Chapters

Islamic Cultural and Media Policy: Revolutionary

Reformations

The Islamic Revolution and a Cultural Disappearance

On 26 February 1979, only two weeks after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini's office announced that the Family Protection Law was to be abrogated. On 3 March, it was announced that women would be barred from becoming judges. On 6 March, Khomeini said in a speech that women should wear the veil (hejab) at work. Later that month, beaches and sports events were segregated and, a few weeks later, coeducation was banned. Soon, the revolutionary regime banned the use of western personal names, and removed from public places any references to previous monarchs and their legacies. As the most visible sign of radical cultural transformations, a traditional gendered dress code institutionalized and enforced: for men, ties and short-sleeved shirts in public were banned - a tie-less shirt buttoned at the neck and several days' growth of beard symbolized an ideal or officially-favoured youth (keeping the face clean shaven instead of wearing a beard was considered as transgression of Islamic morality and tendency to western immorality), and for women, they were prevented to appear without veil in public (light-coloured cloths were not tolerated, while black was presented as women's ideal cover); thus, fokol-keravati - dandy tie-wearer - and bi-hejab and bad-hejab - non-veiled and ill-veiled - became the most telling slurs that the religious regime employed against the secular men and women. In the name of 'public chastity' people were subjected to strict surveillance either by police

95 patrolling the streets or, later, by 'promoters of good and forbidders of evil' (the Islamic revolutionary groups composed of politically active and militant youths), and every couple had to explain and justify their relationship to them.

Obviously, the ground for such organized endeavours was prepared by the Islamic cultural attacks to secular life styles in mass media. For example, , a pro-Shariati revolutionary and the editor of Ettelaat e Banovan (Women's Ettelaat), in a series of articles in Ettelaat newspaper and its index, started to argue for a reduction in women's working hours and their return to their home 'primary tasks', referring back to the enforced unveiling of women by Reza Shah in 1920, concluded that the Muslim women should wear the veil to regain their lost 'identity'; in a serial articles titled 'Colonial Roots of the Abolition of Hejab' in July 1980, she wrote: 'Yes, we can use the hejab as an anti-colonial weapon against these looters [the Pahlavi's protectors]. That is exactly why the planners behind the Shah prevented veiled women's entry into universities and offices. And that is why the raising of this issue, the wearing of the veil as an anti-colonial dress, although I don't agree with the particular way in which it is done at the moment, has so angered these female servants of America. They protest against it to please their masters. This is precisely the protest of America that is voiced through its internal allies.' (1)

Likewise, gender segregation and restriction in education, sport, and leisure were followed by banning 'non-Islamic' entertainment and recreations such as discotheques, bars, night clubs, and casinos; 'immoral' and 'harmful' books by 'anti-Islamist' Iranian and non-Iranian authors were strictly banned; music stores were closed while pop songs were prohibited and popular singers had to leave the scenes; wine shops had to disappear as any kind of producing, distributing, selling, and drinking of any alcoholic beverage was considered a serious transgression of the islamic law; cinemas were 'cleansed' of Hollywood movies and western-styled icons, the national radio and television were 'purified' from 'trivial' and 'banal' contents, and 'pro-Pahlavi' and 'pro- American' producers and presenters were dismissed. Of course, the new regulations

96 covered not only public scene, but also private space and social life form as well as individual life style: from recommending to avoid chair and table and to sit on the ground to banning some fishes and frozen chicken, they condemned the western way of life as something abhorrent and detestable, considered it as a sign of idolatrous luxury with a negative cultural connotation rather than a sense of civilization. Moreover, as a sign of longer-term cultural revolutionary reforms, official calendar of Iranian social life was rearranged so as to not only erase anniversaries of the ancient monarchist and pre- Islamic nationalist functions and festivals, but also include the Islamic lamentations and revolutionary events as 'divine' dates and days - even though the extremists' proposition for removing Nowruz (the national celebration of the ancient new year) from the official calendar were not approved as well as the other Islamist suggestions for converting the ancient ruins of Persepolis into a public urinal and banning the Shahname and so on. (2)

It was no surprise that, as the Shah's failure to wage a successful campaign to divide his opposition along ideological and cultural lines was symptomatic of his inability to contend with the Islamic Revolution, all of his enemies were united under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, an Islamic icon who wanted to Islamize the Iranian territory and beyond. As I indicated earlier, the Shah seemed totally misguided in identification of his real adversary forces; even in the ending years of 1970s, in his last chances for paying attention to actual thought and taste of his own people while the country was sinking into anti-western Islamism, the megalomaniac monarch, with his heroic illusion of creating a Iranian civilization superior to the western world, was simply eager to lecture westerners on 'how they were not working hard enough, not paying enough for oil, not conserving valuable resources, not teaching the virtues of social responsibility, and, by not disciplining their youngsters, producing human monsters like those in the popular film Clockwork Orange.' (3) Soon, the nationalist Aryamehr and his imperial orders were to be replaced by the Islamist Imam whose 'divine decrees' were signed by his Arabic name in Arabic dates. Not only the Iranian 'national identity' was to be undermined as something historically reproachable in several ways, but the very notion of Mellat (a

97 nation-based society) was to be faded against the united Islamic Ommat (a conference of iVIuslim communities) while the new regime, with its strict stress on the 'religious identity,' was ready to 'export' its revolution by propagating its internationalist-leftist

Islamic ideology by means of preventing individual autonomy. As the course of cultural clashes revealed, Khomeini's 'Pure Mohammadean ' had no enough room for the

Shah's 'Authentic Iranian Culture'.

Although, in the years of his exile, Khomeini provisionally promised a free political and social system for the future of , and appointed some moderate liberal figures in revolutionary transitory government, it took only a few months to erase liberal figures and to annihilate western forms of life from Iranian political and social scene, as he launched an aggressive systematic suppression of nationalist aspirations and a massive introduction and imposition of the new Islamic life style. As a matter of fact, during 1979 to 1983, Islamization of Iran was the most persistent ideological agenda for the leader who often declared that his biggest fear for the Islamic country is not any American's invasion but the cultural dependency to them. Hence, the absolute source of political power one/the supreme spiritual power, Khomeini thereupon rushed to replace secular nationalism by religious spiritualism, and westernization and modernization by arabication and Islamization, to the extent that the 'Islamic' became a fixed adjective for all the events that were to be happened in the 'Islamic Iran'. Since he had truly realized that the Islamic regime as a pervasive system of thinking and governing needs a new cultural identity, fundamentally different from western-oriented Iranian national identity, Khomeini was violently inflexible against the previous profane life styles which were dominated in urban areas in Iran during 1970s. To purify the society from its secular pollution and purge the public scene from sign and symbol of such a profane promiscuity was the first necessary step to open the space for Islamic propaganda and proclamations in public and then to internalize the religious agenda in privacy.

In effect, the most manifested images of the Islamic Revolution's anti-imperialist scenario were its struggle against the so-called 'cultural imperialism' with the United

98 states of America as the 'Great Satan' in its centre. Parallel to rapid action of the revolutionary tribunals for the punishment and execution of prominent high-ranking officials of ancien regime, from Amir Abbas Hoveyda, the former prime minister, and six cabinet ministers (of whom one was the woman who had held the ministry of education, accused of nourishing 'cultural imperialism') to military officers, including not only generals such as Nematollah Nasiri (the head of SAVAK) but also captains such as

Monir Taheri (who was charged with involvement in Cinema Rex event), (4) imprisonment of the less dangerous political adversaries and public confessions and recantations of rival revolutionaries, and vast confiscation and expropriation of Pahlavi- related foundations and families, (5) the Islamic Republic led an unannounced cultural invasion to conquer the biggest battlefield and to win the civil cultural war. Since

Islamization as religious leftism set the ideological agenda for the revolutionary state, a wide range of social and individual matters, from educational system and school textbooks to family and gender relations, was considered as an area to be regularized and Islamized as such: by the name of 'Islamic values,' the aim was to cure the Iranian

'alienated society', infected by recent western cultural conquest, and the remedy was to be delivered as a religious ideology of another alien culture that had captured the country 14 centuries ago. Despite all the Pahlavi endeavors to promote nationalist

'secularization', a new wave of Islamist 'sacralization' was to spread all over the country, the western 'cultural imperialism' was to be responded by the Islamic cultural colonialism that was the latent content of the Arab invasion. Therefore, in spite of its most famous slogan, 'No to East, No to West, Only Islamic Republic,' the Islamic absolutist regime utilized most of political tactics and social strategies of socialist- communist states to colonize both public and private spheres, so as to transform the personal into the political and to be able to create its preferred ideological cultural identity.

In other words, while it was harsh to eradicate the old political power structure by instituting new military and economic organizations such as the 'Islamic Revolutionary

Guards' and 'The Foundation for The Deprived' and establishing a propaganda state

99 apparatus named 'Ideological-Political Unit' in every political and non-political public organization, the revolutionary regime was totally aware that only by expanding its roots in private spheres it could control the people's social and individual life and thus consolidate its political power. That was the reason why it relentlessly tried to transform all the non-political issues and affairs of Iranian people in their social and individual life in a radical way. In fact, as they had transformed almost any non-political issue into a political one during their religious revolution, and as long as the religion in question was the Shia Islam that allegedly and, of course, actually had a detailed decree for any single act of everyday life, the cultural revolutionary reforms seemed not only necessary but inevitable actions. Disappearance of secular-national 'cultural identity' was imminent, as a voluntary 'cultural emigration' was followed and reinforced by a compulsory 'cultural revolution'.

The Compulsory Emigration: A Cultural Exodus

They say the Shah was in his hard times when a French journalist questioned his strategy for tackling the islamic Revolution. The journalist said: 'In our country, when de

Gaulle was losing his position, he mobilized and brought his influential and intellectual

proponents in Champs-Elysees to demonstrate and, thus, he regained his legitimacy and

presidency; why do you not do the same thing?' The Shah replied: 'My proponents are

already in Champs-Elysees tool' Factual or fictive, the story reflects an undeniable

reality: on the one hand, anticipating the imminent revolution and prefiguring its

consequences, as soon as cracks appeared in the Pahlavi regime, many of the Shah's

protectors left the country before him; and, on the other hand, many of the young

students that, by his state's financial and educational support, had gone abroad to study

in western universities either had transformed into his serious opponents or simply did

not want to come back to their homeland - for example, as the historian Ervand

Abrahamian claimed, 'by the 1970s, there were more Iranian doctors in New York than

in any city outside . The term "brain drain" was first attached to Iran.' (6) It meant that the royal regime had lost its vanguard forces in the cultural civil war, because not only many of the active proponents for its modernizing plans stopped fighting for it, but also many of the potential protectors for its secularizing project either had turned against him or had no more motivation to stay and struggle - evidently, since it was a 'cultural' civil war, the young modern-minded generation could do more than any other social group to rescue the country from falling in the hands of the traditional Islamists then. However, the Shah's regime was too weak to promise them a better future in the homeland, and they mostly preferred to emigrate or to stay abroad.

At any rate, during the 1977-1978 academic year, about 100,000 Iranians were studying abroad, of whom 36,220 were enrolled in the US institutes of higher education; the rest were mainly in the United Kingdom, West Germany, , Austria, and Italy. During the 1978-1979 academic year, on the eve of the Islamic Revolution, the number of

Iranian students enrolled in the United States rose to 45,340, the number reached a peak of 51,310 in the next year: according to the Institute of International Education, more Iranian students studied in the United States than other students from any other country. (7) More importantly, after the Islamic Revolution, not only many of these students opted to remain in the West, but also many of their relatives joined them soon.

Moreover, alongside the students, there were many emigrant families, including the

royalist sympathizers or the closely associated with the monarchy as members of

previous government, powerful entrepreneurs, military personnel, high-ranking state employees, rich oligarchy, and so on. Meanwhile, another population that fled in this

initial phase were members of religious minorities such as the Baha'is, and religious- ethnic groups such as the Jews, Armenians, and Assyrians.

A second phase of emigration took place in the early years of 1980s, after the

establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. The emigrant political opponents

including liberal intellectuals as well as Marxist activists, and the culturally 'undesirable'

and 'non-committed' elements such as heterodoxical writers, film and television actors

and artists, pop singers, secular entertainers, independent filmmakers were followed by

101 ordinary Iranians, especially young men who fled compulsory military service and engaging in the Iran- war (1980-88) and young women who wanted to escape from an increasingly confining country. Yet, following the 'Cultural Revolution' (1980-83) in universities and other academic spheres, a large numbers of professional experts, entrepreneurs, physicians, and academics left the country, accelerated the so-called

'brain drain'. However, the regime's response to the brain drain's concern was calm and clear, as Khomeini had already said: 'They say there is a brain drain. Let these decayed brains flee. Do not mourn them; let them pursue their own definitions of being. Is every brain with - what you call - science in it honourable? Shall we sit and mourn the brains that escaped? Shall we worry about these brains fleeing to the US and the UK? Let these brains flee and be replaced by the more appropriate brains. Now that they [the Islamic

Republic's authorities] are filtering, you are sitting worried why they are executing

[people]? Why are you discussing these rotten brains of [these] lost people? Why are you questioning Islam? Are they fleeing? To hell with them. Let them flee. They were not scientific brains. All the better. Do not be concerned. They should escape. Iran is not a place for them to live any more. These fleeing brains are of no use to us. Let them flee.

If you know that there is no place for you, you should flee too.' (8)

Although many members of both the first and the second emigration waves considered their departure as temporal, they had to remain permanently in the west while a permanent return seemed increasingly impossible. In addition to voluntary emigrants, a considerable population of refugees and asylum seekers had to leave the country for political, social, and economic reasons - to have a statistical view, while about 64,000

Iranian emigrants admitted only to the United States, Germany and Canada during

1971-1980, about 242,000 were admitted to the tree western countries from 1981 to

1990. (9) Of course, given the fragility of Iranian culture, the remaining purified population could rather easily and rapidly transform its life style - the very young people who used to wear a la California wide-collar shirts and hot pants and go to clubs and listen to pop songs in 1975 were totally ready to wear Arabic wraparound and plain khaki cloths and chant revolutionary songs and slogans in military fronts in 1980. To

102 realize the transformation, the Islamic Republic needed another cultural endeavour to make silent the dissents that preferred to remain and resist, thus to secure disappearance of secular-national Iranian cultural identity. The 'Cultural Revolution' was on the way: the forthcoming 'revolution' contributed to the emigration of a vast number of teachers and technocrats but, before discussing it, we should take a look at the constitution that paved the way for it.

Cultural and Media Policy in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic

On 29 and 30 March 1979, the revolutionary regime held a referendum for a new political system and transforming the constitutional monarchy into the Islamic republic.

According to the official results, 98.2 percent (16,821,557) of the voters affirmed the

Islamic Republic as new political system and 1.8 percent (308,338) denied it, while voter. turnout was 92 percent of the total qualified population. (10) The referendum paved the way for writing a new constitution for the new regime. On 18 June 1979, the first draft of the new constitution appeared in major newspapers: complied by order of Khomeini in before the Islamic Revolution, it had been written by , a member and also spokesman of the 'Council of the Islamic Revolution' - the highest political body in the early Islamic Revolution era, composed of seven religious figures associated with Khomeini, seven secular opposition figures, and two representatives of the security forces, which was responsible for governing the country from 12 January 1979 to 11

February 1980. Meanwhile, before its publication, the draft was revised by a small group of lawyers who were approved by Khomeini and, later, was finalized by a commission composed of high-ranking revolutionaries including Abulhassan Banisadr, the upcoming president of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The draft of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was mainly modelled on the

1958 constitution of the French Fifth Republic, did not differ remarkably from Iran's first constitution, compiled after the Constitutional Revolution (1906), did not give clerics a

103 prominent role in the new state structure (interestingly, although an Islamic supervision was guaranteed by a '', its function was much limited than what it later achieved in the approved Constitution); besides, there was no official status for a religious supreme leader while the president was empowered with the most and the highest competences and qualifications. However, while Khomeini was prepared to submit the draft, narrowly revised but vastly unmodified, to a national referendum, a number of political figures rejected the procedure and demanded that the constitution should be submitted for a comprehensive review by a constituent assembly. Paradoxically, the main protesters to Khomeini's proposed procedure, aside from Banisadr, were (1907-95, the former colleague of Mohammad Mosaddeq and a moderate revolutionary who served as the first prime minister and the head of transitory government of the Islamic Republic) and his like-minded colleagues in its cabinet who insisted that Khomeini should act upon his promise for a constituent assembly - ironically enough, it was , a close aid of Khomeini and a cleric with decisive roles in history of the Islamic regime, who warned them 'who do you think will be elected to a constituent assembly? A fistful of ignorant and fanatical fundamentalists who will do such damage that you will regret ever having convened them.' (11)

After all, Khomeini accepted the proposition but, due to lack of time, a substitute 75- member body was made up as the ' for Constitution', while 55 members were high cleric men and only one woman among the rest. The remaining part of story for moderate revolutionaries was even bitter as the Assembly not only included the principle of Guardianship (or Providence) of the Jurist (Velayat e Faqih) in the Constitution, but also strongly extended powers of Council, thus established a solid constitutional basis for a consolidated religious rule in the country; at last, while Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri (1922-2009) and his wing argued for inclusion of the 'Principle of Velayat e Faqih', (12) the interim cabinet failed in its attempt to dissolution of the Assembly, and its former spokesman and Deputy Prime

104 Minister, Abbas Amir-Entezam, was sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of spying for America. (13)

Given that fact that even the more moderate popular figures such as Bazargan and

Banisadr were by no means 'secular' thinkers (they were the theorists who had passionately tried to propagate Islam as the only religion that could cover all areas of human life, from spiritual ideals and rituals to economics, statecraft, etc.), they could not find any strong support for their criticism of the leaders of the Assembly for misleading the public into thinking they would approve the very earlier democratic draft constitution that gave the clergy a much less powerful role than the constitution that

Assembly finally approved: while the high representatives of Shia Islam were Mojtaheds, the lay revolutionaries' support for a without mullacracy was of no avail, and the new constitution was adopted by a referendum on 24 October 1979. Again, according to the official results, over 99.5 percent (15,680,329) of voters affirmed the new constitution as the fundamental laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran and less than

0.5 percent (78,516) denied it, while voter turnout was about 82 percent of the total qualified population. Then, as written at the end of 'Preamble' of the Constitution, 'the

Assembly of Experts, composed of representatives of the people, drew up the

Constitution on the basis of scrutiny of the draft proposed by the Government, and of the proposals put forward by various groups. It contains 12 chapters and 175 articles. It was completed on the eve of the 15th century since the Hejrat of the great Prophet

(God bless and preserve him) and the establishment of the redeeming faith of Islam with the aims and motives described above, and in the hope that this century will be the century of the rule of the world by the oppressed, and the complete overthrow of the arrogant ones.' (14)

However, later, the Constitution was revised and amended by a 'Constitutional Reform

Council', its 25 members were appointed by Khomeini on 24 April 1989 - ironically again, among them were a number of prominent figures of the future 'reformists' who later, especially after 's presidential period (1997-2005), were

105 repressed and eliminated from political scene due to their protest against the new powers of the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council that had been given and guaranteed to them by their revision of the Constitution. Meanwhile, in addition to legalize those new powers for the more conservative Islamist wing of the revolutionary regime, the 'Constitutional Reform Council' symbolized and stressed on its approach by changing the name of Iranian parliament, the 'National Consultative Assembly' was transformed into the 'Islamic Consultative Assembly'. On 28 July 1989, the Islamic regime held the Constitutional Reform Referendum, where 97 percent (18,659,028) of the people voted for the new revised and amended constitution and 3 percent

(577,083) voted against it, while voter turnout was 89.5 percent of the total qualified

population.

The new constitution, more visibly than any other Iranian historical document, depicts the cultural clash between the previously dominant 'national identity' and the

increasingly overwhelming 'Islamic identity', not only in its articles related to high status

of a religious leader in political structure of the society but also in its lengthy 'Preamble'.

As we read in its beginning, 'The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran sets forth the cultural, social, political and economic institutions of the people of Iran, based on the Islamic principles and rules, and reflecting the fundamental desires of the Islamic people [...] The unique characteristic of this revolution, as compared with other Iranian

movements of the century, is that it is religious and Islamic. The Muslim people of Iran,

after living through an anti-despotic movement for constitutional government, and anti-

colonialist movement for the nationalization of petroleum, gained precious experience

in that they realized that the basic and specific reason for the failure of those

movements was that that they were not religious ones. Although in those movements

Islamic thinking and the guidance of a militant clergy played a basic and prominent part,

yet they swiftly trailed off into stagnation, because the struggle deviated from the true

Islam. But now the nation's conscience has awakened to the leadership of an exalted

Authority, His Eminence Grand Ayatollah Imam Khomeini, and has grasped the necessity

of following the line of the true religious and Islamic movement'. Immediately, in a

106 section titled 'The Vanguard of the Movement', it reminds the reader Khomeini's endeavour against the Shah's 'White Revolution' and its implications: 'Imam Khomeini's crushing protest against that American plot, The White Revolution, which was a step taken with a view to strengthening the foundations of the despotic regime and consolidating Iran's political, cultural and economic links with world Imperialism, was the motive force behind the united uprising of the nation [...] Meanwhile the informed and responsible section of the community was busy with clarification of the issues, within the strongholds of mosques, seminaries, and universities. Inspired by the revolutionary religious feeling and the rich fruitfulness of Islam, they began a persistent and rewarding struggle to raise the level of awareness and vigilance as regards the fight, and its religious nature, among the Muslim nation [Ommat].'

The most visible elements of such an Iranian cultural history are to avoid any reference to the pre- or non-Islamic heritage of the country (except for few negative ones), to ignore most of what was already considered as Iranian national identity, and to celebrate Islamic identity of the people who are supposed to constitute a basis for an international Ommat, not a national Mellat. To contribute to this Islamist agenda, the

'Preamble' continues to address the issue of 'Islamic Governance', declares that: 'The

Islamic Government is founded on a basis of the Providence of the Jurist [Velayat e

Faqih] as put forward by Imam Khomeini at the height of the intense emotion and strangulation under the [Shah's] despotic regime. This created a specific motivation and new field of advance for the Muslim people; and opened up the true path for the religious fight of Islam, pressing forward the struggle of the committed Muslim combatants, inside and outside the country.' To make an epic portrait of the Islamic

Revolution, it wrongly claims in the section 'The Price the Nation Paid' that 'after a little over a year the budding Revolution and its continuing struggle settled to its result. Its cost was the blood of more than 60,000 martyrs, 100,000 wounded and with damaged health, and billions of Toomans of financial loss; all amid cries of Independence,

Freedom, and Islamic Rule.' (15)

107 In the section related to the 'Structure of Governance in Islam', it not only presupposes the Islam as a way of cultural and social administration, but also declares that the very religion 'crystallizes the political aspirations of a nation united in faith and thinking which provides itself with an organization.' It continues, 'in the course of its revolutionary development our nation was cleansed from the dust and rust of idolatry, and from foreign ideological influence. It returned to true Islamic intellectual attitudes and views of the world. Now it is planning to build its new model society on such a basis, with Islamic standards. The mission of the Constitution is to identify itself with the basic beliefs of the movement and to bring about the conditions under which the lofty and worldwide values of Islam will flourish.' Likewise, as a way to manifest its understatement of national identity and to overemphasize internationalist idea of 'export of revolution', it points out that 'the Constitution, having regard to the Islamic contents of the , which was a movement for the victory of all the oppressed over the arrogant, provides a basis for the continuation of that revolution both inside and outside the country. It particularly tries to do this in developing international relations with other Islamic movements and peoples, so as to prepare the way towards a united single world community" - later, in Article 11, it would be declared that 'in accordance with the sacred verse of the Quran ("Your community is a single community, and I am your Lord, so worship Me" [21:92]), all Muslims form a single nation, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of formulating its general policies with a view to cultivating the friendship and unity of all Muslim peoples, and it must constantly strive to bring about the political, economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world'.

Interestingly, after it explains the Islamic duties and responsibilities of the Judiciary and Executive powers in the Islamic Republic, the Preamble concludes with a paragraph on mass media; it declares that 'the mass media (radio and television) must take their place in the process of development of the Islamic revolution, and must serve in the propagation of Islamic culture. In this sphere they must look for opportunities for a healthy exchange of differing ideas, and must rigorously refrain from the propagation

108 and encouragement of destructive and anti-Islamic qualities. In pursuance of the

principles of this law which recognize freedom and human dignity as the central point of their objectives, and opens up the path of development and perfection of man as the

responsibility of all, the Islamic community must elect sagacious and devout

representatives, and exercise active supervision over their work, to participate in the

building up of the Islamic society. This is in the hope that in building the exemplary

Islamic society they will succeed in setting a pattern of self-sacrifice to all the people of

the world.' The importance attached to public mass media, as the only state

organization needed to be clearly regularized in the very constitution, was obviously justified by the functions (ideological propagation of Islamic culture and resistance

against promotion of anti-Islamic qualities) that the Islamic state was to internalize and

to institutionalize by means of its most powerful ideological apparatus.

Following the Preamble, the first five articles of the Constitution make it clear that the

religious identity of Iranian nationals is above all other elements of their cultural

identity, and it is the Islam that determines the basis of the society. It declares that 'the

form of government of Iran is that of an Islamic Republic' (Article 1), and the Islamic

Republic is a system based on the belief in fundamental principles of Shia Islam (Article

2). However, as we read in Article 3, 'in order to attain the objectives specified in Article

2, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of directing all its

resources' to 16 Aims, among them are 'the creation of a favourable environment for

the growth of moral virtues based on the faith and piety and the struggle against all

forms of vice and corruption' (Aim 1), 'Raising the level of public awareness in all areas,

through the proper use of the press, mass media, and other means' (Aim 2),

'strengthening the spirit of inquiry, investigation, and innovation in all areas of science,

technology, and culture as well as Islamic studies, by establishing research centres and

encouraging researchers' (Aim 4), 'the participation of the entire people in determining

their political, economic, social, and cultural destiny' (Aim 8), and framing the foreign

policy of the country on the basis of Islamic criteria, fraternal commitment to all

Muslims, and unsparing support to the oppressed of the world (Aim 16). Article 4

109 emphasizes that 'all civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be based on the Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations, and the Mojtaheds of the Guardian Council are judges in this matter.' And, finally. Article 5 hands all the powers over to an Islamic authority named Vali ye Faqih: 'During the Occupation of the twelfth Imam [the absent saviour of

Shiism] (may God hasten his reappearance), guardianship and leadership of the Ommat devolve upon the just and pious faqih, who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability, he will assume the responsibilities of this office in accordance with Article 107.'

Furthermore, Article 12 defines the Iranian religious identity as follows: 'The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Shiism, and this principle will remain eternally immutable. Other Islamic sects, including the [Sunni] Hanafi, Shafe'i, Maleki, Hanbali, and [Shia] Zaidi, are to be accorded full respect, and their followers are free to act in accordance with their own jurisprudence in performing their religious rites. These sects enjoy official status in matters pertaining to religious education, affairs of personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance, and wills) and related litigation in courts of law' - interestingly, while it recognizes Zaidi Shias whose school developed outside Iran and now are centred mainly in the Arab country of Yemen (some of them believes in authorized leadership of Khomeini and Khamenei), it excludes Ismaili Shias whose school was originated in Iran, has its deep roots in Iranian culture and history, and its followers mostly live in India. Aside from Muslim people, according to Article 13,

'Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only recognized religious minorities, who, within the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and to act according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious education.' Article 14 promises that 'in accordance with the sacred verse, "God does not forbid you to deal kindly and justly with those who have not fought against you because of your religion and who have not expelled you from your homes" [60:8], the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and all Muslims are duty-bound to treat [the

110 recognized] non-Muslims in conformity with ethical norms and the principles of Islamic justice and equity, and to respect their human rights. This principle applies to all who refrain from engaging in conspiracy or activity against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran.'

Likewise, Articles 15 and 16, respectively, determine the special statuses of Persian as the national language (although 'the use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian') and Arabic as the language that should be taught after elementary level, in all classes of secondary schools and in all areas of study because 'the language of the Quran and Islamic texts and teachings is Arabic, and Persian literature is thoroughly permeated by this language' - in fact, the Constitution itself is full of verses of Quran quoted in Arabic and without a Persian translation, almost everywhere. Also, Article 17 declares that 'the official calendar of the country takes as its point of departure the migration of the Prophet of Islam - God's peace and blessings upon him and his Family [in Arabic]. Both the solar and lunar Islamic calendars are recognized, but government offices will function according to the solar calendar.' And, according to Article 18, 'the official flag of Iran is composed of green, white and red colours with the special emblem of the Islamic Republic, together with the motto "God Is the Greatest" [of course, in Arabic].'

To ensure that Islamic identity of the Iranian society is kept intact at any rate. Article 72 declares that 'the Islamic Consultative Assembly cannot enact laws contrary to the principles and decrees of the official religion of the country or to the Constitution. It is the duty of the Guardian Council to determine whether a violation has occurred, in accordance with Article 96.' Thus, as a realization of the ideal that clerics had in mind in their effort to include such a council in first constitution of Iran, the second constitution institutionalized such a regulative body, and dedicated Articles 91-99 to its powers and duties. According to Article 91, 'with a view to safeguard the Islamic ordinances and the Constitution, in order to examine the compatibility of the legislation passed by the

111 Islamic Consultative Assembly with Islam, a council to be known as the Guardian Council is to be constituted with the following composition: 1. six just Mojtaheds conscious of the present needs and the issues of the day, to be selected by the Leader, and 2. six jurists, specializing in different areas of law, to be elected by the Islamic Consultative Assembly from among the Muslim jurists nominated by the Head of the Judicial Power.' As it is declared in Article 93, 'the Islamic Consultative Assembly does not hold any legal status without the Guardian Council, unless in case of approving the credentials of its members and the election of six jurists on the Guardian Council.' And, according to Article 99, 'the Guardian Council has the responsibility of supervising the elections of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the President of the Republic, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the direct recourse to popular opinion and referenda' and also, according to Article 118, 'responsibility for the supervision of the election, of the President lies with the Guardian Council, as stipulated in Article 99.'

Of course, there is a religious authority above all of the official authorities, as it is strictly declared by Article 57: 'The powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive powers, functioning under the supervision of the Absolute Providence of the Jurist and the leadership of the Islamic community [Ommat], in accordance with the forthcoming articles of this Constitution.' Expanded after revision of the constitution, following are the duties and powers of such the leader, according to Article 110: '1. Delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation with the Expediency Discernment Council. 2. Supervision over the proper execution of the general policies of the system. 3. Issuing decrees for national referenda. 4. Assuming supreme command of the armed forces. 5. Declaration of war and peace, and the mobilization of the armed forces. 6. Appointment, dismissal, and acceptance of resignation of: a. the Mojtaheds of the Guardian Council; b. the supreme judicial authority of the country; c. the head of the Organization for Radio and Television of the Islamic Republic of Iran; d. the chief of the joint staff; e. the chief commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; f. the supreme commanders of the armed forces. 7. Resolving differences between the three

112 wings of the armed forces and regulation of their relations. 8. Resolving the problems which cannot be solved by conventional methods, through the Expediency Discernment Council. 9. Signing the decree formalizing the election of the President of the Republic by the people [...]. 10. Dismissal of the President [...]. 11. Pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the framework of Islamic criteria [...].' Thus, paradoxically, he can not only legally maintain such rights for himself, but also can legally cancel all of the rights which are granted for the people, for example, in Article 9 ('no authority has the right to abrogate legitimate freedoms, not even by enacting laws and regulations for that purpose') and in Articles 19 to 42 (chapter on 'People's Rights'), if he observes any contradiction between his might and people's right.

Moreover, since the Judiciary (which is regarded as responsible for discerning any violation of constitutional and non-constitutional laws), the Guardian Council (which is empowered by rights to approve eligibility of candidates for any election), and the Assembly of Experts (which is considered as the body that could supervise the leadership and dismiss the leader) are under his direct or indirect control, the Supreme Leader can keep his pervasive power for a lifetime, can exert and sustain his own interpretation of the laws (including the fundamental laws that are stated in the Constitution) by his vast power in the legal structure of the judiciary (articulated in Articles 156 to 174) that would works 'on the basis of Islamic justice, manned by just judges, well acquainted with the exact rules of the Islamic code' (Preamble) and its function is to be performed by courts of justice, which are to be formed in accordance with the criteria of Islam (Article 61). Thus, as an analyst of Iranian Constitutions observed, 'with the traditional dualism of religious and political authority now replaced by theocratic monism, the supreme leader of the Islamic republic assumed a position similar to the Ottoman sultan as the Caliph: a) he legitimized the entire apparatus of the state and all public law as Islamic; and b) he could legislate on the basis of expediency and public interest.' (16)

113 To ensure the persistency of the constitutionalized power for the leader, the last lines of the Constitution (Article 177) declare that 'the revision of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, whenever needed by the circumstances, will be done in the following manner: the Leader issues an edict to the President after consultation with the Expediency Discernment Council, stipulating the amendments or additions to be made by the Council for Revision of the Constitution which consists of: 1. members of the Guardian Council; 2. heads of the three branches of the government; 3. permanent members of the Nation's Exigency Council; 4. five members from among the Assembly of Experts; 5. ten representatives selected by the Leader; 6. three representatives from the Cabinet; 7. three representatives from the Judiciary; 8. ten representatives from among the members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly; 9. three representatives from among the university professors.' It adds that 'the decisions of the Council, after the confirmation and signatures of the Leader, shall be valid if approved by an absolute majority vote in a national referendum.' However, it points out that: 'The contents of the Articles of the Constitution related to the Islamic character of the political system, the basis of all the rules and regulations according to Islamic criteria, the religious pillars, the objectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the republic character of the government, the providence of Faqih and his leadership ofOmmat [Islamic community], the administration of the affairs of the country based on the public opinions, official religion of Iran [Islam] and the school [Twelver Shiism] are unalterable.'

At last. Article 175 (the last one before inclusion of two other Articles after revision of the constitution) is dedicated to state organization of radio and television. It declares that 'the freedom of expression and dissemination of thoughts in the Radio and Television of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be guaranteed in keeping with the Islamic criteria and the best interests of the country.' Also, as declared in Article 100, it reassures that 'the appointment and dismissal of the head of the Organization for Radio and Television of the Islamic Republic of Iran rests with the Leader.' Of course, both references to authority of the leader for appointment of the head of the Organization are of the Constitutional reforms that were included in the Constitution: earlier,

114 according to the pre-reformed Constitution, a council of representatives of executive, judiciary, and legislative powers were responsible for supervising the radio and television broadcasting and, according to a bill passed in the Consultative Assembly on December 1980, for appointing the managing director of the Organization. The new reformed constitution, however, reducing the council's function, makes clear that 'a council consisting of two representatives each of the President, the head of the judiciary branch and the Islamic Consultative Assembly shall supervise the functioning of this organization. The law will determine its guidelines and its way of administration, and also the way of controlling it.' Meanwhile, the special status of the Organization is already established by Article 44, where it declares that 'the state sector is to include all large-scale and mother industries, foreign trade, major mines, banking, insurance, power generation, dams and large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the so on; all these will be publicly owned and administered by the State.'

At any rate, the new Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran seems as an essentially inconsistent mixture of heavy ingredients of Islamic rule with light liquid of democratic routines. This variation, however, is an extension of a broader Iranian cultural inconsistency: during a period shorter than a generation, the people who voted with a vast majority (91.4 percent of the voters) for the secular White Revolution in 1963, voted with the same majority (98.2 percent) for the Islamic Revolution and its Islamic Constitution (99.5 percent) in 1979. Of course, it should be noted that such an Islamic rebellion did not turn out without a cause. As I mentioned in the last part of the previous chapter, a range of Islamic activist propagated ideology of Islamism whose agenda was not remarkably different from other leftists' aspirations, they both paved the way for the rise of the Islamic Revolution and its consequent hierocracy in a traditionally religious-bound society.

Without a doubt, the Islamic turn did not happen if it did not enjoy a massive support of the Iranian people, and the full-fledged Islamization, followed by its institutionalization

115 in the constitution, could not be effective and applicable without their aggressive persuasion or inactive consent. However, if a group of modern intellectuals and traditional clerics could have such a huge effect and influence on a religious but secularizing society and convince the people of the necessity of an Islamic revolution by their cultural and political propaganda and proclamations, it could not be unexpected that they would probably make another turn in this or that day in future: to ensure persistence of the newly established Islamic society and permanence of its Islamic rule, it was necessary to monopolize the mass media as main source of influence for the highly impressible and hypersensitive audience of the Iranian society-to make an ideal Islamic identity, cultural policy and media policy must go hand in hand.

The 'Cultural Revolution': A Cultural Civil War Announced

During the first months after the Islamic Revolution, universities were centers of a cultural-ideological war. There was a broad sense of freedom of speech which, of course, was not a function of the Islamic Republic's will, but of its relative weakness in its youth, before establishing its ideological agenda and political settlement of its own. However, since the academic area was one of the most strategic geopolitical fields to be conquered in the cultural civil war, the Islamic Republic could no more tolerate its rivals' and opponents' active and influential presence in universities. After securing their victory in the first phase of the Islamic Revolution (11 February 1979) and their second one in the form of conquest of American embassy in Tehran as the 'Second Revolution' (4 November 1979), the third victory for the Islamist revolutionaries was to be achieved by the third Revolution, titled the 'Cultural Revolution' (22 April 1980).

As the first sign of preparing for such a conquest, in article 11 of his Nowruz message in 1980, Khomeini defended an Islamic revolution in universities, declared that 'a radical revolution should be carried in the universities all across the country'. (17) Earlier, during the negotiations in the 'Revolutionary Council' in June 1979, almost all of the

116 members (from the hardliner Islamist officials to the rather liberal-minded and moderate members) were agreed to the necessity of a comprehensive reform in Iranian universities and of transforming them into Islamic ones, while Mir Hossein Mousavi {Iranian prime minister from 1981 to 1989 and, later, a crucial leader of the 'Green Movement') was the only member who argued for a necessary 'cultural revolution' by means of masses' presence in universities (18) - in effect, the Islamist revolutionaries had already started to approach the goal by performing the weekly Friday Prayer in open space of the Tehran University since 27 July 1979.

Meanwhile, following the US Embassy takeover and hostage-taking crisis, Mehdi Bazargan, the first prime minister and the head of the transitory government, resigned along with his cabinet on 4 November 1979. Then, Abuthassan Banisadr was elected as the first president of the Islamic Republic in , was to play the same role before his impeachment in June 1981. Although all of political partners in the early Islamic Republic period were united and unanimous in their request for Islamic reforms in universities, Bazargan and, more or less, Banisadr were considered as more moderate characters that were not so eager to apply a radical Islamist agenda; thus, there was a hidden struggle of power between relatively moderates revolutionaries and their hardliner counterparts. On 18 April 1980, Seyed , Iran's Supreme Leader now and a member of the Revolutionary Council then, in a Friday Prayer heavily attacked the 'spoiled' academic sphere, and warned and threatened that revolutionary people will close and purify the universities from 'leftists' and agents of 'American imperialism', if the government does not walk towards Islamization of universities. (19)

On the same day, in a meeting with Banisadr and other members of the Revolutionary Council, demonizing the western culture, Khomeini declared that 'We are not afraid of economic sanctions or military intervention. What we are afraid of is Westernized universities and the training of our youth in the interests of West or East.' (20) Soon, on 20 April 1980, the Revolutionary Council ordered the de-politicization of all universities, in order to purify the academic sphere from the regime's rivals and opponents. Next

117 day, Shariatist and Khomeinist students, chanting 'colonial culture should be crushed, Islamic university should be created', demonstrated towards their Imam's residency, where he lectured and told them that Iranian universities were the colonized ones, that the teachers were Westoxicated and they Westoxicated our youth, that the universities lacked Islamic ethics and Islamic cultivation, and that they needed to be Islamized. Subsequently, on 22 April 1980, president Banisadr along with a revolutionary population went to the Tehran University, where he read the decree of the Revolutionary Council about 'the great cultural revolution' in all Iranian universities. (21)

Soon after the decree, major clashes became widespread in the main universities, where pro-Islamic Republic students and pressure groups start to capture other student activists' offices and expel them from academic area -the process began by , a next president of the Islamic Republic and an ordinary Khomeinist revolutionary, and his colleagues in Elm-o-San'at University in Tehran, followed by other insistent attacks in other universities in big cities such as Shiraz and . Finally, after several weeks of violent struggles, when over 30 people lost their lives and about 200 persons were wounded and injured, the Revolutionary Council ordered to close all universities on 5 and, as a time required for Islamization of the Iranian universities, they remained closed for over 2 years.

Meanwhile, on 12 June 1980, the 'Cultural Revolution Headquarters' was established by Khomeini's decree to make sure that the Iranian academic cultural policy was based on Islam - later, the Headquarters was transformed into the 'Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution' as the highest establishment of cultural policy-making in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In his decree, Khomeini declared that: 'The need for Cultural Revolution which is an Islamic issue and a demand of the Muslim nation has been recognized for sometimes but so far no effective effort has been made to respond to this need and the Muslim nation and the devoted and faithful students in particular are concerned and worried of the machinations of plotters, which every now and then become evident and the Muslim nation are worried, lest the opportunity is missed and no positive action is

118 taken and the culture remains the same as the time of the corrupt regime which the lowbrow officials put these important centres under the disposal of colonialists. Continuation of this disaster which is unfortunately the objective of some the foreign oriented groups would deal a heavy blow to the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic and any indifference towards this vital issue would be great treason against Islam and the Islamic country.' (22)

Following the three aims of the Cultural Revolution, as Khomeini had pointed them out (instructing teachers and selecting proper persons for teaching in universities; ideological screening of students; and Islamizing the academic sphere and transforming the curriculums), the 'Committee for Islamization of Universities' carried out the task by ensuring an 'Islamic atmosphere' for every academic subject, especially different disciplines in humanities, from political science and economics to psychology and sociology. (23) Subsequently, the closing down of universities during 1980-83 resulted in dismissal of secular professors and ideological entrance exams for students; the academia was purged of Western and non-Islamic influences; and when it reopened, purges continued for five more years with special focus on 'Islam's enemies', while screening students were strongly reinforced - they required to be practicing Muslims, to declare their loyalty to the doctrine of the 'vice regency of the faqih' and so on. This cultural policy, on the one hand, was responsible for dismissal or dissuasion of tens of thousands of students from universities and, on the other hand, forced as many as seven thousands of professors to leave the academia and then, most probably, the country - as a cultural analyst cites in her survey, 'according to the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education, right before the revolution and subsequent closure of all the universities in 1980, there were 16,222 professors teaching in Iran's higher education institutions. When the universities reopened in 1982, this figure had plummeted to 9,042.' (24)

Furthermore, after reopening of academia, the Islamic regime consistently tried to keep and consolidate its stronghold in this decisive battlefield. Based on its strategic cultural

119 policy regarding to the preference of 'commitment' (ta'ahhod) over 'proficiency' {takhassos), it launched a vast plan named the 'Unity of Seminary and University' whose main aim w/as not humanization of Islamic scholarships but more Islamization of human sciences by conquering the secular academia, a process characterized by inclusion of Islamic topics in academic curriculums and appointment of the Islamic authorities as professors and policy-makers of every university. Likewise, to put the universities under strict control of the Islamic state, it inaugurated an 'Office for the Deputy of the Supreme Leader' in every university, whose aims were to screen the academic sphere, to lead ideological activities and state-oriented meetings, and to prevent 'non-Islamic' cultural festivals and 'counter-revolutionary' political happenings. Moreover, as the 'Student Islamic Societies' ('Anjoman e Eslami e Daneshjooyan') started to become rather independent and critical of the state cultural attitudes and political approaches, the Islamic regime started to limit its activities and inaugurate and empower rival state- sponsored organizations such as the 'Student Islamic Community' {'Jame'e ye Eslami e Daneshjooyan') which has been totally in accordance with the regime's ideological agenda.

However, as the most powerful state apparatus in academic area, the 'Student ' established and put in charge of controlling cultural and political activities of university students; as a group of faithful supporters of the Islamic regime, it is composed of state- sponsored students that entre universities by means of special quotas in all academic levels for those who are active members of Basij (Basijian, mobilizational militia as the popular wing of the 'Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' or the so-called 'Revolutionary Guards'), those who attended in Iran-Iraq war {Razmandegan), those who injured during the war {Janbazan), and those who related to family of martyrs of that 'Sacred Defence' - a term coined by Mohammad Khatami, the head of the War Propaganda Headquarters, describing Iran's involvement with Iraq in a long war of attrition. By these quotas, the regime not only provides academic education for the people whom it wants to employ as faithful officials in the future, but also uses them as an internal academic 'pressure group' to push forward the process of Islamization in academia, and to repress

120 student protests whenever it seems necessary. In fact, although the quotas in question, amounted to 40 percent of total students during the war and its following years, were supposed to be reduced in recent years, due to reduction of those Razmandegan and Janbazan who had not yet entered universities, the regime redefined them so as to include more Basijis (Basijian), to be able to retain and reinforce its power in academia as one of the most strategic strongholds in the on-going civil cultural war.

Meanwhile, in December 1984, to institutionalize and to secure its functions, the 'Cultural Revolution Headquarters' was transformed into a state apparatus, named the 'Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution', as the highest body for policy-making not only for academic areas and universities but also for all cultural apparatuses of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Of course, the body was not stipulated in the Constitution but was formed by Khomeini's decree, as he declared that 'to get rid of western evil-encouraging culture and to replace Islamic national good-encouraging culture and to ensure cultural revolution in all areas in the country is so wide endeavour that we need to do it by fighting deeply-rooted western influence for so many years.' However, although the aims of the new apparatus remained intact, its duties and responsibilities did increasingly expand in the next years: while a bill, approved by the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution on 24 February 1985, announces its aims in six parts, from 'expansion and propagation of Islamic culture in people's affairs and reinforcement of cultural revolution and promotion of public culture' to 'dissemination of cultural ideas and effects of the Islamic Revolution and establishment and consolidation of cultural relations with other countries, especially Islamic nations,' (25) a new bill, approved on 17 November 1997, expanded its duties from 10 to 28 items, from 'codification of the principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran's cultural policy and designation of educational, investigative, cultural, and social aims and policies of the country' and 'codification and ratification of the country's principal propaganda policies' to 'preparation and ratification of proper projects for identification and declaration of the manifestations, ways, and modes of enemies' cultural invasion to principles of Islamic and revolutionary thought, culture, and values, and designation of essential strategies and tactics for

121 fighting them' and 'taking internationally position against the cultural distortions of Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran.' (26)

As the largest ideological state institution of the Islamic Republic, the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, whose ratifications are considered above all other bills and laws passed by parliament or ministries, encompasses 19 associations, 4 institutes, and 18 councils that include a wide range of cultural activities, some of them are: 'Organization for Researching and Composing University textbooks in the Humanities', 'Academic Jihad', 'Academy of and Literature', 'Academy of Sciences', 'Academy of Arts', 'Central Commission for Screening Professors', 'Central Commission for Screening Students', 'Central Commission for Student Disciplinary', 'Centre for Composition, Translation, and Publication of Art Works', 'Council of Public Culture', 'Council of Cultural and Social Affairs of Women', 'Council of Islamization of educational institutions', 'Art Council', 'Council of Propagation of Persian Language and Literature', 'High Council for the Youth', 'High Council of Information', 'High Council for Information', 'Council of Compilation of Religious Textbooks for Schools', 'Council for Control of Design, Fabrication, Importation, and Distribution of Children's Toys', and 'Council for Control of Determination, Fabrication, and Installation of Statues and Monuments in Squares and Public Places'. The main members of the huge establishment, presided by the president of the Islamic Republic, are selected and appointed by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution - its 33 members usually include heads of three powers of the Islamic Republic, head of the Organization of Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRIB), head of the Organization of Islamic Propaganda, head of the Office for Deputy of the Supreme Leader, and other 'committed' figures, most of whom hold other governmental posts as well.

In addition to his constitutional powers, such a dominant establishment provides another unrivalled power for the Supreme Leader to implement his ideological agenda through articulation of cultural policies. In July 1985, before his leadership and during his presidency and headship of the Supreme Council, in the form of answers to

122 questions put forward by the Supreme Council's Public Relations, Khamenei declared that they needed a 'cultural invasion' [tahajom e farhangi) to western culture and, according to him, the Supreme Council was the best apparatus to make policies for defeating the enemies' cultural imperialism. However, one decade later, when the country could not achieve any major victory in war with Iraq and then the very idea of 'export of revolution' was to be failed and forgotten, the Supreme Leader was ready to reverse the stream and to defend the necessary Islamic resistance against the western 'cultural invasion' and enemies' 'soft war': relying on his catchword, 'Enemy', he launched a huge propaganda and proclamation against the cultural invasion to the extent that only his related lectures during his leadership since 1989, compiled and published by the Secretariat for Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, mounts to 3 voluminous books (about 1800 pages), under the title of Cultural Invasion and Soft War (2010) -these books together with two more titles on 'science and technology' and 'art and literature' are supposed to constitute the 'Cultural Manifesto of the Islamic Revolution'. (27)

In other words, while the Islamic Republic had lost most of its actual and potential powers during the hard war of Iran-Iraq battle, had become a rather isolated country by its unwelcome interventions in and beyond, the Islamic regime not only could not launch a cultural attack against the west, but also had fo take a defensive position against western cultural influence. In fact, on the one hand, the Iranian cultural figures and messengers who were appreciated in the west were mostly dissident artists, writers, and filmmakers, hostile or irrelevant to the regime's idea of islamic identity; on the other hand, despite a huge investment in its propaganda apparatuses and an observable influence in some Islamic countries, the Islamic Republic's impact on western societies was so narrow, far away from what it expected. Under such circumstances, it seemed obvious that the regime's war was no more against western countries but, indeed, against its adversary in the civil cultural war.

123 From the regime's announced outlook, the cultural invasion had launched to reinforce the Islamists' rival in Iranian territory: in spite of the regime's attempt to Islamize the Iranian cultural identity and despite the following cultural emigration of secularist sections, not only they had not won the cultural civil war, but felt an increasing threat as their adversary could come to terms with the new technologies (especially new media for reproduction and distribution of visual products) that the west provided to propagate its cultural identity and its attached or inherent values - as early as 28 November 1989, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution declared that 'as of now, a huge cultural camp has been arranged by political, industrial, and other different supports, it comes like a torrent to fight us. It is not a military war. The general mobilization would be futile. [...] It works like a chemical bomb and its effects are intangible and slumberous. [...] Now, you suddenly see the signs of this propaganda and cultural invasion in our schools, streets, fronts, seminaries, and universities. [...] A movie is produced and comes inside the country in the form of video cassette, and it paves the way for such an invasion. Last night, a gentleman told me that small devices have been invented, capable of recording 20 video-format films in the form of microfilms: everyone can hide them inside his buttons and bring them inside the country and distribute them among the youth!' (28)

Cinema through the Islamic Revolution

Although a vast number of cinemas and film theatres were destroyed during the Islamic Revolution or, after the Islamic Republic, were used for other purposes, the medium of film was not entirely doomed: on the contrary, it was regarded as a weapon which could be so powerful if it also became a subject of overall Islamization of cultural construction of the country. As Hamid Naficy extensively explains in his canonical essay, 'Islamizing Film Culture in Iran', the revolutionary regime initiated several coordinated efforts to purge the previous Iranian film culture and to establish its new cultural and media policies in cinema. As one of the first symbolic transformations, many of the theatres

124 that had remained intact had their names changed from Western and non-Islamic names to Islamic and revolutionary ones: in Tehran, for example, Atlantic was changed to Afriqa (Africa), Empire to Esteqial (Independence), Royal to Enqelab (Revolution), Panorama to Azadi (Freedom), Taj (Crown) to Shahr e Honar (City of Art), Golden City to Felestin (Palestine), Polidor to Qods (al-Quds) and Cine Monde to Qiam (Uprising). (29)

Another endeavour was concentrated on importation and display of foreign films. Regarding the foreign films that were already in the country, they continued to be screened although many of them were re-edited, cut, re-cut, and re-titled to conform to new Islamic standards. Furthermore, soon the government took over responsibility for importing foreign films, consigning the private sector to the margins. As Naficy explained, 'as early as July 1979, efforts were begun to purify the imports, by restricting their inflow. First, the importation of B-grade Turkish, Indian and Japanese films was curtailed, followed closely by a ban on all "imperialist" and "anti-revolutionary" films. American films were the next group to be excluded, as the political relationship between the two countries deteriorated. A larger percentage of Western films were denied exhibition permit than films from any other region, corroborating the link made between films produced in the West and the moral corruption of the indigenous population. In the first three years of post-revolutionary government, a total of 898 foreign films were reviewed, 513 of which were rejected, the bulk of them Western imports,' while '74 - more than a third - of the 213 foreign films licensed by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (MCIG) in 1981 came from the Soviet bloc' (30) Later, the display of foreign films became strictly limited: while the main medium of their display was the state Television, their cinematic display was confined to few seances in few cinemas, at most, in Tehran.

However, to accelerate the appearance of a new culturally committed Islamic film culture and to help the pro-regime young filmmakers, the endeavours were concentrated not only on cleansing the Iranian film industry from anti-Islamic and non- Islamic effects and appearances of pre-Revolutionary cinema, but also on preventing the

125 previous film figures - who preferred to stay at home and not to go abroad - from continuing their activities. During the first years of the Islamic Republic, several films produced by New Wave directors such as Khosrow Haritash, Mohammad Reza Aslani, Parviz Kimiavi, Bahram Bayzai, Daryush Mehrjui, and Masud Kimiai were banned and, as an alarming event, Mehdi Misaqiye, a famous producer, was sentenced to jail for five years and his properties and theatres confiscated - he was released after he publicly renounced his Baha'i faith. (31) Likewise, a cheap popular production like Doozakhiha (Hell-Raisers, Iraj Ghaderi, 1982) was enough to characterize a decisive moment in the Iranian cinema of the early 1980s, as 'its director and main actors (Malak-Motii and Fardin) were associated with the commercial cinema of bygone years. As soon as it was screened, the film received a torrent of criticism from cultural policy-makers. Haddad- Adel, an influential cultural policy-maker, also criticised the criteria that had allowed the making and distribution of Hell-Raisers.' Abdolmajid Ma'adi-Khah, a cleric who was in charge of the Minister for Cultural and Islamic Guidance, had to resign and, subsequently, 'almost all pre-revolutionary film practitioners, particularly actors and actresses, were banned from Iranian cinema, and harsher criteria were introduced in order to prevent future anomalies.' (32)

Another enlightening example was 'a production company named Ayat Film, which was formed prior to the Revolution, apparently in response to a call by urging the youth to turn to the arts to express their Islamic beliefs and their anti-Pahlavi politics.' Immediately after the Revolution, Ayat Film produced two films: a religious feature film and a documentary about the Islamic Revolution, both of them directed by Mohammad Ali Najafi. However, the impact of Ayat Film 'far exceeded its limited production output because of the way in which its committed (mota'ahhed) and religious (motadayyen) members fanned out soon after the Revolution to take key positions in government, the motion picture industry and allied institutions.' Soon Mir Hossein Mousavi became Prime Minister; Fakhreddin Anvar gained several high posts in both the Ministry of Islamic Guidance and the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran; Mohammad Ali Najafi obtained high positions in the Ministry of Islamic Guidance; Mostafa Hashemi

126 was appointed to a high position in Khomeini's propaganda office; and was appointed as the director of the powerful Farabi Cinematic Foundation, the executive arm of iVIinistry of Culture and Islamic Guidance in cinematic affairs. As Naficy explained, 'these and other members and affiliated members of Ayat Film were among those few whom the government could trust on account of both their artistic abilities and their "correct" Islamic values. As a result, they became ensconced in positions that allowed them, from early on, to influence the direction of the Islamization of cinema. Their impact was augmented by their longevity in office, since by and large they retained their influential positions throughout the first decade of the Islamic regime.' (33)

In general, during 1979-82 most efforts were directed to cleanse the messy scene for introducing the new cultural and media policies of the Islamic regime. According to one report, during the first four years of the Islamic Republic, 513 out of 898 foreign films were banned and 1956 out of the 2208 domestically produced (both pre- and post- revolutionary) films were refused screening permits. (34) In the absence of any articulated and announced film policy, most of fulfilled cinematic projects were either censored and banned films which were directed by non-revolutionary directors or political productions against the Pahlavi regime, tried to propagate ideological agenda of the Islamic Republic, including Westophobia and anti-Americanism in the most direct ways. (35) In addition, the process of controlling filmmaking and screening became increasingly complicated, and included four phases: 'script approval', 'production approval', 'final-cut check', and 'rating' into groups A, B, C, and D - 'A' films were shown at peak times in the best cinemas with higher ticket prices and longer runs, and 'D' films were briefly shown in minor venues with the lowest ticket prices. (36) Importantly, although evaluation and classification of proposals and productions were firstly made on the basis of technical sophistication, aesthetic qualities, and content, the tree criteria, deliberately announced in an ambiguous way, enabled the government to discern their referents according to its own Islamist agenda.

127 Later on, the Islamic Republic articulated its media policy and the related regulations for Iranian film culture and industry. Admittedly, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (MCIG), with its Deputy of Cinematic and Audio-Visual Affairs, is considered as the main source of cinematic control and , while its executive arm, Farabi Cinematic Foundation (FCF) is considered as the main cinematic state apparatus. (37) Besides, there are several different state offices and semi-public institutes such as Documentary and Experimental Film Centre and Iranian Youth Cinema Society (both affiliated to MClG's Deputy of Cinematic and Audio-Visual Affairs), Art Centre of The Organization of Islamic Propaganda, and the Centre for Intellectual Development of Children and Adolescents (established by Farah Pahlavi, now affiliated to the Ministry of Education and Cultivation), but their activities are based on MClG's directives, they cannot alter or ignore its subscribed cultural and media policy. Since its establishment in 1993, the House of Cinema, as a non-governmental union of cinematic guilds, has tried to influence and improve MClG's film policy through its negotiation with the latter's Office of Cinematic and Audio-Visual Affairs. Nevertheless, the Islamic state cultural and media policy has been authoritative and imperative, too stronger to be challenged by the artists who are, in many ways, dependent on it for creation and presentation of their artefacts.

Revolutionary Film Policy: From Culture to Islamic Guidance

Less than one month after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, given its clear priority of cultural reformation, the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education was established on 7 March 1979, based on a legislation passed by the Council of the Islamic Revolution, to administrate cultural matters of the Iranian society - it had formed by integration of two pre-Revolutionary ministries of 'Culture and Art' and 'Science and Higher Education'. Apparently, it was in charge of all the cultural bodies and programs until 2 years later when, in 1981, some cinematic, dramatic, and music departments and institutions were detached from the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education to form a new ministry,

128 named the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, which was supposed to guide and supervise all of artistic activities and events - in fact, the new ministry was an Islamification of the

Ministry of National Guidance which was, in turn, a new name for the pre-Revolutionary

Ministry of Information and Tourism. The final transformation occurred on 2 March

1986 when, based on a legislation passed by the Parliament, the Ministry of Islamic

Guidance was transformed into the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (MCIG) with its new powers and responsibilities. (38)

According to the political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Ministry of

Culture and Islamic Guidance is the main Islamic state cultural apparatus whose announced aims include: 1. Promoting the moral values based of faith and piety; 2.

Cultural independence and protecting the society from influence of alien cultures; 3.

Promoting the public awareness in various areas and fostering of talents and spirit of research and study, innovation and Islamic art and culture; 4. Acquainting the people of the world with the principles and objectives of Islamic Revolution; 5. Promotion of cultural ties with various nations and Islamic and oppressed nations in particular; 6.

Preparing the ground for unity among Muslims. (39) Likewise, one can see the same stress on Islamic conception of Iranian culture in the sections 'Principal Duties and

Responsibilities' and 'Content Strategies of the Ministry' to the extent that one can consider it as the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance. (40) In the absence of any clear indication to the Iranian national heritage or the recognition of its pre-lslamic past, according to the Iranian Ministry of Culture, Iranian cultural identity is a matter of

Islamic identity rather than national identity.

According to the same cultural policy, the MClG's 'Deputy of Cinematic and Audio-Visual

Affairs' is responsible for developing the media policy of the Islamic Republic in film culture and industry. In fact, with its five special offices for 'Development of Cinematic and Audio-Visual Industries', 'Investigations and Planning for Cinematic and Audio-Visual

Activities', 'Administration of Cinematic and Audio-Visual Societies and Festivals',

'Audio-Visual Co-operations and Home Show', and 'Evaluation and Control of

129 Professional Film Productions', the Deputy is the largest media policy-maker of the country, whose claimed aims and duties include: administration of cinematic and audio­ visual affairs according to ratifications and regulations; investigation and preparation of the ground for picturing the valuable virtues; planning and programming for support, guidance, and supervision of cinematic and audio-visual affairs; quantitative and qualitative control of the country's film stream and other audio-visual arts and industries; planning and programming for educating committed art experts in cinema, photography, and other audio-visual activities, and development of the existing academic and private art schools by way of supporting and supervising them; investing, co-investing, and encouraging to invest, for creation and development of artistic and technical centres for film education and film production; effort for introduction and propagation of film art of the Islamic Republic of Iran; participation in introduction and export of the Islamic Revolution and its cultural achievements through cultural deputies of Iranian embassies; ratification and application of regulations for establishing, developing, and dissolving the private educational audio-visual and cinematic institutes and all of other related associations, societies, clubs, companies, and guilds; support of ethically healthy filmmaking in the country, in amateur and semi-professional levels; granting the license for importing and exporting of cinematic and audio-visual works, according to the related regularities; creation and administration of regulative and evaluative councils for supervising and guiding the cineastes through evaluation of film scripts, film revision, ranking the cinemas, and making the exhibition policies in the country; quantitative and qualitative evaluation of cinematic works, from production to exhibition; supervising the appointment of qualified people for cinematic and audio­ visual posts in offices outside the ministry; and quantitative and qualitative evaluation of applied policies and long-term and middle-term plans. (41)

Of course, these are the aims and duties designated for the MCIG and its related organizations during a period of cultural conflicts in different parts of the political structure, and they are still in progress - in a process of adjustment and alteration - but the three principal duties of the Deputy, Hemayat (support), Hedayat (guidance), and

130 A/ezorot (Supervision, in sense of surveillance), have remained intact. Obviously, one can trace their roots in the ratified regulations about exhibition of films and videos that were approved by the Islamic Republic's cabinet, under premiership of Mir Hossein

Mousavi, charging the MCIG with their enforcement in June 1982. As Naficy emphasized, these new regulations 'were instrumental in facilitating the shift from

Pahlavi to Islamic cinema. They stipulate that all films and videos shown publicly must have an exhibition permit.' Importantly, 'they ban all films and videos which: weaken the principle of monotheism and other Islamic principles or insult them in any manner; insult, directly or indirectly, the Prophets, Imams, the guardianship of the Supreme

Jurisprudent (Velayat e Faqih), the ruling Council or the jurisprudents (Mojtaheds); blaspheme against the values and personalities held sacred by Islam and other religions mentioned in the Constitution; encourage wickedness, corruption and prostitution; encourage or teach dangerous addictions and earning a living from unsavoury means such as smuggling; negate the equality of all people regardless of colour, race, language, ethnicity, and belief; encourage foreign cultural, economic and political influence contrary to the "neither West nor East" policy of the government; express or disclose anything that is against the interests and policies of the country which might be exploited by foreigners; show details of scenes of violence and torture in such a way as to disturb or mislead the viewer; misrepresent historical and geographical facts; lower the taste of the audience by means of low production and artistic values; negate the values of self-sufficiency and economic and social independence.' (42)

Meanwhile, to ensure that every single movie would be produced based on such conditions, all scripts 'had to go through a five-stage process at the MCIG before being made and shown to the public. It was during this process that the regulations codifying

"Islamic values" were implemented. The MCIG reviewed a film's synopsis, evaluated and approved the screenplay, issued a production permit (approving the cast and crew by name), reviewed the completed film and, finally, issued an exhibition permit that specified the cinemas in which it would be shown.' (43) Until 1989, filmmakers at first had to get their scripts and screenplays approved, and then to obtain production

131 permission regarding the listed cast and crew, to get approval of the finished production, and to retain exhibition permission that would specify the theatres in which their movies were to be shown. In May 1989, for the first time, the requirement for scripts to be approved was removed. Of course, the removal of the sophisticated process of script approval was not a sign of the Islamic Republic's cultural weakness or withdrawal of its fundamental ideas about the Islamic character of the Iranian cultural identity. On the contrary, as Naficy argued, 'there were two chief reasons for this liberalization policy: the authorities were confident that Islamic values had been sufficiently inculcated (that is, interpellation or "injection" had had the desired effect), so that less supervision was now required; secondly, the government, being more self- assured, wished to open up cultural discourse and to reduce criticism of its iron-clad control, thereby boosting morale and film quality.' (44) Nevertheless, not surprisingly, in 1993, the scrjpt approval once again became mandatory for all cinematic projects seeking production permission: on the one hand, the state administration concluded that without a precise 'guidance' and a strict 'supervision', any 'support' would not result in what the cultural policy-makers meant; and, on the other hand, the filmmakers thought that 'the removal of the script approval stage may have had a negative effect: concerned for their heavy investments, producers may have become more cautious and prone to self-censorship.' (45)

in addition to the general regulations, a booklet of provisions and prescriptions concerning film production, distribution and screening is published by the Deputy of Cinematic and Audio-Visual Affairs, almost every year. The first booklet, published in 1983, included the following orders to be obeyed by filmmakers: '1. Islamic hejab must be obeyed at all times for women. This means: wearing loose long clothes and trousers in dark colours. Even scarves and (a one-piece cloth covering head-to-toe) must be of dark colour. The hair and neck must be completely covered. Only the face and the hands to the wrist can be visible. When this not impossible, as when showing women in the previous [Shah's] time, a hat or wig can be used. 2. It is prohibited to show the made up face of a woman. 3. Close up of a woman's face is not allowed. 4. It is prohibited to

132 show a variety of clothes throughout a film without a logical explanation. 5. All physical contact between men and women is prohibited. 6. The use of the chador for negative characters and persons must have a logical excuse. 7. Hair styles which show dependence or approval of loose and immoral political, cultural or intellectual groups inside and outside the country is not permitted. 8. The exchange of any joke, talk, conduct, or sign between a male and female individual in a film which suggest a departure from the behavioural purity acceptable to society is banned. 9. To use young girls is not allowed without permission of the Office of Supervision and Evaluation. 10.

Words, signs or signals that directly or indirectly relate to sexual matters are prohibited.

11. The use of a tie, bow tie and anything that denotes foreign culture is not permitted.

12. Smoking a cigarette or pipe or the drinking of alcoholic beverages and the use of narcotic drugs is prohibited. 13. The use of music, which is similar to well-known internal or foreign songs, is not allowed. 14. Propaganda for doctrines that are illegal and counter to the Islamic order is banned. 15. Sharia laws and customs, religious beliefs and mandatory religious laws have to be followed and the religiously forbidden be avoided.' (46)

Ten years later, in 1993, the Deputy issued another list of regulations intended to establish an Islamic version of the Iranian cinema. According to the new regulations, films would be rejected if they contain material which 'denies or weakens the principles of Islam; subverts Islam by propagating superstition or sorcery; insults director or indirectly God's messengers, the Vali ye Faqih, the leadership council or qualified

Mojtaheds (those learned in Islamic law); profanes the sanctities of Islam and of other religions recognized in the Constitution of the Islamic republic of Iran; denies or weakens the highest qualities of humankind (the veil, the spirit of forgiveness, sacrifice, modesty...); depicts or mentions situations that are against Islamic virtue (slander, use of tobacco products...); propagates vile acts, corruption, prostitution and improper wearing of the veil; educates on the topic of or encourages dangerous and injurious addictions and illicit professions such as smuggling; depicts foreign culture, politics, economics or society in a misleading manner; states or presents any material that is against the

133 interests of the country and can be exploited by foreigners; expresses or depicts historic and geographic facts, and the internal problems of the country in an exaggerated way or in a manner that misleads the viewer and offends the principles of Islam; depicts unpleasant sounds or scenes (including those caused by technical defects) that could jeopardize the viewer's health; involves films with low artistic or technical value that could lead to a decline in the public's taste and sensibilities.' (47)

As one of the most detailed frameworks for conducting film affairs under the Islamic Republic, the 1996 booklet prohibited many matters in its 95 pages, declared that 'it is not allowed for women to be filmed in close-up, to use makeup, to wear tight-fitting or colourful clothes; men must not wear ties or short-sleeved shirts unless they are negative characters; no Western music is allowed, no intimate lighting; even the editing must correspond to the Islamic norm.' (48) Other prohibitions included: giving the negative characters in films names which have Islamic roots; showing more than face or hands above wrist of women; multiplicity of the costumes worn by characters in a film, which can lead to the culture of consumerism; using the clothes which could create a new trend in wearing Western clothes; body contact between men and women; negative portrayal of personnel of the armed forces, the police, the Revolutionary Guards, and Basijis; use of music which is similar to famous songs, both foreign and Iranian; smoking cigarettes and pipes; sympathetic portrayal of criminals; victory of bad against good, cruel against humane, unethical against ethical behaviour, whether it is shown in the film directly or indirectly. (49)

However, the tight code of cinematic conduct was not intensively practiced in some ways, as the 'reformist' Mohammad Khatami - the previous Minister for Culture and Islamic Guidance in both Mousavi's and Rafsanjani's cabinets. Deputy and Head of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, Chairman of War Propaganda Headquarters, Director of National Library of Iran, and a member of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution - was elected as the new president of the Islamic Republic in 1997. Of course, some basic non-violable red lines such as strict code of hejab - either a chador

134 which covers body from head to toe or a loose outer garment named manto with a scarf

- for women and prohibition of portrayal of any sexual and even asexual contact between men and women remained intact, and any critical approach to state officials or

Islamic clerics could be highly problematic, yet the new government dealt with cinematic affairs with a relative tolerance concerning non-orthodox ideas of identity and the related life styles. Thus, not only some banned movies such as Banu {Lady, Dariush

Mehrjui 1992) - an Iranian remaking of Louis Bunuel's Viridiana, banned due to its transgression of moral norms - and Adam Barfi (Snowman, Davoud Mirbaqeri 1995) - banned for depiction of transvestism - were released and screened, but also a number of taboo images found their ways to post-revolutionary cinema - for example, in

Mohsen Makhmalbaf's Sokut (The Silence, 1999), a teenage girl dances unveiled to rhythmic music and, although this scene was still considered controversial, the director succeeded to release his film uncensored.

Moreover, many of 'New Wave' filmmakers veterans like Bahman Farmanara, who had not been allowed to make films for many years, or Naser Taghvai and Bahram Bayzai, who were rarely given the opportunity to make a new movie, became able to resume their careers. However, the more conservative layer of political ground in the Islamic

Republic did not remained inactive, impeached Ataollah Mohajerani, the Minister for

Culture and Islamic Guidance, for his liberal ideas about artistic activities in cultural scene of the society. Thus, although he had been appointed to the post by order of the

Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khamenei, (50) Mohajerani was interpellated in the Islamic Consultative Assembly in May 1999. In course of interpellation, in addition to his liberal attitude towards freedom of press, his film policies were highly criticised for: ignoring the values and degradation of the high position of women from what was ordered in the 'progressive school of Islam' as well as transgressing limits and religious rules at large; inattention to the Sacred Defence (Iran-

Iraq war) filmmakers, which resulted in reduction of the Sacred Defence films; stopping the subsidies for this kind of movies, although they were the main media for propagating the values of eight years of the Sacred Defence and its transfer to next

135 generations. (51) After all, in spite of surviving the interpellation, Mohajerani was enforced to be more conservative about such problematic matters, until he and his Deputy of Cinematic and Audio-Visual Affairs were finally replaced in second-term presidency of Khatami (2001-2005). Under Khatami's second-term presidency, the state film policies and practices more or less remained unaltered, while the new international acclaim for Iranian cinema (began with Abbas Kiarostami's Taste of Cherry, awarded the Palme d'Or at the 1997 Cannes Film Festival) overshadowed the continuing clashes in cinematic presentation of cultural identity inside the country.

In 2005, with the election of conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad - a former member of the Revolutionary Guards and the mayor of Tehran - as the next president of the Islamic Republic, and the more aggressive statements of the Supreme Leader about the so-called Enemy's 'cultural invasion', a more strict cultural and media policy was set up according to the Islamic ideological strategies. Soon after his appointment as the minister for Culture and Islamic Guidance in the new cabinet, Hossein Saffar-Harandi (a columnist in newspaper which is directed by a representative of the Supreme Leader), announced that from then on distribution and exhibition of films which promoted 'feminism' and 'secularism' were prohibited. Meanwhile, his warning words were coordinated with what was approved in the form of a bill in the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution concerning the 'Policies for Distribution and Display of Foreign Feature Films and Audio-Visual Materials' on 18 October 2005. As its 'Introduction' explains, the Islamic media policy-makers' ideas about the Iranian cultural identity are based on the assumptions that 'cinema is highly attractive art-medium; it is the phenomenon that has its idiosyncratic attractions (such as motion pictures), in addition to the attractions of all of the arts (including painting, literature, drama, music, etc.) that have been determining in its genesis. This is the very ability of cinema for attracting the audience that encourages political, economic, military, social, and cultural power centres to use it as one of the best mass media for propagating their own ideas and conducts or for destroying and denying their opponents' ideas and conducts. The United States of America has contributed to industrial and commercial development of cinema

136 more than any other western country, and the very considerable contribution has led it to use this art-medium, more than the others, to propagate its own culture and politics; this usage is to the extent that, according to many experts, the American cinema is one of its most vital instruments for consolidating cultural imperialism.' (52)

Following such presumptions, it concluded that 'the present policies, articulated in order to determine the limits of display of foreign (especially American) cinematic works in the country, are aimed to allow display of proper foreign films and to avoid display of the movies that can thematically or formally influence the country's culture by their destructive effects.' (53) Also, it emphasized that the policies should be applied in distribution of all foreign feature films and other audio-visual works that were going to be displayed in 'cinemas, cultural centres, (public and private) exhibition halls, authorized networks for distribution of video-cassettes and audio-visual compact disks like CDs and DVDs, and national, provincial, and local TV channels.' (54) Then, in the section 'policies and priorities', it articulated its policies in three principles: '1. Making vigilance in selection of foreign cinematic works in a way that they are not quantitatively to the extent that reduce the attention to domestic cinematic and audio-visual works; 2. Respecting an intelligible ratio of different countries' presence in the selection of the works; 3. Attempting to select the works that have the least contradiction or opposition to Iranian-Islamic culture and peoples' approved moral values.' (55)

At last, in its fourth article, it specified the movies that were not to be distributed or displayed: 'Films that propagate attitudes like secularism, liberalism, nihilism, and feminism, and destroy and despise authentic (religious) cultures of Eastern societies; films that, explicitly or implicitly, deny religious sovereignty over profane life and prefer non-religious regimes over religious regimes; films that explicitly propagate royal regimes, or that try to portray colonial-oriented dictatorial regimes as legitimate and popular ones, or that try to portray anti-colonialist liberation movements as hated ones; films that propagate any kind of apartheid, especially the movies that present western people as superior to other races, nationalities, and ethnicities, or justify their

137 interventions in other parts of the world; films that, explicitly or implicitly, propagate the dominant system of America and its main institutions (such as Presidency, Congress and Senate, security and intelligence services, military organizations such as Pentagon, political ministries, and the two main political parties); films that reduce audiences' self- confidence in dealing with western (especially American) scientific and technological abilities, and try to despise other societies in terms of science and culture; films that,

directly or indirectly, confirm or propagate the world Zionism and the occupying regime of ; films that promote superficial spiritualities and old and new superstitions; films that, by false excitements, prevent audience from understanding the works' themes and

contents; films that propagate any kind of immoralities, or promote violence, or justify

and propagate drugs and alcohol; films that are culturally and aesthetically at low level,

and their popularization would gradually result in degradation of audiences' preference

and taste.' (56)

Meanwhile, following the 'Plan for Development of Culture of Chastity and Hejab',

codified by the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution in April 2003, another endeavour was initiated to control Iranian women's presence in cinema and to consolidate Islamic

ideas of proper Muslim woman, a new leaflet tilted 'The Administrative Regulations of

Principles and Policies for Optimization of Women's Presence in Cinema' was complied

and considered as Deputy of Cinematic and Audio-Visual Affairs' guideline for dealing

with such a long-lasting issue in Iranian cinema. Although it was complied several

months ago, only its headlines were published in August 2008. According to media

reports, along with its main aim, 'increasing and deepening public awareness of Islamic views of position, personality, rights, and roles of women in different fields of life and

proper presence of women in cinema', the new policy based its extended aims on three following principles: 'a. to determine the proper quantitative and qualitative positions of women in cinema in accordance with great values of Islam and the Islamic Revolution; b. to confront improper, non-authentic, and unqualified view of women's presence in cinema, and to introduce a proper model of Muslim woman which is coordinated with contemporary world and represents the whole human virtues; c. to reinforce the

138 committed and qualified women's presence in film industry, and to meet the cultural conditions that would increase and ensure their safe, constructive, and dynamic activities.'

Also, in the section 'principles and policies', it declared the following motifs as its axes: 'Proper and principal application of hejab as a symbol of religious culture and a guarantee for public moral and psychological immunity; exclusion of sex and violence and invalidation of them as inherent essence of cinema; prevention of sceptical attitudes about the Islamic fundamentals, principles, and laws in the name of vindication of women's rights; necessary attention and application of Imam Khomeini and the Supreme Leader's fatwas and directives concerning women's position and function.' (57) Of course, aside from any other implication, the issuance of such codification was a sign of sustaining difficulties of the Islamic Republic in its dealing with the 'non-Islamic' life styles that, despite the regime's huge ideological propagation for proper hejab and cultural aggressions and strict social actions against ill-veiled women (those who let the hair show from under the scarf, wear tight clothes that cling to the body, and use ostentatious and attractive makeup, lipstick, nail polish, perfume, etc.), had not been able to remove them from Iranian life form and cultural identity.

However, the most recent film policy of Deputy of Cinematic Affairs and Audio-Visual Affairs, published on 12 May 2010, could be considered as one of the clearest articulations of the Islamic Republic's modified ideological strategies on cinema. (58) Beginning with quotations of Holy Koran, Imam Ali (the first Shia Imam), the Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Khamenei), the president (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad), and Morteza Avini (a cinematic ideologue of the Islamic Republic who gained reputation for his war propaganda documentaries), it promises that it will present the long-term film policies of the Islamic Republic, inspired by 'the policies made by the Supreme Leader for Five- Year Plan and Twenty-Year Prospect', for the next decade which 'should be named as decade of culture' of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (59) Then, in an explanation of its basic assumptions, it says 'we believe that the religious thought is not confined to intellectual

139 sphere or individual and ritual conducts, but has role, impact, and plan and program for all aspects of human life and his posthumous life. Evidently, art and especially cinema which function as spring of all human intellectual, emotional, credential, aesthetic, and sentimental conducts can take advantage, more than any other endeavour, of illuminating lights of true faithful religion, the precious Islam.' Accordingly, it specified four elements of thematic approaches in Iranian cinema as 'religious orientation, moralism, consciousness raising, hopefulness', and fourteen thematic preferences as 'religious and Koranic ideas. Fourteen Innocents of Shiism [the Holy Prophet, his daughter, and 12 imams, last of them, Mahdi, is considered as the absent Saviour], Mahdism, family consolidation, children and adolescences, culture and civilization of the Islamic Iran (the greater cultural geographical and historical Iran), the Islamic Revolution, history of Islam and contemporary history, the Soft War [confrontation with the so-called Cultural Invasion], Imperialists' confrontation with Iran and the Islamic resistance, the Sacred Defence [Iran-Iraq war], (local and international) political subjects, the Honourable and the Reputable, scientific and technological achievements'. (60) Finally, following a general articulation of its strategies and tactics for developing and flourishing the Iranian film culture and industry, it declares that this is not 'the end of the road', but a new beginning in 'the endless road towards high horizon of religious ideals.' (61)

Meanwhile, the new policies' more moderate and less aggressive tone demonstrated the Islamic Republic, on the one hand, has not been successful in defeating its rival in cultural civil war and, on the other hand, cautiously and conditionally, tried to include some national elements of Iranian cultural identity in its Islamic ideological agenda. One can find a good example of this dual approach in the section 'Co-Productions', where it listed 'ECO members [Pakistan and Turkey, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, in addition to Iran] and Nowruz Cultural area [Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, in addition to Iran], the Islamic world, the Asian, African, Latin and South American continents, and the other countries' as the Islamic Republic's privileges for 'exporting the culture of

140 Revolution, Islam, and Iran, and consolidating fraternity with friendly states and nations' by developing cinematic connections and co-productions. (62)

Nevertheless, since any long-term media and cultural policy is determined in accordance with what the Islamic Republic's authorities call 'overall interests of the regime', one cannot consider the flexible situation as something extraordinary or radically different from the past. During the Ahmadinejad's presidency, on the one hand, the House of Cinema had to be replaced by a state film authority, some well-known directors such as Bahram Bayzai and Bahman Ghobadi had to leave the country due to lack of possible cinematic activities, some filmmakers such as Jafar Panahi and Mohammad Rasulof sentenced to long jails and banned from filmmaking, script writing, gong abroad, and interviewing with local and international media, and some movies such as Santouri (2006) by Dariush Mehrjui and Padash (Reward, 2008) by Kamal Tabrizi were banned, and some film periodicals such as Donya ye Tasvir and Haft were also banned while, on the other hand, some other banned movies such as Be Rang e Arghavan (In the Colour Purple, 2004) by Ebrahim Hatamikia were released, some non-favourites filmmakers such as Masud Kimiai were awarded in the state-sponsored Fajr Film Festivals, and the state tolerance to non-conformist movies were to the extent that many conservative media attacked the government due to several non-Islamist films that were made and screened during the same period.

Commenting on Be Rang e Arghavan, the president Ahmadinejad had claimed 'the Islamic Republic regime does not fear a few films, for the regime's foundations are too strong to be trembled by screening few movies' and 'if we are prone to strong cultural activity in the world, we should annually make 500 movies, but as of now we annually produce only 50 movies: half of them have no word to say, and a high percent of the other are non-committed; then, about 10 movies would remain and half of them cannot receive the permit for screening, and this is not a good situation', concluded that 'directors and screen writers must be told that they should not tend to pessimism, should make movies for the Revolution and the people.' (63)

141 Television after the Islamic Revolution

The 'Organization of Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran' {Sazman e Seda va Sima yeJomhuri e Eslami e Iran) or, as it is officially named, the 'Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting' (IRIB), no doubt, is not only the most influential audio-visual media in the country, but also the most vital state apparatus for sustaining the existence and persistence of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Not only its broadcasting reaches almost all the corners of the country and around 81 percent of Iranians have access to television (in the capital 92 percent of households have at least one television set), but also its impact is to the extent that no cultural, social, political, and economic could have public influence without being approved, introduced, and propagated by the so-called 'National Media': with its 46 national, provincial, and exterritorial TV channels, 58 national, local, provincial, and exterritorial radio channels, online networks, and affiliated organizations and institutions, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting is the most massive media network in the country.

Indeed, its official network is composed of 18 national TV channels (including Channel 1, with political-social trend; Channel 2, with children and adolescences and familial trend; Channel 3, with youth, entertainment, and sport trend; Channel 4, with cultural, scientific, and elite trend; News Network Channel; Education Channel; Quran Channel; Documentaries Channel; and Pouya Channel), 30 TV provincial channels, attributed to 30 provinces of the country, 9 exterritorial TV channels (Jam e Jam 1, for Iranian people in Europe; Jam e Jam 2, for Iranian people in United States; Jam e Jam 3, for Iranian people in Asia and Australia; Al-Alam News Network, in Arabic; Al-Kawthar TV, for Arab audience in Asia and North Africa; Sahar TV, in as different languages as English, French, Turkish, Kurdish, Urdu, Bosnian; Press TV, news network in English; Hispan TV, news and entertainment network in Spanish; iFilm, for Arab audience), 12 national radio channels (including radio channels for news, culture, Quran, urban traffic, religion, youth, sport, health, commerce, and music), 6 exterritorial radio channels (3 in Farsi for Iranian people in Europe, United States, and Asia and Australia, one in Arabic for middle east

142 ^i'' I

and beyond, one in Persian for Afghan and Tajik people, and one in Hebrew for Jewish people), 40 local and provincial radio channels (attributed to provincial capitals and some other cities), 3 online networks (2 online TV networks for pro-Palestine propaganda and the Islamic pilgrims and rituals, and one online radio network for

Iranian news and views), and 9 affiliated organizations (Soroush Press, a publication agency not only books in media and cinema subjects, but also five weeklies for public, children, adolescences, youth, and women; News Central Unit, as the only news source for national, provincial, and some exterritorial radio and television channels; Jam eJam

Daily, as the official newspaper of the organization; Sima Film, as producer of generally expensive TV serials and co-producer of movies, tele-movies, and TV serials with collaboration of filmmakers outside the IRIB; Seda va Sima Faculty, for educating the associate, undergraduate, and graduate students in as different media fields as media engineering, sound engineering, TV production, TV programming, news and radio communications, media management, TV and radio journalism; Sima Choub, as a wood company that makes most of the applied decorations for TV programs and serials; Iran

Sima, as an online archive of programs broadcasted in IRIB TV channels; Saba artistic- cultural company, as producer of animations for IRIB TV channels; Soroush audio-visual company, as producer and distributer of home versions of IRIB films and serials as well as music albums).

According to mandate (Article 44) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as mentioned earlier, no private, non-governmental, or independent Iranian television or radio channel could be created in the country, thus the IRIB has maintained the mass media monopoly since dominance of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. It is interesting that although, due to the transforming economic situation and global technologic developments that increasingly make monopoly such a hard game to play, some large- scale enterprises such as foreign trade, major mines, banking, insurance, have been semi-privatized during the third decade of the Islamic Republic life, the radio and television broadcasting is still state-owned and administered by the state exclusive and pre-emptive control. Without a doubt, the IRIB in general, and evidently its TV channels

143 in particular, has been the most influential arm in the hands of the Islamic

Revolutionaries to consolidate their expanding camp in the cultural civil war and to legitimate and propagate their position in international political war. Of course, according to the Islamic Republic character, far from being a transparent and accountable organization, such a substantial state apparatus as the IRIB is too secure and obscure to have its performing policies clearly announced or its performances extensively analyzed in public; however, a reading of few existing documents related to its aims and operations could be enlightening enough, and could demonstrate, at least, its vital existence for the entire structure of the Islamic Republic as such.

Following what had already been declared in Article 175 of the Constitution about general administrative structure of the Iranian organization for radio and television, a more detailed bill, titled the 'Administrative Code for the Organization of Voice and

Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran', passed by the Consultative Assembly in 29

December 1980. According to what had been written in the first version the

Constitution, the Organization should have been administrated by a supervising council of representatives of executive, judiciary, and legislative powers, while it had been promised that the law would determine its guidelines, way of administration, and way of controlling the Organization. To do so, the 1980 bill declared that the representatives in question should be 'Muslim and aware of, and committed to, religious duties; believer in, and committed to. Providence of the Jurist [Velayat e Faqih]; sufficiently aware of home policy and foreign policy and current and international affairs; endowed with a good career'.

Then, it charged the council with writing and ratifying statute and internal regulation of the 'Organization of Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran': the council was supposed to determine the public policy and planning guidelines of the Organization in terms of 'islamic propagation and faith fortification' in order to 'raise public consciousness of authentic Islamic knowledge, and the Islamic Republic of Iran's objectives and foreign policy' in a complete accordance with 'the Islamic criteria, the

144 Constitution, and public cultural, administrative, economic, military, and foreign policies of the country'. Also, the council was responsible for appointing a managing director who would be 'Muslim and aware of authentic Islamic knowledge, and practically committed to religious duties; believer in, and committed to. Providence of the Jurist [Velayat e Faqih], as it is included in the Constitution; sufficiently aware of home policy and foreign policy and current and international affairs; endowed with management capability and relative proficiency and related necessary knowledge; endowed with a good career'. And his duties include 'administration of the Organization's affairs, plans, and programs and vivification of their religious and ethical aspects'. (64)

Regarding the 'Statute of the Organization of Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran', a new bill passed in the Consultative Assembly on 25 October 1983. As an extension of 'Article 175 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and other Articles related to mass media (radio and television) and the Administrative Code for the Organization of Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran', it articulated the Organization's ideological, administrative, financial, and other related essentials and affairs within 6 chapters. In the first chapter, dedicated to general principles, it consolidated the Constitution's vote for mass media monopoly in the country, as it declared that 'the installation of transmitters in order to broadcast radio and television programs is confined to the Organization in any place in the country; if any individual or legal entity other than the Organization proceed to establish or to utilize such media, they will be prevented from their activities, will be prosecuted by the judiciary' (Article 7). In order to stress on the official cultural and media policy of the Islamic Republic, aims and duties of the Organization were pointed out in second chapter: Article 9 reassured that 'as a public university for propagating the Islamic culture, the Organization's main aim is to provide good ground for human refinement and pedagogy and efflorescence of moral virtues, and to accelerate the evolutionary movement of the Islamic Revolution all around the world'; Article 10 connected the Organization with another state cultural apparatus, as it ratified that 'in order to optimize its utility of the existing facilities and to identify and absorb the existing artistic potentialities in the

145 country, the Organization is allowed to constitute cultural, artistic and research centres and groups, to establish screening halls, and to install exhibitions, in collaboration and coordination with the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance'; and, as Article 11 declared, 'by producing good radio and television programs and their international distribution, the Organization should proceed to extend, according to the Islamic criteria, its international communication and exchange'.

Moreover, while other articles generally articulated administrative and financial structure of the Organization, the political mission of the mass media received a special attention in 3 related articles: although Article 29 (chapter six) declared that 'as long as they are in charge, the Organization's personnel are banned from any political, party- oriented, or guild-related activities inside the Organization', Article 20 (Note b.) introduced a 'Political Unit', administrated by the Supervision Council, 'to assist the Council for making updated policies, and depicting political guidelines for political news and analyses and programs, and monitoring their application', and Article 21 (Note b.) devised a 'Political Deputy' - of Managing Directorship - and charged it with 'preparation, regulation, and distribution of news and reports, and presentation of political analyses and interpretations' and pointed out that it 'receives its news policies entirely from the Political Unit.' (65)

Meanwhile, a significant bill concerning cultural content of mass media, titled the 'Code of Public Policy and Principal Plans of the Organization of Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran', articulated in 9 chapters, was passed in the Consultative Assembly on 8 July 1982. While the bill's final chapters, respectively, considered economic, administrative, and military matters, its preface and first six chapters, concerning genera! principles, news matters, ideological, cultural, social, and political plans, can be considered as the most articulated ideological strategies of the Islamic Republic for making its cultural and media policies, it is worth quoting at length. The Islamic Republic's manifesto, in its 'Preface', claimed that 'enjoying all facilities, the autocratic powers have covered all around the world by their black nightmare, have proceeded to

146 cultural colonization and intellectual and economic exploitation of the deprived to maintain their own evil dominance, have employed the latest propaganda apparatuses to frustrate moral values, to make men aliens to their divine identities, and to make them self-alienated. For many years, our society was dominated by superpowers and their dependent slaves: during this period, unholy values were imposed in every cultural, political, artistic, social, and economic aspect to the extent that to erase all of these pagan symbolizations and their consequent effects from the society and public opinion necessitates a vast effort.' Then, it remarked 'among the determining and vital apparatuses for achieving the goal is the organization of radio and television that has a special significance due to its vast coverage and influential power.' It continued, 'it was this apparatus that, in our previous colonial dependant regime, propagated colonial culture and decadent western system and, enjoying its vast influence, was to constitute a selfless and consumer society', but 'in the Islamic regime, radio and television can, and should, make efforts for emancipating man from evil ties by exclusion of decadent rotten unholy values and inclusion of eminent Islamic values, serve as a large university as Imam [Khomeini] said.'

To do so, it needed to walk along the guidelines that were articulated in 9 chapters and 65 articles. In the first chapter, 'general principals', it declared that 'since the practical policy of the Organization of Voice and Vision the Islamic Republic of Iran should be determined on the basis of the Islamic Republic of Iran's aims and the related function of mass media, the following articles are announced as general principals and public policy of the Organization.' These 15 general principals included: 'Islam's rule over all of programs and avoidance from broadcasting any program that is in contradiction with Islamic criteria' (Article 1); 'Islam's and the Constitution's rule, manifested in the slogan 'Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic', over all of programs' (Article 2); 'realization of Vali e Faqih the Supreme Leader's vision in its every aspect in radio and television programs for practicing the aims mentioned in previous articles' (Article 3); 'the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran belongs to all of people and should represent life condition of every Iranian ethnicity and social class; meanwhile, it is evident that

147 main attention should be paid to religious (Muslim), economic (deprived), and age (children and adolescences) majorities' (Articles 7).

The second chapter, regarding 'News Matters' (articles 16 to 20), emphasized that, 'by its permanent presence in the society', the Organization should 'be true representative of significant social events and occurrences, inform the people about the facts' (Article 16); it should 'justly represent events, activities, and matters related to all parts of the country, according to the regional priorities, in its overall programs' (Article 17); it should 'briefly and expressively, represent the latest local and international, important and authentic, news and information that useful and favourable for the majorities' (Article 18). However, it clarified that 'the following matters are not to be broadcasted within any program, especially news programs: a. the matters that are of military, political, and economic secrets of the country, or the matters that can be misused by the enemy if they are broadcasted; b. the matters that include any accusation of official state organizations and institutions or legally active groups, societies, and parties; c. the matters that their broadcasting could lead to moral decadence and public discretion; d. the matters that their broadcasting could lead to hurt religious sensibilities and national unity, or to make public tensions; e. the matters that could function as propagation for deviant or anti-revolutionary groups; f. the matters that are harmful for our friendly relationships with fraternal and friend countries' (Article 19). Moreover, the Organization should make efforts for 'receiving true world news and information, and to emancipate from news monopoly of Zionist and Imperialist world news agencies' (Article 20).

The next chapter, 'Ideological Matters' (articles 21 to 26), immediately clarified the underlying ideological agenda of this media policy as it defined the related principal objectives of the Organization as follows: 'to uplift the level of public consciousness of Islamic insight, and to introduce, expressively and clearly. Islamic fundamentals and laws to different strata of the society' (Article 21); 'propagation and dissemination of Islamic authentic culture by enjoying the cognizant clergy and the scholars of seminaries and

148 pious Islamists' insights' (Article 22); 'to make efforts for propagating rich Islamic culture of the Islamic Revolution in the region and the world by producing and globally broadcasting good programs' (Article 23); 'to introduce Islamic philosophy, mysticism, and law, and to review the resembling schools in the world' (Article 24); 'to initiate sessions of debate and argument for positive confrontation with proponents of non-

Islamic and pervert schools and ideas' (Article 25); and 'to illuminate public opinion about religious heresies and ideological perversions' (Article 26).

The 'Cultural Plans' (articles 27 to 38), articulated as the fourth chapter, clearly characterized cultural mission of the Organization as it follows: 'to make efforts for replacing eastern and western value systems with Islamic value system, and to struggle against residue of royal culture' (Article 27); 'to make efforts for accelerating the cultural revolution and the return to our own Islamic identity' (Article 28); 'to make efforts for providing a good sphere for human excellence and growth of moral virtues and self-refinement and public spiritual progress' (Article 29); 'to recognize and to introduce dynamic and creative literature and art of Islamic culture, and other cultures as well, and their effective function in changes and transformations in human and social development' (Article 30); 'to initiate mutual cultural relationships, in the field of radio and television programs, with other countries and to respect our own independence at the same time' (Article 31); 'to make efforts for introducing and disseminating popular committed art, and to transform the banal art into the committed and revolutionary art that meet innate human needs' (Article 32); 'to prioritize the sports that can function as an introduction to martial practices and defense preparations as well as their function as a way for physical health' (Article 36); 'to avoid from propagating the sports and entertainments that contradict Islamic criteria' (Article 37); 'to make efforts for keeping away young generation from harmful entertainments and hurtful and dangerous addictions' (Article 38).

In the fifth chapter, in accordance with the Cultural Plans, the 'Social Plans' (articles 39 to 47) articulated the social missions of the Organization in such articles: 'Given the

149 fundamental function of masses of people in the Revolution, the Organization should widely and actively keep the people activated in the social and political scene, so as these makers of the Revolution can continue it themselves' (Article 39); 'to make efforts for developing and consolidating Islamic fraternity among all of Islamic sects and schools and solidarity with the religious minorities that are recognized in the Constitution' (Article 41); and 'to make the ground for installation of Islamic human-making relations in the society and to correct the existing social relations' (Article 43).

Likewise, the sixth chapter articulated the 'Political Plans' (articles 48 to 56) of the Organization. The main articles as its main political aims included: 'to make efforts for creating and consolidating intellectual and moral spheres for perfect realization of the Constitution that draws guidelines of the Islamic Republic regime' (Article 48); 'to make efforts for offering a religious political vision to the public, and to introduce the international political situations and the condition of the world Imperialism and the deprived nations' (Article 50); 'to emphasize on the Islamic identity of the Revolution and its anti-Imperialist character and to expose the enemies' efforts for altering that identity' (Article 51); 'to inform people about evil conspiracies of world colonizers and their local agents for weakening or deflecting the Revolution' (Article 52). The Organization's duties in relation to political groups and parties, declared in Article 55, articulated as 'a. to make efforts for arranging free instructive discussions of legal political organizations and parties in order, firstly, to clarify Islamic authentic political views and, then, to help the groups and parties to come to terms with each other and to secure their positive encounters; b. to expose activities, conspiracies, and operations of anti-revolutionary groups and of enemies' fifth column, and to inform people about their theory and practice'.

Furthermore, Article 56 determined guidelines of foreign policy propaganda in several items, including 'a. concerning Imperialist and adversary states: the Organization should, rationally and uncompromisingly, expose such states' reality and their adversary positions as well as the imperialist political powers and their underlying economic and

150 military blocks; b. concerning multi-faces states: the states that outwardly befriend with the Revolution but inwardly help its enemies should be confronted with a warning and absorptive approach at the same time, thus they would gradually take a passive position and the enemies' camp would not be widened; c. concerning states indifferent to the Revolution: it is necessary to take an enlightening position in dealing with them, make them supporters of the Revolution by way of introduction of the Revolution's characteristics; d. concerning friendly states: such states, which have mostly popular supportive bases, should be approached by idea of increasing solidarity and of consolidation of mutual relations in order to achieve common goals; e. concerning Islamic states: in relation to them, the Organization's propaganda movement would be directed towards unification for realization of the world Islamic front; f. concerning liberation movements: the Organization should make efforts for introducing and supporting every independent anti-Imperialist movement with a popular supportive base - it is evident that the Islamic authentic movements would be the Organization's priorities; g. concerning nations: nations should be generally treated as entities distinct from ruling states' policies; given the nature of the Islamic Revolution of Iran as a fundamental transformation of intellectual and cultural arena, its dissemination would be feasible by means of capturing the minds and of intellectual and cultural transformation. Thus, in order to propagate the emancipating mission of Islam and to pave the way for liberation of the deprived, all around the world, the Imperialists' dominance, the Organization should make efforts for creating cultural unity and for exporting the Islamic Revolution to Muslims and other inhabitants of the world by means of introduction of Islam as the only authentic revolutionary and liberating religious school, and introduction of the others' cultures and campaigns.' (66)

Now, Since the Islamic Republic has systematically tried to exercise such ideological agenda by means of mass media, a glance at careers of the Organization (IRIB) heads explains how such a huge apparatus with such a wide range of roles and functions could be only presided by the most faithful cultural combatants of the Islamic Revolution. As the first head of the Organization of Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran

151 ('Iranian National Radio and Television' then), Sadegh Ghotbzadeh (1936-82), was a vital aide and close consultant of Ayatollah Khomeini during his 1978 exile in France (he was the only person who seemed eligible to sit beside Khomeini in his historical flight from Paris to Tehran) and a member of the Revolutionary Council, later became the Foreign Minister (November 1979 - August 1980) during the hostage crisis in the country. As early as 12 February 1979, one day after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, in his first state appointment, Bazargan appointed Ghotbzadeh as the head of the organization; in his first passionate speeches for radio and television staff, Ghotbzadeh declared that 'television belongs to Islamic believers and should be directed along the idea and interest of the deprived'. (67) Again, in an interview with Kayhan Newspaper, he suggested that 'as for mass media, general need of our society is, above all, to express the will of the people who made the Revolution, to express the ideology of the Revolution, and to protect the people who truly realized the Revolution.' (68)

As any other revolutionary populist, although he himself was a 'westernised' man in his life style, Ghotbzadeh tried to make the media into a vehicle for overall islamization as well as a power base for himself: he made his best efforts for removing pre- revolutionary secular culture and its manifestations in television by dismissing the 'non- committed' staff and limiting western entertaining programs, especially western movies and music. Prioritizing the political agenda, he arranged a platform for political roundtables and televised debates and discussion to reinforce his camp's political position and demoralize rival revolutionaries - he regularly was appeared in the most viewed hours at television, lectured on threats of 'counter-revolutionaries', misuse of freedom of speech, plight of women's freedom, and so on. Ghotbzadeh's passionate arguments for cultural Islamization and his ideological attacks on Iranian national identity were to the extent that Amir-Entezam, the speaker of interim government, had to protest against his television propaganda for removing national rituals and anniversary festivals from student textbooks and even from national flag, claimed that 'this is a cause of concern for people who are afraid of losing their tradition.' (69) However, as the interim government fell soon, Ghotbzadeh was removed from the

152 Organization as well; later, he was appointed as foreign minister in Banisadr's cabinet but lost the position soon. At last, he was arrested for allegedly plotting the assassination of Khomeini and the overthrow of the Islamic Republic: on 15 September 1982, he was shot by a firing squad after the Military Revolutionary Tribunal found him guilty and sentenced him to death. Before his death, he made another appearance in television, but this time for confessing against himself and testifying about the Islamic Revolution's enemies; this was a memorable moment of what was to become a long period of coercive confessions of cultural, political, and ideological opponents of the Islamic state in the state television.

Meanwhile, on July 1979, a council was constituted for managing the Organization: its main members were Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha (an ayatollah who was prosecutor general of the Islamic Republic in its early years and the spiritual leader of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line who led the hostage taking of American embassy in Tehran, later became a key figure in state reformist movement in Iran), Mohammad Khatami (later, the Minister for Culture and Islamic Guidance and the 'reformist' President of the Islamic Republic of Iran), (later, the Minister for Culture and Islamic Guidance and, the head of the Organization), (the current Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance) and (a high-ranking member of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council and the current president of the Islamic Republic) - Rouhani was considered as the head of the council from 1980 to 1983. The council supervised the Organization till 1984 while, for a short time, the Organization had two acting directors: Ali Larijani became the head of Sima (television) and Saeed Rajaie Khorasani (later, Iranian ambassador to the United Nations) was put in charge of Seda (radio).

However, in 1984, Mohammad Hashemi Rafsanjani (a brother of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and a high-ranking official in different state posts) was selected as the second head of the IRIB, remained in the post till 1994. Under his headship, the Organization experienced two different phases: at the first phase, from 1984 to 1989,

153 due to emergency of Iran-Iraq war, the mass media were burdened with overwhelming war propaganda, and the need for mass mobilization by means of promotion of militant spirit (religious calls, epic songs and marches, regular news from the front, and so on) and limitation of entertainment (movies, TV serials, etc.); at the second phase, from 1989 to 1994, as Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the new president of the Islamic Republic, proceeded to create his 'reconstruction period' by a relative economic liberalization, the state television began broadcasting serials, movies, and other entertaining programmes that although did not cross any Islamic red line, were not exactly in the line with the cultural criteria of conservative policy-makers of the Islamic Republic. It was in the second phase that, as an analyst of Iranian mass media summarized, 'Hashemi not only brought back some of the personnel who had lost their jobs in the first few months of Ghotbzadeh's directorship, he began to recruit more personnel, which increased from 8,000 to 14,000. He revived much of the development plan of Reza Ghotbi, who had been director of the Iranian National Radio and Television before the Revolution, including reopening the Office of Satellite Research and Development, co-productions with foreign broadcasters including the BBC and NHK, and adding a third channel devoted mostly to sports coverage.' (70)

However, the new policy of promoting a cultural limited liberalization alongside an economic liberalization was not confirmed by the Supreme Leader (who had already gained new powers, including appointment of the head of the Organization) as well as other state officials or parliament representatives with more conservative attitudes. For instance, before resignation of Mohammad Hashemi Rafsanjani in November 1993, the Legislative and Parliamentary Affairs Division of the Iranian Parliament produced a report on 'cultural invasion' and its different influences in Iranian society: the report specially criticized the performance of Iranian television, since Iranian productions failed to observe Islamic criteria, and out of 900 movies broadcast between 1988 and 1991, 700 were foreign productions, most of them in contradiction with cultural policy of the Islamic Republic - even cartoons and animations were condemned for showing non- Islamic human behaviours and relationships. (71) Soon, in 1994, Larijani replaced

154 Hashemi, promised that he would pursues the media and cultural policy that could expose 'the deceptive face of the west that infiltrates the societies in the guise of human rights and democracy in order to achieve its filthy purpose of domination.' (72)

As the manager of the Organization's world service and news bureau in the early days of the Islamic Republic, with experiences in sensitive posts in the Revolutionary Guards (he was deputy chief of the Revolutionary Guard and director of its intelligence unit between 1982 and 1991), and a member of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution as well as the Minster for Culture and Islamic Guidance in early 1990s (after Khatami resigned due to his implicit disagreement with the conservatives who were highly critical of his slight cultural tolerance), Larijani was the best candidate to implement cultural and media policies of the Islamic Republic, as it was approved by Khamenei the Supreme Leader. However, although his directorship was characterized by state media resistance against the so-called 'cultural invasion' and by the more strict cultural and political censorship in Iranian television, the force of new information and communication technologies were to the extent that, as an Iranian media analyst observed, 'during his ten-year directorship from 1994 to 2004, more far reaching reforms were implemented. He restructured and expanded broadcasting, and lobbied all branches of the state in the face of international competition, making state broadcasting into a large, powerful, centralized, media/political institution.' (73) Yet, the most decisive event during Larijani's directorship was the arrival of satellite TV channels as well as illegally proliferated movies on CDs and DVDs in Iran. For the first time in large scale, the Islamic Republic's mass media confronted with a real threat to its monopoly in terms of culture and politics: by means of these channels and formats, the Iranian audience had a direct access not only to international news channels and entertaining uncensored Hollywood movies that were mainly filled with western cultural values and political point of views, but also to the Iranian diaspora TV channels (mainly based in Los Angeles and, later, Dubai and London) that most of their productions were politically in contradiction with the Islamic Republic and culturally in coordination with the pre- revolutionary (Pahlavi) secular identity.

155 Like their reactions to any other western cultural-industrial innovation, the Islamic Republic's authorities firstly tried to condemn and ban the new media technologies and then, when it became increasingly clear that the latter's powerfulness and pervasiveness are irresistible, they made efforts to control and use them in service of their own ideas of Islamic culture and identity. To deal with the increasing unauthorized use of videos and satellite TV, the Islamic state formulated a plan to license some semi- public institutions to import and to distribute some less culturally dangerous foreign films on video - in fact, as early as July 1993, the Ministry of Guidance and Islamic Culture had assigned a team to develop video clubs in order to prevent the spread of the illegal satellite dishes that began appear on the rooftops of many households in Tehran and other main cities. Then, on the one hand, in 1994, Grand Ayatollah Araki issued a fatwa, declaring that 'installing satellite antennae, which open Islamic society to the inroads of decadent foreign culture and the spread of ruinous Western diseases to Muslims, is forbidden' and, at the same time, parliament and state passed some bills against the usage of such devices. 'The government urged owners of satellite equipment to remove their dishes "voluntarily", and threatened to fine culprits up to US $ 750 and to confiscate their equipment. It also declared that those who were found to be importing, selling or installing dishes would be jailed and fined the huge sum of US $ 25,000' but, as Naficy said, 'despite some arrests and fines, the ban was not entirely successful, as equipment owners found creative ways of camouflaging or miniaturizing their satellite dishes.' (74)

And, on the other hand, the Iranian state television stated to produce more interesting serials and to broadcast more entertaining movies in order to attract more audience and prevent them from being attracted to rival media. Meanwhile, the 'National Media', as they call it, did not forget its fundamental function in the cultural civil war while the very Islamist camp had been divided into 'conservative' and 'reformist' wings since Khatami's presidency; on the contrary, it tried to continue its influential role in the battle with both the old secular camp and the new reformist wing. To do so, alongside other routine productions, it started to produce political programs or politically-

156 motivated cultural ones, among them three TV programs became notoriously influential: Hoviyat (Identity), broadcasted in 1996, stated the Islamic Republic's cultural analysis through three prisoners of conscience and their forced confessions; Cheragh (Light) in which supporters of Khatami were accused of being behind the wave of 'serial assassinations' of the dissident political activists and writers in 1998; and Conferans e Berlin (Berlin Conference), a program made up of thirty minutes of selected and edited coverage of the conference, 'Iran After the Elections', that was held by the Heinrich Boll Institute on 7-9 April in Berlin - the program presented a negative image of the secular intellectuals and reformist activists who attended in: some attendants were condemned to long prisons, and the TV program served as an excuse to consequent conservatives' proceedings for reinstate cultural closure on press and media.

In May 2004, Larijani was replaced by Ezzatollah Zarghami, a former member of Revolutionary Guards, a close consultant of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, and the head of Deputy of Cinematic and Audio-Visual Affairs when Larijani and his successor, Mostafa Mirsalim, were in charge of the Ministry of Culture and islamic Guidance. As a faithful ally of the conservative camp, still in charge of the IRIB, Zarghami has pursued a Supreme Leader-approved media and cultural policy in his directorship of the Organization. However, as in aftermath of the controversial presidential election in June 2009, the Islamic Republic was violently challenged by the most striking street protests since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian state television, playing its most vital role in the regime's life, served as the most influential ideological state apparatus: from its obvious bias in course of Presidential candidates' debates and their TV propagation before the election to news censorship and broadcasting the mass trials and tortured televised confessions after rise of the Green Movement, its functions were to the extent that it needs a separate chapter to describe. Meanwhile, in recent years, inauguration of more influential alternative TV channels such as BBC Persian, whose staff is mainly constituted by migrant reformist journalists, has resulted in a limited tolerance in the IRIB, in spite of traditional warnings of the Islamic authorities against 'cultural invasion', as well as in a state endeavour for preventing the people from

157 receiving foreign TV channels by means of jamming satellite broadcasts, particularly BBC Persian, VOA Persian (Voice of America), Manoto (a Pro-Pahlavi entertainment channel with political light motives), and FARSIl (an entrainment channel for broadcasting TV series). Nevertheless, given the unrivalled position of the IRIB in terms of its accessibility and attraction for the Iranian audience, the Organization continues to promote and propagate the ideological agenda underlying the cultural and media policies of the Islamic Republic, regardless of who is in charge of it.

A review of a related report, titled 'Strategies and Tactics for Performance Improvement of the Organization of Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran', passed as a statute in the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution on 4 October 2005, explains what have been the regime's cultural concerns in terms of mass media. (75) As it is declared in its introduction, 'the Organization of Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran has vital duties in cultural development and social transformation of Iran, its most important ones concern education, information, guidance, entertainment, and propaganda.' It continued, 'according to the honourable Imam Khomeini's and the Supreme Leader's guidelines, the Organization is the public university that, as a the most important mass media, plays a great role in social, cultural, and economic transformations [...] Accordingly, implementation of the approved cultural policies of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution is a legal and official duty of the Organization.' Then, the Supreme Council's 'Commission of Cultural and Scientific Supervision and Evaluation' delivered its review of the Organization's performance in 14 clauses.

In the first clause, it declared that 'despite some deficiencies, the Organization's activities had been generally in accordance with realization of the honourable Imam Khomeini's and the Supreme Leader's guidelines and the related cultural policies, has had a considerable impact in Iran's cultural and social transformation.' In addition to appraisal of the Organization's quantitative and qualitative developments (clauses 3 and 4), the document praised the Organization for it 'has had considerable achievements in

158 its qualitative improvement of film and serial production through producing religious historical TV serials' (clause 4). However, it slightly criticized the Organization for its failure of media accessibility in border districts (clause 5), insufficient extra- organizational studies concerning the IRIB programs and their effectiveness (clause 6), affluentism and consumerism in popular serials and commercial advertisements in contradiction with 'the Iranian Islamic culture' and insufficient attention to middle classes as the majority of the society (clause 7), insufficient attention to subtle and intangible transmission of pedagogical and ideological messages (clause 8), insufficient quantitative and qualitative development of programs regarding review of state apparatuses and public accountabilities (clause 10), insufficient participation of scientific elite and prominent experts in related programs (clause 11), reduction of public sensitivity to religious laws due to the Organization's acculturations of private and social relationships (clause 12), insufficient effort for purging some religious and ritual programs from matters with no Islamic evidence (clause 13), fading moral values in the Organization's interior space, and the widening split of management and staff (clause 14). Meanwhile, it pointed out that the Organization had an impressive approach to 'manifestation of religious values' in related programs, although 'its way of introduction of religious symbols, values, and conducts' could be a matter of deliberation (clause 10).

Then, the document articulated strategies and tactics for the Organization's performance improvement in 23 clauses. They included ideological propositions and prescriptions such as 'attention to value criteria, and culture of justice, contentment, sacrifice, activity and effort, propagation of culture of Shia conduct', 'prevention from dissipation and prodigality, particularly in TV serials and commercial advertisements', and 'observance of Islamic cultural criteria' (clause 6), 'effective and more intelligent struggle with vast aspects of Cultural Invasion' (clause 7), 'professional attention to simultaneously open and guided circulation of information and news and wise presentation of various views and analysis in order to illuminate public opinions and to frustrate international improper circulations of information and local rumours' (clause 8), 'indirect, attractive, and non-manufactured inclusion of educative and pedagogical

159 points in amusing and entertaining programs and observance of religious laws and Islamic rituals in order to consolidate religious identity, national solidarity, life expectancy, social confidence, and to increase creativity, entrepreneurship, innovation, and scientific vision' (clause 10), 'prevention from promotion of vulgar and western music, affirmation of Iranian lawful, artistic, prestigious, and authentic music, and recognition of national, religious, and mystical music' (clause 11), 'content control of films and serials, based on an effort for making the norms and determining the criteria' and 'support of Iranian cinema, especially spiritualist cinema' (clause 13), 'codification of quantitative and qualitative standards for evaluation of Islamic educative programs, their increased coverage, and inauguration of an international channel for Islamic education' (clause 14), 'utilization of a moral and educational pattern, based on the religious rituals, in programs for children and adolescences' (clause 16), 'cultivation of committed and religious artists and presenters' and 'collaboration with art colleges and faculties in order to cultivate and to select the artists with religious passion and profession' (clause 17). Meanwhile, it declared that 'as a vanguard of the movement for freedom of thought according to the Supreme Leader's teachings, the Organization of Voice and Vision, observing ethics, reason, and freedom, should not only follow this approach in political field, but also promote it in intellectual, scientific, and cultural fields by arranging debate sessions and inviting prominent scholars' (clause 19). Considering the definition of 'free thinking' as 'the movement for freedom of thought according to the Supreme Leader's teachings', one can predicts its way of implementation in the public mass media of the Islamic Republic.

'Cultural Civil War" to Be Continued

Evidently, Iranianism and Islamism have no fixed definitions: they are historically determined ideas with different canons and principles which imply diverse readings and interpretations. In fact, theoretical discussion of what they have in common and where they are in contradiction with each other is still an unfinished intellectual project which

160 should be pursued by Iranian scholars. However, if the Iranian cultural Identity, which is composed of Iranianist and Islamist ideas, like any other cultural identity, is something crystallized in Iranian people's life styles, if life styles are something materialized in everyday life forms, and if everyday life forms are increasingly influenced and (in)formed by mass media, then it is no surprise that the Islamic Republic has growingly used film and television for articulating its ideological agenda in order to create and consolidate an orthodox cultural identity by frustration of other heterodoxical cultural identities.

From cultural point of view, it is true that emigration of Iranian secular dissidents on the eve of the Islamic Revolution and its following years, the populist politics of the Islamic Republic was based on people's religious anti-Americanism, Iran's (compulsory) engagement in the battle with Iraq and its (voluntary) continuation for many years, economic difficulties which overshadowed cultural needs, and Iranian historical amnesia due to its cultural instability helped the regime to erase many signs and symbols of nationalist secular life style, especially in Iranian film and television, and to replace them by religious rituals and Islamic icons; but the very making of such long cultural and media policies, even after three decades of the Islamic Republic's life, demonstrates it has not been able to destroy non-Islamist and non-authorized culture and to defeat its adversary in the cultural civil war. Of course, it has followed some strict strategies, implemented by a range of tactics and tricks (from banning of foreign films' screening in Iranian cinemas, banning or censoring Iranian critical or non-Islamist movies, and supporting and sponsoring the conformist ones, to increasing the religious TV programs and reducing the western productions, censoring them - formally or thematically - by cutting or free dubbing, and making costly religious serials in absence of any special attention to Iranian pre-lslamic history and heritage); yet its secular rival not only survived by its cultural resistance but also revived by the arrival of new mass media.

Although there were many difficulties for preserving the pre-revolutionary life forms under the Islamic Republic, especially in its early years, that culture survived by various

161 ways such as maintaining the non-Islamist life style in one's own privacy and keeping the related cultural products in circulation by means of hidden, illegal, and culpable distribution and utilization of tape cassettes and VHS cassettes whose contents were had no place in official cinema and television. If one could drink alcohol and wear tie and feel free with his or her opposite-sex friends in private sphere in spite of visible threats and severe punishments, one could listen and see such a life style through the pre-revolutionary music and movies too: in fact, pop music (by pre-revolutionary Iranian popular singers who later often landed in Los Angeles to Michael Jackson and Madonna) and popular movies (from nostalgic and even fetishist////n Farsi hits in Pahlavi period to James Bond's series and other Hollywood action movies and Bollywood movies, Sholay and Sangam) were the main materials that constituted the content of the most watched 'illegal' audio or video cassettes. Meanwhile, the more aesthetically and artistically precious products were available for the more educated audience and elite tastes. However, since the new media technology, flourished in two last decades, has greatly helped to carnivalize and democratize mediascape, Iranian audiences have enjoyed an alternative sphere for selection and representation of their own constellation of elements of cultural identity.

On the one hand, a wide range (about 40) of news, entertainment, and family satellite TV channels (from BBC Persian, VOA Persian, Euronews Persian to PEN TV, Omid-e-lran, PBC Tapesh TV, PMC, and TV Persia and so on) have inaugurated, and mainly managed and maintained by the secular Iranians abroad, especially at the end of 1990s and 2000s, are increasingly welcomed by Iranian people inside the country: interestingly, as a researcher of 'The Research Centre for The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)' formulated, their main political impacts have been disruption in political socialization, desacralization of clergies, political leaders, and politics, increasing the sense of political deprivation, organizing the opposition, erosion of political legitimacy, rise of political awareness, and enhancement of ethnic identity, while they have had major socio- cuitural implications such as increasing the gap between tradition and modernity.

162 contributing to the Iranian identity, the presence of globalization in Iran, lifestyle changes and consumerism, and secularist perspectives. (76)

On the other hand, advanced technologies for receiving, reproducing, and distributing the movies and other audio-visual matters have functioned as extraordinary ways to break the Islamic Republic's early video prohibition (77) and on-going cinematic censorship - considering the easiness and inexpensiveness of such kinds of activities go beyond any strict restriction, given the fact that Iran is still one of the few countries which have not joined international copy right conventions, it is no surprise that one can easily find many Hollywood and non-Hollywood movies in a cheap price in pavements of not only Tehran but also almost all of big cities, only a couple of weeks after distribution of their digital copies in international market, or even their original screening in United States. Besides, in spite of their filtering in Iran, social networks such as Facebook have been increasingly influential in recollection of Iranian cultural memory and mobilization of members for cultural resistance by sharing the forgotten cultural objects or each other about art events, film festivals, and TV reports which have no room in official state .

Meanwhile, two major political events opened more spaces for cultural survival of the Iranian secular citizens. On 23 May 1997, apparently in spite of the regime's will, Mohammad Khatami won the presidential election, followed by a reformist mobilization, titled Jonbesh e Dovvom e Khordad (23 May Movement). The voters for Khatami were mainly formed by moderate religious people as well as secularist young generation who, although did not regard him as their best choice (all presidential candidates should be actual believers in absolute Velayat e Faqih and be approved by the Guardian Council that is under complete control of the Supreme Leader), could passionately confer their political representation to a cleric who spoke of new concepts such as 'freedom of thought', 'rule of law', 'civil society', 'religious democracy', and of necessity of cultural approaches to social and political matters by empowering cultured and civilised citizens within the Islamic state. Such promises, of course, could be

163 somewhat realized if there was not a powerful Islamic conservative system, still economically and socially so strong to be able to block such threatening innovations, or if the most-voted president of the Islamic Republic and his allies were honestly eager to resist the anti-democratic rules and rulers of the regime by empowerment and invocation of their supporters, did not act upon their announced belief that hefz e nezam (preservation of the regime) is their first and last preference. Then, as it became visible soon, not only the reformations in question did not thoroughly happen, but the limited reforms that took place in early years of Khatami's presidency were doomed to be frustrated as the conservative camp exercised its powers (provided by non-elective posts such as the leadership, judiciary, Revolutionary Guards and their attached Basijis as pressure groups and, of course, the Organization of Voice and Vision) to tame moderate officials, to expel defiant dissidents, and to jail radical reformists - the pressure forced Khatami to form his second cabinet by rather conservative ministers, especially in more critical ministries such as the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, even though he won its second presidential campaign by more votes than the first time. (78)

However, the very limited freedom of expression, particularly in the first period of Khatami's presidency, on the one hand, provided a space for discussions about discourses of modernity, secularization, citizenship, reformism, liberalism, (self- )criticism of leftism as well as theoretical arguments about necessity and possibility of a secular civil society in Iran and, on the other hand, resulted in production, publication, and proliferation of cultural objects and events such as the books, films, and festivals that were not allowed earlier in the Islamic regime. Khatami's presidency had an indisputable impact on opening of cultural sphere; however, it is also an indispensable fact that the better part of what is described as his achievements are, first and foremost, inevitable outcomes of irresistible introduction and influence of western new information technologies and communication systems such as internet and satellite TV channels in light of an ever-increasing globalization. In effect, Khatami's general reformist project, if there was any, tragically failed as he could not make any impressive

164 progress towards institutionalization of his cultural and political aspirations: in the absence of any clear account of essential reformist needs and deeds, it was clear that the state-established cultural institutions such as 'Centre for Dialogue among Civilizations' would disappear too. As far as the main concern of both 'state-sponsored reformists' and their related 'religious intellectuals' was to produce a 'gradualist' combination of 'tradition' and 'modernity' not for desacralization of social and political discourses and pluralist recognition of modern cultural identities but for a religious 'indigenization' of civil society, it was clear that they were preparing a new 'modernized' (armed with modern terminology) version of the Islamic Revolution's old mixture of tradition and religious radicalism, rather than taking a new step towards social and cultural secularism - as though they were only to approve that, in absence of intellectual courage and ethical honesty, any reformism would result in another conformism.

As another manifestation of Iranian cultural inconsistency and lack of long-term historical memory in a short-term society, another major political event happened when, after 8-years presidency of the 'reformist' Khatami, not only his favourite presidential candidate, Mostafa Moeen (the Minister of Science, Research, and Technology under his presidency and a member of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution since the political and ideological purge and purification), did not won the election but, despite some election frauds which were not determining in last analysis, the majority of the people voted for a candidate whose past career and present promises were visibly different from his antecedent. It is true that many disappointed supporters of Khatami (especially young generation and university students) did not support Moeen, as they observed that, during his presidency, Khatami sacrificed almost all of his electoral promises in order to 'preserve the regime', to reconstruct the regime's political and economic connections with western countries that had been seriously damaged following Khomeini's fatwa (1989) for immediate execution of the Indian author, Salman Rushdie, due to his heretic book The Satanic Verses, and to save his international acclaimed reputation as a vanguard of 'dialogue among civilizations'

165 and a 'pacifist' whose crucial claim was to replace 'will to power' with 'will to love' in international political scene. However, it was also verified that many of those who voted for Moeen in the first run of the election, voted for Ahmadinejad in the run-off! In addition to be an evidence of Iranian Cultural instability, it was a revealing event that could remind us the difficulty of cultural institutionalization in the country: if one consider the fact the people who had voted for the revised version of the Constitution as a legalized legitimacy of religious totalitarianism in 1989, voted for a non-desired presidential candidate of the Islamic Republic in 1997 too, it is no surprise to see that, in 2005, they voted for a candidate who were in contradiction with their previous president in many ways.

As the sixth president of the Islamic Republic, Ahmadinejad was a hardliner who wanted to revive the original orders of Imam Khomeini and the Revolutionary values of early years of the Islamic regime, proceeded to implement a revived and reinforced ideological agenda. Enjoying full support of all of the Islamic Republic state officials and apparatuses (from the very Supreme Leader, the Judiciary, the Guardian Council, the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Revolutionary Guards & Basijis to the IRIB and a range of the Islamic propaganda associations as well as different cleric conventions), trying to award them for their unsparing supports and implementing his own ideas of Islamist society, he inaugurated the most radical project of Islamization, enhanced by Mahdism (expectancy for appearance of the Lord of the Age, Mahdi the saviour, as twelfth absent Imam) since the beginning of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Of course, the increasing pressures on political opponents, on universities and student activities, on few critical presses and many ordinary people because of their reformist tendencies or secular life styles were to the extent that they were highly critical of his presidency, strongly eager to vote against him in the new presidential election of June 2009. However, counting on the Islamic regime's traditional faithful supporters as well as low and middle classes who benefited from his economic benefactions as his new supporters, Ahmadinejad enrolled for his second-term presidency while his main rivals were Mir Hossein Mousavi, supported by Khatami, and Mehdi Karroubi, a former

166 chairman of the Islamic Consultant Assembly and the leader of 'Association of Combatant Clerics', who was Ahmadinejad's reformist rival in previous presidential election too.

With its unprecedented pre-election TV debates of candidates and harsh post-election repression of the protesters, holding of the election and its after-effects became a national and international event. Importantly, in spite of state endeavours for filtering all of alternative information and communication networks, the protesters could transmit voice and vision of millions of people who were in streets of Tehran and other big cities, shouting 'Where Is My Vote?', wanted to defy the 'pre-programmed results' of the election: in the absence of free or foreign reporters and the silence of the state media, using new media such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, the protesters could not only communicate each other, but also transfer a considerable amount of news, photos, and comments to Persian or world channels such as BBC, VOA, and CNN and so on. As the most famous example, the footage of the death of Neda Agha-Soltan (1983- 2009) drew international affected attention after she was killed, most probably by plain cloth agents or Basiji pressure groups, during the protests: her death was captured on video by bystanders and broadcast over the Internet to the extent that it was described as probably the most widely witnessed death in human history. Of course, as long as the uprising (soon called 'Green Movement' due to green colour of Mousavi's election campaign) was the biggest challenge for the Islamic Republic's survival since its creation, the regime showed no mercy in repression of the protesters - injuring and killing in streets or raping and torturing in jails were only some of its awards to protesters who peacefully tried to vindicate their 'human rights' in 'inhuman conditions'.

Without a doubt, during the first wave of protests and also their several outbreaks in the following months of 2009 as up, the IRIB - particularly the Iranian state television - proved itself again as the most powerful propaganda machine as it helped the regime by its vital aids: from censoring the news of the protests and distorting the views of the protesters and their leaders (Mousavi and Karroubi) and manipulating the facts and

167 factual events to broadcasting the show trials and the tortured confessions on charges of social sedition and political deconstruction, (79) it probably played its most determining role in the history of the Islamic Republic, while it certainly functioned as the most necessary monopoly that the regime should secure for its survival. (80) As it could be expected, another outcome of the repression was a new wave of cultural emigration: as a result, thousands of journalists, artists, and political activists had to leave the country to go to Turkey and Malaysia as well as Europe and US, while thousands of students left Iran, as soon as possible, to go to more accessible countries such as India and Ukraine for social freedom and further education.

Yet, surprisingly enough, Ahmadinejad later showed more sympathy to 'Iranian national identity' to the extent that often stressed on 'Iranian Islam' as the best interpretation of the religion among its different sects and schools - the idea was originally introduced and promoted by his top adviser (the former head of the Iranian Cultural Heritage, Handcrafts and Tourism Organization and the former President's Chief of Staff), strongly refused by the Islamic cleric authorities as well as the conservative social and political forces - interestingly, he was appointed as the First Vice for one week in 2009 only to resign by order of the Supreme Leader Khamenei. Ahmadinejad's persistent emphasis on the controversial idea, however, demonstrated the new approach was some sort of political strategy, rather than a tactical tendency to the Iranian national spirit. It was clear that, on the on hand, he needed a national support for his struggle with western countries on Iran's suspicious nuclear programs and the consequent international economic sanctions and, on the other hand, had to reassure and reabsorb the majority who were frustrated by his failures of social justice and economic welfare. At last, he not only did not succeed to obtain the popular support but also lost his traditional supporters in power structure to the extent that his favourite candidate was not allowed to be a qualified candidate for upcoming presidential election.

168 In fact, far from being a true belief in worthiness of Iranian national history, Ahmadinejad's new opportunist and populist strategy was a nnatter of attracting more votes for his own wing in the regime's conservative camp; however, it also demonstrated the secular culture identity which has been traditionally represented in Iranian national identity was not dead but, on the contrary, was becoming a more determining factor in Iranian social and political life. Thus, it is too simplistic to think the man who, in his first-term presidency, actually revived the sphere of early years of the Islamic Republic with a thick layer of religious superstitions, propagated the most fundamentalist version of Shia Islam in his words and deeds, exercised the second wave of 'cultural revolution' in Iranian universities, supported dismissal of 'secular' and 'liberal' students and professors, harshly intervened people's private sphere and their daily life matters such as clothing and dressing and male-female relationships, and tried to ignore, and then to repress, millions of - mainly secular - Iranian people as merely a handful of 'dirt and dust' had been suddenly transformed into a true advocate of Iranian national identity by inviting Iranian expatriates to visit their homeland or by praising Cyrus the Great and putting a Basiji shawl on his statue!

Meanwhile, although the IRIB has not only observed the old Islamic cultural criteria like that musical instruments are forbidden to show, Shia Innocents in religious serials should be played by characters without faces and so on, but also increased its religious programs and reinforced application of the Islamic law to the extent that, for example, many of presenters who earlier appeared with scarf started to appear with chador, it was forced to provide some limited spaces for Iranian pop music and more interesting TV serials as well. Yet, the latter endeavour was not exercised without challenges as there were often clerical protests against the influence of the western countries' Cultural Invasion and Soft War and conservative warnings against presence of the 'westoxicated liberals' in the Organization, they usually forced the Organization to stop or retreat from the very limited openness that the regime's cultural policy-makers regarded necessary for the youth to discharge their energy and 'not to refuge to alien western cultures'. As a recent instance, in a letter to Zarghami, 'a group of scholars,

169 masters and professors of universities and seminaries, and cultural and media experts' strongly criticised the broadcast of the movies that their ideologies were in contradiction with the Islamic regime's in May 2011 in Iranian television: they specifically condemned broadcast of Hollywood Clash of the Titans (2010) due to its 'Hellenism, and promotion of Humanistic views, paganism and polytheism, Islamophobia, Anti-lranianism, and saviourism according to the Zionist-American style' and Bollywood My Name Is Khan (2010) due to its 'promotion of Euro-Islam (American Islam), negation of jihad and martyrdom, one-dimensional interpretation of Islam, and falsification of religious doctrines in order to consolidate the constructions of submissiveness and to realize the project of New World Religion' (81) - interestingly, the allegations were made while the very movie had been broadly altered and censored to meet the 'moral' and 'cultural' points of the Islamic Republic's cultural and media policies: in fact, the IRIB always use different innovative (visual and narrative) techniques to censor almost every foreign movie or TV series before telecasting them.

Likewise, while the Deputy of Cinematic and Audio-Visual Affairs in Ahmadinejad's second cabinet, despite its strong attack on secularism and liberalism in cinema, tried to tolerate production of few non-conformist popular movies which could find considerable youth and family audience, it was warned by the traditional conservatives of the other cultural and political bodies to observe strict Islam criteria and not to go beyond religious borders. For example, Kayhan newspaper, which is under editorship of a strong ally of Khamenei and conservative camp, condemning the conduct of 28*^ Fajr International Film Festival (2009) due to 'its permission to screening of vulgar movies' and 'celebration of eroticist filmmakers', announced that 'it is necessary for officials of the Ministry of [Culture and Islamic] Guidance and particularly its Cinematic Deputy to apologize for Iranian revolutionary people.' (82)

Furthermore, one of the most interesting manifestations of the on-going cultural civil war surfaced in process of production and screening of two otherwise non-comparable films, Jodayi e Nader az Simin (, 2011) and Ekhrajiha 3 {The Outcasts 3,

170 2011): the first film was a drama that, secularly and liberally, contemplates on a human condition in Iranian contemporary social situation (a young couple struggling for their different ideals and ambitions), while the second one was a comedy concerning a political problem (Iranian recent presidential election) by favouring a candidate who resembled Ahmadinejad. What doomed these two in two ways of production, however, was mostly related to their directors' careers rather than their contents: while Masoud Dehnamaki, the director of Ekhrajiha 3, had no difficulty for making the movie, the director of Jodayi e Nader az Simin, , had to go through a difficult production process. As a conservative extremist and a founder and general commander of 'Ansar e Hezbollah' (a pressure group constituted by Basiji militia), Dehnamaki used to break-up peaceful student gatherings, attack reformist speakers, bring motor-cycle Basijis and baton-wielding plain-cloth pressure group into streets and, notoriously, was also involved in repression of protesters during the Tehran University student riots in July 1999. Having directed Ekhrajiha (2006) and Ekhrajiha 2 (2008), widely promoted by the IRIB, he had been able to make movies in the so-called Cinema of the Sacred Defence, had enjoyed an exceptional freedom for using a comic approach to such a 'sacred' genre to attract more audience as well as to observe the Islamic Republic's ideological agenda: given the facts that he strongly insisted on his pro-regime propagation - he had not only justified the serial killing of 'non-hazardous enemies' of the Islamic Republic by it intelligence agents (83) but also ensured that he would not become another Makhmalbaf who turned against his Revolutionary ideals (84) - and his previous movies happened to be two best-selling movies of Iranian film history, he had no concern about his new production as it finished easily on time and, again, promoted by the IRIB, was screened in May 2011.

On the contrary, being a graduate of theatre, with BA in Dramatic Arts and MA in Stage Direction, Farhadi had made short 8mm and 16mm films in Iranian Young Cinema Society before moving on to writing plays and screenplays for the IRIB, his first feature film Raqs dar Qobar (Dancing in the Dust, 2003) which he followed with the highly acclaimed A Beautiful City; his third movie, Chaharshanbe Souri (,

171 2006), won the Gold Hugo at the 2006 Chicago International Film Festival, and his fourth film, Darbareye Ely (, 2009) won several international awards including the Silver Bear for best director at 59th International Berlin Film Festival and best picture at Tribeca Film Festival - notably, before its screening after 14 months, the movie was banned due to presence of , an Iranian actress who had been condemned, enforced to not to leave and then to leave the country, because of her performance without Islamic veil in Body of Lies (Ridley Scott, 2008). In September 2010, Farhadi was banned from pursuing the making of Jodayi e Nader az Simin by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, because of an acceptance speech held during an award ceremony in the House of Cinema where he expressed his support for a number of Iranian film figures, wished to see their return to Iranian cinema - they included Golshifteh Farahani, Bahram Bayzai, Amir Naderi and, importantly, Jafar Panahi who had recently condemned to jail for his cinematic activities, connected to the Green Movement. The Deputy of Cinematic and Audio-Visual Affairs clearly announced that the banning was related to his 'deconstructive remarks' while he failed to modify his words within the given one week - the Deputy's argued that 'the people should know the reasons for encouragement of a filmmaker or banning him form filmmaking.' (85) However, the ban was lifted in October, only after Farhadi claimed to have been misquoted and misperceived, apologized for his remarks and their 'non-desired and non-intended' outcomes.

Although the two movies, one a plain political comedy which could hardly meet any artistic or aesthetical value and the other a complicated family drama which received precious accolades and acclaims like the for Best Film and the Silver Bears for Best Actress and Best Actor at the 61st Berlin International Film Festival and won five awards, including for the best directing and the best screenplay, at the 29*^ Fajr International Film Festival (later, it won many more awards, most notably the award for the best foreign film in 69**^ Annual Golden Globes and the 84*^ Academy Award for the best foreign language film in 2012), their coincidence of screening provided an opportunity for a new cultural campaign in course of cultural civil war. Having drastically

172 repressed by the regime's police and Basiji militia during a new wave of civil protests and pro-democracy demonstrations from February to March 2011, young supporters of the Green Movement arranged a massive virtual campaign, mainly in Facebook, encouraging people to watch Jodayi e Nader az Simin and requesting them not to watch Ekhrajiha 3 - not only to deprive an anti-Green Movement movie and his 'fascist' or 'fanatic' director from becoming a new hit and a new cinematic celebrity, but also to increase audience of a 'secular' movie by a 'liberal' director and to make his movie able to surpass Ekhrajiha as the best-selling film of Iranian cinema.

Despite the fact that the campaign was followed by tens of thousands people in virtual sphere, as much as it concerned the last aim, it bitterly failed as Ekhrajiha 3 enjoyed better distribution, biased TV advertisements, and broader audience mobilization, all due to state sponsorships, not easily but finally surpassed Jodayi e Nader az Simin. Of course, it should not be ignored that, average audience have, at any rate, much more desire to watch a comedy than a grief drama, especially in Nowruz holidays. However, although it failed to achieve its negative aim, the cultural campaign was far from being futile as it achieved several positive aims: it considerably raised spectatorship and revenue of Jodayi e Nader az Simin, reinforced sense of cultural commitment among Iranian audience and, more importantly raised the public consciousness about the Iranian contemporary cultural conditions. At least, and hopefully at last, the cultural campaigners came to know that there is such a vast gap between their ideals and a big part of Iranian people's identity, that virtual social networks are not a mirror, or even a far-reaching reflection, of Iranian real society, and that the cultural civil war, even in such polar society as Iran, is too complicated and too contradictory to be reducible to two completely divided camps: for instance, not only the distributor of both movies was the same but also Ekhrajiha 3, just like its previous parts, Ekhrajiha and Ekhrajiha 2, was mainly produced and played by the people who were also major contributors to non­ conformist popular movies as well as intellectual (secular-liberal) cinema of directors such as Bayzai and Mehrjui! - after all, in a broader scene, it was the very 'cultural

173 collaborationism' that guaranteed survival and, no doubt, popularity of the IRIB in spite of all its suppressive functions during heydays of the Green Movement and then.

However, what happened during the last years of Ahmadinejad's period and the first year of Rouhani's presidency explain how the confused and conflicted ideas of Iranian cultural identity determines, and is being determined by, social-political scene of the society. The 2013 Iranian presidential election was another turning point in a complicated process of power struggle in cultural camps and their different wings. Unlike political predictions, the Guardian Council disqualified not only Rahim Mashaei, Ahmadinejad's favourite candidate, but also Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president and the present head of the Expediency Discernment Council, along hundreds of other candidates (including former ministers or members of parliament), while the former reformist president Khatami did not even dare to enrol for candidacy as he knew that he would be disqualified due to his sympathy with the Green Movement. Consequently, as a 'moderate' pragmatist politician, Rouhani won the election, became the seventh president of the Islamic Republic, by support of both and disillusioned pro-Ahmadinejad previous voters and pro-Green Movement reformist people - while he had already condemned the Green Movement protests and many protesters, including key figures such as Mousavi, his wife Rahnavard, and Karroubi, were behind bars or under home arrest.

Despite his cultural and political promises during his presidential campaign, it was clear that Rouhani mainly gained victory by his economic promises to the population who were increasingly suffering from international sanctions. As the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council for 16 years, he had played a leading role in the first round of the nuclear negotiations during Khatami's presidency, the positive pragmatist direction of the negotiations were reversed during Ahmadinejad's presidency; Rouhani's main aim was to convince Khamenei to let him come to an agreement with international community over the Iran's nuclear program as the Supreme Leader is the authority who actually determined and determines the Islamic Republic's long-term strategies

174 including the Iranian nuclear policy. Thus, while he appointed a moderate pragmatist politician, as foreign minister, made him the top negotiator in the nuclear negotiations, delivered the Ministry of Justice to , the former Minister of Interior in Ahmadinejad's first cabinet and a persecutor who was strongly involved in 1988 mass executions of Iranian political prisoners; (86) the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance was handed to Ali Jannati, a former member of the Supervising Council of the IRIB and a pro-Rafsanjani politician who tries to reduce slightly the cultural limitations while maintaining the basic restrictions of the Islamic Republic.

Meanwhile, the cultural and media scene of the society witnessed similar conflicts. Despite the increasing local and international criticisms of the Iranian state television because of its biased censored news as well as its non-representative defective mode of portraying Iranian culture and society, Zarghami was reappointed as the head of the Organization by the Supreme Leader Khamenei. Likewise, from state sponsorship of anti-Green Movement movies, arrest of 5 documentary-makers in charge of their alleged collaboration with BBC Persian and their consequent quittance, and closing of the House of Cinema by order of Ahmadinejad's Ministry of Guidance and Islamic Culture to its reopening in Rouhani's presidency, and removal of a pro-Green Movement film from the final competition and applause of religious and ideological films in 32""^ International Fajr Film Festival (2014), different striking events underlined the fact that the Iranian cinema is still a disputed domain of public policies and private pursuits for reflection and representation of Iranian cultural identity.

175 Notes

1. Cited in Maryam Panah, The Islamic Republic and the World: Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution (London: Pluto Press, 2007), p. 60. Interestingly, as the former chancellor of Alzahra University, whose husband Mir-Hossein Mousavi was the Iranian Prime minister from 1981 to 1989 and a leader of the 'Green Movement' after the controversial presidential election in summer 2009, she symbolized the movement from Iranian secular identity to Islamic religious identity as she changed her original name, Zohre Kazemi, to Zahra Rahnavard: Zahra is the name of the Prophet Mohammad's daughter and the Imam All's wife, is considered as the only woman in 14 Innocents of Shiism together with 12 Imams and the prophet himself, while Rahnavard denoting that she is a walker in the way of Islam.

2. Generally speaking, like other religions, there are many historical events to be celebrated or to be mourned in Islam; however, the Shia Islam specifically includes such functions more than any other religion because, on the one hand, it has 14 central figures (the prophet, his daughter who was the first Imam's wife, and 12 Imams whose last one is the 'absent saviour') and, on the other hand, given the chronological obscurities, there are several (disputed) dates, the mourning days are much more numerous than celebration days. For an account of the 'sorrowful' Shiism, see Ramin Jahanbegioo, In Search of the Sacred: A Conversation with Seyed Hossein Nasr on His Life and Thought (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), pp. 148-52.

3. Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 131.

4. See Ervand Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 124-5. Aside from other several thousands of rival political opponents who were executed in 1980s, Abrahamian writes on 757 people who executed by revolutionary tribunals during 28 months after victory of the Islamic Revolution: 'Those

176 executed can be divided into political and non-political victims. The latter, totalling 260, included 138 drug dealers, 47 pimps and fornicators, 20 homosexuals, 16 prostitutes, 15 rapists, 12 murderers, 7 gamblers, and 3 highway robbers. The former, totalling 497, were prominent royalists, SAVAK officials, military personnel implicated in the recent street shootings, and 125 non-commissioned officers accused of plotting a royalist coup. Among the victims were the prime minister, Hoveyda; 6 cabinet ministers, including the minister of education, the only woman to have held a cabinet post, who was charged with "corrupting youth" and "favouring cultural imperialism"; the 3 surviving directors of SAVAK; 3 elderly statesmen from the secretive Freemasons; 35 generals; 25 colonels; 20 majors; the mayor of Tehran; some 90 SAVAK officials; Nikkhah, the Maoist who had become an outspoken supporter of the regime; a leading Jewish businessman; and 35 Baha'is - they, as well as the Jewish businessman and the Freemasons, were accused of "spying" for Zionism and Western imperialism' (p. 124).

5. See Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, p. 178. 6. Ibid, p. 142. 7. Shirin Hakimzadeh, 'Iran: A Vast Diaspora Abroad and Millions of Refugees at Home,' September 2006, in Migration information Source website: http://www.miRrationinformation.org/feature/displav.cf m?ID=424 (Retrieved 14 January 2012).

8. Interview with Ettelaat newspaper, 31 October 1979.

9. Hakimzadeh, 'Iran: A Vast Diaspora Abroad and Millions of Refugees at Home.' 10. For a critical review of the referendum, see Mohammad Ghaed, 'Hame-porsi' ['Referendum'], from forthcoming book, Dastan e Ayandegan [iHistory of Ayandegan]: http://www.mghaed.com/av/referendum.pdf (Retrieved 26 January 2012). 11. Cited in Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 74-5.

177 12. In fact, Montazeri received his award as he appointed as the designated successor to Khomeini but, following his protest against the mass executions of political prisoners late summer and early autumn 1988. Thus, he lost his position as the heir to Khomeini, his title of Grand Ayatollah was withdrawn, publication of his lectures in newspapers and references to him in the state radio and television were stopped, and his portraits were ordered by the Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi to be removed from offices and mosques. Later, after popular protests against the controversial presidential election in summer 2009 and the beginning of the 'Green Movement', he was considered as its 'spiritual father' and glorified by proponents of Mousavi, the most prominent leader of the movement.

13. For a detailed account of discussions in the Assembly of Experts and the related matters, see Mohsen Milani, 'Shiism and the State in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,' in Samih K. Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi, eds, Iran: Political Culture in the Islamic Republic (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 92-109.

14. Hereafter, all references to the 'Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran' are based on its final version which is appeared in Persian in different sources, for instance: http://tafatton.ir/pluRins/content/content.php7content.213. compared to its English version: http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution.php (Retrieved 9 March 2012). The English translation has been somewhat corrected and modified, and all of italics are mine.

15. As Abrahamian explains in his history of modern Iran, Khomeini in his first speech after his return from exile had paid respects to the 'tens of thousands martyred for the revolution'. However, 'the new regime soon set the official figure at 60,000. The true figure was probably fewer than 3,000. The Martyrs Foundation later commissioned - but did not publish - a study of those killed in the course of the entire revolutionary movement, beginning in June 1963.

178 According to its calculation, 2,781 demonstrators were killed in the fourteen months from October 1977 to February 1979': Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, p. 161.

16. Said Amir Arjomand, 'Constitutional Implications of Current Political Debates in Iran,' in AN Gheissari, ed.. Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 248-9.

17. Cf. Ettelaat newspaper, 26 March 1980. 18. Masud Razavi, Hashemi va Enqelab [Hashemi Rafsanjani and the Revolution] (Tehran: Publications, 1997), pp. 344-8. 19. Cf. Kayhan Newspaper, 19 April 1980. 20. Ibid. 21. Cf. Kayhan Newspaper, 22 April 1980, second imprint.

22. See 'The Constitution of Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution' in 'The Centre for Islamic Revolution's Documents': http://www.irdc.ir/fa/caiendar/68/default.aspx (Retrieved 11 April 2012).

23. For a history of these developments, visit the website of the 'Secretariat for Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution': http://www.iranculture.org/en/about/tarikh.php (Retrieved 13 April 2012).

24. Hakimzadeh, 'Iran: A Vast Diaspora Abroad and Millions of Refugees at Home.' 25. http://www.iranculture.org/fa/simpleView.aspx?provlD=10 (Retrieved 14 April 2012).

26. http://www.iranculture.ore/fa/simpleView.aspx?provlD=1028 (Retrieved 14 April 2012). 27. http://www.iranculture.org/fa/Default.aspx?current=viewDoc¤tlD=631 (Retrieved 14 April 2012). 28. Seyed AN Khamenei, Tahajom e Farhangi va Jang e Norm [Cultural Invasion and Soft War] (Tehran: Secretariat for Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, 2010), vol. I, pp. 632-3.

179 29. Hamid Naficy, 'Islamizing Film Culture: A Post-Khatami Update,' in Richard Tapper, ed.. The New Iranian Cinema: Politics, Representation and Identity (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 2002), p. 30.

30. Ibid, pp. 31-2. As I explain later, the Ministry was still named the Ministry of Islamic Guidance and the word Culture was added some years later.

31. Ibid, p. 34.

32. Hamid Reza Sadr, Iranian Cinema: A Political History (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 2006), pp. 178-80. 33. Naficy, 'Islamizing Film Culture,' pp. 35-6. 34. Trevor Mostyn, Censorship in Islamic Societies (London: Saqi Books, 2002), p. 37. 35. For a detailed account of these decisive years for film affairs and the following events, see Reza Allamehzadeh, Sarab e Cinema ye Eslami e Iran [The Mirage of the Iranian Islamic Cinema] (SaarbriJcken: Bardasht 7 & Navid, 1991).

36. Sadr, Iranian Cinema, p. 185.

37. The Farabi Cinematic Foundation was not initially intended to produce, but later it was involved in producing and co-producing films following the regime's Islamist ideology - its primary task was to take care of equipment, to support cinematic projects, and to deal with the monopoly of import and export of films.

38. See the official website of the 'Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance': http://farhang.Rov.ir/intro-historv-fa.html (Retrieved 28 May 2012). An English translation could be found on the website's English version, although it is full of mistakes and rather unreliable: http://farhang.gov.ir/profileofministrv-historv- en.htmi

39. http://farhang.gov.ir/intro-dutv-fa.html (Retrieved 28 May 2012); also see the English version: http://farhang.gov.ir/profileofministrv-responsibilities-en.html (Retrieved 28 May 2012).

40. Ibid; of course, the grammatical ambiguity of the adjective (Islamic) in Persian syntax and also historical record of an Iranian 'Ministry of Culture and Art' are

180 responsible for the mistranslation that could arose some misinterpretation as

well.

41. See http://farhanR.gov.ir/intro-adiutancv-cinema-fa.html (Retrieved 8 June

2012); the English version: http://farhanK.Rov.ir/deputies-performance-en.html

(Retrieved 8 June 2012).

42. Naficy, 'Islamizing Film Culture,' pp. 36-7.

43. Ibid, p. 39.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Parvaneh Soltani, 'The True Face of Women: A Missing Link in Iranian Cinema',

Iran-Bulletin (October 1998): http://w/w/vtf.iran-bulletin.orR/art/PARVAN2.html

(Retrieved 25 June 2012).

47. Sarvenaz Bahar, Sophie Fellow Silberberg, and Cynthia G. Brown, Guardians of

Thought: Limits of Freedom of Expression in Iran, Middle East Watch Report

(June 1993), p. 30.

48. Agnes Devictor, 'Classical Tools, Original Goals: Cinema and Public Policy in the

Islamic Republic of Iran (1979-97)', in The New Iranian Cinema, p. 70; for a

comparison between Iran's and other countries' film public policy, see pp. 71-4.

49. See Saeed Zeidabadi-Nejad, The Politics of Iranian Cinema: Films and Society in

the Islamic Republic (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 48-9.

50. In an article titled 'For Recording in History', Mohajerani claimed that Khatami's

favourite candidate for the Ministry of Guidance and Islamic Culture was not him

but Mousavi Lari, a cleric who later became the minister of Interior:

http://mohaierani.maktuob.net/archives/2008/ll/26/1132.php (Retrieved 2

July 2012).

51. Ataollah Mohajerani, Estizah [Interpellation] (Tehran: Entesharat e Ettelaat,

1999), pp. 116-17.

52. http://www.iranculture.orR/fa/simpleView.aspx?provlD=1557 (Retrieved 13 July

2012).

181 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid.

55. Ibid. 56. Ibid.

57. See http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8705180297 (Retrieved 9 July

2012).

58. An online Persian version of the booklet is also available on official website of

Deputy of Cinematic and Audio-Visual Affairs:

http://wv\/w.cinema.gov.ir/?sn=news&pt=full&id=125 (Retrieved 19 July 2012). 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid.

63. http://wwv^/.khabaronline.ir/news-40518.aspx (Retrieved 24 July 2012).

64. Online Persian versions of the three bills w/hich will be discussed thereafter are

available on the official website of the Supervision Council of the Islamic

Republic of Iran Broadcasting: http://www.nezarat-

irib.eom/index.php#historvManage 043359412016654164 44%7Cid=l

(Retrieved 21 July 2012).

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Mohammad Ghaed, 'Enqelab e Moft: Gav dar Chiniforushi' ['A Gratis Revolution:

Bull in China Shop'], from forthcoming book, Dastan e Ayandegan [History of

Ayandegan]: http://www.mghaed.com/av/Bull%20in%20Chinashop.pdf

(Retrieved 3 August 2012).

68. Kayhan Newspaper, 18 February 1979.

69. Ghaed, 'Enqelab e Moft'.

70. Gholam Khiabany, Iranian Media: The Paradox of Modernity (London and New

York: Routledge, 2010), p. 167.

182 71. See David Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), pp. 193-5. 72. Ibid, p. 193.

73. Khiabany, Iranian Media, p. 171.

74. Naficy, 'Islamizing Film Culture,' pp. 54-5.

75. http://vtfww.iranculture.org/fa/simpleView.aspx?provlD=1529 (Retrieved 12 August 2012). 76. Fardin Alikhah, 'The Politics of Satellite ' in Media, Culture and Society in Iran: Living with Globalization and the Islamic State, ed. Mehdi Semati (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 102-3; the essay contains good statistical and thematic information about most popular satellite TV channels for Iranian people inside the country. For a cultural analysis of Iranian TV channels in Los Angeles, before the arrival of satellite TV, see Hamid Naficy, The Making of Exile Cultures: Iranian Television in Los Angeles (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

77. For a social history of video in Iran, including 'the years of the ban' (1983-93) and 'the years of the Islamization' (1993 onward), see Mahmood Shahabi, 'The Iranian Moral Panic over Video: A Brief History and a Policy Analysis' in Semati, Media, Culture and Society in Iran, pp. 111-29.

78. For a good account of Khatami's political career see: Ghoncheh Tazmini, Khatami's Iran: The Islamic Republic and the Turbulent Path to Reform (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 2009). The author, of course, is a passionate pro- Khatami analyst in her conclusions: one must ignore her highly misleading conception of Khatami's 'modernization from below' and its alleged implications as simply as she ignores the fact that the announced strategy of Khatami and his allies was 'pressure from below and bargaining from above.'

79. Notably, the main man who was in charge of holding the show trials, as the Public Prosecutor, was Ayatollah Ghorbanali Dorri-Najafabadi, the former Minister of Intelligence in Khatami's first cabinet; he appointed by order of

183 Khamenei and resigned after it was disclosed that the 'serial assassinations' of dissident intellectuals has been committed by high-ranking 'disobedient agents' of the Ministry of Intelligence. For an account of his career and the process of his appointment, see: http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8404270109 (Retrieved 13 August 2012).

80. See Yahya R. Kamalpour, ed.. Media, Power, and Politics in the Digital Age: The 2009 Presidential Election Uprising in Iran (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010). 81. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9001020094 (Retrieved 18 August 2012). 82. http://kavhannews.ir/891123/2.htm#other206 (Retrieved 18 August 2012). 83. Interview with ISNA news agency, 26 November 2000: http://www.isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-23223 (Retrieved 18 August 2012).

84. Interview with Etemad newspaper, 14 August 2007, http://www.iahannews.com/vdch.mnqt23nvkftd2.txt (Retrieved 18 August 2012).

85. http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2010/09/100925 144 farhadi film.shtml (Retrieved 18 August 2012). 86. According to Amnesty International, about 4500 prisoners were executed in a political purge while Iranian opposition groups insist that the true number was higher: http://www.amnestv.org/en/librarv/asset/MDE13/021/1990/en/5c32759d- ee5e-lldd-9381-bdd29f83d3a8/mdel30211990en.html (Retrieved 3 September 2012). See also: Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions, pp. 209-28.

184