DOCSLIB.ORG

Thailand's Lengthening Roadmap to Elections

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Thailand's Lengthening Roadmap to Elections Thailand’s Lengthening Roadmap to Elections Asia Report N°274 | 10 December 2015 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Road to the Roadmap ....................................................................................................... 3 III. Drafting the Twentieth Constitution ................................................................................ 6 A. First Draft................................................................................................................... 6 B. Roadmap Dead Ends ................................................................................................. 8 IV. The Road Ahead ............................................................................................................... 11 A. Revised Roadmap ...................................................................................................... 11 B. Incipient Praetorianism? ........................................................................................... 12 C. Economic Factors ...................................................................................................... 16 D. Dissent ....................................................................................................................... 17 V. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 20 APPENDICES A. Map of Thailand ............................................................................................................... 21 B. Glossary ............................................................................................................................ 22 C. About the International Crisis Group .............................................................................. 23 D. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Asia since 2012 .................................................. 24 E. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ........................................................................................ 26 International Crisis Group Asia Report N°274 10 December 2015 Executive Summary On 6 September 2015, a reform council appointed by Thailand’s military-run admin- istration, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), rejected a constitution prepared by a drafting committee it had itself appointed. With the draft scuppered, the military regime extended its tenure by at least seven months, backtracking on the roadmap to “fully-functioning democracy” it announced after the May 2014 coup and delaying a general election until mid-2017. Passage to a general election, includ- ing a new constitution subject to a national referendum, has started over. The pro- cess is unfolding against a backdrop of impending royal succession, a faltering econ- omy and continuing political and social polarisation that military rule has failed to ease. The regime’s autocratic bent and evident determination to oversee the succes- sion preclude an inclusive national dialogue on a political order rooted in popular sovereignty that protects the rights of all. The country is in the grip of a conflict between forces of change and continuity that has political, economic and geographical dimensions. It manifests itself as fric- tion between elected and unelected authority. The traditional establishment – bu- reaucracy, military, and palace networks – seeks to preserve the status quo in the face of socio-economic change and political claims of provincial voters. Thaksin Shinawatra, prime minister from 2001 until a coup in 2006, challenged the old guard with his ambition and electoral prowess. The establishment’s repertoire of bureau- cratic oversight, constitutional engineering, judicial intervention, street protests and coups d’état failed to contain Thaksin or suppress the popular political aspirations he harnessed. Thaksin-aligned parties have won every general election since 2001. With the 69-year reign of King Bhumibol Adulyadej drawing to an end and royal succes- sion looming, the establishment required a more assertive effort to control events. The NCPO seized power in 2014, citing the threat of continued violence after months of protests against Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, elected in July 2011. Many who demanded Yingluck’s ouster saw the coup as a nec- essary step in eradicating corruption and what they called parliamentary dictator- ship. The NCPO proclaimed a three-phase roadmap to democracy: reestablishment of security and reconciliation; an elected government; and an ongoing reform pro- cess. However, it has repeatedly postponed the projected date for a general election. Ratification of a new constitution is a precondition of the roadmap’s second phase. The Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) produced a document that alarmed ob- servers across the political divide. Provisions included a majority-appointed senate, allowance for an unelected prime minister and a “crisis committee” stacked with mili- tary officers empowered to override parliament and the executive in the interests of national security. The NCPO appeared to lobby its appointed reform council to reject the draft, thereby not only extending its tenure, but also sparing it the potential em- barrassment of rejection by voters in a plebiscite. Few lamented the draft’s demise, but for many, its rejection casts doubt on the military’s commitment to relinquish power to an elected government. Most Thais do not expect the military to step down for several years, until well after a new king is on the throne. Some are concerned that it will use the next constitution to engineer enduring political supremacy. Thailand’s Lengthening Roadmap to Elections Crisis Group Asia Report N°274, 10 December 2015 Page ii A new CDC must produce a draft constitution by 1 April 2016 that will be subject to a national referendum. The failure of the 2015 draft suggests that the NCPO may not be able to issue a constitution that both satisfies its concerns about maintaining political control and is acceptable to the public. If the next draft fails, the process will start yet again. If the public approves a draft simply in order to return to elected gov- ernment, the conflict between elected and unelected authority is likely to re-emerge. The NCPO has spurned the kind of deliberative drafting process that could help con- fer legitimacy on the next constitution and appears to be playing for time. A handful of democracy activists have staged sporadic demonstrations, but the regime’s political opponents have mostly opted to bide their time. The NCPO faces no evident challenge to its hold on power. Nevertheless, continued harassment of re- gime critics betrays its insecurity, which may stem in part from arcane elite faction- alism. Meanwhile, allegations of corruption have undermined its assertion of moral guardianship, and a worsening economy fuels growing discontent, which, if not assuaged, could spur more active opposition. After a decade of turmoil, and with the king’s reign drawing to an end, most Thais appear either receptive or resigned to a period of military rule. Yet, expectation of future turmoil is pervasive. Those convinced that time is on the side of popular sov- ereignty cite recurring collective demands for greater democracy. But few see the military surrendering its veto over the constitutional order. Nor would a new consti- tution and a general election by themselves resolve the legitimacy struggle between elected and unelected authority. This requires a new social contract, best achieved through dialogue about Thailand’s political order. Necessary conditions for such a dialogue, including protection of political rights and leadership with a stake in com- promise, are absent. For now, anxiety surrounding the end of the current reign and the regime’s repression of dissent rule out such a process. Bangkok/Brussels, 10 December 2015 International Crisis Group Asia Report N°274 10 December 2015 Thailand’s Lengthening Roadmap to Elections I. Introduction Thailand’s politics have fallen into a disturbing pattern. Since 2006, the military has staged two coups and scrapped two constitutions; the king has endorsed two interim charters and one “permanent” constitution; courts have dissolved four political par- ties, invalidated two elections and ousted three elected prime ministers; and protest- related violence has killed scores of people.1 This record of turmoil appears anachro- nistic. The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), the ruling military council, evokes military dictatorships of the 1950s-1970s; and an old cycle of coups, constitu- tions, elections and crises has re-emerged.2 Like earlier coup makers, the NCPO promised an end to the cycle and a return to democracy following a period of military-guided reform. Its advertised path to a general election requires a new constitution, Thailand’s twentieth since 1932.3 On 6 September 2015, however, the NCPO’s hand-picked reform council rejected a draft constitution written by a drafting committee it had selected, requiring that the pro- cess start again. The regular recurrence of coups d’état and the fact that successful
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Thailand White Paper
    THE BANGKOK MASSACRES: A CALL FOR ACCOUNTABILITY ―A White Paper by Amsterdam & Peroff LLP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY For four years, the people of Thailand have been the victims of a systematic and unrelenting assault on their most fundamental right — the right to self-determination through genuine elections based on the will of the people. The assault against democracy was launched with the planning and execution of a military coup d’état in 2006. In collaboration with members of the Privy Council, Thai military generals overthrew the popularly elected, democratic government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, whose Thai Rak Thai party had won three consecutive national elections in 2001, 2005 and 2006. The 2006 military coup marked the beginning of an attempt to restore the hegemony of Thailand’s old moneyed elites, military generals, high-ranking civil servants, and royal advisors (the “Establishment”) through the annihilation of an electoral force that had come to present a major, historical challenge to their power. The regime put in place by the coup hijacked the institutions of government, dissolved Thai Rak Thai and banned its leaders from political participation for five years. When the successor to Thai Rak Thai managed to win the next national election in late 2007, an ad hoc court consisting of judges hand-picked by the coup-makers dissolved that party as well, allowing Abhisit Vejjajiva’s rise to the Prime Minister’s office. Abhisit’s administration, however, has since been forced to impose an array of repressive measures to maintain its illegitimate grip and quash the democratic movement that sprung up as a reaction to the 2006 military coup as well as the 2008 “judicial coups.” Among other things, the government blocked some 50,000 web sites, shut down the opposition’s satellite television station, and incarcerated a record number of people under Thailand’s infamous lèse-majesté legislation and the equally draconian Computer Crimes Act.
    [Show full text]
  • Macro Report Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 4: Macro Report September 10, 2012
    Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1 Module 4: Macro Report Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 4: Macro Report September 10, 2012 Country: Thailand Date of Election: July 3, 2011 Prepared by: King Prajadhipok’s Institute Date of Preparation: June 2011 NOTES TO COLLABORATORS: . The information provided in this report contributes to an important part of the CSES project. The information may be filled out by yourself, or by an expert or experts of your choice. Your efforts in providing these data are greatly appreciated! Any supplementary documents that you can provide (e.g., electoral legislation, party manifestos, electoral commission reports, media reports) are also appreciated, and may be made available on the CSES website. Answers should be as of the date of the election being studied. Where brackets [ ] appear, collaborators should answer by placing an “X” within the appropriate bracket or brackets. For example: [X] . If more space is needed to answer any question, please lengthen the document as necessary. Data Pertinent to the Election at which the Module was Administered 1a. Type of Election [x] Parliamentary/Legislative [ ] Parliamentary/Legislative and Presidential [ ] Presidential [ ] Other; please specify: __________ 1b. If the type of election in Question 1a included Parliamentary/Legislative, was the election for the Upper House, Lower House, or both? [ ] Upper House [x] Lower House [ ] Both [ ] Other; please specify: __________ Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2 Module 4: Macro Report 2a. What was the party of the president prior to the most recent election, regardless of whether the election was presidential? - 2b. What was the party of the Prime Minister prior to the most recent election, regardless of whether the election was parliamentary? Democrat Party 2c.
    [Show full text]
  • Bangkok: Two Cities Petra Desatova
    Bangkok: Two Cities Petra Desatova Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 41, Number 2, August 2019, pp. 176-182 (Article) Published by ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/732131 Access provided at 9 Jan 2020 10:18 GMT from New Copenhagen University Library Bangkok: Two Cities PETRA DESATOVA Bangkok delivered one of the biggest surprises of Thailand’s March 2019 election, with the capital’s fickle voters amplifying larger national trends. Though popularly viewed as a stronghold for the storied Democrat Party, the history of Bangkok’s elections over the past 40 years has been distinctly mixed. Bangkok voters have shown an unparalleled willingness to embrace new parties—hence the landslide wins by Prachakorn Thai in 1979, Palang Dharma in 1992 and Thai Rak Thai in 2001. It was the Democrats that secured the majority of Bangkok seats in 2007 and 2011, on the strength of backing both from more affluent middle-class voters and low-income inner city communities in districts such as Bang Rak and Khlong Toei. In the 2011 elections, the Democrat Party won 23 out of the capital’s 33 constituency seats. Its main rival, Pheu Thai, secured the remaining ten seats. By contrast, in the March 2019 elections, the Democrat Party failed to secure even a single constituency seat in the capital. Out of 30 seats available, Pheu Thai won nine. The rest were split between two new parties: the pro-military Palang Pracharat Party (12) and the progressive Future Forward Party (9).
    [Show full text]
  • The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics by Zachary Abuza
    STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 6 The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics by Zachary Abuza Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Complex Operations, and Center for Strategic Conferencing. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, and publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Thai and U.S. Army Soldiers participate in Cobra Gold 2006, a combined annual joint training exercise involving the United States, Thailand, Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia. Photo by Efren Lopez, U.S. Air Force The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics By Zachary Abuza Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 6 Series Editors: C. Nicholas Rostow and Phillip C. Saunders National Defense University Press Washington, D.C.
    [Show full text]
  • A Coup Ordained? Thailand's Prospects for Stability
    A Coup Ordained? Thailand’s Prospects for Stability Asia Report N°263 | 3 December 2014 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Thailand in Turmoil ......................................................................................................... 2 A. Power and Legitimacy ................................................................................................ 2 B. Contours of Conflict ................................................................................................... 4 C. Troubled State ............................................................................................................ 6 III. Path to the Coup ............................................................................................................... 9 A. Revival of Anti-Thaksin Coalition ............................................................................. 9 B. Engineering a Political Vacuum ................................................................................ 12 IV. Military in Control ............................................................................................................ 16 A. Seizing Power
    [Show full text]
  • Thailand After the Red Shirt Uprising
    Avoiding Conflict: Thailand after the Red Shirt Uprising Thailand’s 2006 coup unleashed deadly political conflict as a conservative elite rallied against Thaksin Shinawatra and his red shirt supporters. Further strife was predicted in the wake of Yingluck Shinawatra’s 2011 election victory. But, as Kevin Hewison reports, the expected clashes have not yet materialised. n April and May 2010, Thailand’s reducing opposition from the mili- challenge their own hierarchical con- colour-coded political conflicts tary, judiciary and monarchy. trol of the state. Igrabbed international attention While some in the red shirt Soon after Thaksin’s victory, these when the governing Democrat Party movement considered the election opponents began a campaign to oust led by Abhisit Vejjajiva ordered army a mandate for rapid and progressive him. The yellow-shirted People’s Al- crackdowns on pro-Thaksin Shina- change, for Thaksin, Yingluck and liance for Democracy (PAD) rallied watra red shirt protesters that were Pheu Thai leaders, compromise and and demonstrated, destabilising the demanding a new election. The reconciliation have been the defin- government. With Thaksin refusing result was more than 90 killed and ing political strategies since gaining to resign, the military was prodded some 2,400 injured. In murky cir- office. The underlying rationale for into action, prompted by former cumstances, several areas of Bang- all this has been a determination that generals in the king’s advisory kok and some provincial capitals the Yingluck administration should body, the Privy Council. When the were torched. Abhisit had presided remain in place for a full term and More than 90 military’s tanks rolled and the king over a remarkable expansion of po- gain re-election.
    [Show full text]
  • The Case of Young People and Thai Politics ¿Importan Los Líderes Políticos? El Caso De Los Jóvenes Y La Política Tailandesa
    aDResearch ESIC Nº 4 Vol 4 · Segundo semestre, julio-diciembre 2011 · Págs. 8 a 27 Do political leaders matter? The case of young people and Thai politics ¿Importan los líderes políticos? El caso de los jóvenes y la política Tailandesa Waraporn Chatratichart University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce [email protected] adResearch_4_lib.indb 8 02/06/11 12:15 Nº 4 Vol 4 · Segundo semestre, julio-diciembre 2011 · Págs. 8 a 27 ABSTRACT The influence of the image and personality of political actors have long been dis- cussed in political and communication studies. Although an understanding of the impact is inconclusive, it is widely believed that the image or personality of leaders influences voters’ electoral choices and, therefore, a political actor’s personality is im- portant. Several critics, however, contend that the focus on the party leader encoura- ge voters to engage with the image rather than the substance of politics. This paper Do political leaders argues that the perceived image of a party leader can influence young people’s elec- toral choices, although they may use the image in different ways. As argued by the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo 1981, 1986), among those with matter? The case of JEL Classification: M37, M38 lower levels of political knowledge, interest and/or involvement, a leader’s perceived young people Key words: image or personality may serve as a shortcut when making their electoral choices. Image, political For others, a degree of emotional attachment to a leader may stimulate their con- leadeship, Voting sideration of that leader’s policies, leading to central route processing.
    [Show full text]
  • Civil Unrest in Southern Thailand: Roles and Challenges of Malaysia Field: Strategy Name: Radm Syed Zahrul Putra RMN Course: NDC Class 60
    Civil Unrest in Southern Thailand: Roles and Challenges of Malaysia By Rear Admiral Syed Zahrul Putra Royal Malaysian Navy Student of the National Defence College The National Defence Course: Class 60 Academic Year 2017 - 2018 i Abstract Title: Civil Unrest in Southern Thailand: Roles and Challenges of Malaysia Field: Strategy Name: Radm Syed Zahrul Putra RMN Course: NDC Class 60 Series of violence in Southern Thailand resurgence in late 2001 and eventually escalated dramatically in 2004. Many scholars regarded this conflict entailed from the manifestation of deep resentment of the people in the southern provinces towards the central government especially with regards to the historical factor, culture, leadership style and economic deprivation. Being an immediate neighbour, Malaysia in an absolute sense, is affected physically in this situations. The Southern Thailand is experiencing a situation where there is neither total nor civil war. But the “tone” of having some kind of conflict and unrest in these provinces is clearly evident. Malaysia has significantly played several roles in assisting to restore peace and stability in Southern Thailand provinces. One of the examples is the establishment of General Border Committee (GBC) between Thailand and Malaysia with the primary objective of GBC is to enhance the security and stability in the border areas. It has helped bridging differences, building contacts and facilitating communication between the two countries. Additionally, leaders from both sides maintain close ties through regular official and non-official visits in various forums. The Malaysian government has viewed the conflict in the Southern Thailand seriously. The geographical proximity between the two countries placed Malaysia within the parameters of what is essentially as Thai internal problem.
    [Show full text]
  • Isan: Double Trouble Saowanee T
    Isan: Double Trouble Saowanee T. Alexander Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 41, Number 2, August 2019, pp. 183-189 (Article) Published by ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/732132 Access provided at 9 Jan 2020 10:19 GMT from New Copenhagen University Library Isan: Double Trouble SAOWANEE T. ALEXANDER “Khao ao ngoen phai, ka lueak Pheu Thai khue kao” [It doesn’t matter whose money they take, they will vote for Pheu Thai like before], a concession stand owner on campus told the author two days after the Palang Pracharat Party had held a mass rally at Ubon Ratchathani University—an unprecedented opportunity for any Thai political party. She had attended the rally, for which village-level coordinators had arranged transportation and collated the names of attendees. Upon being asked by the author whether the attendees would get paid, the concession stand owner merely smiled and said that she did not know. Instead of pressing for an answer, the author decided to wait anxiously for election day to find out whether the lady was right about Pheu Thai’s prospects. For almost 20 years, Thailand’s Northeast region (Isan) has strongly supported the Pheu Thai Party and its precursor parties closely associated with former prime ministers Thaksin Shinawatra and Yingluck Shinawatra. The region is also the bastion of the Red Shirt movement, a loose-knit, self-proclaimed “pro-democracy” alliance which staged large mass protests against the unelected government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva in 2009 and 2010.
    [Show full text]
  • Thailand's 2019 Vote: the General's Election
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Singapore Management University Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences 1-2019 Thailand's 2019 Vote: The General's Election Jacob RICKS Singapore Management University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons Citation RICKS, Jacob.(2019). Thailand's 2019 Vote: The General's Election. Pacific Affairs, 92(3), 443-457. Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3074 This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email [email protected]. Thailand’s 2019 Vote: The General’s Election Jacob I. Ricks Abstract Thailand’s March 2019 ballot was the first for the country since 2011, and for many it signaled the potential end of the military junta’s five-year rule. But was it truly a return to democracy? This essay argues that the election was far from a democratization event. Instead, it was a highly orchestrated exercise to ensure authoritarian longevity. The junta employed techniques of institutional engineering as well as managing the election’s outcomes in an effort to extend the premiership of Prayuth Chan-ocha despite increasing pressure for a return to civilian rule.
    [Show full text]
  • 'Thailand's Amazing 24 March 2019 Elections'
    Contemporary Southeast Asia 41, No. 2 (2019), pp. 153–222 DOI: 10.1355/cs41-2a © 2019 ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic Anatomy: Future Backward DUNCAN McCARGO The most popular man in Thailand appears out of the bushes on Thammasat University campus, dripping with sweat and with no staff in sight: Future Forward leader Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit is promptly mobbed by fans clamouring for selfies and autographs. Voters on Bangkok’s Charoenkrung Road look delighted to see a former prime minister out on the campaign trail: eager to show off his fitness, Abhisit Vejjajiva practically runs up some footbridge steps, leaving the local candidate panting behind. A Pheu Thai candidate asks a village crowd in Ubon Ratchathani to raise their hands if they are better off now than they were five years ago: everyone roars with laughter at a woman who puts her hand up by mistake, since nobody could possibly be better off. In Pattani, thousands of people stay until midnight at a football ground to hear prominent speakers from the Prachachart Party. No big outdoor rallies like this have been held after dark in the three insurgency-affected southern border provinces since 2004. The weeks leading up to the 24 March 2019 elections were a time of excitement; after almost five years of military rule following the 22 May 2014 coup d’état, Thais were finally free to express themselves politically. Around 51 million people were eligible to vote, while a record total of 80 political parties and 13,310 candidates from across the ideological spectrum were listed on their ballot papers.
    [Show full text]
  • The Attorney-General Filed a Total of Three Applications Dated 6Th July B
    The Constitutional Court Ruling No. 26/2554 Case No. 42/2553 Dated 27th April B.E. 2554 (2011) Second Lieutenant Porapol Adireksarn, Member of the House of Representatives the applicant Between Pheu Thai Party the respondent Re: A Member of the House of Representatives (Second Lieutenant Porapol Adireksarn) requested for a Constitutional Court ruling on whether or not a resolution of the Pheu Thai Party was inconsistent with the status and functions of a Member of the House of Representatives under the Constitution, or contrary to or inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the democratic form of government with the King as Head of State, as provided under section 65 paragraph three of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007). Second Lieutenant Porapol Adireksarn, Member of the House of Representatives for Saraburi Province, the applicant, filed an application in request of a Constitutional Court ruling under section 106(7) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007) on whether or not a resolution of the Pheu Thai Party, the respondent, had the characteristics under section 65 paragraph three of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007). 2 The facts under the application and supporting documents may be summarised, as follows: 1. The applicant was elected to become a Member of the House of Representatives for Constituency 1, Saraburi Province, of the People’s Power Party, on 23rd December B.E. 2550 (2007). Thereafter, on 2nd December 2551 (2008), the Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of the People’s Power Party.
    [Show full text]