Notes INTRODUCTION 1. Kasravi's Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran (History of the Iranian Constitution), 1961, offers the best detailed analysis of the 1906 revolution. Despite other numerous publications on the same subject, there is still dispute over the precise causes of this revolution, especially in view of the 1979 revolution, which has coloured the opinion of some analysts in Iran. 2. The Bolshevik Revolution and the eventual departure of the Russian troops together with the occupation of the north by the British forces paved the way for the imposition of the 1919 Agreement. With Lord Curzon as foreign secre­ tary, the stage was set for the launching of Curzon's most cherished political ambitions which was 'the regeneration of Persia under British tutelage as one of the friendly countries' (Wright, 1985, p. 205). Therefore, the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919, which had been the subject of secret negotiations with Vusugh al-Dowleh, Sarem al-Dowleh and Nosrat al-Dowleh, was made public on 19 August 1919. The terms of the agreement, even though disguised, clearly showed that the country was becoming a British protectorate. According to the agreement, the Persian government was giving Britain a special position in return for a loan of £2 million at 7 per cent (Annual Register, 1919, p. 255~ Ahmad Shah, in the meantime, was rewarded by a long-awaited tour of Europe after he had fulfilled his obligation by keeping the pro-British trium­ virate of ministers in their posts to complete the necessary negotiations. However, the treaty had to be ratified by the Majlis. Throughout 1919, the Iranian reaction to the treaty grew more hostile. Rus­ sia's denunciation of the treaty as a 'weak agreement as a scrap of paper hav­ ing no legal validity' (Butler and Woodward, quoted in Ghods, 1989, p. 55), together with the concern of the United States and France over the whole affair, only served to encourage the nationalist and anti-imperialist move­ ments throughout the country. During 1920, the nationalists' hostility to the presence of British troops in Iran and the treaty grew and caused many pro­ blems for the British in Iran. By 1921, the British government reluctantly accepted defeat in the face of massive opposition and outraged public opinion, which had turned into a terror campaign against the British interests and those who were classed as 'Lovers of England' (Fatemi, 1952, quoted in Cottam, 1979, p. 185). Public outrage against the British was partly the result of rumours of pay-offs to of.. ficials and continuous denunciation ofthe treaty by the newspapers and per­ iodicals. It must also be noted that the support of the United States and the Soviet Union given to the Iranian opposition to the treaty helped the nation­ alists to claim a victory against British expansionism. It was indeed the first time since the 1906 revolution that the nationalists could claim that they had achieved a victory without the support of an external power. Perhaps more significantly, the movement showed the power of nationalism as a force which could have a place in Iranian politics. It was also an important victory 202 Notes 203 for the nationalists as the ulamds role in these movements in the country had not been as significant as the constitutional movement, even though in some regions local clergy had supported the nationalists. 3. The key turning point in the modern history of Iran is the 1921 coup detat and the coming to power-of Reza Khan. This episode in Iranian history is particularly interesting and has proved controversial because of one signifi­ cant factor: the role of the British in the whole affair. Although the dissatis­ faction of the Iranians with the central government was at its height in 1921 and nationalist movements such as Jangalis at:td Khiabani were proving be­ yond the government's capability to control, it was remarkable for a self.. made Cossack commander to seize power under the noses of the British forces and the British Legation. Therefore, was Reza and Sayyed Zia's blood­ less coup of 23 February 1921 an inspired British plot to put into power a lea­ der with an impeccable record of bravery and honesty to harness nationalist fervour? The 34-year-old Sayyed Zia was well known for his sympathy to­ wards the British and Reza's association with the British officers who had taken over the affairs of the Cossack Brigade was well known. The theory of a plot to bring Reza Khan to power is important. For the foundation of Pahlavi dynasty was laid in 1921 and indeed the legitimacy of the Pahlavis would then be weighed, argued and questioned in the later years. Many Iranians believed that the 1921 coup was concluded by a carefully planned plot, with General Ironside, Lt.-Col. Smyth, Reza Khan and Sayyed Zia as key players (Fardoust, 1991, pp. 82-4; Najmi, 1991, pp. 48-51~ The re­ newal ofD~rcy's oil agreement of1933 by Reza Shah, for instance, and its ex­ tension by a further 30 years, has also been used by many opponents and indeed ordinary Iranians as proof of Britain's involvement in the 1921 coup (Musaddiq, p. 445; Katouzian, 1981, p. 129). By April1921, the British govern­ ment, faced with strong forces of nationalism and anti-British feelings, had decided to withdraw its Norperforce whose function was the 'Support our [British] Minister's policy at Teheran and to induce the Persian Government to subserve British interests' (Mobereley, quoted in Wright, 1977, p. 178) from Iran. With the removal of its forces, the British needed a strong leader who could safeguard their long-term interests and make a bulwark against the ris­ ing tide of communism. The task of identifYing such a character was given to General Ironside and his administrator in the Cossack Brigade. When General Ironside took charge of the Cossack Brigade, with the help of the British Legation in Teheran, he first persuaded the reluctant Ahmad Shah to dismiss the Russian officers attached to the Brigade. Then he ap­ pointed Lt.-Col. Smyth to control the administration and fmances of the Cossacks. In the meantime, Ahmad Shah appointed Sardar Homayoun to command the brigade. But Homayoun, a political figure with no influence in the force, was soon encouraged to go on leave by Ironside. Ironside had al­ ready made his choice of a Persian officer to lead the Cossacks. He wrote in his diary: 'I have interviewed Reza Khan and have put him definitely in charge of the Persian Cossacks. He is a man and the straightest I have met yet ... I made two things clear to Reza when I agreed to let him go: (1) That he must make no attempt to shoot me up behind as he goes or as I go. That would lead to his annihilation and good to nobody except the Revo­ lutionary Party. 204 Notes (2) That the Shah must on no account be deposed. Reza promised glibly enough and I shook hands with him. I have told Smyth to let go gradually (Ironside, cited by Wright, 1977, p. 182~ General Ironside was summoned to Baghdad two days later and by 23 February, Reza Khan, in association with Sayyed Zia, executed their coup and forced Ahmad Shah to name Sayyed Zia as prime minister. Although much of the evidence indicates that the British Legation in Teheran was not involved in the coup, it strongly reaffirms that the coup was carried out with the knowledge of the British officers attached to the Cossack Brigade. This certainly was the impression that Major-General Dickson had at the time. In a letter to a member of the US legation, dated 6 June 1921, he wrote how he now saw Colonel Smyth in Qazvin and how Smyth admitted that 'it was he [Smyth] that had organised the Cossack Coup in Teheran' (National Archives, American Legation Despatch, August 1925, quoted in Wilber, 1976, p. 48). 4. Although the US's support for the Soviets' withdrawal was important, it was not as crucial as it was portrayed at the time. Even the Shah believed that it was President Truman's warning which forced the withdrawal, but latest re­ search shows that this had not been the case. For more details, see Pahlavi (1980b, p. 45, and Bull 1988, pp. 37, 465~ CHAPTER 1 THE RISE AND FALL OF MOHAMMAD MUSAD­ DIQ, 1951-3 1. The production of oil increased from 7 500 000 tons in 1943 to 16 800 000 in 1945. During the war the production of aircraft fuel increased to a new level of 1 million tons a year. At the same time the capacity of Abadan's refinery was increased to 17 million tons a year by 1945 to cope with the demands by the Allied forces. 2. The resolution made it a criminal offence for any government official to dis­ cuss oil concessions with 'any official or unofficial representative of any coun­ try or any company or anybody else'. For more details see Nejatee (1986, p. 41). 3. Al-e Ahmad tells of his shame when, as a young member of the party in charge of keeping discipline and order in one of the demonstrations against the resolution, he witnessed the arrival of Russian soldiers on the scene. See Al-e Ahmad (1978). 4. The AIOC not only undermined the sovereignty of the country, but it gener­ ated hatred towards the British. Abadan, where the biggest refmery was built, was the heart of the AIOC's operation and is still a good example of the AIOC's discriminatory policies towards its Iranian workers.