Thailand After the Red Shirt Uprising

Avoiding Conflict: Thailand after the Red Shirt Uprising Thailand’s 2006 coup unleashed deadly political conflict as a conservative elite rallied against Thaksin Shinawatra and his red shirt supporters. Further strife was predicted in the wake of Yingluck Shinawatra’s 2011 election victory. But, as Kevin Hewison reports, the expected clashes have not yet materialised. n April and May 2010, Thailand’s reducing opposition from the mili- challenge their own hierarchical con- colour-coded political conflicts tary, judiciary and monarchy. trol of the state. Igrabbed international attention While some in the red shirt Soon after Thaksin’s victory, these when the governing Democrat Party movement considered the election opponents began a campaign to oust led by Abhisit Vejjajiva ordered army a mandate for rapid and progressive him. The yellow-shirted People’s Al- crackdowns on pro-Thaksin Shina- change, for Thaksin, Yingluck and liance for Democracy (PAD) rallied watra red shirt protesters that were Pheu Thai leaders, compromise and and demonstrated, destabilising the demanding a new election. The reconciliation have been the defin- government. With Thaksin refusing result was more than 90 killed and ing political strategies since gaining to resign, the military was prodded some 2,400 injured. In murky cir- office. The underlying rationale for into action, prompted by former cumstances, several areas of Bang- all this has been a determination that generals in the king’s advisory kok and some provincial capitals the Yingluck administration should body, the Privy Council. When the were torched. Abhisit had presided remain in place for a full term and More than 90 military’s tanks rolled and the king over a remarkable expansion of po- gain re-election. people were quickly granted an audience to the litical repression, which, by the time In compromising with opponents, killed and junta afterwards, the military brass of the violence, saw virtually all red the Pheu Thai Party is seeking to probably felt satisfied that there was shirt media closed, tens of thousands prevent destabilising street dem- some 2,400 no bloodshed and that it had the of web pages blocked and an emer- onstrations and conservative elite injured in the support of Bangkok’s middle class, gency decree and the lèse majesté law, opposition that unseated previous 2010 protests including academics, civil society which protects the monarchy from pro-Thaksin administrations. Pheu organisations and the mainstream criticism, used to imprison more Thai has had to seek accommoda- media. than 200 political opponents. tions with a military leadership The royalist determination to Fast forward to late 2012 and associated with the 2006 coup, a destroy Thaksin was seen when the Thailand seems to have undergone judiciary that brought down several military appointed an interim gov- a transformation. The Democrats pro-Thaksin parties and a palace that ernment led by General Surayud are in opposition while Yingluck has been implacably opposed to Chulanont, who resigned from the Shinawatra and her Pheu Thai Thaksin since at least 2005. Privy Council to become prime min- Party – elected with massive red ister. A new constitution was writ- shirt support in a landslide in July ten, the military’s budget allocation 2011 – seems settled in government. Opposing Thaksin increased, and Thaksin supporters Certainly, royalist and yellow shirt were repressed as the elite sought to opponents have been sniping at the Thaksin was an odd threat to the con- negate Thaksin’s ‘populist’ appeal. government for alleged corruption, servative elite, given that he was one Despite this, and the dissolution of disloyalty to the monarchy, support- of Thailand’s richest men and formed the Thai Rak Thai Party, the elector- ing red shirt ‘terrorists’ and for being his Thai Rak Thai Party as essentially ate’s support for pro-Thaksin parties at Thaksin’s beck and call, but none a party for domestic businesses. Yet remained strong: his People’s Power of this has yet destabilised the gov- his arrogance and his strong-willed, Party (PPP) snatched a 2007 election ernment. This rapid political cooling aggressive policy implementation an- victory. has been possible because Yingluck noyed conservatives allied with the In 2008 – as the military effectively and her brother Thaksin have rec- monarchy’s state. When Thaksin won mutinied against the PPP govern- ognised that, in government, their an unprecedented landslide victory in ment, refusing to remove the yellow political aims are more likely to the 2005 election, the palace and the shirts occupying Bangkok’s airports be achieved through compromise, military worried that Thaksin was – the Constitutional Court hur- moderating radical demands and estabilshing a popularity that would ried through a ban on pro-Thaksin 28 Political Insight Since her 2011 election victory, Yingluck’s government has sought to keep influential General Prem Tinsulanonda (left) on side.Corbis politicians and parties. The military quickly shoehorned In the midst of a conflict over calls to amend thelèse Abhisit and the Democrat Party into government, a majesté law, Yutthisak was replaced by Air Chief Marshal move that quickly led to red shirt street protests. Sukumpol Suwanatat. Sukumpol, who had opposed With so much political capital invested in royalist the 2006 coup, was prepared to be tougher with the politics and keeping Thaksin and his supporters at bay, military elite and was trusted by Thaksin. Significantly, Yingluck’s election victory amounted to a rejection of The 2011 on the basis of seniority, he was not opposed by Privy the military, its coup and its royalist politics. Despite the election was a Council President and former prime minister General election rout, Thaksin and Yingluck identified the mili- rejection of the Prem Tinsulanonda. tary’s brute power, the palace’s propensity for interven- While the military has remained prickly in dealing tion and a royalist judiciary as significant threats to the military’s coup, with the government, the main points of possible con- new government. Party strategists developed strategies yet Yingluck flict appear to have been avoided. The government has to appease and sideline royalists. and Thaksin honoured the monarchy and refused consideration of decided not changes to the lèse majesté law. Red shirt activists were disappointed by this failure to address a law repeatedly Managing Military Machinations to directly used to jail compatriots, but the Pheu Thai leadership confront its recognised that the law was symbolic of the military’s The election result was a pointed rejection of the mili- leadership self-appointed role as protector of the monarchy. On the tary’s coup, yet Yingluck and Thaksin decided not to Thai–Cambodian border, where a dangerous conflict had confront its leadership. They proceeded carefully in seen the bilateral relationship collapse, some troops have choosing a Defence Minister. The initial choice, Gen- been withdrawn and nationalist fervour tempered. In eral Yutthisak Sasiprapha, was acceptable to the mili- the South, where an intractable insurgency has claimed tary but proved weak in managing the government’s some 5,000 lives since 2004, the government has not relationship with an antagonistic military top brass. confronted the military’s authority. During Thaksin’s December 2012 29 2006 coup and reflected a royalist effort to change the political rules, shifting power to unelected institutions. The anti-Thaksin alliance has vehemently opposed any change. The Yingluck government’s initial efforts at amendment provoked the Con- stitutional Court into a blatantly political intervention, ignoring its own procedures and the constitution to stymie change. Notably, the government – despite party and red shirt anger – has accepted this limitation and backed away from judicial confrontation. In cases involving lèse majesté and political charges against red shirts, the government has given ground to the conservative opposition. This has frustrated red shirts, but the government is reluctant to intervene where the palace is involved. It has quietly bailed red shirts jailed in 2010, although several lèse majesté prisoners remain incar- cerated, apparently considered by royalists as hardcore republicans. Placating the Palace Underlying political turmoil have been con- cerns regarding the future of the monarchy. In 2006, the junta claimed that Thaksin and his government – as well as showing ‘signs of rampant corruption, malfeasance, political interference in government agencies and independent organization’ – engaged in ‘several actions verging on lèse majesté against His Majesty the King, who is highly respected by the Thai people’. The previous Surayud and Abhisit gov- ernments heavily promoted the monarchy, demanded loyalty to the monarchy’s state and used the lèse majesté law to suppress Red Shirt supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra wear masks of the exiled former Thai premier during opposition. Long involved in politics and a demonstration at the Democracy Monument in Bangkok, earlier this year. Corbis suspicious of elected politicians, palace propaganda spun the king’s interventions administration, his Southern intrusions royalists have used it to target Thaksin and as attempts to end national crises. It was the were resented, opposed and sabotaged. his allies with a plethora of cases unparal- 2006 coup that fully revealed the palace’s Yingluck hasn’t made the same mistake leled in modern times. The legal validity of politics: the coup’s leader General Sonthi and, as talks with the insurgents have ex- the cases matters little – it is the targeting Boonyaratglin and his junta met the king panded, the military’s support has gradu- that is politically significant. Amongst many and queen within hours of the coup and ally been won. In these circumstances, the cases, Thaksin lost 46 billion baht of his as- received palace approval, with Sonthi military has become quieter in its political sets (considered improperly gained) and he reporting that ‘the king was relaxed and interventions, with the outspoken Army and more than 200 other politicians were happy, smiling throughout’.

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