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Iran Hostage Crisis National Security Council, 1979 !
CRISIS COMMITTEES | 2014e IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, 1979 ! Dear Delegates, We are in the midst of the Iran Hostage Crisis, and there is no time to spare. Our situation is grave and desperate, and together we will find a solution into dealing with the recent events regarding the kidnapping of 52 Americans from the United States embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979. Indeed there are many sides to this issue, and debates will be tense. The dichotomy between the many people being represented in this committee will surely lead to many disputes and tough agreements. Can the situation remain diplomatic? Or will it lead to something else? It shall remain up to you. It is with great pleasure, as director of this committee, to welcome you to our 2014 UTMUN conference. My name is Stanley Treivus, and alongside our Crisis manager Meerah Haq, we look forward to this thrilling weekend of debate that awaits us. We are both first year students studying Political Science and International relations and this will be our first time being involved in UTMUN. This conference will appeal to all delegates, experienced or novice. And our hope is that you will leave this committee with not only profound knowledge on the subject, but with a better sense of communication and improved debating skills than you had before. The issues we will be discussing will surround the many topics that relate directly to the Iran Hostage Crisis. We will look at foreign relations between the United States and Iran shortly before and during the crisis. -
Fate of Hostages
Fate of hostages in limbo as Iran writhes in turmoil By United Press Iniernattooal Ayatollah RuhoBah Khomeini refused Tuesday to help choose a new prime minister for Iran, deepening the coun- try's political chaos and delaying still further a decision on the 52 American hostages now in their 2S3th day of captivity, reports from Tehran said. President Abolhassan Bani-Sad- r, forced Monday to with- draw his nominee for prime minister, also seemed likely to lose Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who was report- ed to have declared his usefulness in his post ended after an angry mob demonstrated against him, He denied reports he had resigned and was seeking politi- cal asylum in theUnited States or France. Khomeini gave Parliament the responsibility of deciding the future of the hostages but infighting between the moder-at-e Bani-Sad-r and the majority Islamic revolutionaries over Egypt buries the deposed Shah of Iran. Story, Page ISA. a prime minister has persistently held up debate. Iranian sources in Paris who are in contact with persons inside the Iranian government said there was a secret Par-- I liament meeting Monday at which Bani-Sa- dr was told his choice for prime minister would be rejected and Ghotbza-- I deh was denounced for frequent junkets abroad. I The sources said Parliament which has responsibility 1 for naming a prime minister and a new cabinet told Bani- - Sadr that national police chief Mostafa Mir-Sali-m, bis nomi- - I nee for premier, was not acceptable. I Bani-Sad-r withdrew the nomination and it was agreed a I special panel of representatives- - of Khomeini, the president 1 and Parliament would work out agreement on the govern-- ment. -
Documents of the Iranian Revolutionary Movement
the time of this writing. The Revo- knee-jerk anti-clericalism. Islam rep- governments fell: first the Bazar- lutionary Guards did attack the resents a third force in the region, gan/Yazdi regime which was pre- offices of the People's Mojahedin one which is opposed to the interests sumed to be secretly pro-U.S. Organization of Iran (OMPI) and of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. It (Ibrahim Yazdi's secret meeting with the OIPFG: the OMPI placed an would not have been able to make Zbigniew Brzezinski led many to armed guard around its office and the gains which it has made if it conclude that he was the CIA's succeeded in defending it, and while were wholly reactionary and main conduit in the Iranian inner the OIPFG headquarters were anachronistic. Obviously it is circle); then the "moderate" gov- indeed burned, that did not hold inadequate to the broader revolu- ernment of Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr. back their growth and influence. tionary current and obviously it Now Khomeini's longtime loyalist, The OIPFG and the Workers Syn- imposes fetters on those very forces Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, is feeling the dicates jointly sponsored a Mayday which it releases — the clearest heat. demonstration which attracted examples are the repression of Thus far Khomeini himself has 500,000 people. During the last few women and homosexuals and sex- embraced the revolutionary fervor, weeks, huge crowds have marched uality in general. But the left brings and his public statements have all openly in Tehran under the banners no credit on itself for its failure to supported the students. -
The Changing Dynamics of Middle East Politics: Implications For
The Changing Dynamics of Middle East Politics: Implications for Pakistan 2001-2015 This thesis is submitted to University of the Punjab in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy in International Relations Submitted by Uzma Naz Roll no 01 Supervisor Prof. Dr. Iram Khalid Department of Political Science University of the Punjab, Lahore. 2018 IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE MOST BENEFICENT AND THE MOST MERCIFUL Declaration I hereby declare that thesis is a presentation of my original research work and I have not submitted this thesis to any other University or Institute for any degree whatsoever. Wherever contributions of others are involved, every effort is made to indicate this clearly, with due reference to the literature, and acknowledgement of collaborative research and discussions. The research work was done under the Supervision of Prof. Dr. Iram Khalid, at the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore. Researcher’s Name: Uzma Naz Signature: _______________________________________ Date: ___________________________________________ In my capacity as supervisor of the candidate’s thesis, I certify that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge. Supervisor’s Name: Prof. Dr.Iram Khalid Signature: ______________________________ Date: ___________________________________ i Research Completion Certificate This is to certify that MissUzma Naz, Roll No: 01, Doctor of Philosophy research scholar, Session (2014-18) has successfully completed his thesis under my supervision. I also certify that the research has been carried out and completed by the researcher. Supervisor: Professor Dr. Iram Khalid Department of Political Science University of the Punjab, Lahore Signature: Date: ii Certificate of Approval This is to certify that, Mrs. -
Secret Hostage Negotiation MONTREAL (AP) — Secret Negotiations Have Been Americans from Tehran
3 happy Bears pW Best pals Big game for Payton Piggy and 'mom' 1 (NFL roundup, pages 1B,4B) (Marion, page 7A) Plank, Phipps, Payton Weather Partly cloudy with a chance CITY of thundershowers tonight FINAL and Tuesday. Lows tonight Monday around 60. Highs Tuesday 25 CENTS from the mid- to upper 70s. SEPTEMBER 15, 196 Light southwesterly winds. Weather details on page 2A. VOLUME 98, NUMBER 250 ^ EASTERN IOWA'S LEADING DAILY CEDAR RAPIDS CITY OF FIVE SEASONS Secret hostage negotiation MONTREAL (AP) — Secret negotiations have been Americans from Tehran. Embassy officials had hidden Khomeini, who hopes to forge a consensus among rival Khomeini's four conditions were release of Iranian under way for three months to gain the release of the the Americans in their mission for months after the factions in Tehran. assets frozen by Carter after the hostages were seized 52 American hostages in Iran before the Nov. 4 U.S. Embassy seizure, then got them false papers and At a news conference today, Iranian speaker Nov. 4, guarantees by the United States that, it will not American presidential election, the Canadian news spirited them out of the country in January. Hashemi Rafsanjani said that the demand for an interfere in Iran's internal affairs, suspension of all paper La Presse said today. The document, which has never been published and apology — already rejected by Carter — had not been U.S. claims against Iran and return of the ousted shah's Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini favors which Ghotbzadeh never has officially accepted as a dropped. -
The Long Month of January: Intensification of Conflicts Between Different Projects in Iran and the Rise of the Global Confederation of Iranian Students (GCIS)
Shiva Tabari February 2020 The Long month of January: intensification of conflicts between different projects in Iran and the Rise of the Global Confederation of Iranian Students (GCIS) There are moments in history, due to a myriad of events, shifts in the (e)motion of people, and simultaneity of social movements, that participants have a strange feeling of intensification of time. Any day endures as much as a week, every week appears as a month or so. It is unbelievable for people that this amount of change and events have happened only during a week or so. This amount of conflict and clash of ideas, bodies, projects should happen in several years or maybe more. Hence, if people in (so-called) Western countries like Australia, which have a relatively stable country, want to understand the everyday life of Iranians in January 2020 and learn from our experience, they have, first of all, to imagine themselves in a situation that all of the sad news they hear during some years, all of anger they feel due to misbehavior of their ruling class, all of their nightmares about another world war and losing their normal life, all their hopes and hopelessness, and also all of the social/political activities which they do during many years (demonstration, strike, signing a petition etc.), have been compacted and concentrated in a single month. I call it intensification of history. Possibly, an element of a revolutionary situation. I am sure that Iranian people had the same feeling during the September of 1941 when both the Allies and the Soviet Union invaded Iran, occupied Tehran and forcibly abdicated Reza Pahlavi and assigned his son (Mohammadreza), a puppet, as the King. -
Engaging Iran Australian and Canadian Relations with the Islamic Republic Engaging Iran Australian and Canadian Relations with the Islamic Republic
Engaging Iran Australian and Canadian Relations with the Islamic Republic Engaging Iran Australian and Canadian Relations with the Islamic Republic Robert J. Bookmiller Gulf Research Center i_m(#ÆAk pA'v@uB Dubai, United Arab Emirates (_}A' !_g B/9lu( s{4'1q {xA' 1_{4 b|5 )smdA'c (uA'f'1_B%'=¡(/ *_D |w@_> TBMFT!HSDBF¡CEudA'sGu( XXXHSDBFeCudC'?B uG_GAE#'c`}A' i_m(#ÆAk pA'v@uB9f1s{5 )smdA'c (uA'f'1_B%'cAE/ i_m(#ÆAk pA'v@uBª E#'Gvp*E#'B!v,¢#'E#'1's{5%''tDu{xC)/_9%_(n{wGLi_m(#ÆAk pA'v@uAc8mBmA' , ¡dA'E#'c>EuA'&_{3A'B¢#'c}{3'(E#'c j{w*E#'cGuG{y*E#'c A"'E#'c CEudA%'eC_@c {3EE#'{4¢#_(9_,ud{3' i_m(#ÆAk pA'v@uBB`{wB¡}.0%'9{ymA'E/B`d{wA'¡>ismd{wd{3 *4#/b_dA{w{wdA'¡A_A'?uA' k pA'v@uBuCc,E9)1Eu{zA_(u`*E @1_{xA'!'1"'9u`*1's{5%''tD¡>)/1'==A'uA'f_,E i_m(#ÆA Gulf Research Center 187 Oud Metha Tower, 11th Floor, 303 Sheikh Rashid Road, P. O. Box 80758, Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Tel.: +971 4 324 7770 Fax: +971 3 324 7771 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.grc.ae First published 2009 i_m(#ÆAk pA'v@uB Gulf Research Center (_}A' !_g B/9lu( Dubai, United Arab Emirates s{4'1q {xA' 1_{4 b|5 )smdA'c (uA'f'1_B%'=¡(/ © Gulf Research Center 2009 *_D All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in |w@_> a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, TBMFT!HSDBF¡CEudA'sGu( XXXHSDBFeCudC'?B mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the Gulf Research Center. -
Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy
Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs August 14, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32048 Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy Summary Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the Persian Gulf region. In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have often differing approaches over how to try to defeat the group. The finalization on July 14, 2015, of a “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA) between Iran and six negotiating powers could enhance Iran’s ability to counter the United States and its allies in the region, but could also pave the way for cooperation to resolve some of the region’s several conflicts. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran’s support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. A perceived potential threat from Iran’s nuclear program emerged in 2002, and the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to ensure that the program is verifiably confined to purely peaceful purposes. The international pressure contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran’s international isolation. -
Iran's Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan
Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan (2001-2014) The Doctoral Dissertation submitted to THE UNIVERSITY OF BREMEN Faculty of Social Sciences Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Political Science (Dr. rer. pol.) by Farid Muttaqi First Supervisor: Professor Dr. Klaus Schlichte Second Supervisor: Professor Dr. Mushtaq Kaw Bremen, 2018 ii First reviewer: Professor Dr. Klaus Schlichte Second reviewer: Professor Dr. Mushtaq Kaw Date of Submission: October 15, 2018 Date of Oral Defence: March 7, 2019 iii Abstract (English) The present Ph.D. dissertation deals with the analysis of Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. The main purpose is to understand and explain the motives for Iran’s contradictory behavior and actions with regard to its neighbouring country Afghanistan. The main research question is: “What is the nature of Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014?” Conceptually, Iran’s foreign policy is interpreted in the study from the realism (Hans Morgenthau; John Mearsheimer) perspective. This is done in a format that provides an overview of the history of Iran- Afghanistan relations, presents an in-depth analysis of the formal power structure of Iran, singles out four main visions of Iran’s government which help to interpret the interplay of the three major foreign policy interests Iran has: security, political and economic interests. This is a qualitative study which makes use of historical reconstruction, content analysis, and the analysis of the semi-structured interviews, conducted in Iran and in Afghanistan as part of the field trip research. -
Introduction
Notes INTRODUCTION 1. Kasravi's Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran (History of the Iranian Constitution), 1961, offers the best detailed analysis of the 1906 revolution. Despite other numerous publications on the same subject, there is still dispute over the precise causes of this revolution, especially in view of the 1979 revolution, which has coloured the opinion of some analysts in Iran. 2. The Bolshevik Revolution and the eventual departure of the Russian troops together with the occupation of the north by the British forces paved the way for the imposition of the 1919 Agreement. With Lord Curzon as foreign secre tary, the stage was set for the launching of Curzon's most cherished political ambitions which was 'the regeneration of Persia under British tutelage as one of the friendly countries' (Wright, 1985, p. 205). Therefore, the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919, which had been the subject of secret negotiations with Vusugh al-Dowleh, Sarem al-Dowleh and Nosrat al-Dowleh, was made public on 19 August 1919. The terms of the agreement, even though disguised, clearly showed that the country was becoming a British protectorate. According to the agreement, the Persian government was giving Britain a special position in return for a loan of £2 million at 7 per cent (Annual Register, 1919, p. 255~ Ahmad Shah, in the meantime, was rewarded by a long-awaited tour of Europe after he had fulfilled his obligation by keeping the pro-British trium virate of ministers in their posts to complete the necessary negotiations. However, the treaty had to be ratified by the Majlis. -
Iran's New Security Environment Imperatives
Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives: Counter Containment or Engagement with the US Naser Hadian* and Shani Hormozi Abstract The Iran-US relations since 1979 Revolution have remained tension-ridden. Various efforts towards resolution of the sensitive and critical issues between them have failed to bear fruit. The present article looks into the state of these relations from the vantage of Iran’s security environment and how the U.S. policies, particularly since the 2001 occupation of Afghanistan and 2003 war of choice in Iraq, have dramatically affected Iran’s immediate security environment. The paper argues that as a result of the removal of the Taliban and Ba’athist regimes and the emergence of pro-Iran ruling coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran’s regional stature and influence was enhanced, which also coincided with simultaneous shrinking of US material and symbolic resources in the region. The article also tries to shed light on the parameters of Iran 's security environment, decision making processes, sources of security and defense policies, which would help towards a better understanding of the reasons and rationale for the still tumultuous relations with the US, including in particular on Iran’s nuclear program. A review of the past U.S. strategies in dealing with Iran as well as of the alternative strategies currently on the table – Containment, Comprehensive and Selective Engagements, Military option – and Iran’s Counter Containment strategy, indicates that given the actual situation in the region a mere continuation of the past might simply prove impossible. A full-scale confrontation or a major reconciliation appears to be the only possible scenarios for the future. -
Hostage Crisis Is Said to Have Dissipated the Paralyzing Effects of the Vietnam Syndrome" in Washington As Well As Stoked the Fires of Revolutionary Zeal in Tehran
126 August 29, 1980 IRAN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE HOSTAGES: AFTER 300 DAYS INTRODUCTION The November 4, 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the continued holding of 53 American diplomatic personnel as hostages is a pivotal I1hinget1event which has exerted a signifi- cant influence on the course of American-Iranian relations as well as the course of the Iranian revolution, the unfolding of U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis the Persian Gulf, and the state of relations between the United States and its allies. The ongoing hostage crisis is said to have dissipated the paralyzing effects of the Vietnam syndrome" in Washington as well as stoked the fires of revolutionary zeal in Tehran. Regardless of its eventual outcome, it is clear that the prolonged confrontation between the United States and Iran is a watershed which will shape the political landscape in each capital for years to come, if only because the fate of the hostages has become inextricably intertwined with the struggles for political leadership in both countries. The purpose of this paper is to review the development of the hostage crisis by outlining the prevailing currents of Iranian I domestic politics which have generated the disjointed Iranian approach to the problem, and by analyzing the shifting U.S. diplomatic strategy for securing the release of the hostages. The recent death of the Shah has fueled speculation that there may soon be a breakthrough in the hostage impasse. However, as this analysis makes clear, the militants who seized the U.S. Embassy were,primarily motivated by domestic political considera- tions, not by the entrance.of the Shah into the United States, which merely served as a convenient pretext for the operation.