The Ongoing Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, and Nation Building
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CSIS_______________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 [email protected] The Ongoing Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, and Nation Building Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy with Patrick Baetjer May 6, 2004 Cordesman: The Ongoing Lessons of the Afghan Conflict 6/3/04 Page 2 Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Jason Wenner for his work in helping to research and update this report. Cordesman: The Ongoing Lessons of the Afghan Conflict 6/3/04 Page 3 Author’s Note This is a working draft and will be subjected to several revisions before it is published. The author welcomes criticisms, comments, and suggestions. The author would be particularly interested in any additional data related to the Afghan conflict. The author can be contacted via email at [email protected]. The assistant who helped on this project may be contacted at [email protected]. Cordesman: The Ongoing Lessons of the Afghan Conflict 6/3/04 Page 4 Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................................8 II. THE PRELUDE TO THE CONFLICT: THE US, AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AL QAIDA, AND THE TALIBAN.................................................................................................................................................................10 THE RISE IN THE TERRORIST THREAT BEFORE “9/11” ...........................................................................................10 THE PRELUDE TO “9/11”........................................................................................................................................12 THE ATTACK ON THE WORLD TRACE CENTER AND THE PENTAGON LEAD TO THE AFGHAN WAR.........................13 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE US, PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AL QAIDA, AND THE TALIBAN WAS CHARACTERIZED BY FRUSTRATION, THE USE OF PROXIES, AND THE INABILITY TO CONVINCE PARTIES TO TURN OVER BIN LADEN. FOLLOWING THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11TH, THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE OVERTHROW OF THE TALIBAN, AND SAUDI ARABIA AND PAKISTAN BECAME IMPORTANT PARTNERS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. ........................................................................................................15 II. SHAPING THE BATTLEFIELD: A UNIQUE WAR WITH UNIQUE INTANGIBLES.........................16 THE UNIQUE CONDITIONS OF WAR DURING THE “CONVENTIONAL” PHASE OF THE CONFLICT ..............................16 THE UNIQUE IMPACT OF INTANGIBLES ..................................................................................................................20 III. THE “CONVENTIONAL PHASE” OF THE CONFLICT: DRAWING LESSONS WITHOUT HARD DATA........................................................................................................................................................................24 DATA ON AIRCRAFT AND MUNITIONS USE.............................................................................................................26 COMPARISONS OF THE AFGHAN AIR EFFORT WITH THE GULF WAR AND AIR CAMPAIGN IN BOSNIA/KOSOVO.......30 COST ESTIMATES FOR THE WAR DURING THE PEAK OF THE FIGHTING AND CUTTING THE COST OF PRECISION STRIKES .................................................................................................................................................................31 Total 6546 ..........................................................................................................................................................32 IV. DRAWING LESSONS FROM THE “CONVENTIONAL PHASE” OF THE CONFLICT: DRIVING THE TALIBAN AND AL QAIDA FROM POWER ............................................................................................34 THE CHANGING NATURE OF JOINT WARFARE AND THE COMBINED ARMS MIX .....................................................34 THE VALUE OF STRIKE RANGE IN POWER PROJECTION..........................................................................................35 “CLOSING THE SENSOR TO SHOOTER LOOP” TO NEAR-REAL TIME: IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE, TARGETING, PRECISION STRIKE, ASSESSMENT AND RE-STRIKE CAPABILITIES...........................................................................37 “ASSET INTEGRATION” AND NEW APPROACHES TO LAND WARFARE....................................................................38 THE IMPACT OF UAVS AND UCAVS .....................................................................................................................39 THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF OTHER PLATFORMS .................................................................................41 Cordesman: The Ongoing Lessons of the Afghan Conflict 6/3/04 Page 5 DEALING WITH MOBILE TARGETS..........................................................................................................................42 THE PROBLEM OF ISR ASSET DENSITY .................................................................................................................43 ISR AND “FRIENDLY FIRE”....................................................................................................................................43 THE DECISION TIME PROBLEM ..............................................................................................................................44 THE PROBLEM OF TARGETING, INTELLIGENCE, AND BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT ...........................................46 HARD TARGET KILL CAPABILITY...........................................................................................................................48 POWER PROJECTION ..............................................................................................................................................49 THE ROLE OF ALLIED COALITION FORCES .............................................................................................................50 COMMON BASE OPERATIONS.................................................................................................................................60 THE VALUE OF COALITION WARFARE AND MISSION-ORIENTED INTEROPERABILITY .............................................60 RETHINKING THE EMPHASIS ON HIGH COST FORCES AND FORCE IMPROVEMENTS ................................................60 CIVILIAN COVER, COLLATERAL DAMAGE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS AS A WEAPON OF WAR ......................................61 Designing Weapons to Deal with Collateral Damage .....................................................................................66 CBRN WEAPONS AND ATTACKS ...........................................................................................................................68 Al Qaida and the Problem of Proliferation......................................................................................................69 V. THE FORCE TRANSFORMATION IMPACT OF THE “CONVENTIONAL” PHASE OF THE WAR 71 THE “FORCE TRANSFORMATION PDM”.................................................................................................................71 DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE AND FUTURE MILITARY STRATEGY .....................................................................72 AFGHANISTAN AND THE FORCE TRANSFORMATION IMPACT OF THE FY2003 BUDGET ..........................................74 OTHER ADVANCES IN TACTICS AND TECHNOLOGY ...............................................................................................76 MISSION EFFECTIVENESS VERSUS MISSION INTENSITY: THE DUEL BETWEEN OFFENSE AND DEFENSE CONTINUES79 THE MEDIA AND PSYOPS BATTLE..........................................................................................................................80 US MARINE CORPS, THE OSPREY, THE AV-8B, AND NON-LITTORAL WARFARE ..................................................82 THE USE OF CARRIERS AND SURFACE SHIPS AS “BASES” FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND LAND OPERATIONS ..........................................................................................................................................................83 TRUE JOINTNESS FOR THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS ..........................................................................................84 CARRIER OPERATIONS AND AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE..........................................................................................85 CHEAP CRUISE MISSILES AND NAVAL STRIKE POWER ...........................................................................................86 FINDING ADEQUATE ELECTRONIC WARFARE ASSETS............................................................................................86 THE MARINE CORPS, THE LHA-X, LHD-X, THE ARMY, AND MARITIME PRE-POSITIONING..................................86 THE MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAUMA.....................................................................................................87 US ARMY AND FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM ............................................................................................................88 SPECIAL, LIGHT, AND AIR ASSAULT FORCES .........................................................................................................89 GLOBAL, REGIONAL, AND THEATER COMMAND....................................................................................................91 COUNTER-PROLIFERATION AND PREEMPTION ........................................................................................................92