Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. Kasravi's Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e (History of the Iranian Constitution), 1961, offers the best detailed analysis of the 1906 revolution. Despite other numerous publications on the same subject, there is still dispute over the precise causes of this revolution, especially in view of the 1979 revolution, which has coloured the opinion of some analysts in Iran. 2. The Bolshevik Revolution and the eventual departure of the Russian troops together with the occupation of the north by the British forces paved the way for the imposition of the 1919 Agreement. With Lord Curzon as foreign secre• tary, the stage was set for the launching of Curzon's most cherished political ambitions which was 'the regeneration of Persia under British tutelage as one of the friendly countries' (Wright, 1985, p. 205). Therefore, the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919, which had been the subject of secret negotiations with Vusugh al-Dowleh, Sarem al-Dowleh and Nosrat al-Dowleh, was made public on 19 August 1919. The terms of the agreement, even though disguised, clearly showed that the country was becoming a British protectorate. According to the agreement, the Persian government was giving Britain a special position in return for a loan of £2 million at 7 per cent (Annual Register, 1919, p. 255~ Ahmad , in the meantime, was rewarded by a long-awaited tour of Europe after he had fulfilled his obligation by keeping the pro-British trium• virate of ministers in their posts to complete the necessary negotiations. However, the treaty had to be ratified by the Majlis. Throughout 1919, the Iranian reaction to the treaty grew more hostile. Rus• sia's denunciation of the treaty as a 'weak agreement as a scrap of paper hav• ing no legal validity' (Butler and Woodward, quoted in Ghods, 1989, p. 55), together with the concern of the United States and over the whole affair, only served to encourage the nationalist and anti-imperialist move• ments throughout the country. During 1920, the nationalists' hostility to the presence of British troops in Iran and the treaty grew and caused many pro• blems for the British in Iran. By 1921, the British government reluctantly accepted defeat in the face of massive opposition and outraged public opinion, which had turned into a terror campaign against the British interests and those who were classed as 'Lovers of England' (Fatemi, 1952, quoted in Cottam, 1979, p. 185). Public outrage against the British was partly the result of rumours of pay-offs to of.. ficials and continuous denunciation ofthe treaty by the newspapers and per• iodicals. It must also be noted that the support of the United States and the given to the Iranian opposition to the treaty helped the nation• alists to claim a victory against British expansionism. It was indeed the first time since the 1906 revolution that the nationalists could claim that they had achieved a victory without the support of an external power. Perhaps more significantly, the movement showed the power of nationalism as a force which could have a place in Iranian politics. It was also an important victory

202 Notes 203

for the nationalists as the ulamds role in these movements in the country had not been as significant as the constitutional movement, even though in some regions local clergy had supported the nationalists. 3. The key turning point in the modern history of Iran is the 1921 coup detat and the coming to power-of Reza Khan. This episode in Iranian history is particularly interesting and has proved controversial because of one signifi• cant factor: the role of the British in the whole affair. Although the dissatis• faction of the Iranians with the central government was at its height in 1921 and nationalist movements such as Jangalis at:td Khiabani were proving be• yond the government's capability to control, it was remarkable for a self.. made Cossack commander to seize power under the noses of the British forces and the British Legation. Therefore, was Reza and Sayyed Zia's blood• less coup of 23 February 1921 an inspired British plot to put into power a lea• der with an impeccable record of bravery and honesty to harness nationalist fervour? The 34-year-old Sayyed Zia was well known for his sympathy to• wards the British and Reza's association with the British officers who had taken over the affairs of the Cossack Brigade was well known. The theory of a plot to bring Reza Khan to power is important. For the foundation of was laid in 1921 and indeed the legitimacy of the Pahlavis would then be weighed, argued and questioned in the later years. Many Iranians believed that the 1921 coup was concluded by a carefully planned plot, with General Ironside, Lt.-Col. Smyth, Reza Khan and Sayyed Zia as key players (Fardoust, 1991, pp. 82-4; Najmi, 1991, pp. 48-51~ The re• newal ofD~rcy's oil agreement of1933 by , for instance, and its ex• tension by a further 30 years, has also been used by many opponents and indeed ordinary Iranians as proof of Britain's involvement in the 1921 coup (Musaddiq, p. 445; Katouzian, 1981, p. 129). By April1921, the British govern• ment, faced with strong forces of nationalism and anti-British feelings, had decided to withdraw its Norperforce whose function was the 'Support our [British] Minister's policy at Teheran and to induce the Persian Government to subserve British interests' (Mobereley, quoted in Wright, 1977, p. 178) from Iran. With the removal of its forces, the British needed a strong leader who could safeguard their long-term interests and make a bulwark against the ris• ing tide of communism. The task of identifYing such a character was given to General Ironside and his administrator in the Cossack Brigade. When General Ironside took charge of the Cossack Brigade, with the help of the British Legation in Teheran, he first persuaded the reluctant Ahmad Shah to dismiss the Russian officers attached to the Brigade. Then he ap• pointed Lt.-Col. Smyth to control the administration and fmances of the Cossacks. In the meantime, Ahmad Shah appointed Sardar Homayoun to command the brigade. But Homayoun, a political figure with no influence in the force, was soon encouraged to go on leave by Ironside. Ironside had al• ready made his choice of a Persian officer to lead the Cossacks. He wrote in his diary: 'I have interviewed Reza Khan and have put him definitely in charge of the Persian Cossacks. He is a man and the straightest I have met yet ... I made two things clear to Reza when I agreed to let him go: (1) That he must make no attempt to shoot me up behind as he goes or as I go. That would lead to his annihilation and good to nobody except the Revo• lutionary Party. 204 Notes

(2) That the Shah must on no account be deposed. Reza promised glibly enough and I shook hands with him. I have told Smyth to let go gradually (Ironside, cited by Wright, 1977, p. 182~ General Ironside was summoned to Baghdad two days later and by 23 February, Reza Khan, in association with Sayyed Zia, executed their coup and forced Ahmad Shah to name Sayyed Zia as prime minister. Although much of the evidence indicates that the British Legation in Teheran was not involved in the coup, it strongly reaffirms that the coup was carried out with the knowledge of the British officers attached to the Cossack Brigade. This certainly was the impression that Major-General Dickson had at the time. In a letter to a member of the US legation, dated 6 June 1921, he wrote how he now saw Colonel Smyth in Qazvin and how Smyth admitted that 'it was he [Smyth] that had organised the Cossack Coup in Teheran' (National Archives, American Legation Despatch, August 1925, quoted in Wilber, 1976, p. 48). 4. Although the US's support for the Soviets' withdrawal was important, it was not as crucial as it was portrayed at the time. Even the Shah believed that it was President Truman's warning which forced the withdrawal, but latest re• search shows that this had not been the case. For more details, see Pahlavi (1980b, p. 45, and Bull 1988, pp. 37, 465~

CHAPTER 1 THE RISE AND FALL OF MOHAMMAD MUSAD• DIQ, 1951-3

1. The production of oil increased from 7 500 000 tons in 1943 to 16 800 000 in 1945. During the war the production of aircraft fuel increased to a new level of 1 million tons a year. At the same time the capacity of Abadan's refinery was increased to 17 million tons a year by 1945 to cope with the demands by the Allied forces. 2. The resolution made it a criminal offence for any government official to dis• cuss oil concessions with 'any official or unofficial representative of any coun• try or any company or anybody else'. For more details see Nejatee (1986, p. 41). 3. Al-e Ahmad tells of his shame when, as a young member of the party in charge of keeping discipline and order in one of the demonstrations against the resolution, he witnessed the arrival of Russian soldiers on the scene. See Al-e Ahmad (1978). 4. The AIOC not only undermined the sovereignty of the country, but it gener• ated hatred towards the British. Abadan, where the biggest refmery was built, was the heart of the AIOC's operation and is still a good example of the AIOC's discriminatory policies towards its Iranian workers. Offensive notices such as 'No Dogs or Iranians Allowed' outside clubs were daily re• minders of the British domination and colonial policies generally. 5. In 1948 and 1949 Iran had received £9 million and £13.5 million in royalties compared to £28 million and £23 million paid by the AIOC in taxes to the British government Iran's royalty in 1950 amounted to £16 million when the AIOC's profit in the same year from its operations in Iran had come to £200 million. In the same year the company paid £50.5 million in taxes. Notes 205

6. Ann K.S. Lambton served in the British embassy in Teheran during the Second World War as press attache and therefore was considered an authority on Iranian affairs. 7. The word bazaar in this context refers to the traditional business commu• nity, whose base of operations is the bazaar with strong ties with the mos• que and the ulama. The bazaar was instrumental in the making and the success of the 1906 revolution and subsequent events in the modern history of Iran. 8. Qavam al-Saltaneh came from one of the most powerful aristocratic fa• milies in Iran. He was second cousin to Musaddiq and his brother, Vusugh al-Dowleh, was the British stooge in the notorious 1919 Agreement. Qavam became prime minister in 1946 and managed to secure the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Azerbaijan by promising Stalin an oil concession. But this oil concession was later debated and opposed by a group of depu• ties headed by Musaddiq and failed to gain approval. For more details see Bill (1988, pp. 33-7). 9. In Chalangar, the party's satirical paper, a cartoon of Musaddiq portrayed him as a woman dancer and Averell Harriman as the conductor of the all• American music band. For more details on the Tudeh policy towards Mu• saddiq, see Keshavarz (19831 Maleki (1981) and Abrahamian (1982). 10. See Yan Richard's (1983) biographical sketch of Kashani. 11. This was the era of McCarthyisin in the US. While the Americans were fighting communists in Korea, in other parts of the world, like China and Vietnam, communism was consolidating its hold.

CHAPTER 2 IMPERIAL DICTATORSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT 1953-63

1. The consortium consisted of the following companies: British Petroleum (BP) 40 per cent, Royal Dutch-Shell14 per cent, and Compagnie Fran~ise des Pet• roles 6 per cent. The American 40 per cent were divided equally between five major companies with equal shares of 8 per cent as follows: Standard Oil of New Jersey (later Exxon1 Mobil, Gulf, Texaco and Standard Oil of Califor• nia. The five major American oil companies, under pressure from some inde• pendent companies, relinquished I per cent of their shares to them. 2. SAVAK consisted of eight departments, some ofwhich were mainly respon• sible for data and information gathering and analysis. But SAVAK.'s notor• ious reputation was mainly earned by its Third Department (Internal Security) for its alleged brutality and torture. 3. Iqbal had once described himself as His Majesty's Gholam (house servant). He also enjoyed a close friendship with Princess Ashraf, the Shah's twin sis• ter, in his younger days according to Katouzian. Princess Ashraf's role in the 1953 coup and the consequent restoration of the Pahlavis was decisive. See Katouzian (1981, p. 196). 4. The Shah's definition of 'Positive Nationalism' is very ambiguous. He de• fined it as a 'policy of maximum political and economic independence con• sistent with the interests of one's country'. He then classified Musaddiq's 206 Notes

brand of nationalism as a 'negative' one and praised his father's nationalism as 'pure spirit of nationalism to our people' (Pahlavi, 1961, pp. 125--6). He concluded that 'those who preach negative nationalism are automatically suspect'. 5. By the end of 1960, Iran only bad several weeks' worth of foreign exchange for the import essentials. See Looney (1982, p. 16). 6. In 1953, the government of Musaddiq bad passed a tax reform bill The Act had been designed to oblige landlords to pay 20 per cent of their income towards a fund to supplement peasants' income and to pay for rural devel• opment However, with Musaddiq's overthrow, Zahedi's government, in support of its conservative supporters and landed families, reduced this tax to 7.5 per cent Meanwhile, the Shah embarked on redistribution of the crown lands to set an example for the landlords to divide their lands amongst peasants. As his example was not followed, he turned over the land to the Majlis for disposal, but it met resistance from the deputies who were either landlords or represented landed families. By 1960, he had been forced to embark on legislation and a land reform law. See K.atouzian (1981, pp. 201-2) and Keddie (1981, p. 149). 7. Cuyler Young's articles and criticism of the United States' role in Iran, together with Khomeini's speech against the Shah, were published in 1978 before the revolution erupted For details, see Al-e Ahmad (1978, Vol 2, pp. 84-102). 8. The ~liance for Progress' (Alianza para el Progreso) had particularly been designed by Kennedy's foreign policy advisers to avoid revolutions, such as Fidel Castro's in Cuba, in Latin America. For more details see Bill (1988, p. 131). 9. According to the constitution, an election should have been held within 3 months of dissolution. 10. Muharram is the month in the Shi'i calendar when Imam Hossein, the grandson of the Prophet, was martyred in his struggle against tyranny; 11. I witnessed the clashes between demonstrators and the police in Shiraz where a police officer was badly injured After the police force retreated the demonstrators turned their wrath against government offices and shops belonging to Bahaiis and Jews, ransacking them.

CHAPTER 3 DICTATORSHIP AND PSEUDO-MODERNISM, 1963-77

1. The nature of the present regime in Iran and the implementation of strict Islamic laws, founded fourteen centuries ago, justifies the image that the Alam's government portrayed at the time. 2. The reference document, and many others, was seized by militant students after storming the US embassy in Teheran in November 1979. These docu• ments have since been published by the office of Islamic Publishing under the title Documents »om the American Nest of Spies, Number x to }! For ease of reference, these documents will be referred to as US. E Document num• ber, and quoting the volume and the page number within the volume. Notes 200

3. For the complete text of Khomeini's speech, see Al-e Ahmad's (1978, Vol. II). For an English translation with some variations, see Floor (1983). 4. These data are based on my personal observations, which were made possi• ble by extensive travels in the area. Bribery was also rife at the time. The pay-offs to the port authorities and Governor General's office for a ship to jump the queue had become routine. 5. The number oftrucks and trailers have been quoted from Graham (1978, p. 88). 6. Based on personal observation. An even higher number offoreign nationals were working in the naval dockyard in Bandar Abbas, given the number of projects both in the military and other ministries. 7. Military personnel were not allowed to take part in any political activity. Be• fore the was formed, even civilians working for the armed forces and the immediate families of military personnel abstained from any form of political activity or even voting. 8. The quotations from Gharbzadegi is from the second edition of the book, which was published in 1964. The first edition of Gharbzadegi was published in 1962 and was soon sold out. In 1963, Al-e Ahmad revised the first edition. But before publishing it, SAVAK banned the book and halted its distribu• tion. It was republished secretly in 1964. 9. Shariati was born in 1933 into a religious family in a small village by the name of Mazinan in the province of Khorasan. His first teacher in religious studies was his father who was a reformist member of the clergy. While studying at a teachers college, he soon became involved in politics. By the time of 1953 coup at the age of 21, he was actively involved in pro-Musaddiq demonstrations and support. In 1956 he entered the University of Mashhad to study languages. He and his father were imprisoned for 8 months for try• ing to revive the . In 1959 he won a government scholarship to the Sorbonne and in 1960 went to France to study philology, where, he be• came involved in the. activities of the Iranian Student Confederation. While in he met Jean-Paul Sartre and many other eminent thinkers. He organized and actively participated in demonstrations in support of Third World He published many anti-regime periodicals and translated Jean-Paul Sartre's What is Poetry? and Che Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare. He also at• tended lectures given by Louis Massignon, an expert on Islamic mysticism, and George Gurvitch, the founder of the school of dialectical sociology. No doubt his European years were instrumental in Shariati's future thinking (Abrahamian, 1982, pp.106-8; Algar, 1983, pp. 74-5). After completing his doctoral thesis, he returned to Iran in 1965, only to be arrested and imprisoned. He was released after 6 months and moved to Mashhad where he began working in the university. However, his appoint• ment was terminated when he began to have a strong following in the subject of Islamic sociology. In 1969, he moved to Teheran to take a position in Hus• seinyeh Ershad, where he lectured and wrote his most famous works. It was in this period that he began his association with Mojahedin-e Khalgh whose members were arrested later. By 1972, however, SAVAK had closed Hussein• yeh Ershad, alarmed by his large following. By then, the traditional ulama had also grown fearful of Shariati's confrontational ideas. Some conservative clerics had even gone further and 'denounced the Husseinyeh as Kaferstan, the den of infidels' (Abrahamian, 1989, p. 109). 208 Notes

Shariati was arrested and imprisoned for 18 months for his involvement with Mojahedin and his 'Marxist-Islamic' views. He was released in 1975 and was put under house arrest for two years. In 1977, he obtained a pass• port and left Iran for England, where he died one month later at the age of 44. The British authorities reported that he died of a massive heart attack, but his supporters were quick to blame SAVAK for his death. Given SA• YAK's track-record, it was an accusation that carried weight among the Shah's opponents. Although no evidence has been found to prove foul play, the Iranian security police is still held responsible for the 'assassination' (Algar, 1983, p. 77). I 0. Shariati distinguishes between Bashar (human beings) and Ensan (moral man). We are all Bashar but not necessarily Ensan. He then defines the characteristics that Bashar should gain to becoQte Ensan. First, Ensan knows and understands about himself, his world and his environment Sec• ond, he is free and can choose. Third, he is a creator. For more detailed analysis, see Shariati's (n.d, pp. 100--15). II. The serial ~ll the Days of our Lives' was shown on Iranian television and in most countries. It was about family of doctors, but one of its main charac• ters, Billy, was more in the business of making his brothers' wives pregnant than anything else. Shariati criticized the spread of such decadence and pointed to the fact that Playboy magazine for example was distributed free amongst village people. For more examples see Shariati (1978, pp. 257-60). 12. Al-e Ahmad was born in 1923 in Teheran into a religious family. His father and several members of his family were clerics. He attended elementary and primary schools and went on to religious education in Teheran during which he became acquainted with the works of Kasravi. He then went to Teheran Teachers College and graduated in 1946. Throughout these years when 'political parties grew like mushrooms' (Mottahedeh, 1987, p. 2891 he joined the Reform Society and translated from Arabic, thanks to his reli• gious education, a book critical of ta'zyieh. The Reform Society chose to join forces with the Iranian Communist Party and Al-e Ahmad soon won himself a place on the Party's Provincial Committee. By this time he had established a close relationship with Khalil Maleki, a German-educated social democrat who had a profound intellec• tual influence on Al-e Ahmad. However, the Iranian Communist Party's pro-Soviet programme and disagreement over the way the party's leader• ship was selected, prompted Maleki and Al-e Ahmad to split from the Communist Party in 1948. Between 1948 and 1951 he stayed out of political activities. Instead he wrote and travelled extensively throughout Iran. His travels and observa• tion of the country's rural life became the basis of his many writings and analysis later. With the revival of the National Front and coming to power of Musad• diq, Al-e Ahmad joined Maleki and organized the Toiler's Party to support Musaddiq. After the break-up of the Toilers' Party, Al-e Ahmad joined Mal• eki in his newly organized party, the . The 1953 coup ended all political activity. Maleki was arrested and imprisoned and Al-e Ahmad re• signed from the Third Force Party under pressure from the regime (Motta• hedeh, 1987, p. 294). Notes 209

Between 1953 and 1962 he wrote many books and short stories. However, affected by the West's destructive influence in Iran, he wrote Gharbzadegi in 1962 The events of the 1963 uprising had a profound effect on Al-e Ah• mad's outlook on and its role, such that in 1964 he went on a pilgrim• age to Mecca. The result of that was a book Khasi dar Mayghat (Thorn in the Desert). The pilgrimage was an act of self-discovery in the light of Islam. It was an important turning point in his life. It also was an 'act of defiance to the secular intellectuals' who would disapprove of such a trip (Mottahedeh, 1987, p. 303). The impact of the riots in 1963 and the passive role of the intellectuals prompted Al-e Ahmad to embark on a work as important as Gharbzadegi, called Dar khedmat va Khianat Roushanfekran (Concerning the Service and the Treason of Intellectuals). In it he criticized the modern intellectuals for 'washing their hands of the 1342 [1963] events' (Al-e Ahmad, J. l3S7 [1978], Vol. I, p. 16). Al-e Ahmad died of a heart attack in Asalem on the coast of the Caspian Sea on 8 September 1969. 13. Between 1965 and 1971, the Mojahedin began to investigate religion, Iranian history and revolutionary theory. They studied the Koran and other reli• gious works with an emphasis on trying to bridge the gulf between the scientific aspects of modern theories and religious philosophies. They stu• died and discussed the works of Marx, Frantz Fanon, Liu Shaoqui, Che Guevara, Carlos Marighella, Abraham Guillen, Regis Debray and Amar Ouzegan. Having extensively discussed the topics and having been im• pressed by the guerrilla movements around the world, in particular in Al• geria, they adopted the work of Amar Ouzegan's Meilleur Combat as their guideline. Ouzegan advocated that the 'only way to fight imperialism was to resort to armed struggle and appeal to religious sentiments of the masses' (Ouzegan, quoted in Abrahamian, 1989, p. 89). This was indeed compatible with Mojahedin's line of thinking. Moreover, Ouzegan's argu• ment that 'Islam was a revolutionary, socialistic democratic creed' (ibid.) further reinforced Mojahedin's doctrine in taking up armed struggle against the Shah's regime.

CHAPTER 4 THE REVOLUTION, 1977-9

1. Based on interviews with a number of Iranians. Their names have been with• held for their safety. 2. Bakhtiar states in his book Yekrangi that when he, together with Sanjabi and Forouhar, sent their open letter to the Shah, he packed his suitcase in case the security forces called to detain him. For more details see Bakhtiar (1982, pp. 113-14). 3. The information has been supplied by one of the organizers who kept close contact with the Iranian embassy in Washington. The interviewee had been supplied with a large sum of money to pay for the expenses of those travel• ling to Washington to participate in pro-Shah demonstrations. The name has been withheld for security reasons. 210 Notes

4. It is an Islamic custom to commemorate a death on the seventh day and the fortieth day. However, in the months leading up to the 1979 revolution, street killings led to commemorations of the 'martyrs' on the seventh and fortieth days, which in turn led to further clashes and further deaths and other seventh and fortieth day commemorations. These events, even though sporadic at first, gained more momentum and became more widespread 5. Newspaper articles were being published in the US and other western countries in advance of Roosevelt's book Countercoup (1979). Those articles were also being translated and published in Iran where they were being read in the millions. 6. General Khatam was the commander-in-chief of the Iranian air force. He was killed in 1976 in mysterious circumstances while hang-gliding around Dez in the southern province of Khuzistan. At the time of his death, rumours circulated that he had been killed by SAVAK as he posed a threat to the Shah. He was the pilot who flew the Shah out of the country in 1953 and later brought him back. He married the Shah's sister and later be• came the head of the Iranian air force. Despite his family connections with the Shah, he was a highly respected officer and well liked throughout the air force. He was believed to be honest and shrewd. More importantly, he was immune from the bad reputation that surrounded the rest of the royal family. He was indeed an influential figure in the military establishment who en• joyed all the necessary criteria to pose a threat to the Shah himself. Given the Shah's suspicion of all popular political and military personalities as being a threat to his authority, Khatam was one the few officers in the mili• tary who could have commanded a coup against the Shah. 7. Interestingly enough, the culprit behind the fire at the Rex Cinema has never been identified, nor to which organization he belonged. The Islamic Republic would have made political capital out of it if it was able to. It was said that he had first escaped to but later returned to Iran and was ar• rested, but it is not known what happened to him. Although some trials were reluctantly held in 1979 after the February Revolution as a result of pressure from the victims' relatives, nothing concrete came out of the trials except that two policemen were executed for other reasons than the start of the fire. It was significant that no charge or evidence could be brought against any person affiliated to SAVAK or the Shah's regime. The Shah's last prime minister, Bakhtiar, believed that the fire had been started by the orders of the mullahs. See Bakhtiar's (1982, p. 140). 8. It is alleged that Ehsan Naraghi, an Iranian writer, had written the Shah's fa• mous speech in which he told his subjects that 'I heard your revolutionary mes• sage' while encouraging university lecturers to go on strike. For more details see Kayhan Newspaper, No.479, 28 October 1993 and No.480,4 November 1993. 9. After the revolution, the shouting of )\llah-0 Akbar' was repeatedly used by the revolutionary authorities to demonstrate support for the revolution. As the revolutionary government consolidated its position and the euphoria of the revolution faded away, the call by religious leaders to do the same hardly took any onto the rooftops, until it was completely abandoned by 1981. 10. The opposition had in fact added red dye to the water. The present regime has used the same technique to create the fountain of blood in Behesht Zahra cemetery in commemoration of those killed in the Iran-Iraq war. Notes 211

11. George Ball had a long background in Iranian matters. He had visited Iran as a member of Lehman Brothers investment firm during the turmoil and had a lengthy discussion with US Ambassador Sullivan. See Sullivan (1981, pp. 220-1). 12. One major difference between the army and air force was the existence of another level of command between the officer and non-commissioned offi• cer ranks called Homafar. This rank had been created to attract young school graduates to the air force to maintain the highly sophisticated equipments. However, the air force not only did not live up to its contrac• tual commitments to the Homafars but failed to consolidate the three-tier system successfully. Consequently, many resigned their commission and those who remained contributed to the disintegration of the air force dur• ing the last days of the Shah's regime.

CHAPTER 5 FROM CONSOLIDATION TO THEOCRATIC DESPOTISM

1. The mercenaries were interviewed by American television after the freed Americans were safely out of Iran. The whole episode was made into a book by Ken Follet, under the title On Wings of Eagles, and later a lengthy motion picture. 2 For more details on the background and the composition of the original Re• volutionary Council and its later alterations, see Bakhash (1986, pp. 39--66). The Revolutionary Council was made up of Ayatollah Motahari, a professor of Islamic philosophy at Teheran University who was later assassinated; Ayatollah Beheshti, Khomeini's representative in Teheran and the architect of the struggle against the Shah and Khomeini's chief negotiator with the military and foreign embassies, later killed by the Mojahedin; Hojjat-ol Eslam Hashemi-e Rafsanjani, later the speaker of the Majlis and the present President of Islamic Republic; Ayatollah Taleghani, a distinguished and pop• ular figure; Ayatollah Javad Bahonar, later the prime minister under Rajaii's presidency, assassinated by the Mojahedin; and the last two personalities, Ayatollah Musavi Ardebili and Mahdavi Kani, both members of the present regime. Non-cleric members included Mir Hossein Musavi, the co-founder of the IRP; Bani-Sadr, later the first president and now in exile in France; Habibollah Payman; , Khomeini's adviser in Paris, later executed for plotting against the regime; and Jalal Musavi, Ayatollah's Be• heshti's close adviser. 3. In an interview with some local residents of , the centre of , I learnt that Khalkhali had ordered the execution of a police offi• cer who had wrongly been kept in the same cell as other prisoners waiting to be tried by him. He had ordered the execution without listening to the of• ficer and his pleas of innocence. It was widely believed that similar incidents had happened at the hands of other Islamic judges else where in the country. 4. Such incidents are of regular recurrence. A group of so-called students at• tacked the head office of the Farad and Dad-e Sokhan newspapers on 23 April 1992 alleging that the newspaper had published a cartoon which 212 Notes

looked like Khomeini (/(.ayhan Newspaper, No. 401, 23 April 1992). A book• seller by the name of Morgh-e Amin was attacked and set on fire for selling a book with the title of Gods Laugh on Mondays on 22 August 1995 (Kayhan Newspaper, No. 571, 31 August 1995). 5. This statement is attributed to Ali Asghar Hadj-Sayyed-Javadi. Sayyed-Ja• vadi was one of the prominent writers who contributed extensively to the making of the 1979 revolution through his criticism of the Shah's regime. After the revolution, he became one of the staunch critics of the revolution• ary regimes through his articles such as 'They are taking us to the gallows' and 'The guns that only fires lies' a reference to Khomeini's unfulfilled pro• mises. 6. For more details on the debates in the Assembly of Experts and the Iranian Constitution of 1979 and the institutionalization of Velayat-e Faghih, see Said Saffari's 'The Legitimation of the Clergy's Right to Rule', in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1993. 7. Originally, 66 Americans were taken hostage on 7 November. Of those cap• tured, 13 women and blacks were released on 17 November. One hostage was released for medical reasons on 11 July 1980, leaving 52 in the hands of militant students until 20 January 1981. 8. Bani-Sadr, son of a cleric, received his education in Ramadan and later in Teheran University, where he became involved in politics. He continued his education in France, where he became acquainted with French Marxist sociologist, Paul Vieile, who influenced Bani-Sadr's intellectual and politi• cal development He wrote extensively and became a critique of the Shah's regime. He later became an advocate of Shi's Islam and a classless society without a dominant ideology, unlike Khomeini's doctrine of Velayat-e Fa• ghih. To Bani-Sadr, the perfect and classless Islamic society - the universal Kingdom of the Twelfth Imam - would take twelve generations to reach after the inception of the first Islamic state. As to how this Islamic state is achieved, Bani-Sadr only suggests that 'Muslims should act'. Bani-Sadr's commitment to the overthrow of the Shah and Khomeini's leadership in that goal brought the two together. 9. See Cordesman (1987), Lloyd's Shipping Economist Study Economic and Maritime Implication of the Iran-Iraq JJfzr, McLachlan and Joffe (1984) Sick, in Ramazani (1990) and Zabih (1988), and numerous other publica• tions on this subject 10. is divided by the Karoun river. The northern part, which fell into the Iraqi hands, was the main part and the nearest to the Iraqi line of advance. However, the naval base in the southern region stayed in the hands of the Iranian navy although the whole base was demolished by artillery fire across the river. 11. After the defeat of Iranian forces in A1 Faw, reporters found many dead Iranian soldiers without any injuries. It was believed that Iraqis had used chemical weapons as in Halabcheh. 12 Barbara Honegger was the former member of the Reagan-Bush presiden• tial campaign staffs in 1980. She is now working as a private investigator. She alleges that during two meetings in Paris and Washington between Bush, Richard Allen and Donald Greg and the agents of the Islamic Re• public large sums of money were passed to the Iranians to delay the release Notes 213

of hostages until after the election and the presidency of Reagan. In return, the Reagan administration argued for the sale of arms to Iran, which sub• sequently created the Iran-Contra (Irangate) scandal. 13. ~mong those executed were Said Sultanpour, a left-wing poet, who had been adopted by Amnesty International as a prisoner of conscience for opposi• tion to the Shah, and Ali-Asghar Amirani, proprietor and editor-in-chief of the political journal Khandaniha and Saadati, a leader of Mojahedin - pre• viously sentenced to ten years 'imprisonment? The executions included teen• age children and elderly women, whose bodies were left hanging on public gallows. It was reported by Amnesty International that a 15-year-old boy and 13-year-old girl, both described as 'supporters ofMojahedins', had been executed ('fmnesty International Report,l982, pp. 323-4~ 14. For the list of those assassinated by the Mojahedin, see Abrahamian (1989, pp. 220-3) and Hiro (1985, pp.l86-97). 15. These conclusions are derived from discussions and interviews with differ• ent officers during 1981 and 1982 After the purge of the Thdeh Party some were arrested and many fled the country. 16. The break-up of the Soviet Union, the end to the Cold War and the United States' so-called 'New World Order' after the Second Gulf War has changed the geopolitical situation in the Persian Gulf region. The United States' strong presence in the region on the one hand, and the rearmament of the Arab states on the other, has counter-balanced the threat of Islamic funda• mentalism. The US and the West are no longer dependent upon Iranian oil. The regime in Iran is also politically isolated because of the Salman Rushdie affair. With the collapse of the Soviet threat, a stronger Iran is re• garded more as a threat to the stability of the region than a bulwark against communism. More importantly, it seems that Islam is being considered as a substitute for the threat of communism creating a new East-West tension.

CHAPTER 6 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

1. When Dr K. Kharrazi, the permanent representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN was asked (in May 1991 at the Royal Institute of Interna• tional Affairs) about the nature of the despotic rule of the mullahs and the religious dictatorship in Iran, he declared that the Islamic Republic is one of the true democracies because, he said, that the regime had held eleven elections in as many years of its existence. 2. The vast body of literature on the 1979 revolution ranges from historical, the• oretical studies and economic analysis. See Green (1982), Looney (1982), Ar• jomand (1988), Bashiriyeh (1984), Moadel (1993) and Abrahamian (1982~ 3. See Daneshvar's 'Revolution in Iran', thesis, 1993, University of Southampton for an analysis of Green and Arjomand's work. 4. An exception is Moadel, who believes that ideology played the crucial role in the He asserts: 'The Iranian case provided a serious anomaly to many dominant theories of revolution. The revolution occurred without the breakdown of the state, without the presence of economic or 214 Notes

political crisis, and without even the participating groups and classes having the kind of organizational resources necessary to paralyse the formidable power of the state: For more details see Moadel (1993~ 5. The first time I heard a comment similar to the one quoted was on the BBC Radio 4, Today programme, by John Humphrys. 6. It was widely believed in Teheran in 1979-80 that the Libyan government had helped the mullahs to power with approximately $200 million. There is no evidence to support this, but the claim is quite plausible in view of Colo• nel Ghaddafi's hatred of the Shah. After the revolution, the mullahs began to accuse Ghaddafi of having been behind the disappearance of Imam Musa Sadr, the Iranian Shi'i leader in . It was widely believed that Ghaddafi had said that he had spent more than $200 million in helping the mullahs to power and was not prepared to let them. get away with it. Also, when the PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat, visited Iran only days after the col• lapse of the Shah's regime he received a cheque for 900 million Rials ($12- 13 million). This cheque was printed in the then free Iranian newspapers. References

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Abadan 20, 6S, 105, 156, 204 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 146, 147 Abbas Mirza 11 Burujerdi, Ayatollah 49, 51, 52 Mgbanistan 2, 77, 129 Bushehr 66 AtZali, Captain 172 Ahmad Shah 11, 202-4 Capitulation 58 Al-e Ahmad, Jalal 82, 85-7, 204, 208-9 Carter, funmy 79, 94, 99, lll, 123, 1~ Ala, Hossein 9, 18, 40-1, 71 CENTO 46, 51, ISS Alam, Assadollah 42 51, 53-4, 57, 69 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 30-1, Alavi Shi'ism 84 41, 69, 96, 103, 112, 160, 164, lfi7 Allied Occupation of Iran 6-8 Chodour (veil) 106 Ameri, Nasser 71 Chamran, Mustafa 136, 158 Amini, Ali 38, 44, 49-53, 113 Chehelsetooni, Ayatollah 34 Amnesl¥ International 79, 96 Churc:hill, Winston 21, 30 Amouzegar, Jamshid 73, 97, lOS Clark, Ramsey 122 Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 6, 202-3 Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 S D~ 14--15,203 Ansari, Houshang 73 Dowreh 71 Arab-Israeli War 76 Dulles, Allen 33 Ardebili, Ayatollah 137, 162, 211 Dulles, John Foster 33 A~ani, Hassan SO, 52-3, 62 Ashraf; Princess 24, 28, 69, 97, 205 Eden, Anthony 21 Ayat, Hassan 137, 163, 170 Ensflll (Man) 8S Azhari, General 108-10,112,118 Entezam, Amir 119, 146

Baghdad Pact 46 Falk, Richard 122 Bahaism 70-1 Fallahi, General 164 Bahonar, Javad 170,211 Farah, Fmpress 69 Bakhtiar, Shapour 68,96--7, 114--15; Farsi, Jalal al-Din 133, 148 Huyser's mission and 118-23, 124; 177, Fatemi, Hossein Y1 200,209-10 Faza-ye baz-e Siossi (open political Bakhtiar, Taymour 40-1 forum) 96, 99 Ball, George lll, 211 Fedayian-e Eslam 18, 60 Bandar Abbas 66 Fedayian-e Khalgh 87-8, 98, 115, 131, 139 Bani-Sadr, Abolhassan 98; presidency Forouhar, Darioush 96--7, 106 148-50; overthrow 162; 211 Bazargan, Mehdi 49, 57, 81, 88-9, 97, 106, Ghafari, Hojjat ol-Eslam 133, 136 110, 114, 119, 124; premiership 129-32, Ghafouri, Golzadeh 144 146,143, m Ghllrbzadege (Westoxication) 82, 86 Behbahani, Ayatollah 24, 34, 36, 52 Ghotbzadeh, Sadegh 123, 211 Beheshti, Ayatollah 123, 137, 144, 148, 164-- Gharabaghi, General 118-20, m 5, 168, 177, 211 Great Civilization 1, 56, 6S, 75 Bevin, Ernest 19 Birjand 12 Hadayat 15 Bowling, John W. ~ Halabcheh 160, 212 Britain, nineteenth-century Iran and 4--5; Harriman, Averell 23 oil nationalization and 19-21; Hashemi-e Rafsanjani 134, 137, 143, 149, involvement in coup 26--9; 165--6, 172, 211 participation in operation Ajax 33-6; Homafars 124--S, 211 consortium agreement and 38-40 Homayoun, Darioush 101

226 Index 2TI

Hoveyda, Amir Abbas 64, 70, 72, 96-7 Mashad 2, 103, 113, 145, 160 Huyser, General 18-23 Mazloom (Oppressed) 109 Mellioon Party 44 Imami, Jamal 24-5 Moghaddam, General 114 India 77 Mohammad Ali Shah 11 Indo-Pakistan War 76 Mohamad Reza Shah, accession to International Court 20 throne 6; Musaddiq and 24, six Iqbal, Manouchehr 41-2,45,52, 69,71 point programme 53; the Rastakhiz Iran-e Novin Party 71 Party and 73-4; foreign media and Iran-Iraq War 130, 133-4, 150, 153-62 78-9; Carter's visit and 94; visit to Iraq 46,77 US 99, 108; message to the 2 nation 108-9; fmal departure 117 137-9, 142, 148; Mojahedin 88; SAVAK and 92-3, 98, 115, fall ofBani-Sadr 162, 164-7; 131, 139, 140; and fall of Bani-Sadr Mojahedin and 167-71 162-7, 1()1-72, 209 ltedal Party 11 Monafeghin (Hypocrites) 91 Montazeri, Ayatollah 108, 172 Jackson, B. A. 20 Morrison, Herbert 19-21 Jafari, Shahan 34, 71 Motahari, Ayatollah 134, 144, 211 Jaleh Square 106 Musaddiq, Mohammad, oil nationalization and 9, 18-22; 1933 oil Kashani, Ayatollah 18, 23, 25--6, 28, 32, 35, agreement and 15; oil concession to 52,205 the Soviet Union and United States Kasravi, Ahmad 202 and 16-17; premiership and 9, 19; the Kavtaradza, Sergi 16 Tudeh Party and 22-3; the coup Kennedy, l F., 45-6, 56-7 and 26-9, 33-5; 195 Khalkhali, Hojjat ol-Eslam 135, 211 Khamene'i, Ali (Ayatollah) 137, lSl, 172 Nabavi, Behzad 136 Khatam, General 105, 210 Naser al-Din Shah 11 Khomeini, Ayatollah 1, 3; women suffrage Nassiri, Colonel 34, 103, 109 bill and 1963 riots 53-5; capitulation National Front, formation 12; coup agreement and 58-9, 87; Mojahedin and 30--6; 1963 riots and 53; and 91, 101; incident and 102; Bakhtiar government 114-16; 138 Muharram and 110-12; Bakhtiar Negative Equilibrium 12, 17 government and 114-16; return to NIOC (National Iranian Oil Iran 123-4; formation of Islamic Company) 38-9 Republic 131-2; and the US, 145-8; Nixon, Richard 65, 76 and the military, 151-3; and the Iran• Iraq war, 160-1, 172-3; and the fall of Oil, nationalization 9, 17, 18; 1933 Bani-Sadr 162-7 Agreement 13; concession to the Khomeini, Mustafa 98 Soviet Union 16, 17; concession to the Khoramshahr 65, 80, 154, 156 US 17; consortium 38, 45, 47; price Kianouri, Nour al-Din 139, 171 increase 62; price increase and the Lochridge, James 34 us 77-9 Luce, Don 122 OPEC 77 Oveisi, General 106 Madani, Admiral 148, 151 Majlis, formation 4, 5; oil nationalization Pahlavi Foundation 64, 109 and 9,18 Pakistan 2, 46 Malctab (Doctrine) 83 Parsons, Anthony 199 Maleki, Khalil 33, 37, 208 Perot, Ross 132 Mandela, Nelson 200 Mansur, Hassan 57, 60, 70-1 Qaranay, General 40, 134 Mardom Party 44, 71 Qavam, Ahmad 7, 22, 25-8 228 Index

Rafsanjani, see Hashemi-e Rafsanjani Siahkal 87, 91 Rajaii, Mohammad-Ali 149, 163-5, 170 South Africa 200 Rashidians 29, 33 Soviet Union, Iran during the Second Rastakhiz Party (Resurgence Party) 72-3, World War and 7, 16; 74-5, 77, 117, 202, 95,99 204 Rayshahri, Mohammad 150, 172 Razmara, Ali 9, 18 Talabeh (religious students) 86 Reagan, Ronald 147, 213 Taleghani Ayatollah 49, 57; Mojahedin Rex Cinema 105, 210 and 89-90; 108, 109, 110, 112, 211 Reza Shah, abdication 6; coming to Taymourtash 14 power 6; 1933 Oil Agreement 14-15; Tudeh Party 8, oil nationalization 203-4 and 22-3; the coup and 30--3, 37; 115, Roosevelt, Franklin 17 139,171-2 Roosevelt, Kermit 31, 34, 36, 40, 103, 210 Roshanfekr (Intellectuals) 85 Ummah (Islamic Community) 83 Russia, nineteenth-century Iran and 4, 5; United States, and Iran during the Second 202--4 World War 16; Musaddiq and the role of 29-35; post-Musaddiq period Sadat, President 117 and 45-9; the Shah and 74-80; oil Safavi Shi'ism 84 price increase 77-9; and Bakhtiar Sahabi, Yadollah 57 government 115-18; Khomeini Sanjabi, Karim 37, 96-7, 106, 108, 110, 112- and 145-8, 204 15,138 USSR, see Soviet Union SAVAK 41, 52, 56, 60, 68, 72, 92, 95, 97, 100, 103, 107, 115, 132, 135, 169, 205, 210 Velayat-e Faghih (Governance of the Sayyed Zia 12, 19, 203 Jurist) 137, 141-2, 147, 172, 212 Scott, David 112 Shariati, Ali 83, ulama and 84-5; 91, 207- Yazdi, Ibrahim 113, 135, 146, 200 8 Young, Andrew 109 Shariatmadari, Ayatollah 102, 108, 110, 115, Young, T. Cuyler 48, 206 138,142--4 Sharif-Emami, Jafar 45, 49, 69, 105--6, 108 Zaehner, Robin 21-2,27,29 Shayegan, Ali 37 Zahedi, Fazlollah 33-4, 36-40 Shiraz 160, 164, 206 Zoroastians 3