WWII Atlantic I Naval En C and Me Ngageme Editerran Ent Synop Ean

WWII Naval Engagemeent Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters

Written By: Major John Czarzzasty US Army Retired West Point Graduate Class of 1974

Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters

Table of Contents

1. Battle of the River Platte……………………………………………………2 2. Naval Action at Narvik……………………………………………………….7 3. Attack on Mers‐el‐Kébir……………………………………………………11 4. Battle of Calabria……………………………………………………………..14 5. Battle of Cape Spada……………………………………………………..…19 6. Battle of Dakar………………………………………………………………….21 7. Battle of Taranto………………………………………………………...... 24 8. Battle of Cape Spartivento………………………………………………..28 9. Battle of Cape Matapan…………………………………………………….31 10. Sinking the Battleship Bismarck…………………………………………35 11. Naval Warfare Associated with the Siege of Sevastopol……42 12. Battle of Cape Bon…………………………………………………………….45 13. First Battle of Sirte…………………………………………………………….46 14. Battle of the Kerch Peninsula…………………………………………….48 15. Second Battle of Sirte………………………………………………………..50 16. Operation Harpoon……………………………………………………………53 17. Operation Vigorous……………………………………………………………56 18. Operation Pedestal…………………………………………………………...58 19. Battle of the Atlantic………………………………………………………….64

Battle of the River Platte

The Battle of the River Platte, fought 13 December 1939, has the twin distinctions of being the first naval battle of WWII and being the only battle of the war to take place off the continent of South America. The combatant on the German side was Admiral Graf Spee (hereafter Graf Spee), a Deutchland‐class cruiser (also known as a Panzerschiff or “Pocket Battleship”) launched in 1934 and commanded by Kapitän zur See Hans Langsdorff. The combatants on the British side were the York‐class heavy cruiser HMS Exeter (launched in 1929), the Leander‐class light cruiser HMS Ajax (launched in 1934), and the Leander‐class cruiser HMNZS Achilles (launched in 1932).

Graf Spee had been stationed in the South Atlantic before the war began. When war was declared in September 1939, Graf Spee began raiding commerce shipping towards the end of the month. Her first victim was the cargo ship Clement on 30 September off the coast of Brazil. Langsdorff, exhibiting a brand of chivalry associated with raiders, took two prisoners from Clement and allowed the rest of the crew to take to their lifeboats before sinking the vessel. He also ordered the broadcast of a distress signal so that the crew would be rescued.

On 5 October 1939 the Allies reacted by forming eight naval groups to hunt down Graf Spee. Capital ships committed to the hunt included 4 aircraft carriers, one battle cruiser, 2 battleships and 16 cruisers. Force G, commanded by Commodore Henry Harwood, consisted of Exeter, Ajax and Achilles, in addition to the cruiser Cumberland, which was absent, patrolling off the Falkland Islands, when the combatants met. The main body of Force G patrolled off the River Platte.

While the Allies were organizing, Graf Spee was raiding. On 5 October 1939 she captured the steamer Newton Beech, and used it as a floating POW camp. On 7 October Graf Spee sank the merchant ship Ashlea .Newton Beech was unable to keep pace with Graf Spee, so the prisoners were transferred to the cruiser on 8 October and Newton Beech was sunk. On 10 October Graf Spee captured the steamer Huntsman, put a prize crew aboard, and sent it to the rendezvous location of the German supply ship Altmark. On 15 October Graf Spee rendezvoused with Altmark, took on fuel, and transferred prisoners. Huntsman arrived 16 October and also transferred prisoners to Altmark. No longer of any use to the Germans, Graf Spee sunk Huntsman the following day. On 22 October Graf Spee sank the steamer Trevanion. Meanwhile the Allies searched in vain.

In spite of the uncontested successes so far, at the end of October Langsdorff sailed Graf Spee out of the south Atlantic and into the Indian Ocean in order to divert Allied warships away from the south Atlantic where he intended to continue operations after misdirecting the Allies. While in the Indian Ocean, Graf Spee sunk the tanker Africa Shell.

The thus far successful cruise was not without its toll. After cruising for 35,000 miles (30,000 nautical miles) Graf Spee was in urgent need of an engine overhaul. Not able to address that need, Graf Spee returned to the south Atlantic in late November to address a more pressing need. She rendezvoused with Altmark and took on fuel and supplies.

Graf Spee’s reign of terror was coming to an end, though she kept taking victims. She sank the merchant ship Doric Star, but Doric Star was able to send a distress signal before sinking. Based on the distress signal location, Commodore Harwood brought Force G (minus Cumberland) to the mouth of the River Platte, anticipating Graf Spee’s arrival there due to the heavy shipping traffic. Graf Spee sank her penultimate victim, the steamer Tairoa, on 5 December 1939. Rendezvousing with Altmark for what would be the last time on 6 December, Graf Spee transferred prisoners taken from Doric Star and Tairoa.

Graf Spee’s last prize taken was the freighter Steonshalh on 7 December 1939. The prize crew discovered information regarding shipping routes on board, and based on this intelligence, Langsdorff ordered the ship to sail to the seas off Montevideo, and unwittingly, to the ship’s fateful meeting with Force G.

Force G rendezvoused off the River Platte estuary on 12 December 1939. Harwood was confident in the ability of three cruisers to defeat a single pocket battleship, and planned to attack immediately once contact was made. If by day, the ships would attack in two groups, Exeter alone and Ajax and Achilles in tandem. If by night, the attack would be with all three ships together but in open formation. Harwood’s intent was to negate the German advantages in range and firepower by forcing Graf Spee to split its fire and thereby reduce its effectiveness, or to concentrate fire on one ship and allow the other two to attack unmolested by German fire.

Though at a tactical disadvantage, Harwood knew that the strategic environment favored his force, and he need not sink Graf Spee in order to further his strategic mission of ensuring the safety of the shipping carrying food and war materials to Great Britain. Even a tactical defeat could serve that greater purpose if Force G could render Graf Spee unable to continue surface raiding or to engage surface combatants while returning home. Graf Spee returning home would have to run the Home Fleet gauntlet in the North Sea, and a damaged Graf Spee would do so at greater peril. The final part of the calculus was the relative strength of the naval assets of the opposing nations. In the worst case for Great Britain, the loss of all three ships in Force G could be absorbed by overall Allied naval capabilities. However, Graf Spee was one of a handful of German capital ships, and if lost would not be replaced. A defeat would more severely affect the Germans than the Allies.

The Germans had already sighted mastheads of Force G at 0552 hours (though they thought they were Exeter and two destroyers protecting a merchant convoy) when at 0610 hrs on 13 December 1939 the Allied forces sighted smoke. Graf Spee’s float plane

Page 3 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters was not operational, so Langsdorff had to rely on his observers. He had fairly accurate intelligence that the Force G, including Cumberland, was in the area of the River Platte, but relying on his observers’ estimation of a lesser force he decided to engage.

Soon realizing he was facing three cruisers, Langsdorff ordered immediate acceleration to close with the British at 24 knots (28 mph), intending to engage before the British could get up full steam. Critics of Langsdorff say he should have used his ship’s superior range to his advantage, maneuvering to keep the British ships in range of his 11.1‐inch (28.3 cm) guns while, at least at first, staying out of the range of their 6‐ and 8‐inch guns. The speed advantage of the cruisers conversely could have allowed them to stay out of range of Graf Spee’s guns while Force G summoned reinforcements, so Langsdorrf decided to force the issue.

Harwood stuck to his daylight plan. The ships split into two groups. Exeter headed northwest. Ajax, which was Harwood’s flagship, and Achilles headed northeast. Making use of her superior range, Graf Spee fired first at 0618 hours, taking Exeter under fire with from 19,000 yards with her 11.1‐inch guns. Two minutes later, Exeter began to return fire. A minute later Achilles opened fire. Another minute passed and Exeter’s aft guns bean to fire. Another minute passed and Ajax opened fire. It was now 0623 hours.

At 0623 hours shells were not just going up; they were coming down. An 11.1‐inch shell, a near miss, burst abreast of Exeter. Splinters from the shell killed torpedo tube crewmen and damaged equipment on deck, wrecking the ship’s spotter aircraft just about to be launched.

At 0626 hours a shell struck Exeter’s “B” turret putting both guns out of action. Shrapnel swept the bridge killing and wounding personnel. Communications were knocked out, including those with the aft conning position. For the rest of the battle Exeter would be steered using a chain of human messengers.

By 0630 hours, Ajax and Achilles had closed to within 13,000 yards of Graf Spee, causing her to split her main armament targeting.

At 0632 hours, the now wounded Exeter fired two torpedoes from her starboard tubes, and both missed.

At 0636 hours, Graf Spee left an easterly course to turn northwest, behind Ajax and Achilles and parallel to Exeter. She started to lay smoke.

At 0637 hours, Ajax launched her spotter plane.

At 0638 hours, while still being pummeled Exeter had managed to turn in order to fire her port torpedoes. Exeter was struck twice more by 11.1‐inch shells. “A” turret was put out of action and fires had started. Exeter now had only the “Y” turret operational, was

Page 4 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters taking on water, and was listing seven degrees. Fire control for the “Y” turret consisted of an officer on the roof of the turret shouting instructions to those inside. But an 8‐inch shell from the battered Exeter had already delivered what would turn out to be the decisive blow. The shell penetrated two decks and destroyed Graf Spee’s raw fuel cleaning and processing system leaving the ship with only 16 hours of diesel fuel. Graf Spee would not be returning home in its current state. Though damage to her combat systems thus far included the loss of two‐thirds of her anti‐aircraft guns and one secondary turret, the fuel system was key and could not be repaired while under fire. She had no support to call on, and friendly ports were beyond her reach.

At 0656 hours, Ajax and Achilles brought their guns to bear on Graf Spee. The German ship turned away from them and laid more smoke.

At 0710 hours, Ajax and Achilles turned towards the Graf Spee in order to reduce the range, even at the expense of being able to bring only their aft guns to bear.

At 0716, Graf Spee turned on the stricken Exeter, but within the next four minutes fire from the Ajax and Achilles forced the Graf Spee to turn her big guns on them. The pair turned to starboard and brought all of their guns to bear.

At 0724 hours, Ajax turned to starboard again, and fired torpedoes at Graf Spee at a range of 4.5 miles, causing Graf Spee to turn away and make smoke yet again. One minute later at 0725 hours Ajax paid a price for her audacity, bring struck by an 11.1‐ inch shell that caused casualties, put “X” turret out of action, and jammed “Y” turret.

The fight continued, showing signs of turning into a struggle of attrition. At 0730 hours, a splash from a near miss short‐circuited the electrical system for Exeter’s last functioning turret. She broke off action, but Graf Spee did not pursue. Ajax and Achilles were still closing on Graf Spee, and Langsdorff focused his attention on them.

By 0740 hours, one and a half hours after sighting Graf Spee, Ajax and Achilles were low on ordnance, and Harwood decided to change tactics. The British moved east obscured by smoke. Harwood decided to follow Graf Spee and attack again at night. This would accentuate his advantages of speed and maneuverability, but the risks were high. Nightfall was a long way off, especially in December in the Southern Hemisphere. Graf Spee could turn on the wounded British during the long remaining hours of daylight. As Harwood was making his decision Ajax was hit again by an 11.1‐inch shell, causing more casualties and destroying her mast.

Graf Spee continued southwest, and the pursuit was on. Ajax and Achilles kept about 15 miles from Graf Spee, with Ajax to port and Achilles to starboard.

At 0946 hours, Harwood finally called Cumberland for reinforcement. The British Admiralty, determined not to allow Graf Spee to escape, ordered ships within 3,000 miles of the action to the Platte River.

At 1010 hours, Achilles had closed the gap between her and Graf Spee, and for her troubles got a pair of three‐gun salvos. Achilles turned away making smoke.

Ajax and Achilles followed Graf Spee for the rest of the day, including past the British steamer Shakespeare, whose crew ignored instructions from the Graf Spee to abandon ship, yet due to Langsdorff’s haste, was not fired upon. At 1915 hours, Graf Spee turned and fired on Ajax, who turned away making smoke.

Graf Spee entered the Platte River estuary. Harwood ordered Achilles to continue to follow Graf Spee, while Ajax patrolled the other reaches of the 120‐mile wide estuary to ensure that the Graf Spee did not slip away through a different channel.

At 2048 hours, the sun finally set. Achilles strayed too close to Graf Spee one final time, drawing fire. Achilles turned away. These were the last shots fired. The British had suffered 72 dead, mostly from Exeter (61) and 28 wounded, while German casualties were thus far 36 dead and 60 wounded. The battle was over, but the fate of Graf Spee had yet to be resolved.

Graf Spee dropped anchor at a neutral port, Montevideo, Uruguay. The 13th Hague Convention, which forbids a belligerent warship from remaining in a neutral port for more than twenty‐four hours except due to damage, was invoked. British diplomats pressed an already favorably inclined neutral to force the Graf Spee to leave immediately. This was theater. The British were choreographing daily departures of British and French merchantmen from Montevideo, while the Uruguayan government enforced Article 16 of the Convention which prohibits warships from leaving a port within twenty‐four hours of the departure of a merchantman flying the flag of an opposing belligerent. Graf Spee was caught on fly paper while British warships made steam for Montevideo.

While the diplomatic dance was on, the British fed the Germans false intelligence about the strength of the Allied naval force lurking outside the estuary. Late on 14 December 1939, Cumberland arrived on the scene and was the only British warship expected to arrive before 19 December when overwhelming forces would arrive. Cumberland was only slightly superior to Exeter and outgunned by Graf Spee.

The Germans were fooled by the deception, while cognizant of their desperate fuel situation and depleted stocks of ammunition. Langsdorff in consultation with his high command was not given the option of internment in Uruguay. He believed that returning to action against the British fleet would cause loss of life with no possible gain of military advantage. Langsdorff ordered Graf Spee scuttled in the River Platte estuary

Page 6 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters on December 17, 1939. The crew of Graf Spee was taken to Buenos Aires, Argentine where they suffered their final casualty of the battle when Kapitän zur See Hans Langsdorff took his own life by gunshot.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_River_Plate

http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/battle_of_the_river_plate.htm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Exeter_(68)

Naval Action at Narvik

Prelude

On 1 March 1940, Adolf Hitler ordered the execution of Operation Weserübung, the invasion of Norway. For the operation, the Kriegsmarine organized five groups with the goal of occupying six Norwegian ports. Force I, commanded by Kommodore Friedrich Bonte, consisted of ten destroyers. Escorted part of the way by the battleships Scharnhorst and Gniesenau, Force I departed Bremerhaven on 6 April carrying 1,900 mountain troops from the 139th Mountain Regiment of the 3rd Mountain Division. The ground forces were commanded by General Eduard Dietl.

Germany got most of its iron ore from Sweden. The Ofotfjord leads to Narvik, an ice‐free port at the terminus of a rail line bringing iron ore from Sweden. Half of the ore that Germany obtained from Sweden came through Narvik. Both Axis and Allies sought to secure the ore for their own use. On 9 April 1940 Germany simultaneously invaded Norway and Denmark. Force I (minus the battleships and one destroyer, Deither von Roeder delayed by engine trouble) arrived at the Ofotfjord after unsuccessful British attempts to engage Force I. The British had mined the entrance to Narvik on the previous day. In fog and heavy snow, the German destroyers captured three Norwegian patrol boats, but not before one of the patrol boats raised the alarm with the local Norwegian naval commander.

The destroyers of Force I split up within the fjord to deliver their troops to their objectives. Wolfgang Zenker, Erich Koellner, and Hermann Künne delivered their Gebirgsjäger in a northern branch of Ofotfjord with the mission of capturing a Norwegian regimental supply base. Hans Ludemann and Herman Künne landed troops on a wild goose chase to neutralize nonexistent Norwegian forts.

In the face of the German assault, Norway was not going to roll over. Old Norwegian coastal defense ships put up a fight. Around 0415 hours on 9 April 1940, the German invaders were sighted, and when they failed to respond to a Norwegian signal, a shot

Page 7 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters was fired across the bow of the lead German destroyer. The Germans preferred to occupy Narvik peacefully, so responded to the signal and arranged to negotiate. Negotiations got underway, and the Germans tried to convince the Norwegians that they had come as friends, while also trying to persuade the Norwegians to surrender their coastal defense ships. They failed on both counts, and as the negotiators departed, the fighting started.

The Germans sunk both Norwegian coastal defense ships in a matter of minutes with a total loss to the Norwegians of 276 lives. The Germans suffered no casualties. Norwegian naval resistance at Narvik was over.

Fuel immediately became an issue for the German destroyers. Plans called for three tankers to be in the fjord with the destroyers, but two had been intercepted by British and Norwegian vessels, and only Jan Wellem was present to refuel the destroyers. Jan Wellem was a converted whale factory ship with improvised refueling capability. Two destroyers could be refueled at a time, but by early morning on 10 April 1940, only three of the nine destroyers had been refueled, and refueling was underway on two more.

First Naval Battle of Narvik

On 10 April 1940 the British navy struck. The 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, under the command of Captain Bernard Warburton‐Lee, entered the Ofotfjord. The flotilla was comprised of five H‐class destroyers: Hardy, Hotspur, Havoc, Hunter and Hostile. Warburton‐Lee had made Hardy his flagship. The late‐arriving Diether von Roeder had been posted as a picket ship at the entrance to the fjord, but had entered the fjord to queue up for refueling. Refueling was currently underway for Hermann Künne and Hans Lüdemann. The British attacked at 0430 hours, surprising the German force at the harbor entrance. They sank the Wilhelm Heidkamp and Anton Schmidt. Commodore Bonte, commander of Force I, went down with Wilhelm Heidkamp. Diether von Roeder was heavily damaged. Before leaving the British destroyers turned on the two dozen German and captured merchant ships in the harbor in order to deny their use to the Germans, and sank eleven of them.

As the British headed out to open water, they encountered German destroyers emerging from smaller fjords leading off Ofotfjord. Wolfgang Zenker, Erich Koellner, and Erich Giese emerged from Herjangsfjord, while Georg Thiele and Bernd von Arnim exited Ballangen Bay and joined the fray. In the ensuing melee, Hardy came aflame and was beached. Hunter was torpedoed and sunk. Hotspur was badly damaged by a torpedo. The British destroyers broke off the battle and continued to open water, damaging Georg Thiele on their way. The inadequate refueling capabilities of the German force came into play as they were unable to give pursuit due to low fuel. Shortage of ammunition was also a factor. The ammunition situation was not going to improve soon. On the way out of the fjord, the surviving British destroyers encountered and sank the

German ammunition supply ship Rauenfels. The final act of the First Naval Battle of Narvik occurred when U‐25 and U‐51 fired torpedoes at the withdrawing British destroyers. There were no hits, either due to poor aim or faulty torpedoes, as some were observed to detonate before reaching their targets. The battle was over. Cost in combat vessels was two destroyers for each of the major combatants. Both commanders had been killed.

Second Naval Battle of Narvik

The British needed a victory at Narvik for both political and strategic purposes, so committed a battleship, nine destroyers, and two naval air squadrons under the command of Vice Admiral William Whitworth to complete the destruction of the remaining eight German destroyers in Ofotfjord, now under the command of Fregattenkapitän Erich Bey. The British returned to Ofotfjord on 13 April 1940 to find the German forces still low on both fuel and ammo.

As a warm up to the surface ship action, a float‐equipped Swordfish aircraft launched from the catapult of the battleship Warspite bombed and sank U‐64 in Herjangsfjord, north of Narvik. The Swordfish made history in that it was the first case of an aircraft sinking a U‐boat during WWII, and it would stand as the only case of an aircraft launched from a battleship sinking a U‐boat. The Swordfish was not finished contributing and returned to its original mission, reconnaissance. It detected Erich Koellner trying to ambush the British ships. The full wrath of the British destroyers and battleship came down on her with shells and torpedoes, sinking Erich Koellner. Her commander and surviving crew were captured ashore by Norwegian forces. The British also attacked the German destroyers from the air, but the Swordfish torpedo/bomber aircraft from Furious had no success and lost two aircraft.

Four German destroyers (Wolfgang Zenker, Bernd von Arnim, Hans Ludemann and Hermann Künne) engaged the British forces, but were ineffective, only managing to lightly damage the destroyer Bedouin. As ammunition supplies went from low to critical, the German destroyers began to withdraw deeper into the fjord. Hermann Künne missed the withdraw order and was set upon by the destroyer Eskimo. Undamaged but out of ammunition, Hermann Künne was scuttled in Herjangsfjord. Eskimo pursued to ensure that Hermann Künne could not easily be refloated. She struck the Hermann Künne with a torpedo, setting it aflame. Eskimo, in turn, was attacked by Georg Thiele and Hans Ludemann. Eskimo lost her bow, but refused to sink.

Deither von Roeder and Erich Giese had engine problems and were docked, from whence they fired, damaging destroyers Punjabi and Cossack. Both German destroyers were sunk in place, and the German counterattack fizzled out. Warspite’s guns pounded shore batteries and installations to good effect. Warspite was the target of one final futile torpedo attack from U‐46 and U‐48 as she departed the fjord 14 April 1940.

The surviving German destroyers (Wolfgang Zenker, Georg Thiele, Bernd von Arnim, and Hans Lüdemann) fled into Rombaksfjord. Low on fuel and ammo, outgunned by a battleship, and with no counter to the British air component, the destroyers were scuttled.

Aftermath

On the water, the Germans had lost ten destroyers and one U‐boat, along with assorted cargo ships and an ammunition supply ship. The British had lost two destroyers. Not only were the losses lopsided, the German losses amounted to half of the Kriegsmarine’s destroyer strength. But in spite of the result on the water, the Allies had no ground forces immediately available to follow it up. Narvik and vicinity remained in German hands.

The Germans had approximately 5,000 ground forces at Narvik from various sources. The original 1,900 mountain troops were augmented by 2,600 sailors who had lost their destroyers. Approximately 300 specialist troops had arrived after passing through neutral Sweden while posing as health workers. And later in the land campaign, another 1,000 airborne troops were dropped in and rounded out German forces at above 5,000. Norwegian and other Allied troops in the Narvik vicinity would top out at about 24,500.

The Allied contingents sent to the vicinity of Narvik were a varied lot. Besides the Norwegians, there was a British detachment, a French expeditionary force that included two battalions of the Foreign Legion, and the Polish Independent Highland Brigade (so named for a highland region of southern Poland from whence it came; they did not wear kilts.) Though the contribution to the effort from the various Allies led to a substantial force, there was no unity of command for the Allies, or even unity of command between land and naval forces for the British, until 21 April 1940 when British Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cork was given supreme command of all Allied forces.

Other than Norwegian advances in the east, the Narvik front was quiet through early May 1940. Using an amphibious attack on 12 May 1940, the Allies cleared both sides of Herjangsfjord and planned to follow that up by attacking across Rombaksfjord toward Narvik. At 2340 hours on 28 May, the Allies began a naval bombardment in support of a coordinated attack on Narvik. The German commander decided to evacuate Narvik and did so before 0700 hours on 29 May. More than 6 weeks after the naval victory at Narvik, the Allies had achieved victory on land at Narvik.

But the wider Norwegian campaign would not be as successful. The Germans were pressed from three directions by Norwegians, French and Poles, and surrender began to look inevitable. But five days earlier on 24 May, due to the German advances in France and the Low Countries which had begun on 10 May, Lord Cork had received orders to withdraw from Norway. The attack on Narvik was to disguise British intentions and fool the Germans. It fooled the Norwegians, too, who were not informed of the withdrawal

Page 10 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters order until early June. Plans for Norway to carry on alone were realized as being futile, and King of Norway Haakon VII and his government were evacuated to Britain on 7 June 1940. The evacuation of Allied troops was already underway, and was completed on 8 June. The Germans under General Dietl re‐entered Narvik that same day, and Norwegian resistance ended on 10 June.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Narvik

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/timeline/factfiles/nonflash/a1148483.s html

http://www.naval‐history.net/WW2CampaignsNorway.htm

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/campaign_narvik_1940.html

Attack on Mers‐el‐Kébir

Introduction

On 3 July 1940, British naval forces attacked the French Navy at Mers‐el‐Kébir, a French base on the Mediterranean Sea in what was then French Algeria. The British had lost its most important ally at the time when on 22 June, France signed an armistice with the victorious Germans. A new French pro‐Nazi collaborationist government centered in Vichy had taken over France. This government had control over the second largest force of capital ships in Europe behind Britain. The British reasonably feared that the French navy would fall into the hands of the Germans just at a time when the Battle of the Atlantic was getting underway, negating their tenuous naval superiority at a critical juncture. Britain had given conditional consent for the French entering talks with the Germans for an armistice on the condition that the French fleet would sail immediately for British harbors. After the armistice, Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister and former First Lord of the Admiralty, was unconvinced by assurances from Vichy France that the French fleet would remain under its control. He felt that the risk of the French fleet coming under German control was too great. A combined German and Vichy fleet would be a serious challenge and might cut off Britain’s supply lines, sea communication with her empire, and links to British forces in North Africa. The Armistice between France and Germany precluded German demands on the French fleet, but by 1940 Germany’s word was worthless.

Prelude

Operation Catapult was the British plan to neutralize French ships not under British direct control. The first step of the operation was to grab the low‐hanging fruit, those ships that were in British or British‐controlled ports. It was successful, but not bloodless. The crew of a French submarine resisted at Portsmouth, killing three Royal Navy personnel and suffering one fatality themselves. Overall the British took two obsolete battleships, two destroyers, eight torpedo boats, six submarines, and other lesser vessels. The action created tension between the British and the French, including the Free French. It was only the beginning.

Mers‐el‐ Kébir was home to a powerful squadron of French ships including two WWI era battleships (Bretagne, Provence), two modern battleships (Dunkerque, Strasbourg), six destroyers (Mogador, Volta, Terrible, Kersaint, Lynx, Tigre), and a seaplane tender (Commandant Test). The French commander was Admiral Marcel‐Bruno Gensoul.

From Gibraltar, the British Force H commander, Admiral James Somerville (Vice‐Admiral in some sources), sent an ultimatum to Admiral Gensoul. The ultimatum demanded that the French fleet either join the British against the Germans, sail to some British, French Caribbean, or American port where they would be beyond the reach of the Germans, or be scuttled by the French. Failing to select one of the options would leave Admiral Somerville to take whatever actions necessary to ensure that the fleet did not fall into German hands. Admiral Gensoul had six hours to accept. The ultimatum was backed up by the carrier Ark Royal, battlecruiser Hood (Admiral Somerville’s flagship), battleships Valiant and Resolution, cruisers Arethusa and Enterprise, and destroyers Wrestler, Forester, Faulknor, Foxhound, Fearless, Escort, Foresight, Keppel, Active, Vidette and Vortigern. The submarine Pandora was part of the force, but was operating off Oran.

The negotiations got off to a bad start and went downhill. Admiral Somerville sent the commander of Ark Royal, French‐speaking Captain Cedric Holland, to present the ultimatum. Miffed that he would not be negotiating with a senior officer, Admiral Gensoul sent an underling to negotiate, leading to delay and confusion. The basis for a peaceful solution was there. French Navy Minister Admiral Darlan had already in earlier orders given Admiral Gensoul the option of moving the French fleet to American waters if the fleet was in danger of being seized by a foreign power. This option in the British ultimatum was not transmitted to Admiral Darlan when Admiral Gensoul sent an account of the British ultimatum. A possible nonviolent option was not taken. Another monkey wrench in the negotiations was Admiral Darlan’s order to French naval vessels in the Mediterranean to make steam for Mers‐el‐Kébir to assist Admiral Gensoul. The Admiralty intercepted the order. The British felt pressed for time. Negotiations had gone on for over two hours. At 1726 hours, Admiral Somerville radioed Admiral Gensoul and informed him that he had fifteen minutes in which to accept the ultimatum.

The Battle

The British force was comparable to the French fleet, but there were factors that gave the British an advantage. First, the French fleet was at anchor in a narrow harbor. Second, an attack was not expected in spite of the ultimatum, and the French ships were not ready for combat. Third, the two French modern battleships, Dunkerque and Strasbourg, were so positioned as to be unable to immediately bring their main armaments to bear. And finally, the 15‐inch guns of the British capital ships outgunned the French.

While negotiations were not yet terminated, the British made their first move. Ark Royal launched Swordfish torpedo aircraft, escorted by Skua fighter bombers, to drop magnetic mines on the Mers‐el‐ Kébir harbor exit route. French H‐75 fighters intercepted the British aircraft and shot down a Skua. Both crewmembers of the Skua were killed, and they would be the only British fatalities in the battle.

At 1754 hours on 3 July 1940, the British fleet executed Churchill’s orders and opened fire. They scored their first hit on their third salvo, causing the magazine on the battleship Bretagne to explode. At 1809 hours the Bretagne went down with 977 dead. French return fire was ineffectual. Dunkerque’s boiler was hit and she was immobile within the harbor. Provence and destroyer Mogador were damaged by the British fire and intentionally run aground within the harbor. Twenty minutes after the start of the battle Admiral Somerville ordered his surface vessels to cease fire.

Several French ships got underway, made it out of the harbor and successfully traversed the minefield. Strasbourg and four destroyers made it to open water, and came under attack by Ark Royal Swordfish armed with bombs. The bombing was ineffectual and cost the British two Swordfish shot down by antiaircraft fire. Their crews were rescued by the destroyer Wrestler. At 1843 hours Admiral Somerville ordered a surface pursuit of the fleeing French vessels. The British cruisers Arethusa and Enterprise reported firing on an unidentified French destroyer which escaped. At 2020 hours Admiral Somerville called off the surface pursuit but aircraft from Ark Royal continued their attack. At 2055 hours Swordfish attacked Strasbourg with no better results than the earlier attack. Strasbourg made its way to safety at the French port of Toulon, arriving the following day.

The British assessed the damage to Dunkerque and Provence to be low, so Swordfish returned to Mers‐el‐ Kébir on 6July 1940. The patrol boat Terre‐Neuve, moored alongside Dunkerque, was struck by a torpedo from a Swordfish, and its supply of depth charges exploded, causing serious damage to Dunkerque. Terre‐Neuve did not survive the explosion.

Epilogue

One French battleship, Bretagne, was sunk, five other ships were damaged, 1,297 French servicemen lost their lives, and about 350 were wounded. Two British airmen from Ark Royal were killed. Relations between the two nations that had fought side by side against Nazi Germany a mere two months earlier were wounded and sunk to an even lower stage than that reached with the installation of the collaborationist Vichy regime.

On 27 November 1942 the Germans did what was expected of them all along and tried to seize the French fleet at Toulon as they occupied Vichy France. Dunkerque and Strasbourg survived Mers‐el‐ Kébir only to be scuttled at Toulon, along with all the other ships there of any military value, before the Germans arrived. In a letter to Churchill days later, Admiral Darlan reminded him of their conversation in which he (Darlan) said that there was no question of ever surrendering the fleet. He said that the destruction of the fleet at Toulon proved him right. His unstated bottom line was that the Battle of Mers‐el‐ Kébir had been an unnecessary British betrayal.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Mers‐el‐K%C3%A9bir

http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/worldwari1/p/operation‐catapult.htm

http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/operation_catapult.htm

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/merselkebir.aspx

http://www.historynet.com/operation‐catapult‐naval‐destruction‐at‐mers‐el‐kebir.htm

http://forum.worldofwarships.com/index.php?/topic/11107‐battle‐of‐mers‐el‐kebir/

Battle of Calabria

Prelude

Italian ground forces fighting for the Axis in North Africa required supply convoys from Italy to keep them in fighting trim. Early in the war, supply efforts were needed just to get Italian forces equipped for offensive operations. On 6 July 1940, an Italian convoy of four merchantmen left Naples bound for Benghazi, shaping their route to deceive the British into thinking that they were bound for Tripoli, but British code breakers knew the true Italian plans. (The Italians were reading British mail, too.) The merchantmen were joined by two torpedo boats and a fifth merchantman and escorts the following day. It was a substantial convoy for this theater. The payload was 2,190 troops, 72 M‐11 medium tanks, 232 vehicles, 10,445 tons of supplies, and 5,720 tons of fuel and

Page 14 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters lubricants. Some vessels originally with the convoy, primarily destroyers, did not take part in the ensuing battle due to mechanical problems or fuel shortages. (Combatants for both sides are shown in Table 1.)

Britain was also sending a resupply and reinforcement convoys to Malta at the same time. The British Malta convoy was to return to Alexandria in Egypt with evacuees. The convoy was divided into two groups based on the speed that the merchantmen could maintain, a fast group (13 knots) and a slow group (9 knots). Convoy escorts were divided into three groups. Force A had five cruisers and a destroyer. Force B had the battleship Warspite (last seen by our readers pounding German destroyers at Narvik) and five destroyers. Force C was the main body of escorts and consisted of the battleships Royal Sovereign and Malaya, the aircraft carrier Eagle, and ten destroyers. The vessels that took part in the battle are shown in Table 1.

At 1440 hours on 8 July 1940, two Italian Cant Z.506 triple engine float planes based out of Tobruk sighted and followed the British fleet. The Italian commander, Admiral Inigo Campioni, ordered the warships in the convoy fleet to turn eastward towards the British and prepare to give combat. He was overruled by the Italian Supreme Command who did not want to risk what would have been a night engagement by the time the two fleets met. Instead the Italians avoided contact for the time being, and dealt with logistics problems. Two cruisers and three destroyers were detached to refuel in Sicily, and the merchantmen kept several destroyers as escorts. A destroyer group from Taranto was called up to replace the detached destroyers.

Meanwhile, the Italians took up the cudgel against the British fleet using air attacks. From mid‐morning to early evening, 72 land‐based bombers of the Regia Aeronautica harried the British from 12,000 feet. The hope was to weaken the British fleet to set up the surface battle. The British escaped with only a single hit, but a telling one, on the cruiser Gloucester. A hit on the bridge killed 17 including the ship’s captain, and wounded 9 more. Gloucester would remain on duty, but would have to be controlled from an emergency station.

Later in the day on 8 July 1940 the Italians lost contact with the British fleet. During the evening the British commander, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, maneuvered so as to keep his fleet between the Italian fleet and their return route to the Gulf of Taranto while at the same time avoiding Italian air reconnaissance. He was successful. His position remained a mystery to the Italian commander until 1330 hours on 9 July. On the other hand, the location of the Italian fleet was made known to Admiral Cunningham at 0730 hours when a reconnaissance aircraft from Malta spotted the Italians at 0730 hours and tailed them for four hours.

Table 1. The Combatants Battle of Calabria 9‐Jul‐40 Italy Britain Conti di Cavour Battleship Eagle Carrier Giulio Cesare Battleship NAS 813 (Torpedo) Swordfish Zara Cruiser NAS 824 (Torpedo) Swordfish Fiume Cruiser Warspite Battleship Gorizia Cruiser Malaya Battleship Pola Cruiser Royal Sovereign Battleship Bolzano Cruiser Orion Cruiser Trento Cruiser Neptune Cruiser Eugenio de Savoia Cruiser Sydney (AUS) Cruiser Emanuele Filiberto Duca d'Aosta Cruiser Gloucester Cruiser Muzio Attendolo Cruiser Liverpool Cruiser Raimondo Montecuccoli Cruiser Nubian Destroyer Alberico de Barbiano Cruiser Mohawk Destroyer Alberto di Giussano Cruiser Hero Destroyer Duca degli Abruzzi Cruiser Hereward Destroyer Giuseppe Garibaldi Cruiser Decoy Destroyer Vittorio Alfieri Destroyer Stuart (AUS) Destroyer Artigliere Destroyer Hyperion Destroyer Lanciere Destroyer Hostile Destroyer Leone Pancaldo Destroyer Hasty Destroyer Dardo Destroyer Ilex Destroyer Sestri Ponente Destroyer Dainty Destroyer Freccia Destroyer Defender Destroyer Saetta Destroyer Juno Destroyer Strale Destroyer Janus Destroyer Marconi Submarine Vampire (AUS) Destroyer Voyager (AUS) Destroyer

The Battle

At 1200 hours on 9 July 1940 the opposing fleets were 90 miles apart off Calabria, the toe of Italy. Admiral Cunningham untethered the faster Warspite (28 knots) from the slower Royal Sovereign and Malaya (18 knots), and sent in Warspite supported by cruisers without them. At 1310 hours Admiral Campioni received orders from the Italian Supreme Command to engage the British and to keep the action close to the Italian

Page 16 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters mainland and airbases. At 1315 hours Eagle launched Swordfish against the Italian heavy cruisers with no success.

By 1400 hours Admiral Cunnigham had successfully maneuvered his fleet to cut off the Italian fleet from its base in Taranto. The Allies were formed up with the cruiser group as their leading edge, followed by Warspite. At 1452 hours, Neptune made the first British report of an enemy fleet since Jutland during WWI, and the first sighting in the Mediterranean since Nelson sailed there. At 1515 hours at a range of 21,500 meters the Italian cruisers opened fire. Neptune and Liverpool responded at 1517 hours. The gunnery capabilities of the two opponents differed but were well matched. Italian range finding was superior to that of the British. Allied gunlaying was superior, and they could produce tighter shot groups. At 1522 hours the Italian fire began to come close to the cruisers, so Vice Admiral John Tovey broke off the engagement a mere seven minutes in. It was none too soon for Neptune, however, which was struck at this time by splinters from a round fired by Giuseppe Garibaldi. Neptune’s reconnaissance aircraft was rendered unusable, and the catapult was damaged. By 1530 hour the opening round of the surface engagement ended and firing ceased.

The fight moved “up card” to the heavyweights. Warspite started taking Italian cruisers under fire, but her early rounds fell short. The Italian cruisers retired under smoke. Warspite was unable to press the battle, and instead circled in place to allow Malaya to catch up. Royal Sovereign was still hopelessly out of the action.

Admiral Campioni moved his two battleships forward to counter Warspite. At 1548 hours Giulio Cesare opened fire on Warspite at a range of 26,400 meters. Conte di Cavour was with Giulio Cesare, but held her fire. Her assigned targets were Malaya and Royal Sovereign, still out of range. The decision not to add the fire of Conte di Cavour to that of Giulio Cesare because of the difficulty rangefinding parties had identifying their own splashes when more than one ship was firing on the same target. Warspite assumed both ships were immediate threats and split her fire between the two. Long fire from Giulio Cesare caused light damage to Warspite’s escort destroyers, Hereward and Decoy. At 1555 hours the Italian cruisers, counting on Warspite’s fire to be concentrated on the Italian battleships, reentered the fray but were driven off by the return of the Allied cruisers.

The battleships began to get the range. At 1559 hours two rounds from Giulio Cesare nearly hit Warspite, while one of Warspite’s 15‐inch rounds struck Giulio Cesare killing 66 and wounding 49. At a range of over 24,000 meters and a 33‐second flight, it was one of the longest naval artillery hits in history. Though the structural damage was superficial, a secondary effect proved very damaging. Stored anti‐aircraft ammo had been set off, and smoke from the resulting fire was drawn into the engine room causing an evacuation and the shutting down of half the boilers. Giulio Cesare’s speed dropped to 18 knots, and Conte di Cavour shifted her attention from Malaya to Warspite. The Italian cruiser Bolzano was also struck but without serious damage.

Warspite appeared to have the hobbled Giulio Cesare for the picking, put again turned off to allow the Malaya to catch up. At 1601 hours, Italian destroyers made smoke and their larger brethren reached concealment.

Meanwhile the cruisers reentered the battle. At 1558 hours Fiume opened fire on Liverpool, and was soon joined by Zara, Bolanzo and Pola. Gorizia and Trento entered firing range and commenced firing. At 1607 hours Neptune struck back avenging the loss of her reconnaissance aircraft, hitting Bolzano with three 6‐inch rounds. The hits temporarily locked Bolzano’s rudder and caused two fatalities in the torpedo room. On the fringes of the battle, a near miss caused minor damage to an Italian destroyer, Vitorio Alfieri.

Back on Giulio Cesare, repairs had been made to the extent that the battleship could make 22 knots, but she was withdrawn from battle along with Conte di Cavour, as Admiral Campioni considered the matchup between his one good battleship and the three British battleships and a carrier as too unfavorable.

Destroyers from both sides made long range torpedo attacks, but there were no hits. At 1640 hours, the final act of the battle took place as 126 Italian aircraft attacked the British fleet. Eagle, Warspite and Malaya all suffered minor damage. Showing no partiality, about 50 of the Italian aircraft also attacked Italian ships, but none were damaged. The next day, 9 July 1940, at 0940 hours the British naval air arm offered a riposte, and a Swordfish sunk the destroyer Leone Pancaldo. It was shallow water, however, and the Leone Pancaldo was raised and back in service in less than a year and a half.

Epilogue

Both fleets made for home ports after the battle. The Italian cargo ships had sailed past the action and made it safely to Libya. This was the primary basis of Italians claimed of victory. These claims may have also been inspired by inflated battle reports from the Regia Aeronautica claiming to have damaged half of the Allied fleet. In fact the air superiority that the Italians enjoyed was ineffectively employed and achieved nothing other than minor damage to Gloucester. On the Allied side of the ledger, their cargo ships and escorts also made it safely to their destination. A lesson learned was that modern battleships were needed. The older models were more of a hindrance than a help. Ultimately, with only one ship, the Italian destroyer Leone Pancaldo, sunk the first battle between the belligerents in the Med during WWII can fairly be said to have had an indecisive outcome.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Calabria

http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=8466

http://www.desertwar.net/battle‐of‐calabria.html

http://regiamarina.net/detail_text_with_list.asp

http://www.naval‐history.net/WW2CampaignsRNMed.htm

https://sites.google.com/site/mezeviris/battleofcalabria

http://blog.mongoosepublishing.co.uk/?p=338

http://www.gunplot.net/matapan/scrapironflott3.html

Battle of Cape Spada

Prelude

On 19July 1940, ten days after the Battle of Calabria, the British Navy pitted five veteran ships of Calabria and one veteran of the First Battle of Narvik against two untested cruisers of the Italian Navy. The engagement took place in the Mediterranean Sea off Crete’s Cape Spada, the northwest end of the island.

The two Italian high‐speed light cruisers, Giovanni dalle Bande Nere and Bartolomeo Colleoni, were enroute from Tripoli in North Africa to a new duty station at Leros in the Dodecanese Islands. The two cruisers formed the 2nd Cruiser Division and were commanded by Vice Admiral Fernando Casardi. While transiting the Aegean they were discovered by an Allied surface patrol. The Allied squadron consisted of the HMAS Sydney, the British H class destroyers Havock, Hyperion, Hasty and Hero, and I class destroyer Ilex. Havock had been at Narvik, the rest at Calabria. The Allied force was commanded by Australian Captain John Collins.

Battle

Sydney and Havock were on a sweep for submarines near the approaches to the Gulf of Athens and were approximately 64 kilometers (40 miles) north of the four other British destroyers when the four destroyers encountered the Italian cruisers at 0730 hours on 19 July 1940. The destroyers alerted Sydney at 0733 hours. The Italian cruisers pursued the outgunned British destroyers north, but without using their IMAM Ro. 43 reconnaissance aircraft, they did not know that they were being drawn towards Sydney. Sydney, however, was kept abreast of developments by wireless from the bait destroyers while maintaining radio silence herself. The crew of the Sydney took up battle stations at 0815 hours. The Italian cruisers came within sight of Sydney at 0826 hours and three minutes later Sydney opened fire from 18,300 meters. The Italian

Page 19 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters cruisers gave up the chase and turned southwest. At this point the speed advantage of the Italian cruisers was negated by the course they were forced to take. Going directly south would trap them between Crete and Sydney. Going southwest gave Sydney an approach angle that ensured an engagement.

The hunters had become the hunted. Sydney gave chase, making her top speed of 32.5 knots. The Italians made smoke. Sydney fired upon whichever ship was visible at a given moment. She pounded Bartolomeo Colleoni. The light armor of the Italian cruisers was scant protection against Sydney’s shells. These Condottieri class light cruisers bore the less than confidence‐building nickname “cruisers of paper”. Shots from Sydney struck Bartolomeo Colleoni’s boilers at 0923 hours and she drifted to a stop, dead in the water. Her main guns were gone and she could not maneuver, but Bartolomeo Colleoni fought on with her 3.9 inch (100 mm) guns until, at 0959 hours, torpedoes from Ilex and Hyperion sent her to the bottom. The dead numbered 121, while 555 were rescued by the British destroyers despite harassment by Italian bombers.

Sydney could now concentrate all her fire on Giovanni dalle Bande Nere, and traded hits. Sydney sustained damage to her foremost funnel resulting in one man wounded, while Giovanni dalle Bande Nere was struck at least twice and suffered eight killed. But Sydney was unable to finish the job. With her ammo low and Giovanni dalle Bande Nere pulling away, she gave up the chase at 1037 hours. Giovanni dalle Bande Nere returned to North Africa, making port at Benghazi.

Epilogue

With the Giovanni dalle Bande Nere at large, Allied shipping was disrupted. Convoy AN.2 out of Port Said was ordered back to port where it remained until the Allies were certain that Giovanni dalle Bande Nere was no longer at sea. The British battleship Warspite made an appearance at the end, and with a screen of destroyers made sure that Giovanni dalle Bande Nere did, in fact, go back to a North African port. Havock suffered a flooded boiler when she was damaged by Italian bombers trying to keep pursuing British ships away from the coast of North Africa.

While searching for Giovanni dalle Bande Nere, a floatplane from Warspite developed engine trouble and had to ditch in the sea near Tobruk. The crew was rescued by the Italians and became POWs. Meanwhile, Captain Umberto Narvi, commander of the Bartolomeo Colleoni and one of the 555 rescued Italian sailors, died of wounds aboard a British hospital ship in Alexandria. He was buried with full naval honors in the British military cemetery there, and his funeral was well attended by British sailors. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cape_Spada

http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages‐battles/ww2/cape‐spada.htm

http://museum.wa.gov.au/explore/sydney/history‐hmas‐sydney‐ii

Battle of Dakar

Prelude

The port of Dakar and French West Africa (modern Senegal) had a number of attractions to Allied forces in the early fall of 1940. Capture of the port would deprive Vichy France of a colony, and bring another French colony over to the Allies (to join Cameroun and French Equatorial Africa already with the Free French). French West Africa was at that time the unlikely location of the gold reserves of both the Polish government in exile and the Banque de France. Finally, the only port that the Allies had in the area was at Freetown, Sierra Leone, and this port was inferior to the port of Dakar.

Just over two months earlier, a British attack at Mers‐el‐Kébir had neutralized a French fleet that the British feared would fall into German hands. This time the leader of the Free French, General Charles de Gaulle, would attempt to get the French forces at Dakar to change sides before force would be used. The Allies sent a task force of one aircraft carrier, two battleships, five cruisers, and eleven destroyers (Table 1) to support what was codenamed Operation Menace. They were accompanied by troop transports carrying 8,000 soldiers. Should the peaceful approach fail, they were to take the port by force.

Table 1. The Combatants France Britain Richelieu Battleship Ark Royal* Carrier NAS 800 Georges Leygues Cruiser (Fighter/Bomber) Skaus NAS 803 Montcalm Cruiser (Fighter/Bomber) Skaus El Dzejair Aux Cruiser NAS 807 (Fighter) Fulmar El Kantara Aux Cruiser NAS 810 (Torpedo) Swordfish El Mansour Aux Cruiser NAS 820 (Torpedo) Swordfish Schoelcher Aux Cruiser Barham Battleship Ville d'Oran Aux Cruiser Resolution Battleship Audacieux Destroyer Australia (AUS) Cruiser Fantasque Destroyer Cumberland Cruiser Malin Destroyer Devonshire Cruiser Hardi Destroyer Dragon Cruiser Ajax Submarine Dehli Cruiser

Bévéziers Submarine Echo Destroyer Persée Submarine Eclipse Destroyer Escapade Destroyer Faulknor Destroyer Foresight Destroyer Forester Destroyer Fortune Destroyer Fury Destroyer Griffin Destroyer Greyhound Destroyer Inglefield Destroyer

The Allied force had some combat veteran ships, including veterans of the attack on the French fleet at Mers‐el‐Kébir. The aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the battleship Resolution, and the destroyers Faulknor, Foresight, and Forester had all battled the French there. Forester had also been at the second battle at Narvik. The cruiser Cumberland had been at the River Platte. The Allied commander was Admiral John Cunningham.

The French fleet at Dakar had one battleship, two cruisers, five auxiliary cruisers, four destroyers, and three submarines. The French lacked combat experience, except for the Richelieu. Richelieu was only 95% complete when she left Brest just ahead of the Germans on 18 June 1940. Once at Dakar, and after the establishment of the Vichy regime, Richelieu was attacked and torpedoed by aircraft from the HMS Hermes, who days before had been operating with the French forces there. Rendered immobile by the torpedo damage, Richelieu, one of the most advanced warships in the French fleet, was reduced to serving as a floating gun battery.

Battle

The battle started mildly enough. On 23 September 1940 the British fleet aircraft dropped leaflets rather than bombs over Dakar. Free French aircraft crews and emissaries flying from Ark Royal to nearby Ouakam airfield were taken prisoner as soon as they landed. The Vichy did not want to talk. Free French trying to peacefully enter Dakar by boat in the port were given an even less friendly welcome, and were fired upon. This set the tone for subsequent encounters. At 1000 hours Vichy ships trying to leave port were given warning shots from Australia, and returned to port. Once the ships were back, coastal batteries opened fire on Australia, leading to a lively exchange between the British fleet and the coastal guns. An attempt later in the day to land Free French on a beach south‐east of Dakar was scrubbed when it drew heavy fire from strongpoints on the shore. Weather was also a factor, as a heavy fog caused confusion.

The first surface engagement occurred that same afternoon when the Vichy destroyer Audaceiux ignored the warning shots fired earlier in the day, sallied forth, was intercepted by the Australia, fired upon, and set aflame. Audaceiux had to be beached.

Leaflets having been ineffective, the British tried bombs on 24 September 1940. A series of three aerial attacks were made. The first was made by six Skua fighter bombers carrying 500‐pound bombs against Richelieu, but no hits were made. The second attack was made by six Swordfish carrying 250‐pound bombs against the coastal batteries. This attack also failed. The third attack was a return visit to Richelieu. Three Skuas and three Swordfish attacked, and again the attack failed. The aerial attacks cost the British three Skuas and three Swordfish shot down. The leaflet drops were as effective and less costly.

During the rest of the 24th and into 25 September 1940, the fighting was mainly between British fleet and the coastal batteries including the floating battery Richelieu, which did not fare well. Barham struck Richelieu with two 15‐inch shells. Richelieu was ineffective striking back. She had gun failures and propellant problems. Richelieu was using reconditioned propellant left at Dakar the previous winter by the battleship Strasbourg, a participant in the battle of Mers‐el‐Kébir. The degraded propellant reduced the range of the Richelieu’s guns and created fire control difficulties. Richelieu went 0 for 24, not scoring a single hit over the two days of action. Barham was struck twice herself, and if not from Richelieu guns, Richelieu still got a measure of revenge. The coastal batteries that hit Barham were manned by crewmen from Richelieu, redeployed when the ship’s No. 1 main turret become nonoperational.

At the end of the day on 24 September 1940 British naval air tried once more, this time with torpedoes. A flight of nine Swordfish escorted by three Skuas went for the French cruisers. Thick flak and evasive maneuvers prevented any torpedo hits. Two planes were shot down bringing the number of lost British aircraft to eight.

If the Vichy surface ships (other than Audaceiux) would not or could not come out to fight, the subsurface ships would. The Vichy submarine Bévéziers torpedoed the British battleship Resolution. Damage to Resolution was so severe that she had to be towed to Capetown, South Africa for repairs. The submarines Persée and Ajax were not as successful. Both were sunk before they could strike any Allied ships.

Results

It was clear that the Vichy French were not going to negotiate or back down. De Gaulle had oversold his ability to bring the garrison over to the Allies’ side, and his reputation amongst the Allies suffered accordingly. Dakar and French West Africa would remain in Vichy hands. One would have to go all the way to French Equatorial Africa to find a Free French garrison on the continent. Perhaps that is why Rick and Louis planned to go from Casablanca all the way to Brazzaville.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_DakarOne

http://www.desertwar.net/battle‐of‐dakar.html

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kiNJcDG4E0

http://ww2today.com/23‐september‐1940‐the‐french‐fire‐on‐the‐british‐at‐dakar

http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=12077

http://armedforcesmuseum.com/wwii‐west‐africa‐campaign/

http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=96

http://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/178286‐unknown‐and‐unsung‐battle‐ of‐the‐second‐world‐war‐remembering‐dakar/

Battle of Taranto

Prelude

The Battle of Taranto took place on the night of 11/12 November 1940 between forces of the British navy and the Italian navy. The battle was a rematch of sorts for the commanders facing off. Admiral Andrew Cunningham commanded the British Mediterranean Fleet, while Admiral Inigo Campioni commanded the Italian forces. They had fought to a draw at the Battle of Calabria four months earlier. The British task force that fought the Battle of Taranto was commanded by Rear Admiral Lumley Lyster.

Taranto is a port city on Italy’s southeast coast. The British working assumption was that the Italians vessels kept there were the major part of a “fleet in being”. Though a threat to the Allies due to its existence, the Italian fleet would not seek battle on the open seas. They would sally forth to interdict British efforts to resupply and reinforce their forces in North Africa (and Malta), but would stay conservative. Convoy support was a task not planned for and adopted by Italy until after Italy entered the war. The Italian fleet outnumbered the British fleet in every vessel class except aircraft carrier, but Italy had no hope of replacing any losses larger than a destroyer.

The British had contingency plans dating back to 1935 for the seizure of Taranto. After the Munich Crisis of 193, Commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet Admiral Sir Dudley Pound modified the plans to consist of a night attack on the harbor using Fairey TSR Swordfish aircraft carrying torpedoes. Training for such a mission began, and security was so tight that no written records were kept. Pound turned his command

Page 24 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters over to Cunningham with a recommendation to consider the attack, which became known as Operation Judgment (also found as Operation Judgement).

Operation Judgment was originally planned for 21 October 1940. It was Tafalgar Day, a good omen. However, mishaps aboard the aircraft carrier Eagle caused the mission to be scrubbed. Auxiliary fuel tanks had been mounted on the Swordfish to give them the ranged needed for the mission, and fire broke out in one of the tanks and spread. Additionally, Eagle’s fuel system broke down. She was replaced in the mission by Illustrious. The mission was rescheduled for the night of 11/12 November, which would make it part of Operation MB8, a series of ten naval operations in the Med. The flurry of activity was expected to confuse the Italians and work to the advantage of Operation Judgment.

In addition to the Illustrious, Rear Admiral Lumley’s force consisted of the heavy cruisers Berwick and York, the light cruisers Gloucester and Glasgow, and the destroyers Hyperion, Ilex, Hasty and Havelock. Among the two dozen Italian capital ships at Taranto were the battleships Conti di Cavour, Andria Doria, Littorio, Vittorio Veneto and Caio Duilio, the cruisers Gorizia and Trento, and the destroyers Lebeccio and Passagno. Hyperion, Ilex and Hasty had been at the battles of Calabria and Cape Spada. Gloucester had been at Calabria. Conti di Cavour, Gorizia and Trento had been at Calabria. But this was to be a new type of naval battle, and previous surface experience would not yield high dividends.

Preparation

The naval aircraft that would figure so prominently in the battle consisted of 21 Swordfish from the 813, 815, 819 and 824 Naval Air Squadrons (NAS), down from 24 Swordfish due to contaminated fuel and other technical difficulties. There was concern that the force was too small. Only half of the Swordfish were to carry torpedoes while the other half carried bombs (and flares meant for diversions). Casualties of 50% were expected. The final squadron in the task force, 806 NAS, was a fighter squadron and would fly cover for the task force with Fairey Fulmars.

Reconnaissance flights from Malta confirmed the presence of the Italian fleet at Taranto. Photos taken during these flights revealed previously undetected barrage balloons. Appropriate changes were made to flight approaches. On the night of 11 November 1940 as the attack was forming up, one final reconnaissance aircraft overflew Taranto to make sure that the Italian fleet was present. The Italian fleet was present, and an attack on the harbor was not expected.

The Attack

The British attack would face a harbor defense of 101 anti‐aircraft guns and 193 machineguns in addition to ships’ guns. Passive defensive measures included barrage

Page 25 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters balloons and torpedo nets. Twenty‐seven barrage balloons were in place on the night of the attack. Originally 87 balloons had been installed, but high winds and lack of hydrogen had reduced the number deployed to 27. Capital ships were protected by torpedo nets, but only one third of the required netting was in place at the time of the attack. Additionally, the nets allowed a gap of over two feet (60 cm) between the bottom of the net and the bottom of the harbor. Getting a torpedo through that gap might be difficult, but the British were more afraid that their torpedoes would bottom out in the harbor mud. If they could avoid that pitfall, there was a small but sufficient gap to exploit. A torpedo travelling just above the bottom and passing below a ship would still explode due to its magnetic proximity fuse. Bombs would be used too, so the attack did not depend entirely on torpedoes.

At 2040 hours on 11 November 1940 the first wave of NAS 815 aircraft, six Swordfish with bombs and six with torpedoes, launched from Illustrious. A second wave left at 2134 hours but had one aircraft turn back due to an auxiliary fuel tank problem. The timing of the assault allowed the aircraft to attack in the direction of the rising moon.

The first wave unintentionally split into two sections when three torpedo‐armed Swordfish and one bomb‐armed Swordfish became separated in the thin cloud cover. This small group of strays continued on to Taranto.

At 2258 hours the main group reached the harbor from the southwest. An aircraft dropped flares, and then was joined by a second aircraft in an attack on the oil tanks, which they set aflame. The next three aircraft, led by NAS 815 commander Lieutenant Commander K. Williamson, used this other‐worldly illumination to attack the battleship Conti di Cavour. A torpedo put a 27‐ft hole below the waterline in the side of Conti di Cavour. Lieutenant Commander Williamson’s Swordfish was shot down by Conti di Cavour’s anti‐aircraft guns and both crewmen were captured. The two surviving aircraft pressed on to attack the battleship Andrea Doria, but in spite of excellent flying while dodging barrage balloons in heavy anti‐aircraft fire, they were unable to hit her.

The next three aircraft from the first wave came in from a slightly more northerly vector and went after the battleship Littorio, striking it with two torpedoes. The third torpedo missed the battleship Vittorio Veneto. The bombers in the first wave attacked next. They targeted cruisers and destroyers, but had no hits.

The second wave arrived just before midnight from the southwest and its lead aircraft dropped flares. Two aircraft attacked Littorio with torpedoes, and the battleship suffered her third torpedo hit. An aircraft launched a torpedo at Vittorio Veneto, but the ship’s luck held and the torpedo missed. The battleship Caio Duilio was not as lucky, and was hit by a torpedo. She sustained a large hole in her hull and both of her forward magazines were flooded. The cruiser Gorizia shot down a Swordfish while it was attacking Littorio. Both crewmen were killed.

Results

Conti di Cavour, hit by a torpedo, sunk. Permission to ground the ship came too late. Fortunately she sunk in a relatively shallow spot, and her superstructure and armaments were above water. She was raised and was still undergoing repairs when Italy switched sides in the war. Conti di Cavour saw no further action.

Damage to the Caio Duilio caused by the torpedo strike was serious, but she was able to run aground and save herself from sinking. It took seven months to repair her.

The three torpedo strikes suffered by Littorio caused extensive damage, considerable flooding and 32 fatalities. Somehow Littorio staggered along far enough to beach herself. She was repaired in five months.

Two Italian aircraft were destroyed by bombing. The destroyer Pessagno was damaged by near misses. The cruiser Trento and the destroyer Libeccio were struck by bombs that failed to explode. (In all about 25% of the 60 bombs dropped failed to explode.)

The British lost two aircraft to anti‐aircraft fire. The Italians had fired 13,489 shells from land batteries and several thousand more from the ships in harbor. The initial British estimate of 50% losses proved overly pessimistic despite the volume of fire that the British aircraft faced.

Aftermath

Regia Marina Italiana moved all undamaged ships from Taranto to Naples. Though losses had been severe, they did not diminish Italian capacity to support Axis convoys to North Africa. Nor was the overall balance of naval forces in the Mediterranean tipped in favor of the British. The British success was only tactical in nature, providing a temporary superiority in capital ships. (For a detailed critique of British force composition for the mission, weapons selection, target selection and follow‐up see the United States Naval War College paper cited in the references below.)

A major technical development of the battle was the use of a combination of measures to prevent torpedoes from running deep. The Mark XII torpedoes were found to be prone to dive when the high speed setting of 40 knots was used. The tendency was much less at a setting of 29 knots, and that is the setting that was used for the raid. Also, by releasing the torpedoes at a lower altitude and using a wire attached to the nose of the torpedo and connected to the aircraft, the nose could be pulled up forcing the torpedo to be almost horizontal when it entered the water. This allowed torpedoes to run shallower then the 12 meter depth of the Taranto harbor. Previously, with torpedoes entering the water nose first, 23 meters was the accepted minimum depth. Shallow ports would no longer offer protection from torpedo attacks.

Finally, it is possible that the Japanese navy took the lessons from the Battle of Taranto and applied them to the attack on Pearl Harbor. On at least two occasions after the British attack, Japanese officers visited Taranto. One of these officers, assistant naval attaché to Berlin Lieutenant Commander Takeshi Naito, had a subsequent conversation with Commander Mitsuo Fuchida who would lead the air attack on Pearl Harbor within two months of the conversation.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Taranto

http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/worldwari1/p/taranto.htm

https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/92c2c6b2‐c918‐40c1‐b56a‐ f718ff8b30c9/Attack‐at‐Taranto,‐The‐‐Tactical‐Success,‐Operatio.aspx

http://forum.worldofwarships.com/index.php?/topic/4843‐battle‐of‐taranto‐the‐ inspiration‐of‐pearl‐harbor/

http://ww2today.com/11th‐november‐1940‐italian‐fleet‐attacked‐in‐taranto‐harbour

https://todayshistorylesson.wordpress.com/tag/battle‐of‐taranto/

http://worldwariipodcast.net/2013/02/battle‐taranto/

Battle of Cape Spartivento

Prelude

Two weeks after the Battle of Taranto, on 27 November 1940 the British Royal Navy and the Italian Regia Marina were at it again off Sardinia in the Battle of Cape Spartivento. Even sooner after their loses at Taranto, the resilient Italians had capital ships confronting the Royal Navy. On the night of 17 November, the Italian battleships Vittorio Veneto (a Taranto survivor) and Giulio Cesare, attempted to intercept the British carriers Ark Royal (veteran of Mers‐el‐Kébir and Dakar) and Argus. The carriers were enroute to Malta from Gibraltar to deliver aircraft. The British aircraft carriers and escorting vessels were warned and turned back for Gibraltar, but the aircraft (two Skuas and twelve Hurricanes) were launched before the planned release point. One Skua and eight Hurricanes ran out of fuel and had to ditch in the sea, with a loss of seven airmen. A larger effort to resupply and re‐equip Malta was organized and dispatched, including ships from both Gibraltar (Force H) and Alexandria, Egypt (Force D). Italian intelligence was aware of Force H from Gibraltar, and the Italian fleet sallied forth to meet it.

The Battle

British Intelligence was also alert, and the movement of the Italian fleet was known to the British commander, Admiral James Somerville. The British combatant vessels of Force H detached from the cargo ships of the convoy and sailed north to intercept the Italians. Aircraft from Ark Royal spotted an Italian force of five cruisers and five destroyers at 0956 hours on 27 November 1940. This flotilla outgunned Force H, but things were happening fast. At 1011 hours Force D arrived on the scene and the odds were evened. The Italians had the advantages of greater firing range and heavier fire capability, but the British estimated that their naval air assets would offset the Italian advantages. The Italian commander, Admiral Inigo Campioni, had orders to avoid combat unless the odds were heavily in his favor, so a decisive battle between the two roughly even forces was unlikely.

Admiral Somerville arranged the British forces into three groups. The first group consisted of five cruisers and was commanded by Rear Admiral Lancelot Holland. The cruiser group was stationed forward. A second group to the south consisted of two battleships and seven destroyers. The third group was the Ark Royal and her attendant vessels, but Ark Royal and her aircraft did not figure in what was to be a surface gunnery battle. (Conflicting sources say that either the Swordfish were never launched, or they attacked and were ineffective.) The Italians were organized into two primary groups. The first consisted of six cruisers and seven destroyers, and it was positioned forward. A group of two battleships and six destroyers was to the rear.

At 1207 hours, a recon report sent from a Gorizia floatplane indicated to the Italian commander that the battle he was poised to begin was one with evenly matched forces. This being contrary to his orders, he ordered the cruisers to fall back on the battleships and the entire force to prepare to depart the field. However, the lead cruisers were closing on the British force and were beyond recall. To paraphrase the original Giulio Cesare, the die was cast. There would be a battle after all.

Fiume broke the ice, opening fire at 1222 hours when the cruiser forces came within range at 23, 500 meters (25,700 yards). The Italians had the British outgunned as the two forces closed the distance between them. Almost immediately after the firing started, the British heavy cruiser Berwick was hit by an 8 inch (203 mm) shell which knocked out her “Y” turret, killed seven, and started a fire. The British battleship Ramillies helped even out the firepower of the two sides, but the help was short‐lived. She was unable to keep up, and a mere four minute after Fiume opened the battle, Ramillies had fallen behind the British cruiser formation and dropped out of the battle.

At 1230 hours, the commander of the Italian cruiser group, Vice Admiral Angelo Iachino, received the order to disengage. Despite the slight edge the Italians enjoyed with Ramillies dropping out, the desire to preserve the fleet in being won out. Vice Admiral Iachino ordered increased speed and the group came about while making smoke. They

Page 29 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters fired, and took fire, as they left. At 1235 hours, Berwick was struck again, losing power to her last functional aft turret. The British cruiser Manchester landed a broadside on the Italian destroyer Lanciere, a veteran of Calabria. Manchester was unable to deliver the death blow. Lanciere stayed afloat, and was towed into port after the battle.

At this point the battlecruiser Renown closed within firing distance of the Italian cruisers and the British again outgunned the Italians. As before the advantage was fleeting. At 1300 hours the Vittorio Veneto came within range and opened fire from 27,000 meters (30,000 yards). As she was getting the range on Manchester and the already stricken Berwick, Rear Admiral Holland ordered his ships to make smoke and close with Renown for protection. Both forces withdrew, and the battle, having lasted for less than an hour, was over. The British suffered a damaged heavy cruiser, Berwick. The Italians sustained a damaged destroyer, Lanciere.

Afterthoughts

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was upset with what he perceived as Admiral Somerville’s lack of offensive spirit. The seed for this discontent was sown when Admiral Somerville opposed the attack on Mers‐el‐Kébir. A board of inquiry was held after Cape Spartivento, and it exonerated Admiral Somerville’s conduct there.

Admiral Campioni had not burnished his reputation at Cape Spartivento any more than Admiral Somerville had his. His instructions were to be conservative, but the armchair admirals now thought that he had been too conservative, and blown the Italian Navy’s best chance to win a fleet action against the British. Admiral Campioni would shortly lose his command.

And finally, with perfect hindsight, a case can be made that a stronger effort by the British at Taranto earlier in the month could have prevented the presence and successful intervention of Vittorio Veneto at Cape Spartivento.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cape_Spartivento

http://ww2today.com/27th‐november‐1940‐battle‐of‐cape‐spartivento

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/action_off_spartivento.html

http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/shipprofiles/p/hmsarkroyal.htm

http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=12136

Battle of Cape Matapan

Introduction

The Battle of Cape Matapan was fought between naval forces of Italy’s Regia Marina under Admiral Angelo Iachino and forces of the British Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy during 27‐29 March 1941 of the southwest coast of Greece’s Peloponnesian peninsula. Order of battle for both sides is presented in the table below. The battle was precipitated by the successful breaking of the Italian naval Enigma code by cryptographers at Bletchley Park in late March 1941, which alerted the Royal Navy of an Italian battle fleet intent on attacking Allied convoys. The breaking of the code was protected by the use of a reconnaissance plane directed to the Italian fleet, giving the plausible appearance that it was the reconnaissance aircraft that provided the location of the Italian fleet. The Italian intelligence was not quite as good. Their estimate of Royal Navy strength in the Mediterranean, based on Luftwaffe reports, included one battleship and no aircraft carriers. There were actually three of the former and one of the latter. Tactical intelligence would also favor the British. Several of their ships were equipped with radar. No Italian ships had radar. Another serious handicap that Italian naval forces would have during the battle was a lack of coordination with Italian air forces. The field commander could only request Axis air support through naval headquarters, a system that did not allow timely commitment of air assets.

Battle

On 27 March 1941 the British navy began to marshal its forces south of Crete. Vice‐ Admiral Sir Henry Pridham‐Wippell sailed there from Greek waters with a force of cruisers and destroyers to rendezvous with a fleet including a carrier and three battleships sailing from Alexandria, Egypt under the command of Admiral Andrew Cunningham. At 1200 hours a British reconnaissance plane located the Italian fleet. Italian radio interception and decryption of British radio traffic revealed the presence of Formidable. Even with the unexpected presence of a British aircraft carrier, the Italian command decided to pursue combat. They were confident in the advantage given them by their superior speed. There was also a political reason. The Italians wanted to show their German allies that Italians had the will to fight.

At 0650 hours on March 28, 1941 a floatplane from Vittorio Veneto sighted the British cruiser force under Vice‐Admiral Pridham‐Wippell. At 0755 hours the force of Italian heavy cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers encountered the British cruiser force off the small island of Gavdos, south of Crete. The British ships were headed southeast, and the Italians assumed that the British, fearing that they were outgunned, were fleeing. The Italians gave chase and opened fire at 0812 hours from 24,000 yards (22,000 meters), directing most of the fire at the cruiser Gloucester. Firing by both sides at this range was ineffective, though fire from Gloucester caused the Italians to alter course. Firing

Page 31 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters stopped at 0855 hours. The Italians were unable to close the gap with the British ships, and quit the pursuit as they were approaching the coast of North Africa and feared intervention by the Royal Air Force from bases there. The Italian cruisers turned northwest and intended to rejoin Vittorio Veneto. The British ships also turned and followed the Italian ships at extreme range. This suited Admiral Iachino, who was hoping to draw the British ships to within range of Vittorio Veneto’s guns.

The British cruiser Orion was the first Allied vessel to sight Vittorio Veneto. Unable to identify the ship, Orion signaled that she was going in for a closer look. She flashed the recognition signal to the unknown vessel and got shelled for her trouble. At 1055 hours Vittorio Veneto, now with the Italian cruisers, opened fire from 25,000 yards (23,000 meters) on the unsuspecting Allies. Their cruisers suffered light damage from splinters, but excessive spread of the Vittorio Veneto’s salvos kept the damage light. The Allied cruisers withdrew.

Table 1. Battle of Cape Matapan Order of Battle Italy Britain Vittorio Veneto Battlship Formidable Carrier Duca degli Abruzzi Cruiser NAS 803 (Fighter) Fulmars (13) NAS 826 Giuseppe Garibaldi Cruiser (Torpedo) Albacores Bolzano Cruiser NAS 829 Swordfish and Albacores (Torpedo) Trento Cruiser Barham Battleship Trieste Cruiser Valiant Battleship Fiume Cruiser Warspite Battleship Pola Cruiser Ajax Cruiser Zara Cruiser Gloucester Cruiser Alpino Destroyer Perth (AUS) Cruiser Bersagliere Destroyer Orion Cruiser Fuciliere Destroyer Calcutta Cruiser Granatiere Destroyer Carlisle Cruiser Emanuele Pasagno* Destroyer Bonaventure AA Cruiser Nicoloso da Recco Destroyer Greyhound Destroyer Griffin Destroyer Jervis Destroyer Janus Destroyer Mohawk Destroyer Nubian Destroyer Hotspur Destroyer

Havock Destroyer Stuart (AUS) Destroyer Hasty Destroyer Hereward Destroyer Ilex Destroyer Defender Destroyer Jaguar Destroyer Vampire (AUS) Destroyer Decoy Destroyer Juno Destroyer

Admiral Cunningham’s force, yet to rendezvous with the cruiser force, had not been idle while the cruiser force was engaged. At 0938 hours, Naval Air Squadron 826 Albacore torpedo planes were launched from Formidable. After being misidentified by the Italians as friendly aircraft from Rhodes, the Albacore attacked Vittorio Veneto but were unable to damage her, though on their return to Formidable they reported a probable hit. Still, the attack had a salutary effect, as the evasive maneuvers that it induced hindered coordinated movement of the Italian ships.

A second airstrike was launched at 1509 hours, surprised the Italians, and had greater success than the previous one. An Albacore torpedoed the Vittorio Veneto, as the ship’s antiaircraft guns shot down the plane, killing its crew. The torpedo strike damaged the outside port propeller and caused flooding. The ship was stopped until 1642 hours when it got underway again at a reduced speed of 19 knots, well below her top speed of over 28 knots. When he learned of the damage to the Vittorio Veneto, Admiral Cunningham decided to pursue.

A third strike from Formidable departed shortly after 1930 hours. Swordfish and Albacores were thwarted from finishing off Vittorio Veneto by smoke screens, searchlights and intense antiaircraft fire. They did manage to strike the cruiser Pola with one torpedo while she was at a near standstill avoiding a collision with Fiume. Pola lost steam, electric power, and began to drift. Pola’s sister ships Zara and Fiume, along with a few destroyers, returned to Pola to render assistance, while Vittorio Veneto and the rest of the Italian fleet returned to Taranto.

The Allied pursuit continued into the night. At 2015 hours radar on the Orion picked up Pola, dead in the water. By 2200 hours, most of the British ships had picked up the Italian force on radar. The Italian ships had no radar, and the British were able to close with them undetected. The Italian ships depended on visual direct sighting, and their doctrine did not include night actions. Many of the Italian ships had disarmed their main batteries for the night. When they finally did make visual contact with the Allied

Page 33 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters squadron, the Italians took them to be friendly ships. The British battleships Barham, Valiant and Warspite closed to within 3,800 yards (3,500 meters), mere spitting distance for their weapons. The British illuminated the Italian ships with searchlights and opened fire. Surprise was complete and Italian response was ineffective. It took three minutes to destroy Fiume and Zara. Fiume sank at 2330 hours. Zara stayed afloat until torpedoed by the destroyer Jervis at 0240 hours the following day, 29 March 1941.

In addition to the cruisers, two Italian destroyers were sunk within minutes while another pair escaped with damage. Pola was there for the taking as a prize, and towing her to Alexandria was considered. Fear of air attack weighed against that option. The British made a quick sweep of Pola for Breda anti‐aircraft machine guns they coveted. Pola was sunk shortly after 0400 hours by torpedoes from Jervis and Nubian, but not before the British evacuated her crew.

The Italian Navy suffered 2,303 killed in action. Allied ships rescued 1,015 survivors. When fear of air attack in the coming light forced them to quit rescue operations, the British informed the Italian navy on the Merchant Marine emergency frequency that they were ceasing rescue operations and granting safe passage to Italian hospital ships for rescue operations. The location of survivors was provided. The Italians rescued another 160 sailors. On the other side of the ledger, the Allies had lost 3 men, the crew of the aircraft shot down by Vittorio Veneto.

Aftermath

In spite of the lopsided results, the decisive victory that the British sought still remained elusive. The elimination of three cruisers by the Italians was offset by the loss of two British cruisers in the Med in other combat during the month of March 1941. And once again the big prize, Vittorio Veneto, had escaped.

The demonstrated willingness of the Italian Navy to expand the area of operations of its major ships so far east, i.e., willingness to be more than a fleet in being, forced the British to keep battleships ready to face another such sortie off Greece and Crete. In fact, the Italians stayed away from the eastern Mediterranean until Crete fell to the Germans two months later. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cape_Matapan

http://www.historynet.com/battle‐of‐cape‐matapan‐world‐war‐ii‐italian‐naval‐ massacre.htm

http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/worldwari1/p/capematapan.htm

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/timeline/factfiles/nonflash/a1151740.s html

http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=104

http://ww2today.com/28th‐march‐1941‐italian‐fleet‐surprised‐at‐the‐battle‐of‐ matapan

Sinking the Battleship Bismarck

Introduction

Bismarck was a Bismarck‐class German battleship, the first built of two in its class. She was launched in February 1939 and commissioned on 24 August 1940. With her sister ship Tirpitz, Bismarck was one of the largest battleships ever built by a European nation. Bismarck was commanded during her almost nine month career between commissioning and sinking by Captain Ernst Lindemann.

Bismarck’s main armament consisted of eight 15 inch (38 cm) guns mounted two per turret with two turrets fore and two turrets aft. There was an assortment of lesser guns ranging from 5.9 inch (15 cm) guns to 0.79 inch (2 cm) anti‐aircraft guns. Bismarck carried four reconnaissance float planes. She was armored, ranging from 14.2 inches thick faces on her main gun turrets to 2 inches thick on her upper deck. The main deck added another 3.9 to 4.7 inches.

Bismarck first saw combat on 12 March 1941while in harbor at Kiel during a break from combat readiness training. British bombers attacked the base without success.

Oberkommando der Marine (OKW), the German Naval High Command, originally planned to use Bismarck as part of a group of surface raiders against Allied merchant shipping in the North Atlantic. The other raiders in the group were to be Bismarck’s sister ship Tirpitz and the two Scharnhorst‐class battleships (also called battlecruisers) Gniesenau and Scharnhorst. Tirpitz was not finished on schedule. Gniesenau was torpedoed and then bombed while being repaired in dry dock. Scharnhorst had to undergo an extensive boiler overhaul. Going a size down, the Germans considered adding the heavy cruisers Admiral Hipper and Admiral Scheer to the operation, but both vessels were undergoing repairs delayed by British bombing of supply depots. The heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen was teamed with Bismarck, and the two vessels were committed to the operation, codenamed Operation Rheinübung. Admiral Günther Lütjens was chosen to command the operation.

Operation Rheinübung

Operation Rheinübung began during the early hours of 19 May 1941. Bismarck departed Gotenhafen at 0200 hours and was met by Prinz Eugen off Cape Arkona at 1125 hours.

In support of Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, eighteen supply ships were deployed. Additionally, four U‐boats were stationed along convoy routes between Halifax, Canada and Britain to provide intelligence to the raiders regarding convoy movements. At this point the two vessels were accompanied by three destroyers and several minesweepers. Overhead the Luftwaffe flew cover while the ships were in German waters.

[Note: Prinz Eugen was named after Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Duke of Marlborough’s stalwart ally at the Battle of Blenheim (1704) and other battles during the War of Spanish Succession. The Duke of Marlborough, John Churchill, was an ancestor of Winston S. Churchill.]

A group of aircraft from neutral Sweden encountered the flotilla, unbeknownst to the Germans. They reported the composition and heading of the German vessels to their naval headquarters. The Swedish cruiser Gotland encountered the German ships an hour later, and reported the composition and heading of the German fleet. The British naval attaché to Sweden obtained the report and sent it to the British Admiralty. The report supported intelligence gained from interception and decryption of German naval signals. In response, two Supermarine Spitfires were sent to search the Norwegian coast for the German ships.

German reconnaissance aircraft were also active, spotting one carrier, three battleships and four cruisers anchored in the Scapa Flow. Admiral Lütjens took this news as an indicator that the British were not yet aware of Operation Rheinübung. On 20 May 1941 the German flotilla reached the coast of Norway without incident. Once there, the minesweepers departed and the capital ships with their destroyers turned north. The following morning the Germans intercepted a British radio signal ordering reconnaissance aircraft to search the Norwegian coast for two northbound battleships accompanied by three destroys. The German vessels sojourned in Grimstadtfjord the rest of the day and the night of 20/21 May, and the ships’ camouflage was repainted from the Baltic pattern to Atlantic grey. Despite Messerschmitt Bf 109 coverage over the anchorage, a Spitfire got through and photographed the Bismarck and her entourage. With this information in hand, the Admiralty bolstered the two cruisers patrolling the Denmark Strait with the battlecruiser Hood, the battleship Prince of Wales, and six destroyers. The Home Fleet in the Scapa Flow was placed on high alert. Bombers were sent to attack the German flotilla, but due to bad weather over the fjord they were unable to locate the enemy.

Orders for Bismarck did not include replenishment of fuel supplies while anchored in Norway despite having left port 200 tons of fuel short of a full load, and having burned 1000 tons getting to where she now floated. Therefore she did not refuel while in Norway. Prinz Eugen, however, took on 762 tons of fuel. At 2130 hours on 21 May 1941, Bismarck and her consorts left the harbor of Bergen. It was only when the ships had reached the open sea and were headed for the Arctic Ocean that OKM commander Admiral Erich Raeder informed Hitler of Operation Rheinübung. Hitler reluctantly gave

Page 36 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters approval for the raid. At 0414 hours on 22 May, the escorting destroyers detached from the raiders. About noon on the same day, Admiral Lütjens ordered Bismarck and Prinz Eugen make for the Denmark Straits and to break out into the Atlantic.

At 0400 hours on 23 May 1941, Admiral Lütjens ordered Bismarck and Prinz Eugen to put on speed and make a dash for open sea on the other side of the Denmark Strait. Mist had reduced visibility to between 3,300 and 4,400 yards (3,000 to 4,000 meters). Unlike their Italian allies at this time, the German vessels had radar, and activated them upon entering the strait. Bismarck was ahead, Prinz Eugen followed 770 yards (700 meters) behind. At 1000 hours, the presence of ice caused the German ships to reduce speed from 27 knots to 24 knots. A zigzag pattern was sailed to avoid ice floes. At 1922 hours German radar and hydrophone operators detected the British cruiser Suffolk at 12,500 yards (13,700 meters), and a radio‐intercept team on the Prinz Eugen decrypted the message from Suffolk alerting the British forces of the German presence.

Prinz Eugen was given the green light to attack Suffolk, but visibility was so poor that Prinz Eugen held her fire. Suffolk retreated out of the mist‐reduced range and followed the German ships. At 2030 hours, Suffolk was joined by the cruiser Norfolk. Norfolk strayed too close to the German ships and was fired upon by Bismarck. Norfolk added smoke to the existing fog bank and fled into it, having suffered a rain of splinters on her deck but no serious damage. Bismarck actually suffered more from her own salvos. The concussions from the 15 inch guns knocked out the ship’s radar set. Prinz Eugen, with functioning radar, took over the lead position.

Admiral Lütjens tried to catch the British napping and at 2200 hours ordered Bismarck to make a sudden 180 degree turn to surprise her shadows. Though visibility was poor due to a rain squall, British radar picked up the maneuver and the British ships were easily able to evade, yet remain on station. They reported the position of the German ships throughout the night.

The weather cleared on the morning of 24 May 1941. At 0507 hours hydrophone operators on the Prinz Eugen picked up two ships approaching at a distance of 23 miles (37 km). They were Hood and Prince of Wales, under the command of Vice Admiral Lancelot Holland. German lookouts made visual contact at 0545 hours, and Admiral Lütjens ordered battle stations.

Battle of the Denmark Strait

Hood was the first to fire, at 0552 hours on 24 May 1941. Prince of Wales joined one minute later. Initial range was 26,000 yards (28,000 meters). Hood fired on Prinz Eugen, thinking she was Bismarck, while Prince of Wales fired on Bismarck. The British ships, approaching the German ships head on, were limited in being able to bring to bear only their forward guns. The German ships were oriented to be able to fire broadsides at the British ships. In order to bring the rear guns to bear, Vice Admiral Holland ordered a 20

Page 37 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters degree turn to port minutes after the firing started. Prinz Eugen scored the first hit on Hood with an 8 inch (20.3 cm) shell, starting a short‐lived fire. Once Bismarck had Hood’s range she fired salvos from her eight 15 inch guns, while shifting small guns to Prince of Wales. Vice Admiral Holland ordered a second 20 degree turn to port, putting the British ships on a parallel course with the German ships. Prinz Eugen shifted fire to Prince of Wales in order to keep both enemy vessels under fire, and scored two hits that started a small fire. Prinz Eugen was then ordered to fall behind Bismarck to keep watch on the Norfolk and Suffolk, both still approximately 12 miles (19.2 km) distant to the east.

Hood had just completed her second turn to port when she was struck by the fifth salvo from Bismarck. A 15‐inch (38 cm) shell hit Hood and penetrated her thin deck armor, reached the rear ammunition magazine, and detonated approximately 110 tons of cordite shell propellant. The ensuing explosion broke Hood in two between the main mast and rear funnel. Hood immediately sank taking all but three of her 1,419‐man crew with her. Only eight minutes of firing had elapsed.

Prince of Wales became the focus of Bismarck’s attention, and was struck by Bismarck’s first salvo aimed at her. One shell went through the bridge without exploding, but still managed to kill all there except the ship’s captain (Captain Leach) and one other. It took Prince of Wales six salvos, but she finally struck Bismarck. Three shells hit Bismarck. The first hit the forecastle above the waterline, creating a hole that allowed high seas to enter. The second shell inflicted minimal damage after striking the torpedo bulkhead and exploding. The third shell passed through an onboard boat and the floatplane catapult, failing to explode.

Both German ships continued to fire on Prince of Wales, and she sustained serious damage. Only two of her ten 14‐inch (36 cm) guns were still firing. At 0613 hours Captain Leach ordered retreat. Prince of Wales turned about and retreated under the cover of her own smoke. German fire slacked off, then ceased as the range increased. The ever aggressive Captain Lindemann recommended pursuing Prince of Wales, but Admiral Lütjens adhered to his orders to avoid combat with any enemy force not protecting a convoy, that is, he interpreted his orders in their literal, narrow sense and restricted the role of the two German ships to surface raiders. He ordered both ships to head for the North Atlantic.

The Battle of the Denmark Strait was a victory for the Germans, but more straws had been added to Bismarck’s camel’s back. The hit she had taken on the forecastle had allowed almost 2,000 tons of seawater to flood the ship, contaminating fuel oil stored in the bow. Admiral Lütjens refused to reduce speed to allow for repairs to the hole, which became larger and took in more water. This flooding, along with a lesser amount of water coming in due to the second shell hitting Bismarck, caused the ship to list 9 degrees to port. Bismarck was also leaving a large oil slick from its damaged bow.

Pursuing Bismarck

The Royal Navy ordered all warships in an area extending over 400 miles (650 km) away to pursue Bismarck. Six battleships and battlecruisers, two aircraft carriers, thirteen cruisers, and twenty‐one destroyers were on the hunt for Bismarck. This included Prince of Wales, with nine of her ten main guns back in action. Meanwhile, Admiral Lütjens had decided to detach Prinz Eugen as a commerce raider and to take Bismarck into port at Saint‐Nazaire, occupied France, for repairs.

Contact with Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had not been completely broken. Norfolk, Suffolk, and the reinvigorated Prince of Wales trailed the German ships, keeping radar contact. Prinz Eugen was detached from Bismarck at 1814 hours on 24 May 1941 when Bismarck turned back on the trailing British ships. She exchanged salvos with Prince of Wales, but there were no hits. Bismarck resumed course with its foes keeping pace, while Prinz Eugen slipped away.

Bismarck was making 28 knots and would have to be slowed if she was to be overtaken before reaching Saint‐Nazaire. The task was given to aircraft from the aircraft carrier Victorious. She took a course to enable her to launch a torpedo bomber strike, and nine Swordfish torpedo bombers escorted by six Fulmar fighters took off at 2200 hours. The aircraft mistook Norfolk for their target. They realized their mistake during their approach and Norfolk was unharmed, but Bismarck was alerted by the confusion.

All nine Swordfish launched their torpedoes. Despite the alerted anti‐aircraft gunners and the use of Bismarck’s primary and secondary guns to create splashes in the paths of the Swordfish, no attacking aircraft were shot down. The first eight torpedoes missed; the ninth struck amidships killing one and injuring five. The damage to the ship caused by maneuvers to avoid the first eight torpedoes was more severe than the damage caused by the ninth. The makeshift repair of the forward shell hole was torn loose and more water entered the ship, forcing abandonment of a boiler, the ship’s second lost boiler. Things were adding up. The increased water load, the added list that it caused, and the loss of a second boiler slowed Bismarck down to 16 knots for a time. Repairs increased the top speed to 20 knots, which further improved throughout the night.

Before the curtain closed on 24 May, Bismarck and Prince of Wales again exchanged salvos, with no hits.

As the pursuit moved away from the Denmark Straits and farther into open waters, the Royal Navy had to become more concerned about U‐boats. The pursuers adopted a zigzag pattern of sailing to confound any U‐boats that might be hunting the hunters. This pattern caused Bismarck to be out of (Suffolk’s) radar range for a few minutes each cycle. At 0300 hours on 25 May 1941, while out of radar range, Bismarck increased speed to 28 knots and sailed west and then north, circling behind her pursuers. Suffolk’s captain assumed that Bismarck had turned west and changed course in that direction. It

Page 39 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters was realized that Bismarck had given them the slip, and the three British vessels (Suffolk, Norfolk, and Prince of Wales) dispersed at daylight to search for Bismarck.

Admiral Lütjens was unaware that the German ship had lost her pursuers. He sent long radio messages to Germany’s Naval Group West headquarters, which allowed the British to take bearings on his location. The British almost squandered this intelligence when the bearings were improperly plotted and the chase went in the wrong direction for seven hours.

Code‐breakers were able to decrypt German naval signals indicating that Bismarck was making for Brest, and the Royal Navy was able to focus its search on an area through which Bismarck had to pass. At 1030 hours on 26 May 1941, a US Navy Catalina spotted Bismarck approximately 800 mile (1,300 km) northwest of Brest, making speed sufficient to reach Luftwaffe and U‐boat protection in less than 24 hours. The Royal Navy had precious few assets that could reach Bismarck before she reached that protection, and some of the capital ships in a position to do so were too low on fuel. The aircraft carrier Ark Royal was the only vessel positioned to immediately engage Bismarck. Ark Royal was about 70 miles (110 km) from Bismarck.

Ark Royal recalled her Swordfish who were out searching for Bismarck and armed them with torpedoes equipped with magnetic detonators. They set out and mistakenly attacked the cruiser Sheffield, shadowing Bismarck. Fortunately, the magnetic detonators failed and Sheffield was undamaged. The Swordfish returned to Ark Royal, rearmed with torpedoes with contact detonators, and set out again for Bismarck.

At 1910 hours on 26 May 1941, fifteen Swordfish left Ark Royal, and ninety minutes later they descended through the cloud cover to discover Bismarck engaging Sheffield. Bismarck was unable to hit Sheffield, but near misses rained steel on Sheffield killing three and wounding more. Sheffield retreated under smoke as the Swordfish attacked.

Bismarck again initiated violent maneuvers to avoid the torpedoes, and engaged the Swordfish with antiaircraft guns. Two torpedoes struck home. The first hit amidships on the port side and caused minor flooding. The second torpedo struck the stern on the port side, damaging the port rudder assembly, locking it into a 12 degree port turn. Bismarck could no longer be maneuvered. She was steaming in a circle, and could not make port. Bismarck’s fate was sealed. Admiral Lütjens informed his headquarters of his intention to fight to the end. Five destroyers (four British, one Polish) kept watch on Bismarck through the night.

The Sinking

After daybreak on 27 May 1941, King George V and Rodney attacked Bismarck. At 0843 hours, lookouts on King George V sighted Bismarck at a range of 25,000 yards (23,000 m). At 0847 hours, Rodney opened up with her forward six 16 inch (40.6 cm) guns.

Rodney was joined by King George V’s 14 inch (35.6 cm) guns. At 0850 hours, Bismarck began to return fire. As the range diminished, the cruisers Norfolk and Dorsetshire opened up on Bismarck with their 8 inch (20.3 cm) guns. At 0902 hours Rodney hit Bismarck with a 16 inch shell killing hundreds including according to survivors Admiral Lütjens and Captain Lindemann, and disabled the forward main battery, which yet managed to get one last salvo off at 0927 hours. All four main batteries on Bismarck were silent by 0931 hours.

Bismarck was aflame her entire length, and the list to port reached 20 degrees. The British would not cease fire unless Bismarck struck her colors or the crew was abandoning ship. Rodney pulled within spitting distance (3,000 yards/2,700 meters) and continued to fire. Bismarck had been hit by over 400 of the 2,800 shells fired at her, but gunfire alone would not sink Bismarck. Rodney held nothing back and fired two torpedoes at Bismarck. Claiming one hit, she became the only battleship in naval history to torpedo another battleship.

Meanwhile on the Bismarck, surviving officers (First Officer Hans Oels and Gerhard Junack, the ship’s chief engineering officer) gave orders to abandon ship and to scuttle the ship by opening watertight doors and setting scuttling charges.

At 1020 hours, Dorsetshire was ordered to finish off Bismarck, whose deck was already awash, with torpedoes. The battleships, low on fuel, returned to port. Dorsetshire fired two torpedoes at Bismarck’s starboard side, scoring one hit, then fired one torpedo at the port side, hitting again. At 1035 hours Bismarck capsized to port, and at 1040 hours she sank beneath the surface, not to be seen again for over 48 years when her resting place would be found by oceanographer Dr. Robert Ballard.

Dorsetshire and the destroyer Maori began taking on the approximately 400 surviving German sailors. Rescue operations continued until 1140 hours when lookouts reported the presence of a U‐boat. At this point the British had rescued 110 survivors, one of which died of wounds the next day, 28 May 1941. Three more were later rescued by a U‐boat. A German trawler added another two. Of 2,200 hands, 114 survived the sinking of Bismarck.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_battleship_Bismarck

http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world‐war‐two/weapons‐of‐world‐war‐two/the‐ bismarck/

http://www.wired.com/2009/05/dayintech_0527/

http://www.kbismarck.com/bismarck‐last‐battle.html

http://www.hmshood.com/history/denmarkstrait/bismarck1.htm

Naval Warfare Associated with the Siege of Sevastopol

The Siege of Sevastopol was a World War II Eastern Front battle fought by the Axis powers of Germany, Italy and Romania against the Soviet Union. At stake was control of Sevastopol, a Black Sea port and fortress in the Crimea. The following account concentrates on the naval aspects of the siege, with references to the land battle where appropriate to keep the naval action in context. Axis forces invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 with Operation Barbarossa. Initially considered as a low priority objective, the Crimea was a threat to Romanian oil supplies due to the presence of Soviet air bases, and this caused the Crimea to be upgraded to an immediate objective. By the autumn of 1941 the Axis had overrun most of the Crimea, with the significant exception of Sevastopol. During October and November 1941the German 11th Army, commanded by General of Infantry Erich von Manstein, made several unsuccessful attempts to take Sevastopol and its naval base. Soviet forces tried to take pressure off Sevastopol and to divert Axis forces by launching an amphibious landing on the Crimean peninsula at Kerch in December 1941. The diversionary attack created a bridgehead which held until May 1942. Sevastopol itself was held by the Soviets until 4 July 1942. The combined forces (land, air and sea) defending Sevastopol was commanded by Vice Admiral Filipp Oktyabrsky. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet contributed to the defense both at sea and on land. The Black Sea Fleet sent 49,372 personnel untrained in ground combat to fight as infantry. The Soviet Black Fleet naval component consisted of the following:

• One battleship • Two heavy cruisers • One Light Cruiser • Two Flotilla Leaders • Six Destroyers • Nine Minesweepers • One Guardship

In addition to immediate combat roles, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was responsible for bringing men and supplies into Sevastopol. The men and materials came both from points west where Soviet units were evacuated, and from secure locations to the east.

Axis air forces that figured in the naval battle surrounding the siege came from the VIII Fliegerkorps of Luftflotte 4, commanded by Generaloberst Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen, a name with a certain pedigree in aerial combat. Richthofen began the siege with approximately 1500 aircraft in his command. Soviet naval (and other) forces faced Axis medium bombers, dive bombers, and torpedo bombers. Axis naval forces were provided by the Italians and consisted of torpedo boats, explosive motorboats, midget submarines, coastal submarines, and other small vessels. With few exceptions, this was not a theater for capital ships.

During November and December 1941, Axis forces completed the encirclement of Sevastopol. However, the Soviet Black Sea fleet continued to bring in troops and equipment from the Caucasus. The Luftwaffe, concentrating on the Battle of Moscow at this time, was not a major threat. This allowed the Soviet Navy to keep the heavy cruiser Krasny Kavkaz, light cruisers Krasny Krym and Chervona‐Ukania, and seven destroyers to protect the port and provide fire support to land troops. These and other Soviet vessels still felt the sting of a diminished Luftwaffe.

On 31 October, the destroyer Bodryy, shelling German tank concentrations, was attacked by Ju 87 dive bombers and took casualties from machinegun fire but was undamaged. On 2 November, Ju 88 bombers damaged the cruiser Voroshilov while it was supporting operations to bring in troops to Sevastopol, putting it out of action for months. On 7 November He 111 medium bombers sank the Soviet transport Armeniya, evacuating soldiers and civilians from Sevastopol via Yalta. The Armeniya was serving as a hospital ship and was marked with a red cross. Some reports state that there were as many as 7,000 souls on board. Only 8 survived the sinking. On 12 November, Ju 87 dive bombers sank the cruiser Chervona‐Ukania (though her guns were brought ashore and fought again) and He 111 medium bombers damaged the Soviet destroyers Sovershennyy and Besposhchadnyy. In spite of the Luftwaffe threat, the Black Sea fleet still took the Axis November land assault under naval gunfire when feasible. The battleship Parizhskaya Kommuna and two light cruisers assisted land forces in halting the Axis November offensive.

While the Axis marshaled their forces to resume their offensive in December 1941, the Soviets used their transport fleet to bring in the 11,000 men of the 388th Rifle Division into the Sevastopol perimeter. The Axis anticipated further difficulties using a stretched‐ thin Luftwaffe to interdict Soviet shipping supplying (and ultimately, evacuating) the port. To increase pressure on Soviet naval forces, Germany prevailed upon Italy to provide nine torpedo boats and nine coastal submarines organized as the 101st Naval Squadron, commanded by Captiano di Fregata Francesco Mimbelli. Based at Feodsiya and Yalta, this force would be the only major Axis naval asset during the siege.

The Axis ground offensive resumed in mid‐December. The Soviet battleship Parizhskaya Kommuna provided fire support to ground forces at points where the Axis threatened to break through Soviet defenses. The Axis offensive made some progress, only to be stopped when the Soviets staged an amphibious assault on 26 December 1941 at Kerch in the Crimea to divert Axis attention from Sevastopol. Though Sevastopol would get a reprieve on the ground until the Axis defeated the Kerch assault in May 1942, the Luftwaffe kept up efforts to quarantine Sevastopol from reinforcement and resupply by sea.

As a prelude to the next ground assault, the Luftwaffe provided a sustained aerial assault. Kampfsgeschwader (KG) 26, a bomber wing, participated in the air assault, concentrating on Soviet shipping. The He 111s of KG 26 sank the tanker Mikhail Gromov,

Page 43 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters part of a convoy bringing troops to Sevastopol. The ground assault was launched 7 June 1942. Axis forces penetrated Soviet defenses to a depth of about 2 km, but the attacking force suffered high casualties, exhausted basic loads of ammunition, and was spent by evening. The following days saw little progress though Axis offensive action continued and casualty rates remained high.

With support of ground operations temporarily less demanding, and in spite of its own problems with dwindling ordnance and aviation fuel, the Luftwaffe turned once more on the Soviet supply line through the Black Sea. German bombers sank the destroyers Sovershennyy and Svobodnyy, and the 4,727 ton transport Abkhaziya between 8 June and 10 June. However, the Black Sea Fleet successfully delivered men, ammo and artillery on 12 June on the cruiser Molotov and destroyer Bditel'nyy. (Some accounts record Bezuprechnyy as destroyer with Molotov.) On 13 June the Luftwaffe sank the transports Gruzyia and TSch‐27, patrol boat SKA‐092, motor boat SP‐40, five barges and a floating crane.

As the tempo of the land battle began to rise again, the Luftwaffe stayed busy applying pressure to Soviet naval forces in order to choke off reinforcement and resupply, a task essentially forfeited to them by the dearth of Axis naval forces committed to the task. On 18 June the Soviet cruiser Kharkov was severely damaged by German aircraft. Elimination of fixed anti‐aircraft assets in the harbor made it impossible for the minelayer Komintern to deliver reinforcements.

Between 18–23 June the Soviet defense line in the north collapsed. Soviet attempts to restore the line were ineffective. Soviet defensive positions began surrendering. The Soviets were exhausted and out of ammunition. On 30 June Axis forces launched a heavy attack and three days later no Soviet defensive line remained unbreached. Top Soviet commanders, Party officials and administrative officials were evacuated by aircraft and submarine. Though scattered units resisted until 9 July, by 4 July the battle was over. Though successful, the operation took longer than expected, and kept the 11th Army from supporting the German 6th Army during the advance on Stalingrad.

http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=214

http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt08/sevastopol.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Sevastopol_(1941%E2%80%9342)

Battle of Cape Bon

The Battle of Cape Bon was an episode in the ongoing naval struggle in the Mediterranean Sea during the early years of World War II. The Axis, represented primarily by the Italian Regia Marina, sought to keep the sea lanes open to sustain Axis forces in North Africa. The Royal Navy also sought to keep its own sea lanes safe for resupply and reinforcement of Allied forces in Egypt and elsewhere in North Africa, and to maintain the island of Malta as a base of operations against the Axis in the Med. The Battle of Cape Bon was an interdiction of Axis resupply by Allied naval surface forces.

The forces involved in the Battle of Cape Bon were the Italian 4th Cruiser Division and the British 4th Destroyer Flotilla. The Italian 4th Cruiser Division, commanded by Admiral Antonio Toscano, consisted of two Da Giussano class light cruisers, Alberto da Giussano and Alberico da Barbiano, and the Spica class torpedo boat Cigno. The British 4th Destroyer flotilla, commanded by Commander G. H. Stokes, consisted of three British destroyers (Sikh, Maori, Legion) and one Dutch destroyer (Isaac Sweers).

The Italian 4th Cruiser Division had departed Palermo, Italy sailing for Tripoli in North Africa. They carried nearly 2,000 tons of aircraft fuel needed by Axis fighter planes and fuel for mobile units of the Afrika Corps in Libya. Storage space on the cruisers was limited, so containers of fuel were placed on the ships’ decks. With such a dangerous arrangement, the Italian cruisers were planning to depend on their speed to allow them to avoid any confrontation with Allied warships. Alberico da Barbiano had reached a speed exceeding 42 knots during her trials, though such a high speed could be maintained for short times only. An Italian aircraft had spotted the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, but Regia Marina headquarters assumed that the destroyers were unaware of the cruisers and would not be able to intercept them if they were aware. However, British interception and deciphering of Italian naval signals gave the Allies precise knowledge of their location and route, and made the Italian speed advantage a moot point. The British made good speed themselves, travelling at 39 knots.

At 0325 hours on 13 December 1941, the opposing forces met near Cape Bon. Equipped with radar, the Allied destroyers approached from astern and surprised the Italian cruisers. The destroyers launched torpedoes and opened fire at close range. Alberto da Giussano managed to return fire with three salvos before becoming disabled and dead in the water after being struck by gunfire and a torpedo amidships. Her crew abandoned ship. Alberto da Giussano stayed afloat until 0422 hours, when she broke in two and sank. Alberico da Barbiano was struck by three torpedoes, two from Sikh and one from either Legion or Maori. She was quickly aflame with burning fuel on her decks, and sunk by 0330 hours. The battle was essentially over in five minutes. Isaac Sweers engaged Cigno briefly, launching four torpedoes and missing. Cigno took on survivors from the two Italian cruisers, rescuing over 500 Italian sailors. Other sailors were able to reach the nearby shore, or were rescued by Italian torpedo boats arriving on the scene later.

The battle had cost the Italians 534 men from Alberico da Barbiano, including Admiral Toscano, and 283 men from Alberto da Giussano. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cape_Bon_(1941)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_cruiser_Alberto_da_Giussano

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_cruiser_Alberico_da_Barbiano

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spica‐class_torpedo_boat

http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=11

http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=11038

First Battle of Sirte

The Setup

The First Battle of Sirte occurred when on 17 December 1941 escorts of two opposing convoys met southeast of Malta off the coast of North Africa. A west‐bound Allied supply convoy sailing from Alexandria to Malta had been joined by an eastbound convoy of Allied warships. The Axis convoy was sailing from Italy with supplies for forces in Libya, North Africa. The engagement was the climax of a week of constant encounters between naval elements of the Axis and Allies.

The First Battle of Sirte was set against the background of events in the ground war in North Africa. The British 8th Army had just completed Operation Crusader and lifted the siege of Tobruk. The Axis forces were conducting a fighting withdraw and occupied a defensive line east of Benghazi. It was this force that was in desperate need of resupply, and whom the Axis convoy was intended to succor.

To help meet this need the Italians sent Convoy M41 to Africa on 13 December 1941. This was just hours after the previous attempt to resupply North Africa went up in flames at the Battle of Cape Bon. Convoy M41 had eight merchant vessels, a Close Covering Force, and a Distant Covering Force. The Close Covering Force consisted of five destroyers. The Distant Covering Force was made up of the battleships Vittorio Veneto and Littorio, and four destroyers. The Distant Covering Force was also accompanied by two torpedo boats. Convoy M41 departed on 13 December 1941, but after a collision between two ships in the convoy, a false report of British battleships in the area, and successful strikes by British submarines sunk two merchant ships and damaged Veneto Vittorio sufficiently for her to return to port, the entire convoy returned to port to await reinforcement.

The British planned to use a single cargo ship to take supplies to Malta on 15 December 1941. The ship would be covered by cruisers and destroyers. The 4th Destroyer Flotilla, victorious in the Battle of Cape Bon, was also in the operational area, preparing to proceed from Malta to Alexandria.

Before the Allied operation could begin, the British were having their own problems. Galatea, one of the cruisers to take part in the convoy, was torpedoed and sunk by a German U‐boat on 14 December 1941. When the British convoy sailed on 15 December, the single merchant ship was escorted by three cruisers and eight destroyers under the command of Rear‐Admiral Philip Vian aboard the cruiser Naiad. The 4th Destroyer Flotilla departed Malta on 16 December accompanied by two cruisers and an additional two destroyers.

On 16 December 1941 the Italian convoy, reduced to four merchant ships and renamed Convoy M42, departed Taranto. A close escort for the second iteration of the convoy was made up of seven destroyers and a torpedo boat. They were joined by the Close Covering Force of a battleship (Caio Duilio), three light cruisers and three destroyers. The Distant Covering Force, consisting of battleships Littorio, Andrea Doria, and Giulio Cesare, two cruisers and ten destroyers rounded out the thirty ships escorting the four cargo ships, a testament to the importance of delivering their supplies. Admiral Angelo Iachino was in command of Italian forces.

The Battle

On 17 December 1941, Italian reconnaissance aircraft spotted the westbound Allied convoy near Sidi Barrani, and mistook its intention as being to intercept the Italian convoy. Axis aircraft shadowed the Allied convoy, and attacked it during the afternoon without success. The westbound and eastbound components of the Allied forces made contact, and spotter planes from the Italian battleships sighted the combined Allied force. At 1742 hours, the opposing fleets made visual contact.

Admiral Iachino cautiously moved his fleet’s combatants to intercept the Allied convoy. Rear Admiral Vian directed the Allied fleet to give ground (or water). Rear Admiral Vian did not realize that his opponents were part of a resupply convoy. The Italians pursued, still cautious. As darkness fell, Axis aircraft returned for another go at the Allied fleet, again unsuccessfully, but the firing anti‐aircraft guns allowed the Italian fleet to see and home in on the Allies in the gathering darkness. Admiral Iachino directed the Distant Covering Force to close with the Allied fleet and the Italians opened fire at an extreme range of 35,000 yards (32,000 m). This was out of range of the largest guns on the British cruisers. Once his cargo ship safely away from the combat zone, Rear Admiral Vian had his ships make smoke and turned to the attack. In a smoke‐obscured night engagement, his radar equipped fleet had the advantage.

For the Italians, it was déjà vu all over again. Back in February 1941 they had taken a beating at the hands of the British during a night engagement at the Battle of Cape Matapan, and they understood fully the disadvantage they would be fighting under. Anticipating the Allied attack, Admiral Iachino ceased fire after fifteen minutes, retired westward and broke contact.

Results

The results of the engagement were two lightly damaged Allied destroyers. Kipling suffered damage and the loss of one seaman from a near miss by an 8 inch (20 cm) shell believed to have been fired by the cruiser Gorizia. The Australian destroyer Nizam also suffered from a near miss, this one from the destroyer Maestrale.

Considering the number of ships involved, there was surprisingly little damage inflicted by either side. The greatest impacts to each fleet occurred due to enemy submarines during the buildup to the battle. The result of the battle itself was inconclusive. However, both Axis and Allies acheived their original goals of supplying forces in North Africa and in Malta, respectively.

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_sirte_1st.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Battle_of_Sirte

http://www.icsm.it/regiamarina/battles.htm

http://www.regiamarina.net/detail_text.asp?nid=39&lid=1

Battle of the Kerch Peninsula

On 26 December 1941, Soviet forces consisting of the 44th and 51st Armies main landed on the Kerch peninsula in the Crimea, with supporting landings at nearby Feodosiya on 30 December. Their objective was to drive on Sevastopol and relieve the Soviet garrison surrounded by the German 11th Army. Considering the lack of success of the Soviet army against Axis forces thus far in the war, this was an ambitious goal. But the Soviets had selected the point of attack wisely. The only unit standing between the invaders and their goal was the German 46th Infantry Division. The division was insufficient to hold the Soviets off, but the German commander, General of Infantry Eric von Manstein, was able to seal the Soviet force in the Kerch Peninsula by quickly using the XLII Corps and the XXX Corps. The Soviet forces in the Sevastopol perimeter were not relieved, but they did get a reprieve as the German focus switched to the Soviet force on the Kerch Peninsula. If the Soviets were going to provide support for their forces now on the Kerch peninsula, it would have to come by air or by sea, just as for Sevastopol garrison.

The German Luftflotte 4 was given the mission of interdicting Soviet shipping carrying reinforcements and resupply to the Kerch landing. The first to feel its wrath was the transport Emba, damaged on 29 January. However, the Luftwaffe was unable to staunch the flow of men and supplies. Between 20 January and 11 February, the Soviets were able to bring approximately 100,000 men and hundreds of artillery pieces to Kerch. In mid‐February, the cruisers Komintern and Krasny Krym, the destroyers Shaumyan and Dzerzhinskiy, the minesweeper T410, and the transport Belostok successfully brought in men and supplies. The naval combat vessels also shelled German positions within range. The Luftwaffe kept up its efforts to try to seal off the Kerch bridgehead, and on 20 February sank the transport Kommunist.

While the land battle was mired in stalemate during late February, March and April, Luftwaffe operations against the Black Sea Fleet’s efforts to keep the bridgehead manned and supplied continued. The tanker Kuybyshev was damaged off Kerch on 3 March and eventually crippled in the port of Novorovssiysk on 13 March by Ju 88s. On 23 March, a flight of nine Ju 88s sank the minelayers Ovstrovskiy and GS‐13 and a motor torpedo boat, while damaging submarines S‐33 and D‐5. The Ju 88s returned the following day and added to their tally by sinking the transports Yalta and Neva. On 2 April the tanker Kubyshev, previously damaged but still afloat, was sunk. As a result of these losses, Soviet ground forces were ordered to cease all offensive operations to conserve supplies. Things got worse for the Black Sea Fleet when between 19 and 21 April the tanker I. Stalin and mine sweeper Komintern were damaged, one transport was sunk and three others were damaged.

The Axis prepared for a major ground offensive to clear the Kerch Peninsula with a start date of 8 May 1942. Stalin refused requests from Stavka to evacuate the Kerch peninsula. He waffled on which course to take, first ordering an offensive to liberate the entire Crimea, then switching to a completely defensive posture, and finally he allowed commanders to initiate limited offensive operations to improve defensive positions and alignments.

Stalin had also refused to send further reinforcements to the Kerch Peninsula. Earlier efforts to reinforce the Soviet forces at there had given the Soviets a two to one numerical advantage, though by late April food and other resources were almost totally depleted, so the numerical advantage was not directly related to a like advantage in combat effectiveness. In any case, the perceived advantage, along with restrictive terrain that limited Axis options for an attack, led the Soviet Commander, Lieutenant General Dimitri Kozlov, to discount the possibility of an Axis attack. Undeterred, the Axis planned to overcome the disadvantages by using Fliegerkorps VIII, commanded by Generaloberst Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen, for concentrated close air support. For this mission Fliegerkorps VIII was reinforced with a medium bomber wing.

The Axis offensive kicked off on 8 May 1942with successful air attacks on Soviet airfields and lines of communication, including the communications of the Soviet 44th Army in

Page 49 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters the southern portion of the Kerch perimeter, where the Axis focused the assault. The disrupted communications made a counter offensive impossible, organized resistance was disorganized, and Soviet forces retreated before the ensuing ground attack. Organized resistance to the assault by the Soviet 44th Army collapsed within hours before the Axis main assault and an amphibious assault behind Soviet lines. Kozlov compounded his earlier error discounting the possibility of an attack with the failure to realize the seriousness of the attack once it occurred, and failed to commit his reserves to stem the breakthrough. Von Manstein used the 22nd Panzer Division to exploit the breakthrough, and total Soviet collapse followed in short order.

The Axis advance was swift on the ground, and the Luftwaffe continued to interdict Soviet shipping trying to evacuate troops from the Kerch Peninsula. The Black Sea Fleet did manage to evacuate approximately 116,000 soldiers, while 162,000 killed or captured were left behind. Kerch fell on 20 May 1942, and in the aftermath of the Axis victory, von Manstein was able to turn his attention back on Sevastopol.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Kerch_Peninsula

http://www.desertwar.net/battle‐of‐the‐kerch‐peninsula.html

http://www.joelhayward.org/Richthofens‐Giant‐Finished.pdf

Second Battle of Sirte

Introduction

Three months after meeting southeast of Malta off the coast of North Africa for the First Battle of Sirte, the Royal Navy and Regia Marina met there again. As in the earlier encounter, the British were attempting to resupply Malta by convoy from Alexandria, Egypt. Unlike the previous encounter, the Italian warships were not escorting supply ships bound for North Africa. The primary intention of the Italian fleet this time was the destruction of the British convoy, both cargo ships and escorts.

The Setup

Malta was running out of aircraft, antiaircraft guns, and supplies of every class. Its role as a thorn in the side of Axis resupply operations to North Africa was being neutralized by late winter of 1941. Convoy MW10 sailed from Alexandria on 21 March 1942 bound for Malta with four cargo ships to help keep Malta in the game. A diversionary convoy had sailed from Gibraltar the day before. The diversion included two aircraft carriers from which aircraft would fly to Malta. On the day that MW10 set sail, the diversionary convoy aborted its mission when it was discovered that the aircrafts’ long range fuel

Page 50 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters tanks were defective and the aircraft would be unable to reach Malta. The Axis would be able to concentrate air and naval forces against MW10.

The mix of combatants supporting Convoy MW10 was destroyer heavy. Including ships sent from Malta to meet and join the convoy, the order of battle included seventeen destroyers and five cruisers, including an antiaircraft cruiser. Additionally, three British submarines were in the operational area. Admiral Philip Vian was convoy commander. Admiral Vian organized his combatants into six divisions of two to four ships. His plan in the event of an encounter with Italian surface ships was to have the 6th Division consisting of the antiaircraft cruiser Carlisle and the destroy Avon Vale lay smoke between the convoy and the enemy, then escort the cargo ships to Malta while the other five divisions fought a rearguard action.

Italian surface naval forces available to attack the convoy included one battleship, three cruisers, and ten destroyers. An Italian submarine was also operating in the area.

The Battle

Admiral Vian soon had a chance to implement his contingency plan. At 1410 hours on 22 March 1942 the cruiser Euryalus sighted funnel smoke. The British convoy had encountered two Italian cruisers and their escorting destroyers off the coast of Libya, and began sighting ships at 1425 hours. Admiral Vian was not surprised, having been warned by an Ultra decryption and a sighting by a British submarine off Taranto. The British executed their plan. They started making smoke at 1433 hours, and those cruisers and destroyers not involved in escorting the cargo ships to safety charged the Italians in an aggressive rearguard action. The two Italian cruisers backed off, trying both to lure the British attackers closer to the main body of Italian warships and to avoid a sudden torpedo attack out of the smoke, exchanging gunfire with the British ships all the while. At 1637 hours, the two retreating Italian cruisers reversed direction after being joined by the battleship Littorio, a third cruiser, and escorting destroyers.

An unusual battle ensued. The British fleet had created and maintained an enormous smoke screen, aided by the direction and force of the wind. British ships would leave the screen, fire on the Italians until return fire got too close, and then return to the smoke screen. The British ships on the whole were successful using this tactic, but the destroyer Havock suffered 8 deaths and damage caused by a near miss from Littorio. Havock was ordered out of the line and sent to join the convoy. At 1834 hours, Admiral Vian ordered the destroyers to approach the Italians and launch torpedoes from 5,000 yards (4,000 m). A total of 38 torpedoes were fired by the British during the battle, and all missed. The British destroyer Kingston was struck amidships by Littorio during the torpedo attack. Kingston suffered 15 killed and became temporarily dead in the water when the hit started a fire in the boiler room. She made repairs and limped into harbor at Malta on 23 March. Lively was also struck with splinters from Littorio’s main gun. A bulkhead was pierced and there was flooding, but no crewmen were hurt. Lively

Page 51 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters retreated to Tobruk for repairs. Three other destroyers, Sikh, Legion and Lance, all took minor damage from 8 inch (20.3 cm) fire from cruisers.

The British cruisers were also hit. At 1644 hours, the Italian cruiser Giovanni dalle Bande Nere struck Cleopatra, Admiral Vian’s flagship, with a 6 inch (15.2 cm) round, killing 16 sailors. Euryalus was the fourth ship damaged by Littorio, though not seriously and with no fatalities. The cruiser Penelope was also damaged.

The action ended at 1855 hours, and the British got a hit in on Littorio right at the bell. She was struck by a 4.7 inch (12 cm) shell which caused negligible damage. In perhaps one of the more embarrassing moments of the naval war in the Med, a blast from Littorio’s after turret set fire to her own float plane. Overall, the Italian fleet had suffered minimal damage and no fatalities.

At 1900 hours in the gathering dusk the Italians broke contact with the British warships. As at the conclusion of the First Battle of Sirte, the Italians were unwilling to engage the radar‐equipped British after dark.

Aftermath

The following day, 23 March 1942, the British convoy and escorts were subjected to continuous air attacks. The Axis air forces of the German II Flieger Korps and Italian 4th Air Fleet had been active during the battle, but had been ineffective. This changed. Air attacks sunk one cargo ship (Clan Campbell) and damaged the oil tanker Breconshire so severely that it could not make port in Malta under its own power. Two attempts to tow her in with warships failed, and finally tugs brought her into port. The two other cargo ships (Talabot and Pampas) made it to Malta, not without copious luck. Pampas had been hit twice by bombs that failed to explode. They were welcomed by cheering thousands.

But luck took a turn for the worse. Axis aircraft continued to attack the cargo ships and tanker in harbor for the next three days until on 26 March 1942 they sank both cargo ships and caused the tanker to capsize. Breconshire did not have a catastrophic hull breach, so most of the oil within her was salvaged. As for the dry cargo, only about 20 percent had been unloaded before the ships were sunk.

Outcome Assessed

The Second Battle of Sirte has reasonably been assessed as a victory for the British, in that an outgunned force of cruisers and destroyers fought off an Italian force that included a battleship and heavy cruisers, while dealing with Axis air attacks. Though damage and death was lopsided against the British, they kept the vessels bring supplies to Malta safe from the Italian surface fleet. Admiral Vian’s active defense is credited with bringing about these results. The Italians were unable to use their overwhelming

Page 52 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters strength to get at the supply vessels, and were forced to break off the action at dusk yet again for lack of radar to match the British.

Conversely, others credit the Italian fleet with delaying, diverting and disrupting the Convoy MW10 sufficiently to allow Axis air supremacy to be brought to bear on the convoy as it continued on to Malta after the battle, and even while the cargo ships were in harbor. They point to the loss of 80 percent of the supplies and contend that, though the British won a tactical victory over the Italian fleet, they suffered a strategic defeat. I respectfully disagree. Perhaps one could make that argument if no supplies got through. But the British overall mission and purpose of the resupply convoy was to keep Malta in the game, not to deliver “X” amount of supplies. The 20 percent that was delivered was part of a sufficient effort that attained that goal. Malta would survive.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Sirte

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_sirte_2nd.html

http://www.world‐war.co.uk/sirte.php3

http://ww2today.com/22nd‐march‐1942‐italian‐battle‐fleet‐attacks‐malta‐convoy

http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Mediterranean/OOB_WWII_Secon d‐Sirte.htm

https://www.navyhistory.org.au/the‐second‐battle‐of‐sirte‐mediterranean‐1941/3/

Operation Harpoon

Introduction

Operation Harpoon was an Allied effort to resupply the island of Malta in the Mediterranean Sea during World War II. The operation was launched from Gibraltar on 12 June 1942. Operation Harpoon was paired with Operation Vigorous. While Operation Harpoon departed Gibraltar and approached Malta from the west, Operation Vigorous would depart Egypt and approach Malta from the east. The intent was to split the Axis forces trying to prevent the resupply effort.

Malta played a large role disproportionate to its size in the Mediterranean Theater of World War II. Axis armies threatened Allied‐held Egypt and the Suez Canal, and with them, Allied control of Middle Eastern oil supplies. Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal could destabilize Allied control of the oil, or lead to the seizure of those resources by the Axis. The Axis needed the delivery of adequate supplies to its forces in North Africa from

Italy across the Med in order to have hope of bringing about the seizure of the oil supplies. Malta stood athwart this supply route and was a constant target of Axis forces.

By the time Operation Harpoon was launched on 12 June 1942, Malta was slowly being isolated and starved by the Italian Regia Aeronautica and the German Luftwaffe. Replacement aircraft could reach to Malta, but fuel and ammunition to use the aircraft was critically low. And the Axis attempt to starve Malta was not merely figurative. The Malta garrison and population were being starved of food. The population of 250,000 and the 20,000 British defenders were already on starvation rations.

At Sea

The Operation Harpoon convoy included six ships carrying 39,000 tons of cargo and oil for Malta. The ships came from three Allied nations. Merchantmen Troilus, Burdwan and Orari were British ships. Tanimbar was a Dutch merchantman. The merchantman Chant and tanker Kentucky were American vessels. The cargo vessels had a close escort (Force X) of one antiaircraft cruiser, nine destroyers, one minelayer, and assorted smaller vessels. Distant cover (Force W) was provided by a battleship, two aircraft carriers with a total of 42 aircraft, three cruisers and at least four more destroyers immediately available.

The convoy departed Gibraltar on 12 June 1942.Two days out on 14 June the air attacks began. Tanimbar was sunk by Italian torpedo bombers. The cruiser Liverpool was damaged and it cost the escorts the destroyer Antelope to tow her back to Gibraltar. The fast minelayer Welshman was detached and traveled to Malta alone, where she delivered cargo then returned to the close escort, arriving the following day. In addition to the detachment of Welshman and the departure of Liverpool and Antelope, Force W, the distant cover force, was ordered back to Gibraltar on 14 June, but not before the two aircraft carriers, Argus and Eagle, were damaged by air attack.

The Axis struck the convoy again at dawn on 15 June 1942 with a coordinated attack by the Regia Marina’s 7th Division (2 cruisers and 5 destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral Alberto Da Zara) and Axis aircraft. The convoy escort responded to the surface attack aggressively. Five of the Allied destroyers made smoke and attacked the Italians. Two Allied destroyers, Bedouin and Partridge, were immediately disabled by fire from the Italian cruisers. The Italian destroyer Ugolino Vivaldi was hit by fire from Allied destroyers, but she was towed to safety by Italian destroyers Lanzerotto Marocello and Premuda. At 0800 hours the engagement was terminated when the Italian fleet lost contact with the convoy.

Later that morning, just before noon, the Italian fleet once again engaged the convoy. Convoy escorts abandoned Kentucky, Chant, and Burdwan, disabled earlier in the day by air attack. The stricken ships were eventually sunk, Chant by aerial attack, Kentucky and Burdwan by gunfire from the cruiser Raimondo Montecuccoli and the destroyers Ascari

Page 54 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters and Alfredo Oriani. The British cruiser Cairo and minesweeper Hebe were also damaged by gunfire.

By early afternoon Partridge had been repaired sufficiently to be underway and she tried to take Bedouin under tow. The resumption of the attack by the two Italian cruisers and two destroyers caused Bedouin to be cast off and she was left adrift. Bedouin was finally sunk by an Italian bomber using a torpedo, after being pummeled by gunfire. In a last feat of defiance, Bedouin shot down the aircraft that delivered the lethal torpedo. Her crew lost 28 killed and over 200 captured. The majority of the captured were picked up by the Italian hospital ship Meta. Partridge escaped and headed back to Gibraltar.

The main body of the convoy had escaped the Italian fleet, but they had to endure one more obstacle. While approaching Malta on the evening of 15 June 1942 they ran into a minefield. Two British destroyers and a minesweeper were damaged, as was the merchantman Orari, who lost some of her cargo due to the mine explosion. Also, a Polish destroyer, Kujawiak, struck a mine and sunk during the early minutes of 16 June.

Results

Of the original five merchantmen and one tanker that set out from Gibraltar for Malta, only two merchantmen made it. The Italian action against Operation Harpoon is celebrated as the only undisputed squadron‐sized victory for the Regia Marina during World War II. The Allies had lost two destroyers, three merchantmen, and a tanker sunk. Two cruisers, three destroyers and one merchantman were damaged. The Allies had lost just over 100 men killed, and over 200 captured. The Axis had one destroyer damaged, 12 men killed in the naval battle, and 29 aircraft shot down.

The losses suffered by the cargo ships of Operation Harpoon were severe, especially the loss of the tanker Kentucky with her 14,000 tons of fuel and kerosene. The supplies that were delivered extended the nonfuel inventory by eight weeks. Malta’s Royal Air Force contingent could measure its fuel supply in terms of a few weeks. But as with the results of the Second Battle of Sirte, some supplies did make it to Malta. Malta was hanging on, barely. Even with the population and the British defenders on starvation rations, Malta could remain a thorn in the Axis side for a little longer, at least long enough for the next convoy attempt, Operation Pedestal.

http://www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=6674

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Harpoon_(1942)

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http://www.oocities.org/mike_buhagiar/convoy/convoy.html

Operation Vigorous

Introduction

Diminutive Malta played a large role in the Mediterranean Theater of World War II. Britain controlled Middle Eastern oil supplies. Axis armies threatened Egypt and the Suez Canal, held by the British. Losing the Suez Canal could destabilize Britain’s control of the oil, or in the worst case, lead to the loss of those resources to the Axis. For the Axis to have any hope of bringing this about, it needed the delivery of adequate supplies to its forces in North Africa from Italy across the Med. This is where Malta came in. Malta threatened this supply route, all the while being under a constant threat from Axis forces itself.

By the time that Operation Vigorous was launched on 12 June 1942, Malta was slowly being isolated and starved by the German Luftwaffe and the Italian Regia Aeronautica. Though replacement aircraft could be flown to Malta, fuel and ammunition to use the aircraft was critically low. And Malta was not merely being starved of war supplies; it was being starved of food.

Operation Vigorous was paired with Operation Harpoon. Operation Vigorous was to depart Egypt and approach Malta from the east, while Operation Harpoon was to depart Gibraltar and approach Malta from the west. The intent was to split the Axis response to the resupply effort.

The ships making up the Operation Vigorous making up the convoy and escorts, including reinforcements from the Indian Ocean, departed Haifa and Port Said on 12 June 1942 and rendezvoused the next day off Tobruk with Force A’s seven light cruisers and seventeen destroyers. Force A was commanded by Rear Admiral Philip Vian, who assumed overall command of the operation. The British also had thirteen submarines deployed, nine near the Italian port of Taranto and four along the western approaches to Malta.

At Sea

The convoy sailed between Crete and North Africa in an area known as “Bomb Alley.” Crete had been occupied by Germany for just over a year when the convoy sailed, and the Luftwaffe was well established there. One merchant ship was damaged during this passage and diverted to Tobruk. Another had engine trouble and was also diverted to Tobruk, but was sunk by air attacks before it could reach harbor.

On 14 June 1941 Rear Admiral Vian was warned that an Italian force had sailed from Taranto to intercept the convoy. The Italian fleet, commanded by Vian’s previous foe Admiral Angelo Iachino, was a strong one with two battleships, four cruisers (two heavy

Page 56 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters and two light), and a dozen destroyers. Unlike previous engagements between the two forces, this time the Italians were equipped with radar.

Early on 15 June the convoy began the first of five course reversals as it tried to find an unobstructed path to Malta. German E‐boats harried the convoy escorts, damaging the cruiser Newcastle and sinking the destroyer Hasty. But with the main Italian fleet 230 miles (370 km) to the northwest, the convoy resumed a course for Malta at 0700 hours.

Course reversals were inspired by alternately pessimistic and optimistic evaluations of the convoy’s chances of avoiding the Italian fleet. The morning of 15 June Royal Air Force units from Malta had attacked the Italian fleet. At 0515 hours a Bristol Beaufort torpedoed the cruiser Trento and immobilized her. Almost four hours later at 0910 hours Trento was found by the British submarine Umbra and sunk. Umbra was set upon by support ships but escaped. Inflated reports of damage to the Italians by British aircraft had caused the latest reversal back towards Malta. Several hits were reported, but in fact the only hit was on Trento.

Before noon the convoy had made three additional course reversals and was again heading towards Malta. Throughout the afternoon the convoy escorts were subjected to continuous attacks by Luftwaffe Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers. The cruiser Birmingham and destroyer escort Airedale were damaged, Airedale so severely that she was scuttled the following day, 16 June. An Australian destroyer, Nestor, suffered near misses from an Italian bomber which damaged her boiler rooms. She was taken in tow, but was gradually sinking. Nestor was intentionally sunk on 16 June by depth charges.

Mission Aborted

As early as the evening of 15 June 1942, things did not look good for the successful completion of Operation Vigorous. The British were facing Axis air attacks in strength from North Africa. A large portion of the Italian fleet threatened the convoy. Admiral Henry Harwood, commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet and victor of the River Platte Battle of December 1939, had to consider the likelihood that a substantial portion of the supplies carried by Operation Vigorous ships would ever reach Malta. Operation Harpoon had delivered only two of the six cargo ships it had started out with, and now that that operation was over, all Axis attention could be focused on Operation Vigorous. The ships of Operation Vigorous were low on fuel due to constant evasive maneuvers, and getting low on ammunition. Admiral Harwood ordered the Operation Vigorous convoy and escorts to return to Alexandria. Operation Vigorous was aborted.

Admiral Harwood’s order and its execution did not mean the end of combat associated with Operation Vigorous. The cruiser Hermione was torpedoed and sunk by U‐205 while the convoy retraced its path through Bomb Alley. Nor did the Italian fleet make it back to port unscathed. The battleship Littorio was torpedoed by a Wellington bomber form

Malta, but damage was slight and she reached port without even having to reduce speed.

An Italian Victory

Operation Vigorous ended as an Italian victory. Regia Marina had interposed itself between Malta and the British convoy and, with the help of Axis air forces, prevented any supplies carried by Operation Vigorous ships from reaching Malta, even though there was no direct contact between surface forces. The Axis had sunk one cruiser, three destroyers and two merchant ships, while damaging three cruisers, one destroyer, and a corvette. All of this was accomplished at the cost of one cruiser sunk, one battleship slightly damaged, and 21 aircraft lost. Malta’s need was becoming desperate, and the stage was set for the next effort to resupply the outpost. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Vigorous

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http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK‐RN‐II/UK‐RN‐II‐2.html

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Operation Pedestal

Introduction

During World War II in the Mediterranean Sea, the British‐held island of Malta was a chicken bone in the throat of the Axis resupply effort to their forces in North Africa. But Malta was as vulnerable as it was valuable. During 1941 and 1942, Axis air and naval forces strived to quarantine Malta or force the surrender of the garrison. The British repeatedly sought to sustain Malta with resupply via convoys, while maintaining the island as a base of offensive operations against Axis resupply of forces in North Africa. Through the first half of 1942, resupply of Malta had slowed to a trickle. Two months after the paired resupply convoys of Operation Vigorous and Operation Harpoon had provided meager sustenance to the island of Malta during June 1942 the British were ready to try again with Operation Pedestal.

Prelude

Operation Pedestal would muster the largest covering force yet to be deployed with a single convoy. The escort would include two battleships and three aircraft carriers. Operation Pedestal would not only attempt to deliver food, fuel and ammo, but would also be in conjunction with Operation Bellows the reinforcement of Malta’s air defense

Page 58 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters capabilities by 38 Spitfires being ferried on one of the carriers. Air Vice Marshal Keith Parks, Malta’s air commander, informed his superiors in London that there was only a few weeks’ supply of aviation fuel left on the island. Without the delivery of fuel, the 38 Spitfires would be near useless.

The convoy was to consist of 14 merchantmen with their escorts, and it would sail from Great Britain with some escorts joining at Gibraltar. Almost all of the fuel eggs would be in one basket, the Ohio. She was an American‐built tanker with a fuel carrying capacity of 11, 500 tons sailing with a British crew under the British flag. Other vessels would be carrying some fuel in drums. Convoy protection was divided into a distant covering force (Force Z) and a close covering force (Force X). Force Z included the two battleships and three aircraft carriers, along with three cruisers and several destroyers. Force Z would cover the convoy from Gibraltar to the Sicilian channel, at which point it would return to Gibraltar, leaving the convoy in the care of Force X. Force X consisted of four cruisers and a destroyer flotilla. Force X would accompany the convoy all the way to Malta. The commander of Operation Pedestal was Vice Admiral E. N. Syfret.

Italy’s Regia Marina with the help of Axis air forces had been able to turn back or take a heavy toll on previous efforts to resupply Malta. By the time of Operation Pedestal in August 1942, the Regia Marina was having its own fuel problems. Lack of fuel oil kept Italy’s largest vessels in port. The immediate response to Operation Pedestal would be by aircraft, submarines and torpedo boats. A cruiser division would enter the fray later, once fuel for it had been transferred from inactive battleships.

The Battle

On the night of 10 August 1942 the convoy entered the Mediterranean under the cover of darkness. Darkness may have hidden the convoy, but the Axis was aware of its approach. The following morning at dawn the convoy successfully completed the refueling of 29 combatant vessels by two tankers without incident. Refueling would have been done at Malta, but the dire fuel situation there made it necessary to take the more dangerous course of action of refueling at sea. Axis forces did strike the convoy, but it was unrelated to refueling. The aircraft carrier Eagle was struck by four torpedoes fired by U‐73 and sunk. With that blow the convoy lost 260 men killed and one fourth of its fighter strength.

The aircraft carrier Furious fared better, and launched 38 Spitfires on their 585 mile (940 km) flight to Malta, an unsinkable aircraft carrier. All but one Spitfire made it to Malta. Furious then turned back to Gibraltar with her escorts, one of which, the destroyer Wolverine, rammed and sank the Italian submarine Dagabur. Wolverine sustained damage to her bow but made it safely back to Gibraltar.

The Luftwaffe made a single attack on August 11. A fleet of 36 Ju‐88 and He‐111 aircraft attacked the convoy shortly after sunset. No convoy vessels were hit in the gloaming. The British claimed to have shot down three of the attackers with antiaircraft fire.

On August 12, 1942 the convoy proceeded under air cover. The Ju‐88s returned, a flight of nineteen. The covering Fulmars and Sea Hurricanes shot down four at the cost of one fighter, while antiaircraft fire shot down another two. Surface combat started out light. The British destroyer Ithuriel rammed and sank the Italian submarine Cobalto. The collision put Ithuriel’s Asdic out of action. Two Italian crewmen were killed, the rest taken captive, but two British seamen trying keep the submarine afloat to capture it were lost when the submarine sunk.

Throughout the day on 12 August the main threat to the convoy was from Axis air attacks. The convoy, under constant observation by Italian aircraft, was attacked three more times. At noon Italian and German bombers accompanied by Italian fighters attacked the aircraft carrier Indomitable and wrecked the flight deck. Indomitable’s aircraft already in flight had to land on Victorious. Due to overcrowding several fighters were pushed overboard to make room on Victorious for more landing aircraft.

Submarines were also a continuous threat. The Italian submarines Brin and Giada were driven off by destroyers and a Sunderland flying boat, respectively. Concern for submarine attack was so high that destroyers adopted the dubious tactic of dropping depth charges every ten minutes from mid‐afternoon to early evening. This tactic did not deter the Italian submarine Axum. At 2000 hours on 13 August 1942 she torpedoed the cruisers Cairo and Nigeria, and the tanker Ohio. Cairo sank. Besides the immediate battle loss and damage, the torpedoing of the cruisers disrupted a change in formation that was in progress, requiring the replacement of the cruisers as column leaders. Four destroyers were detached to stand by the cruisers. Force Z had turned back for Gibraltar as planned approximately an hour earlier, and now Force X had lost nearly half of its escorts. Vice Admiral Syfret called back three destroyers from Force Z to reinforce Force X.

Dive and torpedo bombers followed close on the heels of the successful submarine attack. At 2035 hours the convoy came under heavy air attack. British destroyers Penn and Ashanti responded with a smoke screen along the convoy’s western flank, both providing smoke and blocking light from the glowing western horizon. The merchantman Empire Hope was the first to be sunk, victim of a bomber. (The Italian submarine Alagi also claimed this kill.) The cargo ship Deucalion was sunk at 2130 hours after being struck by a torpedo from an aircraft (with another competing claim from the Italian submarine Bronzo). This was followed shortly by the loss of the destroyer Foresight. Merchantman Clan Ferguson was also lost this day. As August 12 came to a close, the British cruiser Nigeria, further damaged during the air attacks, led the other damaged ships back to Gibraltar under the escort of two undamaged destroyers. The remaining escort used depth charges to disperse the remaining Italian submarines.

While passing through minefields between Sicily and Africa just after midnight during the first minutes of 13 August 1942, the convoy was targeted by a series of 15 attacks by Italian and German torpedo boats. The British merchantman Wairangi and the American merchantman Almeria Lykes were both disabled. Almeria Lykes, with two Ju‐88 kills to her credit, was later hit by a torpedo and sunk.

At 0100 hours, the cruiser Manchester was struck by torpedoes from two Italian E‐ boats, and had to be scuttled later in the day. She has the sad distinction of being the largest warship lost to torpedo boats during World War II. The British merchantman Glenorchy and the American merchantman Santa Elisa were both torpedoed and sunk. The British merchantman Rochester Castle was hit by a torpedo but staggered on.

German and Italian bombers and dive bombers attacked next, battling through air cover provided by British fighters from Malta. The merchantman Waimarama was hit by bombs from Ju‐88s. The aviation fuel being carried in tanks on deck were ignited, and Waimarama exploded and sank, taking 80 men from her crew of 107 with her. The destroyer Ledbury braved the flames, picking up survivors. Flaming wreckage from Waimarama set fire to the merchantman Melbourne Star, but fires were brought under control and Melbourne Star proceeded on. Ledbury picked up Melbourne Star crewmen who were a little too quick to abandoned ship.

A group of 60 Ju‐87 dive bombers attacked the convoy and concentrated on Ohio, already torpedoed by Axum. Ohio was pummeled by near misses and even had two crashing planes strike her. Her hull plates were buckled, her forward tank filled with water, and her boilers ruptured. At 1050 hours Ohio was dead in the water. The air attacks did not let up. The destroyer Penn attempted to tow Ohio, but the line snapped. A bomb struck Ohio and the captain ordered the crew to abandon ship.

The merchantman Dorset was abandoned after three near misses caused the engine room to be flooded. She was disabled and caught fire before she could be gotten underway again. Her crew abandoned ship. A near miss of the cruiser Kenya caused the forward engine room to catch fire, but it was put out and Kenya kept up steam.

At 1800 hours on 13 August 1942, the stricken Melbourne Star and Rochester Castle and the undamaged Port Chalmers made it into port at Grand Harbor in La Valetta, Malta. They were the first vessels from Operation Pedestal to arrive. Others would straggle in over the following two days, some under their own power, other vessels with assistance.

The heavy air attacks endured by the Operation Pedestal convoy on 13 August, though taking their toll, forced the Italian surface fleet to keep its distance due to the lack of air cover assets left available. The German Commander in Chief, South and Air Commander, Field Marshal Albert “Smiling Albert” Kesselring, committed his aircraft for direct attacks

Page 61 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters on the Allied convoy in accordance with direction received on 12 August from Reichmarschall Herman Goering. Field Marshal Kesselring denied requests from Regia Marina for air coverage for the Italian cruiser division sniffing around the convoy. With the threat of attack from airbases on Malta, the Italians withdrew their cruisers to Messina, Sicily.

On 14 August 1942 the last two vessels struggled to reach Malta. Both were damaged and one only one under her own power. Brisbane Star arrived in spite of the torpedo damage to her bow, and her cargo was unloaded. Ohio’s final leg to Grand Harbour was perhaps the most dramatic port arrival of the war in the Med. She was chased by enemy bombers to the end. They destroyed her rudder and holed her stern. Ohio was surrounded by a flotilla of Force X ships for protection, and two survivors of the sunken Santa Eliza would win the Merchant Marine Distinguished Service Medal for manning Ohio’s antiaircraft guns. After many broken tow lines Ohio was finally successfully towed with Ledbury and Penn supporting her, one on each side. Even with their support, Ohio’s deck was awash.

At 0930 hours on August 15, 1942, with the destroyer Bramham replacing Ledbury on the port side, and with tugs adding further assistance, Ohio sailed into La Valetta harbor and into immortality. Crowds cheered. Bands played. But silence fell as a mark of respect for the crewmen who were lost. Two other small tankers were on hand to take on Ohio’s cargo. As the last of her precious cargo was pumped from her holds, Ohio settled to the bottom of the harbor.

(Photo courtesy of John Czarzasty, taken in Melbourne, Australia, January 2015)

Epilogue

Operation Pedestal has been called a tactical defeat and a strategic victory for the Allies. Whatever it was, the price was dear. Nine merchantmen had been sunk, more than two sunk for each one arriving in Malta. One aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and a destroyer had been lost. Estimates of the Allied killed in action range between 350 and 550 men. On the other side of the ledger the Regia Marina had lost two submarines sunk, and two cruisers damaged badly enough to put them out of action for the rest of the war. The Axis had also lost 60 aircraft. But the statistic that mattered most was not measured in vessels sunk or aircraft shot down or even the loss of lives, as painful as these last losses are. The most important statistic was measured in weeks. The fuel and the 29,000 tons of cargo added ten more weeks of life to Malta above and beyond the few weeks that the existing stocks could sustain. Another positive result was not so easily quantified. Morale soared. The deliverance of food supplies had eliminated the possibility of surrender due to starvation. And the future looked brighter. Being able to fuel the Spitfires on the island and have the fighters protect future convoys or individual ships such as fast minelayers, both at sea and while unloading, gave promise to an ever improving supply situation.

The Germans had misread Operation Pedestal and overinflated Axis effectiveness. On 17 August 1942 German reports stated that all tankers in the convoy were sunk. The Germans were also wrong about the destination of the convoy, believing that they had prevented the arrival of a single ship from a convoy bound for Egypt, not Malta.

Enough damage had been done to Allied convoy assets in the Mediterranean that it would take until November 1942 to mount another large scale resupply effort for Malta. However, the resupply of Malta from Operation Pedestal allowed the Allies to improve on their ability to interdict Axis convoys to North Africa. During the month of August 1942 the Allies had stopped 35% of Axis shipping to North Africa, and this number would improve. The Axis could not compete with the buildup of resources in North Africa enjoyed by the Allies, an imbalance that would lead to Allied victory at El Alamein three months after Operation Pedestal, and the ultimate surrender or expulsion of Axis forces from North Africa early in 1943.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pedestal

http://www.usmm.org/malta.html

http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/WorldWarIISeaAtlantic/p/World‐War‐Ii‐Operation‐ Pedestal‐Relief‐Of‐Malta.htm

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Battle of the Atlantic

Introduction

The Battle of the Atlantic was a series of engagements between Allies and Axis naval and air forces during the entire duration of World War II. The broad scope of the battle included blockade, counter‐blockade, submarine warfare, surface raiders, air power and intelligence coupes. The Battle of the Atlantic early on boiled down to a struggle to provide Great Britain with the approximately one million tons of imported food and materials needed per week to stay fed and in the fight. Once the Allies were ready to pass to the offensive, the battle also raged around the massive effort to build up in Great Britain sufficient men, equipment and supplies for the invasion of Europe. The Battle of the Atlantic lasted six years and spanned thousands of square miles. It was fought in over one hundred of convoy battles and 1,000 single‐ship encounters. The Allies won the battle in stages, vanquishing the surface raiders by the end of 1942 and turning the tide against the U‐boats by mid‐1943. This account of the Battle of the Atlantic focuses on the Allies’ struggle against U‐boats, and traces the trajectory of the battle with early German ascendancy followed by Allied success and ultimate victory through the introduction of new measures, counter‐measures, intelligence sources, tactics and equipment. We will examine one convoy battle for each of the four years in the period 1940 to 1943.

The German U‐boat Threat

The German U‐boats were commanded by Vice Admiral (later Grand Admiral) Karl Dönitz. Admiral Dönitz believed that Great Britain could be defeated by focusing on her major weakness, dependence on overseas commerce. Admiral Dönitz advocated the use of “wolf pack” tactics (Rudeltaktik) for his U‐boats. The use of the wolf metaphor for submarines was common in the navies of the world, but as “lone wolves” stalking and ambushing. In this new variation, Rudeltaktik used a screen of submarines to detect the approach of a convoy. Coordinated by radio, a portion of the U‐boats would attack the escorts and once the escorts pursued the attackers, the remainder of the wolf pack would feast on the unprotected merchant ships. Admiral Dönitz estimated that 300 Type VII U‐boats would be sufficient for the task of strangling Great Britain. There were only 39 U‐boats in the shipping lanes when war broke out in September 1939. Typically even fewer U‐boats were available at any given time for Atlantic operations during the first few months of the war, and rarely were more than six or seven at sea at the same time. It would take months for Admiral Dönitz to put wolf packs in place. Rudeltaktik began to be successfully employed in September and October 1940.

Other German Assets

The Luftwaffe contributed long range aircraft to the Battle of the Atlantic. Fw 200 Condors and Ju 290s were used for reconnaissance and reported convoy locations. The Condors also directly bombed convoys, claiming significant successes during early 1941. Notwithstanding these claims, overall air assets were limited in effectiveness due to the low numbers of aircraft, lack of coordination between the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, and limited pilot training for anti‐shipping warfare.

The Italian Navy (Regia Marina) contributed a total of 32 submarines to the Battle of the Atlantic. Slower than U‐boats and with huge conning tower profiles, the subs were not as well suited for attacking convoys and were used primarily against single merchantmen. Dissatisfied with their discipline and teamwork, Admiral Dönitz moved the Italian area of operations away from that of the German U‐boats. Even with these limitations, the Italian subs sank 109 ships through August 1943 just before Italy’s surrender to the Allies.

Convoy System

A convoy is a group of merchant vessels and/or transports sailing together with or without warship escorts. The use of convoys was not new to World War II. The convoy system had been used during the age of sail and earlier. The convoy serves two main purposes. The first is to reduce losses. Counterintuitive though it may be, it is more difficult for enemy attackers to find a target when friendly ships are in a relatively concentrated area on a vast ocean than if the ships were spread out and sailing alone or in numerous small convoys. Using operations research analysis, the British realized that one large convoy had less chance of being detected than two convoys made up of the same total number of ships. Given the time it took for a convoy to cross the Atlantic, 15 to 20 days depending on speed, and the interval between convoy departures, usually a week, there was seldom more than a dozen convoys at sea, a half dozen full heading to Great Britain and a similar number empty returning west, at any one time. In such a large area an individual convoy enjoyed good odds of passing undetected.

The second purpose is to increase enemy losses. Enemy vessels, particularly U‐boats, would be attracted to a relatively concentrated area where friendly escorts could engage them. This increased the chances of encountering and sinking enemy assets compared to either random pattern or systematic search missions.

During the World War II, there were two main categories of convoys, operational and commercial shipping. The operational types of convoys were for specific missions, such as the relief of Malta, and for transportation of troops. The commercial shipping convoys were formed to transport the supplies and materials needed to keep Great

Britain in the war. The most important of the commercial shipping convoys were the North Atlantic convoys.

The Admiralty assumed control of British shipping only days before the war started, and exercised that control through its Trade Division. The utility of the convoy system was immediately obvious to Great Britain during World War II. However, lack of resources prevented its effective use at the beginning of hostilities. Initially, emphasis was placed on arming merchant ships with the only available weapons to be had, medium caliber guns stripped from warships that had been scrapped.

Early in the war, convoys heading west were only escorted 100 miles west of Ireland. The escorts would pick up the next west‐bund convoy to reach their location, and accompany them for the rest of their journey. Meanwhile the merchantmen would continue west for 2000 miles until picked up by escorts only as far eastward as the eastern tip of Greenland.

Success or failure, safety or horrendous losses, ultimately depended on adequate escorts. A fairly typical convoy of 45 vessels would, depending on weather conditions, travel with merchant ships in a rectangular formation with ships in nine to eleven columns with a diagonal 8000 meters in length. With escorts picketed 3000 meters beyond the edge of the rectangle, the perimeter to be defended could reach 60,000 meters. This created a situation in which sufficient escorts were rarely if ever available. Even with asdic submarine detection equipment, there were great gaps in protection. Subtract an escort in pursuit of an enemy sub or rescuing survivors of a sinking merchantman and the gaps become larger.

Escorts were few at the beginning of the war, exacerbating the situation. The Royal Navy had 176 destroyers at the outbreak of the war, about one third of which were of World War I vintage. After subtracting destroyers for other operational commitments, only 76 destroyers were available for convoy escort duty. The United States gave Great Britain 50 destroyers in exchange for naval bases in the Caribbean, but most of the destroyers also dated to World War I. Armed trawlers and purpose‐built corvettes, again in inadequate numbers and too slow to catch a surfaced U‐boat, would fill the role of escort in place of destroyers, or supplement the available destroyers. This was the state of convoy defense leading to a period of U‐boat success known as ‘The Happy Time’. ‘The Happy Time’ (June 1940 – February 1941)

From the start of the war until the fall of France in June 1940, U‐boats had sunk 224 ships. After the fall of France, conditions for attacking Allied shipping became even better. Use of French ports gave U‐boats direct access to the Atlantic Ocean and shortened the distance to the operational area by over 1000 miles. U‐boats could spend longer times on patrol and range further west. British escort assets were reduced at this time as destroyers were taken off escort duty to face a possible cross channel invasion by the Germans. Britain shifted convoy routes northwest to avoid Luftwaffe attacks

Page 66 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters from France, thus increasing the length of convoy routes and their vulnerability to U‐ boat attack. The long range Type IX U‐boats were coming into service and allowed operations against South Atlantic commerce routes. The biggest obstacle for the U‐ boats was simply finding convoys in the open seas. This obstacle was partially overcome by code‐breaking efforts that allowed the Germans to anticipate convoy routes and locations. With the war in Europe in a quiet stage, U‐boat commanders and crews became Germany’s war heroes. During the period June to October 1940 over 270 Allied ships were sunk by U‐boats. These months were called “the Happy Time” (“Die Glückliche Zeit”) by German submariners. It was during the Happy Time that U‐boats attacked Convoy SC 7.

Convoy SC 7

Convoy SC 7 departed Nova Scotia for Great Britain on 5 October 1940. The convoy consisted of six escorts, two tankers and 35 merchantmen of various nationalities (Table 1). The convoy commander was Vice Admiral Lachlan Mackinnon, who voluntarily returned from retirement. The convoy commander was responsible for the civilian vessels and had no authority over the military escort.

The convoy was classified as “slow” with a speed on paper of 8 knots, but the collection of ships included older smaller ships slower than this. The captains of the few faster ships in the convoy liked their chances better on their own, but they stuck with the convoy. The vessels carried bulk goods including lumber, pulp wood, grain, steel, steel ingots, and iron ore. One of the merchantmen, Empire Brigade, carried a cargo of trucks. The oil tanker Langudoc carried fuel for the Royal Navy. For the first three quarters of the voyage, the sole escort for Convoy SC 7 was Scarborough, a Hastings‐class sloop. Once out of the coastal area, there would be no aircraft cover for the convoy.

On its first day out, Convoy SC 7 lost her first ship. Winona, the sole United States vessel in the convoy, developed engine trouble and returned to port. Bad weather on 11 October 1940 separated some members of the convoy, and they continued on alone. The Canadian merchantman Trevisia was caught alone and sunk by U‐124 on 16 October. The Greek merchantman Aneos was caught alone the following day and sunk by U‐38. On 17 October the convoy entered the Western Approaches to the British Isles and was joined by the sloop Fowey and the corvette Bluebell. On the same day the convoy was sighted by U‐48 which attacked and sunk Scoresby and Langudoc. Scarborough counterattacked and forced U‐48 to break off contact with the convoy, but in doing so Scarborough herself fell so far behind the convoy that her service as an escort for SC 7 was through. On 18 October the sloop Leith and corvette Heartsease joined the convoy in time to drive off U‐38, which had just attacked and damaged the merchantman Carsbreck. Heartsease was detailed to accompany Carsbreck the rest of the way, and the convoy lost the services of Heartsease.

During the night of 18‐19 October 1940 the wolf pack struck en masse. From Lorient, France Admiral Dönitz and his staff coordinated the attacks of U‐46, U‐99, U‐100, U‐101 and U‐123. The merchantman Creekirk, carrying iron ore, was first, lost with her crew of 36. Later in the evening the merchantman Fiscus went down with her cargo of steel ingots and 38 out of 39 of her crew. Empire Brigade was sunk with her cargo of trucks. Commodore Mackinnon’s flagship, the merchantman Assyrian, was sunk. She lost 17 of her crew, but the commodore survived. In a six hour period, the convoy had lost 16 ships.

Table 1. Convoy SC 7 Orders of Battle Britain Germany Bluebell Corvette U‐38 Submarine Elk (CANADA) Armed Yacht U‐46 Submarine Fowey Sloop U‐48 Submarine Heartsease Corvette U‐99 Submarine Leith Sloop U‐100 Submarine Scarborough Sloop U‐101 Submarine Aenos (GREECE) Cargo U‐123 Submarine Assyrian Cargo U‐124 Submarine Beatus Cargo Blairspay Cargo Boekelo (NETHERLANDS) Cargo Botusk Cargo Carsbreck Cargo Clintonia Cargo Convallaria (SWEDEN) Cargo Corinthic Cargo Creekirk Cargo Dioni (GREECE) Cargo Eaglescliffe Hall Cargo Eelbeck Cargo Empire Brigade Cargo Empire Miniver Cargo Fiscus Cargo Flynderborg Cargo Gunborg (SWEDEN) Cargo HavØrn (NORWAY) Cargo Inger Elisabeth (NORWAY) Cargo Karlander (NORWAY) Cargo Langudoc Tanker Niritos (GREECE) Cargo Scoresby Cargo Sedgepool Cargo Shekatika Cargo Snefjeld Cargo Sneland I Cargo Soesterberg (NETHERLANDS) Cargo Sumersby Cargo Thalia (GREECE) Cargo ThorØy (NORWAY) Tanker Trevisa (CANADA) Cargo Trident Cargo

Valparaiso (SWEDEN) Cargo

The merchantman Blairspay was defiant in face of the carnage. She was torpedoed on 18 October 1940 by U‐101, abandoned and left for dead. The following day Blairspay was encountered by U‐100 and torpedoed again, and again she refused to sink. Ultimately she was towed into the Clyde, repaired, and saw further convoy duty later in the war. Blairspay would survive the war.

Only 15 of the 35 convoy ships made it to port in Great Britain. U‐99 was responsible for seven of the 20 ships sunk. Personnel losses numbered 141. More losses of men and ships would have been suffered by Convoy SC 7 if the wolf pack had not turned its attention to Convoy HX‐79, which was also in the area on 19 October 1940. The wolf pack enjoyed continued success against Convoy HX‐79. By the end of the day, with the loss of another 8 ships, the Allies had suffered the worst 48‐hour period of the entire Battle of the Atlantic. At this point in the battle, convoy tactics and escort responses were inadequate to face the wolf packs.

Developments during Early 1941

Convoys through early 1941 usually numbered 40‐50 ships shepherded by two escorts equipped with unreliable Asdic. At this point, with the disastrous losses during the German Happy Time as impetus and with greater numbers of escorts becoming available, the British changed tactics. With the expansion of the Canadian Navy, and deployment of the now refurbished American destroyers obtained by trading bases, sufficient escorts were available for the establishment of permanent escort groups. On paper, escort groups consisted of two or three destroyers and six corvettes, but with ships in dock for repairs, the escort group averaged five ships. Lessons learned were incorporated into the training of escort crews, and the escorts gradually became a formidable match for the U‐boats. Additionally, the Admiralty took over Coastal Command aircraft in April 1941 and established a level of cooperation between escorts and aircraft that had previously been lacking. Both escorts and aircraft began to be equipped with short‐wave radar sets capable of detecting surfaced U‐boats.

As welcome as the escort groups were, convoys would still face parts of their voyages without being accompanied by the new escort groups. The Happy Time was over, but Allied convoys would still be subjected to stiff punishment. In war for every move one side makes the enemy attempts a countermove. Admiral Dönitz, faced with the developments enumerated above, shifted his wolf packs further west, patrolling areas where convoys could be attacked before the anti‐submarine escort groups rendezvoused with them. Convoy SC 26 was caught in this situation in March 1941, just after the conclusion of the Happy Time.

Convoy SC 26

Convoy SC 26 left Halifax, Nova Scotia for Liverpool, England on 20 March 1941. The convoy consisted of 23 ships from five Allied nations (Table 2), and was commanded by Commodore G. Swabey who had his flag on the merchantman Michigan. Until the Western Approaches were reached, the convoy would be protected by one vessel, the armed merchant cruiser Worcestershire. She would offer some protection against surface raiders, but only little to no help against U‐boats.

And there would be U‐boats. A wolf pack of nine waited just beyond that line at which escorts could meet eastbound convoys entering the Western Approaches. While stalking a westbound convoy (Convoy OB 305) on 2 April 1941, U‐74 encountered Convoy SC 26 and the pack was ordered by U‐boat Command (Befehlshaber der U‐boote, or BdU) to attack it. Four of the U‐boats closed in on Convoy SC 26 and attacked just after midnight.

U‐46 drew first blood, torpedoing and sinking the tanker British Reliance. The merchantman Alderpool was damaged in this initial engagement, but would be sunk later in the night by U‐73.

Table 2. Convoy SC 26 Orders of Battle Britain Germany Worcestershire Armed Merchant U‐46 Submarine Cruiser British Reliance Tanker U‐69 Submarine British Viscount Tanker U‐73 Submarine Akabahra (NORWAY) Cargo U‐74 Submarine Alderpool Cargo U‐76 Submarine Anacortes Cargo U‐94 Submarine Athentic Cargo U‐97 Submarine Daleby Cargo U‐98 Submarine Editor Cargo U‐101 Submarine Empire Dew Cargo Ethel Radcliffe Cargo Harbledown Cargo Havtor (NORWAY) Cargo Helle (NORWAY) Cargo Indier (BELGIUM) Cargo Leonidas Z. Cambanis Cargo (GREECE) Magician Cargo Nea (NORWAY) Cargo Taygetos (GREECE) Cargo Tenax Cargo Tennessee Cargo Thirlby Cargo Welcomby Cargo Westpool Cargo

Joined after contact: Chelsea Destroyer Havelock Destroyer Hesperus Destroyer Hurricane Destroyer Verity Destroyer Veteran Destroyer Vivien Destroyer Wolverine Destroyer Arbutus Corvette Convovulus Corvette Scarborough Sloop Hontestroom(NETHERLANDS) Rescue Ship

At 0421 hours on 3 April 1941 Commodore Swabey ordered the convoy to disperse. As this order was being executed U‐73 struck again, torpedoing the tanker British Viscount, and setting it ablaze casting light on the scene. The convoy’s sole accompanying escort, Worcestershire, was hit by U‐74, damaged, but stayed afloat.

As day broke on 3 April 1941, the scene was one of flight and pursuit. The ships of the now scattered convoy fled east, pursued by members of the wolf pack seeking to regain contact. Meanwhile, the warships dedicated to meeting Convoy SC 26 and bringing it into port were steaming west. Aboard Michigan, Commodore Swabey sought to reorganize the convoy and managed to reform eight ships. Aid to the eight arrived in the form of destroyers Wolverine and Veteran. Worcestershire, limping along on her own, was met by the destroyer Hurricane, who stayed with her until she was safely in port at Liverpool. The destroyers Havelock and Hesperus continued east to the site of the encounter and searched for survivors. The remaining scattered, unescorted ships were still prey for U‐boats. U‐98 arrived on the scene just before midday and sank the Norwegian merchantman Helle. U‐76 encountered and sank the Finnish freighter Daphne. Daphne was not part of Convoy SC 26, and was in fact sailing under the flag of an ally of Germany. Other losses on 3 April include the merchantman Westpool (sunk by U‐74), the Greek merchantman Leonidas Z. Cambanis and the Belgian merchantman Indier (both sunk by U‐73). As the sun sank, U‐94 sank the merchantman Harbledown, part of the reassembled convoy. Further attacks in the gathering dusk were beaten off by escorts.

On 4 April 1941, the reconstituted portion of the convoy had respite. The ships suffered no attacks this day, and their escort was strengthened with the arrivals of the destroyers Verity, Vivien and Chelsea and the corvette Convolvulus. However, the Norwegian merchantman Helle, straggling behind the convoy, was sunk by U‐98. The night of 4/5 April, two ships sailing alone were attacked. The merchantman Athenic was sunk by U‐ 76 and the merchantman Thirlby was torpedoed by U‐69 and damaged. Thirlby managed to make it into port. At dawn on 5 April the escorts struck back at the wolf pack. Wolverine sighted U‐76 on the surface and assisted by Scarborough and the corvette Arbutus, attacked. U‐76 submerged, but was brought back to the surface by depth charges from Wolverine, and abandoned by her crew. U‐76 sank taking only one crew member with her, the rest being rescued. There were no further attacks by the U‐ boats, and during 8‐11 April the remaining ships of Convoy SC 26 reached various ports.

Convoy SC 26 lost 10 of its 26 cargo ships, including two tankers, all from U‐boat attacks. In addition to battle losses, one ship had returned to Canada, and two diverted to Iceland. Another two ships and the convoy’s lone ocean escort had been damaged. Almost 100 sailors had perished. The attackers had suffered one U‐boat sunk with the loss of one life. The German countermovement of shifting wolf pack patrol areas further west to get to convoys before they could rendezvous with escort groups had paid off handsomely in the case of Convoy SC 26.

Further Developments, 1941

Tactical and technological developments on the Allied side ever so gradually helped to tip the Battle of the Atlantic in favor of the Allies. In mid‐1941 convoys began receiving door‐to‐door escorts with no vulnerable gaps during the voyage without escorts. Sufficient escorts had been built to raise the average number of escorts for a convoy to five. The United States, though a nominal neutral, began to play a role in the Battle of the Atlantic which included openly hostile encounters with U‐boats. After declaration of war against Germany, the United States joined with Canada and Britain to form a mid‐ ocean escort force.

The Battle of the Atlantic was also fought in the air over the ocean. The British installed catapults on some merchantmen that, using a rocket assist, would launch a single Hurricane fighter. The catapult‐equipped cargo ships were called Catapult Aircraft Merchantmen (CAMS), and the sacrificial Hurricane was used to chase down and destroy German bombers when sighted. Nine Hurricanes were launched during the battle, and they shot down eight Fw 200 Condors that were shadowing convoys. One Hurricane pilot was lost. The United States also provided Great Britain with B‐24 Liberator bombers and PBY Catalina flying boats for use in antisubmarine warfare.

High‐frequency direction‐finding (HF/DF, or huff‐duff), a technology originating in the late 1920s, was put to use in detecting U‐boats and was in common use by 1942. The operation of a wolf pack required constant radio contact to report the locations of convoys. An HF/DF operator intercepting a transmission could determine the direction from which it came. A destroyer equipped with HF/DF could head in that direction and attack the U‐boat source of the transmission, or at least disrupt the U‐boat’s attack by forcing it to submerge. The British also made use of shore based HF/DF. Two HF/DF interceptions of a radio transmission allowed the British to plot the U‐boat’s location, not just its direction from the HF/DF operator. HF/DF and visual sightings were used to direct support groups to U‐boats. Such support groups acted independently from convoy escorts and their pursuit of U‐boats did not diminish a convoy’s accompanying escorts. HF/DF is credited with contributing to 24% of Allied U‐boat kills.

The breaking of the Enigma code was a soaring triumph the affected Allied conduct of the war on the entire western front. The breaking of the Kriegmarine’s Enigma had profound effects on the Battle of the Atlantic. U‐boat operations required large amounts of coded radio messages. On 9 May 1941 crewmembers of the British destroyer Bulldog boarded U‐110 and captured Enigma tables and keys that enabled the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park to decode messages for several weeks until they ran out of current keys. But this episode provided the codebreakers with the experience needed to continue to break new keys as they were introduced by the Germans. The effect was immediate. The following month, June 1941, convoy losses dropped by two thirds, as their paths were routed around the U‐boat patrol lines

Page 74 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters revealed by the broken code transmissions. The breaking of the code was particularly timely, as the Germans began fielding large numbers of U‐boats by late 1941, including the new Type VIIC, which became the workhorse of the U‐boat fleet.

The Battle Spreads

After the United States entered the war, Hitler no longer needed to restrain Admiral Dönitz’s desire to attack the shipping lanes off the American east coast. The U‐boat fleet contained only twelve of the Type IX U‐boats with the range to reach the American east coast and of the twelve only five were immediately available when Admiral Dönitz ordered Operation Drumbeat (Paukenschlag), also known to the Germans as the Second Happy Time. Operation Drumbeat also ranged into the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.

At first it was easy pickings for the U‐boats. U‐boats reached the US coast on 13 January 1942 and during the first two weeks of Operation Drumbeat the five U‐boats committed to the operation sunk 20 merchantmen. The United States had never tasted submarine warfare off its coasts. Basic measures such as blackouts were not used. U‐boats could sit off the coast and acquire targets silhouetted by the urban lights. Inter‐Allied friction also contributed to losses. American Admiral Ernest King initially rejected British calls for coastal blackouts and use of convoys for merchant shipping (though he approved of the use of convoys for troop transports).

The U‐boats were serviced by U‐tankers (Type XIV) which extended U‐boat patrol times by one month. The number of U‐boats for Operation Drumbeat peaked at 30 in May 1942. At this point use of the convoy system for merchantmen was finally adopted by the United States. Operation Drumbeat had cost the Allies 360 ships (some estimates are as high as 397) at a cost to the Kriegsmarine of eight U‐boats.

The effect of Operation Drumbeat went beyond its immediate battlefield results. Its success enhanced Admiral Dönitz in Hitler’s eyes, and Admiral Dönitz was given free rein to use the U‐boat arm of the Kriegsmarine as he saw fit. The critical focus of the Battle of the Atlantic shifted back to the Atlantic convoys. Naval construction priorities were given to U‐boats. Admiral Dönitz later became a Grand Admiral (and Hitler’s successor).

Refocusing on the Mid‐Atlantic

During the summer of 1942 Admiral Dönitz ordered his U‐boats to refocus on the mid‐ Atlantic hunting grounds amidst optimistic projections that the U‐boats could sink enough shipping to doom Great Britain. With a total strength of 331 U‐boats, of which only 141 were operational and averaging 50 on patrol, Admiral Dönitz believed he had the tools he needed. Prior to this point, for each U‐boat lost the Allies had been losing 13 merchantmen. With greater numbers and their ability to read Royal Navy codes giving assembly points and sailing times of convoys, the U‐boat service intended to

Page 75 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters improve on these numbers. During the late months of 1942, especially with the diversion of Allied escort ships for Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa, the U‐ boat campaign enjoyed great success. Operation Torch took place on November 8, 1942. One day earlier, Convoy ON 144 sailed.

Convoy ON 144

Convoy ON 144 (Table 3) left Liverpool on 7 November 1942 heading for North America. The convoy was made up of 33 merchantmen and tankers. The following day they were joined by Mid‐Ocean Escort Force Group B‐6. The escorts consisted of five Norwegian‐ manned corvettes (Vervain, Potentilla, Eglantine, Montbretia and Rose) and the rescue ship Perth. Group B‐6 normally had two destroyers assigned to it, but both were under repair and not replaced. United States Coast Guard cutters Bibb, Duane and Ingham accompanied the convoy then detached with ships bound for Iceland.

On 15 November 1942 Convoy ON 144 was discovered by U‐521. She began to shadow the convoy and reported the sighting. By the following day U‐521 had been unable to direct additional U‐boats to the convoy so its commander, Kapitänleutnant Klaus Bargsten asked for and received permission to attack alone. U‐521 fired a salvo of six torpedoes and missed with all of them. Rose counterattacked with depth charges and was also unsuccessful.

The wolf pack finally began to congregate. After sunset on 17 November 1942, U‐184, U‐262 and U‐264 made a coordinated attack. U‐184 sunk the merchantman Widestone. U‐264 sunk the merchantman Mount Taurus. U‐262 missed with three torpedoes. More U‐boats arrived on the scene through the night.

Before sunrise on 18 November 1942 an additional six U‐boats joined the hunt and U‐ 521 reentered the fray, torpedo tubes freshly reloaded after her six misses three days earlier. The busy U‐624 sank the tanker President Sergent and merchantman Parismina, while damaging the merchantman Yaka, later sunk by U‐522. The corvettes counterattacked and avenged Widestone by sinking U‐184. However the corvette Montbretia was torpedoed while on the attack and sunk by U‐262. The wolf pack broke off contact with Convoy ON 144 on 19 November when destroyers Badger and Firedrake showed up to assist the corvettes.

The Allies had lost five merchantmen and a corvette against the loss of a single U‐boat. The Allies had lost 133 sailors against 50 for the Germans. For the Allies, the trend in losses was in the right direction, but a large enough wolf pack could still take a toll on shipping. In early 1943 a German victory in the Battle of the Atlantic still seemed within reach.

Table 3. Convoy ON 144 Orders of Battle Britain Germany Eglantine (NORWAY) Corvette U‐184 Submarine Montbretia (NORWAY) Corvette U‐224 Submarine Potentilla (NORWAY) Corvette U‐262 Submarine Rose (NORWAY) Corvette U‐264 Submarine Vervain Corvette U‐383 Submarine Bibb (USA) Cutter U‐454 Submarine Duane (USA) Cutter U‐521 Submarine Ingham (USA) Cutter U‐522 Submarine Perth Convoy Rescue Ship U‐624 Submarine Aiga Marina (GREECE) Cargo U‐753 Submarine Baxtergate Cargo Bestik (NORWAY) Cargo Borgfred (NORWAY) Cargo Cetus (NORWAY) Cargo Dimitros Inglessis (GREECE) Cargo Empire Stour Cargo Fjallfoss (ICELAND) Cargo Godafoss (ICELAND) Cargo Governor John Lind (USA) Cargo Guido Cargo Ingertre (NORWAY) Cargo Leonidas N. Condylis (GREECE) Cargo Minister Wedel (NORWAY) Cargo Maycrest Cargo Monkleigh Cargo Moscha D. Kydoniefs (GREECE) Cargo Mount Taurus (GREECE) Cargo Nordeflinge Cargo Norlom (NORWAY) Cargo Orwell (NORWAY) Cargo Parismina (USA) Cargo President Sergent Tanker Reigh Count (PANAMA) Cargo Robert E. Hopkins (USA) Tanker Selfoss (ICELAND) Cargo SuderØy (NORWAY) Cargo Tahchee Cargo Titanian (NORWAY) Cargo Van de Velde (NETHERLANDS) Cargo

Widestone Cargo Yaka (USA) Cargo Yemassee (PANAMA) Cargo

The Decisive Months

In 1943 new faster escorts, Black Swan‐class sloops and River‐class frigates came into Allied service. Convoys had an average of eight escorts. The better and more numerous escorts, along with the deployment of dedicated U‐boat hunting task groups, began to make a difference. The ratio of merchant ships lost to U‐boats lost declined to 10 to 1. Also, Allied construction capacity far outpaced losses. During the entire year of 1943, losses of 7.5 million tons of merchant shipping would be replaced by 20 million tons constructed mostly in American shipyards. However, early in the year this overwhelming factor was not readily apparent.

By early 1943 Admiral Dönitz had increased his U‐boat fleet to 400, of which 200 were operational and an average of 100 were at sea. German code‐breakers were still reading daily Admiralty assessments of U‐boat dispositions. The U‐boat toll on Allied shipping, combined with ancillary Allied losses (mines, aircraft, surface raiders), convinced Admiral Dönitz that Germany had nearly reach the level of effort needed to defeat Britain. But Allied shipyards were not only turning out enough ships to keep the merchant fleet growing. There were by this time over 500 escort vessels available for both close escort protection of convoys and for hunter/killer groups. Aircraft available for anti‐submarine warfare increased from 10 to 60 between February and May 1943. Improved air tactics against U‐boats, improvements in radar, and radar direction finding that allowed convoys to be diverted away from wolf packs all contributed to the gradual turning of the Battle of the Atlantic in favor of the Allies. Even so, the wolf packs enjoyed some successes in early 1943 due to bad weather which made it harder to detect them and a lapse in Enigma intelligence due to the introduction by the Germans of a refinement of the U‐boat code. One U‐boat success in early 1943 was the attack on Convoy TM 1.

Convoy TM 1

Convoy TM 1 was a group of nine tankers sailing under three flags (Great Britain, Norway and Panama) from Trinidad to Gibraltar. The convoy was escorted by one destroyer and three corvettes, giving it a low merchant ship to escort ratio (Table 4). The convoy was still forming up on 29 December 1942 when U‐124 sighted the corvette Godetia escorting two tankers on their way to join the main convoy.

On 3 January 1943 the first shots of the battle were fired when U‐514 torpedoed the tanker British Vigilance, damaging her severely enough to cause the crew to abandon ship, but the tanker did not sink. The German assessment of the convoy was that it was

Page 78 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters a large tanker convoy attempting to make for North Africa to resupply Allied forces there. Admiral Dönitz ordered wolf pack “Dolphin” on the attack against Convoy TM 1.

Five days later on 8 January 1943 the wolf pack made contact when U‐381 sighted the convoy. That evening U‐436 sank the tanker Olentia II and damaged the tanker Albert L. Ellsworth. The escorts responded immediately. The destroyer Havelock drove off and damaged U‐381. The corvettes Pimpernel and Godetia drove off U‐571 and U‐575, respectively. U‐522 attacked after sunrise damaging the tankers Norvik and Minister Wedel. U‐422 damaged the tanker Empire Lytton, while U‐181 and U‐134 made unsuccessful attacks. Godetia responded and damaged U‐134 with depth charges.

The wolf pack managed to stay in contact with the convoy into the next day, 9 January 1943. In the evening, U‐522 returned and finished of Norvik and Minister Wedel. Also gathering the low hanging fruit, U‐442 sank the abandoned Empire Lytton with torpedoes while U‐436 sunk the abandoned Albert L. Ellsworth using her deck gun. The unfortunate British merchantman William Wilberforce, not associated with Convoy TM 1 and sailing alone, blundered into the wolf pack and was sunk by U‐511.

Table 4. Convoy TM 1 Orders of Battle Britain Germany Havelock Destroyer U‐124 Submarine Godetia Corvette U‐134 Submarine Pimpernel Corvette U‐181 Submarine Saxifrage Corvette U‐381 Submarine Albert L. Ellsworth (NORWAY) Tanker U‐436 Submarine British Dominion Tanker U‐442 Submarine British Vigilance Tanker U‐511 Submarine Cliona Tanker U‐514 Submarine Empire Lytton Tanker U‐522 Submarine Minister Wedel (NORWAY) Tanker U‐571 Submarine Norvik (PANAMA) Tanker U‐575 Submarine Oltenia II Tanker U‐620 Submarine Vanja (NORWAY) Tanker

Arrived 1/12/1943 Quentin Destroyer Pentstemon Corvette Samphire Corvette

On the night of 10/11 January 1943, British Dominion was torpedoed by U‐522. Damage was sufficient to cause her crew to abandon ship, but she stayed afloat until U‐620

Page 79 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters finished her off with gunfire and torpedoes. U‐571 and U‐511 were also involved in attacks that night and over the next 48 hours, but both were unsuccessful.

The remnants of Convoy TM 1 by this time were approaching Gibraltar. The hard pressed escorts were reinforced by the destroyer Quentin and the corvettes Pentstemon and Samphire. Additional help arrived in the form of air cover from Gibraltar. With this help, the remaining two tankers of the original nine, Cliona and Vanja, reached Gibraltar. But the curtain had not yet come down on convoy. On 24 January 1943, three weeks after she had been torpedoed and her crew abandoned her, British Vigilance was found adrift by U‐105 and immediately dispatched to the bottom of the sea.

The Battle of the Atlantic Reaches a Crescendo

Under cover of unusually foul North Atlantic weather the U‐boats took an already ferocious battle to a higher level. Fifty U‐boats were at sea at the beginning of March 1943. Of this number 44 U‐boats were brought together from three wolf packs to attack Convoy SC 122 and Convoy HX 229 with devastating effects. A total of 22 ships were lost within ten days in mid‐March along with a high number of experienced crewmen. The cost to the U‐boat fleet was seven damaged and two sunk by aircraft while sailing back to harbor. No escorts had been damaged or sunk. This was perhaps the high water mark of the U‐boat fleet. As high as these losses were for the Allies, for the Germans it would ultimately be too little too late.

Though fierce combat raged throughout April 1943, Allied losses were half those suffered in March. But on the other side of the ledger, 14 U‐boats were sunk or damaged. And for the Germans it got worse. While attacking Convoy ON 55, the Germans lost seven U‐boats while sinking 12 merchantmen, a ratio below two merchantmen sunk per U‐boat lost. And it was downhill from there. During the following month, May 1943, the Germans lost 41 U‐boats while sinking a similar number of merchantmen. The Happy Time was long gone. This month became known in the U‐ boat fleet as Black May. In late May, Admiral Dönitz moved all but a token force of U‐ boats out of the North Atlantic, effectively calling of the U‐boat offensive.

Fighting On

Admiral Dönitz ordered the Atlantic campaign renewed in September 1943. Although U‐ boats were now equipped with short‐wave radar detectors, acoustic torpedoes and enhanced antiaircraft weaponry, they were unable to read British codes from June until December 1943. Convoys were better able to evade wolf packs. In the cases in which wolf packs found and attacked convoys, the strong escort detachments were able of fight off the U‐boats. The enhanced antiaircraft weapons gave the U‐boats a false sense of security. When they attempted to fight on the surface, they still suffered heavy losses from attacking aircraft.

By November 1943 Admiral Dönitz all but admitted defeat in his personal writings, and abandoned wolf pack tactics. Individual U‐boat commanders would henceforth work on their own initiative. Abandoning the principle of war of mass, U‐boats were relegated to a nuisance and not a threat to Allied convoys. Over the next six months in all theaters of the Battle of the Atlantic, the Allies would lose 107 ships to individual U‐boat attacks, while 136 U‐boats would be lost.

The Penultimate Year

Despite German efforts to upgrade the U‐boat fleet by fielding next generation designs, using snorkels to allow underwater recharging of diesel engines, and the previously mentions radar detectors, improved torpedoes, and enhanced antiaircraft capabilities, by early 1944 crews began regarded their U‐boats as “iron coffins.” As the invasion of the European continent by Allied forces became imminent, the seamen of the U‐boat fleet dutifully manned 73 of their iron coffins and concentrated their efforts in the Bay of Biscay and the Norwegian Sea to confront the invasion fleet.

By the time of the Normandy invasion, the German naval code was transparent to the British code breakers and this factor along with of Allied sub hunter groups made the attempt to disrupt the invasion a costly failure. The U‐boats battled gamely on against the invasion fleet into August 1944, but managed to sink only 21 Allied ships of which five were warships at a cost of 19 U‐boats and approximately 1000 officers and crew.

In August 1944 the U‐boat fleet was faced with a threat from a new direction, as the advances of Allied land forces threatened their Bay of Biscay bases from the land side. This caused the U‐boat fleet to displace to more secure Norwegian bases. However, the Norwegian bases lacked the repair and maintenance facilities that the U‐boats enjoyed at French ports, so the number of U‐boats on mission at any given time declined further. Results obtained by those on mission were meager. Between August and the end of 1944 U‐boats sunk eleven Allied vessels at a cost of eight U‐boats sunk. Not only was the ration of kills‐to‐losses low, the total raw number of Allied vessels sunk made an insignificant impact considering the vast naval resources that the Allies had accrued. For December 1944 seven merchantmen were sunk at a cost to the U‐boat fleet of three vessels. The Battle of the Atlantic was winding down.

The Battle Winds Down

U‐boats continued to operate in the North Atlantic to the very end, and an attempt was made to revive wolf pack tactics. Compared to early days, the campaign was desultory and came to naught in any strategic sense, though this is not meant to diminish the ordeals faced by the Allied crews who lost their vessels and lives during this time or at

Page 81 ©2015 Czarcchino Games Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters any time during this grim and bitterly contested battle. By now, however, the Allies were giving much better than they got. Air attacks against U‐boats had reached a high stage of refinement, and during the final months a large portion of the 152 U‐boats sunk were accounted for by air attack. Against this success the Allies lost during the same period 63 merchant ships.

The limited successes of the U‐boat fleet continued right up to the cessation of hostilities, and slightly beyond in one case due to failure of timely communications to one U‐boat commander. Once the surrender order was received by the U‐boat fleet, the majority (218) were scuttled by their crews. Thirty U‐boats surrendered in British, Canadian and American ports. An additional 154 U‐boats were surrendered in German and Norwegian ports. Two sailed up the River Platte, setting off tales of escaped Nazis that have adherents to this day.

The Results

Estimates of the losses during the Battle of the Atlantic vary. John Barratt (Military History Online) places the losses of U‐boats from all causes at between 777 and 821. The U‐boat crewmen lost with these vessels and other German submariners killed in action during the Battle of the Atlantic numbered approximately 28,000, or 70 percent of all who served in the U‐boat branch. The Allies lost 2,603 merchantmen and tankers with approximately 30,000 seamen.

Retrospectives of the battle in recent years conclude that the outcome of the battle was never in doubt, though it may have been unforeseeable in the heat of battle. Churchill himself described the U‐boat attack as “our worst evil” (Churchill 1950:125), that which worried him most. The massive shipbuilding capacity of the Allies created a situation in which the U‐boats simply could not sink sufficient ships fast enough. Before the United States entry into the war, U‐boats were able to sink more tonnage than Great Britain could replace during only four of 27 months. Once the United States entered the war, U‐ boats were able to sink the combined Allied shipbuilding capacity during only one month. And as the longest continuous campaign of World War II dragged on, the battlefield of the Atlantic became more deadly a place for the U‐boats. The U‐boats lost on the field of battle to an enemy that fought on that field and above it, who fought the battle on technological and cryptological fronts, and even on land as U‐boat bases were taken by ground forces and rendered useless. Even in the face of defeat, the U‐boat fleet took Allied ships and lives to the very end of the war.

References

Churchill, W. S. 1950 The Hinge of Fate.Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, MA.

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/atlantic/convoy.aspx

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http://homepage.ntlworld.com/annemariepurnell/can3.html