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Military History— Why and How: a Conference Report - FPRI Page 1 of 7 Teaching Military History— Why and How: A Conference Report - FPRI Page 1 of 7 Footnotes Search The Newsletter of FPRI’s Wachman CenterTeaching Military History— Why and How: A History Institute for Teachers By Trudy Kuehner, Reporter October 2007 Vol. 12, No.23 On September 29-30, 2007, FPRI’s Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education presented a weekend of discussion on Teaching Military History: Why and How for 35 teachers from 22 states across the country, held at the First Division Museum in Wheaton, Illinois and co-sponsored by the Cantigny First Division Foundation. Additional participants logged in for the webcast from around the country and the world. See www.fpri.org for videocasts and texts of lectures. The History Institute for Teachers is co-chaired by David Eisenhower and Walter A. McDougall. Core support for the History Institute is provided by The Annenberg Foundation; additional support for this conference was provided by FPRI trustees W. W. Keen Butcher, Robert L. Freedman, Bruce H. Hooper, and John M. Templeton, Jr. The next history weekends are: China’s Encounter with the West, March 1-2, 2008, to be held at and co-sponsored by the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga; and America in the Civil War Era, May 17-18, 2008, to be held at and co- sponsored by Carthage College. McDougall’s book Throes of Democracy: The American Civil War Era, 1829-1877, will be published in March by HarperCollins, and complimentary signed copies will be distributed to participating teachers. Why Teach Military History? FPRI Senior Fellow Jeremy Black of the University of Exeter addressed the frequent criticism that teaching military history somehow encourages bellicosity. In fact, just war properly conceived is an appropriate recourse in international law; it has played a major role in the formation of individual states and societies and needs to be understood. Resources for teaching students about military history include museums such as the First Division Museum, with their collections of the material culture of war; photographic and film archives; and interviews, both filmed and taped. Students can also record living history themselves with people who lived through wars. Students should also be encouraged to try to understand conflicts from the other side’s perspective. Too often history is taught as if it is a linear, inevitable process. But people at the time had no sense of inevitability. Allied soldiers and generals in WWI, for instance, were unsure what the consequences of the collapse of Russia would be for them. Students need to appreciate that what happens is not determined, and that we all need to take part in unfolding processes. Common historical memories frame national identity. Thus even if people use events from the past in flawed ways— e.g., applying the Munich 1938 analogy of appeasement in different contexts—this reflects the need to explain things with reference to a common memory. This is acutely important in the case of war, where citizens are asked to endure great sacrifices. Historical memories can help to make people feel that however difficult this is, it is a necessary purpose. Military history is not just operational history; there is also the relationship between war and the development of states. The U.S. arose as a result of a war of independence; through war it expanded from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and it was the Civil War that created the country we know. It is also through war that the relationships among states have been molded and influenced. http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1223.200710.kuehner.teachingmilitaryhistory.html Teaching Military History— Why and How: A Conference Report - FPRI Page 2 of 7 War and society covers a wide range of topics such as women in war and war and environment. One can also consider the military itself as a society, and explore war and culture. One can show the triumphalist (e.g., Beethoven’s Wellington’s Victory) as well as the later critical (e.g., Picasso’s Guernica) accounts of war, juxtaposing the latter with an account from the Times of the bombing and a German propaganda piece claiming that Guernica was never bombed. It is also tremendously valuable for students in the West to understand that much of the war in the world is not a matter of Western powers but is in South Asia or subsaharan Africa. Students need to understand what tribalism or ethnic conflict mean, if they are to understand the world in which they live, and that these pose real questions for the U.S. and other powers as to how to respond. Teaching military history is thus a key element of civic education. Teaching About War in the Ancient World Kimberly Kagan of the Institute for the Study of War noted that the study of war cannot be divorced from the study of policy or politics. War is a product of states, organizations, armies, institutions, and individuals interacting with one another and with enemies in order to accomplish an overarching political objective. War is a human, not a technical, phenomenon. War is about making decisions in crisis. Ancient warfare of course differs from modern warfare, but both involve the individuals who compose the states, make decisions, or formulate policy. What policymakers decide at home determines the mission abroad, which a commander translates into concrete objectives his subordinates can execute. Students often bring into contemporary studies various political prejudices; the ancient world provides a laboratory for studying war in a value-neutral environment. The ancient world is full of wonderful sources for studying war: Polybius, Herodotus, Thucydides, Caesar’s commentaries. The ancient historians not only studied their specific eras, but also the general phenomena of war, societies, states, and decision-making. They are provocative, full of details and examples of the nature of command and decision-making. Moreover, because warfare in the ancient world was in some ways simpler than war is today—not because of the lack of technology but because of simpler state systems, institutions, and command and technological relationships—it is comprehensible through the reading of a few sources rather than through the reading of the massive amounts of documents we have for any modern war. We can learn about command decisions from reading Caesar’s memoirs in a way we cannot from reading Eisenhower’s or Patton’s, owing to the extraordinary echelons of organization that have developed over time, which in some ways have distanced commanders from the battlefield. The strategic level of a war changes over time. We can debate now whether Iraq is its own strategy theater or whether strategy for Iraq needs to be considered in the context of the Middle East. Grand strategy is the use of all a state’s resources to achieve particular objectives. How and when should it go to war against one power or another? Should it invest more in its army or navy? We can use the ancient classics to introduce students to all the levels of war, from battles up to grand strategy. Today we generally study structures, processes, and trends, whereas ancient historians studied individual decisions, events, debate, and rhetoric. They studied policy as something that decision-makers made, not as something that inevitably arose from a concatenation of uncontrollable circumstances. These themes are no less relevant today. In his Commentaries, Caesar offers timeless insights into what commanders do on the battlefield. He includes his errors as well as his successes, and one can see that he often lost his battles but won wars. Caesar was sometimes a terrible tactician, but he compensated by how he strung battles together, continuing to maneuver, campaign, and fight when other adversaries would give up; by using speed, surprise, and intelligence as a way of gaining an upper hand. He never underestimated his enemy but rather thought about his enemy as a living force. We learn from studying ancient history how projecting power throughout the world is a problem that global powers face whether they are Rome or the U.S., both of whom took three to six months to deploy their forces to the Tigris River Valley. These are endemic problems of states: how to deploy and organize their militaries. Critical Analysis Case Study: Thucydides http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1223.200710.kuehner.teachingmilitaryhistory.html Teaching Military History— Why and How: A Conference Report - FPRI Page 3 of 7 Karl Walling of the U.S. Naval War College discussed how one can integrate the study of military history with other liberal arts to make it a more humanistic endeavor, by teaching, for example, Homer’s Iliad or the Greek tragedies based on Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War. In Democracy in America, Alexis deTocqueville distinguishes between what he calls democratic and aristocratic historians. Tocqueville observed that in modern mass democracies, based as they are on universal human equality, historians tended to explain events in terms of abstract forces beyond human control. Concerned that determinism would lead to fatalism among citizens and leaders, Tocqueville saw merit in studying ancient aristocratic history, and most of that history is military/political history. In On War, Clausewitz tried to do for war what Isaac Newton had done for physics. But in war, the force is never proportional, equal, and opposite. War is more art than science. Thus one needs to perform critical analysis, to examine all possible strategies, actions, and decisions. One cannot praise as successful a strategy or the leader who chose it unless it can be shown that the strategy was superior to the available alternatives, or criticize a failed strategy unless it can be shown that there were superior alternatives.
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