of Putra, Malaysia Geir Johnson, Music
    [Show full text]
  • Thailand's First Provincial Elections Since the 2014 Military Coup
    ISSUE: 2021 No. 24 ISSN 2335-6677 RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE ANALYSE CURRENT EVENTS Singapore | 5 March 2021 Thailand’s First Provincial Elections since the 2014 Military Coup: What Has Changed and Not Changed Punchada Sirivunnabood* Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, founder of the now-dissolved Future Forward Party, attends a press conference in Bangkok on January 21, 2021, after he was accused of contravening Thailand's strict royal defamation lese majeste laws. In December 2020, the Progressive Movement competed for the post of provincial administrative organisations (PAO) chairman in 42 provinces and ran more than 1,000 candidates for PAO councils in 52 of Thailand’s 76 provinces. Although Thanathorn was banned from politics for 10 years, he involved himself in the campaign through the Progressive Movement. Photo: Lillian SUWANRUMPHA, AFP. * Punchada Sirivunnabood is Associate Professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities of Mahidol University and Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. 1 ISSUE: 2021 No. 24 ISSN 2335-6677 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • On 20 December 2020, voters across Thailand, except in Bangkok, elected representatives to provincial administrative organisations (PAO), in the first twinkle of hope for decentralisation in the past six years. • In previous sub-national elections, political parties chose to separate themselves from PAO candidates in order to balance their power among party allies who might want to contest for the same local positions. • In 2020, however, several political parties, including the Phuea Thai Party, the Democrat Party and the Progressive Movement (the successor of the Future Forward Party) officially supported PAO candidates.
    [Show full text]
  • Thailand's Puzzling 2019 Election
    ISSUE: 2019 No. 44 ISSN 2335-6677 RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE ANALYSE CURRENT EVENTS Singapore | 29 May 2019 Thailand’s Puzzling 2019 Election: How the NCPO Junta has Embedded itself in Thai Politics Punchada Sirivunnabood* EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The “mixed-member apportionment” system that Thailand’s 2017 Constitution introduced to parliamentary elections has led to the changes in the country’s political landscape. Although the system was designed to help the military-backed Phalang Pracharat Party garner a large number of parliamentary seats, it also enabled a number of medium-size and small parties, including the Future Forward Party, to gain more parliamentary seats than expected. Eleven small parties with one or two seats each have pledged to support the pro- junta Phalang Pracharat Party in forming a government and to back the incumbent prime minister continuing in power. If these small parties join a pro-military coalition, the new government will face challenges managing a coalition of more than 20 parties. *Punchada Sirivunnabood is Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. 1 ISSUE: 2019 No. 44 ISSN 2335-6677 INTRODUCTION “Please let it be known about an important thing in governing, that in the country, there are both good and bad people. No one will make all people become good people. So to give the country normality and order is not about making everyone become good people, but it lies in supporting goodness, so that good people govern the country, and restraining bad people from having power, in order not to create confusion.” (Unofficial Translation) His Majesty King Vajiralongkorn’s statement 23 March 20191 On 23 March 2019, King Vajiralongkorn released an unexpected announcement on the eve of Thailand’s national elections, saying that voters should support “good people” to rule Thailand.
    [Show full text]
  • Economic Reformation in Thailand
    No. 08/ 2017 Thammasat Institute of Area Studies WORKING PAPER SERIES 2017 Economic Development Pattern under Military Regime: A Comparative Study between Park Chung Hee and Sarit Thanarat Administration Merica Chanakitchinchon December, 2017 THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY PAPER NO. 08 / 2017 Thammasat Institute of Area Studies, Thammasat University Working Paper Series 2017 Economic Development Pattern under Military Regime: A Comparative Study between Park Chung Hee and Sarit Thanarat Administration Merica Chanakitchinchon Thammasat Institute of Area Studies, Thammasat University 99 Moo 18 Khlongnueng Sub District, Khlong Luang District, Pathum Thani, 12121, Thailand ©2017 by Merica Chanakitchinchon. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given to the source. This publication of Working Paper Series is part of Master of Arts in Asia-Pacific Studies Program, Thammasat Institute of Area Studies (TIARA), Thammasat University. The view expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Institute. For more information, please contact Academic Support Unit, Thammasat Institute of Area Studies (TIARA), Patumthani, Thailand Telephone: +02 696 6605 Fax: + 66 2 564-2849 Email: [email protected] Language Editors: Mr Mohammad Zaidul Anwar Bin Haji Mohamad Kasim Ms. Thanyawee Chuanchuen TIARA Working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. Comments on this paper should be sent to the author of the paper, Ms. Merica Chanakitchinchon, Email: [email protected] Or Academic Support Unit (ASU), Thammasat Institute of Area Studies, Thammasat University Abstract Thailand and South Korea in the period of 1960s had some similar characteristics.
    [Show full text]