CHAILLOT PAPER / PAPER CHAILLOT 165 A WICKED PROBLEM A WICKED PROBLEM WICKED PROBLEM A How to cooperate with | HOW TO COOPERATE WITH COLLUSIVE STATES? WITH COLLUSIVE COOPERATE TO HOW collusive states? By Roderick Parkes and Mark McQuay CHAILLOT PAPER / 165 March 2021 European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) 100, avenue de Suffren 75015 Paris http://www.iss.europa.eu Director: Gustav Lindstrom © EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021. Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union. print ISBN 978-92-9198-962-1 online ISBN 978-92-9198-963-8 CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-20-002-EN-C CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-20-002-EN-N ISSN 1017-7566 ISSN 1683-4917 DOI 10.2815/712662 DOI 10.2815/355434 Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Belgium by Bietlot. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021. Cover image credit: Meghan Schiereck/unsplash A WICKED PROBLEM How to cooperate with collusive states? By Roderick Parkes and Mark McQuay CHAILLOT PAPER / 165 March 2021 The editors Roderick Parkes is the Head of the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Stud- ies at the German Council on Foreign Rela- tions (DGAP). His research focuses on issues of international home affairs cooperation. He was educated at the Universities of Edinburgh and Cambridge, as well as the Institut d’études politiques in Grenoble, and received a PhD from the University of Bonn. Mark McQuay is an independent researcher based in Warsaw. He previously worked as a trainee at the EUISS, working on topics related to EU justice and home affairs. He holds a Mas- ter’s degree in International Relations from Collegium Civitas in Warsaw (2014). The EUISS Chaillot Paper series The Chaillot Paper series, launched in 1991, takes its name from the Chaillot hill in the Trocadéro area of Paris, where the Institute’s first premises were located in the building oc- cupied by the Western European Union (WEU). The hill is particularly known for the Palais de Chaillot which was the site of the signing of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and housed NATO’s provisional head- quarters from 1952 until 1959. 1 CONTENTS Executive summary 2 Introduction 5 Thinking outside Pandora’s box Scenario 2025 9 Development by crime in the Gulf of Guinea CHAPTER 1 Where does the EU stand on collusion? 13 CHAPTER 2 Can crime contribute to liberal development? 18 CHAPTER 3 Can the EU engage with collusive states? 32 CHAPTER 4 Can the EU define its futures? 42 Scenario 1 47 A licence to hack in West Africa Scenario 2 56 Post-modern slavery in the Arctic Scenario 3 62 Organ counterfeiting in the Western Balkans Scenario 4 68 A narco-state by choice in the South Pacific Scenario 5 74 The Olympics of Crime in the Middle East Conclusions 79 Abbreviations 81 2 A wicked problem | How to cooperate with collusive states? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On almost every major foreign policy issue, the was hardly exemplary, and that the EU is the EU faces a path-defining choice. It finds itself prime beneficiary of these past misdemean- split between loyalty to longstanding policy ours. They look back to colonial times, and cite principles and a new pressure to pursue its in- dubious European precedents to push the EU terests through value-free realpolitik. Crucial- to abandon its principles and to validate ques- ly, policymakers lack the evidence to weigh up tionable behaviour. the implications of either course - continuity or compromise - and so risk being gripped by Collusion is one such example – and the au- inaction. thors take it as their test case. In increasing numbers, developing economies are turning to Such situations, where policymakers face a criminals to master the challenges of globali- dilemma and lack the evidence to guide their sation, using collusion as “an instrument of choices, are called ‘wicked problems.’1 And a national strategy”.2 They point to past Western failure to solve its wicked problems could leave behaviour as justification. As the 2020s unfold, the EU paralysed on the world stage at a time of and as economic modernisation becomes even huge global change. more strenuous, it is plausible that a majority of states worldwide will actively collude with This Chaillot Paper proposes that the EU tack- criminals, seeing crime and collusion as legit- le such problems by means of a thought exer- imate means to catch up with Europe. cise/experiment. This means posing a series of hypothetical questions in order to explore the The EU’s reading of its history presents suc- potential consequences of policy continuity or cessful development as contingent upon the change and thereby to help the EU realign its expulsion of criminal elements from the body principles and its interests. politic, and at the earliest possible stage. The EU has thereby presented itself with a stark choice: cut ties to collusive states, and push the Facing up to history EU towards splendid isolation; or accommodate them and suffer a loss of self-respect and iden- tity. Few in Brussels, it seems, have thought Somewhat unexpectedly, the greatest contri- to pose the obvious question: can collusion be bution of this paper may be to help policymak- conducive to liberal development? ers in Brussels face up to Europe’s past. The EU has always viewed its own 70-year de- velopment as setting a path for others to follow Making use of history – based on the assumption that what worked best in the EU, will work best abroad. But rivals, The authors’ method is designed to produce partners and even its own strategists increas- counter-intuitive findings to reconcile the ingly point out that Europe’s past behaviour EU’s interests and principles. It operates on the 1 ‘Wicked problems’ are policy issues which present decision-makers with contradictory political pressures, and where they lack the evidence to evaluate the available options. 2 Philip Zelikow et al., “The Rise of Strategic Corruption: How States Weaponize Graft,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ united-states/2020-06-09/rise-strategic-corruption. Executive summary 3 assumption that Europe’s sometimes murky unspoken and reflexive. Collusion is a case in history can be turned into a treasure trove for point: as far as the authors can ascertain, there practical policy evidence generating ways for are no explicit EU guidelines for dealing with today’s Europeans to engage with the world collusion (unlike the related field of corrup- without betraying their idealistic goals – a way tion). Rather, the EU’s distaste for collusion is out of their ‘wicked problems’. implied from a set of abstract principles drawn from its reading of history about the damage A review of the historical record confirms that inflicted by collusion upon economic and po- European states did indeed rely on criminals litical development. The first step, then, is to and criminal methods on their path to liberal- articulate these hidden assumptions. ism. But this finding – far from paralysing the EU or undermining its values – shows that col- 2. Is there overlooked evidence to contradict lusion is (under specific conditions) a potential the EU’s assumptions? basis for better governance, including when it comes to enforcing laws and redressing the Because the EU has never articulated its as- marginalisation of socio-economic groups and sumption that collusion is uniformly harmful of whole countries. and presents an obstacle to all liberal devel- opment outcomes, it has not actively sought evidence to the contrary. This leaves the EU A three-step thought exercise without evidence to assess the option of condi- tional engagement. As a corrective, the second step is to actively seek out evidence from the But this process is about more than past and present that shows that collusion can re-examining the past. Until lately, the EU’s in fact promote positive outcomes. development promotion represented a perfect melding of the EU’s interests and values. It com- 3. Does this new evidence generate practical bined the EU’s dual character as an interest-led alternatives? ‘market power’. The EU has a strong interest in accessing poorer economies: it needs to expand New evidence is of little use unless translat- its markets and to source raw materials. and a ed into clear policy guidelines. The third step, principled ‘normative power’ requires interna- therefore, is to explore the implications of poli- tional stability and cooperation, and this means cy change – does the scattered evidence gleaned spreading liberal norms. from cases of collusion generate a set of rules coherent enough to challenge the settled as- EU development policy long achieved both sumptions of liberal development theory? The ends. However, a decade of crises has hit the EU outcome should be a set of clear, cohesive and economy hard. Its raw interest in accessing new practical policy recommendations that demon- markets has grown, but its ability to influence strate how the EU can respond to new evidence other nations’ norms and values has shrunk. while staying true to its principles. Economic development no longer guarantees a peaceful, inclusive and democratic global order based on the rule of law. Future scenarios The authors have assembled a process for the EU to face up to uncomfortable truths. It in- Policymakers are understandably reluctant to volves asking three questions: experiment with fields like collusion – in the real world, at least. For this reason, the authors’ 1. What are the EU’s current assumptions method is structured as a counter-intuitive about the effective pursuit of its goals? thought exercise which culminates in the con- struction of a virtual alternative world - a safe Wicked problems tend to emerge when as- space in which to experiment.