Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives: Counter Containment or Engagement with the US

Naser Hadian* and Shani Hormozi∗∗

Abstract The Iran-US relations since 1979 Revolution have remained tension-ridden. Various efforts towards resolution of the sensitive and critical issues between them have failed to bear fruit. The present article looks into the state of these relations from the vantage of Iran’s security environment and how the U.S. policies, particularly since the 2001 occupation of Afghanistan and 2003 war of choice in Iraq, have dramatically affected Iran’s immediate security environment. The paper argues that as a result of the removal of the Taliban and Ba’athist regimes and the emergence of pro-Iran ruling coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran’s regional stature and influence was enhanced, which also coincided with simultaneous shrinking of US material and symbolic resources in the region. The article also tries to shed light on the parameters of Iran 's security environment, decision making processes, sources of security and defense policies, which would help towards a better understanding of the reasons and rationale for the still tumultuous relations with the US, including in particular on Iran’s nuclear program. A review of the past U.S. strategies in dealing with Iran as well as of the alternative strategies currently on the table – Containment, Comprehensive and Selective Engagements, Military option – and Iran’s Counter Containment strategy, indicates that given the actual situation in the region a mere continuation of the past might simply prove impossible. A full-scale confrontation or a major reconciliation appears to be the only possible scenarios for the future. The paper concludes that Comprehensive Engagement will instead present a way out of the decades-old conflict with tremendous benefits for the protagonists and the surrounding region.

Keywords: Iran-US Relations, Iran's Security Environment, U.S. Strategies, Iran’s Counter Containment, Comprehensive Engagement

* Nasser Hadian, PhD in Political Sciences, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, is professor of Political Sciences, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, University of Tehran, where he also served as the Director of Graduate Studies (1996-98). He served as the Director of the Political Development Program at the Center for Strategic Research - CSR (1992-95). He was a Visiting Professor and Research Scholar at the Middle East Institute and Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures Department, Columbia University (2001-04). His areas of scholarly and research interests include Iranian contemporary politics, Iran’s nuclear program, and political Islam. He recently authored several articles on the nuclear debate in Iran for the Contemporary Security Policy (in English) and for Political Quarterly and Research Letter of Political Science (in Persian). ∗∗ Shani Hormozi, M.A. in Political Sciences, Islamic Azad University, is currently a research fellow at the Center for Strategic Research – CSR. Ms. Hormozi has authored several research and policy papers on Iran-US relations, Iran's nuclear program, and U.S. politics. Her recent edited books (in Persian) are: The U.S. Strategy towards the Islamic World (2009), and The United States and Global Economic Crisis (2010).

IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 4, Winter 2011, pp. 13-55 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives

Introduction The objective off this paper is to provide an overview of Iran’s national securityy environment, challenges, opportunities,, and imperatives, with specific consideration for the US-Iran relationsns as a critical factor andnd its current dynamics and future prospects.s. The paper initially willll provide a rather brief background on the evolvingvolving nature of Iran’s security environment and the historical factors affecting and shapingaping Iranian perceptions and policies. It willill also look into the three major events in recent decades thatt have transformed the domestic and foreign security landscape off Iran; Islamic Revolutionon in 1979, collapse of the Soviet Union, and the US invasion of Afghanistanghanistan and Iraq. The security and politicalolitical environment of Iran will be examined in order to arrive at a better grasp of the rangege of strategic and security predicaments the Islamic Republic faces. The paper will also address the role and impactpact of such factors as Iran’s experience with external war, economicmic and geopolitical imperatives,eratives, national pride, threat perceptions,s, and ideology in shapinging Iran’s decision-making process and thinkinging on national security. Turning to US-Iran relations, the paper will then present a brief review of these relations since the Revolution, including a cataloguetalogue of contentious issuesssues between the two sides. While Iran’s nuclear program, terrorismm and extremism, the Palestinian-Israeli conflictict and the Middle East peace process, and the issue of human rightss have been the major issues for the Americans, Iranian concernss have included the followinglowing: sanctions, Iranian frozen assets, deliberateiberate

14 IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairss disregard of Iran'sn's regional stature and role, continuing U.S.S. and NATO operationsons in Iran's security environment, supportrt for secessionist movements,ements, interference in Iran’s domestic affairs,rs, and expeditious withdrawaldrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistananistan and Iraq. The reviewview will also address the issues and situations where Iran and U.S. share common concerns and interests - Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan – even if for their own particular reasonsasons - and at a more strategicrategic level, security in the Persian Gulf, includingcluding long-term securityty of energy sources. Furthermore, such alternativernative strategies as selectivective or comprehensive engagement, containment,nment, and military optionon for the U.S., and the counter-containment strategytrategy for Iran, will be reviewed from the vantage point of assessingg their usefulness or effectivenessectiveness in managing - and preferably resolvinglving – issues and situationsons of contention. Based on thehe discretion that the resort thus far to thee wide gamut of foreignn policy tools in support of “cold peace” andd “cold war” has failed to resolve outstanding issues between Iran andnd the U.S., the paper concludes that continuation of the past may simply prove impossible,, in which case search for a new alternative approachproach geared to better management and improvement of relations is well justified.

Historical and Structural Context Iran, a sizeable countryountry located in one of the most vital and strategicrategic parts of the world,rld, borders seven other countries. It connectscts the Middle East to Central Asia and Southwest Asia, and is situatedituated between the oil-richich and strategically significant Persian Gulf andnd the Caspian Sea. Three timess during the past 32 years events of great historicalstorical significance havee transformed Iran’s national, regional and global setting - the 19799 Revolution, collapse of the Soviet Union, andnd the U.S. response to September 11. First, the Revolutionevolution changed not only the prism through which

15 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives the outside worldd was received and interpreted, but also how Iranan was perceived and treatedreated (Mesbahi, 1997; and 2009)1; disruptionion of relations with thehe U.S. and Saddam Hussein’s full-scale military aggression were the most consequential results. Iran’s sharedd long border with the Soviet Union played an important role for thee West during much of the Cold War. Because of its strategic location,cation, geopolitics, and large oil reserves, Iran occupied an importantportant position for bothh East and West during this period. Its alliancece with the West, along with domestic stability, was deemed crucial to the preservation of Western interests (Chubin, 2002). As an extensionsion of its strategic significanceificance, Iran, as of 1972 under the U.S. Nixon Doctrine, becamee the main pillar of stability in the Persian Gulf.lf. The 1979 Iranian Revolutionolution changed the geopolitics of Iran; an overnighternight transformation fromom one of the closest and most strategic allies of the U.S. to one of its most vehement opponents. Iran’s threat perceptionception and foreign policyy priorities underwent radical change with respectpect to its immediate environmentnvironment and the larger world at this pivotal juncture. Social revolutions,lutions, often seek and entail fundamental changeshanges not only in domesticmestic arrangements of power but also aim at restructuring the country’s foreign relations, and even fancy changanging established regionalnal and international institutions, norms andd rules. Iranian Revolutionon was no exception. The post-revolutionaryry new power elite in Iranran sought a change in the status quo both in the surrounding regionon and on a world scale. Iranian revolutionarieses were willing – ideologicallycally at least - to consider and, if necessary, usee non- conventional meansans in pursuing their ideals and objectives. However,wever, as it often happensns with the revolutionary situations, as time passed, revolutionary fervorrvor abated, and conditions changed, graduallyually a pragmatist line emergedmerged that favored if not a totally new vision of the world but at leastast new conventional methods embedded in and supported by a different reading of Islam that would enable thehe new establishment to achievea their revolutionary objectives2.

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It is interestingting to note that while successive periodic electionsections have brought differentifferent parliaments and administrations to power since the early daysys of the Revolution, but the overall perceptionsns and general objectiveses of the power elite regarding the internationalational political system have remained almost the same. In their view,ew, the dominant world order and power arrangement are hierarchicallychically organized to the disadvantage of Iran, the Muslim World, andnd the developing worldd in general, it is unjust both in terms of a revolutionary readingding of Islam as well as the current conceptiontion of Iran’s national intereststerests, and hence, it must be changed. Instrumentsuments of achieving changenge have varied from one administration to anonother. Rafsanajani and Khatami – considering, of course, the nuance differences in outlook,utlook, discourse, and actual conduct – tendedded to pursue desired change through established and internationallyionally accepted rules and norms. Ahmadinejad, coming in 2005 on a platform critical of the previous two outlooks, took a differentfferent approach. Second, collapselapse of the Soviet Union changed Iran’s geopolitics,politics, and removed thee limited umbrella of the Cold War. By exposingposing Iran’s northern frontierrontier and further complicating the problemss of an already border/neighborneighbor-saturated country, the collapse openeded the Pandora’s Box off a totally new situation fraught with both potentialotential opportunities andnd actual vulnerabilities. The impact off this development on Iran’s security environment was tremendous by all accounts; the emergingmerging new geo-politics all but changed the threat and opportunity equation for Iran. All of a sudden Iran foundd itself bordering three new land neighbors, and two new states vying independently forr access to and influence in the Caspian Sea.. Even though Iran’s chanceshances for using the unfolding opportunitiesies for cooperation withh these countries increased, but the immediatemediate regional and the supra-regional decision to isolate Iran, especiallyially in the area of energy,y, severely hampered the practical realization off these potentials – whichh was made worse due to the sudden eruptionn of an

17 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives ethno-territorial conflict between two of the new neighborsbors - Azerbaijan and Armenia (Mesbahi, 2001). Withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistanfghanistan and the ensuing internal bloodlettingdletting between various Mujahedin factions with its attendant instabilitytability faced Iran with thehe second wave of refugee influx. Iran also becamecame a significant transitt route for narcotics at this time – an unfortunatertunate situation that has persisted since and even become worse as instabilitytability has further perpetuatedtuated in Afghanistan in the post-2001 period. Third, the 9/11 tragic events served as the catalyst for yet another round of drastic change in Iran’s regional if not itsts very national securityy environment. The U.S. invaded Afghanistan,nistan, removed the Talibaniban from power, substantially weakened Al-QQaeda, and in a “war of choice” occupied Iraq and overthrew Saddamaddam Hussein’s Ba’athistist regime. The new situation created a new securityecurity environment thatt fundamentally transformed the security landscapecape in the region. Initially,ally, friends and foes, actors and spectators, all felt baffled at the nature of the emerging security complex, whose strategic calculus gradually clarified itself with the passage of timeme and lent itself to easierasier contemplation and speculation of its future potentials. U.S.-led invasionvasion of Afghanistan and Iraq led to the emergencergence of a new security environment, whose principal beneficiary happenedppened to be a U.S. regionalonal rival – Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran’s avowedvowed enemies in the eastast and west were replaced by friendly governmentsments. Moreover, the U.S.S. engagement in two costly wars and the increasingreasing pressure on availableilable resources at the national level, with serious negative repercussionsssions for the domestic economy, caused substantialstantial constriction in thee US material and symbolic resources at regionalnal and international levels.els. While the U.S. regional allies suffered a rather sharp deficit in legitimacy,egitimacy, a much buoyed Iran felt itself in a positionosition to build importantnt security, intelligence and military infrastructureture in neighboring countriesuntries – as explained later by Iranian officialsfficials primarily for deterrenceterrence purposes against possible outside hostile

18 IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairss actions or retaliationtion in case of a military attack. It was rather ironic that the new securityurity environment was good enough of an incentivecentive for the power eliteite in Iran to assume the mantle of a proponentnent of “status quo” ratherher than act according to its traditional revolutionarytionary predisposition andd impulse - at least for medium term. Lookingg at the actual tally, it can be said that since the early years of the decadee Iran’s regional foreign policy objectives have not been revolutionary. Considerationion of the following features – thoughh not exhaustive - can help us arrive at a better understanding of Iran’s foreign policy behavior.havior. First - Rentierer State. The government in Iran is the sole recipientcipient of the oil and gass revenues that account for over 80percent of state’s income and foreigneign exchange earnings. Monopoly in receiptpt and control over suchh a source of easy and abundant income has led to the government’ss relative autonomy from the society as welll as its simultaneous dependencependence on the international communityy and external markets – a feature shared by the state both before andd after the 1979 Revolutionution. With its hands on the oil revenueses, the government in Iranran has exercised a considerable degree of influencefluence in determining whichhich projects to be funded, which social groupss to be given privileged access to consumption possibilities, and also which country or bloc off countries would constitute Iran’s major tradingng and economic partners.rs. The same phenomenon also makes it vulnerablenerable to major price – and ultimately, income fluctuations - withh quite serious policy repercussionspercussions (Farhi, 1990), Second - Ayatollahyatollah Khomeini called the post-monarchy Iranian state an Islamic Republic, which was subsequently enshrinedd and encoded in the 1979 Constitution. It is Islamic because it shoulduld be instituted and governedoverned according to the law of Islam - Maximalistimalist view - or it shouldd not contradict Islamic Shariah - Minimalist view. It is Republic because,use, while acting under the overall ultimate Divine sovereignty, as perer various provisions of the Constitution, it is based on the will and sovereignty of the people – to be effected throughhrough

19 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives holding regular, periodic elections, separation of powers,s, and institution of someme form of constitutional check and balance.e. But, what was seeminglyngly assumed at the outset to be a theoreticallyetically justified and practicallyctically working easy combination, later provedd quite problematic and came to be judged as an unconvincing juxtapositionosition of two different phenomena. And at the practical level, statee – as defined and understooderstood in modern political thought - has becomeome an arena where ideological,logical, status and class conflicts are fought out.ut. As a concrete manifestationstation of the dichotomous theoretical-legal divide, active social forceses and political parties/currents tend to lean either toward the Islamicic or the Republican aspect of the Islamic Republicublic – which also somehowhow reflects the very essence of the conflict as well as the moral-politicalitical orientations of the society at large (Hajjarian,jjarian, 2000); Third - Socialcial revolutions, as borne out by history, aree often accompanied withh a peculiar kind of idealism and utopianism – with the particular “utopia”opia” embodying a construction of an idealizeded past or future. But, ass history tells us, it is practically impossible to shape or construct thee reality in a manner commensurate withth the expectations of a post-revolutionary society and its utopia, especiallypecially in the modern world.orld. Whether simply frustrated or convinced of the futility of the projectroject of pursuance of “utopia” in human society,ociety, nonetheless the post-revolutionary population still demandsds the realization of a certainertain level of initial goals and earlier promises.s. Such a society is qualitativelytatively different in various respects from a society that has not experiencedrienced a social revolution, particularly in termss of its demands and expectationspectations as well as in terms of the acceptable norms of state conductt vis-à-vis the rights and entitlements of citizens (Tajzadeh, 2010); Fourth - Iranan is a Multi-Constituent Society comprised of differentfferent ethnic, religious, and lingual minorities – with the ethnic minoritiesnorities mostly inhabitingg the country’s periphery. Many of these minoritiesnorities share close affinitiesnities with their people on the other side of the

20 IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairss geopolitical border.er. This reality – the Iranian peculiar mosaicc - has had, and continuesues to have, an important impact on the nationalational defense and securityurity policies of Iran as a nation-state – independentendent to some large measure from the particular political or ideologicalological mold of the rulingng center. As aptly underlined by former Presiesident Khatami while at the helm: “Whoever presides in Tehran and seekseeks to form a coherent [national] policy must be conscious of the multi- faceted nature of the [Iranian] society.” (Khatami, 2000) Fifth – Irann proper looks at itself as the “motherland” of the Persian language and Shi’ism, which, as borne out by both pastast and contemporary history,story, constitutes an important integral part of the Iranian national identity, and hence, strategic national interests.ts. The role of the Persianian language in contributing to the promotionion of literature and culture in the traditional realm of the larger Persian/Iranian spherephere of influence dates back in a sense to thehe pre- Islamic era, albeitt further strengthened since the early centuries of the Islamic era. The role of Shi’ism - even though shorter in terms of age as compared withh the language – dates back to the sixteenth century when the Safavidsds established the unified Iranian state aroundnd the Twelver School – which has gradually come to form a central feature of the Iranian society,ciety, inclusive of the crux of state policy and pursuit of national interestssts, both before and after 1979.

Iran’s National Security Environment A mere glance at the incredible array of security challenges facingng Iran – now the Islamicic Republic – shows the actual parameters off Iran’s security predicament.ment. Recognition of the reality on the ground is not the same as sympathy.pathy. In the Northth - The stability of the Soviet era has been replacedeplaced by an intense rivalryalry over the resources of the Caspian Sea, largelgely to the territorial, political,litical, economic, and even environmental detrimentriment of Iran (McGuinnn and Mesbahi, 2000). The situation in Azerbaijanrbaijan, where Ilham Aliev’sev’s government is grappling with the questiontion of

21 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives political legitimacycy and the country is still engaged in a seeminglymingly irresolvable politicalical-military conflict with the neighboring Armeniarmenia over Nagorno-Karabakh,arabakh, can hardly project prospects for stabilitybility – with inevitable seriouserious implications and repercussions for Iran. With a sizeable populationtion of Azeris in Iran, Iran reasonably prefers to see a stable and prosperousperous Azerbaijan to its North. Turkmenistan,, also a new neighbor inn the north, facing potential instability as in the Kyrgyzstan and yet in a position to present competition in the oil and gas field and difficultyfficulty on the legal regime in the Caspian Sea, is another area of concern. In the East - Iran’s experience with Afghanistan since 197979 has been quite hectic and tumultuous; a decade of Soviet occupationon and war led to anotherer long period of civil war and jockeying for power, which culminatedd in the emergence of violently anti-Shi’ite, hostile Taliban. The overthrowerthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001 – a positive development for Iran in itself – has been succeeded since withith the presence and activive engagement of U.S. and NATO forces, without any clear prospectsects for withdrawal. Iran’s long, mountainous,us, and porous border with Afghanistan, especially in so far as the refugee and narcotic drugsugs problems are concerned, makes securityty and stability in Afghanistannistan a matter of serious national security interesterest to Iran. While havingng to deal with the economic and social difficultieslties of the continued presenceesence of a large number of Afghan refugees, Iran’s fight against transitsit of Afghan illicit drugs by narco-terrorists hasas been extremely costly in both human and material terms which hass been further compoundednded with the presence of abundant, cheap narcoticsrcotics on Iranian streetsets and the unfortunate expansion of the addict population. This explains the Iranian policy-makers’ preferencee for a strong and stable central government in Afghanistan. Pakistan, anothernother neighbor to the East, while “friendly”dly” in routine politicall-diplomatic terms, presents its own peculiareculiar challenges. Whilee a nuclear power with all its implications, Pakistanakistan has been an ardentdent supporter of the Taliban and harboredd anti-

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Shi’ite/anti-Iranianan regional extremist movements. Givenn the multiethnic naturere of the Pakistani society and on-going ethnic- sectarian feud, prevalence of poverty, continuing disputee and contention with India, rise of extremist Islamist currents, andnd the perennial politicalal instability, Iran has every reason to be concernedcerned about the prospectsects of the emergence of a failed state with nuclear weapons in its immediatemmediate neighborhood – with serious repercussionsussions for the region and even for the world. Iran’s interests withth the Pakistani situationn also include prevention of drugs transit throughhrough Iran, border security,urity, the Baluchistan minority problem, andnd the position and rightsts of Shi’ites in Pakistan, which is also directly related to the Iranian expectationxpectation to see control of extremist elementsnts and currents within Pakistanakistan (Najjar, 2011). In the Westt - Turkey, despite fast growing economic, trade,de, and energy relations and even political cooperation – as reflected in the May 2010 Iran-TTurkey-Brazil initiative on the uranium swapap and current activism in the nuclear negotiations, even though drivenven in large measure by sheer pragmatist concerns and interests - is a NATO member with strongrong traditional military ties to the US andd until recently quite closese liaison with Israel. While the Islamic credentialstials of the current Turkishkish government and the perceptible distance it has taken from the previousrevious established secular posture and politics of the Turkish state hass helped improvement of relations with the Islamic Republic, however,er, the deep-seated undercurrents of historicalcal and traditional rivalries,es, now also compounded by the implicit rivalryry over two competing discourse on the role of Islam in the public sphere, can hardly be neglected.glected. Another criticaltical neighbor to the west is Iraq, with a track record of conflict relationsons with Iran since Iraq emerged as an independentendent state in 1921 and tumultuous relations with the Islamic Republicc since 1979, including a bloody, protracted 8-year war and a host of still unresolved war-related issues. Even if the post-Saddamm new governance structurecture is closely allied with Iran – much to the

23 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives strongly-felt resentmentntment of a segment of the Iraqi populationon and most of the Arabb world - Iraq is still hosting a large number of US forces and is expectedpected to enjoy close relations with the U.S. in the future even afterr total withdrawal of the American forces.. Iraq, despite close historical,torical, religious, institutional and personal ties,es, and even under a friendlyendly pro-Iran coalition, presents particular securityecurity challenges for Iranran: still smoldering war-related bitter memories;mories; contention betweeneen Iran and U.S. in the Iraqi theatre in practicallycally all areas; and potentialntial rivalry over regional stature and influence,luence, especially in the Persian Gulf. The fact that many capitals in thee Arab world and also influentialnfluential conservative, Neocon quarters in thehe U.S. (Bolton, 2009, WWolfowitz, 2009) – who are unhappy with the Iranian influence in Iraqq – would like to see Iraq pursue a hostile policy towards Iran underscoreserscores the seriously challenging, sensitive natureture of the relations betweenween the two countries. It is also of note thatat Iran considers a unifieded Iraq under a relatively strong government too be in its long-term strategicrategic interest. And contrary to certain current perceptions or speculations, a disintegrated Iraq with a Shi’ite government in thehe south and Kurdish rule in the north will indeed present an enduringing nightmare for Tehran. In the Southth - In the Persian Gulf, the traditional spherehere of Iranian historicall preponderance and where Iran’s strategicic and economic-trade concerns, including safety of oil exports, are att stake, the country still faces the United States – politically as well as militarily. Securityy and stability in the Persian Gulf have always been a matter of critical national security concern of Iran – and will continueontinue to do so in the futureuture – which calls, inter alias, for removal of tensionension among the regionalonal countries concerned. Increasing institutionalutional military presence of the U.S. in the Persian Gulf since early 1980s, also as a direct result of the outward-looking policies of thee Gulf Cooperation Counciluncil (GCC) and its individual member states,es, has significantly increasedeased Iranian security concerns ever since. Purchaseurchase and procurement of advanced U.S./Western military hardware by the

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Arab states of thee Persian Gulf during the past decades, particularlylarly in recent years, withh the clear intention of counter-balancing Iranian prowess (Warrickk, 2010) could have hardly been reassuring to Tehran. Wikileaks documentsments – whatever the incentives behind the leakagekage – threw some light on the depth of the not-so-friendly feelings towardsowards Iran in some of thehe neighboring capitals, when made under presumedsumed privacy – includinging with regard to the possible U.S.-Israeli military attack on Iran, which if anything, could not but have further sensitized and heightenedightened Iranian national security concerns (Hadian,Hadian, 2011). The above sketchy review of the security challenges surroundingunding countries presentt to decision-makers in Tehran points to difficultiesiculties of national securityity planning that would enhance Iran’s securityity and reduce its vulnerabilities.abilities.

Iran’s National Security Policy Sources The Iranian nationalonal security policies under the Islamic Republicic have been influenced – and shaped - by the intersection of ideologicalological orientations, Iran’sn’s threat perceptions, past experiences, nationalational pride, and economicmic and geopolitical imperatives. All these factorsctors – even though to differing degrees, individually and in combinationation – play a very significantficant role in informing and framing Iranian nationalational security decisionss and policies. A critical point that needs to be underscored at this stage of the analysis is that all the factors discussed below involve, one way or another, or are somehowmehow affected by US-Iranan relations. 1. Ideologicalcal Sources - Three important ideological outlooksutlooks and orientations have played an influential role in informingng and shaping the nationaltional security and defense policies in Iran - Revolutionary Islam,slam, Reformist Islam, and Traditional Iranian Nationalism. Dependingpending on the particular issue and the constellationellation of political forcess involved, also considering the relevance, interactionraction and impact of externalxternal players, any or a combination of thesee three

25 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives outlooks/orientationstions come to bear on policy-making. Failureure to arrive at a reasonableable degree of consensus among the three competingmpeting camps, as is oftenen the case, leads inevitably to serious problemsems in implementation. 2. Threat Perceptions - Threat perception can be categorizedgorized into threats to Revolutionaryevolutionary ideology/values and threats to nationalational interest as traditionallyitionally defined. In the post-revolutionaryy Iran, according to the dominant discourse, “revolutionary ideology/values”values” per se has been equated with “national interest.” From the vantage point of the dominantminant ideological approach, the “global arrogance”gance” (US imperialism) and international Zionism are out to destroy Islam. From this perspective,ective, revolutionary Iran – the Islamic Republicblic - is seen as the centerter of the Islamic world, providing [revolutionary]ionary] leadership to thee Islamic Ummah (nation/community), whichch the United States/globalobal arrogance abhors and tries to destroy (Larijani,arijani, 2007). Viewed as such, “global arrogance” and its regional corollaryollary – Israel – representnt the principal and the most immediate threats.hreats. American puppets/croniesets/cronies in the region are also consideredred as sources of threat, though of a lesser significance and consequencece. Iran’s nationalnal interest – as traditionally defined and keepinging the above proviso in mind - becomes more important when theree is an incompatibility with ideological priorities. Territorial integrityy – as best reflected in the dispute on the three Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf - geopoliticalal issues, and enhancing Iran’s international stature via demonstratingg the primacy of Iran’s national interests, have in actuality played a more influential role in informing and molding Iran’s security andnd defense policies. Threats emanating from Iran’s immediate neighborhoodhborhood and environment are considered more dangerous than those from countries farther away, provided,ed, of course, that ideologicalological considerations are not the driving force behind the foreignn policies of other countries. 3. Past Experienceseriences - The long, bloody and destructive warar with Iraq, including Iraq’saq’s extensive and repeated use of chemical weaponseapons

26 IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairss against Iranians and also the war of cities, deeply affected the psyche of the Iranian populaopulation at large – reviving the old memorieses of a nation that has been subjected to frequent foreign invasionon and occupation sincee ancient times. The Iran-Iraq War experience,rience, especially the UNN Security Council’s unbelievable refusal to condemnndemn the act of aggressionsion and call for the immediate withdrawal of forces and the later failureure to react strongly to Iraq’s numerous war crimes, including resort to chemical weapons, led Iran to conclude that it simply could notot rely on the United Nations to provide for its national securityy and defense. The bitter conclusion thatat the international communitymmunity could not be trusted proved extremelyy costly during the War andnd came to cast its long shadow on the foreigngn and defense policies oof the Islamic Republic afterwards. As seen byy Iran’s longest-serving foreignoreign minister, “Historical precedent is in fact an important input intonto Iran’s foreign policy.” (Velayati, 1998) 4. National Pride – Iranians, as historical inheritors of an old, millennial civilizationation with a deeply-felt grandiose perceptionion of themselves, theirr role and power, especially in the wake of a successful popularar social revolution in 1979 – which has added rejuvenated ideologicallogical fervor [revolutionary Shi’ite ideology] to the traditional Iraniann nationalistic pride – appear to have found itt quite difficult to acceptt that their young, newly established neighborsrs have more wealth andd opportunities, more advanced technology, and a higher standard of living. Given the stark differences at the material level, the ruling elite have instead tried to argue that advancementment in science and technologynology (particularly nuclear, stem cell and software)ftware) could empower Iran and help raise the country to its deservedd place in the world. Thisis outlook could well explain the dogged pursuit of the nuclear programgram – even if at tremendous costs – especiallyially if placed in the biggergger context of a region consisting of three nuclear neighbors (Israel, India, and Pakistan), which has led some Iraniansians to feel that achievingng a comparable power status necessitates acquiringquiring nuclear capabilityy (Ahmadinejad 2010 and Kemp 2003).

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5. Economicmic Imperatives - Iran’s almost 75 million people, especially consideringdering the quite high level of education, have expectations of a higher standard of living and a better life. Taking national resourceses and capabilities, including abundant oil revenuesvenues (discussed previously)ously) into account, it is now a fact that morere than three decades afterer the 1979 Revolution Iranians expect a higherer level of governance andnd a much better national economic performance.nce. As is widely known,n, the Iranian government – in fact, the Islamic Republic - is undernder serious pressure to perform. It can be safely predicted that, onn the whole, economic issues will exercise increasingreasing influence on Iran’sn’s future security and defense policies; low ratesates of economic growthh and capital formation will, in the final analysis,is, also negatively impactt the country’s expenditures in the military-ddefense field. 6. Geopoliticaltical Considerations – As discussed earlier in the paper, Iran is livingng in a tumultuous area and is surrounded by quite a number of activeve conflict situations - particularly instabilitylity in Afghanistan and Iraq and uncertainty in Azerbaijan and Pakistan.akistan. Extensive U.S. presence in many of the areas in Iran’s immediatemediate neighborhood or in the surrounding environment is challengingng and poses a problem – lack of any meaningful buffer or physicall space between the two sides who look at each other with deep suspicionspicion and hostile intentions.tions. Iran and the U.S. are literally neighborsrs – all around Iran; to thehe South, East, West and North. Such an unenviablenviable position for Iran is bound to enhance the impact and influencence of geopolitical issues,es, situations, and considerations on the country’suntry’s security and defensense policies.

Iran’s National Security Decision-making Institutions andd Process A detailed discussion of Iran’s decision-making apparatusus and process is beyondd the scope of this paper, but two points meritt to be emphasized. First,t, decisions on major issues, whether on internalrnal or

28 IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairss external matters, are not made by one person, a particular group,p, or a single body. Second,ond, all decisions on key issues are made, in thehe final analysis, through consensus – for lack of a better word - andd via a rather complex process of political-ideological interaction withinhin and among a compositeposite network of constitutionally-based formal institutions and bodies, and informal networks of influential actors and players. The complex arrangement also involves the elementment of personal relationships,ships, especially within the clerical establishmentnt and hierarchy, individualdual initiatives, and the traditional Byzantine wheelingheeling and dealing comee into the picture – with the entire dynamism acting under the ultimatemate overall authority and or blessing of the person/office off the Velayat-e Faqih [Guardian Jurisconsult].onsult]. Decision-making for defense and security policies, as a critical area of national import, significance, and consequence and of particularrticular interest to the widestidest possible range of actors/players at the nationalational level, represent the best example for such a process of policy articulation and development. Given the peculiar dynamism of such a process of decisionsion-making with myriad actors/stakeholderss with diffuse and even blurred lines of responsibility and authority, many outside observerss have found the situation chaotic, often wonderingering – even with a sensee of amazement if not perplexity - who makess what decisions and how, albeit the final outcome being consideredsidered “consensually-based”sed” (Byman, et al, 2001). It is true thatat the consensually-drivenen process provides policy stability, yet, as indicated,dicated, reaching decisionss becomes extremely difficult and arduous, especiallypecially on major nationalal security decisions, including relations with thehe U.S. – which has in factact proved as the most difficult issue for the ruling elite all through the past three decades (to be discussed in thehe next section). As describedscribed by Mesbahi, “consensus in the Islamic Republic is bornene out of a painstaking process of give-andd-take, public and privateate maneuvering, and at the end a “democratic’ocratic’ process in its ownn context and meaning, within a maze of incrediblyredibly complex labyrinthh of interest groups and factions” (Mesbahi, 2004).

29 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives

While the dominantant conservative bloc has significant power – which we do not discusss here in detail - but their often recalcitrant rhetorichetoric is both checked by their own sense of reality as well as serious increasing challengesenges within their own ranks, and also by the reformers even iff practically pushed to the outer limits of the power constellation. Thee actual power – and the paramount role - of the conservative blocc in charge, even if suffering from imagege and legitimacy deficit,, should not be overlooked; they control thee “real believers” and hot-headed radical fringe – which the reformersormers acutely lacked evenven while they controlled both the executiveve and legislative brancheshes during the first term of Khatami’s presidencyidency (1997-2001). A number of formal and informal institutions and organizationszations have been engagedged in and played an important role, thoughugh to differing degrees,, in shaping security policy in the Islamic Republic.public. Major formal institutionsstitutions include the office of the Supreme Leader and the President;t; Supreme National Security Council (SNSC);; Iran’s armed forces (particularlyarticularly the Pasdaran); intelligence, interior,or, and foreign ministries;es; Islamic propagation organizations; Expediencyediency Council; and Foreigneign Relations and Security Committee of the Majles [Parliament]. A number of informal organizations, individualls, and political “circles” – or pseudo-political parties - also provide inputput for security policy issuesssues – whether through the quite active informalformal networks for politicalitical activity [Iranian-style lobbying], the traditionalditional religious networksks [mosques, Friday congregational prayers, etc.],tc.], or through the media.dia. Depending on the nature of the issue,ue, the interplay betweenn these different organizations, institutions, bodies, circles, and individualsiduals differ, both in terms of the process of debate and negotiation aamong them at both formal and informal levelsvels as well as of the kindnd and degree of impact on the final outcomee – let alone on implementation.entation. The Suprememe National Security Council (SNSC), whichhich is chaired by the Presidentesident and is composed of the representativess of all

30 IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairss the bodies and institutionsstitutions in the burgeoning security apparatus of the Iranian state – andnd reports on its decisions to the Supreme Leaderder for final approval - pplays a very important role in initiating, debating,ng, and ultimately reachingng consensus on security issues. Typically, decisionscisions of the SNSC, especiallypecially after receiving the Leader’s imprimatur,r, have been abided by the participants/stakeholders – with or withoutout ex- poste qualms. Breakingeaking ranks on SNSC decisions carries a heavyy price – as happened inn fall 2003 when the Council’s hard-won sensitivensitive decision, enjoyingng the Leader’s approval, on the suspensionion of enrichment of uraniumranium following the agreement concluded withith the Foreign Ministerss of the European 3 was challenged by a numbermber of hardliners and conservatives. The un-accommodating elementsements ultimately fell in line and joined the decision – which, as is known, proved contentiousous in the post-2005 political ambiance andnd was reversed, with significantgnificant consequences to follow.

Relations with thehe US - The U.S.-orchestratedhestrated coup of August 1953 in Iran andnd the subsequent all-outut support of the Shah during his quarter of a century dictatorial rule came,ame, in retrospect, to serve as the most criticall event in shaping “The Perception” of Iranians towards the U.S. Donette Murray’s assessmentent on the longer-term impact of the coup imbrogliobroglio is shared by almostost all Iranians, across the political spectrum.. “The shoring up of ann authoritarian monarch at democracy’s expensense put an indelible stain on US-Iranian relations that has retained a vibrant immediacy undiminishedminished by time, and forms another thread in the narrative.” (Murrayay, 2010) The story of the ever-deepening intimacytimacy between the US and Iran under the Shah, and how it developedd from an early ‘cliency relationship’ in the 1950s (Gasiorowski, 1991) to the Shah’s becoming the gendarme of the Persian Gulf as of 1972 (Nixon Doctrine) and to his later years of megalomaniac ambitions andd West- phobic rhetoric, is history to all students of US foreign policcy and contemporary Iraniananian history. The euphoric US-Shah ‘ecstasy’ of the

31 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives early-to-mid 70s was followed by the totally unexpected 1978978-79 popular movementnt and the ‘agony’ in the wake of the Februaryy 1979 Islamic Revolution,on, and hence, the venomous recriminations in the U.S. of “who lostt Iran?” Looking back,ack, it seems that a number of major episodespisodes coalesced to set the actual context, parameters and contours for the making and implementationlementation of mutually hostile policies that shaped the relationship – or lack thereof – between the two countrieses ever since – and up to this very moment. In post-Revolutionaryvolutionary Iran, even though the Islamic coalition,alition, led by the Shi’ite clerical establishment, captured and to a large extent controlled the state apparatus, but the dominant discoursee that influenced the conceptionsonceptions and perceptions of the revolutionaryry elite was that of radicalcal left with sometimes Islamic polishing – quiteuite in tune with the postst-1960s dominant radical, revolutionary ethos across the Third World. Framing the U.S. identity and policies and actionsions as “imperialism” thathat was inherently bent on acting againstst the oppressed nations,s, and drawing on the past U.S. conduct in Iranan – as well as in such other countries as Vietnam, Chili, Brazil, Guatemalatemala (to name only a few) - the radical left convinced many Iraniansns that the U.S. was in fact determined to reinstate the Shah. Allowingwing an ailing Shah into thehe U.S. in October 1979 even for medical treatmentatment – under the pressure of his former Republican friendss and benefactors and despite Carter administration’s expressed reluctanceuctance and trepidation – set the stage for a group of radical [Muslim] Iranian university studentsts to storm the U.S. Embassy in early Novembermber – and hence the 4444-day “Hostage Crisis” – which, similar to the August 1953 eventent, came to leave an enduring negative imageage of Iranians in generalneral and the post-revolutionary governmentent in particular in thee minds and hearts of most Americans thatat still impacts the framinging of the “Issue of Iran.” The electionn of Ronald Reagan, not unrelated to thee 1979 “Iranian fiasco” and the subsequent “Embassy humiliation” andnd also

32 IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairss similarly to the Nicaraguan revolution, made strengtheningng the American hard andnd soft power as number one foreign policy priority.riority. Releasing of the hostages just as the new president took oath off office – finely synchronizednized by Iranians to further humiliate a defeated,feated, demoralized Jimmymy Carter, quizzical indeed in retrospect and inn terms of political calculationculation and colossal consequences - helpedped to refurbish the damagedmaged American image and ego. Coming into office a few months afterer Iraq had invaded Iran in September 198080, the Reagan administration’sration’s major concern, as it turned out and despite official neutrality,y, was geared towards containing the unwantedwanted escalation of the Iran-Iraq War, but practically preventing eitherer side from winning thee War – which as of summer 1982 meant preventingventing Iranian victory andnd containing spread of the spill-over effects off Iran’s revolutionary ideology.eology.3 Despite open mutual acrimony betweenetween Tehran and Washington,hington, especially given the unmistakable U.S. tilt towards Iraq as off 1983, the attempt in 1985 from the U.S. side which was supposedly intendedntended to improve the relations – later dubbedbed as Iran-Contra Affairir - was so badly managed by those directly involvedvolved that led in a total turnabout to much worsened relations, also becauseecause of knee-jerk reactionction of a personally discredited and hurt Ronald Reagan.4 The post-WWar period brought some prospects foror the betterment of rellations. Election of President Hashemi Rafsanjaninjani in Iran in summer 1989 on a pragmatist platform, with pronouncedounced emphasis on rebuildingebuilding the previously badly damaged foreign relations, had already received a potentially positive chordord in President Georgee Bush’s oft-quoted line in his inaugural speechech in January 1989 thatt “good will begets good will”. He had also indicateddicated in the same addressress in very clear terms that “progress on US-Iran relations was possible,”ssible,” even if through what he had set out to do - “small things leadingding to significant developments.” Having receivedeceived the not-so-implicitcit message, Tehran assisted with the releasease of American hostageses in Lebanon. Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait

33 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives in August 1990 turnedurned out to be the “major event to influence BBush’s policy towards Iran.” Iran’s general neutrality in the conflictct that ensued brought about some positive impact in the relations withith the US and the Europeans.uropeans. Just a few months down the line,ne, the potentially brightt prospects for real change in the state of relationslations was dimmed forr all practical purposes when at the end of the Operation Desertt Storm in February 1991 the U.S. decided against toppling a weakened,kened, desperate Saddam and maintaining Iraq’s capability to constrainstrain and thwart Iran – seen then in Washingtongton as “America’s strategicgic enemy.”5 That carried the day while Bush was in office. What Seniorr Bush had had in mind to effect - containmentment of Iran6 – was in factt instituted by the Clinton Administration, underder the “Dual Containment”ent” policy, targeting both Iraq and Iran, even if purported to envisagenvisage different treatment for each. Whilele the administration officialsfficials considered Iraq “criminal and irredeemable,”mable,” their problem withith the Islamic Republic concerned its “behavior.”avior.” The new policy “seemed to signal that, after 14 years, the US had given up on reachinghing out to the Islamic Republic;” it entailed, among others, economicc sanctions, toughening of visa restrictionsns and cultural exchanges.es. Secretary of State Warren Christopher was known to have played a central role in the articulation and implementationtion of the new policy,7 wwhich was followed in later years with more stringentringent economic and tradeade sanctions. The electionn of President Khatami in May 1997 on a reformrm and détente platform offered a new opportunity for improving relationslations between the two countries. Clinton himself called the developmentopment “hopeful” and expressedxpressed the hope that the estrangement betweeneen the people of the twowo countries could be bridged. The ensuing positiveositive ambiance and thee indirect exchanges between the two presidentsnts (1) were followed byy the U.S. and Iran open expression of regret for the 1953 coup the 1979 hostage-taking (2) respectively. The promisingmising atmosphere of thehe late 1990s, however, failed to bear fruit before

34 IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairss other factors – att both ends – intervened to change the encouraginguraging track altogether. The electionn of President George W. Bush – and the sudden move to the centerer of the previously marginal Neocon outlookk in the American politicss - followed by the atrocious events of Septemberber 11, totally changed thehe security environment; for the U.S., for the entire Middle East, andnd for Iran. Despite Iran’s immediate official categorical condemnationemnation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in thee U.S., including by Presidentsident Khatami himself, as well as by the majorityority of political parties, socialocial organizations and government officials,8 BBush’s self-proclaimed “WarWar on Terror” came to haunt the state of relationslations between the twoo countries. Iran’s quite generous support to the American militaryry campaign in Afghanistan, in particular throughhrough supporting the Northern Alliance in defeating the Taliban in Kabul and the Al-Qaeda,a, and subsequent close political cooperation throughhrough the Bonn processs in putting together a new government in Kabul,9 did in fact raisee the prospects for the emergence of a differentfferent dynamism in the relations. George W. Bush’ inclusion of Iran in the proverbial “AxisAxis of Evil” – along withth such pariah states as Iraq and North Koreaea – in the State of thee Union Address in late January 2002 servedved to suddenly dash all the hopes for a possible change. To many Iraniansnians – inclusive of governmentvernment officials, diverse forces from differentfferent political and ideologicalological persuasions, and across the society at large - the designation meant that the Bush administration was drivenven by ideology and bentnt on reshaping the entire region on the basiss of an ideological blueprintrint – considered detrimental to the national interestsnterests of Iran. The U.S. occupationccupation of Iraq in March 2003 – a war of choiceoice by any measure - ggenerated significant debates in Iran regardingng the American intentionsons and Iran’s position about the war – rangingg from emotional/sentimentalmental outbursts against the Ba’athist regime’segime’s criminal record and reminiscent of bitter war time experienceses and

35 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives memories to moreore sober-minded rational approaches drivenven by calculations of longong-term and strategic national interests and securityecurity implications. The choice before the Islamic Republic, as debatedd then, was between a positionosition of neutrality or [implicit] support for thehe anti- Ba’athist campaigngn – similar to the situation in Afghanistan.. As it turned out, pro-Iranran Kurds in the north and the Shi’ites in thee south helped the Alliedd forces in their joint operations to topple Saddamaddam Hussein in Baghdad.hdad. Prevalence of sound strategic calculationsons in Tehran helped thee removal of another irreplaceable enemy in Iraqaq and the emergence off a pro-Iran ruling political coalition representinging the majority bloc in the Iraqi population. The development, howeverowever viewed by otherss in the region, was an important change in the geopolitical matrixix of strategic calculations and presented Iran with a rather peculiar mixix of enhanced national interests and regional stature as well as a host of intractable sources of potential threat. The Iraniann cooperation in post-2003 Iraq, as in the Afghan case, provided another potentially conducive ambiancee and opportunity for someome sort of rapprochement between the two sides – inclusive of whatt has come to be referred to as the Iranian proporoposal for a Grand Bargaingain in May 2003. The proposal, as reported inn some U.S. quarters, andd purported to have enjoyed the blessing of “Iran’s highest authority,”y,” conveyed the Iranian willingness of putting everything on thee table. According to the same American sources,ces, the “only formal responseponse made by the White House was its criticismism of the Swiss ambassadorsador in Iran” for transmitting the Iranian “non- paper” – which was practically the last chance for any possiblee thaw in the relations whilehile Khatami was still in office. Ahmadinejad’sad’s presidency as of summer 2005, on a platformatform critical of previousous administrations, particularly blaming Khatami’satami’s pro-dialogue and détente-oriented posture and policy as dovishsh and compromising, changedhanged Iran’s foreign policy discourse and alsolso the prism through whichhich international political system was seen inn Iran. With his peculiarar radical-sounding discourse and unconventionalntional

36 IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairss pronouncements and actions, which he claimed were intendedded to better represent Iran’s “real power,” he personally – andnd his administration - came to be perceived and defined in the West as hawkish and confrontationalfrontational in posture and disorienting to the region and world in conduct.duct. His letters to a number of heads of statee in his early years and too Barack Obama in early 2009 attracted quite a lot of attention among officials, diplomats, pundits, and the media, both in terms of contentnt and style – were also criticized in Iranran as unconventional and uncalled for, especially when left unansweredwered. Reversal of Khatamtami’s policy on the nuclear dossier led to serious widening of the differences with the Western bloc (in fact withith the 5+1 as a group). While Iran’s opposition to efforts at promotinging the Middle East peacece process stiffened, the U.S. presence and actual engagement, bothh quantitatively and qualitatively, in the bigger region surrounding Iran steadily increased. In the meantime, while a contest of words and willsills with the Neocons in Washington continuedntinued unabated, Iran alsolso proceeded with building up important seecurity, defense and intelligencelligence infrastructures in strategic locations across the region. The electionn of President Obama, similar to the situation in the U.S., was receivedd with strong euphoric sentiments in the regionon and in Iran as well. Hisis discursive language and emphasis, both duringing the campaign and inn his early months in office, on the “open hand” approach towardsds Iran created heightened expectations in Iranan and generated seriouss debates at various levels – among officials, within the ruling elite, inn academia, in the media, also among the populaceulace at large. Compared with the earlier approach by George W. Bushsh and the Neocons, thereere existed a general consensus that Barack Obama’sbama’s approach was different and held the potentials for a possibleossible rapprochement – even if it was also judged to constitute a more formidable challengeenge in terms of its stronger position and efficacycacy in mobilizing furtherer international pressure on a recalcitrantt Iran, especially on the nuclear dispute. While some argued that the gesturesestures

37 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives were genuine andd called for reciprocity, others – mostly fromom the conservative bloc,c, from the top echelon down – tended to rely on the traditional suspicioncion and insisted on the imperative of demandinganding concrete action in support of nice-sounding discursive “rhetoric”oric” – even as a preconditiondition for any positive Iranian counter gesture. Much to everybody’s chagrin,hagrin, before Obama’s “open hand” policy could stand a reasonablele chance of being tested in actual terms, domesticomestic developments in Iran in the post-June 2009 presidential electionsections created a totally new dynamism that soon changed the ball game, which was furtherer eclipsed by the continuing impasse on the nuclear negotiations and subsequent passage of the UN Security Council resolution 1929 and the much expanded sanctions regimee that ensued. The outcomecome of the mid-term congressional elections in the U.S. last Novemberber has for all practical purposes further constrainedtrained Obama’s space for foreign policy maneuvering. Even if it mightight as well create the oppopportunity for a stronger bi-partisan anti-Iran policy.olicy. Looking backck at a three-decade horizon, one of the enduringnduring characteristics off the US-Iran relations since 1979 has beenen the mutual constructiontion of an enemy image in both countries of the “other” that, for those in the say, reflects the will and intereststs of a powerful minorityty on the fringe of the mainstream politics.s. The fringe, having occupiedcupied a privileged position at and around the center, has managed – wwith the inadvertent assistance of its counterpapart in the other countryy – to systematically undermine and practically render impossible any andnd all potential initiatives that could have improvedproved the relationship. Also at the regional level actors have useded this opportunity to receive/enhance US support in their presumablyumably unified effort to contain the Iranian fundamentalist threat. A much- threatened Iran has also helped promote anti-U.S. challenge throughhrough supporting countriesntries and political movements and currentsurrents unbecoming to the Islamic Republic’s ideological or even politicalolitical correctness – whichich has faced criticism at home on grounds off cost- benefit analysis or national interest calculus [e.g., much expandedpanded

38 IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairss relations with the radical and leftist governments in Latin America]rica]. It is unfortunate, butut true, that a sense of mutual obsession whichch cuts on both sides, domesticallyomestically and internationally, has reigned supremeupreme in both countries.es. Worse still, occasional attempts at a realisticealistic assessment of thehe state of relations and hopes for a possibleossible rapprochement have not survived the intensity of the past and recent legacy of hostilityy and mutual acrimony and frustration. The followinglowing survey of the arrayray of current contentious issues between thehe two countries as welll as areas of common interest could perhapps help depict a better picturecture of where the two sides stand or should standand.

Contentious Issuesues and Common Interests The U.S.-Allied occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq andnd the consequent situationtion has led, albeit inadvertently and contrary to the original intent, to an actual power realignment in the region. Before the U.S.-Allied military action, the regimes in Baghdadaghdad and Kabul were known for their enmity towards Iran. As discussedcussed earlier, the new governments in both countries are consideredd Iran’s friends. This powerwer realignment, advances in Iran’s nuclear programrogram – despite the internationalernational controversy – and simultaneous shrinkingrinking of the resources at the U.S. disposal, both at home and in the region, have all coalescedced towards the unintended emergence of an “imbalance of power”wer” in the Persian Gulf sub-region. Indicationsons are that Iran’s projectiontion of power, inclusive in particular of its seeminglymingly fast developing missile program, has gradually worked to shapeape an image of an emergingrging powerful player in the eyes of ordinary people and governmentss of the region. The previous “balance of power”wer” in the Persian Gulf sub-region has now transformed into an “imbalancebalance of power” – withith Iran’s rising power being widely perceivedved at different levels within the sub-region as indisputable (Hadian, 2009). It should be cautioned,tioned, however, that the perceived reality mightight in fact differ from thehe reality itself – even substantially – but, as itt often happens and in thehe final analysis, decisions are made on the basisasis of

39 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives perceptions10 in thehe matrix of strategic calculations. Moreover, the previous “power imbalance” in the Middlele East region at large is now in the process of transforming into a “balancebalance of power” – or att least it is so being perceived. Israel’s power was in the past considered/perceiveded/perceived to be uncontested and it tendedd to act on that basis andd perception in the region – a regional superpower.power. This “imbalance of power” has been changing into a “balancence of power” due, in largearge measure, to the growing perceptions acrossoss the region of Iran’sn’s enhanced power and geopolitical stature. Furthermore, at thehe regional level, the people of the region, previouslyviously humiliated for a long time by Israel’s seemingly superior might,t, have all but welcomed the new emergent “balance of power.” The “reality”reality” on the ground indicates that Israel possesses the most advancedvanced military arsenal in the region, has advanced missile systemss even capable of carryingng nuclear warheads11, is widely believed to have a “second strike capability,”apability,” and no less important is fully backeded – in fact, endorsed - bby the Western powers and in particular the US.S. But, as Israel and its Western backers are aware, the “perceived reality”lity” at the regional level,, and especially at the popular level, may provee more important than thehe reality itself.12 As viewed from Tehran, the U.S. is the major stakeholderr in the extant world orderrder and maintaining that dominant positiontion is considered of vitalal strategic interest. It is also believed in Tehranan that strengthening thee U.S. global hegemony has served as the guiding principle for the U.S. security, defense and foreign policies in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Along the same line of thinking, it is alsoo analyzed that such being the case, the U.S. hasas been bent on preventing,ng, at all costs, erosion of its hegemonic powerwer and emergence of discordantcordant regional powers whose challenge of thehe U.S. supremacy impedesdes the smooth exercise of the U.S. powerer and authority. Georgee W. Bush and his Neocons contended that thee “use” of military force for maintaining U.S. hegemony is legitimate.13 As it happened,ppened, following early U.S.-Allied victoriesies in

40 IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairss

Afghanistan and Iraq in toppling the old regimes bandwagoninggoning became the orderr of the day for a number of countries in the region. Iran, though obviouslyviously apprehensive about the U.S. intentionsns and possible next moves,oves, remained neutral and did not seek regionalegional balancing against U.S. hegemony either. But the strategic calculusulus of major actors changednged with the passage of time. While U.S. alliess in the region experienceded a sharp deficit in legitimacy, the disappearanceance of the Taliban and Ba’athist regimes in the two neighboring countriesuntries turned Iran into the principal beneficiary of the U.S.-Allied military campaign. The reducededuced U.S. material and symbolic resources in the region, concomitanttant with Iran’s enhanced stature and bolsteredlstered security, intelligencence and military infrastructures in the neighboringboring countries – even though primarily for deterrence purposes andnd also for ultimate retaliiatory capability in case of a possible military attackttack – served to encourageage the ruling power elite in Iran to act as a promoteromoter of status quo ratherther than a revolutionary actor chafing for radical change at least in the medium term. In our analysis, as argued inn detail elsewhere, Iran’s regional foreign policy objectives have nott been “revolutionary” during the past several years (Hadian and Hormozi,ormozi, 2010). Faced with the new security environment in the regionon and eager and anxiousus to restore the status quo ante – that is, re- establishment of previous unchallenged U.S. hegemony – thehe U.S. appears to have opted for “containment” as its main strategy visis-à-vis Iran. But, given the changed environment and the array of forcesces and currents involved,d, the U.S. goal of restoration of the past – if possibleossible at all - is nothing short of a fundamental change in the realignmentment of power arrangementsents in the region. Such a realignment is, for all practical purposes,es, entangled with Iran-US relations, which,ch, as discussed in the previous section, has proved quite difficult foror both sides and has eludeduded normalization or rapprochement. A numbermber of major issues of criticalritical concern to both sides account for this sadd state of affairs.

41 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives

Iran’s nuclearclear program, terrorism and radicalism,m, the Palestinian-Israelii conflict and the Middle East peace process,ss, and finally the issue of human rights, have constituted the majoror U.S. concerns. While the degree of relevance and significance off each element might have differed, depending on the administrationtion in Washington and also a host of other factors and circumstances,tances, however, collectivelyvely they have come to occupy the center pieceiece in the U.S. approach,h, agenda – and needless to say, the official discoursecourse and spin - towardsds Iran. On their paart, Iranians also have had their own set of issuesssues – grievances – whichch have directed their posture and policy towardsrds the U.S.: unilateral U.S. sanctions, Iranian frozen assets; deliberateiberate disregard for Iran'san's regional stature and role; continuing U.S.S. and NATO operationsons in Iran's security environment, supportrt for secessionist movementsvements in Iran, interference in Iran’s domesticomestic affairs, and expeditiousditious withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forcess from Afghanistan and Iraq. The above areas of serious difference – and even disputepute – notwithstanding, the two countries also share common concernrn and interest over a number of issues and situations. They include Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, combating terrorism and extremism in the region [given thehe sharp difference of view on the definitionion of “terrorism” especiallyecially as it applies to Hamas and more so to Hezbollah], and at a more fundamental level, security in the Persian Gulf - even if for their own particular reasons - and at a more strategic level, securityecurity in the Persian Gulf, including longg-term security of energygy sources. On a larger scale, and from a strategicrategic perspective, the long-term interests of both countries requireuire – whether expresseded explicitly or implied through diplomatic allusionslusions or even coquetry - establishment or restoration of regional stabilitybility in the Middle East, the Caspian Basin and in Southwest Asia.

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Alternative Strategiestegies In light of the precedingeceding review of the seemingly irresolvable faceace-off between Iran andd the U.S., we now turn to the central questionon this paper has set outt to address: the best strategy to be adopted towardsowards possible resolutionon of the outstanding issues. As viewed from Tehran and also by Irann-US pundits, three strategies of dealing withh have been debated in the U.S. in recent years, of which one hass been pursued in action.n. These three strategies are: Comprehensive Engagementagement; Selective Engagementnt plus Containment; and finally, Military Attackk. The overriding perception,ption, on the Iranian side, has been that the actual policy – beyond rhetoric and spin - adopted and implemented by the U.S. has been Selectivelective Engagement plus Containment, which dates back to the days of formerer Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates. This was the dominant approach and policy up to the end of 2008 under George W. Bush and the Neoconn team. Barack Obama’s pronounced emphasis on “open hands” posture towards Iran, bothth in the course of the campaign and also in thehe early months of his presidency,esidency, which appeared to have raised quite serious expectations at both ends, failed to sustain itself in the wake of the events in the post-June 2009 presidential elections in Irann and domestic pressureses in the US. What came to pass, as a matter of fact, was that the U.S.S. policy reverted to the earlier policy underder the Neocon team at the White House. Given the new regressiveressive dynamism and the dashed hopes, the predominant perceptiontion in Tehran since fall 2009 has been that President Obama’s pro-change, soft posture onlyy sought – and served - to make the previous policy more effective byy repairing the tarnished U.S. international imagege and regaining the moralral upper hand, appealing to the expanding ranksanks of disgruntled Iranians,ans, and also convincing or silencing his criticsitics at home through gradualadual ratcheting up of pressure on Iran followinging the failure of attemptsts at diplomacy and engagement.. The US Containmentntainment strategy has included: Steady ratchetinging up

43 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives of a wide range of sanctions (inclusive of UN, unilateral, and byy allies and like-minded countries) that target the Iranian economyy with increasing focus on the energy sector; b) Political isolationn and diplomatic pressure,ure, through lining up of allies and fellow-travelers,avelers, aiming at restrictinging Iran’s diplomatic activities and outreach andnd also through increasingng pressures of sorts on the countries defyingng the American policy;y; c) Public diplomacy and engagementnt in psychological warfare,arfare, including through high-profile critical public statements at variousious levels directed at the government of the Islamic Republic along with public expressions of support for the opposition;osition; d) Increasing scientificcientific and technological restrictions on Iran, including throughh limiting Iranians’ access to a range of science disciplines and departments, preventing export of advancedd and double use technologyology and products, and restricting the participationipation of Iranian scientistsntists in important global conferences; and e) Constraining Iran’san’s military capabilities, among others, throughhrough banning export of advanced military hardware and even sparee parts for the existing systems, and also assistance to military build-up of Iran’s immediate neighbors and other countries in the region. Selective Engagementgagement – as part and parcel of the overallall US containment strategytegy in dealing with Iran - has in recent yearss come to be understoodd as engagement in confidence-building measureseasures towards resolvingg outstanding issues of urgency for both sides,es, one by one, and withh the [implicit] hope that it would help the overall situation betweenn them and move it forward, even if on a piecemealcemeal scale. Looking backack at the track record, it can be said, with a senseense of certainty, that thee approach has been tried before and despitee some successes in a numbermber of cases, the experience does not appearr to be reassuring. A glaringaring example of this sort of confidence-buildinguilding measure with limitedmited goals happened a few years back withth the participation of the American wrestlers in an Iranian-organizedganized tournament, in thehe course of which the American flag was raiseded and the U.S. nationalal anthem was played in Iran, which was almost

44 IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairss unthinkable thenn and is certainly out of question now. Thehe nice Iranian gesture did not go any further, and all sport exchangeshanges between the twoo sides have all but ceased. Other more serious confidence-buildinging measures, such as the direct talks on Iraq inn 2007, which appeared at the time to hold promising prospects cameame to naught – whateverever the immediate cause, whether deliberatelyerately sabotaged by fringege elements and currents in either side or fromm other quarters in the regiongion or just a victim of un-conducive circumstances.tances. All in all, what appearsppears to be sorely lacking has been – and continuesntinues to be - the necessarysary political will on both sides to undertake to address in earnest the wideide gamut of outstanding issues between themm and explore practical – doable – ways and means towards resolvingg them. Taking cue fromm other experiences, one could say that a process similar to the Shanghaianghai Declaration would be appropriate to consider.nsider. As for resolving issues one by one, for example, Afghanistan or Iraq, as things stand now, the two sides do not seem to be on thee same wave lengths. Whilehile these two situations have proved quite intractableactable and seem to be of immediate and urgent concern to the U.S.S. and NATO and theyy seem to expect Iranian cooperation, Iran, to the contrary, does notot appear to be currently under tremendous pressureressure or feel compelledd to move towards extending a helping hand.nd. As debated in Iran - within the public sector, academia, and the media – the question hass been: why should Iran help resolve a problemroblem situation in its immediatemmediate neighborhood that would directly benefit the other side andd place it in a more advantageous position in dealing with Iran than is currently the case. The Militaryy Option strategy, as the last resort strategy in dealing with Iran, particularlyularly considering the still unresolved nuclear dossier, has been “on thee table” for quite a number of years – Georgee Bush and the Neoconss kept referring to it while in office. It apparentlyarently disappeared fromm the Obama Administration’s radar for a short period and reappearedpeared again as the American official discoursese and spin have toughenedened since fall 2009. Since the days of thee Bush

45 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives

Administration thehe following three military contingency planss have attracted attentionn and been talked about - in the U.S. media and in the pundits’ analysis.ysis. 1- The contingencyntingency plan referred to as “Surgical Operation”ration” involves attacks on 100 to 140 targets inside Iran, with the purportedported objective of paralyzinglyzing – delaying - Iran's nuclear program. As widely argued by Americancan and other sources during the past years, due to the uncertainty of the outcome, actual pursuit of the option would present an extremelymely difficult decision for the Americans, Israelisaelis or even jointly. Moreover,reover, a number of other quite risky considerationsrations also seem to be involved, including the rather pervasive doubtt as to existence of clandestinendestine nuclear sites and facilities in Iran which would question thehe efficacy of any surgical operation in the firstt place; the quite cataclysmicsmic political fallout in Iran which would, among others and mostt probably, convince or silence the politicalal and military quarters within the Iranian power elite who opposese the weaponization off the nuclear program. Rather, the rival quartersuarters might find it much easier and expedient to openly espousese the weaponization trackack as the only right path forward (Rogers, 20100). 2- The secondond military plan - “Massive Aerial Bombardment”ment” - considers attackingng between 1000 and 1400 targets inside Irann for a sustained period of 30 to 60 days, the purported objective of which would be to substantially cut down Iran’s military-industrialustrial- technological capability.pability. Again, as argued by various Western sourcesources and quarters, thiss is a much riskier option than the “limited”” plan. Results are unknown,own, and moreover, possible destabilization of Iran is hardly consideredred in anybody’s real, long-term interest. And hence, likewise, it is nott expected to be any easy decision for the Israelis,sraelis, Americans or NAATO to make (Toukan and Cordesman, 2009). The third military plan calls for an “All-inclusive War” which, due to a host of reasons,easons, including lack of requisite resources availablevailable to both the U.S or NATO, could be considered practically out of question and notot taken serious even by the most belligerentigerent

46 IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairss supporters of thee military option (Arkin, 2006) – aside, of course, from the incalculableable political fallout and ramifications for the greater region surroundingng Iran. With the preceding in mind, especially the failure of the strategies of Containmenttainment and Selective Engagement on the one hand,nd, and impracticability or iinadvisability of the military option on the other,er, one would tend to concludeonclude that Comprehensive Engagement might offerfer the best possible stratategy for both sides to consider in the directiontion of moving towards resolving the array of outstanding issues betweenetween them. In the Comprehensiveomprehensive Engagement approach important issues, inclusive of bilateral,eral, regional, and multilateral issues, can be raised and negotiated. With all the issues on the table, as befits a genuineenuine negotiating processess - complex, difficult and time-consumingg as it would inevitably be – a range of options of resolving some disputes,sputes, cooperation in certain other issues and situations, and managingnaging issues and situationsions on still others where strategic differencesces are involved, can bee considered. As witnessed in other similarr cases involving negotiationation between the two adversaries, all issues should be addressed withinthin the same time frame and same organizationalational framework, preferablyrably simultaneously in a number of parallel working groups. Here, as ample previous experience shows, Trackack II diplomacy can be relied on as an extremely important conduitduit in facilitating the process and paving the way for success of the engagement strategyegy (Hadian, 2009). Looking at Iran’s response to the dominant U.S. approachoach in recent years, it appearsppears that Iran has been pursuing a strategyy of its own geared to thee preservation of status quo while pressing forwarward – cautiously thoughh - its geopolitical and ideological objectives, which can be termed ass reactive adoption of a Counter–Containment strategyrategy. But, successful maintenance of status quo calls for practicalractical overcoming of twowo challenges; a) normalization of relations withith the West; b) acting ass a responsible regional state (Hadian and Hormozi,ormozi, 2010).

47 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives

Consideringg the nuclear program as the most contentiouss issue with the West proper,oper, which also appears to have accorded Iranan with a potentially valuableable card, it would be reasonable to assume thathat any acceptable managementgement or resolution of the issue would be linkednked to the overall objectivetive of normalization of the relations with West – which, as discussed,ed, would also involve addressing and resolutionon of a host of other issues.ues. Acting as a responsible regional state also has its own requirements,s, inter alias, adoption of the following measures:ures: a) establishing the necessary symbolic and material infrastructuresres for management andd resolution of regional conflicts, b) provisionion of energy security as a major gas and oil producer-exporter;ter; c) commitment to and compliance with the established internationalational principles and normsorms while maintaining a critical outlook andnd the commitment to seekeek change through accepted international rulesles and norms, d) takingg actual distance from engagement in adventurousnturous foreign policy at regional and international levels; and e) transparencyarency in military, trade, and banking activities. It should bee cautioned, however, that Counter Containment,nt, as a reactive strategy, has proved quite costly. Its pursuit has involvedvolved increasing political,cal, diplomatic, economic, and social costs for the country, and has,, as a result, proved contentious for the rulingg elite. An important segmentegment of the Iranian elite contend that thee costs involved far outweighutweigh the presumed benefits, and call for its discontinuation and change of track. The government, supportedrted by another segment of the elite, continue to insist that the price paid – and being paid - is necessary for safeguarding Iran’s independence,ndence, dignity, and the new-found posture and status. While the governmentrnment officially denigrateses sanctions as ineffective and of marginal impactpact on the Iranian societyty and economy, pursuit of the Counter Containmentainment strategy has involved,lved, inter alias, active search for alternative sourcesources for substitution regardless of cost; reliance on imports and domesticomestic substitution at thehe expense of quality; coalition-making withh like- minded countriess in order to balance and challenge the U.S. power

48 IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairss and pressure; buildinguilding up of defense, intelligence and securityecurity infrastructures in a number of countries for deterrence purposesoses or possible retaliatoryry action in case of external (U.S. or Israeli) military adventure; allocationation of substantial resources for public diplomacylomacy and psychologicalal warfare geared to refuting the current prevalentevalent tarnished image at the international level and for promotinging an alternative image of Iran – the Islamic Republic - among Muslimsms and “oppressed people”le” of the world.

Conclusions The present articlele has looked into the state of relations betweenen Iran and the U.S. sincee 1979, during which both sides have continueded on a tangent of conflictualctual relations and have practically exhausted all the space for proxy war between them. Since the U.S. occupationion of Afghanistan in 2001001 and the subsequent war of choice in Iraq inn 2003 they have becomee not only virtual but real physical neighbors. In the absence of diplomaticmatic-political relations, they have entered into a new cycle and dynamismism of interaction, characterized by direct proximityoximity and dogged competitionmpetition over stature and influence in the region surrounding Iran,, which is qualitatively different from what theyey had experienced up untilntil then. The strategiesies the U.S. has pursued over the past three decades in dealing with thehe revolutionary Iran - Containment, and Selectiveelective Engagement - haveave simply failed to bear fruit. Military Attack,, as an option espoused by the Bush Administration, which has also comeome to be kept on the tablble by a hastily disillusioned Obama Administration,tration, does not appear to offer any viable, practical solution to the U.S.S. Iran predicament. Continuedntinued harping in Washington on a practicallylly un- doable option, whetherhether by the Administration or its Republican critics and detractors, especially Neocons or the Israeli lobby, has hardly helped or will helplp the American quandary. Failed U.S. strategieses have also pushed Iran into the zealous pursuit of a reactive, costly antinti-U.S. Counter Containmentment survival strategy – which does not promisemise or

49 Iran’s New Security Environment Imperatives augur well for any movement towards a rapprochementent or reconciliation. With the failureilure of various strategies to resolve the outstandinganding issues and substantialantial differences between the two sides, andd given the new dynamismism and the intractability of the ever-heighteninghtening tension between them, especially on Iran’s controversial nuclear program, the prospectsospects and options available to them appearr to be increasingly limiteded to either a direct confrontation with incalculableculable and catastrophic consequences or a major reconciliation – from which both sides stand to reap long-term strategic benefits. Ann Iran- US rapprochement,nt, when and if it becomes a reality, will undoubtedlyubtedly serve to help promotemote peace and stability in the region, particularllarly in the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and the Caucasus, and on largerr scale in the Greater Middle East. Since the continued conflict betweenetween Tehran and Washingtonshington has cast its long shadow over a host of regional issues andnd situations and has further complicated themem, an ultimate rapprochementhement between them – sooner or later, better sooner than otherwiserwise - will inevitably help ameliorate quite a number of these intrinsicallyically complex issues and situations – currentlyurrently unthinkable or tabooboo for all practical purposes. All things considered,onsidered, and looking to the future notwithstandinganding an almost bleak immediatemmediate picture, one cannot but espouse thee hope that the two sideses will come to the realization that Comprehensivehensive Engagement, thee only strategy not pursued thus far by eitherer side, offers the potentialsntials for an eventual exit from the decadesdes-old impasse and prevent a devastating ultimate confrontation.ntation. Comprehensive Engagement, complex, difficult, and time-consumingsuming as it will inevitablybly be, is nonetheless predicated, first and foremost,emost, on political will in both capitals. It is granted that breaking out of the hardened mold and psyche of the familiar mutual demonizationization policy – in bothh countries – will prove challenging, and dieie-hard proponents of old, albeit futile, past approaches and policieses will militate against the movement towards a future-looking, proactiveoactive

50 IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairss alternative strategygy of talking to – and negotiating with – the former adversary-tuned-iinterlocutor. As in similar processes in thee past, Track II Diplomacyacy can play a critical catalytic role in the early stages of the process. We close the article on this hopeful note.

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Notes

1. We are deeply gratefulful to Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi for careful reading and generous comments on an earlier draft of the paper, including in providing to us a numberumber of concepts of pivotaltal significance for our analysis. 2. Look at Ruhollah Ramazaniamazani (2002), Farideh Farhi (2001), Mohsen Milani (2003). 3. The American policyy also involved the traditional concern for the safe, unimpededd passage of oil from the Persian Gulf as well as to reassure regional allies vis-a-vis the “Iranian Menace” and of American support in time of need. 4. As part of the effortsts to reestablish his authority and credibility – at home and abroad – the Reagan administrationnistration adopted a more hawkish and openly hostile policy towards Iran by, inter alias,s, providing satellite intelligence to Iraq, direct military engagementement in the Persian Gulf, destroying Iran’s oil platforms, providing security for oil tankerskers also through re-flaggingng, and military action against the Iranian Navy (April 198888). The Vincennes’ shootingting down of an Iranian passenger plane in early July 1988 over the Persian Gulf watersaters – whose rationale is yet to established – came too prove instrumental in convincingonvincing the Iranians of the imperative of settling for the acceptanceceptance of the Security Councilouncil resolution 598 – which they had refused to do since itss passage back in July 1987 while they had the clear upper hand in the War. 5. As reported then in the U.S. media and subsequently corroborated in the statementsments and writings of Americanrican political and military officials, including General Colinn Powell, this was how the U.S. chose to act at the time. Based on a CIA analysis in Marchrch 1992, “With Iraq weakenedened and contained, Iran seemed reconfirmed as ‘America’s strategic enemy’, with whomom only tactical deals could be done.” 6. George Bush wrote later in his memoirs, that his administration “could have pursuedursued a policy of dual containment…byontainment…by going it alone. And going it alone would not have worked” – which Clinton and his team believed it would. 7. The rich literature on Iran-US relations point to the interesting fact that Secretary Christopher’s bitterter personal experience of dealing with the hostage questionn back in 1979-80 – and withth the post-revolutionary Iranians – had shaped his extremely negative attitude towards Iran and Iranians. He saw Iran “not as a diplomatic abstractionion but a living menace.” 8. Hours after the attackscks on the Twin Towers in New York, many Iranian citizens expressed

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sympathy with thee victims’ families and the Americans in general, and a large crowd of young people heldd candle-light vigil in one of Tehran’s famous squares. 9. Then Under-Secretaryry of State Richard Armitage termed the assistance as “very significantignificant Iranian cooperation.”on.” 10. It should be pointeded out we do not have direct access to reality; rather the “reality”eality” is “perceived” via ourur minds. 11. Israel is generally believedelieved to possess at least 200 nuclear warheads. 12. For the sources playingying up the “Iranian threat” see, for example, Sokolski, 2004; CClawson, 2008; Eisenstadt, 2005; and Timmerman, 2005. 13. Look, for example, at Wolfowitz, 2009; Bolton, 2009; Perle, 2006.

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