A WICKED PROBLEM | HOW to COOPERATE with COLLUSIVE STATES? European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)

165 CHAILLOT PAPER / PAPER CHAILLOT March 2021 collusive states? collusive By Roderick Parkes and Mark McQuay How to cooperate with cooperate to How PROBLEM A WICKED WICKED A

CHAILLOT PAPER / 165 A WICKED PROBLEM | HOW TO COOPERATE WITH COLLUSIVE STATES? European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)

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print ISBN 978-92-9198-962-1 online ISBN 978-92-9198-963-8 CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-20-002-EN-C CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-20-002-EN-N ISSN 1017-7566 ISSN 1683-4917 DOI 10.2815/712662 DOI 10.2815/355434

Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Belgium by Bietlot. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021. Cover image credit: Meghan Schiereck/unsplash A WICKED PROBLEM

How to cooperate with collusive states?

By Roderick Parkes and Mark McQuay

CHAILLOT PAPER / 165 March 2021 The editors

Roderick Parkes is the Head of the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Stud- ies at the German Council on Foreign Rela- tions (DGAP). His research focuses on issues of international home affairs cooperation. He was educated at the Universities of Edinburgh and Cambridge, as well as the Institut d’études politiques in Grenoble, and received a PhD from the University of Bonn.

Mark McQuay is an independent researcher based in Warsaw. He previously worked as a trainee at the EUISS, working on topics related to EU justice and home affairs. He holds a Mas- ter’s degree in International Relations from Collegium Civitas in Warsaw (2014).

The EUISS Chaillot Paper series

The Chaillot Paper series, launched in 1991, takes its name from the Chaillot hill in the Trocadéro area of Paris, where the Institute’s first premises were located in the building oc- cupied by the Western European Union (WEU). The hill is particularly known for the Palais de Chaillot which was the site of the signing of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and housed NATO’s provisional headquarters from 1952 until 1959. 1 CONTENTS

Executive summary 2

Introduction 5 Thinking outside Pandora’s box Scenario 2025 9 Development by crime in the Gulf of Guinea

CHAPTER 1

Where does the EU stand on collusion? 13

CHAPTER 2

Can crime contribute to liberal development? 18

CHAPTER 3

Can the EU engage with collusive states? 32

CHAPTER 4

Can the EU define its futures? 42 Scenario 1 47 A licence to hack in West Africa Scenario 2 56 Post-modern slavery in the Arctic Scenario 3 62 Organ counterfeiting in the Western Balkans Scenario 4 68 A narco-state by choice in the South Pacific Scenario 5 74 The Olympics of Crime in the Middle East

Conclusions 79 Abbreviations 81 2 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On almost every major foreign policy issue, the was hardly exemplary, and that the EU is the EU faces a path-defining choice. It finds itself prime beneficiary of these past misdemean- split between loyalty to longstanding policy ours. They look back to colonial times, and cite principles and a new pressure to pursue its in- dubious European precedents to push the EU terests through value-free realpolitik. Crucial- to abandon its principles and to validate ques- ly, policymakers lack the evidence to weigh up tionable behaviour. the implications of either course - continuity or compromise - and so risk being gripped by Collusion is one such example – and the au- inaction. thors take it as their test case. In increasing numbers, developing economies are turning to Such situations, where policymakers face a criminals to master the challenges of globali- dilemma and lack the evidence to guide their sation, using collusion as “an instrument of choices, are called ‘wicked problems.’1 And a national strategy”.2 They point to past Western failure to solve its wicked problems could leave behaviour as justification. As the 2020s unfold, the EU paralysed on the world stage at a time of and as economic modernisation becomes even huge global change. more strenuous, it is plausible that a majority of states worldwide will actively collude with This Chaillot Paper proposes that the EU tack- criminals, seeing crime and collusion as legit- le such problems by means of a thought exer- imate means to catch up with Europe. cise/experiment. This means posing a series of hypothetical questions in order to explore the The EU’s reading of its history presents suc- potential consequences of policy continuity or cessful development as contingent upon the change and thereby to help the EU realign its expulsion of criminal elements from the body principles and its interests. politic, and at the earliest possible stage. The EU has thereby presented itself with a stark choice: cut ties to collusive states, and push the Facing up to history EU towards splendid isolation; or accommodate them and suffer a loss of self-respect and identity. Few in Brussels, it seems, have thought Somewhat unexpectedly, the greatest contri- to pose the obvious question: can collusion be bution of this paper may be to help policymak- conducive to liberal development? ers in Brussels face up to Europe’s past.

The EU has always viewed its own 70-year development as setting a path for others to follow Making use of history – based on the assumption that what worked best in the EU, will work best abroad. But rivals, The authors’ method is designed to produce partners and even its own strategists increas- counter-intuitive findings to reconcile the ingly point out that Europe’s past behaviour EU’s interests and principles. It operates on the

1 ‘Wicked problems’ are policy issues which present decision-makers with contradictory political pressures, and where they lack the evidence to evaluate the available options. 2 Philip Zelikow et al., “The Rise of Strategic Corruption: How States Weaponize Graft,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ united-states/2020-06-09/rise-strategic-corruption. Executive summary 3 assumption that Europe’s sometimes murky unspoken and reflexive. Collusion is a case in history can be turned into a treasure trove for point: as far as the authors can ascertain, there practical policy evidence generating ways for are no explicit EU guidelines for dealing with today’s Europeans to engage with the world collusion (unlike the related field of corrup- without betraying their idealistic goals – a way tion). Rather, the EU’s distaste for collusion is out of their ‘wicked problems’. implied from a set of abstract principles drawn from its reading of history about the damage A review of the historical record confirms that inflicted by collusion upon economic -and po European states did indeed rely on criminals litical development. The first step, then, is to and criminal methods on their path to liberal- articulate these hidden assumptions. ism. But this finding – far from paralysing the EU or undermining its values – shows that col- 2. Is there overlooked evidence to contradict lusion is (under specific conditions) a potential the EU’s assumptions? basis for better governance, including when it comes to enforcing laws and redressing the Because the EU has never articulated its as- marginalisation of socio-economic groups and sumption that collusion is uniformly harmful of whole countries. and presents an obstacle to all liberal development outcomes, it has not actively sought evidence to the contrary. This leaves the EU A three-step thought exercise without evidence to assess the option of conditional engagement. As a corrective, the second step is to actively seek out evidence from the But this process is about more than past and present that shows that collusion can re-examining the past. Until lately, the EU’s in fact promote positive outcomes. development promotion represented a perfect melding of the EU’s interests and values. It com- 3. Does this new evidence generate practical bined the EU’s dual character as an interest-led alternatives? ‘market power’. The EU has a strong interest in accessing poorer economies: it needs to expand New evidence is of little use unless translat- its markets and to source raw materials. and a ed into clear policy guidelines. The third step, principled ‘normative power’ requires interna- therefore, is to explore the implications of poli- tional stability and cooperation, and this means cy change – does the scattered evidence gleaned spreading liberal norms. from cases of collusion generate a set of rules coherent enough to challenge the settled as- EU development policy long achieved both sumptions of liberal development theory? The ends. However, a decade of crises has hit the EU outcome should be a set of clear, cohesive and economy hard. Its raw interest in accessing new practical policy recommendations that demon- markets has grown, but its ability to influence strate how the EU can respond to new evidence other nations’ norms and values has shrunk. while staying true to its principles. Economic development no longer guarantees a peaceful, inclusive and democratic global order based on the rule of law. Future scenarios The authors have assembled a process for the EU to face up to uncomfortable truths. It in- Policymakers are understandably reluctant to volves asking three questions: experiment with fields like collusion – in the real world, at least. For this reason, the authors’ 1. What are the EU’s current assumptions method is structured as a counter-intuitive about the effective pursuit of its goals? thought exercise which culminates in the construction of a virtual alternative world - a safe Wicked problems tend to emerge when as- space in which to experiment. This virtual world sumptions about effective policy become is brought to life through five scenarios, each of 4 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? which is built to test the following assumptions drawn from the evidence:

> A global increase in crime and collusion is not necessarily a symptom of failed development. It may even be - under very specific conditions - a requisite for success. Europe’s own historical path to development involved forms of collusion with criminals. And, given that the EU treats Europe’s path as a precedent for others to follow, it should not treat crime solely as an obstacle to liberal development. It must instead draw honest and viable lessons from Europe’s own past.

> EU members are living proof that states are not hindered in fighting crime by past government collusion with criminal groups. History suggests that states collude with criminals to improve their capability to govern – to establish a monopoly of violence, access to capital and the authority to make rules. As part of this same drive to establish their administrative monopoly, they logically go on to use these capabilities to fight the same criminals they once colluded with.

> Societies in Europe embraced liberal standards due to a desire for better government, not wealth. Modern-day societies can be expected to accept collusion for the same reasons - if it makes government more responsive. Successful attempts to address the ‘root causes’ of collusion will therefore focus more on sensitising governments to the needs of marginal groups than on raw economic development.

> EU development policy in Africa and Asia aims to redress the dubious practices of Eu- ropean colonialism, as well as to prevent neo-colonialism by emerging powers. But the liberal development of many of Europe’s own states was super-charged by colonialism, and they would not have softened their governance at home without access to overseas territories. By implication, Europeans ought to explore ways for post-colonial countries to replicate the advantages of colonial practice within the current multilateral system. 5 INTRODUCTION Thinking outside Pandora’s box

Since 2015, international events have frequent- which would prioritise European interests; but ly split the EU between principle and interests.1 diplomats continued to insist on longstanding That was the year the EU fell prey to a wave of principles – and, again, the EU lacked evidence international terrorism and migration. The to justify a decisive move forward. crisis was unprecedented in its scale. But what made it particularly complex and ‘wicked’ for diplomats was the contradictory political impulses. EU leaders responded to the shock by demanding a more interest-led interna- THE PROBLEM tional strategy, pressing diplomats to engage with authoritarian countries.2 But they pro- OF COLLUSION vided little practical guidance as to how their realist new international priorities should be This issue of collusion has largely subsumed implemented.3 the policy dilemmas of 2015, as EU diplomats have realised just how many of the govern- As the crisis deepened, they pressed the EU to ments they seek to engage in migration and seek border and counter-terrorism deals with counter-terrorism cooperation are themselves countries in Africa, the Middle East and the colluding with people smugglers, militias and Balkans. But longstanding policy principles even terrorist groups. encouraged diplomats to be cautious when dealing with states with questionable records The EU has long known that globalisation cre- on human rights. European leaders, however, ates opportunities for criminals.5 But the grow- began to insist they wanted the EU to engage. ing reports of state involvement in crime have According to some reports, they perhaps also caused it particular dismay. The EU’s support wanted to use development support to sweeten for development was always grounded in the the deal.4 These contradictory instincts creat- hope that partner governments (and multilat- ed gridlock in Brussels, which lacked the ev- eral organisations) would grow stronger and idence to evaluate either course. Since then, the pass the benefits of globalisation on to their estrangement between the EU’s principles and citizens. But these reports suggest they are in interests has only increased. In 2019 political fact growing weaker. Governments to the EU’s leaders renewed their call for a ‘geopolitical EU’ south are colluding with people-smugglers

1 Esther Barbé and Pol Morillas, “The EU Global Strategy: The Dynamics of a More Politicized and Politically Integrated Foreign Policy,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 32, no. 6 (2019), pp. 753-70. 2 Vincent Della Sala and Roberto Belloni, “Realism in the EU: Can a Trans-national Actor be Strategic?” in Roberto Belloni, Vincent Della Sala and Paul Viotti (eds.), Fear and Uncertainty in Europe: The Return to Realism? (London: Palgrave, 2019), pp. 241-65. 3 Karen Smith, “A European Union Global Strategy for a Changing World?”, International Politics, vol. 54 (2017), pp. 503-18. 4 Shoshana Fine, Susi Dennison and Richard Gowan, “False Moves: Migration and Development Aid,” Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/false_moves_migration_and_development_aid.pdf. 5 Arghya Ghosh, Peter Robertson and Marie-Claire Robitaille, “Does Globalisation Affect Crime? Theory and Evidence,” World Economy, vol. 39, no. 10 (2016). 6 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

(and justify this by appealing to the UN’s own achieve its idealistic long-term goals. But this humanitarian values).6 African leaders are ac- is easier said than done. And collusion shows cused of working with embezzlers (unchecked why. Think tanks themselves shy away from the by an African Union recently headed by the one vital question that could resolve the issue: ex-wife of one of the accused).7 And cartels ‘can collusion with criminals ever be “progres- collude with politicians across Latin America sive” – can it be conducive to liberal goals?’ (where Interpol’s own liaison officer was- ar rested on corruption charges).8 Yet the reluctance of policymakers and think tanks to pose this vital question is odd, because the answer in fact seems to be yes: when states are able to harness the talents of criminal groups, they really can turn them to the UNDER THE RIGHT common good. For proof, just open a newspaper. The media are currently full of examples of CONDITIONS, criminal groups proving innovative, agile and responsive to the needs of marginal groups. COLLUSION CAN The Covid-19 pandemic has seen gangs,9 cartels,10 mafias11 and even religious extremists12 BE PROGRESSIVE step up to mitigate the impact of the virus on their host societies. At present, the EU is gridlocked on how to engage with collusive states. It is in the EU’s in- The way ahead seems simple. The EU merely terest to accommodate collusive states – the EU has to remarry its principles with its interests, needs global development for economic rea- that is: to become more hard-headed about sons, needs nearby states as allies in controlling how to achieve its idealistic long-term goals.13 migration, and needs to defend its ‘turf’ from But this is easier said than done. And collusion China, Russia and even the US. But its principles shows why. tell it collusion is harmful and undermines its long-term liberal ideals. Other European think Over the past decades, journalists and academ- tanks have contended that the way to reconcile ics have catalogued many individual cases in EU interests and values is simple: the EU merely which crime-state collusion has led to liberal has to become more hard-headed about how to outcomes. They have described the potential

6 Frontex, the EU borders agency, envisages the emergence of new forms of ‘smuggler-states’, that is, states captured by smugglers. Its draft strategic risk analysis (SRA) draws on: Federico Varese, Mafias on the Move: How Organized Crime Conquers New Territories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). For more information on the SRA exercise, see: https://frontex. europa.eu/intelligence/strategic-analysis/. 7 “The State Capture Papers,” Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, February 24, 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/the- state-capture-papers/. 8 Andrea Diaz and Jessica Campisi, “Mexico Goes to the Polls this Weekend. 132 Politicians Have Been Killed Since Campaigning Began, Per One Count,” CNN, July 2, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/27/americas/mexico-political-deaths-election- season-trnd/index.html; Brendan Pierson, “Jurors in ‘El Chapo’ Trial Told of Mexico’s Drug Wars, Corruption,” Reuters, November 15, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-mexico-el-chapo/jurors-in-el-chapo-trial-told-of-mexicos- drug-wars-corruption-idUSKCN1NK2V3. 9 Caio Barretto Briso and Tom Phillips, “Brazil Gangs Impose Strict Curfews to Slow Coronavirus Spread,” The Guardian, March 25, 2020, https://www.theguardian. com/world/2020/mar/25/brazil-rio-gangs-coronavirus. 10 Vanda Felbab Brown, “Mexican Cartels Are Providing COVID-19 Assistance. Why That’s Not Surprising.” Brookings, April 27, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/ blog/order-from-chaos/2020/04/27/mexican-cartels-are-providing-covid-19-assistance-why- thats-not-surprising/ 11 Lorenzo Tondo, “Mafia Distributes Food to Italy’s Struggling Residents,”The Guardian, April 10, 2020, https://www.theguardian. com/world/2020/apr/10/mafia- distributes-food-to-italys-struggling-residents. 12 Ruchi Kumar, “Taliban Launches Campaign to Help Afghanistan Fight Coronavirus,” Al Jazeera, April 6, 2020, https://www. aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/taliban- launches-campaign-afghanistan-fight-coronavirus-200406055113086.html. 13 Sven Biscop, “The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics,” , Security Policy Brief, no. 75, Egmont Institute, Brussels, June 2016, http://www. egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2016/06/SPB75.pdf ?type=pdf. Introduction 7 benefits for development and peacebuilding of Consequently, local communities were more accommodating criminals – of “hybridity”,14 loyal to smugglers than to the Nigerien state. “dirty deals”15 and “bribing for peace”.16 And But the government successfully incorporated they have warned that purist development pol- them in an ‘informal power-sharing’ system in icies have often backfired, undermining public 1991, which is credited with bringing peace and administration and inviting corrosive crime. employment.18 Northerners were permitted to Too often, academics say, fragile states have conduct smuggling activities while occupying eschewed criminal partnerships, relying in- official positions and the state levied taxes on stead on the support of Western donors who fail migrants.19 Western efforts to crack down on to fully understand their needs.17 The result: smugglers risked undermining development. these weak states fell into the hands of militias and rent-seeking elites. So if the yardstick is And yet such lessons remain taboo. Western the achievement of inclusive and responsive policymakers would rather be seen to do the public institutions, then the signs are clear: un- ‘right thing’ on collusion than act upon such der the right conditions, crime and collusion counter-intuitive findings.20 Cooperating with can be ‘progressive’. collusive states is taboo, and that is what makes collusion such a wicked prob- Moreover, Western diplomats ooperating lem. This paper seeks to account know this. They could probably for mental blockages on the part even cite examples from their C with collusive of policymakers in ways that own work. One common example states is taboo, and academics seldom take into ac- concerns their recent attempts that is what makes count. They would rather berate to crack down on people smug- collusion such a Western policymakers for their gling in the Sahel. The north of ignorance and self-defeating Niger has traditionally been set- wicked problem. policies than help them draw tled by nomadic traders. The im- practical lessons.21 They seem to position of borders there – first make a point of crediting posi- by colonial powers and later by a distant Nige- tive outcomes to states that go against West- rien government – disrupted this way of life. ern ‘best practice’ rather than showing where

14 Syaifu Anam, “Peacebuilding: The Shift towards a Hybrid Peace Approach,” Global & Strategis, vol. 9, no. 1 (2015), pp. 37-48. 15 Rachel Kleinfeld, A Savage Order: How the World’s Deadliest Countries Can Forge a Path to Security (New York: Pantheon Books, 2018), pp. 101-121. 16 Yuliya Zabyelina and Jana Arsovska, “Rediscovering Corruption’s Other Side: Bribing for Peace in Post-conflict Kosovo and Chechnya,” Crime Law and Social Change, vol. 60, no. 1 (2013), pp. 1-24. 17 Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis, “State Building in a Rentier State: How Development Policies Fail to Promote Democracy in Afghanistan,” Development and Change, vol. 44, no. 3 (May 2013), pp. 501-26. 18 Luca Raineri, “Cross-border Smuggling in North Niger: The Morality of the Informal and the Construction of a Hybrid Order,” in Abel Polese, Alessandra Russo and Francesco Strazzari (eds.), Governance Beyond the Law: The Immoral, The Illegal, The Criminal, International Political Economy Series (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 227-46. 19 A 2015 European Commission study recognised that between 2003 and 2008, Nigerien authorities levied between CFA 850 million and CFA 3.5 billion in illegal taxes per year from migrants passing through the city of Agadez alone. See: European Commission, DG Migration & Home Affairs, “A study on smuggling of migrants: Characteristics, responses and cooperation with third countries,” Brussels, September 2015. 20 They explain that European voters will withdraw support for EU actions if these are thought to fuel crime and corruption: Europeaid, “Promoting Anti-corruption in EC Development Cooperation,” Fact Sheet, 2009, https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/ pubaideffect/documents/promoting-anti-corruption-ec-development- cooperation. 21 For analysis see: Peter Andreas and Ethan Avram Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 8 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? the West can help.22 By contrast, this Chaillot Paper tries to free policymakers from taboos. A thought exercise to challenge It frames the issue as a thought experiment, implicit policy assumptions employing the methods of strategic foresight to create a virtual (yet true-to-life) setting for testing new policy ideas. The aim of this paper is to untangle this wicked problem by identifying a way for Even with evidence-based policy recommenda- the EU to pursue its interests in a messy tions, policymakers are understandably nerv- world while staying true to its idealistic ous about trying out alternative policies. Thus, goals. It does this by means of a three-step the culmination of this three-step thought thought exercise designed to re-examine exercise is to use scenario-building to create a the EU’s core policy principles. safe space in which to test alternative policies and experiment with breaking taboos. Locating the EU’s policy on collusion

The EU has no explicit guidelines for dealing with collusion, relying instead on a set of abstract principles about the damage collusion inflicts upon economic and political development. The first step, therefore, is to articulate these hidden assumptions.

Reviewing the evidence

Because the EU has never articulated its assumptions about collusion, it has never looked into the alternative. The second step, therefore, is to actively seek out contradictory evidence suggesting that collusion can in fact promote positive outcomes.

Drawing policy implications

New evidence is of little use unless translated into practical policy recommendations. The third step, therefore, is to examine the implications of policy change and to build an alternative approach that both responds to the evidence and remains true to principles.

22 See, for example: Dispanadda Diskul, Ramrada Ninnad, Andrea Skinner. and Visitorn Rajatanarvin, “Development Not Drug Control: The Evolution of Counter Narcotic Efforts in Thailand,”Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, vol. 1, no. 1 (2018), pp. 80-8; Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan, “On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: What is Failing – States in the Global South or Research and Politics in the West?,” Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation Dialogue Series, vol. 8 (2009), pp. 13-15. Likewise, negative outcomes are attributed to ‘Western interference’. For analysis, see, for example: Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” Review of International Studies, vol. 36, no. 2 (2010), pp. 337-65; Solveig Richter and Natasha Wunsch, “Money, power, Glory: The Linkages between EU Conditionality and State Capture in the Western Balkans,” Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 27, no. 1 (2020), pp. 41-62. Introduction 9

times, when its justice sector was dominated SCENARIO 2025 by a single ethnic group. Now, at long last, the police and judiciary are beginning to open up Development by crime their ranks to the full range of social elements.’ The media hail a new age of Chinese-inspired in the Gulf of Guinea development: Western development policy ‘has only fuelled inequality and corruption’. In 2025, an international partnership is China offers an alternative. Its engagement is launched in a West African state, only a few no longer simply about extracting resources; hours flight from the EU. Its centrepiece: a pro- Beijing has shown that its model of governance ject to strengthen the country’s justice system offers a viable alternative. Moreover, this is not and so boost development. The Chinese am- just propaganda: the project has really begun to bassador, speaking against the vast blue back- show signs of success. The local justice sector drop of the Atlantic Ocean, proclaims that this really is becoming more inclusive, the power of Beijing-sponsored project will embrace “local the cartels is dwindling and legitimate liveli- community justice mechanisms”, making the hoods are beginning to emerge. country’s court system “more efficient and more attuned to grassroots culture”. His care- What triggered the crisis? fully chosen words disguise a worrying element: the initiative relies on two violent drug The story began four months earlier, when a cartels to dispense ‘justice’. And the cartels’ swarm of civilian drones loaded with impro- bosses have been nominated as ‘community el- vised explosive devices (IEDs) buzzed over the ders’, tasked with ensuring compliance within country’s capital and descended on its central their own ethnic group. prison, ripping through its east wing, eviscer- ating inmates and destroying a pop-up drug The EU ambassador is asked for her opin- lab inside. The victims were members of the ion by local journalists, and unintentionally Coronthie cartel; and the attack was the latest sparks a diplomatic crisis. She dismisses Chi- in a series of reprisals in their feud with the na’s ‘hybrid governance project’ as an excuse Boussoura cartel. The two had only recent- to formalise corrupt local practices, in a bid to ly opened hostilities: for years, they had been ensure that the fragile West African state re- too busy fending off police violence and indis- mains a pliant trading outpost for Beijing. This criminate arrests to fight one another. In pris- is not just neo-colonialism, she says, but also on, they initially thrived together, conducting neo-orientalism: here is an Eastern power re- business and recruiting from the pool of in- ifying backward practices in Africa. The issue mates languishing in pre-trial detention. Only is soon picked up at the highest political levels as their numbers swelled in the overcrowded in the EU, where one firebrand leader suggests prison had tensions mounted. it poses a threat to Europe’s judicial integrity: ‘It won’t be long before West African diaspo- Shortly before the attack, the Coronthie cartel ra groups here are demanding recognition for had been confined to a separate wing, a fact tribal law’ and ‘Chinese-backed gangsters start exploited by the Boussoura and their deadly clamouring to decide on Europe’s own justice drones.1 But, ironically, when security services standards’. arrived on the scene, the two cartels seemed to forget their differences. Both cartels draw their Chinese state media counter that West Afri- members from the marginalised Malinké eth- ca is ‘finally overcoming the legacy of colonial nic group; the police are mainly Fulani.2 Faced

1 Similar segregation methods have been used in Latin American prisons. See: “Prisons in Latin America: A journey into Hell,” The Economist, September 22, 2012, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2012/09/22/a-journey-into-hell. 2 The Fulani’s prominence is a legacy of colonialism, which left them richer and more influential than other ethnic groups in the country. 10 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? with an onslaught from the security services, What was the EU’s initial New vulnerabilitiesNew vulnerabilities prisoners from the two gangs united. Togeth- Sppl hais or stilat rs to Chia response? Supply chains for stimulant drugs to China er, the prisoners raided the prison armoury and pursued the police back to their compound. Cheial protio h Two weeks after the prison attack, EU leaders Across the whole country citizens watched the r protio h met at their regular June summit. It was the footage, struggling to believe that the country’s Trasit state first time West Africa had been on the agenda E aret formidable police force was being routed. The for some time: increasingly, the fallout from president – also Fulani – was forced to beg for problems in that region spread south across moderation and clemency. sub-Saharan Africa and west into Latin Ameri- 中华人民共和国 ca, not north across the Mediterranean. None- The riot in the prison compound was bloody, theless, the EU still considered West Africa to be but the real aftermath played out on the streets 欧盟 its backyard, so leaders were stung by the tone - of Brussels. West African community groups of international criticism, especially from the descended on the EU’s Commission headquar- region itself. The EU Development Commis- ters demanding that it do more. EU develop- sioner reported that the violence pointed to a ment policy had recently begun to focus on lack of investment in the country’s judicial sys- 菲律宾人 boosting European exports to Africa and one of tem. The court system was gridlocked, and the 尼加拉瓜 its most successful export areas had been raw cartels had been able to recruit heavily in pris- chemical products. Protestors complained that ons because they were full of Malinké trapped these chemicals were falling into the hands of in perpetual pre-trial detention. the cartels, which used them to produce synthetic drugs for consumers in the Americas. The 澳大利亚 The Commissioner’s proposal was for a pro- African Union (now heavily financed by China) gramme of judicial automation across West Af- lodged a formal complaint against the EU. And rica, using artificial intelligence (AI) tools first one outspoken Latin American ambassador re- developed in Europe during the 2021 migration inforced the message, calling on Europe “to re- crisis, when the EU was trying to speed up asy- think its principles”. lum decisions.3 The West African Automatic Sentencing Processor (WAASP), the commissioner claimed, would unblock the courts, while simultaneously reducing administrative costs and helping curb systemic corruption.4 But the African Union rejected the EU’s insin- uation that the root cause of the crisis lay in West Africa. And local critics soon pointed to the WAASP’s inherent cultural, racial and class biases,5 showing that its software perpetuat- ed the kind of discrimination already endemic within the local security services.

With the WAASP failing to take flight, the West African state had reached out to its own preferred partner – Beijing. China had already turned the country into a major maritime trans- port hub, a channel to suck up West Africa’s

3 During this second wave of irregular migration, EU governments automated the early stages of the asylum process to prevent sub-Saharan immigrants abusing a gridlocked system to disappear into Europe’s underground economy. 4 Vyacheslav Polonski, “AI is Convicting Criminals and Determining Jail Time, but Is It Fair?,” World Economic Forum, November 19, 2018, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/11/algorithms-court-criminals-jail-time-fair/. 5 Bias has been a common critique of AI sentencing in the US: Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu et al., “Machine Bias,” ProPublica, May 23, 2016, https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. Introduction 11

New vulnerabilitiesNew vulnerabilities Sppl hais or stilat rs to Chia Supply chains for stimulant drugs to China

Cheial protio h r protio h Trasit state E aret

中华人民共和国

欧盟

菲律宾人尼加拉瓜

澳大利亚

mineral wealth6 and a potential stop-off point one side are the liberals, who argue for prin- for shipping destined to cross the new Nicara- cipled disengagement from the region. They gua canal en route to Asia.7 Now Beijing focused suggest that EU engagement, no matter how on the country’s politico-economic develop- well-intentioned, has backfired. Economic ment: increasingly aware of worldwide prob- modernisation and governance reform have lems with transnational crime, terrorism and given rise first to crime and then to deep social migration, it saw that connectivity entailed a tensions, borne out in the failure of the WAASP. risk. Its new sea links could expose it to threats They argue that the EU should get its own house emanating from West Africa, Latin America in order, concentrating on protecting the rule of and even Europe itself. Seeking to reduce this law at home in the face of transnational threats. vulnerability, Beijing took its first steps into On a rare optimistic note, they say that the Chi- state-building. nese project indicates that emerging powers might take a more responsible approach to de- What lessons does the EU velopment if only the EU would stop doing the draw from the crisis? heavy lifting on their behalf.

Once the dust has settled on the Chinese pro- Opposition comes from Europe’s realists. They ject, the political fallout reaches Brussels. On contend that principled disengagement is not

6 Neil Hume, “China Consortium Wins Rights to Develop Guinea Iron Ore Deposit,” Financial Times, December 2, 2019, https:// www.ft.com/content/6729b63c-12d3-11ea-a225-db2f231cfeae. 7 Nicholas Muller, “Nicaragua’s Chinese-Financed Canal Project Still in Limbo,” The Diplomat, August 20, 2019, https:// thediplomat.com/2019/08/nicaraguas-chinese-financed-canal-project-still-in-limbo/. 12 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? an option: it will only leave Africa prey to a predatory China. Years of liberal EU development policy have succeeded only in spreading wealth (and power) to other parts of the globe, including rapacious powers in the east. The EU should leverage its remaining power to drive forward economic development in key markets, pushing partner states to comply with its own regulatory standards. Unless it acts decisively to protect its interests and find new ways of deal-making with elites in Africa, the EU will face a much bigger threat. China has already begun to cast European standards as part of the problem: how long before Beijing is pressing the EU to align with Chinese regulations?

A small contingent of policy advisers point to a third way: the possibility of the EU engaging in the messy politics of West Africa and remaining true to its liberal principles. In fact, they say, China’s engagement with the cartels points the way. Not only is its ‘hybrid’ justice system in West Africa an objective success, the contours of the project trace a distinctly European line. Liberalism in Europe was born of a similar process of state-building through crime and collusion. With a better understanding of why states enter into relationships with drugs cartels, the EU too can begin to offer a viable alternative. Sadly, these arguments prove unpalatable to EU decision-makers. 13 CHAPTER 1 WHERE DOES THE EU STAND ON COLLUSION?

The scenario presented in the previous pages, it goes without saying. This is certainly how EU set in the Gulf of Guinea in 2025, shows how officials behave in the 2025 scenario, taking it crime-state collusion will challenge the EU’s as given that China’s bargain with the cartels principles and interests in the coming years. In is a bad thing. And yet, exactly this kind of in- the scenario, one of the EU’s partners in Africa ferred policy assumption is what gives rise to seeks ways to collude with drug cartels to en- wicked problems. Herein lies the authors’ mo- force laws and provide justice. It acts partly out tivation for exploring the issue. of duress and partly in the belief that collusion with criminal gangs will bring tangible benefits ‘Collusion’ and ‘corruption’ are both pro- to society. But the move implacably divides EU foundly negative phenomena and yet they are policymakers. And the gridlock in Brussels in not the same. The latter infers a state of decay, turn opens the door for another outside power and carries exclusively negative connotations.2 to step in and formalise a fitting system of hy- But not every public official who partners with brid governance. Future scenarios such as this illicit actors does so for private gain, weaken- one suggest that the EU already needs to re- ing the state by misappropriating its resourc- think its policy on collusion and development. es. Moreover, even when public officials do And that in turn begs the question: what is the gain personally from criminal relationships, EU’s policy on collusion? this does not rule out the possibility of wider public benefits.3 The term ‘collusion’ can ap- The obvious place to look for guidance is the ply to those rare occasions where crime is used 2016 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), in pursuit of state-building or carries broad- the EU’s overarching foreign policy strategy. er social benefits. The conflation of these two Although an explicit mention of collusion is not overlapping but rather different phenomena is to be found there, the strategy does reference reductionist, and by only partially framing the crime and corruption more than ten times – issue, the EU may be ignoring evidence to block always as the targets of a clear-cut ‘fight’ by out an inconvenient truth. the EU.1 So European diplomats can logically infer from the strategy that the problem of The EU really ought to consider such ideas when state-crime collusion is likewise something to creating development policies. Evidence-based be stamped out, an issue so black and white that policymaking entails a duty to question even the

1 European External Action Service, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, Brussels, 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web. pdf. 2 Camila Vergara, “Corruption as Systemic Political Decay,” Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol.47, no.3 (2019), https://doi. org/10.1177/0191453719868265. 3 Kendra Koivu, “Illicit Partners and Political Development: How Organized Crime Made the State,” Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 53 (2018), pp. 47-56. 14 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? firmest assumptions and to probe the -possi itself in the world. And they explain the very bility to achieve idealistic goals by ‘value-free’ motif which still guides the EU’s foreign and means.4 In this case, that would mean asking development policy – the notion of being sur- whether crime and collusion can ever be ‘pro- rounded by four ‘concentric circles’ of partners. gressive’, whether collusion can be conducive to liberal outcomes in partner countries, and whether EU development policy has the means Precedent to harness collusion to this end. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that suggests that crime This is the principle that the EU’s own develop- can indeed boost public administration, that it ment sets a precedent for others to follow. The is sometimes the only means by which govern- EU’s highly-advanced model of governance has ments can function, and that it allows adminis- produced extraordinary results at home. Thus, trators to access resources and capabilities that the EU will achieve the best results abroad if it would otherwise be out of reach. But, it seems, applies the same model there too. This means the EU does not avail itself of this evidence. asserting in the outside world the same tough line on crime-state relationships that the EU takes within its borders.8 Incidentally, this notion also explains why the EU seems to picture itself at the centre of neat rings of concentric THE EU’S FOUR CORE circles: it expects its economic and political norms to suffuse outwards, one ring at a time.9 POLICY PRINCIPLES This points to the fact that there is some gra- dation in EU policy on collusion: the EU has the The authors believe that the EU’s stance on highest expectations of its nearest neighbours, collusion (and on many other internation- namely the ‘enlargement’ and ‘neighbourhood’ al issues) is instead based on four largely im- states. This is not only due to their geographical plicit principles that reflect its understanding proximity to the EU; it also takes into account of how best to achieve its liberal international their governance capacity and their prosperity. goals. They are the ‘four P’s’: precedent,5 progress, problem-solving6 and the past.7 And they are the central focus of our three-step thought exercise. It is these principles, after all, that Progress would need to change if the EU were to replace its implicit distaste for collusion with some- The EU appears to act on the belief that global thing more explicitly accepting of it. Such a progress involves step-by-step convergence change would, moreover, be extremely difficult around Western norms in general and the EU as these principles suffuse every aspect of EU model in particular. As a result, the EU plac- foreign policy. They not only define its policy es considerable expectations in nearby states, on collusion; they reflect how the EU pictures which have the greatest capacity to adopt its

4 Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge, 1957); Milton Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). 5 Among many examples: Jan Zielonka, “Europe’s New Civilizing Missions: The EU’s Normative Power Discourse,” Journal of Political Ideologies, vol. 18, no. 1 (2013), pp. 35-55. 6 Georges Tapinos, “Migration, Trade and Development: The European Union and the Maghreb Countries,” in R. King, G. Lazaridis and C. Tsardanidis (eds.), Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), pp. 277-97. 7 Ian Manners, “Global Europa: Mythology of the European Union in World Politics,” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 48, no. 1 (2010), pp. 67-87. 8 European Commission, “EU Anti-corruption Report,” Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2014) 38 final, Brussels, February 3, 2014. 9 Michael Emerson, “Just Good Friends? The European Union’s Multiple Neighbourhood Policies,” International Spectator, vol. 46, no. 4 (2011), pp. 45-62. CHAPTER 1 | Where does the EU stand on collusion? The concentric 15 standards. The EU’s neighbours in the West- Thecircles concentric model circles model ern Balkans retain strong crime-fighting -ca pabilities developed by their security services EUROPEAN UNION during the Cold War. Moreover, the EU has invested billions of euro in improving their ad- ENLARGEMENT CANDIDATES ministrative capacity under its Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance. Accordingly, the EU NEIGHBOURHOOD expects these states to ensure collusion-free public administration. It makes similar demands of its other neighbours, promoting AFRICA, CARIBBEAN & anti-corruption efforts in Georgia, Moldova PACIFIC ACP and Ukraine, among others. Elsewhere, particularly in post-colonial settings and poorer states, it appears somewhat more resigned to 10 crime-state relationships. LATIN AMERICA & ASIA

Problem-solving

The EU’s development policy suggests it believes it is possible to solve governance problems in almost any place and culture. It appears to act on the belief that its model is universally applicable and can lift obstacles using economic tools.11 Consequently it defines the focus of cases of deviant behaviour, the EU also uses its development aid as ‘the reduction and … negative economic tools such as trade condi- eradication of poverty’,12 reasoning (presuma- tionality and economic sanctions to affect so- bly) that increased prosperity will lead to better cial standards and voter behaviour.15 governance and the spread of liberal outcomes. It generally focuses its economic aid on those countries with the lowest World Bank income The past status.13 Its preferred tools are positive ones such as job creation, training programmes and The colonial past of five of its six founding private sector investment, and it uses prefer- members bestows on the EU a general obliga- ential trading relations to give a leg-up to the tion to engage in even distant parts of Africa and world’s least developed countries (LDCs).14 In

10 In Afghanistan, for example, one official alleged that “the [EU] line was ‘[corruption is] a national issue. It does not concern us. We can provide funding.” See: Mark Pyman, Corruption: Lessons from the International Mission in Afghanistan, Transparency International UK, February, 2015, p. 41. 11 Hein de Haas, “The Myth of Invasion: The Inconvenient Realities of African migration to Europe,” Third World Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 7 (2008), pp. 1305-22; Op. cit., “False Moves: Migration and Development Aid”. 12 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2016), Article 208. 13 “Middle-Income Countries Must Take Responsibility for Their Own Poor, Says Development Committee,” European Parliament News, July 11, 2012, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20120709IPR48497/middle-income-countries-must- take-responsibility-for-their-own-poor. 14 In 2007, the EU adopted its Aid for Trade Strategy, which aimed to integrate LDCs into the global trading system. The Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) is a mechanism adopted under this strategy to allow LDCs to pay reduced duties on exports to the EU. In addition, ‘everything but arms’ (EBA) agreements between the EU and LDCs allow them full tariff-free access for all exports except arms and ammunition. When states graduate from LDC status, they are given a three-year transition period to adapt to the end of the scheme. 15 A recent example of such sanctions is Cambodia, whose EBA was partially suspended in February 2020. See: Human Rights Watch, “Cambodia: EU Partially Suspends Trade Preferences”, February 13, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/13/cambodia-eu- partially-suspends-trade-preferences. 16 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

Asia, and to embrace the constraints imposed on raison d’état by the post-war multilater- Opening Pandora’s box al order. This plays out in the two outer rings of states in its concentric circles model.16 The EU lavishes the most attention on a confection It can be a risky business to rethink prin- known as ‘Africa-Caribbean-Pacific’ (ACP), ciples on any matter. But collusion opens which includes the majority of states decolo- a veritable Pandora’s box. If the EU did nised after 1945. The outermost ring comprises accommodate collusive states it would Latin America and Asia, where this responsi- seem to acknowledge that its values are bility is ‘shared’ with local organisations and not in fact universal and that its own par- third powers. The EU appears to accept that ticular understanding of crime is little crime-state relationships may be a legacy of more than an accident of history. Its ri- colonialism, but it opposes these on the ba- vals already point out that, when it comes sis that crime could easily overwhelm already to crime and punishment Europeans weak public administrations. And it uses de- have not always been on ‘the right side velopment aid and support for multilateral or- of history’. Practices such as child labour, ganisations to crowd out competitors like China slavery and privateering were once read- that might undermine these constraints.17 ily accepted, whereas blasphemy, homo- sexuality and witchcraft were at times deemed criminal.1 Even today, there is a vibrant debate in Europe about whether certain forms of behaviour are really criminal. And one of the great obstacles to EU justice cooperation is the fact that practices illegal in one member state may not be in another.2

Presumably these rivals and malcontents – Russia, China, even North Korea – would quite like the EU to bend and embrace moral relativism. They would use any acknowledgement of Europe’s past sins as a licence for crime. Whole swathes of the globe that EU foreign and development policy is ‘moralising’ and towards which it deploys double standards and an

1 Transform: Drug Policy Foundation, “Drug Decriminalisation in Portugal: Setting the Record Straight”, November 14, 2018, https:// transformdrugs.org/drug-decriminalisation-in- portugal-setting-the-record-straight/. 2 On the problem of ‘dual criminality’, see: 16 William Brown, “Restructuring North-South Relations: European Commission, “Communication to the ACP-EU Development Co-operation in a Liberal Council and the European Parliament: Mutual International Order,” Review of African Political Economy, Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal vol. 27, no. 85 (2000), pp. 367-83. Matters,” COM(2000) 495 final, Brussels, July 26, 2000. 17 Maurizio Carbone, “The European Union and China’s Rise in Africa: Competing Visions, External Coherence and Trilateral Cooperation,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, vol. 29, no. 2 (2011), pp. 203-21. CHAPTER 1 | Where does the EU stand on collusion? 17

attitude of ‘do as we say, not as we did’.3 A Nor is the aim of this study to redefine the similar moral relativism can be found even EU’s current idealistic international goals. among academics. Ottorino Cappelli, if the It seeks merely to test whether the EU can authors interpret him correctly, cautiously better achieve them by a conditional accom- welcomes Moscow’s mafia connections on modation of collusion – to test whether this the grounds that violent authoritarianism might be a means to overcome cultural spe- was a stepping stone that European states cificities, ensure that collusive states adopt took – “the essential ground on which more European norms and, above all, to reduce autonomous and capable modern states global crime. Like Cappelli and other such were later built”.4 And he criticises the academics, the authors are particularly in- “ahistorical liberal-democratic impatience terested in the precedent set by Europe’s [which] may consider this too modest an own historical path to development. But, achievement.”5 whereas Cappelli might treat evidence of Europe’s past reliance on crime as a reason The aim of this study is not to justify a rel- for relativism, the authors see it as a way to ativist approach to crime – just the reverse. hone the EU’s promotion of its norms. Rath- The authors treat the EU’s present-day defi- er than leaving itself open to accusations of nition of crime as the ‘gold standard’, using double standards, Europe can potentially the term ‘crime’ as shorthand for practic- use this more nuanced understanding of its es widely deemed criminal in the EU today. past to create more credible, sympathetic Likewise, in line with current EU practice, the and effective foreign policies. authors focus on ‘serious’ and ‘organised’ crime, as this is more likely to have a significant effect on development. Finally, when imagining the future of crime, we do so by reference to fields where EU crime-fighters are forging a leading role: cybercrime, slave labour, human organ trafficking, drug production and genome editing. And we draw on key EU policy documents, including the Seri- ous and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) produced by Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation.6

3 House of Commons International Aid Committee, “Aid under Pressure,” Evidence, Mr Maciej Popowski, Fourth Report 2008-2009, p. 60; Hayriye Avara and Bruno Mascitelli, “Do as We Say, Not as We Do’: EU to Turkey on Roma/Gypsy Integration,” European Review, vol. 22, no. 1 (2014), pp. 129-44; Peter Evans, “Develop as We Say, Not as We Did,” Interview with Ha-Joon Chang, Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies, April 7, 2008, https://clas.berkeley.edu/ research/development-develop-we-say-not-we-did. 4 Ottorino Cappelli, “Pre-Modern State-Building in Post-Soviet Russia,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 24, no. 4 (2008), pp. 531-72. 5 Ibid. 6 Europol lists 44 areas of ‘serious organised crime’ of which eight are identified as priority crime threats: cybercrime; drug production, trafficking and distribution; migrant smuggling; organised property crime; trafficking in human beings; criminal finances and money laundering; document fraud; and the online trade in illicit goods and services. See: Europol, Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment, 2017. 18 CHAPTER 2 CAN CRIME CONTRIBUTE TO LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT?

The key to unlocking wicked problems is evidence – more precisely, generating evidence to help decision-makers reconcile seemingly The EU’s four core policy principles contradictory pressures. In the case of the EU and the many dilemmas facing its foreign poli- Precedent cy, this means digging up evidence to reconcile its long-held ideas about the effective realisa- Europe’s own model of politico-economic tion of its idealistic goals with a new emphasis development sets the path and template on its basic interests. for others, including its achievement of (virtually) crime-free governance. If the authors are correct, the EU has distilled its ideas about effective foreign policy into four Progress core principles – summed up as ‘precedent’, ‘progress’, ‘problem-solving’ and the ‘past’. As in Europe, states’ progress is meas- The implicit assumption running through all ured by their ability to modernise and four principles is that what worked best inside spread the benefits of development to Europe will also work well abroad. In the case of their citizens, requiring strong adminis- collusion, that understanding of Europe’s his- trative capacity to banish illiberal forces tory explains why the EU tries to banish crimi- like criminals. nals from the public sphere. Problem-solving

Having articulated the EU’s guiding policy Societal obstacles to progress can be principles the real work begins with an effort overcome, no matter a country’s culture to challenge them. It goes without saying that or geography, by spreading prosperity, crime is an overwhelmingly negative phe- raising living standards and creating a nomenon, a leech on the body politic. But the robust middle class. assumption that crime is uniformly negative appears to derive from a classic liberal reading The past of European history. The task now is to look for any instances where crime has in fact served Europe’s history does have a dark side liberal development. and this presents the EU with a unique responsibility to prevent a resurgence of Any such evidence would show that the EU can, colonialism and neo-imperialism – in- at least in theory, follow its interests by en- cluding by emerging powers exploiting gaging with collusive states, without compro- corrupt regimes. mising its idealistic liberal goals. Is the classic liberal interpretation of history accurate or can CHAPTER 2 | Can crime contribute to liberal development? 19 crime, in fact, advance liberal development? centralising powers (violence, money-making The search for evidence that actively contra- and rule-making) while also giving society a dicts these assumptions is detailed over the lever to control the state and tame it. course of this chapter, and permits the construction of a counter-case: On the surface, it would hardly seem to mount a challenge to the EU’s current policy principles: > Collusion did in fact play a positive role in the EU’s antipathy towards crime and corrup- Europe’s own historical path to liberalism; tion is based on the modern-day finding that these phenomena are profoundly negative. By > Collusion can sometimes be more condu- contrast, most of this state-building literature cive to good public administration than draws on the deep history of development in crime-fighting; Europe, Asia and the Middle East. It details how the earliest states emerged thanks to a close > More prosperous societies sometimes find cooperation with violent and predatory crimi- collusion more acceptable than their poorer nals, before gradually turning these attributes counterparts; to the common good. And yet, the EU is engaged in cooperation with partner states in the > The global liberal framework sometimes very early stages of modernisation (Afghani- pushes states towards crime. stan), which suffer from weak central authority (Libya), or which have missed out on vital early steps of state-building (Somalia). So this deep history is not without relevance. LESSON 1 Today, states across the developing world find Collusion helped Europe themselves under huge strain. As such, it would probably be easy to argue the case for granting on the path to liberalism an exceptional loosening of aid conditions for developing states with criminal links. But the Most of the literature about the EU’s ear- evidence goes further than making the case for ly development in the 1950s, and Europe- merely a partial exemption. In fact, it suggests a an international development policy since its systemic link between collusion and successful launch in 19751 has roots in economics and state-building – a link also apparent in Euro- political economy. This canon of literature pean history. If, as we believe, the EU’s guiding proves almost uniformly sceptical about there policy principle is the concept of ‘precedent’ – being any public benefits to crime-state -rela the idea that Europe’s own liberal path guides tions, tending to frame the subject in terms of the way for others – then Brussels is duty bound ‘rent-seeking’ and corruption. There is, how- to at least consider this evidence. The EU is the ever, a slim strand of literature on the EU and inheritor of its member states’ deep history and its international policies which is rooted in is a leading international development player. state-building.2 And that body of analysis does Moreover, this alternative history of develop- provide evidence that collusion can play a pos- ment – of state-building through crime – is itive role: collusion has on occasions helped often better at explaining liberal outcomes than states improve their governance capacity by liberal history itself.

1 One expert argues that until the Lomé Convention of 1975, the EU lacked a ‘coherent overall development policy’. See: Dieter Frisch, “The European Union’s development policy. A personal view of 50 years of Development Policy”, Policy Management Report 15. ECDPM, Maastricht, www.ecdpm.org/pmr15. 2 James Caporaso, “The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modern?” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no. 1 (March, 1996), pp. 29-52; Jan Zielonka, “Is the European Union a Neo-Medieval Empire?” Great Debate Paper no. 1, The Cicero Foundation, 2008, https://www.cicerofoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/Jan_Zielonka_The_EU_Neo- Medieval_Empire.pdf. 20 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

State-building by crime: the case of Japan

State-building in Europe began when war- Honshu was under his control and the power lords expanded and consolidated their of other daimyō severely curtailed.5 realms through violence and expropriation. Similar processes also took place elsewhere His successor, Hideyoshi, continued the - in the Ottoman Empire,1 Yorubaland,2 process of territorial consolidation by sim- Hawaii,3 and beyond. Once they established ilarly violent means. Yet once his power was power, rulers then went on to outlaw the secure, he forced disarmament throughout very same methods from others. the country, sending government troops on ‘sword hunts’ to confiscate weapons. In late sixteenth century Japan, for example, His aim was clear: to secure a monopoly the daimyō (warlord) Oda Nobunaga waged on force, or ‘coercion’, within Japan as he war against rival lords and deposed the rul- launched a (disastrous) invasion of Korea.6 ing shogun.4 By the end of his rule, most of

1 In the nascent Ottoman Empire, the devsirme system was imposed on the Christian population, allowing the state to claim (by force) male children between 8 and 12 years old for the Sultan’s private army in Istanbul. This army raised helped bolster the Sultan’s ability to assert a monopoly on violence and reduce the power of the Turkish nobility. See: Ahmad Feroz, The Making of Modern Turkey (London & New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 18-19. 2 The pre-colonial Niger basin comprised a number of Yoruba ‘states and a state system that derived extensive support from three distinctive features – warfare, slavery and slave-taking,’ each of which helped the Yoruba elite to control the resources they needed to gain power and influence. See: E.C. Ejiogu. “State building in pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa: The case of Yorubaland”, in Political Power and Social Theory (published online: 12 March, 2015), pp. 3-40. 3 Proto-states formed in Hawai’i as local leaders such as Ma’ilikukahi on the island of O’ahu became ‘stationary bandits’ who sought to centralise power for themselves, often while seeking to expand their rule to other islands. By the eighteenth century, the eight islands of Hawai’i counted just three rulers. And by 1810, King Kamehameha I had constructed a centralised kingdom ruling over all eight (thanks in part to his acquisition of European military technologies). See: Ian Morris, War! What Is It Good For?: Conflict and the Progress of Civilization from Primates to Robots (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), pp.149-50. 4 Ibid., pp.151-2. 5 Nobunaga used investiture of daimyo with new lands as a tool to move them away from their established power bases and prevent them from being able to raise their own private armies. See: Philip Brown, Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the Formation of Early Modern Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 6-7. 6 Op. Cit., War! What is it Good For?, p. 152.

as advances in agriculture encouraged people to settle down. But, whereas liberal history sees THE EVIDENCE this as the point where economic rationalisation and civilisation unfurl in a smooth progressive A lesser known strand of historical analysis tells fashion, revisionist historians tell a different the story of state-building and development in story. As urban settlements became widespread, Europe as a tale of criminal enterprise.3 Like the they say, people were forced to settle down, familiar liberal version of European history, this abandoning small non-hierarchical mobile alternative story begins around 3,000 years ago communities and traditional itinerant ways of

3 Janice Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Willem van Schendel and Itty Abraham, Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005); Peter Andreas, “Illicit Globalization: Myths, Misconceptions, and Historical Lessons,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 126, no. 3 (2011), pp. 403-25. CHAPTER 2 | Can crime contribute to liberal development? 21 ensuring security.4 In these vulnerable, hierar- instead see a brutal logic of power-seeking and chical communities, crime emerged as a strategy raison d’état. And the means were crime and crim- for survival, resistance and finally advancement inalisation. As their landholdings became larger, – a ‘crooked social ladder’,5 or tool to rise in power struggles between feudal lords intensified. society. But as elites formed, they used these States cheered when a single winner was able to criminal techniques to control populations and claim a monopoly on violence.10 The winners territory. What had been a means of resistance centralised the means of ‘coercion’ (violence and increasingly became an instrument of power. protection), then ‘extraction’ (raising capital) and, finally, ‘transgression’ (the power to make In Europe, the first states took form in the Mid- and break rules). Each time they centralised a set dle Ages as rulers deployed just such means of of criminal powers, rulers outlawed their use by crime and terror – a protection racket.6 This oc- others as a way to lock in their advantage. If this curred when a predatory class of roving warlords revisionist narrative is to be believed, European gained respectability as great landowners. They states were large-scale protection rackets that asserted control over large areas of land by la- controlled populations through the asymmetri- belling itinerant populations as ‘bandits’ while cal use of crime, terror and mobility. 11 claiming freedom of movement for themselves.7 Pastoralists now found themselves tied to plots The pertinent lesson for EU strategists thinking of land too small to support their needs and thus about weak states like Syria and proto-states to a precarious system of joint food production. like Afghanistan is that this brutal process did Landlords exploited their vulnerability for fi- not preclude liberal outcomes. Indeed liberal- nancial gain, offering peasants a sense of secu- ism was a logical outcome of the desire to cen- rity, which often amounted to little more than an tralise power. Rulers accrued their powers by exemption from violence meted out by the lord’s criminal techniques but, importantly, they then own militia. For ordinary people, roving banditry outlawed their use by others, leading to the remained a common means of resistance. But the pacification and civilianisation of territory. In methods of the lords – or ‘stationary bandits’8 order to lessen their reliance on criminals, they – were more effective. Owning land meant that sought to broaden their range of domestic allies they were able to extort revenue through ‘tith- by spreading the benefits of their rule. Early Eu- ing’, later relabelled ‘taxation’. ropean rulers were reliant upon local warlords from whom they bought protection and secu- Liberal historians assert that European rity. But, increasingly, they aligned themselves nation-states emerged from a dynamic of na- with other classes to undercut these rivals.12 tional market-building, economic rationali- The urban gentry provided rulers with access to sation and ‘bourgeoisification’.9 Revisionists the capital they needed to fund standing armies

4 The popular historian Yuval Noah Harari argues that migration is the natural state of humanity. It is an innate survival strategy, providing physical and food security. The invention of the plough obliged societies to become sedentary, exposing them to unimaginable vulnerabilities. This meant that the course of civilisation unrolled not smoothly but rather with one panicked innovation after another. As he succinctly puts it, ‘wheat domesticated man’, rather than the other way around. Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (London: Vintage Books, 2011). 5 James M. O’Kane, The Crooked Ladder: Gangsters, Ethnicity and the American Dream (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishing, 1992); Malcom Gladwell, “The Crooked Ladder,” New Yorker, August 4, 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/11/ crooked-ladder. 6 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 171. 7 Tim Cresswell, On the Move: Mobility in the Modern Western World (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 13. 8 Mancur Olsen, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictators (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 9 For example, T.H. Marshall’s theory of how citizenship rights in England evolved. See: T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950). 10 Op. Cit., “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” p. 171. 11 Ibid., p. 172. 12 Ibid., pp. 179-80. 22 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? of their own. In return, rulers promised to put their powers to work for their new clients – of- LESSON 2 fering the middle classes law and order, jobs and services, and a social contract. Collusion can be more conducive to good public administration than crime-fighting State-building by force: the case of France The EU seems to subscribe to a linear conception of progress based on a liberal reading of history. That would explain its heavy focus on building The foundations for modern centralised other states’ capacities and sharing technical ex- rule were laid in France only in the 1620s, pertise in the field of justice and home affairs.13 when Cardinal Richelieu began to claim In the classic liberal reading, strong state insti- as doctrine a royal monopoly on force. tutions established themselves via a Darwinian Following Richelieu’s advice, Louis XIII logic of growth through competitive struggle. destroyed the castles of the great rebel In Europe, that involved a centuries-long arms lords against whom his armies faced a race against criminal groups. States secured constant struggle. In a bid to disarm his their monopoly of coercion, extraction and rivals, the king also condemned duelling, transgression at the expense of rivals; the strug- the carrying of deadly weapons and the gle honed and strengthened their capacities; and raising of private armies. It took another it allowed them to outlaw their competitors. 50 years and the series of calamitous civil wars known as ‘La Fronde’ (1648-1653) This classic liberal reading of history would ex- for the crown to decisively wrest control plain one of the hidden assumptions underpinning from the nobility.1 This marked the point the EU’s understanding of progress, and one which at which local warlords finally yielded to we believe is problematic – that states with strong a prince and where domestic violence be- crime-fighting capacities are guilty of backsliding tween rival landholders gave way to in- if they forgo competition with criminals in favour ternational warfare. of collusion. There is a strand of evidence to offer a different perspective. It shows that crime-fighting is not the only means of state-building. And nor is it necessarily the best. Fighting criminals is a risky 1 Op. Cit., “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”, pp. 173-4. strategy with no guarantees of success – and, even when it is successful, it can cost the state and society dearly. Pragmatic and limited collusion sometimes works better.

Throughout history, states have advanced not by fighting crime but by tolerating or cooperating with criminals – even with those groups whose behaviour the state itself had proscribed. Somewhat counter-intuitively, such incidenc- es of collusion grew more frequent as states advanced because the process of gradual state

13 This criticism has been levelled against the EU’s foreign policy in general and its Neighbourhood Policy in particular. In Ukraine, for example, TAIEX has been criticised for an excessive focus on government-to-government cooperation at the expense of deeper developmental work. See: Richard Youngs (ed.), “Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in its Neighbourhood,” Fundación para las relaciones internatcionales y el diálogo interior, p. 91, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/94972/EU_democracy. pdf. CHAPTER 2 | Can crime contribute to liberal development? 23

states, allowing them to control marginal ter- Collusive development: ritory societal groups by cooperative means the case of Thailand rather than by the costly deployment of force.

Thailand struggled for many years to rein in illicit poppy cultivation in its remote and ethnically diverse highland regions. THE EVIDENCE Unable to muster the repressive force needed to eliminate the industry, it tried The ideal of state-building through an alternative approach. In the 1980s, it crime-fighting, the one that seemingly- in began to focus on better integrating the spires European policymakers, certainly does highlands, providing greater funding for have historical precedent and can readily be education, health and infrastructure and illustrated with examples such as the devel- focusing on integrating non-Thai eth- opment of the Finnish Sea Guard. When the nic groups.1 fledgling Finnish state banned alcohol in 1919, customs officers seized thousands of litres Laws criminalising cultivation were in- from fishing boats and merchant ships in the troduced only later and, even then, a first months. But smugglers were quick to in- gradual timeline for crop eradication novate.14 They armed themselves and clashed was then negotiated with local commu- violently with law enforcement agencies. The nities. In 2002, Thailand was declared state was obliged to compete with them. As a ‘poppy-free’ by the UN Office on Drugs result, political will to tackle the problem grew and Crime.2 Its ‘alternative development’ and the state invested heavily, hiring more cus- approach won over international part- toms agents, providing better equipment and ners, and the state has begun to apply encouraging communications with other law similar measures in urban areas where enforcement agencies. By 1930, Finland had synthetic drugs are now being produced.3 a fully-fledged Sea Guard, a new agency fully dedicated to the supervision of its territorial waters which – unlike prohibition laws – is still around today as part of the national Bor- 15 1 Op. cit., “Development Not Drug Control: der Guard. The Evolution of Counter Narcotic Efforts in Thailand”. 2 Ibid. But this ideal type of state-building is none- 3 Ibid. theless comparatively rare and does not always end well. Even when the state achieves its aims of defeating criminals and asserting expansion and consolidation obliged them to state authority, it often encounters setbacks focus on borderlands and marginalised groups. and bottom-up resistance. This is illustrated by another Nordic example, albeit one from Criminal elements there could supplement the an earlier phase of state-building: in the late state’s power and enjoyed the legitimacy of lo- seventeenth century, the borderlands of Swe- cal custom. Rather than undermining the state, den and Denmark fell into the hands of bandits a willingness to collaborate with or, at the very known as Snapphanar; both states asserted their least tolerate criminal activities strengthened authority, leading to the first real demarcation

14 “History of Finnish Customs: Prohibition Act,” The Customs Museum, https://tulli.fi/en/web/tullimuseo/history-of-finnish- customs1/prohibition-act. 15 Op. Cit., “Illicit Partners and Political Development,” pp. 157-9. 24 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? of the border – but it took generations for the 16 bloodletting to be forgotten. In the past, such Criminal legitimacy: bloodshed was an acceptable cost for states, the case of the Italian Dodecanese which were largely unaccountable to their citizens. But, today, it saps governments’ legitimacy.17 Crime-fighting can escalate violence, In 1924, the governor of the Italian is- engulfing society as a whole and unwitting- lands of the Aegean reported back to ly strengthening criminal groups.18 Often the Rome that the province had become rife state responds by adopting an even stricter ap- with smuggling. But, rather than detail- proach, empowering coercive institutions such ing measures taken to curb illicit trade, as the police and border guard. These meas- he wrote that his administration “does ures are counterproductive19 and may result in not encourage smuggling, but neither abuses of power.20 does it apply itself to repressing it”.1 This permissive approach was based on two These lessons of history continue to go un- basic observations. First, many island- heeded. Present-day China bears the legacy of ers’ livelihoods depended on trade with a worst-case scenario example of an aggressive nearby Greek and Turkish islands, and so crime-fighting approach. In the early -twenti the legitimacy of the Italian administra- eth century, successive Chinese governments tion would be difficult to maintain if this (both imperial and republican) presided over were banned. And, second, the cost of a campaign to suppress rural opium produc- patrolling the islands’ extensive coast- tion. These efforts met with strong resistance. line would dwarf any improvement in The rural populations regarded opium culti- customs revenues. By turning a blind eye vation as a legitimate activity, and their live- to smuggling, the Italian administration lihoods depended on it. The state responded responded to the needs of local people by engaging in a highly repressive form of and bolstered its legitimacy.2 law enforcement. The campaign was highly successful in eradicating production – but it robbed state institutions of societal acceptance in opium-producing regions. This contributed 1 As quoted by Filippo Marco Espinoza and Giorgios Papanicolaou, “Smuggling in the Dodecanese to the revolution and the fragmentation of the under the Italian Administration,” in G.A. Chinese state in 1917, a state of affairs which Antonopoulos (ed.), Illegal Entrepreneurship, Organized Crime and Social Control (Cham: spurred its most recent attempts at central- Springer, 2016), p. 189. 21 ised control. 2 Ibid.

Weak states like Afghanistan or Iraq have the most to gain from a raw assertion of crime-fighting power. But they also have the

16 Thomas Gallant, “Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism, and State-Formation: Transnational Crime from a Historical World-Systems Perspective,” in Josiah Heyman (ed.) States and Illegal Practices (London: Hart Publishing, 1999), pp. 48-9. 17 States often attempt to legitimise such violence with euphemisms such as ‘cleansing’ (Colombia), ‘pacification’ (Brazil) or ‘encounter killings’ (India). See: Nicholas Rush Smith, Contradictions of Democracy: Vigilantism and Rights in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 214. 18 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “A State-Building Approach to Organized Crime, Illicit Economies, Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Governance,” in Virginia Comolli (ed.) Organized Crime and Illicit Trade (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2018), p. 130. 19 In El Salvador, for example, iron fist (mano dura) policies were ‘an ineffective, even counterproductive approach to the gang problem’. See: Sonja Wolf, Mano Dura: The Politics of Gang Control in El Salvador (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2017), p. 226. 20 The systematic abuse of power by the Philippines’ police force is a recent example of this tendency. See: Human Rights Watch, “‘License to Kill’. Philippine Police Killings in Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs’,” March 2, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/03/02/ license-kill/philippine-police-killings-dutertes-war-drugs. 21 James Windle, “Harms Caused by China’s 1906-17 Opium Suppression Intervention,” International Journal of Drug Policy, no. 24 (2013), pp. 498-505. CHAPTER 2 | Can crime contribute to liberal development? 25

Crime or revolution: the case of Britain’s American colonies

In the second half of the seventeenth centu- enforcement.”3 At first, this was because ry, the British authorities imposed trading illicit wealth drove up demand for British rules that severely restricted the American goods, providing a stimulus to trade and colonies’ ability to trade with other Euro- consolidating the power of the British state. pean states in a bid to consolidate their hold But as time wore on, tolerance of smuggling over the territory. In the northern colonies, became an unofficial means for the Crown to this posed an acute threat to local stability signal to the colonial elite that it was sen- and security as these areas produced very sitive to their needs, even if official trade little that was in demand in Britain.1 As a regulations were not. When mounting debt result, port cities like New York, Philadel- prompted Britain to crack down on colonial phia and Boston turned to smuggling as a smuggling in the 1760s, it became clear to means of offsetting the shock. Smuggling colonial society that their needs were sec- was deemed legitimate not just by the poor ondary to those of the Crown. This prompt- in these areas, but also by the existing mer- ed a surge in revolutionary activity in the chant elites.2 northern colonies. The merchant elite began to smuggle arms and ammunition across Initially, colonial smuggling “was met borders, precipitating the American War of with imperial accommodation more than Independence.4

1 Peter Andreas, Smuggler Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 13-22. 2 One prominent family of merchant-smugglers were the Hancocks of Boston. John Hancock was one of the signatories of the Declaration of Independence. See: Ibid., pp. 13-22. 3 Ibid., p. 15. 4 Andreas contests that “[i]t was not so much Britain’s burdensome trade and tax rules that provoked such outrage in the colonies but rather the attempt for the first time to actually enforce the rules—and thus threaten long-established smuggling activities.” Ibid., p. 30.

most to lose. If they fail to beat violent crimi- advanced. This is because the process of state nals in a straight fight, they haemorrhage au- expansion and consolidation obliged them to thority. This is why, rather than establishing focus on their margins: on borderlands and power by imposing the rule of law, many states marginalised groups. Criminal elements there instead cohere by offering precisely the oppo- could supplement the state’s access to capital site: qualified exemptions from it. Throughout and enjoyed the legitimacy of local custom. European history, there have been examples of rulers who advanced state-building through cooperation with criminals – even those whose behaviour they had themselves proscribed. Somewhat counter-intuitively, such incidenc- es of collusion grew more frequent as states 26 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

behaviour like intellectual property theft?22 And LESSON 3 why has Russia neither embraced liberal democracy nor severed its ties to criminal groups Prosperous societies despite levels of wealth on a par with some EU member states?23 Revisionist history is bet- sometimes find collusion more ter able to answer these questions. As we have acceptable than poorer ones. already seen, this alternative understanding of development argues that progress is better benchmarked by the aggressive centralisation As we have seen, the classic liberal reading of of power by the state than by economic indi- history portrays global progress as a linear pro- cators, and that collusion with criminals offers cess, with economies growing more efficient states a means to achieve this. But, vitally, it via a Darwinian process of competition. We also suggests that collusion is what gives vent have corrected this by placing state-building to bottom-up pressures for political inclusion. centre-stage, and highlighting that states develop in a non-linear, cyclical fashion. But there is a second, equally important element to the liberal model. Liberals imagine a close link between economic competition and democratisation. They argue that economic liberalisa- THE EVIDENCE tion drives political liberalisation. As domestic The classic liberal model of development holds economies modernise, the logic goes, urban that states become more responsive to their middle classes demand modern democratic populations as their middle classes expand and governance and provide governments with the demand a say in government. Yet revisionist support to expel criminals from the body poli- historians have highlighted a dynamic of po- tic. The EU’s development goals likewise focus litical liberalisation and tolerance driven by a on the democratisation of society, and it logi- quite different process – not economic- mod cally tries to achieve this by addressing what it ernisation, but raison d’état. This involved the identifies as the economic root causes of obsta- incorporation of marginal and often criminal cles to socio-political modernisation. groups into the apparatus of the state. This process was driven by necessity. Marginal groups Yet this classical liberal view is increasingly such as the Cossacks of the Russian Steppes24 or under fire due to its inability to explain a sim- the Uskoks of the Habsburg Adriatic,25 had be- ple fact: global wealth has spread in the last come highly adept at using crime as a means of 30 years, but democracy has stuttered. Why, survival on the margins of a state that neglect- for instance, do China’s fast-growing middle ed them. Rather than eliminating such groups, classes appear largely content with an author- rulers instead co-opted them into their ser- itarian leadership that itself engages in deviant vice. In return, the state granted these criminal

22 Andrew Nathan, “The Puzzle of the Chinese Middle Class,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 27, no. 2 (2016), pp. 5-19. 23 According to World Bank figures, Russia’s gross national income (GNI) per capita stood at $26,470 in 2018. Two EU member states fell into a range of less than 5% above this figure, while one stood below. See: International Comparison Program, “GNI per capita, PPP,” World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD. 24 Early Cossack communities were made up of criminals, runaways and misfits who fled to the borders of Muscovy to escape feudal obligations, taxation, famine, debt and justice. During the fourteenth century, the emerging Muscovite state co-opted Cossacks on its south-eastern borders to work as border guards, to defend against Tatar raids and to guide emissaries and merchants safely across the Steppe. In return, Cossacks’ reliance on piracy and theft was tolerated by the state. See: See: Kelly Hignett, “Co-option or criminalisation? The state, border communities and crime in early modern Europe,” Global Crime, vol. 9, nos. 1-2, February- May 2008, pp. 37-40 25 The Uskoks were a band of Christian refugees from Ottoman lands that settled in Senj on the Dalmatian coast. Here, they survived through plunder, piracy and racketeering against Muslims and Christians alike (although they denied the latter). Throughout the sixteenth century, Habsburg authorities tolerated the Uskoks’ criminal activities. In response to Venetian complaints about Uskok piracy, the Habsburg state claimed that the Uskoks were necessary to defend against the Ottoman threat and that the state could not afford to replace them with regular troops. Only with the decline of Ottoman power in the early seventeenth century did the Habsburgs begin to crack down on Uskok activities. See: Ibid., pp. 40-45 CHAPTER 2 | Can crime contribute to liberal development? 27 bands ‘privileges’, often amounting to an ex- and then crushed these criminals. But, once emption from the strict application of the law. again, a subtler logic was at play: the state found that it was more cost-effective to spread The implacable logic of raison d’état was even the proceeds of crime. more obvious in Western Europe. There, rulers colluded with violent criminals, driven by There are more reasons to question the liber- a desire to appropriate the criminals’ coercive al assumption that societies lose their taste capabilities. Outside the ruler’s employ, their for crime as they grow wealthier.29 Through- associates were violent outlaws – but their out history, it is precisely the middle-class ability to wield force made them a valuable as- members of marginal groups and the provin- set.26 Thanks to rulers’ thirst for power, roving cial bourgeoisie who have bankrolled criminal bandits became police, highwaymen tax collec- groups. The Sicilian mafia is a prime -exam tors and pirates privateers. Collusion served not ple. Its sponsors were not motivated by a de- only to strengthen public administration but sire for wealth – or at least not only. Rather, also to make it more open and inclusive. This is they sought more inclusive government, and because rulers picked their dubious associates from the geographical and societal margins of the state, and they were subsequently unable to quash them without widespread social re- Taming bandits: sistance. Instead they simply co-opted violent the case of Ottoman Anatolia criminals into the system, oftentimes yielding to local customs.27 Between 1550 and 1660, banditry became endemic in Ottoman Anatolia. Bands of The same holds true for rulers’ relations with demobilised soldiers, vagrants and desti- non-violent criminals. European states turned tute peasants known as ‘celali’ plundered to these groups when they needed to boost their and extorted towns and villages across ‘extractive’ capabilities and raise money. One Anatolia.1 Rather than relying on force, typical example is in times of war, when they the state negotiated with bandits.2 Their found themselves cut off from international leaders were awarded high-ranking po- trade and financial flows. The French state, for sitions in the provincial administration, example, licensed smugglers to break its own while their followers were given work naval blockade in the English Channel to deliv- collecting taxes or were incorporated into er gold, goods and information from England. the army. If they continued to predate on As well as helping the state build capital, these the local population – and in particular if operations represented a means of reaching out they refused the call to battle – the state to the fringes of French territory and society, cracked down on them.3 Thus, bandit- bringing jobs and welfare to struggling port ry and co-optation became a channel of towns.28 Naturally, if it had been able to pursue mobility not only for would-be provincial its blunt logic of centralisation, the state would administrators but also “for the destitute have appropriated the smugglers’ capabilities and the vagrant, providing them with employment opportunities other than agriculture and thereby relieving rural tensions.”4 26 Op. Cit., “Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism, and State- Formation”. 27 Ibid. 28 Gavin Daly, “Napoleon and the ‘City of Smugglers’, 1810- 1814,” Historical Journal, vol. 50, no. 2 (June 2007), pp. 1 Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The 333-52. Ottoman Route to State Centralization (Ithaca & 29 This essentially economic understanding of crime ‘risk[s] London: Cornell University Press, 1994), stripping away the influence of social and cultural forces… pp. 195-7. including social and cultural identities that help explain 2 Ibid., pp. 203-228. organized crime and its variety’. See: John Picarelli, ‘Enabling Norms and Human Trafficking’ in H. R. Friman 3 Ibid., pp. 200-201. (ed.), Crime and the Global Political Economy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), pp. 85-103. 4 Ibid., p. 236. 28 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

violent criminals were the only actors capable of Community smuggling: squeezing this from an unresponsive state. The the case of present-day Algeria original mafiosi acted as a mediating force between local society and a distant ruler.30 There are also examples – past and present – of mar- On Algeria’s border with Tunisia, smug- ginal groups that relied heavily on non-violent gling has emerged as a major part of the criminals to provide jobs and welfare.31 Again, local economy. Petrol, which is gener- they supported collusion not because of the ously subsidised in oil-producing Alge- trickle-down economics of crime but as a way ria, is transported across the border to of achieving a form of governance more sym- Tunisia, where it fetches three times the pathetic to their way of life. price. The motive for smuggling is nothing less than societal survival.1 The region has long been neglected by central According to this revisionist version of histo- government and is poor and underdevel- ry, crime can potentially be progressive. Under oped. Jobs are few and far between, and very specific circumstances, it can make the even those people who do work struggle central government not only stronger but also to make ends meet. more responsive and inclusive. This is because governments collude with criminals in order to Smugglers do not find it difficult to -jus strengthen their hand – to reinforce their mo- tify their acts; they see themselves as en- nopoly on violence or to help them gain access trepreneurs, not criminals. The border is to capital. But this gives social groups – even treated as an artificial barrier imposed by middle-class ones – an opportunity to steer the colonial powers and sustained by a dis- government, using crime to make themselves tant central state “intent on restricting valuable to the ruling elite. This can potential- everything from their mobility to their ly make government more open and inclusive, livelihood”.2 Yet local authorities are and allows societies to push it to respond to more accommodating. They know that their needs. Once this has been achieved, both a crackdown on smuggling would wreak sides work to expel criminals from the body economic havoc. And they fear it would politic or to tame them by co-opting them into also be an easy recruiting tool for jiha- it. Liberal democracy is by no means the only di groups. Instead, they have sought to logical outcome of collusive state-building, but co-opt smugglers. As long as smugglers it is certainly one possible product. keep clear of jihadis, weapons and illicit drugs, they will be allowed to continue their activities unchecked.3

1 Dalia Ghanem, “Algeria’s Borderlands: A Country unto Themselves,” Carnegie Middle East Centre, May 27, 2020, https://carnegie-mec. org/2020/05/27/algeria-s-borderlands-country- unto-themselves-pub-81881, p.8. 30 James Cockayne, “Can Organised Crime Shape Post- 2 Ibid. war Transitions? Evidence from Sicily,” Third World 3 Ghanem proposes two possible strategies for Thematics, vol. 3, no. 1 (2018), pp. 9-27; Letizia Paoli, Mafia Algiers to deal with smuggling, by transforming Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style (New York: smugglers into either entrepreneurs or agenct od Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 36. the state? Notably, she does not consider a ‘tough- 31 Largely unassimilated immigrant communities – Jews in on-crime’ approach as a viable option. See: Ibid., the United States (particularly in the 1920s and 1990s), p. 13. Albanians in Europe or Koreans in Japan - provide clear examples of marginal groups that have turned to crime as a source of jobs and welfare. One writer contends that states deliberately encourage the creation of mafias among these communities as a ‘time-limited’ channel for extracting revenue from their illicit activities. See: Herman Schwartz, ’Immigrants and Organized Crime,’ in H. R. Friman (ed.), Crime and the Global Political Economy, op. cit., pp. 119-129. CHAPTER 2 | Can crime contribute to liberal development? 29

LESSON 4 Illicit development: the case of Turkey The global liberal framework sometimes pushes In the mid-1920s, when restrictions on states towards crime the opium trade were agreed on by the International Opium Convention in Ge- neva, Turkey was one of the world’s big- These historical examples of state-building gest opium producers. Due to Turkey’s by collusion may appear obscure at first sight. limited industrial capacity, it was re- Under the post-war liberal multilateral sys- fused licences to produce morphine and tem, almost all countries are assumed to have codeine, effectively locking it out of the achieved modern statehood. They enjoy ter- most lucrative part of the trade.1 Licences ritorial sovereignty and official recognition, were instead awarded primarily to West- meaning they do not need to consolidate terri- ern states, while others like Turkey were tory through the violent processes that charac- expected to content themselves with terised Europe’s own development. Indeed, all supplying raw opium. that stands between these states and modern liberal statehood is economic development, In response, the Turkish government al- which Europe works to encourage through the lowed the illicit opium trade to continue twin levers of trade and aid. There seems little on the understanding the profits would if any justification for the EU to dabble once be reinvested in improving the coun- more in the murky practices of state-building try’s industrial capacity. Meanwhile, the of the early modern era, an age utterly removed Turkish state lobbied for greater licens- from our own. ing rights.2 It was only in 1932, when it became clear that massive quantities of Yet this misses the point. Post-colonial states raw opium were leaving the country with may enjoy the trappings of modern statehood, no export tax being paid, that the state but they were deprived of the careful early steps began to crack down. Even then, the state of state-building, leaving their consolidation did not entirely enforce the rules. Opium incomplete. Their borders and administrative producers from the country’s least devel- models were defined by colonial powers rath- oped regions were allowed to self-report er than through local processes of contesta- their harvests with the state doing noth- tion and consolidation described above; and ing to ensure their accuracy.3 they are now beset by unresolved societal and ethnic tensions.32 For marginal groups, the state appears to be little more than a protection racket to which they must pay bribes. The 1 Op. Cit., “Illicit Partners and Political effect is often to drive minorities into the arms Development: How Organized Crime Made the of criminals and militias, which appear more in State.” tune with their values.33 Yet states face pres- 2 Ibid. sure from the international community to crack 3 Ibid. down on groups which live off crime.

32 Ethnic diversity has been shown to contribute stability in ‘fragmented’ societies, in which no ethnic group maintains dominance. However, in societies characterised by dominance, the risk of civil war is doubled. See: Paul Collier, “Implications of Ethnic Diversity,” Economic Policy, vol. 16, no. 34 (April 2001), p. 134. 33 One expert provides evidence from West Africa that, in marginal areas, criminal groups may be considered more legitimate than the state. See: William Reno, “Understanding Criminality in West African Conflicts,”International Peacekeeping, vol. 16, no.1 (2009), pp. 47-61. 30 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

Yet the reality is that many developing states power to exert violence (‘coercion’). During today crave recognition. They may enjoy formal earlier ages of state-building, rulers achieved membership of international institutions - the this through internal conflict and civil war. United Nations and other associated bodies - but They civilianised their security apparatus only they struggle to make (or break) international once they were properly centralised and had norms.34 Membership of liberal bodies like the turned their focus to fighting external wars.35 WTO means submitting to pre-defined rules By contrast, today’s post-colonial states face made by long-standing clubs of states that they pressure to demilitarise their domestic secu- are unable to influence. Should they overstep rity apparatus. Nobody36 would suggest that the bounds, they face political and econom- state-led violence and civil war should be al- ic censure. This unsympathetic internation- lowed to proceed in the name of state-building. al order imagines raison d’état as the preserve But as things stand, states often turn to crimi- of an earlier, more anarchic era of inter-state nals to shed blood covertly on their behalf.37 competition and so traps post-colonial states in a vicious cycle. They are constrained from When it comes to the centralisation of capital practising collusive state-building - even those (‘extraction’), the pattern is repeated. Euro- ‘progressive’ forms that may help improve pean states succeeded in centralising capital in their governance capacity or the inclusion of part by harnessing the power of criminals. To- marginal groups. And so some states turn to day’s emerging states, by contrast, are forced predatory criminals to escape the constraints of the international liberal order.

Misconceived international reforms: the case of Nicaragua

THE EVIDENCE In 1997, peace was restored in Nicara- gua after years of violent confrontation Today’s liberal international order constrains between the government and the rebel all three elements we suggest constitute mod- Contras. A freshly elected government ern statehood - the centralisation of the power applied economic reforms designed by of coercion, of extraction and of transgression. the International Monetary Fund, World Take the foundation of any modern state - the Bank and US Agency for International Development.

But as economic growth took off, unem- 34 Andreas and Nadelmann describe how the diffusion ployment doubled, increasing inequality of international criminal norms is a “process driven primarily by the criminalizations of dominant states – the initial driver of the conflict.1 Rath- (notably those of Europe and the United States) and their efforts to export their own criminal justice preferences”. er than drawing ordinary people away See: Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, “The from illicit activities, it fuelled informal Internationalization of Crime Control” in H. R. Friman (ed.), Crime and the Global Political Economy, op. cit., p. 29. and illicit economies. Armed bands in 35 For example, the French state’s drive to break the power of the countryside kidnapped as many as its aristocratic rivals in the seventeenth century coincided with an extended period of external conflict with Spain. 600 people. In cities, among underem- See: “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”, ployed youths, there was a rapid increase op. cit. in criminal violence and gang culture.2 36 The political scientist Jeffrey Herbst comes the closest to this conclusion, arguing that there is little evidence Orthodox economic recovery brought a to suggest that ‘third world’ states will be able to achieve consolidation through purely peaceful means. return of violence. Nonetheless, he does not advocate war as a viable solution. See: Jeffrey Herbst, “War and the State in Africa,” International Security, vol. 14, no. 4 (1990), pp. 117-39. 37 This is a tactic frequently employed by Russia. See: Mark Galeotti, “Gangster Geopolitics: The Kremlin’s Use of Criminals as Assets Abroad,” Moscow Times, January 18, 1 Op. Cit., “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding”, pp. 39- 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/01/18/ 68. gangster-geopolitics-the-kremlinsuse-of-criminals-as- 2 Ibid. assets-abroad-a64204. CHAPTER 2 | Can crime contribute to liberal development? 31 into a subordinate relationship with them. they lack the means with which to convert this Historically, states accrued capital through do- into genuine de facto statehood. Informal ‘sur- mestic taxation, but today they must harness vival networks’ are activated at both state and fast-flowing transnational capital flows from societal levels, and criminals – more agile and predatory investors.38 This is difficult, and it subject to fewer constraints than the state – step comes at a price. Multinational corporations into the breach.40 Bandits, thieves and conmen and financial institutions act as the gatekeepers offer their services to help states harness alter- of international money markets and have polit- native (deniable) means of coercion, extraction ical demands of their own. They promote poli- and transgression. And, increasingly, states cies of deregulation, privatisation and austerity accept. The go-to response of the international that run counter to state-building. As the state community is to impose political and economic shrinks under the weight of economic liberali- sanctions. The result: embargo-busting crimi- sation, state-building goes into reverse. States nals offer their services, only to siphon off pub- and societies may come to rely on smugglers lic finances for their own gain.41 Thus, collusion and criminal gangs to survive.39 gives way to corruption and state decay.

Finally, the power of the state to make and break rules (‘transgression’). Too easily, post-colonial states – even those of Latin America with a long history of independence – are deemed to have transgressed the bound- aries of acceptable behaviour. Western governments, in order to bring them back onto the path of liberalism, turn to diplomatic isolation, trade sanctions and restrictions on migration (ordinarily an important safety valve for dealing with underemployed young men). These efforts to discipline governments are carried out in the expectation that they will enjoy the support of the target state’s middle classes, in line with liberal theory. But, in fact, the middle classes are precisely the ones most likely to turn to criminals to stave off the effects. And, as their governments try to soften the effects of economic sanctions on voters, they too rely on criminal gangs – for instance in order to smuggle young workers abroad and gain access to remittances.

This is where post-colonial states find themselves trapped in a vicious circle. They enjoy the trappings of statehood – international recognition and de jure territorial sovereignty – but

38 Anna Leander, “Wars and the Un-Making of States: Taking Tilly Seriously in the Contemporary World,” in Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung (eds.), Conceptual Innovations and Contemporary Security Analysis (London; New York: Spon Press, 2004), pp. 69-80. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 This has famously been the case of North Korea, where the state has resorted to producing drugs, trafficking humans and trading in protected animals, not to mention consorting with terrorist groups – all in order to circumvent sanctions and gain access to cash. See: Paul Rexton Kan, Bruce Bechtol and Robert Collins, “Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea’s Illicit International Activities,” Letort Paper, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, March 2010. 32 CHAPTER 3 CAN THE EU ENGAGE WITH COLLUSIVE STATES?

The evidence review of the previous chapter states may likewise resort to crime in order suggests that Western policymakers are wrong to centralise power and achieve inclusive to treat crime-state collusion as a uniform- political institutions. ly negative phenomenon: reliance on crime is not always a sign of partners rejecting the path > Support states that collude with crim- of liberal development, and it may sometimes inals despite having the capacity to even be a requisite for its success. That at least is fight crime. Collusion can help even- ad the theoretical conclusion drawn from the evi- vanced and robustly policed states dence review. The next step is to translate this boost their administrative capacity, for ex- finding into practical policy recommendations. ample by giving access to international finance, strenghtening their international The EU cleaves to certain ideas about how leverage and improving their legitimacy best to practically achieve its internation- within society. al goals, which we have articulated as four policy principles (‘precedent’, ‘progress’, > Recognise that crime and collusion may ‘problem-solving’ and the ‘past’). At present, be perceived as legitimate even in wealthy those core principles demand the eradication states. Crime arises among socially and of collusion on the part of its partners at the geographically marginal groups because earliest possible stage. But if collusion can po- of a lack of inclusive government rath- tentially be conducive to the achievement of the er than for reasons of poverty, meaning EU’s liberal goals, a recalibration is required. groups will court criminal links even as they grow wealthy. In order for the EU to harness the ‘progressive potential’ of collusion, and offer a viable alter- > Reintroduce a valid sense of raison d’état into native to crime, it would need to rethink each the multilateral order. Weak states – and in one of these principles – the precedent set by particular weak post-colonial states - suffer Europeans in their own path to development, under a liberal international system which its way of measuring global progress, its econo- is unsympathetic to the role that crime his- metric approach to removing societal obstacles torically played in state-building, inhibiting to progress, and of course the historical obliga- modern-day catch-up. tions arising from Europe’s history of war and imperialism. Its new understanding of prece- Policymakers are often reluctant to reassess dent, progress and so on would require it to: their principles in any such drastic way – hence why policy problems become ‘wicked’. The ex- > Recognise that collusion is a systemic part of ercise of rethinking policy principles becomes global development. Crime was vital to the far more palatable if broken down into steps. In development of states – in Europe and else- this chapter, we ask: where, and today’s weak and post-colonial CHAPTER 3 | Can the EU engage with collusive states? 33

> Should the EU make the historical prec- preclude liberal outcomes. Indeed, it has some- edent of state-building in Europe avail- times even been a condition for them. able to today’s weak, developing and post-conflict states? If that is so, the EU becomes almost obliged to cooperate with collusive governments in the > Is there a way for the EU to distinguish the throes of state-building. This is because the few instances of collusion that will help four policy principles we ascribe to the EU, and states progress towards liberalism from its which have driven its success as an interna- usual negative forms? tional actor, all flow from the central notion of precedent – the notion that what worked in > Can the EU find a new problem-solving ap- Europe should be applied abroad. If the EU is to proach to overcome the societal and cultural meld its old principles to the new evidence, it roots of crime, without giving up on its usual would therefore be obliged to revisit all its oth- wealth creation approach? er core principles - progress, problem-solving and past responsibility. > Can the EU loosen multilateral constraints without giving licence to predatory powers as was the case in Europe’s own colonialist past? The EU currently treats crime-state collusion as an obstacle to its efforts to THE ANSWER spread wealth and wellbeing abroad. This is due to the obvious empirical fact that Yes, it should. crime is an overwhelmingly negative societal phenomenon – but also due to the We have shown that the EU works on the prin- classical liberal reading of collusion in Eu- ciple that its own politico-economic develop- rope’s historical development. In that read- ment sets a precedent for others – that what ing, liberalism emerged from a battle to worked best in Europe will also work best expunge state-crime collusion and expel abroad. Somewhat contrary to expectations, rent-seekers and predatory criminals from our evidence review confirmed the validity of the European economy. this principle - but with a twist. It is the long history of state-building in Europe, not Eu- rope’s post-war economic modernisation, that sets the precedent. Europeans forged the template of the centralised Westphalian state QUESTION 1 that others seek to follow. And governments in Europe, at specific times in their development, Should the EU make achieved this template by deploying criminal the precedent of state- techniques. Collusion not only helped them consolidate power, but also set them on a path building by crime available to liberalism: once they had usurped the crim- to today’s states? inals’ capabilities, they outlawed their use by others and made the benefits freely available to all citizens. If the EU wants today’s weak and If we recognise global liberal development as a post-colonial states to follow Europe’s path, it product not of economic modernisation (as the should logically expect them to resort to collu- classical liberal reading seems to) but instead sion unless provided with a viable alternative. as a product of state-building and raison d’état (as our own analysis suggests), this casts a new By the same logic, the historical evidence light on the phenomenon: states everywhere suggests that the idea of progress is in were built by means of crime and collusion, and need of a re-think. The EU seems to oper- European history is evidence that this does not ate on the principle that liberal development 34 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? involves a progressive linear process towards colonialism still disrupts development across collusion-free government, and that renewed Africa, Asia and elsewhere, and governments bouts of collusion should be stamped out as dis- do believe the EU should act to redress this. But appointing examples of ‘backsliding’ and pred- again there is a twist: the criticism the EU fac- atory governance. Again, the evidence suggests es is focused not so much on the crimes of the that this principle holds fundamentally true: past as on the EU’s attempts to atone. Former the most capable public administrations are colonies resent the constraints of the interna- indeed those that have progressively severed tional system and what they see as an attitude their ties to criminals, and the states ranked of ‘do as we say, not as we did.’ Post-colonial highest for governance capacity are indeed the states seek to exercise precisely the kind of least corrupt. And yet the evidence also showed raison d’état the multilateral system is de- that states which have reached this pinnacle did signed to hinder, viewing this as vital to their not do so by a simple linear progression. Rather, ‘catch-up’ and to protecting themselves from they went through three cycles, each involving neo-colonialism. Europe thus bears a respon- a new bout of collusion. States used criminals sibility to accommodate collusive states in the to assert first their monopoly of violence, then liberal international order lest it continue to money-making, then norm-making, each time perpetuate a colonial legacy. colluding with criminals and then stamping out crime. Each new bout was evidence of progress, not of backsliding. If states skip a step, moreover, they are likely to ‘regress’ later to restore these foundations. QUESTION 2 As to its ability to remove the societal obstacles Is there a way for to liberal development in weak and developing states, the EU appears to work on the assump- the EU to distinguish tion that societies all have the same basic as- potentially progressive pirations. This allows it to address obstacles to liberal developmentalism anywhere, regard- instances of collusion? less of geography or culture. This belief in the existence of universal aspiration was broadly Rethought in this way, the EU’s four core prin- confirmed by the evidence. But once again, with ciples do not prevent it from engaging with col- a twist. The EU’s current assumption is that lusive states; and they may even compel it to societies share a universal desire for econom- do so. But any duty of engagement is of course ic advancement, while the evidence suggests highly conditional and contingent on the con- that it is more to do with a common desire for text. The EU should not engage with any and inclusive and responsive government. Socie- all forms of collusion. This leads to a second ties resort to crime not for its ‘trickle-down important consideration: can the EU work out economics’ but because it addresses their lack which forms of collusion to fight, and which to of responsive and inclusive administration. treat with sympathy? More precisely, can the EU Consequently, crime may be legitimate even in learn to recognise what might be termed ‘pro- societies with a high per capita gross national gressive’ forms of collusion, and distinguish income (GNI) and among groups that are pros- them from the far more common instances of perous but marginalised. Forms of violent col- violent predation and corruption? lusion that the EU deems beyond remedy, and which it meets with economic sanctions, may After all, for an exercise like this one to be therefore be nothing of the sort. worthwhile, it will need to generate a set of principles regulating the EU’s approach to Finally, the EU’s approach to development state-crime relations - one that is coherent and suggests it feels a particular responsibility for systematic and remains true to the EU’s ulti- the colonial past of its founding members. The mate goals. The process of rethinking Europe’s evidence largely confirmed that the legacy of historical precedent cannot be allowed to throw CHAPTER 3 | Can the EU engage with collusive states? 35 policymakers into the morass of moral and This begs the question: how can the EU ver- historical relativism and debilitate the EU. Evi- ify that instances of collusion really have a dence reviews, like the one we prescribe, cannot progressive function? After all, there is often be permitted to open the door for partner states a fine line between state-building and elite to justify dubious practices simply by claim- rent-seeking. The answer lies in identifying the ing to be following the historical precedent of distinct phases of the state-building process. state-building in Europe. According to this new reading of the historical record, the would-be state initially colludes Happily, the historical review does provide a with criminals to harness their violent capa- constructive answer of sorts. It provides the bilities; next, it harnesses criminal methods basis for rethinking Europe’s path to liberal- to make money; and finally it uses criminals ism, showing that states progress not in the to bend norms. This is because the state’s first kind of linear step-by-step process that policy- priority is to centralise the means of ‘coercion’, makers commonly assume but rather in cycles. then ‘extraction’ and finally ‘transgression’: States accrue the capacity for good governance governments want to secure territory, exploit in three cycles, and crime and collusion may it and then gain domestic and international ac- play a role in each: states co-opt criminals to ceptance. The state can progress through each usurp their capabilities and then crack down stage only if it cracks down on its criminal al- on them, making the benefits of collusion more lies - and the EU ought to sanction states that freely available. If Western policymakers wish fail to do so. to identify instances of ‘progressive’ collusion, the task is to identify whether the state finds it- If the EU is to engage with collusive states it self in one of these three cycles. must not only identify examples of ‘progressive collusion’ but also offer an alternative. This is vital to its notion of problem-solving. Can it do so? The EU is well-versed in helping states strengthen their governance capacity, THE ANSWER the prime motivation for collaborating with criminals. But, for societies, the motivation for Yes, there is collusion is different: they view crime as legitimate if it forces their government to be more inclusive and responsive. Thus, when the state When deciding whether to engage with collu- builds its ‘coercive capabilities’, societies press sive states, this new and more honest reading for the inclusive provision of justice and securi- of history offers the EU a basic rule of thumb. ty; when states build their ‘extractive capabili- Rather than condemning collusion outright, ties’, societies push for better jobs and services; policymakers can instead ask whether or not a and, when states build their ‘transgressive ca- development partner is following the histor- pabilities’, societies demand a sense of empow- ical precedent of state-building. If states are erment and representational government. indeed following that well-trodden path and using crime for the purposes of state-building, The EU’s recognition of a responsibility to the EU would cautiously engage (albeit look- post-colonial states completes the puzzle and ing for alternatives to draw the state away provides a means of rethinking the precedent from crime). If not, it would opt for diplomatic set by its members’ own path to development. censure. At present, the EU is more comforta- Few post-colonial states were permitted to ble with the latter course of action: diplomatic undergo the ideal sequence of state-building. censure and economic sanctions usually enjoy Newly-independent states across Africa and a clear moral case. But, with practice, the for- Asia instead inherited a set of highly coer- mer could well become the EU’s new comfort cive security services and excessively extrac- zone. Although morally complex, such cases tive economies as well as the capacity to make are likely to be more conducive to successful and break rules with impunity. Even today, state-building outcomes. they may look like fully capable states with all 36 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

A state-building framework

Drawing on an alternative reading of his- In a second cycle, the state looks establish a tory, state-building can be conceptualised monopoly on extraction within its territory. as a three-stage process, each one poten- Again, it may do so by entering into collu- tially involving collusion for want of oth- sive relationships with criminals able to er options: provide access to capital. Once the state has established the capacity to extract sufficient In the first cycle, the state must establish a funds by itself, it will once again sever its monopoly of violence over its territory. In criminal ties. the absence of other options, it may well do so by entering into collusive relationships In the final cycle, the state seeks to gain with violent criminal groups. But once its international acceptance for its particular goals have been achieved, the state cracks model of governance. In order to achieve down on its erstwhile allies to protect its this, it may ally itself with criminals able monopoly. to transgress established rules. Once it has successfully established its own model with their help, it will once again crack down on its criminal partners. State-building through crime State-building through crime Governance improves via three cycles of collusion and crime-ﬁghting Governance improves via three cycles of collusion and crime-fighting

COERCION EXTRACTION TRANSGRESSION

Collsio ith Collsio ith Collsio ith iolet Crime-fighting apitaleerati Crime-fighting rlereai Crime-fighting riials riials riials

the trappings of international recognition and territorial sovereignty. But they have not progressed through the three cycles of centralisa- QUESTION 3 tion and collusion and, as such, have not built truly robust institutions or social acceptance. Can the EU find a way to overcome the societal and The EU’s instinct is often to punish states with seemingly strong capacities for ‘backsliding’. cultural roots of crime? But the benefit of this alternative approach is that it allows the EU something far more rigor- If the EU were to measure the effectiveness ous: self-restraint. of its external action less by global economic improvement and more by these three state-building benchmarks, it would need to re-think its familiar ‘concentric circles’ model. Focused on global economic integration and convergence, this model groups states together CHAPTER 3 | Can the EU engage with collusive states? 37 based on their proximity to the internal market and income level, as well as whether or not they THE ANSWER were once colonised by Europeans. In its place, the EU would need to tailor its approach to each Yes, it can individual society and how well the state fulfils their demands. Instead of dividing the world up into concentric circles and placing itself at the centre, the With this new individualised approach, the EU could instead classify each state individually EU would still attempt to pilot states towards according to its progress in state-building. The European-style liberalism. But it would also IDPS model is useful as it offers a less Eurocen- afford each society the scope to define its own tric perspective, having been formulated by a outcome within the broad parameters of ef- ‘unique multi-stakeholder partnership’ that fective, responsive and inclusive governance. gives a voice to fragile states.3 The IDPS per- Just such non-Eurocentric classifications of ceives that successful states develop five core state-building progress already exist. The In- governance capabilities: justice, security, jobs, ternational Dialogue on Peacekeeping and services, and legitimacy.4 An accompanying di- Statebuilding (IDPS) provides one such, which agnostic tool known as the Fragility Spectrum could help guide the EU’s efforts to solve- so has also been designed to help states under- cietal, geographical and cultural obstacles to stand their progress towards these goals.5 This progress.1 tool could be usefully adapted for the EU’s purposes. If the EU were to use similar criteria to IDPS has identified five core governance capa- classify all developing states, it would be more bilities developed by states which successfully sensitive to their needs and better able to rec- meet the demands of their citizens – justice, ognise instances of ‘progressive’ collusion. security, jobs, services, and legitimacy.2 It has also designed a diagnostic tool for assessing There is a sense of progression in the five goals how far each state has progressed. A toolbox of the IDPS.6 Justice and security are the very like IDPS could form the basis for a new EU ef- basic functions a state needs to fulfil to avoid fort. By better understanding societal demands, collapse (‘core’ or ‘survival’ functions).7 As the EU would be able to design policies that are such, they coincide with the first cycle of state more responsive to the drivers of collusion than centralisation, namely the centralisation of simply wealth creation through ‘trade and aid’. coercive force. The second category, which includes the provision of economic foundations,

1 A core element of the IDPS is the participation of the g7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected states, which helps it escape the Eurocentrism of many other such forums. See: International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, “A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States,” Busan, South Korea, November 30, 2011. 2 The IDPS describes jobs and services more precisely as ‘economic foundations’ and ‘revenue and services’, respectively. It also defines legitimacy primarily in terms of internal, rather than international, politics. See: Tobias Nussbaum, Eugenia Zorbas & Michael Koros, “A new deal for engagement in fragile states,” Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 12, no. 5, p.569. 3 International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, “International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Delegates agree major political commitments,” Press Release, Stockholm, April 2016, https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/news-events/5th- global-meeting/press-release/ 4 Op.Cit., “A new deal for engagement in fragile states.” 5 g7+, Note on the Fragility Spectrum, Kinshasa, 2013, http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/17/43/17434d29-eb70- 425b-8367-7ccef13bfb0b/g7fragility_spectrum_2013.pdf; International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, “Guidance Note on Fragility Assessments,” Fifth International Dialogue Working Group Meeting on New Deal Implementation, Freetown, June 17, 2014, http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/d8/ae/d8ae82f3-1370-40d2-9e6e-cc0337ad4a84/new_deal_ fragility_assessment_guidance_2014.pdf. 6 Research has confirmed that citizens’ expectations of the state evolve as it becomes less fragile. A 2012 study found that in Rwanda and Nepal, where security is largely established, citizens’ expectations focused on service provision. This contrasted with South Sudan, where security was a priority, whereas service provision was an aspiration. See: Susy Ndaruhutse, Janice Dolan, Nigel Pearson et al., Synthesis Research Report: State-building, Peace-building and Service Delivery in Fragile and Conflict-affected States (Reading: CfBT Education Trust, 2012), p. 10. 7 Sian Herbert, Sequencing reforms in fragile states: Topic guide (Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2014), p. 12. 38 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? meaning jobs and public services, is ‘expected’. security, those in stable states focus on jobs and These functions coincide with the second cycle welfare, and those in the most developed states of centralisation, the centralisation of capital primarily seek a proper say in government. So- or ‘extraction’. A state that has achieved these cieties tolerate collusive relationships because two steps has a good basis for achieving both these offer a way of making the state both more internal and external legitimacy, the third cy- capable and more responsive: people do not cle. Unsurprisingly, the IDPS does not advocate just want security and justice, jobs and servic- collusion, but it does demand qualities that can es, representative government; they also want be derived from a more permissive approach - these things to be sympathetic to local or group resilience and inclusiveness. values. Governments see collusion as a way to boost their capabilities to coerce people, extract The five goals of the IDPS also chime neatly money from them and impose rules; but, by with the sequence of demands that societies colluding with criminals, states allow marginal put upon states and which drive societal ac- groups into administrative structures, poten- ceptance of collusion. People in the least de- tially making these more inclusive. veloped states are focused on basic justice and

The governance capacity model

Drawing on European history, and > Once the proto-state is able to provide modern-day trends, development can be justice and security, it can turn its atten- conceptualised as a five-stage sequence tion to building a stable national market, that, although by no means strict or auto- in turn providing economic opportunities matic, drives states towards better adminis- to its citizens. The tax revenue generated trative capacity: by economic activity creates an expectation that the state will fund services. Jobs > The provision of justice is the foundation and services are ‘expected’ rather than of even the smallest, most informal com- ‘survival’ functions for the state, and munities and so is the most fundamental they involve a second cycle of centralisa- element of state-building. But the state tion (‘extractive’ capacities). can only apply justice equally across its territory by establishing a monopoly on > A state that has achieved these steps has violence, and this gives it a responsibility a good basis for achieving both internal for national security. Justice and security and external legitimacy. This involves the are the ‘survival’ functions of the state authority to make and break norms, and and they involve a first cycle of centrali- it involves a third cycle of centralisation. sation (‘coercive’ capacities). A seuence o state-building goals A sequence of state-building goals Societies accept crime as aa means means of pressing the state to fulﬁlfulfil ﬁve five core core functions. functions

COERCION EXTRACTION TRANSGRESSION

stie Serit os Series eitia

a rer elare ors CHAPTERFive 3 ages | Can the of EU state-building engage with collusive states? 39 and globalisation

The global politico-economic system has been through at least five major shifts in the thousand years in which European states THE AGE OF EXPANSION took form. At each stage, Europeans were able to look abroad for the resources necessary for their development. As the rate and The global economy shifted once more with scale of those shifts grow, it is ever more im- the discovery of coal and then steam, making portant to take into account the advantages it possible to power steamships and railways. and disadvantages that this system bestows Power shifted from the Indian Ocean to West- box6 on developing states. ern Europe, and then from the sea back to the land, requiring maritime powers to hold ter- ritoryTHE AG andE OF allowing land powers to mobilise armiesEXPANS fastION and reach shipping routes.

THE AGE OF SETTLEMENT

Agricultural advances drove up population THE OIL AGE rates and put a premium on land holdings. In this era, land management was the essential skill in maintaining sedentary populations. Air travel allowed people to cross continents But it was innovations in sailing that allowed quickly and relatively cheaply, as well as ‘surplus populations’ to settle overseas in making all parts of the world vulnerable to search of land to cultivate and to sustain THE AGE OF long-range bombing. Oil replaced coal as the theirSETTL homelands.EMENT must-have resource, making oil-producing regions strategically valuable. Following de- colonisation, oil-rich states powered through the capital-intensive stages of state-building – other new states less so.

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY

Innovations in shipbuilding and naviga- tion allowed the first truly global economy. THE GREEN AGE Long-distance maritime trade came to be funded by luxury products such as precious metals and spices, sourced far and wide. Eu- The global economy is shifting with the rap- ropeans seeking a new sea route to join the id rate of technological advancement. As we core economy of the Indian Ocean acciden- enter a high-tech, greener era, there is likely tally landed in the silver-rich Americas. to be a shift away from the kind of extractive development that was once the norm. But rare resources, climate change, uneven connectivity and demographic changes will subject modern state-building to retrograde geopolitical pressures. 40 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

favours. This is the real lesson from the evi- QUESTION 4 dence review. Precisely by constraining raison d’état, the current international order leaves Can the EU loosen multilateral smaller and weaker states vulnerable to predatory practices such as military and economic constraints without giving domination and debt-trap diplomacy (if there licence to predatory powers? is such a thing). By building an international order more sensitive to the needs of developing states and allowing them greater leeway to ex- The EU would obviously find it difficult to- ex periment with statecraft, the EU would increase plain and defend any new approach to collu- their ability to withstand such pressures and sion. But in many ways, these difficulties lie help them to build strong and inclusive state more with itself than its audience in the inter- structures of their own. national community. The evidence review does not demand the EU give carte blanche to criminals, nor make expedient exceptions from its vision of liberal development. The review instead asks the EU to recognise that states are the main building blocks of the liberal inter- THE ANSWER national order, and to acknowledge that collusion has on occasions played a constructive Yes, it can role in state-building. This recognition is key to weaning states off crime. The EU is, in other If Europe were to help build an international words, being asked to stay true to its principles. order more sensitive to the needs of developing states, it might find them more receptive Whereas the EU might readily accept collu- to its liberal policy prescriptions. This would sion and bring criminals to the table in pursuit involve recognising just how difficult it is for of – say – peace-building, it does not afford post-colonial states to catch up with Europe. the same flexibility to state-building. -Euro European state-builders enjoyed huge ad- pean policymakers would balk at the sugges- vantages compared with their modern-day tion that the EU should allow for raison d’état partners in Africa and Asia. They had ample in international relations for fear this will lead scope to experiment with statecraft; they col- predatory powers like Russia, China and Tur- laborated freely with illicit actors to centralise key to engage in neo-imperialism, deploying the means of ‘coercion’ (violence), ‘extrac- criminal means against much weaker states in tion’ (money-making) and ‘transgression’ Africa and Asia. And herein lies the real issue. (rule-breaking). They did, admittedly, face a If the EU is reluctant to adopt a state-building constant threat of loss of territory and annihi- approach, it is likely because it was constituted lation, but that was punishment for failing to as a post-national project and antidote to the harness the violence and cunning of their crim- problems of its own past. It is more at ease with inal classes.1 The worst fate facing developing the language of economic modernisation and states in the modern international system is technical aid than it is with state-building. sanctions. But these are unleashed precisely for trying to follow the precedent of development But the truth is that developing states are al- through crime and collusion. ready vulnerable to neo-imperialism, so the EU’s clear-cut line is not doing them any

1 A prime example of the failure of state-building in the early modern period is the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Beset by opposition from powerful local magnates, the state was largely unable to centralise capital and coercion. This left it vulnerable to competition from abroad, and in the late eighteenth century the state was partitioned among its neighbours. See: Nicholas Wheeler, “The Noble Enterprise of State Building: Reconsidering the Rise and Fall of the Modern State in Prussia and Poland,” Comparative Politics, vol. 44, no. 1 (2011), pp. 21-38. CHAPTER 3 | Can the EU engage with collusive states? 41

It would also involve recognising just how resource export markets that built them. These much Europe’s own nascent states benefited are precisely the type of state systems that from access to overseas territories and markets. might be ‘improved’ by collusion, making them Today, we tend to think of imperialism as anti- more attuned to marginal groups and more thetical to the progress of European capable of meeting citizens’ demands. But, state-building, with modern European states once again, the international system imposes somehow emerging only after empires col- restraint. lapsed. But in fact, European states used their colonies to boost their domestic monopoly of Viewed from this perspective, the liberal inter- violence (treating them as military practice national order is unsympathetic to the needs of grounds and a stock of human resources for re- developing states. It grants post-colonial states cruitment);2 to diversify their sources of fi- formal recognition and upholds their territori- nance (extracting resources and extorting trade al integrity but - even in its current weakened chokepoints); and to boost their international state - it denies them a real voice in the making standing (establishing the European state as and breaking of international norms, leaving the global norm). Because they could draw their them scrambling to access international capital money and power from foreign territories, flows and exercise violence on their own terms. moreover, they were able to soften and liberal- Ironically these constraints are imposed for ise their governance at home. By contrast, well-meaning reasons. Europe has helped build post-colonial states often lack access to mar- the liberal order in part due to an admirable de- kets and resources.3 sire to atone for the surfeit of raison d’état in its own past. But the liberal in- This new perspective would also urope has ternational system it has created help Europeans to better under- focuses on constraining raison stand the bottom-up societal E helped build d’état, and so leaves smaller problems inherited by former the liberal order and weaker states vulnerable. colonies. Today, we tend to think in part due to a They are picked apart by large of European colonialism as in- desire to atone neo-imperialist predators like hibiting state-building in Africa China - predators that practice and Asia. Again, this is not quite for the surfeit of ‘strategic corruption.’6 so. Access to colonial resources raison d’état in strengthened metropolitan Eu- its own past. ropean states, and metropolitan states in turn bequeathed political elites across Africa and Asia robust coercive, extractive and transgressive capabilities.4 Their law enforcement institutions are aloof, often dominated by the ethnic groups co-opted by colonists.5 And their economies are too extractive, often dependent on the same European

2 For example, the 45,000 Nigerians that fought for Britain in the Second World War. See: “Learn about the 45,000 Nigerians Who Fought against the Japanese,” Pulse Nigeria, December 1, 2018, https://www.pulse.ng/gist/world-war-2-learn-about-the- 45000-nigerians-who-fought-against-the-japanese/ztfxc01. 3 Europe’s leaders have recognised that colonialism can be considered a criminal enterprise that brought access to markets. See: Michael Stothard, “Macron Calls France’s Colonial Past a ‘Crime against Humanity’,” Financial Times, February 17, 2017, https:// www.ft.com/content/87d6f430-f521-11e6-95ee-f14e55513608. 4 Shamsul Haque “Rethinking Democratic Governance,” in Gedeon M. Mudacumura and Goktug Morçö (eds.), Challenges to Democratic Governance in Developing Countries (Springer: Cham, 2014), p. 268. 5 Johnson Asiegbu, Nigeria and its British Invaders: A Thematic Documentary History (NOK Publishers International, 1984), p. xvii. 6 Op. Cit., “The Rise of Strategic Corruption: How States Weaponize Graft.” 42 CHAPTER 4 CAN THE EU DEFINE ITS FUTURES? Five scenarios for 2030 Where and what?

Strictly speaking, the phenomenon of approach – one that responds to the evidence Each fictitious scenario features an example of state-crime collusion is not a single wicked that crime can be ‘progressive’ while still up- state-crime collusion during a different phase problem but a bundle of four. These derive from holding the EU’s core principles. of state-building. the four core policy principles uncovered in the first step of this exercise. The subsequent two steps involved challenging and rethinking the assumptions born of these principles. The re- ARCTIC Sla sults point the way to a rather different policy Stage o centralisation: Extractive State-building goal: obs Collaoratio ith ha trafﬁckers to kickstart the eoo The four wicked problems WESTERN BALKANS riatia of crime-state collusion Stage o centralisation: Extractive State-building goal: Services MIDDLE EAST Taar Should the EU engage systematically Should the EU engage with states that Collaoratio ith ora otereiters Stage o centralisation: Legitimacy to proie healthare with collusive states? collude with armed and violent groups? State-building goal: Legitimacy Collaoratio ith roe sietists to hae loal ors Yes. Europe’s own history demonstrates Yes. Societies accept crime and collusion a systemic link between successful state not because they are poor but because they centralisation and criminal collusion. This lack resilient and inclusive governance. Vi- WEST AFRICA ola three-step thought exercise provides a olent gangs have the means by which mar- Stage o centralisation: Coercive scheme for the EU to plan its response to ginalised groups can force themselves into SOUTH PACIFIC The etelt Islas State-building goal: Security collusion in partner states, rather than re- government and so, under certain condi- Stage o centralisation: Coercive Collaoratio ith erriials lying on ad hoc engagement or withdrawal. tions, can contribute to opening up state to rai a Eropea a State-building goal: ustice structures. Collaoratio ith rs artels to r prisos Should the EU ever engage with states that collude despite being Should the EU support a more pragmatic capable of crime-fighting? approach from international institutions?

Yes. The previous two steps have helped Yes. If the EU wishes to stamp out crime identify where a collusive approach may be and build international cooperation, it must more conducive to good governance than first acknowledge the role that resourc- crime-fighting. Many of the EU’s- part es, connectivity and geography play in the ners have inherited strong crime-fighting state-building process – and the way that capacities from the past, and a collusive international institutions can leave states phase might make them more resilient and trapped by geography. inclusive. CHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define its futures? 43

Five scenarios for 2030 Where and what?

Each fictitious scenario features an example of state-crime collusion during a different phase of state-building.

ARCTIC Sla Stage o centralisation: Extractive State-building goal: obs Collaoratio ith ha trafﬁckers to kickstart the eoo WESTERN BALKANS riatia Stage o centralisation: Extractive State-building goal: Services MIDDLE EAST Taar Collaoratio ith ora otereiters Stage o centralisation: Legitimacy to proie healthare State-building goal: Legitimacy Collaoratio ith roe sietists to hae loal ors

WEST AFRICA ola

Stage o centralisation: Coercive SOUTH PACIFIC The etelt Islas State-building goal: Security Stage o centralisation: Coercive Collaoratio ith erriials to rai a Eropea a State-building goal: ustice Collaoratio ith rs artels to r prisos 44 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

‘transgressive’ capabilities. States first col- ASSUMPTION 1 lude with criminals and then, in order to complete each cycle and safeguard their new How the world really works capabilities, turn to crime-fighting.

> In each scenario, social groups use these Like individuals, states operate according to a three cycles of crime and collusion as a con- set of principles that, taken together, express a duit to insert themselves into policymaking, vision of how the world works. Nine times out taming the state and making government of ten, these principles are useful – they are a more inclusive and responsive. shorthand for years of successful practice. But, where governments cease to critically review > And lastly, in each scenario an unsympa- this vision, taboos can emerge, and wicked thetic Western-led liberal order still exists problems with them. We believe this to be true and constrains the developing state’s ac- of the EU’s stance on collusion – and indeed of tions, pushing it towards criminal collusion liberal developmentalism as a whole. Exploring and then punishing it for this. This proves different views of the world and its workings is self-defeating. therefore an important final step in correcting policy. Scenario-building allows us to confect Whereas the scenario in the introduction to just such an alternative world. Or, rather, it al- this Chaillot Paper was designed merely to raise lows us to pull together overlooked phenomena awareness of collusion, the five scenarios that from the real world to reveal patterns and re- follow provide a practice ground for experi- lationships that demonstrate a different reality. menting with new policy ideas. They are based on a distinctive set of assumptions about how This final chapter does exactly that. It presents the world works, which will be further ex- five scenarios of state-crime collusion. Each is plained throughout the chapter. This chapter set ten years from now in a fictional state, albe- will also explain where the EU might act to in- it one which brings together real-world trends fluence outcomes. The final scenario imagines in the region in question. This virtual world is a fully-fledged alternative policy from the EU, designed to help the EU face up to present-day based on lessons learnt from those that came dilemmas in the way it handles and classifies before. All in all, the authors’ alternative vision states, not to highlight a critical timeframe or of the world and its workings (the ‘government a particularly at-risk group of states. It builds capacity model’) is not so different from that upon dynamics that can already be observed to- of the EU. It expects broadly the same kind of day across broad swathes of the globe. step-by-step process of national development, the same overall progression from collusion to Each scenario portrays a fictional state at a crime-fighting and, potentially, the same lib- different stage of development and in - adif eral outcomes. Central to both worldviews is a ferent part of the world. Together the five sce- progressive improvement by states in the pro- narios illustrate dynamics which conform to vision of justice and security, jobs and welfare, our particular understanding of collusion and and legitimate governance. But the govern- state-building: ment capacity model differs from liberal- or thodoxy because it holds that this progression > In each of the scenarios, the state is follow- is driven by state centralisation not economic ing Europe’s historical precedent, colluding modernisation - by raison d’état rather than with criminals to develop its capabilities, wealth creation. just as successful state-builders of the past have done. The EU currently acts on the belief that prosperity drives improvements in rights and gov- > In each scenario, the state builds its ca- ernance. The orthodox liberal formula goes as pabilities in three cycles. It first boosts its follows: the upheavals of economic modern- ‘coercive’, then ‘extractive’ and finally isation prompt old elites and landowners to OrthodoxCHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define explanation its futures? o 45 governance improvements The lassi orthodox oel explanation o stateili for hols governance that oerae improvements iproesGovernance as improvesprosperit as ireases prosperity increases

POLITICAL RIGHTS SOCIAL RIGHTS PROPERTY RIGHTS

ile lass ori lass aoers ECONOMIC GROWTH

push for property rights to protect their sta- citizenry as a whole. As the state appeals to citi- tus (leading to improvements in security and zens, it uses its coercive power for the provision justice). The emergent working classes fight of justice and security, extractive power to pro- for social rights (jobs and welfare). And, most vide jobs and welfare, and transgressive power crucially, the powerful new middle classes push to give citizens a say over the norms to which for a proper constitutional framework (political the state subscribes. legitimacy).1 Put succinctly: wealth spawns a middle class and the middle class demands bet- The first scenario, set in a fictional West Afri- ter government.2 can state, is typical of this version of progress. It imagines the government of Oyoland in 2030, The alternative ‘governance capacity model’ colluding with violent criminals in an attempt argues that progress is achieved as states fol- to achieve that first step, its control of national low a logic of raison d’état. Proto-states estab- territory; and it imagines marginal regions ex- lish domestic control through the acquisition of ploiting crime and collusion to make the state’s ‘coercive powers’, wielding violence to control provision of security more inclusive. The sce- and unify territory. Next, they monopolise ‘ex- nario also presents the EU with an opportunity tractive powers’, to raise money to fund these to wean the state off crime and towards a liberal capabilities. Finally, they monopolise ‘trans- outcome. But, to fully highlight the difference gressive powers’, the authority to exercise between the two logics, the scenario imagi- these powers as they choose. These three phas- nes that the EU instead sticks to its current es of state-building can be achieved through principles. collusion with criminal groups, as the state appropriates criminals’ capacity to wield vio- In real life, the challenge for the EU would be lence, extort cash and break the rules. to identify whether an instance of collusion is ‘progressive’ and ‘justified’. But readers can This model holds that these episodes of collu- take this as given. Oyoland was confected on the sion last only as long as they are useful. Fol- basis of real-life states with a similar level of lowing the same logic of raison d’état, the state development and facing similar obstacles. This cracks down on criminal activity once its objec- virtual state was then matched with the ‘fitting’ tives have been achieved. But states must make form of collusion – in this case, collusion with concessions in the process, either recognising violent criminals. the criminals’ cultural and ethnic practices or undercutting criminals with concessions to the Thus, the following questions arose:

1 This is a continental European version of T.H. Marshall’s theory of how citizenship rights in England evolved. See: Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays, op. cit. 2 David Motadel, “The Myth of Middle-Class Liberalism,” New York Times, January 22, 2020, https://www.nytimes. com/2020/01/22/opinion/middle-class-liberalism-populism.html. Alternative explanation or governance46 improvements A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? ThisAn alternative oel o stateili explanation hols for that governance oerae iproes improvements viaGovernance three cycles improves of collusion via three and cycles crime-ﬁghting of collusion and crime-fighting

COERCION EXTRACTION TRANSGRESSION

Collsio ith Collsio ith Collsio ith iolet Crime-fighting apitaleerati Crime-fighting rlereai Crime-fighting riials riials riials

> What is the international crisis caused by the > What is the multilateral response? collusion? > Is there a European precedent for this form > How did the situation arise? of collusion?

> What was the specific tipping point? > What lessons might the EU learn? CHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define its futures? 47

agritech, fintech, health and logistics have revo- SCENARIO 1 lutionised the state’s ability to provide for its rural youth – and EU investments have helped these A licence to hack in West Africa citizens provide for Europe’s ageing population.2 But, recently, rural discontent has returned.

When staff at the Al Ghaib Financial Group in Rural youths remain stuck in isolated places and Liechtenstein come in to work one morning have been squeezed by an economic downturn. in 2030, they are told that their bank has been Regional governors had promised them a chance the victim of a devastating robbery. Overnight, to ‘telemigrate’ – to move virtually to offices in hackers have diverted $350 million of the bank’s Africa’s cities or to provide automated care to assets into an array of foreign accounts; the the elderly in Europe.3 But these jobs dried up, money was then converted into cryptocurrency and Jama’at al-iikhwan al-hujaj alsaalihin, an and disappeared. As the authorities investigate, Islamist group, has taken them under its wing. they find the fingerprints of a foreign- govern The group initially mentored them away from ment: the perpetrators have made no effort to extremism, with the encouragement of local hide a digital tag that identifies them as a- vir politicians. But, in the past year, the central tual private security force (VPSF) contracted government has begun to crack down as rural to the government of Oyoland in West Africa. youths, encouraged by Jama’at, began unleash- The EU has already expressed concerns about ing cyberattacks on local companies. With re- ‘state-sponsored cyberpiracy’ in Oyoland, and cent Chinese financing, the government began last year its government made assurances that recruiting the best of these in a bid to protect any VPSFs based in the country were operating companies and combat Jama’at. That is how the in a purely domestic arena, under the state’s cy- VPSFs were created. For the first time, one of berdefence strategy. But their role in the Liech- these government-sponsored VPSFs has taken tenstein heist suggests otherwise. Indeed, it its operations outside Africa, recovering stolen looks like their sponsor, the cash-strapped cen- money that had been stashed in Liechtenstein. tral government, is behind this daring operation. How we got here: the decentralisation The government of Oyoland has been struggling of territorial security to contain a wave of cybercrime and rural violence, which it attributes to the blurring of the A decade earlier, Oyoland embraced a decen- lines between violent virtual gaming and reality. tralised approach to security. Or rather a de- The country has long enjoyed a reputation as a centralised approach embraced Oyoland. Barna tech giant, thanks to its vibrant urban tech hubs.1 state in the rural north-east is typical: it was But, since the end of the Junud ‘Uwyuland insur- simply left to muddle through on its own. Its gency in 2026, its record of rolling out technology local governors were tasked by the government to the countryside has proved equally impressive. in Ajuba with reconstructing territories once Regional governors connected up rural areas held by Junud ‘Uwyuland. And they were em- with drones and 6G technology. Thanks to cash powered to do so for the simple reason that they from the European Investment Fund, they were had more success in attracting Western donors able to invest in home-grown programming po- than did central government. The governor of tential, identifying future software engineers in Barna won plaudits from the EU and other do- out-of-the-way places. Innovations in edutech, nors for his ‘comprehensive approach’ to the

1 Other African tech hubs include Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt and Kenya. See Toby Shapshak, “Africa’s Booming Tech Hubs Are “Backbone of Tech Ecosystem” Having Grown 40% This Year,” Forbes, July 11, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ tobyshapshak/2019/07/11/africas-booming-tech-hubs-are-backbone-of-tech-ecosystem-having-grown-40-this- year/#4cd3548324c2 2 A large number of Oyolanders work remotely in Europe’s large healthcare industry, particularly in the field of gerontology. 3 Telemigration describes the practice of using new technical solutions to work remotely in another country, which became commonplace in the mid-2020s Cyberhajj48 routes A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

acrossCyberhajj routes Arica across Africa

Five different 'levels' of cyberhajj are created by the Pilgrims. Each charts a different traditional route from West Africa to Mecca, via digitally reconstructed historical centres of Islamic learning such as Timbuktu and Cairo. With each level they complete, the cyberhajjis unlock new status and akat refers to the obligation for practising privileges within the group, but are also Muslims to donate a certain proportion of expected to donate more to akat, their wealth to charitable causes. Normally, this tax is 2.5% but, within the Brotherhood of which is administered by the group. Righteous Pilgrims, a zakat of 10% is paid.

airoa liers

eel aat e MAGHREB ROUTE Se haaes ila Cairo aa

In−Salah st hat eel sar eel MANSA MUSA eia ROUTE FORTY DAY Taha ROAD Selia eah Mecca Shiit

eel Sai alata ao SAHARA aar ROUTE Tit osoto ee oe ao airi eel SAVANNAH ROUTE

a eero o Cit

insurgency. Not only did he mix law enforce- peripheries were from the capital – and indeed ment with programmes to improve local skills from Mecca itself. and regional connectivity, he even recruited ulamas in Mecca to give daily prayers for Bar- It is perhaps understandable that the govern- na’s tech industry.4 But, while such initiatives ment in Ajuba had been neglecting the rural improved security in Oyoland’s rural peripher- economy in favour of the major urban hubs. Oy- ies, they highlighted just how disconnected the oland’s population of 250 million is stretched

4 This approach has been used by local governors in parts of Nigeria. See: John Campbell, “Borno Governor Launches State-level Initiatives to Fight Boko Haram,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 11, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/blog/borno-governor- launches-state-level-initiatives-fight-boko-haram. Cyberhajj routes CHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define its futures? 49 acrossCyberhajj routes Arica across Africa across nearly 1 million km2, and its largest city, disarming them, the government had chosen to Yezero, houses 10% of the country’s citizens integrate them into the army after the insurgency, 5 9 Five different 'levels' of cyberhajj are alone. In the mid-2020s, Ajuba, Yezero and subjecting them to military discipline and giving created by the Pilgrims. Each charts a other urban hubs were swollen by large move- them an outlet for their more violent tendencies. different traditional route from West ments of farmers and environmental refugees Africa to Mecca, via digitally reconstructed historical centres of fleeing the adverse effects of climate change on The tipping point: the rising Islamic learning such as Timbuktu and the rural north.6 Even as hot winds ravaged the burden of cyberdefence Cairo. With each level they complete, the cyberhajjis unlock new status and akat refers to the obligation for practising countryside, heavily populated coastal cities privileges within the group, but are also Muslims to donate a certain proportion of such as Yezero still drew all the attention: they Among the rural population the opportunity for expected to donate more to akat, their wealth to charitable causes. Normally, this tax is 2.5% but, within the Brotherhood of which is administered by the group. were expected to take the strain as their outly- cybercrime was growing, and this was legitimised Righteous Pilgrims, a zakat of 10% is paid. ing regions filled up with farmers and then sub- by the ‘Brotherhood of Righteous Pilgrims’, to sided into the sea.7 Oyoland ranked second last give Jama’at its English name. Barna’s regional across Africa when EU development specialists government, and its Western partners, still clung airoa liers applied their new econometric evaluation, con- to the belief that the Pilgrims offered a good solu- eel firming the picture of a country riven by terri- tion to rural youth discontent. They had welcomed aat e MAGHREB torial and generational inequality and spurring the Pilgrims into the countryside as a moderating ROUTE Se a flurry of rural youth employment schemes. force who shifted the emphasis of Islamic teach- haaes ila Cairo aa ing from jihad to the five pillars of Islam,10 and This set the stage for the confrontation between in particular the hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca. In−Salah st the tech-savvy, angry young men now sitting in The Pilgrims were permitted to recruit the rural hat eel sar eel bedrooms across the countryside and the gov- unemployed for the hajj, and encourage them to MANSA MUSA eia 11 ROUTE FORTY DAY ernment’s own fragmented security apparatus. work along the way. Before long, large numbers Taha ROAD Underemployed rural youths, immersed in vio- of poor young Oyolanders were working their way Selia eah Mecca Shiit lent gaming culture and in the cultural values of to Mecca. But the conditions were intolerable. As Jama’at, came to blows with government-backed the death toll rose, Ajuba cracked down. This is eel Sai militias. It was these militias, made up of local when the Pilgrims first moved online, launching alata ao SAHARA aar ROUTE hunters and pastoralists, that ten years earlier a virtual cyberhajj, with immersive virtual reality Tit had given the army the upper hand against Junud technology to simulate the long walk to Mecca. osoto ee oe ‘Uwyuland. Theirs marked the first attempt to ao airi eel SAVANNAH co-opt violent predatory groups from the prov- The most visible sign of the popularity of the ROUTE inces wholesale into the state apparatus, formal- cyberhajj was a massive rise in cybertheft. The 8 a ised as a ‘public-private security force’. What Pilgrims permitted their tech-savvy followers eero they lacked in discipline, they made up for in their to conduct raids on companies associated with o Cit knowledge of the local terrain. And, rather than the ‘corrupt’ and ‘anti-Islamic’ Oyo state; its

5 This pattern can be seen in other large cities in West Africa. For example, current models project that the population of Lagos will rise to over 34 million by 2050. See: Daniel Hoornweg and Kevin Pope, “Population Predictions for the World’s Largest Cities in the 21st Century,” Environment and Urbanization, vol. 29, no. 1 (2016), pp. 195-216. 6 Other West African states are also likely to experience climate-driven population movements. See: Temidayo Olagunju, “Drought, Desertification and the Nigerian Environment: A Review,”Journal of Ecology and the Natural Environment, vol. 7 (2015), pp. 196- 209. 7 This is a common problem among large coastal cities in the region. See: Nick Tattersall, “Sea Surges Could Uproot Millions in Nigeria Megacity,” Reuters, November 19, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-nigeria/sea-surges-could-uproot- millions-in-nigeria-megacity-idUSTRE4AI74G20081119. 8 This strategy has been employed in Nigeria. See: Jacob Zenn, “Boko Haram Is Not ‘Defeated’ but Buhari’s Strategy Is Working,” African Arguments, January 5, 2018, https://africanarguments.org/2016/01/05/boko-haram-is-not-defeated-but-buharis- strategy-is-working/. 9 The UN has financed similar projects elsewhere in Africa. See: United Nations Development Programme, “UNDP Trains Vigilantes and Civilian Joint Task Force Members in Human Rights and Leadership,” July 9, 2019, https://www.ng.undp.org/content/nigeria/ en/home/presscenter/articles/2019/civilian-joint-task-force--cjtf--members-and-vigilante-groups-tr.html. 10 The five pillars of Islam are the five obligations of every Muslim, which provide a framework for a good and responsible life. They are shahadah, or profession of faith; salat, the prayers performed five times daily;zakat , financial contributions to charitable causes; sawm, fasting during the month of Ramadan; and hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca. 11 The local Maliki school of Islam allows the faithful to make their pilgrimage even if they do not have the resources to do so, the only requirement being to work along the way. See: Baz Lecocq, “The Hajj from West Africa from a Global Historical Perspective (19th and 20th Centuries),” African Diaspora, vol. 5, no. 2 (2012), pp. 187-214. 50 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? followers were thus earning real money for their ambassador from Berne and call upon their EU virtual hajj. At first, the raids were little more than neighbours to follow suit: they say that Oy- ransomware attacks against medium-sized busi- oland’s government is directly implicated in a nesses, but, as the Pilgrims’ resources expanded, massive bank theft. Switzerland currently has a so too did their ambitions. Oyoland’s biggest tech non-permanent seat on the UN Security Coun- firms were subject to embarrassing data breach- cil and calls for sanctions under the Regime on es. And then the Oyo National Bank fell victim to the Use of Cybercrime as a Weapon. The Swiss a cyberheist, a vivid sign of the government’s ne- authorities say they have already foiled a sec- glect of state cybersecurity during its high-tech ond attempted cyberheist and, if the Security boom. Increasingly, the government of Oyoland Council turns a blind eye, it will ‘open the door came to think of the virtual realm as an extension to a ruinous new era of piracy against European of its physical territory, talking of Barna State as banking institutions by state-sponsored cyber- a ‘breakaway’ region of cyberspace. criminals’. Oyoland counters that its operation was far from unprecedented, citing Mossad’s Unable to assure its own cybersecurity, Ajuba once Operation Harpoon, which involved the theft of again turned to violent criminals for help, produc- bank assets held by Hezbollah;13 what is differ- ing a licensing system for VPSFs. It found recruits ent this time is that Oyoland acted openly and among the same underemployed, violent gaming within the bounds of its own very clear laws de- community that were drawn to the Pilgrims, al- signed and debated for this purpose. lowing them an outlet for their frustration and rewarding them with a cut of the proceeds. In Some European representatives concede that the early days, most continued to engage in cy- there is a precedent for Oyoland’s effort to use bercrime on the side. The CEO of one VPSF is ru- national law to extra-territorial effect (the US has moured to be the offline identity of the notorious long done this with its sanctions and taxation pol- SojiGirl, responsible for a number of high-profile icy). But the dispute is really a clash of world views. cyberattacks on the country’s vital infrastructure, For Oyoland, collusion with criminal groups has including a devastating ransomware attack on the become an integral part of an effort to control its Eko nuclear power plant. Still, when they were fractious territory; for Europe it is an aberration. employed as VPSFs, they stuck to strict rules.12 The Oyo ambassador points out that the colloquial Ahead of their action against the Al Ghaib Finan- term for the VPSFs – ‘cyberteers’ – echoes the Eu- cial Group, the lead VPSF meticulously traced the ropean ‘privateers’ who historically ensured order Pilgrims’ assets and then presented the evidence on the high seas.14 In today’s highly connected to a government liaison officer who gave them world, he argues, cybercrime is analogous to pi- permission to take ‘active defensive measures.’ racy, as the internet is to the high seas. Moreover, Oyoland’s ‘Cyberteers’ Charter’ was consciously The multilateral response: modelled on historical practices, which are still cyberpiracy or privateering? formally sanctioned in some parts of the West.15 Oyoland has turned cyberpirates into cyberse- In response to the Al Ghaib heist, Liechten- curity guards, gradually co-opting them into the stein and Switzerland jointly expel the Oyo

12 VPSFs’ official actions are governed by a three-level protocol. The first level, known as trace back ,requires them to build a casefile; level two, sanction and blockade, involves the government placing restrictions on the internet use of the offender; the third level, forward defensive measures, requires the authorisation of a government liaison officer, who allows the VPSF to retaliate against the attacker, conducting reprisal attacks and seizing financial assets. A similar model has been outlined by Michael Todd Hopkins. See: “The Exceptionalist’s Approach to Private Sector Cybersecurity: A Marque and Reprisal Model,” Thesis, George Washington University Law School, 2011. 13 Nitsan Darshan-Leitner and Samuel Katz, Harpoon: Inside the Covert War against Terrorism’s Money Masters (New York: Hachette, 2017). 14 Jonathan Still, “Resurrecting Letters of Marque and Reprisal to Address Modern Threats,” US Army War College, Strategy Research Project, 2012, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a590294.pdf. 15 To this day, the US Constitution asserts that “Congress shall have Power To ... grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal” to privateers. See: The Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 11. CHAPTERsubmission 4 | Can the EU define its futures?boxes 51

It is hard to deny the success of Oyoland’s VPS- Fs. Indeed, they appear already to have inspired Permanent Mission o the similar groups in Africa’s other tech hubs. Cy- Oyo Republic to the berteering is a means of gainful employment for United Nations tech-savvy rural youths affected by the economic downturn. It curbs their more destructive ten- Legal precedents for the use of VPSFs dencies. This, in turn, leads to a fall in recruitment for the Pilgrims and to a significant decline Privateering has been a common state in their capabilities. And the cyberteers, having practice for the past seven centuries contributed to the security of the country, are now and will in all likelihood persist with or setting about finding ways to fund cyberdefence, without international sanction. Euro- creating a properly secure online banking sector pean privateers were among the first of for the region. Despite Swiss-led sanctions, Oy- their kind, and they were well known oland’s use of cyberteers actually increases trust for preying on merchant ships and mili- and lowers the incidence of attacks. As the coun- tary vessels flying an enemy flag. During try’s tech sector begins to recover, the govern- times of war, they acted like a navy; in ment works to reduce its reliance on the private peacetime they engaged in reprisals only sector for its digital defence, slowly integrating against foreign vessels.1 The line be- its cyberteers into the regular army and replacing tween privateering and piracy, between their ‘booty prizes’ with a regular salary. defence and aggression, was blurred: privateering was a way of earning reve- Hard-learned lessons: tentative nue for the state and could be a substitute steps towards engagement for open war. This is why regulation became necessary. In the mid-nineteenth This all contributes to an increased awareness in century, those European states that had the EU that Oyoland is moving in a positive di- benefited most from privateering now rection, albeit by a ‘crooked’ path. When Liech- became the most vulnerable, and so they tenstein is hit by a new round of cyberattacks, outlawed it.2 the EU is more circumspect. It continues the discussion about applying UN sanctions, but it also Submission of the Oyo Republic to the UN Security Council, 2030 urges Liechtenstein to take more direct action to prevent the laundering of money through its financial system.16 After all, Africa’s weak cy- berdefences can be explained in large part by the

1 Florian Egloff, “Cybersecurity and the Age of way politicians syphoned off cash from the tech Privateering: A Historical Analogy,” Cyber sector to their own pockets; and the raid on the Studies Programme Working Paper Series, no. 1, University of Oxford, 2015. Al Ghaib Financial Group was an understanda- 2 Jan Lemnitzer, “‘That Moral League of Nations ble effort by the state to recover money hidden against the United States’: The Origins of the 1856 Declaration of Paris,” International History Review, by the Pilgrims, the fruit of their cybercrime. In vol. 35, no. 4 (2013), pp. 1068-88. parallel, the EU dispatches a team of cybersecurity experts to Ajuba to work with the Oyo government to improve its defensive infrastructure – thus reducing its reliance on cyberteers. service of the state. ‘Outlaw this practice,’ the Am- bassador warns, ‘and it will only result in chaos.’

16 For more information on specific actions that can be taken by Liechtenstein to improve its capacity to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, see: Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein,Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks in the Principality of Liechtenstein, Vaduz, July 2018, https://www.llv.li/files/sfiu/20180731-nra-zusammenfassung- en-final.pdf. 52 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

ASSUMPTION 2 How Europe really relates to the world

Today, in 2021, the EU approaches different driven by raison d’état. Each state develops as it parts of the world using the (EU-centric) con- endeavours to centralise ‘coercive’, ‘extractive’ centric circles model. With this model, the EU and ‘transgressive’ power, ending with the categorises states according to their proximity, capacity to make and break norms. At each of capacity to adopt European norms, economic these three stages, the state exploits the capac- performance and history of European coloni- ities of criminal groups, before quashing them. sation. The authors’ alternative government Meanwhile, societies use these three collusive capacity model, by contrast, categorises states phases to achieve more responsive and inclu- according to their degree of centralisation and sive government. They seek to translate coer- responsiveness: their ability to ensure justice cive power into justice and security, extractive and security (coercive functions), jobs and power into jobs and public services, and trans- services (extractive functions) and legitimacy gressive power into a social contract. How far (transgressive function). The five states -fea states have advanced in centralising power is tured in the scenarios can be classified accord- the best benchmark for classifying their devel- ing to both this model and the EU’s concentric opment needs and also the extent of their resort circles model, and they are a representative to collusion. sample of both. But the latter is vulnerable to blind spots, which the former reveals. The five virtual states featured in the scenarios can be easily classified according to the EU’s The concentric circles model reflects the EU’s ‘concentric circles’ model. But they also reflect assumption that development is driven pri- the authors’ assumptions: the five different marily by economic advancement. Because the stages of centralisation; different histories of EU’s internal market is (by its own measure) European colonisation; and problems of glob- the largest in the world, other countries have al connectivity. Each scenario is modelled on an incentive to seek integration. As they inte- real-world, observable phenomena and ima- grate, they will become more prosperous and gines how they would play out if the two logics their standards of governance will improve. were allowed to compete. At the very least, this Eventually, they will converge around the EU’s is a good way of highlighting the salient features advanced model of governance, squeezing of the EU’s model (as the authors understand out crime and collusion. Nearby states have a it); at best, it will convince readers of a different greater incentive to integrate, and presumably model. There is no proof in favour of the latter; greater capacity, so they are prioritised. This the only real test is the plausibility of the sce- economic approach is tempered only by his- narios. And, ideally, policymakers themselves tory: the EU affords special attention to - for are the ones who will think them through. mer colonies because of a sense of historical responsibility. Legend The governance capacity model, on the other hand, reflects the view that development is Oyoland

Snøland

Adriatica

The Betelnut Islands

Taqar CHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define its futures? 53

Differences between the two logics

In each of the five scenarios, the two logics di- verge in the following ways.

On the resort to collusion On the role of geography

The EU would normally expect richer coun- When it comes to development, the EU’s approach tries to govern without collusion, while brac- suggests it thinks of geography primarily in terms ing for signs of graft and corruption from of proximity to its internal market. It expects its less wealthy ones. Yet the evidence suggests closest neighbours to be the best at crime-fighting: that wealthier states are likely to collude with they are closely connected to the EU market and criminals to raise illicit capital and to bend therefore have both the capacity and the incentive international norms. This is because public to adopt its norms and standards ( , ). administration becomes more economically Our approach is different: geography -mat strenuous as states climb further up the de- ters when it comes to global connectivity – ac- velopment ladder, and the expectations be- cess to financial markets and natural resources. come greater: they need a means to finance States in the capital-intensive middle stag- expensive economic and welfare policies es of development may be unlucky when it ( , ). As for poorer states, they will comes to geography and so may turn to crime collude with criminal groups to harness their as a way of gaining access to new markets capacity for violence: they want to boost their ( ). And even advanced states may meet sud- coercive capacity to establish justice and secure den new geo-economic challenges, drawing them territoryProjected ( , ). income towardsDistance crime ( rom).

Projectedcategories income categories DistanceBrussels from Brussels 2030 projectedProete GNII per capitaapita (Atlastlas method),etho $ km

lo ioe THE BETELNUT ISLANDS loerile ioe OYOLAND ADRIATIKA ADRIATIKA pperile ioe SNØLAND OYOLAND TAQAR

TAQAR hih ioe

SNØLAND THE BETELNUT ISLANDS

Data: World Bank, 2030 54 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

On Europe’s colonial legacy

The EU seems to assume that the legacy of co- The scenarios also imagine that, by 2030, lonialism is weak public administration in for- the EU will have confected a more differen- mer colonies. But it can be argued instead that tiated version of its current model, but its it is more typically strong but unrepresentative overall logic will remain unchanged. The public administration.1 In less developed states, Brussels of 2030 still focuses its attention this translates into law enforcement structures on its closest neighbours and expects them that tend towards violence and are unaccount- to converge with EU market regulations able to the public ( , ), whereas in ( ). It also continues to emphasise Europe’s better developed states it may manifest in ex- shared historical obligations in Africa – even cessive resource extraction unsympathetic to to former British colonies ( ) – and with- marginal groups ( , ) or employment out regard to their distance or integration with and welfare policies that are ill adapted to local other economies ( ). This reflects the - un needs ( , ). The EU sees collusion as a changing logic of its market power, as well as a sign of regression and aims to stamp it out. But renewed readiness to leverage its economy for it can also be seen as a means for societies to the purposes of liberalism that is being articu- gain more representative administration. lated even today.2 Colonial ties EU international Colonial ties to Europe? EU international partnerships in 2030 Differencesto Europe between the EU’s Projectedpartnerships new iteration of the concentric in 2030 circles presentyesno and future models modelProjected iteration of the concentric circles model

EUROPEAN UNION SNØLAND ENLARGEMENT CANDIDATES Denmar driatia

OYOLAND NEIGHBOURHOOD United ingdom nland

yes THE BETELNUT ISLANDS DEVELOPMENT United ingdom Oyoland ermany TAQAR United ingdom PARTNERSHIP ADRIATIKA aar taly

SHARED he etelnut slands

1 Among the countries featured in the scenarios, only the Betelnut Islands deviate from this pattern. Because of the islands’ extremely hostile terrain, colonial rule was less invasive than elsewhere. Consequently, their public administration is both weak and unrepresentative. 2 Ursula von der Leyen, “Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session by Ursula von der Leyen, Candidate for President of the European Commission,” European Parliament, Brussels, July 16, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ presscorner/detail/it/speech_19_4230. CHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define its futures? 55

The only significant changes foreseen in the scenarios relate to money and geopolitics. By 2030, they imagine that the EU has declared wealthier aid recipients to be ‘development graduates’, introducing a new category of partnerships from which the EU also stands to benefit, and opening this up to other, wealthy states. These new partnerships are designed for ‘mutual development’ between the EU and the third country. Countries that currently have no development relations with the EU therefore may do in 2030 ( ). Meanwhile, in response to renewed geopolitical manoeuvring from the US and China, the EU has sharpened its focus on its near neighbours, adding a new Arctic dimension to its familiar Neighbourhood Policy ( ).

The second scenario takes place in Snøland, part of the future EU’s neighbourhood and therefore expected to have the incentive and capacity to adhere to European norms. Yet, as the scenario plays out, it turns out that Snøland is drawn to collusion as a means of achieving economic independence – not least from the European Union itself. The EU would not normally expect this kind of financial collusion from a wealthy partner state that benefits from substantial EU funding. But this can be expected and under- stood by the governance capacity model. This disparity makes Snøland a good place to test the plausibility of this model. 56 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

American-Snølandic firms, disregarding glob- SCENARIO 2 al labour and environmental rules. The Chinese call now for the EU to apply economic sanc- Post-modern slavery tions under its legal regime (EU Regulation on Labour Standards in Extreme Environments), in the Arctic concluded following a series of ‘slave labour’ scandals in Europe.1 There is only a month left before Snøland de- cides on independence, and the dreams of na- In the wake of the US mine closures, the Amer- tionalist prime minister Kristina Qitsualik look ican Miners’ Benevolent Association (AMBA) set to be realised. Private sector employment helped unemployed workers find jobs. But has never been higher, fuelled by demand for AMBA, it appears, has fallen prey to unscrupu- the country’s abundant supplies of rare earth lous mining interests both at home and abroad. elements (REEs), demand from the global tech The organisation secured its members tempo- sector and defence spending in the US and Chi- rary work visas in Snøland, but obliged them na. Qitsualik had swept to power in 2026 on a to sign confidentiality agreements due to their pro-development, pro-social democracy ticket ‘critical defence work’ on the spaceplanes. Once and has established independence as the ‘com- in Snøland, workers were taken by the consor- mon sense option’. It helps, of course, that she tia to remote mining towns, their contact with has found Snøland a wealthy patron: Washing- their families limited and their passports con- ton pays generously for exclusive access to its fiscated. European governments are shocked by resources and manufacturing capacity, used to the revelations. They too covet Snøland min- build a new generation of rapid-launch space- eral resources, but European extractive firms planes, and has lavished praise on its ‘strong are bound by EU labour regulations. This has labour standards in a fragile environment’. cost Europe dearly in the new ‘geopolitics of Snølanders, so long seen as trapped by their norms’2 – norms that have apparently been isolated geography, are finally enjoying their flouted by its competitors. The EU had believed geostrategic position. that nearby Snøland was one of the few places with a regulatory regime under which its firms Then a leading Chinese newspaper drops a could thrive. bombshell. It purports to have evidence that Snøland’s success story is just a front: min- How we got here: striving for ing companies operating in Snøland have been economic independence exploiting ‘indentured migrant labourers’ to scrape out resources from near-exhausted One of the key drivers of events in Snøland is mines. Most of the migrants, the newspaper the desire for independence. Under their con- claims, are Mexicans and Peruvians – but al- stitution, Snølanders have the right to replace most all worked in the US during the short-lived self-rule with independence whenever a ma- ‘REE-rush’ that followed China’s decision to jority of citizens so choose. Throughout the terminate REE exports in 2026. When pric- 2020s, polling showed that as many as two es eventually stabilised, the US mines became thirds of Snølanders supported independence; unprofitable. US consortia were keen to retain but, when respondents were told that inde- the miners’ skills and - according to the report pendence might mean a dip in working and - now employ them in Snøland, in joint-owned living standards, support plummeted to just

1 Emma Batha, “North Korea Sends ‘State-sponsored Slaves’ to Europe – Rights Group,” Reuters, July 6, 2016, https://www.reuters. com/article/northkorea-eu-slavery/north-korea-sends-state-sponsored-slaves-to-europe-rights-group-idUSL8N19N43L 2 Bjorn Fagersten and Tim Rühlig, “China’s Standard Power and its Geopolitical Implications for Europe,” UI Brief, 2/2019, March 2019, https://www.ui.se/butiken/uis-publikationer/ui-brief/2019/chinas-standard-power-and-its-geopolitical-implications- for-europe/. CHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define its futures? 57

Mineral resources resources in Snøland in Snøland

e EE e C P C

i C P PE i PE i PE EE EE

EE U r Ta

Data: Natural Earth, 2020; Exploitation of Greenlandic Natural Resources for the Benefit of Society, 2014

to build a high-tech manufacturing industry one fifth.3 Successive governments were torn around the capital, Nordhavn, but its stock of between seemingly incompatible pressures: potential miners was vanishingly small. The Snølandic voters wanted greater independence Large Scale Projects Act II created new migrant from Europe, but the country was ever more re- visa categories – ‘gold’, ‘zinc’ and ‘rare earth’ liant on European funding for job creation; they visas – designed to attract skilled temporary wanted greater parity with European working workers from abroad. and living standards, while fretting about the loss of their unique Inuit-Scandinavian culture; Relations with Brussels also heated up: and they called for more intensive extraction of Snølanders had their pick of international part- the country’s mineral resources, while also de- ners and felt confident about approaching the manding protection for workers. EU on their own terms. Pundits in Nordhavn envisaged crowning an independence vote with But then the Gordian knot appeared to untie active EU membership. They were enthused itself. As Snøland’s permafrost melted, glob- when the EU welcomed back independent Scot- al hype grew on the assumption that new REE land as part of its ‘arc of prosperity’ strategy for reserves were becoming accessible. Combined resource-rich Nordic countries,5 imagining the with high-tech manufacturing, these newly same for themselves.6 But in early 2026 the EU accessible resources would provide a potential instead pressed for a new ‘Northern Neighbour- source of revenue for maintaining the country’s hood Policy’ with ‘full political convergence’, Nordic welfare model, a means of diversifying rather than membership: was the EU interested employment away from the public sector,4 and only in accessing Snøland REEs? The US Secre- a way of sustaining the infrastructure needed to tary of State now spent three days in Snøland, link up its vast territory. The government in- wooing local politicians and snubbing EU dip- vested in education, training and infrastructure lomats. He said he shared Snøland’s sympathy

3 This echoes the pattern seen in Greenland, a self-governing autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. Kevin McGwin, “On the Question of Greenland Independence, There Are Fewer Moderates, Poll Finds,” Arctic Today, April 3, 2017, https://www.arctictoday.com/on-the-question-of-greenland-independence-moderates-still-a-plurality-are-in-the-decline- poll-finds/. 4 In 2019, public sector employment accounted for over 40% of employment in Snøland, rising to 60% among women. This echoes other states in the region. See: Statistics Greenland, Greenland in Figures 2019, Nuuk, May 2019, http://www.stat.gl/publ/en/ GF/2019/pdf/Greenland%20in%20Figures%202019.pdf. 5 On the idea of a Nordic ‘arc of prosperity’, see: Mary Hilson and Andrew Newby, “The Nordic Welfare Model in Scotland and Norway,” in John Bryden, Ottar Brox and Lesley Riddoch (eds), Northern Neighbours: Scotland and Norway Since 1800 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015). 6 Snøland entered the European Community as part a new member state in 1973. Following the introduction of home rule in 1979, a referendum on continued membership was held in 1982. 53% of Snølanders voted to leave, and that took effect in 1985. 58 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? for its unique human and natural environment, Passage’, a channel 100 km above the earth’s and explained that the US has developed strict surface and largely out of reach for China. The standards for work in its own harsh climate. US was prepared to pay over the odds for some That is when Snøland’s Eurosceptic opposition, ‘minerals’ in order to maintain the airbase, headed by Qitsualik, swept to power. whichThe was Northwest now designated the launch pad for its new spaceplanes. The tipping point: the weight of expectations Sea and Aerial

Despite public perceptions, the mining sector in ThePassages Northwest Sea and Aerial Passages Snøland has long been in decline: REEs are living up to their name. Reserves have been dwindling and extraction becoming more costly, with local workers reluctant to join the extractive sector. But Nordhavn actually increased its rhetoric around the economic viability of NORTHWEST AERIAL PASSAGE independence, under the weight of public expectation about a ‘resource super-cycle’. Public ii ser sea ie perceptions were bolstered by a slew of disin- etet formation online. The source remained elusive, but some suggested that it had come straight iti US irase from Washington. Slick adverts and online clips orha exaggerated Snøland’s mineral wealth and falsely suggested that US investment was now NORTHEAST more important than EU support. The US, with SEA PASSAGE thousands of immigrant miners having been NORTHWEST laid off since the collapse of its own- REEin SEA PASSAGE dustry, had seen an opportunity. It encouraged Data: Natural Earth, 2020 AMBA to begin a recruitment drive, matching migrant workers with new opportunities in As for Snøland’s system of ‘indentured migrant the Arctic. labour’, the US military was actually the driving force, taking its inspiration from the setup for The US itself was under no illusions about employing migrant labour on bases in the Mid- Snøland’s mineral potential. The US military dle East.7 AMBA was a ready vehicle: it started had carried out a hyperspectral survey on the out as a community organisation looking to government’s behalf and knew that there was help unemployed miners find work, but it had not much left to mine. But Snøland was still long since fallen prey to unscrupulous mining strategically useful, especially if independ- interests (and, some say, the CIA). Now it is ent. It is host to the Vigtig airbase, from which little more than a honey-trap for grey market the US once operated its early-warning mis- Latino labourers. Snølandic officials, acutely sile system against Russia. Lately, the airbase aware of the impact that mine closures would had regained its importance, thanks to a joint have on their independence project, appear to Russian-US defence initiative conceived more have turned a blind eye. Mines systematically or less explicitly at China’s expense. This in- under-reported emissions, lowered standards itiative gave the US and Russia joint control for the disposal of hazardous waste and post- of the entrance to the increasingly navigable poned their phase-out in spite of diminishing Northwest Passage and provided a key hub in financial returns and growing environmental what was now labelled the ‘Northwest Aerial costs. This was the hidden price of maintaining

7 Sarah Stillman, “Invisible Army,” New Yorker, June 6, 2011, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/06/06/the-invisible- army. CHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define its futures? 59 the high-tech manufacturing industry that employed the bulk of native Snølanders and fuelled the idea that independence was affordable.

The multilateral response: slavery or sharing? Government o Snøland aalaersist The US washes its hands of the whole mining enterprise, claiming that it was misled about working conditions. But, to widespread sur- The ‘legal’ slave trade prise, the Qitsualik administration mounts a stout defence. When the EU tries to organise European countries established colo- global sanctions through the International La- nies in ‘peripheral’ zones (Asia, Afri- bour Organisation (ILO), Brussels is accused of ca, Americas) extracting agricultural double standards. Europeans, Qitsualik con- goods and raw materials produced in tends, talk up a ‘global division of labour’, the labour-intensive plantations and mines. theory that each economy can grow wealthy if This economy relied on cheap labour and it specialises in its own niche products. But, if was severely disrupted by the abolition this were so, she says, Snøland should have ac- of the slave trade. An alternative system crued real advantages from its niche resource was developed to respond to the need for base. The reality of the global division of labour a cheap, servile labour force. It primar- is very different: the world is divided between a ily extracted workers from a supposed- wealthy core and a huge periphery. Core econ- ly overpopulated and turbulent China omies such as the US and Western Europe hog and transported them to colonies. The the white collar jobs, and they do so by ex- system essentially recreated the con- tracting resources – both mineral and human ditions of slavery but with a new legal – from the much poorer periphery. Snøland, veneer.1 Workers were forced into bond- she insists, will no longer accept this structural age as a way of repaying their debts to inequality. transporters – debts they would never be able to fully repay.2 We consider the When Qitsualik announces that the referen- AMBA system to be a continuation of this dum will go ahead, this prompts a dire pre- asymmetric system, and we have finally diction from the EU Commission president: established a means to remedy it. Snøland ‘will soon learn the limits of inde- Submission of the government of pendence in today’s world’. Her rhetoric enrag- Snøland to the ILO, 2030 es Snølanders, who respond well to Qitsualik’s new vision for development. Snøland, she says, will follow Europe’s example, its real example, that is: it will create wealth by extracting re- 1 Robert Irick, Ch’ing Policy toward the Coolie Trade, sources from its periphery, outsourcing labour 1847-1878 (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1977). to foreign workers. But Snøland will do so open- 2 Ong Jin Hui, “Chinese Indentured Labour: Coolies ly: it will extract wealth from its own periphery, and Colonies,” in R. Cohen (ed.), Cambridge Survey of World Migration (Cambridge: Cambridge rather than covertly taking resources from hid- University Press, 1995). den corners of the earth; and it will regularise AMBA workers instead of exploiting a murky pool of irregular migrants as wealthy governments do. The Commission president replies The flagship initiative of Qitsualik’s second ad- that Nordhavn is perpetuating the misery of the ministration is the ‘Indigenous Workers Mo- AMBA workers. The remark is ill-timed: it helps bility Initiative’ (IWMI), a scheme that twins carry the independence vote to 63.4%, and Qit- Snøland’s mines with indigenous communities sualik wins a comfortable majority in the elec- across the Americas and Eurasia, fostering mo- tions that follow. bility. This is a ‘global sharing economy based 60 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? on indigenous values’. Extraction is slowed, and working conditions are negotiated between communities. Latin American states recipro- cate, arguing that a mix of heavy global demand and tight international labour standards leaves them permanently at the mercy of foreign firms, which break the rules with- impu nity.8 The EU argues that the IWMI legitimises exploitative labour practices and exploits marginalised communities, and it pins its hopes on the ILO, a largely EU-funded organisation. But the ILO is a long-time supporter of indigenous rights,9 and it offers to broker a deal to bring the IWMI to Europe – to the High North, Celtic Fringe and the peripheral and maritime regions of Europe.

Hard-learned lessons: the EU’s resolve weakens

The ILO dispute is bruising for the EU, which immediately rejects an offer to act as an- ob server in the IWMI. But the incident does prompt some reflection. One EU member state dispatches a fact-finding mission to evaluate the IWMI. The results, it seems, are encouraging. It helps brings mobility and prosperity to marginalised communities. A pilot scheme is launched to help sending communities better negotiate working conditions in Snøland. The EU’s position is beginning to soften. It is well placed to cooperate with Nordhavn when Snøland’s permafrost melts, its volcanic activity increases and the Snølandic countryside starts spewing out valuable new molten metal compounds.

8 Cecilia Olivet, “Violations of Peoples’ Rights by European TNCs: The Case in Latin America Presented to the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal”, Transnational Institute, July 10, 2010, https://www.tni.org/es/node/11804. 9 In 1989, the ILO passed the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, the only international treaty on indigenous peoples currently open for ratification. See: Martin Oelz, Rishabh Kumar Dhir and Marek Harsdorff,Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change: From Victims to Change Agents through Decent Work (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2017), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/ groups/public/---dgreports/---gender/documents/publication/wcms_551189.pdf. CHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define its futures? 61

ASSUMPTION 3 How the EU really ticks

The five scenarios for 2030 portray a global or- > The EU has increased its demands on the der that has changed and an EU whose thinking nearest rings of countries ( , ) not has not kept up. This is not a prediction, but a because they are any longer benefiting from thought exercise designed to generate warn- the internal market but because the EU ings about the present. The scenarios imagine needs them to bend to its geo-economic in- a future where the European single market has terests. Other more vibrant economies have contracted and been overshadowed by econo- emerged in the Global South, East and West, mies to its west, east and south. More autocrat- and the EU must cross this ring of neigh- ic and effective powers have blunted the EU’s bours to access them. reputation for cutting-edge governance. Yet Brussels maintains the same EU-centric vision > The EU has been quick to declare wealthy Af- of the world and continues to picture itself sur- rican states ‘development graduates’, and rounded by circles of compliant countries. The has focused its efforts on the world’s poor- future EU still expects other countries to follow est countries. This is not because increased its (remembered) path to development. global prosperity has resolved its partners’ governance problems. Rather, the EU is keen The scenarios imagine the world of 2030 as a to cut costs ( ) and to forge partnerships multipolar order, one in which states are sub- of ‘mutual economic development’ ( ). ject to conflicting influences and allegiances. The EU is certainly a pole but an increasingly > The EU has renewed its post-colonial re- peripheral one. This leaves it at risk of becom- sponsibilities, even towards Britain’s ing an international ‘policy-taker’, losing its ex-colonies, and has tried to enforce a long-held power to set the rules. But, although multilateral order. But, despite appearanc- political and economic power is shifting away es, these moves actually reflect the EU’s from the EU, Brussels’ instinctive reaction is to embrace of power politics. The EU is try- double down on its existing strategies. The EU ing to crowd out competitors such as Chi- leverages trade and aid, incentives and sanc- na by using multilateral organisations tions, with the same loftiness as today. The ( ) and is trying to compete with only difference: it is acting not out of strength post-Brexit Britain in Asia and Africa ( ). but out of weakness. 2030 therefore represents a moment of truth In the five scenarios, the EU insists ever more for the EU and its ideas about effective policy. strongly that other states converge with its Nowhere is the shift of power away from the governance standards. Unlike today, it does so EU – and the EU’s continued expectations of not because of the vibrancy of its own econ- influence in spite of this – clearer than in our omy but rather its malaise. The EU finds it next scenario, set in the neighbouring Western too costly to adapt to new economic models Balkan state of Adriatika. And nowhere would emerging abroad, so it stands firm on its- in EU policy benefit more from a critical rethink sistence that others adopt its own regulatory from Brussels. approach ( , ). 62 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

it seems, has been buying organs from living SCENARIO 3 specimens and then marketing them as their much more expensive bioprinted equivalent. Organ counterfeiting in Across Europe there is media uproar, particu- the Western Balkans larly in Nordic countries that had just signed contracts with JB. The EU comes in for particular An elderly woman is admitted to a Swedish criticism for its ‘misguided efforts to integrate hospital just days after receiving a liver trans- a backward state into its regulatory regime’. In plant. She complains of fever and abdominal truth, Adriatika’s accession to the EU has been tenderness, the familiar symptoms of acute on hold for years, but the EU is home to a 1.5 organ rejection. Such emergencies were quite million-strong Adriatikan diaspora.2 Adriati- common in the days of human-to-human ka’s progress in converging with EU standards (H2H) transplants, but nowadays all European is undermined by the scandal, especially as a hospitals use bioprinted organs, meticulously cache of minutes from a meeting between JB’s engineered to match the patient’s genetic ma- owner Organuevo and the Adriatikan health terial.1 Odder still, the patient responds well to minister comes to light. And worse is to come: treatment with the same immunosuppressive in Adriatika, bloggers and non-governmental drugs that used to be prescribed following H2H organisations are investigating whether or- transplants. Suspicious, her doctor reports the gans have been sourced from ‘donors’ without incident to the national human tissue authori- their consent. There has been a spate of disap- ty, Vävnadsrådet. It turns out this is just the lat- pearances among marginalised communities est in a series of similar cases across the EU, and – Roma, Ashkali and rural Adriatikan migrants one name keeps cropping up: Jadranski Biom- to the capital, Lashkov – which have received jekësi (JB), the successful Adriatikan supplier of scant investigation by local police. bioprinted organs. How we got here: organ poverty This surge in post-operative complications following organ transplants has already attract- Ever since the invention of ‘bio-ink’, a printed the attention of the Global Observatory on able substance made of living cells,3 its bene- Transplants and Transfers (GOTT), which be- fits have been aggressively marketed to elderly lieves that JB has been dealing in ‘off-the-shelf’ populations. At first, strict global regulations organs – generic bioprints sold to patients as if meant that the technology was used only for they were custom-made for them. There has non-invasive procedures such as skin grafts. been a recent upsurge in post-operative com- But elderly populations in Western Europe, plications in hospitals that use organs provided North America and East Asia called for a more by both JB and its mother company, the Mex- risk-tolerant approach. And, soon, small-scale ican bioprinting giant Organuevo. But GOTT’s labs began popping up, exploiting 3D print- investigators go further. They allege that JB has ing technology to disrupt the pharma giants. not only been mis-selling generic bioprints but One such lab, Tijuana’s Organuevo, has grown that the Adriatikan company has also taken ad- rapidly by appealing to American healthcare vantage of the commercialisation of bioprint- tourists and taking advantage of Mexico’s ed organs to launder genuine human parts. JB, comparative lack of regulation to engage in

1 Chloe Kent, “The Future of Bioprinting: A New Frontier in Regenerative Healthcare,” Verdict Medical Devices, June 10, 2019, https://www.medicaldevice-network.com/features/future-of-3d-bioprinting/. 2 High levels of outward migration are common to all countries in the region. In 2018 alone, Eurostat estimated that around 230,000 people left the Western Balkans. See: Alida Vracic, “Can Europe help the Balkans keep its young emigrants?” Balkan Insight, October 7, 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/10/07/can-europe-help-the-balkans-keep-its-young-emigrants/. 3 Michael Pooler, “3D Printing Offers hope of Building Human Organs from Scratch,”Financial Times, December 9, 2019, https:// www.ft.com/content/eabb0e00-9755-11e9-98b9-e38c177b152f. CHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define its futures? 63 Organ transplantation in Europe Organ transplantation in Europe The prevalenceprealee ofo differentieret typestpes ofo organora transplantationtrasplatatio ini selectedselete EuropeanEropea statesstates

HUMANTOHUMAN GENERIC BESPOKE GNI H2H TRANSPLANTS BIOPRINTS BIOPRINTS per apita tlas etho rate per people rate per people rate per people

ila stro orrelatio ess ealth otries era etee I ae p or espoe rae a tpe ioprits ith Ital o trasplat a eeri ora Spai trasplats Sloeia Ceh epli reee Pola Croatia oaia Seria elars orth aeoia riatia

Data includes kidney, heart, liver, lung, pancreas and small bowel transplants. Data: World Bank, 2030; Global Observatory on Donation and Transplantation, 2030 experimental research into ‘regenerative med- them felt the gap acutely. Adriatikan pensioners icine’.4 The costs of bioprinting organs were took to the streets to protest against ‘the organ high even for the world’s wealthiest states. So donation lottery’. The demands of the elderly spare a thought for countries like Adriatika, weighed heavily on the government. In 2030, which have ‘grown old before they became rich’. 20% of the population was over 65 in almost all Adriatikan prefectures. Lashkov was always Poor countries like Adriatika began to pro- the exception, because it sapped working-age duce the new organs, and wealthier countries migration from other parts of the country. But, snapped them up. This reversed decades in even there, the elderly dependency ratio6 hit which transplant standards had been ‘levelling record highs.7 up’. For the previous three decades, the link between a state’s per capita income and access Adriatikan public healthcare had been improv- to transplants had finally been diminishing,5 ing.8 But these improvements were actually often because poorer communities had higher part of the problem: they accelerated the rate levels of social solidarity and organ donation. of demographic ageing. By concentrating on But the countries that now made use of bio- the early detection of chronic disease, Adriati- printed organs were rich, with a history of low ka helped elderly people live longer and wors- donor rates. And the poorer societies bordering ened its own demographic health. Moreover,

4 Damini Kunwar, “The Uncertainty of Regulating 3D Organ Printing,” The Regulatory Review, December 10, 2019, https://www. theregreview.org/2019/12/10/kunwar-uncertainty-regulating-3d-organ-printing/. 5 See: Conor Stewart, “Deceased Organ Donor Rate Both DBD and DCD in Europe 2017-2018,” Statista, October 15, 2019, https:// www.statista.com/statistics/537908/deceased-organ-donor-rate-in-europe; Sarah White, Richard Hirth, Beatriz Mahíllo et al. “The Global Diffusion of Organ Transplantation: Trends, Drivers and Policy Implications,”Bulletin of the World Health Organization, vol. 92, no. 11 (2014), pp. 826-35. 6 This metric is calculated based on the number of people aged over 65 for every 100 people of working age. 7 This echoes the situation elsewhere in the region. See, for example: Republic of Albania Institute of Statistics, Population Ageing: Situation of Elderly People in Albania, Tirana, November 25, 2015, http://www.instat.gov.al/media/3550/population_ageing_ situation_of_elderly_people_in_albania.pdf. 8 Improvements in primary healthcare have become a priority for other states in the region. For example, the Albanian government instituted a preventive check-up programme in 2017 to improve early detection of chronic diseases that require organ transplants. See: Improving the Role of Primary Health Care in Early Detection and Management of Non-communicable Diseases in Albania, WHO Europe, Copenhagen, May 15, 2017, www.euro.who.int/en/countries/albania/news/news/2017/05/improving-the-role-of- primary-health-care-in-early-detection-and-management-of-noncommunicable-diseases-in-albania. 64 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? pensioner expectations rose: bioprinting was its partnership with Organuevo was in jeop- now included as a metric in World Health Or- ardy: the Mexicans said they could find better ganization (WHO) league tables of national business conditions inside the EU itself. In a healthcare, and there were even calls to end last-ditch effort to save the partnership, the H2H transplants altogether. In an effort to health minister met privately with members of catch up, Adriatika’s health minister reached the company’s board. Even when the minutes of out to the emerging market leader, Organuevo. their meeting were leaked online, the conver- Organuevo was offered a generous ‘sweetheart sation was ambiguous. The minister promised deal’ to establish a new Adriatikan subsidiary to ‘turn Adriatika into an innovation-friendly in partnership with the state. The minister tri- regulatory environment’ if Organuevo contin- umphantly announced that the new company, ued to operate. As part of a new drive to im- Jadranski Biomjekësi, would ‘revolutionise prove nationwide economic cohesion, JB would both public and private healthcare in Adriatika, receive funds to ‘shift production to a number elevating it to world-beating standards’. But, at of smaller labs around Adriatika, under local the same time, she urged patience. rather than central oversight’.

The tipping point: diaspora demands Organuevo saw an opportunity: its other international operations were struggling with a It was Adriatika’s young overseas population growing roster of regulatory restrictions. The that brought matters to a head. The govern- company demanded that the Adriatikan regula- ment had attracted criticism with a series of tions be hammered out directly between Lash- flat-footed healthcare announcements: just kov and Organuevo’s headquarters in Tijuana. days after announcing the bioprinting partner- Perhaps for this reason, they were not properly ship with Organuevo, the health minister began communicated abroad. When the scandal hit, a national campaign to promote the old system surgeons in the EU could honestly claim that of organ donation. This mixed messaging pro- they were unaware that JB had been supplying voked a strong reaction from diaspora associ- them with organs produced under a divergent ations, vocal critics of a government that they set of standards. But it is interesting that many felt had let them down both at home and in their private medical firms in the EU’s poorer regions host countries. A series of diaspora-funded ad- concluded supply agreements with JB without verts appeared across social media, criticising ever asking why the price was so low. They also the country’s political elite who, they said, appear to have altered the way they stored JB themselves travelled abroad for healthcare. organs, a sign that they were aware that they The government’s response was defensive. The had been given generic bioprints, less durable health minister pointedly asked why, if the di- than their bespoke equivalent. JB’s board con- aspora was so concerned about the elderly, they tinued to maintain that the change had been did not return to their families in Adriatika. And communicated. she argued that real Adriatikans are a “hardy people, who only go to the doctor when car- The multilateral response: ried there”.9 innovation or negligence?

Despite the bravado, the Adriatikan govern- Following a series of global pandemics in the ment was conscious that its ever less hardy early 2020s, the EU has gained powers in the domestic population was losing patience. Adri- field of healthcare. Following the Adriatika atikan GNI was locked into a downward spiral, scandal it asserts itself at the WHO, pushing and Lashkov was forced to hike up taxes on the for greater regulation of bioprinting, as well as country’s few profitable companies. Suddenly, restrictions on H2H transplants. Polling shows

9 The Albanian health ministry made a similar claim in 2019. See: Arne Björnberg and Ann Yung Phang, Euro Health Consumer Index 2018, Health Consumer Powerhouse, February 25, 2019, https://healthpowerhouse.com/media/EHCI-2018/EHCI-2018-report. pdf. Government o Snøland aalaersist

CHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define its futures? 65 that EU consumers have clear preferences: H2H transplants are ‘backward and outmoded’. Despite a healthy rate of H2H donations, Adriatika is ranked last by the European Health Consumer Index. Yet, in large swathes of the world, there is sympathy for the argument that practices such as H2H transplants and generic Republic o Adriatika bioprints are being proscribed by international Република Јадранска policymakers based on little more than consumer taste. Adriatikans are experiencing what Human tissue harvesting in Europe one local social scientist describes as ‘normative flux’. They had been proud of the spectac- Medical researchers in Western Eu- ular increase in rates and standards of organ rope relied on human dissection into donation over the last decade, but now they are the modern era – and this was because told to be embarrassed by it. Enlightenment values started to win out against religious taboos. In the ear- But the Adriatikan government recognises that, ly days, only the bodies of convicted in every crisis, there is an opportunity. And criminals were eligible. But supply was this normative crisis is no different. It creates unable to meet demand.1 And it was not a good environment in which to address taboos long before enterprising body snatchers and forge new standards – even organ harvest- turned to murder as a way of quickly and ing. The country has little to lose by taking its easily procuring bodies to sell to medical own path. It is an open secret that the EU acces- professionals. We note that governments sion process is going nowhere and that Western were unwilling to close loopholes that European capitals are content with the current left the legality of selling bodies ambigu- advantages of ‘modular integration’ between ous, and few questions were asked about the EU and Western Balkan states.10 Without the provenance of corpses.2 Govern- admitting any wrongdoing, the health minis- ments cracked down on body snatching ter holds that market forces rather than mor- only when they had identified a seem- al weaknesses are to blame. She compares the ingly inexhaustible alternative source mass emigration of young Adriatikan workers of bodies: the poor.3 In effect, they had to an ‘organ-harvesting campaign from our out-competed the body snatchers. We wealthier neighbours’. And she reminds Euro- have found no evidence of body snatch- peans that they in the past have had to respond ing in Adriatika, and we certainly would to the commercialisation of human bodies. Or, not condone it; but we do highlight the as the minister put it, ‘Europe has some skele- precedent set by states that seek to apply tons in its closet.’ their rules to us.

As the EU pursues stricter regulation of bio- Submission to WHO from printing and organ transfer through the WHO, the Republic of Adriatika, 2030 Adriatika looks elsewhere for partners. The country begins to decouple from the EU, promoting its own alternative formula for medical standardisation. The US, a harsh critic of 1 Ruth Richardson, “Human Dissection and Organ Donation: A Historical and Social Background,” the WHO since the early 2020s, is quick to back Mortality: Promoting the Interdisciplinary Study of Death and Dying, vol. 11, no. 2 (2006), pp. 155-6. Adriatikan objections. But Adriatika is seeking 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., pp. 160-2.

10 Andreas Maurer and Max Haerder, “Alternatives to Full Membership of the EU,” in Johannes Varwick and Kai Olaf Lang (eds), European Neighbourhood Policy: Challenges for the EU Policy Towards the New Neighbours (Opladen: Barbara Budrich Verlag, 2007), pp. 197-218. 66 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? allies in countries experiencing similar ‘growing pains’ to itself. JB diverts its generic bioprint operations first to the Balkans, Eastern Europe and North Africa, then around the In- dian Ocean, Latin America and southern Africa. Critics inside the EU expect the Adriatikan elite to hoard their ill-gotten gains. And, while JB shareholders – many of whom are connected to the government – do receive generous rewards, the EU is surprised to see that the company’s profits are largely reinvested in the Adriatikan healthcare system, as well as in universities, research institutes, hospitals and clinics in Adriatika and the wider region.

Hard-learned lessons: EU strategists begin to reconsider

The EU’s push for greater regulation through the WHO ends in impasse when the Expert Ad- visory Committee on Biotechnology calls on the Adriatikan health ministry to submit evidence in spite of EU objections. There is a growing sense that the EU’s ability to unilaterally set international norms is long gone, even in its own neighbourhood. A small group of policy strategists float the idea that the EU’s tight embrace of its neighbours might in fact be what is pushing them away; a more sympathetic approach to ‘outmoded’ and ‘divergent’ practices could help them develop along broadly European lines, rather than diverging entirely. CHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define its futures? 67

these amount to a progression from collusion ASSUMPTION 4 to crime-fighting. But we have also warned that each of the three phases involves a renewed How the EU can really bout of collusion. In the scenarios, the future EU misreads this repeated collusion as backsliding solve problems and responds with corrective policies such as economic sanctions ( ), diplomatic censure The five scenarios were designed to highlight ( , ) and disengagement ( ). If the the scope for positive engagement with col- EU cracks down on collusion rather than looking lusive states – and the risks of failure. If the for viable alternatives, its fears of state capture EU misreads its partners’ motivations, it risks and collapse are likely to become self-fulfilling isolating itself, missing opportunities to affect prophecies. positive outcomes and pushing states further into the grasp of criminal groups. The proper identification of opportunities is therefore vi- Neo-imperialism or sympathetic tal. This exercise reveals at least three potential areas of misunderstanding. engagement?

In the scenarios, the EU trusts a mix of invest- Divergence or convergence? ment and economic sanctions to keep states on the straight and narrow: it believes that economic tools transcend cultural specificities, The scenarios imagine that the EU contin- thus overcoming prejudices in Europe that some ues to cleave to the idea that its own (re- groups are just ‘backward’. When China tries to membered) path to development provides a engage with local groups in the Gulf of Guinea, precedent for others to follow. According- the EU dismisses this as ‘neo-orientalism’ (see ly, it projects its own policies onto states that p. 9). The scenarios imagine a future China that have sufficient law enforcement capacities is better at problem-solving, in part because it to follow its lead and crack down on crime recognises the logic of raison d’état and the need ( , , ). Each scenario includes a for security and jobs. China’s actions continue box to explain how states are indeed follow- to reflect Chinese interests rather than the spe- ing Europe’s path to statehood; but they do so cific notion of state-building explored here. But by copying its historical patterns of collusion. dismissing them out of hand will cause Brussels Evidently this does not mean that they will au- to overlook valuable opportunities. tomatically converge with EU policy – but nor should this be the EU’s first priority. Success- In our next scenario, set in the Betelnut Islands ful processes of state-building will provide in the South Pacific, these lessons begin to positive new models, from which the EU itself make their way into the EU’s response. Far from might also draw inspiration. Brussels, the EU takes an uncharacteristically permissive approach to ‘hybrid’ state-building. And China, acting closer to home, is less per- Regression or progress? missive of local solutions than it has been far away in the Gulf of Guinea. Yet when political In earlier steps, three cycles of collusion were pressure mounts, the EU is unwilling to stand identified that allow states to progressively fulfil by its approach. Here is another missed oppor- their state-building goals and societies to gain tunity – but a tentative sign that the EU’s ap- more inclusive governance. Taken together, proach might be beginning to change. 68 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

on a deal that would have allowed Australia to SCENARIO 4 start offshore asylum processing on Sanum.4 The Betelnut Islands’ show of assertiveness A narco-state by choice was backed by an odd coalition: on one side, an authoritarian Chinese government, keen to in the South Pacific project its power into Australia’s backyard;5 on the other, European development and hu- It is dusk, the sky is darkening and a riot breaks manitarian agencies, angered by Australia’s out in the overcrowded Moubana jail on the neglect of human rights. But, when China sub- fringes of Birmarck, capital of the Betelnut Is- sequently began pushing the Islands to repur- lands. Inmates go on the rampage, slaughtering pose the Australian-built facilities on Sunam as unarmed guards,1 razing buildings and ripping a judicial processing centre, the coalition broke down perimeter fencing. The trigger? A rumour down. Now, European donors are threatening to that inmates will soon be transferred to Sunam, withdraw aid, while China remains set on this a remote island hundreds of kilometres from new ‘offshore model’ of judicial effectiveness. shore.2 For the prisoners this spells eternal banishment: picked up seemingly at random When he finally appears outside his ministry in from Bismarck’s gang-ridden slums, most will downtown Bismarck, the justice minister looks spend years awaiting trial in the gridlocked ju- as if he has not slept. As dawn broke, so too did a dicial system.3 The government cannot pub- new scandal: an Australian news group claimed licly admit the continued failings in its justice to have obtained a copy of a written agreement system and release the falsely imprisoned be- between the government and the powerful Kips cause international aid donors have made ju- Kaboni drugs cartel.6 The ‘Good Friday Truce’, dicial integrity a condition of support. So they as it has been dubbed, secured the cartel’s help are simply being moved out of sight and out in ending the riots in the city’s suburban slums. of mind. That night several hundred detainees In return, the Kips Kaboni will formally gain escape, seeping back to the outskirts of Bis- access to the Betelnut Islands’ port facilities for marck, where they are taken in by family and unspecified purposes. The beleaguered minis- ethnic kin. ter defends the deal for ‘onshore hybrid justice’: ‘Half of our money comes from Western For the next three nights, as darkness falls, po- donors who want preventive justice and pris- lice clash with youths and the city burns at the oner rehabilitation. The other half comes from edges. The government appeals to Australia for China, who want us to send suspects away and help but is snubbed by its traditional partner. throw away the key.’ He pauses, regaining his Relations between the two countries have been composure: ‘We made a choice to go our own strained ever since the Betelnut Islands reneged way – and to find the means to make it happen.’

1 Prisons with unarmed guards are not uncommon in the region. “Inside the world’s toughest prisons”: David McConnell, “Papua New Guinea: The Breakout Prison,” Netflix, 2018. 2 The 2019 Acarigua prison riot in Venezuela was also prompted by the threat of inmates being relocated away from their families. See: Mariangel Moro, “Twenty-nine Detainees Killed in Venezuela Police Station Cellblock Riot,” Reuters, May 25, 2019, https:// uk.reuters.com/article/uk-venezuela-politics-prison-idUKKCN1SU2I4. 3 In 2018, when its inmate population was just 700, the Boumana prison in Papua New Guinea held prisoners who had already been in pre-trial detention for two years, See: “Papua New Guinea: The Breakout Prison”, Op. cit. 4 This echoes the case of Manus Island in Papua New Guinea, which was used by Australia as a regional processing centre for asylum seekers until 2016, when this was declared unconstitutional by the Papua New Guinea Supreme Court. See: Eric Tlozek, “PNG’s Supreme Court Rules Detention of Asylum Seekers on Manus Island Is Illegal,” ABC News, April 26, 2016, https://www.abc.net.au/ news/2016-04-26/png-court-rules-asylum-seeker-detention-manus-island-illegal/7360078. 5 Malcolm Davis, “China’s Interest in Manus Island,” Australian Naval Institute, September 29, 2018, https://navalinstitute.com. au/chinas-interest-in-manus-island/. 6 The Kips Kaboni is a notorious Papua New Guinean raskol gang that has established a presence in the Betelnut Islands. Its name is Tok Pisin for ‘Scarred Devils’. See: Stephen Dupont, Raskols: The Gangs of Papua New Guinea (Brooklyn, NY: PowerHouse Books, 2012). CHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define its futures? 69

Demographics of the Betelnut o Islands the Betelnut Islands

POPULATION RURAL VS URBAN BISMARCK POPULATION DISTRIBUTION POPULATION GROWTH ae rop thosas thosas peret 7 Female Male

o ti la 80−89 p po Urban a r population o 70−79 e a et r pe 60−69 50−59

40−49

30−39 20−29

10−19

Rural population 0−9 years 2010− 2015− 2020− 2025− 2030−

Data: UNDESA, 2030

and battered the northern coast of New Corn- How we got here: growth 8 without development wall, things only got worse. Fishermen were obliged to go out in extreme weather, causing loss of vessels and lives; villagers and farmers The Betelnut Islands have experienced ex- began to rely on having large families to sus- tremely rapid urbanisation. Their sprawling tain themselves. Youngsters were irritated by urban agglomerations are the messy residue the patriarchal structures of provincial life, and of environmental, economic and demograph- young male breadwinners moved to the cities ic shifts. For a decade now, the country’s for- in unprecedented numbers in search of a better merly productive agricultural sector has been life. Slums have sprung up around large inland ravaged by flooding, as year-round heavy resource extraction projects and the ports that rainfall became the norm.7 And when Cyclone serve them, notably the capital, Bismarck. Buri tore through the island of New Shetland

7 Australian Bureau of Meteorology and Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, “Climate Variability, Extremes and Change in the Western Tropical Pacific”,New Science and Updated Country Reports, Melbourne, 2014. 8 While cyclones are unlikely to be more frequent in the future, they will be more intense. See: “Current and Future Climate of Papua New Guinea,” Pacific Climate Change Science Programme, 2011, https://www.pacificclimatechangescience.org/wp-content/ uploads/2013/06/14_PCCSP_PNG_8pp.pdf. 70 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

Farmers were reduced to doing unproductive 9 The tipping point: moral work such as selling betelnuts at roadside breakdown in Bismarck stalls, day-labouring on construction sites and housekeeping in the sprawling cities. The for- Despite a recruitment campaign, the Royal mal economy now accounted for just 15% of all Betelnut Islands Constabulary was increasing- economic activity.10 Authority collapsed as the ly dwarfed by private security contractors. The government concentrated its scarce tax reve- Islands’ police force could not simply hand over nue on the construction of a new administrative policing to these international contractors. But capital, which it hoped would give internation- the lack of coordination between these secu- al investors a more attractive bolthole than rity forces led to a heavy duplication of efforts crime-ridden Bismarck. After all, what formal in the city centre, meaning the police were ab- economy there was relied on these outside in- sent from the settlements, except for lightning vestors, and they were hungry for the Islands’ raids, where heavily armed forces rounded up resources. But that meant the state was unable suspected gang members with little or no evi- to find the money for infrastructure in the cur- dence. The justice minister repeatedly defended rent capital city with its rapidly growing skirt of this practice: these young men are trouble, full settlements. Over the past decades, the Betel- stop. They have disobeyed their parents to leave nut Islands had developed one of the world’s their homes in the countryside, often stealing least diversified economies and had come to family money to do so, and they have cut them- suffer from ‘Dutch disease’, relying heavily on selves adrift from the authority of their elders. international demand for its resources.11 Without the social bonds of village life, they have turned to raskolism, triggering a complete In the centre of Bismarck, house prices and moral breakdown in the capital. rents skyrocketed as a result of an influx of Chi- nese mining companies, not to mention the in- Raskol gangs profited from the fact that- Bis ternational development agencies that arrived marck’s slum-urbs were spreading closer to in the wake of Cyclone Buri. East Asian mining connective infrastructures – ports and airports firms and Western non-governmental -organ – and moving further from state control. Small isations (NGOs) demanded strict protection kitchen labs started to appear in the slums, for their workers, sapping resources from the producing stimulant drugs from legal chem- state, which was forced to foot the bill for for- ical precursors shipped in undeclared from eign private security. Gangs of youths known Australia. Stimulants were then transported to as raskols were now free to engage in criminal illicit markets such as China. The chronically economies such as narcotics and prostitution, understaffed and under-resourced Royal Betel- operating with impunity in the informal settle- nut Islands Defence Force was unable to effec- ments on the outskirts. Unable to keep up with tively disrupt the flows of chemicals and drugs rent inflation in the city, a growing section of in and out of the country, and poor relations Bismarck’s urban middle class was also forced with Australia weakened international coordi- out into the settlements. As these ‘slum-urbs’ nation along the two states’ maritime borders. swelled, the rule of law deteriorated dramati- The hazardous waste produced as a by-product cally. Interpersonal violence became endemic of the drug labs in the slums and even inside and frequently went unpunished, and the city’s prisons was disposed of in the sewers, sea and police regarded the settlements as no-go zones. settlements around Bismarck.

9 The betelnut, from which the islands take their name, is a mild stimulant that is ubiquitous in the Southern Pacific, as well as parts of South and South East Asia. 10 Such low levels of licit economic activity are not unheard of in the region. See: “The Report: Papua New Guinea 2012,” Oxford Business Group, 2012, https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/papua-new-guinea-2012. 11 This is already the case elsewhere in the region, notably in Papua New Guinea. See: Satish Chand and Theodore Levantis, “Dutch Disease and the Crime Epidemic: An Investigation of the Mineral Boom in Papua New Guinea,” Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, vol. 44, no. 1 (2000), pp. 129-46. Republic o Adriatika Република Јадранска

CHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define its futures? 71

As the crisis sharpened, the government sought some quick wins. One was to stamp out the Delegation o the informal justice system that had developed European Union to the Betelnut Islands around the slum-urbs. Middle-class communities seeking property rights and retribution had turned to komitis of local lidamen as an informal Facing up to Europe’s precedent justice mechanism.12 More often than not, the members of these komitis were associated with European states have a history of drugs gangs and they administered rough jus- co-opting criminal elements into their tice, enforced by rag-tag gangs of youths kept state apparatus – with some success, it loyal through a mixture of drugs and cash. The must be said. Newly formed nation states main punishment handed down by these komi- were barely present in their peripheries tis was the payment of compensation, as was in the beginning, much as in the Betel- customary among Betelnut Islander tribes. But nut Islands today.1 Into this gap stepped compensation payments were unregulated, criminal gangs, which appropriated dis- leaving the gangs free to skim money off the pute mediation and retribution. They top. The project was badly received: Western were able to play this role because they NGOs called for long-term programmes of ed- were more sensitive to local social norms ucation and prevention based on methods tried and concepts of justice than the state.2 and tested in the West; China demanded imme- Despite their criminal activities, these diate emphasis on counter-trafficking and law gangs enjoyed significant local legiti- enforcement. macy. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, state institutions The multilateral response: realpolitik, came to terms with this hybrid govern- regression or restitution? ance of the periphery and delegated to them the maintenance of public order in When the Good Friday Truce comes to light, territories under their control. In return, the government says it is only following best the state tolerated their criminal activ- practices: the EU’s overseas diplomatic mis- ities.3 Over time, the state co-opted the sions have been granted permission by Brussels criminals and then, when it was strong to ‘adapt European programming standards to enough, eradicated their presence. the specificities of the locality’. Left to its own Diplomatic despatch from the EU devices by a largely disinterested Brussels, the Ambassador to the Betelnut Islands, 2030 EU delegation to the Betelnut Islands launched one such experimental new project. It sent development specialists out to the countryside to study the local justice system used in the vil- 1 Louise Shelley, “Mafia and the Italian State: lages with a view to adapting this system to the The Historical Roots of the Current Crisis,” Sociological Forum, vol. 9, no. 4 (1994), pp. 661- country’s urban slums. The delegation recog- 72. nised that the informal governance structure in 2 John Lea and Kevin Stenson, “Security, Sovereignty, and Non-state Governance ‘From the slum-urbs was an attempt to replicate this Below’,” Canadian Journal of Law and Society, vol. system and would be improved if formalised.13 22, no. 2 (2007), pp. 9-27. 3 Roy Godson, “The Political-Criminal Nexus and Global Security” in R. Godson (ed.) Menace to Society: Political-Criminal Collaboration Around the World (New York: Routledge, 2017).

12 These patterns can be observed elsewhere in the region. See: Sinclair Dinnen, Abby Mcleod and Gordon Peake, “Police-building in Weak States: Australian Approaches in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands,” Civil Wars, vol. 8, no. 2 (2006), pp. 87-108. 13 Similar developments have occurred in Papua New Guinea. See: David Craig and Doug Porter, “Safety and Security at the Edges of the State: Local Regulation in Papua New Guinea’s Urban Settlements,” Justice for the Poor Research Report, The World Bank Group, Washington, DC, June 2018, p. 7. 72 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

Under EU guidance, the slum-urban strongmen of trust in state institutions. If properly sup- that made up the komitis were offered a wage ported, he argues, the extension of this ap- and allowed to settle disputes (particularly over proach under the Truce could expand its land ownership) that were simply not being benefits. In China, the state media holds up the brought to the formal courts. ambassador’s remarks as yet another example of European ‘orientalism’. And yet, the ambas- This would have gone largely unnoticed by sador remarks, China itself has taken much the Brussels itself, had it not been politicised. In same ‘hybrid approach’ for the past five years the wake of the Good Friday Truce, and the on- in the Gulf of Guinea – and rather successfully slaught of criticism from both China and the at that. He recalls the debate five years earli- Western NGOs, the Betelnut Islands govern- er, when the EU tried to introduce the WAASP ment underlines again and again the inspira- in the region only to be comprehensively out- tion for its deal with the cartels: its cooperation flanked by a Chinese programme, and argues with the EU delegation. The Truce simply ex- that the situation in the Betelnut Islands mir- tends the kind of ‘hybrid’ approach to justice, rors that incident. which apparently counts as best practice in Eu- rope. Indeed, the criminals the justice minister Hard-learned lessons: the EU has now reached out to are the very same komiti probes a new approach members that were co-opted into the justice sector under EU guidance. Brussels denies any The ambassador is recalled as a gesture of equivalence. The EU project was designed to goodwill towards Beijing. But, before leaving, empower local communities and urban mid- he sends Brussels a final diplomatic dispatch, dle classes, whereas the country’s government making the case that not only the EU’s hybrid has empowered a band of violent thugs. The EU justice programme but even the Good Friday says it would prefer the government to return Truce mirrors Europe’s own historical devel- to earlier attempts to stamp out the rough jus- opment. His unconventional approach seems to tice administered by komitis. pique the interest of policymakers in Brussels. They are aware that the Chinese approach in the The EU ambassador to the Betelnut Islands Gulf of Guinea has brought improvements. And goes off script. He argues that what was special recent events in Oyoland, Snøland and Adriati- about the programme he oversaw was that it ka show that the EU’s usual approach to crime, did indeed bring criminals gangs into the fold. collusion and development needs updating. The The result was a marked improvement in law European Commission sets up an expert work- enforcement in the settlements, a reduction in ing group to take a closer look. summary detentions and a gradual restoration CHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define its futures? 73

geography. But geography – or, more properly, A NEW APPROACH geo-economics – is highly varied: it confers uneven advantages on different states at differ- The key to resolving state-crime relations lies ent times. It allows some states to forge ahead in better understanding when and why states with state-building without resort to collusion. turn to criminals and in offering viable alterna- If the EU wishes to offer a viable alternative to tives accordingly. The scenarios flesh out an al- collusion, it must take account of the lottery of ternative explanation and a possible corrective global connectivity. – a two-part reconceptualisation of the relationship between states, crime and develop- These two possible correctives are illustrat- ment that might help the EU better understand ed in the final scenario, which unfolds -in ar its partners’ needs. guably the most highly developed of our five states. The Emirate of Taqar’s f the EU wishes development has – until 2030 – The internal context been relatively smooth because I to offer a viable of favourable geo-economic alternative to conditions, namely the im- The orthodox liberal approach portance of oil and natural gas to global development trusts collusion, it must to the global economy. Yet in to wealth maximisation and take account of the 2030, as it embarks on the final a market economy to ensure lottery of global stage of state-building under ‘catch-up’ to Western standards. connectivity. our scheme, Taqar is struggling The continued growth of crime to cope with rapidly changing and collusion is an aberration geo-economic conditions: a in this model. The governance capacity model global economy that is less reliant on fossil fu- provides an alternative way of understanding els, combined with increasingly onerous envi- states’ motivations for colluding with criminal ronmental conditions. This prompts it to turn actors, and acknowledges that some instanc- to collusion as a means of transgression from es of collusion may have positive motivations. restrictive international norms. This scheme defines three distinct stages of national development when different types of This final step of state-building – the search collusion are conducive to state-building and, for legitimacy for a distinctive model of gov- therefore, when they are not. This model could ernance- is arguably the biggest challenge to help the EU to distinguish between collusive EU engagement as it poses a challenge to Eu- and corrupt states and to avoid ill-conceived rope’s sense of its normative power and univer- policies of constraint with counterproduc- sal values. Yet, by the time the events in Taqar tive effects. come about, the EU has had time to reassess its approach to state-building and has adopted a more nuanced approach to crime-state collu- The global context sion. It is a rather different EU that responds to the Taqar crisis: one that is less Eurocentric, The EU recognises the importance of geog- more sympathetic to states’ needs and better raphy and history to development, but it does able to identify alternatives to draw them away so in a compressed way. It focuses the bulk of from criminality. This has not, however, en- its efforts on Eastern Europe and the Southern tailed any weakening of the EU’s commitment Mediterranean because they are nearby. Fur- to its four core principles, simply a reinterpre- ther afield, it groups together Europe’s- for tation of them. mer colonies, irrespective of their particular 74 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

man unfurls page after page: maps, charts and SCENARIO 5 finally a logo – a chain of fiery Olympic rings. In four years’ time, Taqar will host the inaugu- The Olympics of Crime ral Arid Olympics: if there is still to be a winter games, suitable only for the few remaining cold in the Middle East climates, it is appropriate to have a games for other climates as well. The Emir of Taqar is making what sounds like a routine address to the UN Climate Change The revelation that Taqari athletes won Olym- Conference. As always, he lists Taqar’s en- pic medals through ‘gene doping’ makes global vironmentalist credentials: big emission re- headlines. But this, and indeed the Emir’s whole ductions, ambitious development projects, Olympic vision, is just a side show. His plan is to eye-wateringly expensive research. And, as al- enhance not just athletes but the Taqari people ways, he moves on to the usual justifications for as a whole. Genome editing will make Taqaris Taqar’s failings: it is a country on the front line resilient to climate change, offering an alter- of climate change; sustainability is a battle for native to the potentially catastrophic side ef- survival; and certain measures are easy to con- fects of interventions such as geoengineering.1 demn from the temperate North, not least out- But more importantly, it will reduce their reli- door air conditioning. Then he emits a nervous ance on energy-exhaustive technologies such cough. He is sure his fellow world leaders will as outdoor air conditioning, putting an end understand: he is obliged to balance the obliga- to suggestions that the country should be de- tions of global citizenship with his duty of care populated because its harsh climate makes life to the Taqari people. Consequently, the Emir there too energy inefficient. The WHO’s prohi- announces, his government has been com- bition of genome enhancement2 stands in his pelled to look for unconventional solutions. way, but he has been advised that he should engage in ‘forum-shopping’:3 he can get around Then he drops the two words that start the this blanket prohibition in one international storm: genetic enhancement. We have already organisation if he can just force a change in begun experimenting, he says, and the world the rules in another. Taqar has set its sights on has cheered us on. At the last summer Olym- sports governance. pics, the Taqari team excelled, equalling the national medal haul over all previous Olympics How we got here: climate crisis in the Gulf (six). The secret of its success: all of the medal winners had been genome-edited. Moreover, Already one of the hottest places in the had his team been competing under extreme world, the Persian Gulf had been doubly weather conditions, its performance would punished by climate change. Its geograph- have been even more pronounced. The Emir ical peculiarities4 amplified the effects, is joined on stage by a diminutive man with a pushing temperatures up at a rate not seen flipchart. As the Emir rolls out his vision, the outside the Arctic.5 Low-lying coastal

1 Christopher Trisos, Giuseppe Amatulli, Jessica Gurevitch et al., “Potentially Dangerous Consequences for Biodiversity of Solar Geoengineering Implementation and Termination,” Nature Ecology & Evolution, vol. 2 (2018) pp. 475-82. 2 Based on the direction of current debates around genome editing, we imagine a future WHO Framework Convention on Human Genome Editing. This convention bans the use of genome editing for non-therapeutic means (i.e. enhancement rather than treatment). It also bans the editing of human germline cells, i.e. cells such as eggs, sperm and embryos, which pass on their characteristics to future generations. 3 Stephanie Hofmann, “The Politics of Overlapping Organizations,” Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 26, no. 6 (2019), pp. 883- 905. 4 These include the shallow water of the Persian Gulf and the intense sun and cloudless sky. See: David Chandler, “Study: Persian Gulf Could Experience Deadly Heat,” MIT News Office, October 26, 2015, http://news.mit.edu/2015/study-persian-gulf-deadly- heat-1026. 5 Kristin Houser, “Qatar Is Air Conditioning the Outdoors to Battle 120-Degree Heat,” Futurism, October 24, 2019, https://futurism. com/qatar-air-conditioning-outdoors-battle-heat. CHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define its futures? 75 Gul temperatures CoieGulf temperatures easre o teperatre a hiit or eree o iess Combined measure of temperature and humidity, or degree of ‘mugginess’

AVERAGE DAILY MAXIMUM AVERAGE DAILY MAXIMUM

Mina’ Al Salam Mina’ Al Salam

Data: Data: MIT, 2015 areas now spent much of the year under water, off Taqar’s attempt to brand itself as a hospi- and massive sand and dust storms known as table country: while the international media haboobs swept across the country.6 Desertifica- lauded Taqaris’ hospitality, they described the tion caused respiratory problems among chil- climate as ‘unbearable.’ Upcoming sporting dren, asthma sufferers and the elderly.7 People events were relocated, and Taqar was forced to sought shelter in the air-conditioned cities, abandon a bid for the Olympics, despite having causing ‘urban heat islands’. Thermal stress pumped millions of dollars into the Interna- and poor air quality made heat exhaustion a tional Olympic Committee (IOC). A bid to re- fact of life: suffering an attack of heat stroke house World Athletics (formerly known as the in Taqar was now as common as getting a cold IAAF) and the International Federation of As- in Europe. sociation Football (FIFA) in the Gulf fell flat.

The capital, Mina’ Al-Salam, had been particu- Skilled foreigners and wealthy locals were the larly hard hit, as extreme heat from the desert first to leave, unwilling to endure increasing- interior combined with the near-unbearable ly hostile conditions. This hit all sectors of the humidity of the sea. The city once had vibrant economy, from agriculture to financial servic- tourism and events industries, but these shriv- es. In response, Taqar doubled down on natural elled in the heat. The 2025 Athletics World resource extraction, aggressively marketing its Championships, taking place during an unsea- fossil fuels to poor countries unable to afford sonal October heatwave, were marred by the green energy. Success provided a mixed bless- deaths of three visiting fans due to hyperther- ing. With oil and gas still profitable, the Taqari mia and severe dehydration. This in turn killed authorities failed to commit fully to economic

6 Similar dust storms have become increasingly common elsewhere in the region due to global warming. See: Steff Gaulter, “The Science behind the Dust Storm That Hit Qatar on August 24,” Gulf Times, September 3, 2016, https://www.gulf-times.com/ story/510568/The-science-behind-the-dust-storm-that-hit-Qatar-o. 7 Extreme weather events are becoming increasingly common in the region. See: El Morjani Zine El Abidine, Yasir Mohieldeen, Ahmed Mohamed et al., “Heat Wave Hazard Modelling: Qatar Case Study,” QScience Connect, vol. 2014, no. 1 (2014). 76 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? diversification. The ‘knowledge economy’ more sustainable climate. Critics rejected as imagined in the Taqar National Vision 20308 naive the Taqari government’s narrative that largely failed to materialise. Indeed, all the climate adaptation was a mere engineering government achieved with its relentless pro- problem,9 taking aim at showpiece projects motion of this vision was to train up young such as Hadar City. Marketed as a high-tech Taqaris for tasks that could still only be found sustainable city, Hadar had become an envi- abroad. A narrative of intergenerational injus- ronmental ‘white elephant’, consuming far tice emerged. more energy than it saved.10 Despite the dip in its population, moreover, Taqar’s per capita The tipping point: sharpening energy consumption was rising sharply; food rhetoric on all sides shortages were staved off only by long-distance imports; and water was provided through As younger Taqaris suffered the physical and energy-intensive desalination. Taqar really did economic consequences of climate change, need a saviour. they became increasingly critical of the government. The Gulf Youth Climate Movement, a militant group led by charismatic Pakistani expatriate Ayaan Saifi, emerged as a major grassroots force in Taqar. Promoting the idea of a simpler, more austere way of life, it took on religious overtones. When relatives of the three dead World Athletics tourists sued the Taqari government for negligence and the defence lawyer responded that the heatwave was ‘an act of God’, the Youth Movement seized the opportunity to frame climate change as di- vine punishment. Tapping into youth discontent across the region, it pointed the finger at Taqar’s ruling patriarchy: the wealth they had accrued during the Oil Age would cost future Step forward Qin Liu. A decade ago, the Chinese generations the world. scientist had achieved brief notoriety as part of the team behind the world’s first genome-edited Abroad, the rhetoric against the government baby.11 This did not put off the Taqari govern- also sharpened. Echoing the language of mili- ment, which now offered Qin citizenship and tant environmentalist groups such as Real Ex- state-of-the-art research facilities if he could tinction Rebellion, the outgoing EU find a means to edit the national genome. Be- Commissioner for the Environment sparked cause of the prevalence of genetic diseases in controversy by suggesting that Taqar’s popula- Taqar, most Taqaris were already accustomed tion should be relocated to somewhere with a to being treated through the genome-editing

8 Other states in the region have published similar plans. See: General Secretariat For Development Planning, Qatar National Vision 2030, Doha, July 2008, https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/national-vision2030/; General Secretariat of the Executive Council, The Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030, Abu Dhabi, November 2008 https://www.actvet.gov.ae/en/Media/Lists/ ELibraryLD/economic-vision-2030-full-versionEn.pdf; Council of Economic and Development Affairs, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Vision 2030, https://vision2030.gov.sa/download/file/fid/417. 9 Jay Willis, “Qatar Is Air-Conditioning the Outdoors Because of Climate Change,” GQ Magazine, October 17, 2019, https://www. gq.com/story/qatar-outdoor-air-conditioning. 10 Critics suggest that the environmental aspect of the Hadar project was a politically expedient late-stage addition and question the Taqari government’s true commitment to fighting climate change. A similar criticism has been levelled against the Lusail City project in Qatar. See: Natalie Koch, “‘Building Glass Refrigerators in the Desert’: Discourses of Urban Sustainability and Nation Building in Qatar,” Urban Geography, vol. 35, no. 8 (2014), pp. 1118-39. 11 Ian Sample, “Chinese Scientist Who Edited Babies’ Genes Jailed for Three Years,” The Guardian, December 31, 2019, https://www. theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/30/gene-editing-chinese-scientist-he-jiankui-jailed-three-years. CHAPTER 4 | Can the EU define its futures? 77 technique known as CRISPR.12 Nevertheless, راﻗﻂ ةراﻣﺈ genome editing for non-therapeutic purposes Emirate of Taqar was still strictly prohibited under internation- ةﺿﺎﯾﺮﻻو ةﻓﺎﻗﺜﻼ ةرازو ,al law. The Taqari government calculated that Ministry of Culture and Sport by making genome editing an issue of ‘extreme sports’ rather than medical ethics, it could successfully shift these norms. This would secure Levelling the playing field legitimacy at home and abroad for its plans to (campaign brief) offer a better quality of life to its restive population, and finally allow the country to enhance For 200 years, Europeans have used its environmental credentials. sport to legitimise global inequality, ex- The multilateral response: fair ploiting its reputation as an egalitarian play or territorial injustice? and apolitical pursuit to whitewash the criminal nature of colonialism.1 In the nineteenth century, colonial subjects From his office in Lausanne, the IOC’s head (a were invited to participate in a ‘fair con- former European Games gold medal winner) test’ when in fact the rules of the game issues a statement condemning gene doping – and the game itself – had already been in sport and announcing that World Athletics, defined. The hurdles stacked against co- FIFA and all other associated sporting bodies lonial subjects became clear when they will bar every Taqari athlete from competition, started winning: they were criticised for with immediate effect. The IOC’s arguments lacking ‘sportsmanship’ and for turning take on a moral tone, accusing Taqar of under- genteel sports into games of ‘power, skill mining the integrity of the Olympics, the pinna- and intense competition’.2 cle of friendly competition between nations. A host of Western nations speak out in support of At the base of each sporting contest – the IOC decision and invoke the threat of more ball games, board games and field sports serious sanctions. But, in Moscow, the Russian alike – is a battle for control of terri- minister for sport welcomes Taqar’s ‘transpar- tory, both real and metaphorical.3 The ency’. The Russian president announces that IOC, IAAF and FIFA, all gatekeepers of Russian athletes will be encouraged to prove international sporting competition, are their mettle and enter the Arid Games. Russians thus directly implicated in the territori- will not be genome editing, he says, but he un- al injustices of today. The Emir of Taqar flinchingly supports Taqar’s case. has made it his mission to at last ‘level the playing field’. The first step: to thor- Europeans initially react with horror. The Rus- oughly reform these organisations and sian sprinter Sofia Zaitseva compares genome relocate their headquarters (in Laus- editing to something as trivial as laser eye sur- anne, Monaco and Zurich, respectively) gery, and this encourages a stinging rebuke to more neutral ground. from partially sighted German Paralympian

Lara Haas, who says genome editing is tan- Internal document from the Taqari tamount to eugenics. The EU looks for a mid- Ministry of Culture and Sport, 2030 dle way. Recognising that Taqar’s actions are motivated by a need to shift norms about territorial sovereignty, rather than a simple dis- regard for ethical considerations, it is the new 1 Brian Stoddart, “Sport, Cultural Imperialism and Colonial Response in the British Empire,” Sport in Society, vol. 9, no. 5 (2006), p. 813. 2 Ibid., p.826. 3 Eric Dunning, “Sociological Reflections on Sport, Violence and Civilization,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport, vol. 25, no. 1 (1990), pp. 12 This is true of other small states in the region. See: Nader 65-81. Al-Dewik, Al-Mureikhi, Noora Shahbeck et al., “Clinical Genetics and Genomic Medicine in Qatar,” Molecular Genetics & Genomic Medicine, vol. 6 (2018), pp. 702-12. 78 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

EU Commissioner for the Environment who a new roster of sports, including a number of takes the lead in formulating its response. The games with huge international appeal – ka- Commissioner condemns the unilateral nature baddi13 and sepak takraw14 from South Asia and of Taqar’s decision to go ahead with genome wushu from China.15 He frames this as part of a editing and calls on the WHO to mobilise its global discussion under the heading ‘The ball’s compliance, risk management and ethics de- in your court’. partment to brief members on their roles and responsibilities under the Framework Conven- Hard-learned lessons: the EU tion on Human Genome Editing. Yet he does not revisits its principles yield to pressure to announce immediate sanctions against Taqar. With the debate brought safely back into the realm of the WHO, the EU is more than usual- The Commissioner acknowledges that climate ly sympathetic towards Taqar. It takes pains to adaptation is an existential question for Taqar clarify its red lines: European rules on genetic and that heightened rhetoric around depopu- enhancement will not change; any use of ge- lation has placed extraordinary pressure on its netic enhancement must be strictly regulated, government. He restates the EU’s commitment limited and consensual; and the enhancement to helping find sustainable climate solutions of human germline cells – those which are under its mutual development partnership passed between generations – must remain with Taqar. Mina’ Al-Salam is wrong-footed strictly prohibited. But, within these bounda- by this response. The Ministry for Culture and ries, the EU signals its willingness to support Sports has already begun to prepare a global the establishment of a WHO expert working information campaign premised on lambasting group, chaired by a Taqari, to explore the po- Western ‘double standards’ in sport. But the EU tential for genetic enhancement as a means of Commissioner also presses the IOC to announce extreme climate change adaptation.

13 Kabaddi is a team contact sport popular mainly in South Asia. The International Kabaddi Federation is made up of 31 national associations. See: John Nauright and Charles Parish (eds), Sports around the World: History, Culture and Practice, vol. 2 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2012), p. 228. 14 Sepak takraw is a South East Asian form of kick-volleyball. The International Sepak Takraw League has 18 participating nations. See: Sports around the World: History, Culture and Practice, Op. cit., p. 248. 15 Despite lobbying the IOC, China has been unable to get wushu, traditional Chinese martial arts, included in the Olympic programme. See: Niko Besnier, Susan Brownell and Thomas Carter, The Anthropology of Sport: Bodies, Borders, Biopolitics (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2018), pp. 47-8. 79 CONCLUSIONS

The EU has recognised that strategic foresight Good intentions, and scenario methods are a good way to address ‘wicked’ policy problems, a way to help policy- poor outcomes makers face up to the taboos and hard truths that sometimes block positive policy outcomes. Such questions – questions which cut against By imagining different futures and the paths the grain of current policy – are vital. The EU that might take us there, we break old path de- is a status quo power with a huge stake in the pendencies and habits of thinking. To further existing rules-based liberal order. It is ready, develop the EU’s appetite for such exercises, moreover, to go to great lengths to defend its the authors chose to tackle one of the wicked- position. The European Commission has indi- est of questions: how should the EU cooperate cated a new appetite to act geopolitically, and with partner governments which collude with has begun defending this status quo robustly. criminals? Faced with a global resurgence of power politics and neo-imperialism, as well as spoiler This question is particularly pertinent today behaviour from discontented regimes, the EU because of two sets of worrying signals from is bundling together its trade, aid, diplomatic the real world: the first signal strongly suggests and other resources to assert the rules of lib- that some of the EU’s partners in developing eral order. countries view collusion with criminals as the only way to build up their state apparatus and The EU’s justification for its actions is- unim achieve positive liberal outcomes; the second, peachable: liberal order brings huge benefits, that the EU’s current attempts to discipline and political as well as material, to people world- propel countries along the path to liberal de- wide. These benefits need to be shared more velopment in fact impose constraints that end evenly, and this means defending the rules that up driving these states into negative, predatory permit global integration and ‘catch up’ to de- criminal partnerships. veloping countries. And yet, the best of intentions can sometimes produce poor outcomes. This Chaillot Paper is an elaborate exercise, but Indeed, they are particularly susceptible to this, it essentially boils down to three simple, repli- because blind-spots and taboos emerge. The cable questions. First, what are the assumptions signals are that this is the case when it comes to behind Europe’s current high-minded policies? collusion and liberal development. Second, has the EU done due diligence and ex- amined the evidence against these assump- Historically, European countries themselves tions? And finally, can we imagine scenarios charted a course towards prosperity and lib- that demonstrate a different reality, and where eral democracy which was at best erratic. On a different policy approach might produce more occasions, it involved collusion with crimi- favourable outcomes? If posing such questions nals (as well as predatory activities such as required this long elaboration, it is because of colonialism). For the best of reasons, Europe- the tricky follow-up they invite: can collusion an policymakers have tried to preclude poorer with criminals, under certain circumstances, countries from taking the same path. But this produce positive outcomes? has involved a certain historical amnesia. And by rewriting and whitewashing their own liberal development, Europeans now risk squeezing others onto an impossible course. It is helpful to be at least aware of this. 80 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states?

Recommendations But this new reflectiveness occurs at the tricki- est of times. Developing states, especially those which bore the brunt of Europe’s colonial past, What specific policy recommendations follow are tired of taking lessons from Europeans, and from the thought exercise set out in this Chail- may pounce on any risky rethink. Collusion is lot Paper? None at all. Rather than providing a case in point. Is the EU really ready to draw answers to a specific policy problem, the- au a distinction between generic corruption and thors hoped to raise questions, finding ways potentially positive examples of state-crime for EU policymakers to ask themselves whether collusion at a time when countries like China the current policy approach is really the best and Russia seek to bolster their influence over way to achieve the EU’s high-minded ends. But organisations like Interpol and the United Na- there are recommendations for the EU’s politi- tions Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), -as cal culture and organisation in Brussels and the serting a new, non-Western approach to crime, member states capitals: the EU could usefully law and order, and when the Biden administra- introduce such thought exercises as a routine tion is spearheading Western efforts against step in its policy development. kleptocracy?

Happily, the EU seems aware of this need. As it There are huge opportunities involved in re- becomes more assertive of its own interests and thinking old liberal policy assumptions, but priorities, it has taken care to introduce new there are concomitant risks. So perhaps the au- approaches to decision-making. The Europe- thors’ final recommendation is to use exercises an Commission has not only revived strategic like this one with care. They offer policymak- foresight and scenario practices of the kind ers a ‘virtual safe space’ for risk-taking and first introduced under Jacques Delors when he experimentation, but herein lies the danger. was president of the Commission 30 years ago. Policymakers should be wary of ceding to the As part of a commitment to evidence-based temptation to favour the risk-free comforts of policymaking, the Joint Research Centre scenario exercises over the potential dangers of has developed a suite of table-top games to real-world action: what is needed is a partner- help policymakers think through their policy ship of the two. assumptions.1

1 Laurent Bontoux, John A. Sweeney, Aaron B. Rosa et al., “A Game for All Seasons: Lessons and Learnings from the JRC’s Scenario Exploration System,” World Futures Review, vol. 12, no. 1, 2020. 81 ABBREVIATIONS

ACP ILO Africa-Caribbean-Pacific International Labour (region) Organisation

AMBA IOC American Miners’ International Olympic Benevolent Association Committee

BSH LDC Biomjeksia Shqiptare Least developed country CEO NGO Chief Executive Officer Non-governmental organisation FIFA International Federation of REE Association Football Rare earth element GNI TAIEX Gross national income Technical Assistance and Information Exchange H2H Instrument Human-to-human (transplants) VPSF Virtual private security IAAF force International Association of Athletics Federations WAASP West African Automatic IDPS Sentencing Processor International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and WHO Statebuilding World Health Organisation CHAILLOT PAPER / 165

At a time of huge international upheaval, a failure to resolve its ‘wicked problems’ risks leaving the EU paralysed on the world stage. This class of problem is characterised by contradictory political pressures, typically a clash of interests and principles. It is exemplified by the dilemma of whether to accommodate partner states that collude with criminals.

The EU has always believed that collusion precludes liberal development outcomes. But now, facing political pressure to engage with as broad a range of states as possible, it is hard-pressed to reassess its beliefs. This Chaillot Paper looks for evidence that collusion can in fact promote positive outcomes, and in so doing develops a methodology which could help resolve other similarly intractable problems.

The chosen methodology is strategic scenario-building: in a bid to guide the EU as it realigns principles with interests, this volume presents a series of scenarios of state-crime collusion, designed to highlight the scope for positive engagement with collusive states – and the costs of failure. APROBLEM WICKED | HOW TO COOPERATE WITH COLLUSIVE STATES?