Fate of Hostages

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Fate of hostages in limbo as Iran writhes in turmoil By United Press Iniernattooal Ayatollah RuhoBah Khomeini refused Tuesday to help choose a new prime minister for Iran, deepening the coun- try's political chaos and delaying still further a decision on the 52 American hostages now in their 2S3th day of captivity, reports from Tehran said. President Abolhassan Bani-Sad- r, forced Monday to with- draw his nominee for prime minister, also seemed likely to lose Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who was report- ed to have declared his usefulness in his post ended after an angry mob demonstrated against him, He denied reports he had resigned and was seeking political asylum in theUnited States or France. Khomeini gave Parliament the responsibility of deciding the future of the hostages but infighting between the moder-at-e Bani-Sad-r and the majority Islamic revolutionaries over Egypt buries the deposed Shah of Iran. Story, Page ISA. a prime minister has persistently held up debate. Iranian sources in Paris who are in contact with persons inside the Iranian government said there was a secret Par-- I liament meeting Monday at which Bani-Sa- dr was told his choice for prime minister would be rejected and Ghotbza-- I deh was denounced for frequent junkets abroad. I The sources said Parliament which has responsibility 1 for naming a prime minister and a new cabinet told Bani- - Sadr that national police chief Mostafa Mir-Sali-m, bis nomi- - I nee for premier, was not acceptable. I Bani-Sad-r withdrew the nomination and it was agreed a I special panel of representatives- - of Khomeini, the president 1 and Parliament would work out agreement on the govern-- ment. s? But Khomeini sent word Tuesday morning he would not j become involved, saying it was not his role to take part in political processes, the sources said. Tehran Radio quoted j Khomeini's office as saying the matter was "the concern of I the president and Parliament." I The sources said Ghotbzadeh was ordered to the secret meeting to explain his conduct of foreign affairs, but refused i to appear. ' Tuesday morning demonstrators protested at his office. There were some reports a mob broke into the ministry and held Ghotbzadeh prisoner for a time, but the Paris sources said they could not confirm this. I The foreign minister, a moderate in the Iranian context I who was appointed to his post by Khomeini to replace Bam- - I Sadr last Nov. 23, telephoned the president later, the sources said. 1 Although a formal resignation was not mentioned in the report, be was said to have told Bani-Sa- dr his usefulness 1i was at an end and that he no longer considered himself as I occupying the post..

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Iran Hostage Crisis National Security Council, 1979 !
CRISIS COMMITTEES | 2014e IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, 1979 ! Dear Delegates, We are in the midst of the Iran Hostage Crisis, and there is no time to spare. Our situation is grave and desperate, and together we will find a solution into dealing with the recent events regarding the kidnapping of 52 Americans from the United States embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979. Indeed there are many sides to this issue, and debates will be tense. The dichotomy between the many people being represented in this committee will surely lead to many disputes and tough agreements. Can the situation remain diplomatic? Or will it lead to something else? It shall remain up to you. It is with great pleasure, as director of this committee, to welcome you to our 2014 UTMUN conference. My name is Stanley Treivus, and alongside our Crisis manager Meerah Haq, we look forward to this thrilling weekend of debate that awaits us. We are both first year students studying Political Science and International relations and this will be our first time being involved in UTMUN. This conference will appeal to all delegates, experienced or novice. And our hope is that you will leave this committee with not only profound knowledge on the subject, but with a better sense of communication and improved debating skills than you had before. The issues we will be discussing will surround the many topics that relate directly to the Iran Hostage Crisis. We will look at foreign relations between the United States and Iran shortly before and during the crisis.
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