ARL VON CLAUSEWITZ’s On War is information. The only problem with this neat formula more often cited than read.1 Less obvious is is that Clausewitz neither uses fog of war nor gives Cthat people tend to read On War following those fa- fog significant weight in his argument. mous citations by people who have not read it them- Friction is, of course, a central element of selves. Struggling through a difficult book and al- Clausewitz’s theory of war; the word appears at ready apprised of the work’s least 13 times in the text key points, newcomers and serves an important seize upon the familiar Like most useful military analytical purpose. Fog is aphorisms: absolute war, concepts, “fog of war” normally a different matter. Al- war as an extension of is attributed to Clausewitz, though Clausewitz uses politics, the trinity, and who receives credit for the fog four times, he never role of fog and friction. alliterative “fog and friction”— uses “fog of war.”3 Twice Unless blessed with un- friction referring to physical fog refers to a meteoro- usual resources of time impediments to military action, logical phenomenon and, and intellectual energy, fog to the commander’s lack incidentally, serves as a they discover little beyond of clear information. The only type of friction. Thus, “fog these well-advertised problem with this neat formula can prevent the enemy truths—and find them is that he neither uses fog of from being seen in time, a whether or not they are war nor gives fog significant gun firing when it should, there. Following is one ad- weight in his argument. a report from reaching monitory demonstration the commanding officer.”4 that what is assumed to be In the second instance, fog in On War can eclipse the text itself. is still only water vapor: “It is rarer still for weather The so-called “fog of war” is one of the most to be a decisive factor. As a rule only fog makes pervasive and natural metaphors in the English lan- any difference.”5 guage.2 War is inherently volatile, uncertain, com- The third occurance may be mistaken for the plex and ambiguous. For this condition, contempo- conventional fog of war. Speaking of the unreli- rary US military usage offers the acronym VUCA, ability of information in war, Clausewitz notes that to which anyone would prefer the terse elegance of “all action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of twi- fog. For 19th-century writers, fog of war has the light, which, like fog or moonlight, often tends to added merit of evoking the opacity of the black pow- makes things seem grotesque and larger than they der battlefield. It is not surprising that the phrase is really are.”6 But sentence structure denies that popular and widely used. Like most military concepts, Clausewitz liked the fog of war image. Given a per- “fog of war” is normally attributed to Clausewitz, fectly good opportunity to write, “all action takes who receives credit for the alliterative “fog and fric- place in a kind of fog,” he opted, instead, for “twi- tion”—friction referring to physical impediments to light,” relegating “fog” and “moonlight” to poetic military action, fog to the commander’s lack of clear emphasis.7

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Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks coordinating the movements of VII Corps from a Jump TAC M577 at 0700, 27 February 1991.

Rejecting the friction-fog dichotomy allows a better understanding of what Clause- witz actually means by friction. Only one passage in On Instead of mental fog and tion. Instead, Clausewitz War employs “fog” to de- physical friction, he guides us identifies four central ele- scribe war’s ambiguities. to see two different forms of ments in his “Concluding Discussing “military ge- friction. On one hand, friction Observations”: physical nius” in chapter 3 of book encompasses the physical exertion, intelligence, fric- I, Clausewitz writes that difficulties of moving and tion and danger. These “war is the realm of uncer- fighting armies. On the other, four, he concludes, “can be tainty; three quarters of the grouped into a single con- he links friction with intangible 10 factors on which action is factors—fear, physical hardship cept of general friction.” based are wrapped in a fog and problems of information— That Clausewitz never of greater or lesser uncer- mentions the fog of war 8 that hamper the military tainty.” The fog metaphor, commander. does not mean that he however apt, is not impor- would deny the importance tant in Clausewitz’s analy- of the ideas subsumed to- sis. He does not suggest uncertainty is more impor- day under the phrase. On the contrary, uncertainty tant than the other factors—danger, exertion, suf- is central to Clausewitz’s argument. In fact, sepa- fering, chance—or than their antidotes—coup d’oeil rating fog from friction actually weakens his claims: and determination. Indeed, Clausewitz swiftly shifts sub- friction becomes the purely physical hindrances to ject; most of the chapter on military genius treats, military action and fog the confusion that arises from at great length, the commander’s character. absent, misleading or contradictory intelligence. This The latter two passages certainly do not give fog distinction is alien both to the text and to the spirit the weight necessary to justify the fog and friction of Clausewitz’s argument. scheme commonly ascribed to him. If Clausewitz Rejecting the friction-fog dichotomy allows a had wished to use the word “fog” to describe the better understanding of what Clausewitz actually vagueness, uncertainty, ambiguity and chaos of war, means by friction. Instead of mental fog and physi- he could have done so in the chapter “Intelligence cal friction, he guides us to see two different forms in War,” a chapter in which, suggestively, he es- of friction. On one hand, friction encompasses the chews the fog metaphor.9 In short, On War does not physical difficulties of moving and fighting armies.11 justify the modern tendency to speak of fog and fric- On the other, he links friction with intangible fac-

86 September-October 2001 l MILITARY REVIEW FOG OF WAR tors—fear, physical hardship and problems of infor- well how to tackle, if not solve, physical problems. mation—that hamper the military commander.12 The Fog, on the other hand, is simply a matter of poor friction that impedes the army is clearly far less in- intelligence. If one believes the contemporary con- teresting to Clausewitz than ceit that the information that which impedes the revolution will soon supply commander’s mind. Hence Eliminating fog gives military forces with near- he says little about such us a clearer and more useful perfect information, the fog practicalities as planning understanding of Clause- of war will soon vanish.16 It and staff work but much witzean friction. It restores is surely no accident that about the commander’s uncertainty and the intangible reducing Clausewitz’s “fear, moral requisites. Clausewitz stresses of military command danger and uncertainty” to even treats physical exer- to their rightful centrality in the fog of war leaves only tion, superficially an ex- On War. It allows us to replace that one element of mental ample of simple, physical the simplistic message that friction susceptible to tech- friction, as primarily a psy- intelligence is important with nological solution. chological concern, writing the reminder that Clausewitz Eliminating fog gives us that “the mind must be constantly emphasizes moral a clearer and more useful made even more familiar forces in warfare. understanding of Clause- with them than the body.”13 witzean friction. It restores The purpose of training is to uncertainty and the intan- prepare soldiers and commanders to face mental gible stresses of military command to their rightful challenges, “those aspects of active service that centrality in On War. It allows us to replace the sim- amaze and confuse him when he first comes across plistic message that intelligence is important with them.”14 Ultimately, this section of On War is not the reminder that Clausewitz constantly emphasizes about lubricating an army’s movements but about moral forces in warfare. shaping the commander’s intellect. Armies require How fog came to insinuate itself into the standard training, preparation and intelligence, but victory ul- military interpretation of the text is worth some re- timately depends on the commander’s strength of flection. So is the resistance among teachers of On will to carry out his plans in spite of doubt, danger War to the suggestion that Clausewitz wrote a chap- and uncertainty.15 ter on friction rather than one called “fog and fric- By reducing the commander’s many mental pres- tion.” Also troubling is that we insist on reading fog sures to the fog of war, the fog and friction inter- into Clausewitz’s discussion of the friction of war. pretation makes military command seem easier than In what other key passages are we making similar it is. All friction is physical, and armies know fairly mistakes? MR

NOTES 1. Michael Howard and Michael Handel are merely the most famous people to light there is, discerning objects by degrees, and finally seeing them distinctly. have made this observation. Thanks to Conrad Crane, Alexander S. Cochran, Martin By contrast, the novice is plunged into the deepest night.” The image of a pupil Cook, Dennis Heath, John Nagl and Jon T. Sumida for their comments on the first responding to light works better than that of fog for his purposes because draft of this essay. there is no mechanism by which some people can see better in fog than other 2. A book picked at random to illustrate this point contains the sentence, “. . . people do. ‘fog of war’ includes the direct stresses arising from the ordeal of battle, but also 8. Ibid., 101. censorship, secrecy, deception, propaganda, camouflage, and rumour,” Roger Beau- 9. By noting in “A Guide to Reading On War” that “Chapter Six introduces the mont, War, Chaos, and History (Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1994), 2. Note element that others have called ‘the fog of war,’” Bernard Brodie assumes the equa- that Beaumont treats fog of war as if it has an accepted definition. tion rejected here, Ibid., 649. 3. A claim that will undoubtedly inspire readers to find additional examples. 10. Ibid., 122. 4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret, eds. 11. Ibid., 119-21. (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 120. 12. Ibid. 5. Ibid., 143. 13. Ibid., 122. 6. Ibid., 140. 14. Ibid. 7. Ibid., 122. Clausewitz’s choice of metaphor involving light rather than fog 15. The emphasis on the moral over the physical appears throughout the work, but in chapter 8, book I, suggests that he rejected fog as a metaphor for battlefield see especially, Ibid., 100-110. uncertainty. “In war,” he points out, “the experienced soldier reacts rather in the 16. For such an argument, see Admiral William A. Owens, Lifting the Fog of War same way as the human eye does in the dark: the pupil expands to admit what little (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, May 2000).

Eugenia C. Kiesling is the 2000-2001 Harold K. Johnson Visiting Professor of Military History, Military History Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and associate professor of Military History, United States Military Acad- emy, West Point, New York. She holds a B.A. from Yale University, master’s degrees from Oxford University and Stanford University, and a Ph.D. from Stanford University. She was previously an assistant professor, History Department, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama. She is author of Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning and various essays and articles.

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