DOCSLIB.ORG

WWII Atlantic I Naval En C and Me Ngageme Editerran Ent Synop Ean

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
WWII Atlantic I Naval En C and Me Ngageme Editerran Ent Synop Ean WWII Naval Engagemeent Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters Written By: Major John Czarzzasty US Army Retired West Point Graduate Class of 1974 Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters Table of Contents 1. Battle of the River Platte……………………………………………………2 2. Naval Action at Narvik……………………………………………………….7 3. Attack on Mers‐el‐Kébir……………………………………………………11 4. Battle of Calabria……………………………………………………………..14 5. Battle of Cape Spada……………………………………………………..…19 6. Battle of Dakar………………………………………………………………….21 7. Battle of Taranto……………………………………………………….........24 8. Battle of Cape Spartivento………………………………………………..28 9. Battle of Cape Matapan…………………………………………………….31 10. Sinking the Battleship Bismarck…………………………………………35 11. Naval Warfare Associated with the Siege of Sevastopol……42 12. Battle of Cape Bon…………………………………………………………….45 13. First Battle of Sirte…………………………………………………………….46 14. Battle of the Kerch Peninsula…………………………………………….48 15. Second Battle of Sirte………………………………………………………..50 16. Operation Harpoon……………………………………………………………53 17. Operation Vigorous……………………………………………………………56 18. Operation Pedestal…………………………………………………………...58 19. Battle of the Atlantic………………………………………………………….64 Page 1 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters Battle of the River Platte The Battle of the River Platte, fought 13 December 1939, has the twin distinctions of being the first naval battle of WWII and being the only battle of the war to take place off the continent of South America. The combatant on the German side was Admiral Graf Spee (hereafter Graf Spee), a Deutchland‐class cruiser (also known as a Panzerschiff or “Pocket Battleship”) launched in 1934 and commanded by Kapitän zur See Hans Langsdorff. The combatants on the British side were the York‐class heavy cruiser HMS Exeter (launched in 1929), the Leander‐class light cruiser HMS Ajax (launched in 1934), and the Leander‐class cruiser HMNZS Achilles (launched in 1932). Graf Spee had been stationed in the South Atlantic before the war began. When war was declared in September 1939, Graf Spee began raiding commerce shipping towards the end of the month. Her first victim was the cargo ship Clement on 30 September off the coast of Brazil. Langsdorff, exhibiting a brand of chivalry associated with raiders, took two prisoners from Clement and allowed the rest of the crew to take to their lifeboats before sinking the vessel. He also ordered the broadcast of a distress signal so that the crew would be rescued. On 5 October 1939 the Allies reacted by forming eight naval groups to hunt down Graf Spee. Capital ships committed to the hunt included 4 aircraft carriers, one battle cruiser, 2 battleships and 16 cruisers. Force G, commanded by Commodore Henry Harwood, consisted of Exeter, Ajax and Achilles, in addition to the cruiser Cumberland, which was absent, patrolling off the Falkland Islands, when the combatants met. The main body of Force G patrolled off the River Platte. While the Allies were organizing, Graf Spee was raiding. On 5 October 1939 she captured the steamer Newton Beech, and used it as a floating POW camp. On 7 October Graf Spee sank the merchant ship Ashlea .Newton Beech was unable to keep pace with Graf Spee, so the prisoners were transferred to the cruiser on 8 October and Newton Beech was sunk. On 10 October Graf Spee captured the steamer Huntsman, put a prize crew aboard, and sent it to the rendezvous location of the German supply ship Altmark. On 15 October Graf Spee rendezvoused with Altmark, took on fuel, and transferred prisoners. Huntsman arrived 16 October and also transferred prisoners to Altmark. No longer of any use to the Germans, Graf Spee sunk Huntsman the following day. On 22 October Graf Spee sank the steamer Trevanion. Meanwhile the Allies searched in vain. In spite of the uncontested successes so far, at the end of October Langsdorff sailed Graf Spee out of the south Atlantic and into the Indian Ocean in order to divert Allied warships away from the south Atlantic where he intended to continue operations after misdirecting the Allies. While in the Indian Ocean, Graf Spee sunk the tanker Africa Shell. Page 2 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters The thus far successful cruise was not without its toll. After cruising for 35,000 miles (30,000 nautical miles) Graf Spee was in urgent need of an engine overhaul. Not able to address that need, Graf Spee returned to the south Atlantic in late November to address a more pressing need. She rendezvoused with Altmark and took on fuel and supplies. Graf Spee’s reign of terror was coming to an end, though she kept taking victims. She sank the merchant ship Doric Star, but Doric Star was able to send a distress signal before sinking. Based on the distress signal location, Commodore Harwood brought Force G (minus Cumberland) to the mouth of the River Platte, anticipating Graf Spee’s arrival there due to the heavy shipping traffic. Graf Spee sank her penultimate victim, the steamer Tairoa, on 5 December 1939. Rendezvousing with Altmark for what would be the last time on 6 December, Graf Spee transferred prisoners taken from Doric Star and Tairoa. Graf Spee’s last prize taken was the freighter Steonshalh on 7 December 1939. The prize crew discovered information regarding shipping routes on board, and based on this intelligence, Langsdorff ordered the ship to sail to the seas off Montevideo, and unwittingly, to the ship’s fateful meeting with Force G. Force G rendezvoused off the River Platte estuary on 12 December 1939. Harwood was confident in the ability of three cruisers to defeat a single pocket battleship, and planned to attack immediately once contact was made. If by day, the ships would attack in two groups, Exeter alone and Ajax and Achilles in tandem. If by night, the attack would be with all three ships together but in open formation. Harwood’s intent was to negate the German advantages in range and firepower by forcing Graf Spee to split its fire and thereby reduce its effectiveness, or to concentrate fire on one ship and allow the other two to attack unmolested by German fire. Though at a tactical disadvantage, Harwood knew that the strategic environment favored his force, and he need not sink Graf Spee in order to further his strategic mission of ensuring the safety of the shipping carrying food and war materials to Great Britain. Even a tactical defeat could serve that greater purpose if Force G could render Graf Spee unable to continue surface raiding or to engage surface combatants while returning home. Graf Spee returning home would have to run the Home Fleet gauntlet in the North Sea, and a damaged Graf Spee would do so at greater peril. The final part of the calculus was the relative strength of the naval assets of the opposing nations. In the worst case for Great Britain, the loss of all three ships in Force G could be absorbed by overall Allied naval capabilities. However, Graf Spee was one of a handful of German capital ships, and if lost would not be replaced. A defeat would more severely affect the Germans than the Allies. The Germans had already sighted mastheads of Force G at 0552 hours (though they thought they were Exeter and two destroyers protecting a merchant convoy) when at 0610 hrs on 13 December 1939 the Allied forces sighted smoke. Graf Spee’s float plane Page 3 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters was not operational, so Langsdorff had to rely on his observers. He had fairly accurate intelligence that the Force G, including Cumberland, was in the area of the River Platte, but relying on his observers’ estimation of a lesser force he decided to engage. Soon realizing he was facing three cruisers, Langsdorff ordered immediate acceleration to close with the British at 24 knots (28 mph), intending to engage before the British could get up full steam. Critics of Langsdorff say he should have used his ship’s superior range to his advantage, maneuvering to keep the British ships in range of his 11.1‐inch (28.3 cm) guns while, at least at first, staying out of the range of their 6‐ and 8‐inch guns. The speed advantage of the cruisers conversely could have allowed them to stay out of range of Graf Spee’s guns while Force G summoned reinforcements, so Langsdorrf decided to force the issue. Harwood stuck to his daylight plan. The ships split into two groups. Exeter headed northwest. Ajax, which was Harwood’s flagship, and Achilles headed northeast. Making use of her superior range, Graf Spee fired first at 0618 hours, taking Exeter under fire with from 19,000 yards with her 11.1‐inch guns. Two minutes later, Exeter began to return fire. A minute later Achilles opened fire. Another minute passed and Exeter’s aft guns bean to fire. Another minute passed and Ajax opened fire. It was now 0623 hours. At 0623 hours shells were not just going up; they were coming down. An 11.1‐inch shell, a near miss, burst abreast of Exeter. Splinters from the shell killed torpedo tube crewmen and damaged equipment on deck, wrecking the ship’s spotter aircraft just about to be launched. At 0626 hours a shell struck Exeter’s “B” turret putting both guns out of action. Shrapnel swept the bridge killing and wounding personnel. Communications were knocked out, including those with the aft conning position. For the rest of the battle Exeter would be steered using a chain of human messengers. By 0630 hours, Ajax and Achilles had closed to within 13,000 yards of Graf Spee, causing her to split her main armament targeting.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • An Analysis of the Loss of HMAS SYDNEY
    An analysis of the loss of HMAS SYDNEY By David Kennedy The 6,830-ton modified Leander class cruiser HMAS SYDNEY THE MAIN STORY The sinking of cruiser HMAS SYDNEY by disguised German raider KORMORAN, and the delayed search for all 645 crew who perished 70 years ago, can be attributed directly to the personal control by British wartime leader Winston Churchill of top-secret Enigma intelligence decodes and his individual power. As First Lord of the Admiralty, then Prime Minster, Churchill had been denying top secret intelligence information to commanders at sea, and excluding Australian prime ministers from knowledge of Ultra decodes of German Enigma signals long before SYDNEY II was sunk by KORMORAN, disguised as the Dutch STRAAT MALAKKA, off north-Western Australia on November 19, 1941. Ongoing research also reveals that a wide, hands-on, operation led secretly from London in late 1941, accounted for the ignorance, confusion, slow reactions in Australia and a delayed search for survivors . in stark contrast to Churchill's direct part in the destruction by SYDNEY I of the German cruiser EMDEN 25 years before. Churchill was at the helm of one of his special operations, to sweep from the oceans disguised German raiders, their supply ships, and also blockade runners bound for Germany from Japan, when SYDNEY II was lost only 19 days before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and Southeast Asia. Covering up of a blunder, or a punitive example to the new and distrusted Labor government of John Curtin gone terribly wrong because of a covert German weapon, can explain stern and brief official statements at the time and whitewashes now, with Germany and Japan solidly within Western alliances.
    [Show full text]
  • Cataloging Service Bulletin 098, Fall 2002
    ISSN 0160-8029 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS/WASHINGTON CATALOGING SERVICE BULLETIN LIBRARY SERVICES Number 98, Fall 2002 Editor: Robert M. Hiatt CONTENTS Page DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGING Library of Congress Rule Interpretations 2 SUBJECT CATALOGING Subdivision Simplification Progress 58 Changed or Cancelled Free-Floating Subdivisions 58 Subject Headings of Current Interest 58 Revised LC Subject Headings 59 Subject Headings Replaced by Name Headings 65 MARC Language Codes 65 Editorial postal address: Cataloging Policy and Support Office, Library Services, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540-4305 Editorial electronic mail address: [email protected] Editorial fax number: (202) 707-6629 Subscription address: Customer Support Team, Cataloging Distribution Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20541-4912 Subscription electronic mail address: [email protected] Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 78-51400 ISSN 0160-8029 Key title: Cataloging service bulletin Copyright ©2002 the Library of Congress, except within the U.S.A. DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGING LIBRARY OF CONGRESS RULE INTERPRETATIONS (LCRI) Cumulative index of LCRI to the Anglo-American Cataloguing Rules, second edition, 1998 revision, that have appeared in issues of Cataloging Service Bulletin. Any LCRI previously published but not listed below is no longer applicable and has been cancelled. Lines in the margins ( , ) of revised interpretations indicate where changes have occurred. Rule Number Page 1.0 98 11 1.0C 50 12 1.0E 69 17 1.0G 44 9 1.0H 44 9 1.1B1 97 12 1.1C 94 11 1.1D2 84 11 1.1E
    [Show full text]
  • On Our Doorstep Parts 1 and 2
    ON 0UR DOORSTEP I MEMORIAM THE SECOD WORLD WAR 1939 to 1945 HOW THOSE LIVIG I SOME OF THE PARISHES SOUTH OF COLCHESTER, WERE AFFECTED BY WORLD WAR 2 Compiled by E. J. Sparrow Page 1 of 156 ON 0UR DOORSTEP FOREWORD This is a sequel to the book “IF YOU SHED A TEAR” which dealt exclusively with the casualties in World War 1 from a dozen coastal villages on the orth Essex coast between the Colne and Blackwater. The villages involved are~: Abberton, Langenhoe, Fingringhoe, Rowhedge, Peldon: Little and Great Wigborough: Salcott: Tollesbury: Tolleshunt D’Arcy: Tolleshunt Knights and Tolleshunt Major This likewise is a community effort by the families, friends and neighbours of the Fallen so that they may be remembered. In this volume we cover men from the same villages in World War 2, who took up the challenge of this new threat .World War 2 was much closer to home. The German airfields were only 60 miles away and the villages were on the direct flight path to London. As a result our losses include a number of men, who did not serve in uniform but were at sea with the fishing fleet, or the Merchant avy. These men were lost with the vessels operating in what was known as “Bomb Alley” which also took a toll on the Royal avy’s patrol craft, who shepherded convoys up the east coast with its threats from: - mines, dive bombers, e- boats and destroyers. The book is broken into 4 sections dealing with: - The war at sea: the land warfare: the war in the air & on the Home Front THEY WILL OLY DIE IF THEY ARE FORGOTTE.
    [Show full text]
  • RAN Ships Lost
    CALL THE HANDS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6 Issue No. 6 March 2017 Royal Australian Navy Ships Honour Roll Given the 75th anniversary commemoration events taking place around Australia and overseas in 2017 to honour ships lost in the RAN’s darkest year, 1942 it is timely to reproduce the full list of Royal Australian Navy vessels lost since 1914. The table below was prepared by the Directorate of Strategic and Historical Studies in the RAN’s Sea Power Centre, Canberra lists 31 vessels lost along with a total of 1,736 lives. Vessel (* Denotes Date sunk Casualties Location Comments NAP/CPB ship taken up (Ships lost from trade. Only with ships appearing casualties on the Navy Lists highlighted) as commissioned vessels are included.) HMA Submarine 14-Sep-14 35 Vicinity of Disappeared following a patrol near AE1 Blanche Bay, Cape Gazelle, New Guinea. Thought New Guinea to have struck a coral reef near the mouth of Blanche Bay while submerged. HMA Submarine 30-Apr-15 0 Sea of Scuttled after action against Turkish AE2 Marmara, torpedo boat. All crew became POWs, Turkey four died in captivity. Wreck located in June 1998. HMAS Goorangai* 20-Nov-40 24 Port Phillip Collided with MV Duntroon. No Bay survivors. HMAS Waterhen 30-Jun-41 0 Off Sollum, Damaged by German aircraft 29 June Egypt 1941. Sank early the next morning. HMAS Sydney (II) 19-Nov-41 645 207 km from Sunk with all hands following action Steep Point against HSK Kormoran. Located 16- WA, Indian Mar-08. Ocean HMAS Parramatta 27-Nov-41 138 Approximately Sunk by German submarine.
    [Show full text]
  • An Ambiguous Partnership: Great Britain and the Free French Navy, 1940-19421
    An Ambiguous Partnership: Great Britain and the Free French Navy, 1940-19421 Hugues Canuel On se souvient aujourd’hui des forces de la France libre en raison de faits d’armes tels que leur courageuse résistance à Bir Hakeim en 1942 et la participation du général Leclerc à la libération de Paris en 1944. Par contre, la contribution antérieure de la marine de la France libre est moins bien connue : elle a donné à de Gaulle, dont l’espoir était alors bien mince, les moyens de mobiliser des appuis politiques au sein de l’empire colonial français et d’apporter une contribution militaire précoce à la cause des Alliés. Cette capacité s’est développée à la suite de l’appui modeste mais tout de même essentiel du Royaume-Uni, un allié qui se méfiait de fournir les ressources absolument nécessaires à une flotte qu’il ne contrôlait pas complètement mais dont les actions pourraient aider la Grande- Bretagne qui se trouvait alors presque seule contre les puissances de l’Axe. Friday 27 November 1942 marked the nadir of French sea power in the twentieth century. Forewarned that German troops arrayed around the Mediterranean base of Toulon were intent on seizing the fleet at dawn, Admiral Jean de Laborde – Commander of the Force de Haute Mer, the High Seas Force – and the local Maritime Prefect, Vice Admiral André Marquis, ordered the immediate scuttling of all ships and submarines at their berths. Some 248,800 tons of capital ships, escorts, auxiliaries and submarines was scuttled as the Wehrmacht closed in on the dockyard.2 The French “Vichy navy” virtually ceased to exist that day.
    [Show full text]
  • Seeschlachten Im Atlantik (Zusammenfassung)
    Seeschlachten im Atlantik (Zusammenfassung) U-Boot-Krieg (aus Wikipedia) 07_48/U 995 vom Typ VII C/41, der meistgebauten U-Boot-Klasse im Zweiten Weltkrieg Als U-Boot-Krieg (auch "Unterseebootkrieg") werden Kampfhandlungen zur See bezeichnet, bei denen U-Boote eingesetzt werden, um feindliche Kriegs- und Frachtschiffe zu versenken. Die Bezeichnung "uneingeschränkter U-Boot-Krieg" wird verwendet, wenn Schiffe ohne vorherige Warnung angegriffen werden. Der Einsatz von U-Booten wandelte sich im Laufe der Zeit vom taktischen Blockadebrecher zum strategischen Blockademittel im Rahmen eines Handelskrieges. Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg änderte sich die grundsätzliche Einsatzdoktrin durch die Entwicklung von Raketen tragenden Atom- U-Booten, die als Träger von Kernwaffen eine permanente Bedrohung über den maritimen Bereich hinaus darstellen. Im Gegensatz zum Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg fand hier keine völkerrechtliche Weiterentwicklung zum Einsatz von U-Booten statt. Der Begriff wird besonders auf den Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg bezogen. Hierbei sind auch völkerrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen von Bedeutung. Anfänge Während des Amerikanischen Bürgerkrieges wurden 1864 mehrere handgetriebene U-Boote gebaut. Am 17. Februar 1864 versenkte die C.S.S. H. L. Hunley durch eine Sprengladung das Kriegsschiff USS Housatonic der Nordstaaten. Es gab 5 Tote auf dem versenkten Schiff. Die Hunley gilt somit als erstes U-Boot der Welt, das ein anderes Schiff zerstört hat. Das U-Boot wurde allerdings bei dem Angriff auf die Housatonic durch die Detonation schwer beschädigt und sank, wobei auch seine achtköpfige Besatzung getötet wurde. Auftrag der Hunley war die Brechung der Blockade des Südstaatenhafens Charleston durch die Nordstaaten. Erster Weltkrieg Die technische Entwicklung der U-Boote bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges beschreibt ein Boot, das durch Dampf-, Benzin-, Diesel- oder Petroleummaschinen über Wasser und durch batteriegetriebene Elektromotoren unter Wasser angetrieben wurde.
    [Show full text]
  • PN99:99 01/12/09 12.00 Pagina 1 PN99:99 01/12/09 12.01 Pagina 2
    PN99:99 01/12/09 12.00 Pagina 1 PN99:99 01/12/09 12.01 Pagina 2 Rassegna Periodica Trimestrale Anno XXVII • n. 99 • Giugno 2009 Direttore Anthony Emanuele Barbagallo Sindaco Direttore Responsabile Salvo De Luca Comitato di Redazione Sommario Alfio Nicolosi, Giuseppe Distefano, Un nuovo impianto di lanterne Mario Calabretta, Giuseppe Pappalardo, artistiche per promuovere la Laura Petralia, Enza Zappalà cultura del decoro Segretaria di Redazione Agata Petralia Testi Mario Calabretta, Salvo De Luca Salvo Failla, Alessandro Laudani Mario Laudani, Antonino Moschetto Graziano Motta, Alfio Nicolosi Carmelo Nicolosi, Giuseppe Pappalardo Salvo Pappalardo, Laura Petralia Angelo Pulvirenti, Enza Zappalà Hanno collaborato Rosita Pappalardo, Pina Bonanno Tina Motta, Salvo Pappalardo Gaetano Petralia Fotografie Gabriele Fasanaro, SDL Images Direzione, Redazione ed Amministrazione Sede Municipale L’Estate Pedarese Piazza don Bosco • 95030 • PEDARA (CT) quando il centro storico si fa protagonista Tel. 095.7028111 • fax 095.7028112 e-mail: [email protected] Registrazione PRIMOPIANO Tribunale di Catania 4. Inaugurata la nuova area Expo n. 626/ 3.3.1983 Grafica, impaginazione e stampa AMMINISTRAZIONE WE-GROUP s.r.l. 8. Nuova luce nel centro storico Via R. Franchetti, 18/A - CT 9. La Carta dei giovani 9. 4ª Rassegna teatrale DISTRIBUZIONE 10. Opere pubbliche GRATUITA 11. Consiglio comunale Finito di stampare nel mese di Novembre 2009 EVENTI L’Ara di Giove 12. Il premio “Ara di Giove” un premio all’eccellenza siciliana L’elaborazione dei testi, benché scrupolo - 14. L’Estate Pedarese samente esaminata dalla Redazione, non 15. L’opera dei pupi può comportare responsabilità alcuna per 15. Serate d’arte a Pedara CELEBRAZIONI l’Editore relativamente ad eventuali errori 16.
    [Show full text]
  • Quellensammlung Zur Geschichte Der Deutschen Sozialpolitik I
    Quellensammlung zur Geschichte der deutschen Sozialpolitik I. Abteilung: Von der Reichsgründungszeit bis zur Kaiserlichen Sozialbotschaft (1867-1881) Kumuliertes Inhaltsverzeichnis [Kopf- und Kurzregest]* der Haupttexte Bde. 1-8 1816 – 1862 17.11.1811 Allgemeine bayerische Verordnung, das Armenwesen betreffend Bd.7, Anh. Nr.1 [Die politische Gemeinde, in der der Arme heimatberechtigt ist, ist zur Armenpflege verpflichtet; Grundsätze über Art, Maß und Voraussetzungen der öffentlichen Armenunterstützung sowie deren Finanzierung und Organisation] 09.03.1839 Regulativ über die Beschäftigung jugendlicher Arbeiter in Fabriken Bd.3, Anh. Nr.1 [Verbot der Kinderarbeit in Fabriken vor dem neunten Lebensjahr; Fabrikarbeiter unter 16 Jahre dürfen höchstens 10 Stunden beschäftigt werden; Verbot der Nachtarbeit und de Arbeit an Sonn- und Feierta- gen für jugendliche Arbeiter] 31.12.1842 Preußisches Gesetz über die Aufnahme neu anziehender Personen Bd.7, Anh. Nr.2 [Grundsätze der armenrechtlichen Niederlassungsfreiheit] 31.12.1842 Preußisches Gesetz über die Verpflichtung zur Armenpflege Bd.7, Anh. Nr.3 [An die Stelle der mit Geburt erworbenen Heimat tritt mit dem Tag der Wohnsitznahme der sog. Unter- stützungswohnsitz als Grundlage der Verpflichtung zur Armenpflege] 31.12.1842 Preußisches Gesetz über die Erwerbung und den Verlust der Eigenschaft als preußi- Bd.7, Anh. Nr.4 scher Untertan sowie über den Eintritt in fremde Staatsdienste [Grundsätze des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts kraft Abstammung] 17.01.1845 Allgemeine Gewerbeordnung für Preußen [Teildruck]
    [Show full text]
  • Naval Ensigns & Jacks
    INTERNATIONAL TREASURES ™ A NATIONAL TREASURE Naval Ensigns & Jacks ZFC3577 USSR, Cruiser Aurora, unique, Order of the Oct. Revolution & Military Order of the Red Banner, Holiday Ensign, 1992. This variant of the Soviet Naval Ensign is from the Cruiser Aurora, a ship with a long and distinguished career. The Aurora is an armored cruiser currently preserved and serving as a school and museum in Saint Petersburg, Russia. ZFC0228 Lead Royal Navy ship, D-Day Operation Overlord, ZFC0514 France Ensign, FFL Aconite WWII, Sank 2 German Invasion of Normandy, 1944. This battle ensign was on the leading U-Boats on same day, 1943. An iconic French ensign which embod Royal Navy ship of the invasion that assaulted the Normandy ies the brief, yet brave, struggle of French forces against fascist beaches on June 6, 1944. Commander Anthony Kimmins secured Germany in the opening years of WWII. This flag comes from the the flag for Calvin Bullock for his return visit to New York. FNFL corvette ‘Aconite’ and was part of the Bullock Collection. ZFC0232 Royal Canadian Navy White Ensign, HMCS Wetaskiwin, ZFC0503 Lead Royal Navy ship Eastern Tack Force, Operation “Battle of the Atlantic,” 1943. This White Ensign, according to Husky, Invasion of Sicily, 1943. Due to wartime security constraints, Calvin Bullock’s documentation was “From His Majesty’s Canadian the name of the vessel that wore this ensign remains unknown. The Corvette WETASKIWIN, which for long had been flown in both the documentation states only that it flew on the task force leading the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.” allied attacks on Sicily.
    [Show full text]
  • Consequences of the Attack on Pearl Harbor from Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia Jump to Navigationjump to Search
    Consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search Hideki Tojo, Japanese Prime Minister at the time of the attack Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor took place on December 7, 1941. The U.S. military suffered 18 ships damaged or sunk, and 2,400 people were killed. Its most significant consequence was the entrance of the United States into World War II. The US had previously been neutral but subsequently entered the Pacific War, the Battle of the Atlantic and the European theatre of war. Following the attack, the US interned 120,000 Japanese Americans, 11,000 German Americans, and 3,000 Italian Americans. Contents 1American public opinion prior to the attack 2American response 3Japanese views 4Germany and Italy declare war 5British reaction 6Canadian response 7Investigations and blame 8Rise of anti-Japanese sentiment and historical significance 9Perception of the attack today o 9.1Revisionism controversies 10Analysis o 10.1Tactical implications . 10.1.1Battleships . 10.1.2Carriers . 10.1.3Shore installations . 10.1.4Charts o 10.2Strategic implications 11See also 12Notes 13External links American public opinion prior to the attack[edit] From the outbreak of World War II on September 1, 1939 to December 8, 1941, the United States was officially neutral, as it was bound by the Neutrality Acts not to get involved in the conflicts raging in Europe and Asia. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, public opinion in the United States had not been unanimous. When polled in January
    [Show full text]
  • Museum Policies in Europe 1990 – 2010: Negotiating Professional and Political Utopia
    Museum Policies in Europe 1990 – 2010: Negotiating Professional and Political Utopia Lill Eilertsen & Arne Bugge Amundsen (eds) EuNaMus Report No 3 Museum Policies in Europe 1990–2010: Negotiating Professional and Political Utopia (EuNaMus Report No. 3) Lill Eilertsen & Arne Bugge Amundsen (eds) Copyright The publishers will keep this document online on the Internet – or its possible replacement – from the date of publication barring exceptional circumstances. The online availability of the document implies permanent permission for anyone to read, to download, or to print out single copies for his/her own use and to use it unchanged for noncommercial research and educational purposes. Subsequent transfers of copyright cannot revoke this permission. All other uses of the document are conditional upon the consent of the copyright owner. The publisher has taken technical and administrative measures to assure authenticity, security and accessibility. According to intellectual property law, the author has the right to be mentioned when his/her work is accessed as described above and to be protected against infringement. For additional information about Linköping University Electronic Press and its procedures for publication and for assurance of document integrity, please refer to its www home page: http://www.ep.liu.se/. Linköping University Interdisciplinary Studies, No. 15 ISSN: 1650-9625 Linköping University Electronic Press Linköping, Sweden, 2012 URL: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-81315 Copyright © The Authors, 2012 This report has been published thanks to the support of the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for Research - Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities theme (contract nr 244305 – Project European National Museums: Identity Politics, the Uses of the Past and the European Citizen).
    [Show full text]
  • Europe (In Theory)
    EUROPE (IN THEORY) ∫ 2007 Duke University Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper $ Designed by C. H. Westmoreland Typeset in Minion with Univers display by Keystone Typesetting, Inc. Library of Congress Cataloging-in- Publication Data appear on the last printed page of this book. There is a damaging and self-defeating assumption that theory is necessarily the elite language of the socially and culturally privileged. It is said that the place of the academic critic is inevitably within the Eurocentric archives of an imperialist or neo-colonial West. —HOMI K. BHABHA, The Location of Culture Contents Acknowledgments ix Introduction: A pigs Eye View of Europe 1 1 The Discovery of Europe: Some Critical Points 11 2 Montesquieu’s North and South: History as a Theory of Europe 52 3 Republics of Letters: What Is European Literature? 87 4 Mme de Staël to Hegel: The End of French Europe 134 5 Orientalism, Mediterranean Style: The Limits of History at the Margins of Europe 172 Notes 219 Works Cited 239 Index 267 Acknowledgments I want to thank for their suggestions, time, and support all the people who have heard, read, and commented on parts of this book: Albert Ascoli, David Bell, Joe Buttigieg, miriam cooke, Sergio Ferrarese, Ro- berto Ferrera, Mia Fuller, Edna Goldstaub, Margaret Greer, Michele Longino, Walter Mignolo, Marc Scachter, Helen Solterer, Barbara Spack- man, Philip Stewart, Carlotta Surini, Eric Zakim, and Robert Zimmer- man. Also invaluable has been the help o√ered by the Ethical Cosmopol- itanism group and the Franklin Humanities Seminar at Duke University; by the Program in Comparative Literature at Notre Dame; by the Khan Institute Colloquium at Smith College; by the Mediterranean Studies groups of both Duke and New York University; and by European studies and the Italian studies program at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
    [Show full text]