Gaining Certainty in the View, Part

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GAINING CERTAINTY IN THE VIEW

PART TWO: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING The Subtleties of the Rangton and Shentong Traditions

SOURCEBOOK

RIME SHEDRA CHANTS

ASPIRATION

In order that all sentient beings may attain Buddhahood, From my heart I take refuge in the three jewels.

This was composed by Mipham. Translated by the Nalanda Translation Committee

MANJUSHRI SUPPLICATION

Whatever the virtues of the many fields of knowledge All are steps on the path of omniscience. May these arise in the clear mirror of intellect. O Manjushri, please accomplish this.

This was specially composed by Mangala (Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche). Translated by the Nalanda Translation Committee

DEDICATION OF MERIT

By this merit may all obtain omniscience May it defeat the enemy, wrong doing. From the stormy waves of birth, old age, sickness and death, From the ocean of samsara, may I free all beings

By the confidence of the golden sun of the great east May the lotus garden of the Rigden’s wisdom bloom, May the dark ignorance of sentient beings be dispelled. May all beings enjoy profound, brilliant glory.

Translated by the Nalanda Translation Committee

For internal use only Exclusively for the use of the Rime Shedra/Advanced Buddhist Studies Program Shambhala Meditation Center of New York First Edition ‐ 2016 GAINING CERTAINTY IN THE VIEW Part Two: Much Ado about Nothing The Subtleties of the Rangton and Shengtong Traditions

An Advanced Buddhist Studies/Rime Shedra Course 12 Tuesdays from January 12 to April 5, from 7‐9:15 (omitting Feb 2)

SOURCEBOOK TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Syllabus, SB pp. 3‐4

2. Mipham’s Wheel of Investigative Meditation, 7 pages, SB pp. 5‐8

3. How to Practice Vipashyana, To Dispel the Misery of the World: Whispered Teachings of the Bodhisattvas, Rabjampa Kunga Yeshe, trs. Rigpa Translations, 6 pages, SB pp. 9‐11

4. Mipham's Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness: To be, not to be or neither, Karma Phuntsho, excerpts, SB pp. 12‐23 a. Introduction, excerpt on pp. 3‐10 b. The Big Fuss about Emptiness, pp. 40‐54

5. The Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition, Karl Brunnholzl, pp. 295‐310, SB pp. 24‐33

6. From Analysis to Insight, Introduction to Emptiness: As Taught in Tsong‐Kha‐Pa’s Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path, Guy Newland, pp. 101‐111, SB pp. 34‐39

7. Rangtong & Shentong Madhyamaka, The Ri‐Me Philosophy of Jamgon Kongtrul the Great, Ringu Tulku, pp. 193‐214, SB pp. 40‐61

8. Empty Reasons for Liberation, The Center of the Sunlit Sky, Karl Brunnhölzl, pp. 231‐262, SB pp. 62‐78

9. A General Commentary on the Doctrine, The Buddha from Dolpo, trs. Cyrus Stearns, pp. 113‐121, SB pp. 79‐94

10. Rongzom’s View on Madhyamaka in Relation to Mantra, Establishing Appearances as Divine, Heidi I Köppl, pp. 37‐51, SB pp. 95‐104

11. Wish‐Fulfilling Meru, Three Texts on Madhyamaka, Shakya Chokden, pp. 2‐36, SB pp. 105‐123

Page 1

12. Distinguishing the Views, Freedom from Extremes – Go rams pa and the Polemics of Emptiness, Go rams pa, trs. Jose Ignacio Cabezon and Geshe Lobsang Dargyay, SB pp. 124‐148 a. Introduction, excerpt, pp. 48‐56 b. Three Ways of Understanding Madhyamaka, pp. 69‐95 (odd pages only)

13. Mipham's Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness: To be, not to be or neither, Karma Phuntsho, excerpts, SB pp. 149‐158 a. Mipham’s Main Criticisms, excerpt on pp. 79‐91 b. Some Concluding Remarks, pp. 208‐212

14. The Present Absence, Mipham on Buddha‐Nature, Douglas Duckworth, pp. 55‐91, SB pp. 159‐177

15. Introduction to the Middle Way: Chandrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara with Commentary by Jamgon Mipham, Trs. Padmakara Translation Group, excerpts, SB pp. 178‐185 a. The Two Truths, pp. 192‐195 and 274‐278 b. What is refuted by Reasoning? pp. 205‐207 and 238‐240

16. The Lion’s Roar Affirming Extrinsic Emptiness, Mathew Kapstein, in Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings, Ed. William Edelglass and Jay Garfield, pp. 61‐71, SB pp. 186‐193

Page 2 GAINING CERTAINTY IN THE VIEW Part Two: Much Ado about Nothing The Subtleties of the Rangton and Shengtong Traditions

An Advanced Buddhist Studies/Rime Shedra Course 12 Tuesdays from January 12 to April 5, from 7‐9:15 (omitting Feb 2)

SYLLABUS

1. Introduction: Overview and How to Meditate on Emptiness, SB pp. 5‐11 a. Mipham’s Wheel of Investigative Meditation, 7 pages b. How to Practice Vipashyana, To Dispel the Misery of the World: Whispered Teachings of the Bodhisattvas, Rabjampa Kunga Yeshe, trs. Rigpa Translations, 6 pages

2. Introduction: Review of the Foundation, SB pp. 12‐23 a. Mipham's Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness: To be, not to be or neither, Karma Phuntsho, excerpts: i. Introduction, excerpt on pp. 3‐10 ii. The Big Fuss about Emptiness, pp. 40‐54

3. The Stages of Meditation on Emptiness, SB pp. 24‐39 a. The Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition, Karl Brunnholzl, pp. 295‐310 b. From Analysis to Insight, Introduction to Emptiness: As Taught in Tsong‐Kha‐Pa’s Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path, Guy Newland, pp. 101‐111

4. The Standard Presentation of Emptiness ‐ Rangtong, SB pp. 40‐51 a. Rangtong & Shentong Madhyamaka, The Ri‐Me Philosophy of Jamgon Kongtrul the Great, Ringu Tulku, excerpt: i. An Overview of Madhyamaka, pp. 193‐194 ii. Rangtong Madhyamaka, pp. 195‐214

5. The Radical Presentation of Emptiness ‐ Shentong, SB pp. 51‐61 a. Rangtong & Shentong Madhyamaka, The Ri‐Me Philosophy of Jamgon Kongtrul the Great, Ringu Tulku, excerpt: i. Shentong Madhyamaka, pp. 214‐232 ii. Tantra Madhyamaka, pp. 232‐236

6. The Standard Reasonings into Emptiness, SB pp. 62‐78 a. Empty Reasons for Liberation, The Center of the Sunlit Sky, Karl Brunnhölzl, pp. 231‐ 262 b. The Five Great Reasonings: i. The analysis of a nature: the reasoning of freedom from unity and multiplicity

Page 3 ii. The analysis of causes: the vajra sliver reasoning iii. The analysis of results: the negation of an arising of existents and nonexistent iv. The analysis of both causes and results: the negation of arising from the four possibilities v. The analysis of mere appearances: the reasoning of dependent origination

7. The Other Emptiness of Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen & Rongzom’s Radical Blending of Sutra and Tantra Madhyamaka, SB pp. 79‐104 a. A General Commentary on the Doctrine, The Buddha from Dolpo, trs. Cyrus Stearns, pp. 113‐121 b. Rongzom’s View on Madhyamaka in Relation to Mantra, Establishing Appearances as Divine, Heidi I Köppl, pp. 37‐51

8. The Radical Historical Views of Shakya Chokden, SB pp. 105‐123 a. Wish‐Fulfilling Meru, Three Texts on Madhyamaka, Shakya Chokden, pp. 2‐36

9. Gorampa’s Middle Path between the Middle Paths, SB pp. 124‐148 a. Distinguishing the Views, Freedom from Extremes – Go rams pa and the Polemics of Emptiness, Go rams pa, trs. Jose Ignacio Cabezon and Geshe Lobsang Dargyay i. Introduction, excerpt, pp. 48‐56 ii. Three Ways of Understanding Madhyamaka, pp. 69‐95 (odd pages only)

10. Mipham’s Critique of the Extremes of Rangtong and Shentong, SB pp. 149‐165 a. Mipham's Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness: To be, not to be or neither, Karma Phuntsho, two excerpts: i. Mipham’s Main Criticisms, excerpt on pp. 79‐91 ii. Some Concluding Remarks, pp. 208‐212 b. The Present Absence, Mipham on Buddha‐Nature, Douglas Duckworth, pp. 55‐66 i. Introduction, pp. 55‐57 ii. Other‐Emptiness in Jonang, pp. 57‐66

11. Mipham’s Middle Path between the Middle Paths, Part One, SB pp. 165‐177 a. The Present Absence, Mipham on Buddha‐Nature, Douglas Duckworth, pp. 66‐91

12. Mipham’s Middle Path between the Middle Paths, Part Two, SB pp. 178‐193 a. Introduction to the Middle Way: Chandrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara with Commentary by Jamgon Mipham, Trs. Padmakara Translation Group, excerpts: i. The Two Truths, pp. 192‐195 and 274‐278 ii. What is refuted by Reasoning? pp. 205‐207 and 238‐240 b. The Lion’s Roar Affirming Extrinsic Emptiness, Mathew Kapstein, in Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings, Ed. William Edelglass and Jay Garfield, pp. 61‐71

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Page 5 ϭ͘,ŽǁƚŽDĞĚŝƚĂƚĞŽŶƚŚĞ&ŽƵƌDĂƌŬƐŽĨǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ZĞĨůĞĐƚĚĞĞƉůǇŽŶŚŽǁƚŚĞƐĞĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞƐ͕ tŚŝĐŚĂƌĞŝŵƉƵƌĞĂŶĚůĂĐŬƌĞĂůĞƐƐĞŶĐĞ͕ /ŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŽĚǇŝŶƚŽWĂƌƚƐʹŝƐƐŽůǀŝŶŐ&ŝǆĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞYƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨĞŝŶŐhŶŝƚĂƌǇ ŽŶŽƚƌĞŵĂŝŶŽŶĐĞƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĂƌŝƐĞŶ͕ ƵƚƉĞƌŝƐŚĨƌŽŵŽŶĞŵŽŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŶĞǆƚ͘ /ŵĂŐŝŶĞƐŽŵĞŽŶĞǁŚŽƐƚŝƌƐŝŶǇŽƵŝŶƚĞŶƐĞĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚ͕ ŶĚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞŵŶŽǁƉƌĞƐĞŶƚǀŝǀŝĚůǇďĞĨŽƌĞǇŽƵ͘ ůůƚŚĞĐŝǀŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ͕ ^ĞƉĂƌĂƚĞƚŚŝƐƉĞƌƐŽŶŝŶƚŽĨŝǀĞĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐŬĂŶĚŚĂƐ͕ DĞƚǁŝƚŚŽŶůǇĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĞŶĚ͕ ŶĚďĞŐŝŶďǇŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůďŽĚǇ͘ ŶĚƐŽǁŝůůƚŚŽƐĞŽĨƚŽĚĂǇĂŶĚĂŐĞƐǇĞƚƚŽĐŽŵĞ͘ dŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚĐĂŶŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚŝƐĞŶĐŚĂŶƚŵĞŶƚ͘ ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂůůŝƚƐŝŵƉƵƌĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ KĨĨůĞƐŚĂŶĚďůŽŽĚ͕ďŽŶĞƐ͕ŵĂƌƌŽǁ͕ĨĂƚ͕ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂůŽƌŐĂŶƐ͕ůŝŵďƐĂŶĚŽƌŐĂŶƐŽĨƐĞŶƐĞ͕ ĞĂƚŚŝƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĨŽƌĂůůůŝǀŝŶŐƚŚŝŶŐƐ͕ &ĞĐĞƐ͕ƵƌŝŶĞ͕ďĂĐƚĞƌŝĂ͕ŚĂŝƌ͕ŶĂŝůƐĂŶĚƚŚĞůŝŬĞ͕ ^ƵĚĚĞŶůǇŝƚĐŽŵĞƐ͕ĂŶĚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚǁĂƌŶŝŶŐ͘ ŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐŽĨĞĂƌƚŚĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ͘ ZĞĨůĞĐƚŽŶŚŽǁĂůůƚŚĂƚǁĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝŶůŝĨĞ /ƐĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵŽŶĞŵŽŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŶĞǆƚ͘ dŚŝŶŬŽĨĂůůƚŚĞƐĞĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ͕ĞĂĐŚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚ ĂŶƐƚŝůůďĞĚŝǀŝĚĞĚĞǀĞŶĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶ͕ /ŶƐƵŵŵĂƌǇ͕ƚŽƚŚĞďĞƐƚŽĨǇŽƵƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ͕ ŽǁŶƚŽƚŚĞǀĞƌǇƚŝŶŝĞƐƚƉĂƌƚŝĐůĞ͕ ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂůůƚŚĞĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨŝŵƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶĐĞ DĞŶƚĂůůǇĚŝƐƐĞĐƚƚŚĞŵĂůůƐƚĂŐĞďǇƐƚĂŐĞ͕ dŚĂƚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝǌĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚƚŚŝŶŐƐ͘ ŚĞĐŬŝŶŐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌǇŽƵĨĞĞůĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌĞĂĐŚŝŶƚƵƌŶ͘ ZĞĨůĞĐƚŽŶĞĂĐŚŝŶƚƵƌŶǁŝƚŚůƵĐŝĚƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ͘ ^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐǁĞĐŽƵůĚĐĂůů͞ďŽĚǇ͟ ZĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞŚŽǁƚŚĞĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞƐŽĨƚŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚǁĞĚĞƐŝƌĞ͕ ƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ͕ǀĂƌŝĞĚĂŶĚŝŵƉƵƌĞ͕ ƌĞƚƌĂŶƐŝĞŶƚĂƐůŝŐŚƚŶŝŶŐ͕ĞǀĂŶĞƐĐĞŶƚůŝŬĞďƵďďůĞƐ͕ ďŽĚǇŝƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐďƵƚĂŶƵŶĐůĞĂŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƉƚŝŽŶ͕ ďƵŶĚůĞŽĨŵƵƐĐůĞƐĂŶĚĨŝďƌĞƐ͕ĂŵŽƵŶĚŽĨǁĂƐƚĞ͕ ŶĚĨůĞĞƚŝŶŐůŝŬĞĐůŽƵĚƐŝŶƚŚĞƐŬǇ͘ ŶĚƐĞĞƚŚŝŶŐĨůƵŝĚƐƚŚĂƚŽŽǌĞĂŶĚƚƌŝĐŬůĞ͘ hŶƚŝůƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵŽĨƚŚŝƐŝĚĞĂĨĂĚĞƐ͕ &ŽĐƵƐǇŽƵƌĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽŶŶŽƚŚŝŶŐĞůƐĞ͘ /ŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ^ƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐͲͲŝƐƐŽůǀŝŶŐ&ŝǆĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞYƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨWƵƌŝƚǇ /ŶǀŽůǀĞĂŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĨŽƵƌƉŽŝŶƚƐ ΀DƵůƚŝƉůŝĐŝƚǇ͕ŝŵƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶĐĞ͕ƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐĂŶĚƐĞůĨůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐ͘΁ dŚĞŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŚŽǁǁŝƚŚŝŶĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞƐ͕ tŚŝĐŚĂƌĞŵŽŵĞŶƚĂƌǇĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŽĨŵĂŶǇĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ͕ ŶĚƚƵƌŶƚŚĞǁŚĞĞůŽĨĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂŐĂŝŶĂŶĚĂŐĂŝŶ͘ dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐǁĞŵŝŐŚƚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĂƐƉĂŝŶŝƚƐĞůĨ͕ dŚĞŵŽƌĞǇŽƵĂŶĂůǇǌĞ͕ƚŚĞŵŽƌĞǇŽƵƌĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇǁŝůůŐƌŽǁ͘ ŶĚƚŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚƐĞĞŵƉůĞĂƐĂŶƚƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞǇĐŚĂŶŐĞ͘ ƉƉůǇƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĂĐůĞĂƌŵŝŶĚŽĨŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ dŽĂůůŬŝŶĚƐŽĨŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐũƵƐƚůŝŬĞƚŚĞƐĞ͕ zĞƚƚŚĞǇĂůůƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞĨŽƌĨƵƚƵƌĞǁŽĞƐ͕ ŶĚ͕ůŝŬĞǁŝůĚĨŝƌĞƐƉƌĞĂĚŝŶŐĂĐƌŽƐƐĂŐƌĂƐƐǇƉůĂŝŶ͕ ŶĚƚŚƵƐƚŚĞƐŬĂŶĚŚĂƐĂƌĞƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ͘ WƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůůǇǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŝŶƚĞƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ͘ ZĞĨůĞĐƚĂƐǁĞůů͕ĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐǇŽƵĂƌĞĂďůĞ͕ KŶĂůůƚŚĞŵŝƐĞƌǇƚŚĞƌĞŝƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ͘ ^ĂǇƚŽǇŽƵƌƐĞůĨ͗͞/ŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ͕/ǁŽƵůĚĂůǁĂǇƐ 'ĞƚĐĂƵŐŚƚŝŶŵǇŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŶŝĚĞĂƐĂŶĚĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ͕ ůůŝƐĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞƐŬĂŶĚŚĂƐ͛ŝŵƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ͘ tŚŝĐŚůĞĚƚŽĂůůŬŝŶĚƐŽĨƵƐĞůĞƐƐƐƉĞĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ͕ dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞƚŝŶŝĞƐƚƐƉĞĐŬŽƌƉŝŶͲƚŝƉ͛ƐǁŽƌƚŚ ƵƚŶŽǁ/ǁŝůůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŽŶůǇƚŚŝƐŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ͘͟ KĨƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶƚĂŵŝŶĂƚĞĚĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞƐ dŚĂƚŝƐĨƌĞĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚĞĨĞĐƚŽĨƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ͘ /ĨǇŽƵĨŝŶĚǇŽƵƌƐĞůĨŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŝƌĞĚ͕ zĞƚŶŽƚŝĐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂĨĨůŝĐƚŝŽŶƐƐƚŝůůĚŽŶŽƚĂƌŝƐĞ͕ ƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƚŚĞƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ͕ ǀĞŶǁŝƚŚŽƵƚǇŽƵƌĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐƚŚĞĂŶƚŝĚŽƚĞ͕ dŚĞƐŬĂŶĚŚĂƐĂƌĞůŝŬĞŶĞĚƚŽĂĨŝůƚŚǇƐǁĂŵƉ͕ dŚĞŶƌĞƐƚŝŶĞƋƵĂŶŝŵŝƚǇƚŽƌĞĨƌĞƐŚǇŽƵƌŵŝŶĚ͘ ƉŝƚŽĨďƵƌŶŝŶŐĐŽĂůƐŽƌĂŶŝƐůĂŶĚŽĨĚĞŵŽŶƐ͘ ZĞŵĂŝŶǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚĨŽƌĂƐůŽŶŐĂƐǇŽƵĐĂŶ͘ ĨƚĞƌĂǁŚŝůĞ͕ŽŶĐĞǇŽƵƌƚŝƌĞĚŶĞƐƐŝƐŶŽŵŽƌĞ͕ ZĞƉĞĂƚƚŚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶũƵƐƚůŝŬĞďĞĨŽƌĞ͕

Page 6 /ŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƐĞŶĐĞͲŝƐƐŽůǀŝŶŐ&ŝǆĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞYƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨ^ĞůĨ ƚĂůůƚŝŵĞƐďĞŝŶŐŵŝŶĚĨƵůĂŶĚĂǁĂƌĞ KĨƚŚĞŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƚŚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶďƌŝŶŐƐ͘ ƚƚŚĞĞŶĚ͕ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞƚŚĞƐĞĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞƐ͕ tŚŝĐŚŚĂǀĞŵĂŶǇĂƐƉĞĐƚƐĂŶĚĂƌĞŝŵƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ͕ /Ĩ͕ĂƚƚŝŵĞƐ͕ǇŽƵƐůŝƉŝŶƚŽĨŽƌŐĞƚĨƵůŶĞƐƐ͕ ŶĚǁŚŽƐĞƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŶĂƚƵƌĞŚĂƐŶŽǁďĞĞŶƐŚŽǁŶ͕ ŶĚƚŚĞĂĨĨůŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŚĂǀĞŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƚŽĂƌŝƐĞ͕ ŶĚůŽŽŬĨŽƌǁŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƚŚĂƚǁĞĐĂůů͞/͘͟ dŚĞŶƚĂŬĞƵƉƚŚŝƐŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽŶĐĞŵŽƌĞ͕ >ŝŬĞƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐĨŽƌĂǁĞĂƉŽŶǁŚĞŶĞŶĞŵŝĞƐĂƉƉĞĂƌ͘ tŚĞŶǇŽƵƐĞĞƚŚĂƚ͕ůŝŬĞĂǁĂƚĞƌĨĂůů͕ ƐŚŽǁĞƌŽĨƌĂŝŶŽƌĂŶĞŵƉƚǇŚŽƵƐĞ͕ dŚĞǇĂƌĞĚĞǀŽŝĚŽĨĂŶǇŝŶƚƌŝŶƐŝĐƐĞůĨ͕ ZĞŵĂŝŶƵŶƚŝůƚŚŝƐĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶĨĂĚĞƐ͘ Ϯ͘dŚĞDĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨWƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ dŚĞtŚĞĞůDĞƚŚŽĚŽĨŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚŝŽŶ ZĞƐƵůƚ tŚĞŶŝƚĚŽĞƐĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌ͕ƚŚĞŶŽŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶ :ƵƐƚĂƐůŝŐŚƚǁŝůůďĂŶŝƐŚĚĂƌŬŶĞƐƐ͕ /ŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞŝŶƚŚĞƐƚĂŐĞƐĂƐƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐŚŽǁŶ͘ /ƚŝƐĂůŵŽƐƚŶĞĞĚůĞƐƐƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚ ^ŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚĞŝŶŶŽƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ͕ ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚŝƐ͕ KƌĞůƐĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐ͘ ǀĞŶŝĨŝƚŝƐŽŶůǇƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĚĂůŝƚƚůĞ͕ tŝůůĚŽŐƌĞĂƚŚĂƌŵƚŽƚŚĞŬůĞƐŚĂƐ͘ WƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞƉŽŝŶƚƐĂŐĂŝŶĂŶĚĂŐĂŝŶ͕ ^ŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ͛ƐĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞƐ͕ ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌŵƵĐŚŽŶĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƐƚŚĞĨůĂǁƐ ^ŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐůŽŽŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŽǇŽƵƌŽǁŶ͕ KĨƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚƐĂŵƐĂƌŝĐǁŽƌůĚ͕ ŶĚĂƚƚŝŵĞƐ͕ĂŶĂůǇǌŝŶŐĂůůƚŚĂƚŝƐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ͘ KŶĞǁŝůůĂůƐŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƵŶĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ͕ EŝƌǀĂŶĂ͛ƐƐƵƉƌĞŵĞĂŶĚƌĞĨƌĞƐŚŝŶŐƉĞĂĐĞ͘ >ĞƚǇŽƵƌĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚƚŽĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐďĞƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ͘ /ŶƐŚŽƌƚ͕ƌĞŶŽƵŶĐĞĂŶǇƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƚŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ ^ĞĞŝŶŐƚŚĞ&ŽƵƌDĂƌŬƐ dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞƚŚĞŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŚŝŐŚĞƐƚƐĞĐƌĞƚĞƐƐĞŶĐĞƚĂŶƚƌĂƐ͕ dŚĞĂůůͲƉĞƌǀĂĚŝŶŐƐƉĂĐĞŽĨƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞĐŽͲĞŵĞƌŐĞŶƚďůŝƐƐ͕ ǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇ͕ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌŝƚǇǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ͕ /ƚŝƐĂůƐŽƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐ͚ŶĂƚƵƌĂůůǇĂƌŝƐŝŶŐǁŝƐĚŽŵ͕͛ zŽƵǁŝůůŶĂƚƵƌĂůůǇĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞŚŽǁĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ƐƚĂƚĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂůůƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂŚĂǀĞƚŽƚĂůƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶ͘ /ŶĐůƵĚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĨŝǀĞƐŬĂŶĚŚĂƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƵŶĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ /ƐŵĂŶŝĨŽůĚ͕ŝŵƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ͕ƉĂŝŶĨƵůĂŶĚĚĞǀŽŝĚŽĨƐĞůĨ͘ dŽŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞƚŚŝƐĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŵĂƐƚĞƌ͛Ɛ WŝƚŚŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐŝƐƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞ'ƌĞĂƚWĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶ͘ ǀĞŶǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂŶǇĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞĞĨĨŽƌƚ͕ dŚĞǁŚŽůĞŽĨǇŽƵƌĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ dŚĞWƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞWĂƚŚ tŝůůƐĞĞŵŵĂŐŝĐĂůĂŶĚŝŶƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů͕ ŶĚǇŽƵǁŝůůŽǀĞƌĐŽŵĞƚŚĞŬůĞƐŚĂƐ͘ dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ͕ĂƐĂƉƌĞůŝŵŝŶĂƌǇƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ &ŽƌƚŚĞŵĂŚĂǇĂŶĂƉĂƚŚŽĨďŽƚŚƐƵƚƌĂĂŶĚŵĂŶƚƌĂ͕ dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞĂƐŝƐĨŽƌ^ŚĂŵĂƚŚĂĂŶĚsŝƉĂƐŚǇĂŶĂ ƌĞĂŬŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƐŚĞůůŽĨĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ͕ tŚĞŶŝƚŝƐĨƌĞĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞǁĂǀĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĂĨĨůŝĐƚŝǀĞĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ͕ dŚŝƐƉĂƚŚŽĨƉƌĞĐŝƐĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĞǆĐĞůůĞŶƚŝŶĚĞĞĚ͘ dŚĞŽĐĞĂŶŽĨǇŽƵƌŵŝŶĚŝƐŵĂĚĞƐĞƌĞŶĞĂŶĚĐĂůŵ͘ dŚŝƐŝƐĐŽŶĚƵĐŝǀĞƚŽŐĂŝŶŝŶŐŵĞŶƚĂůƐĞůĨͲĐŽŶƚƌŽů͕ &ŝƌƐƚ͕ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌŽĨĨŝŶĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ͕ dŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚŝĐŚŽŶĞƌĞĂĐŚĞƐƚŚĞƐĂŵĂĚŚŝŽĨĐĂůŵĂďŝĚŝŶŐ͘ KŶĞĚĞƐƚƌŽǇƐƚŚĞŵĂƌŬƐŽĨƌŝƐŝŶŐĂĨĨůŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ͘ /ĨǇŽƵĐĂŶƚŚĞŶůŽŽŬŝŶƚŽƚŚĞǀĞƌǇŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ dŚĞŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĞŵƉƚŝŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞƐ͕ KĨƚŚĞŵŝŶĚŝŶŽŶĞͲƉŽŝŶƚĞĚĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ͕ KŶĞůĞƚƐŐŽŽĨĚĞƐŝƌĞƐĂŶĚŚŽƉĞƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞƌĞĂůŵƐ͕ dŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞĞǆƚƌĂŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇŝŶƐŝŐŚƚŽĨǀŝƉĂƐŚǇĂŶĂ͘ ŶĚĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇ͕ďǇƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝŶŐŝŶƐƚĂŐĞƐ͕ĂůůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŶŽƚŝŽŶƐ ƌĞƉĂĐŝĨŝĞĚĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŽĨĞŵƉƚŝŶĞƐƐ͘

Page 7 /ƚŝƐŚĞƌĞƚŚĂƚŽŶĞĨŝŶĚƐƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂůĞŶƚƌǇƉŽŝŶƚ dŚĂƚŝƐĐŽŵŵŽŶƚŽĂůůƚŚƌĞĞǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ͘ EŽƚǁŝƐŚŝŶŐĨŽƌĂŶǇĂŶƚŝĚŽƚĞƐŽƌĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƌĞůŝŶƋƵŝƐŚŝŶŐ͕ KŶĞŝƐĨƌĞĞĚĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇĨƌŽŵĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĐůŝŶŐŝŶŐƚŽĞǆƚƌĞŵĞƐ͘ ϯ͘dŚĞhŶŝƚǇŽĨŵƉƚŝŶĞƐƐĂŶĚ>ƵŵŝŶŽƐŝƚǇĂƐƵĚĚŚĂEĂƚƵƌĞ tŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƵƌĞƐƚĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶďĞǇŽŶĚĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚ͕ KŶĞĐŽƵƌƐĞƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƐůŝŐŚƚĞƐƚĨĞĂƌ͕ ŵƉƚŝŶĞƐƐΘƵĚĚŚĂEĂƚƵƌĞ >ŝŬĞĂďŝƌĚƐŽĂƌŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂďƐŽůƵƚĞƐƉĂĐĞ͕ ŶĚĂƚƚĂŝŶƐƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨĂƐƵƉƌĞŵĞďŽĚŚŝƐĂƚƚǀĂ͘ ůůŝůůƵƐŽƌǇƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂǁŚŝĐŚĂƌŝƐĞŝŶƚĞƌĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚůǇ͕ ,ĂǀĞŶĞǀĞƌĂƌŝƐĞŶƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǁŶŽĨƚŝŵĞ͕ ϰ͘dŚĞŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ŶĚƐŽŝŶĞŵƉƚŝŶĞƐƐͲͲƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂůŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇͶ dŚĞǇĂƌĞďĞǇŽŶĚĞǆƚƌĞŵĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƐĂŵĞŶĞƐƐŽƌĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ͘ WŽŝŶƚŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚĞWƵƌƉŽƐĞ dŚŝƐĂďƐŽůƵƚĞƐƉĂĐĞŽĨŐƌĞĂƚŝŶĚŝǀŝƐŝďůĞĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ͕ ĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƚĞǆƚƐŽĨŶŽďůĞŵĂƐƚĞƌƐ͕/ŚĂǀĞŚĞƌĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ /ƐĂůƐŽŬŶŽǁŶĂƐƚŚĞĞƐƐĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƵŐĂƚĂƐ͘ dŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƉŽŝŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƚŚƐŽĨƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ͕ KŶĐĞŝƚŝƐƌĞĂůŝǌĞĚ͕ŽŶĞĨŝŶĚƐƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚŶŝƌǀĂŶĂ tŚŝĐŚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŝŶŵĞŶƚĂůŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ͕ dŚĂƚĂďŝĚĞƐŝŶŶĞŝƚŚĞƌĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŶŽƌƋƵŝĞƐĐĞŶĐĞ͘ ƐĂƉƌĞůŝŵŝŶĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƚŚƐŽĨƐŚĂŵĂƚŚĂĂŶĚǀŝƉĂƐŚǇĂŶĂ͘ dŚŝƐŝƐƐƵƉƌĞŵĞůǇƉƵƌĞĂŶĚďůŝƐƐĨƵů͕ dŚĞŐƌĞĂƚƵŶĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ͕ƚŽƚĂůůǇƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ͕ dŚĞŵŽƌĞĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌǇŽƵďĞĐŽŵĞǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ dŚĞŐƌĞĂƚƐĞůĨͲŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇͶƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞŝƚƐ KĨƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŝŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝǀĞŵĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ͕ dƌĂŶƐĐĞŶĚĞŶƚĂŶĚƵŶƐƵƌƉĂƐƐĂďůĞƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ͘ dŚĞŵŽƌĞƚŚĞĂĨĨůŝĐƚŝŽŶƐǁŝůůĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚ͕ ŶĚƚŚĞƐƵďƚůĞƌƚŚĞŬůĞƐŚĂƐǁŝůůďĞĐŽŵĞ͘ dŚĞdĂŶƚƌŝĐWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ dŚŝƐǁŝůůŵĂŬĞŝƚĞĂƐŝĞƌƚŽƉƌĂĐƚŝƐĞƐŚĂŵĂƚŚĂ͕ ŶĚũƵƐƚůŝŬĞŐŽůĚƚŚĂƚŝƐƚƌĞĂƚĞĚŝŶĨŝƌĞ ,ŽǁƚŽŵĞĚŝƚĂƚĞƵƉŽŶŵƉƚŝŶĞƐƐ͗ &ƌĞĞƚŚĞDŝŶĚĂŶĚƚŚĞZĞƐƚtŝůů&ŽůůŽǁ DĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶĞŵƉƚŝŶĞƐƐŝƐŶŽƚĚŽŶĞďǇĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐŽŶĂĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝǌĞĚǀŽŝĚŶĞƐƐ͊/ŶƐƚĞĂĚŝƚŝƐ ĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚĞĚŽƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƌĂƚŚĞƌďǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŚŽǁƚŚĞŵŝŶĚŝƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝŶŐŽƵƌ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝǌĞĚǁŽƌůĚ͘&ŝƌƐƚ͕ǁĞŐĂŝŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝƐŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŶďǇ ^ŽŝƚďĞĐŽŵĞƐŵĂůůĞĂďůĞĂŶĚƌĞĂĚǇƚŽĐƌĂĨƚ͕ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌŝŶŐŝƚǁĞĂůƐŽŐĂŝŶĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞƵŶĐƌĞĂƚĞĚƐƉĂĐĞĨƌŽŵǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĂƚĐĂŵĞ͘ DŝŶĚǁŝůůďĞƌĞĨŝŶĞĚŽŶĐĞŝƚŝƐĨƌĞĞĚĨƌŽŵĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚ͘ >ŽŽŬĂƚŚŽǁƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞǀŽůǀĞƐǁŚŝůĞŝŶŵĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ͘^ĞŶƐĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĐĐƵƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ WƌĂŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ƵďůŝŵĞĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨƚŚŝƐWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ĂƉƉĞĂƌŝŶŐĂƐƉĞĐƚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇĐƌĞĂƚĞƐĂĐŽŶŐĞĂůĞĚǁŚŽůĞŝŵĂŐĞŽĨ ĂΗƚŚŝŶŐΗƉĞƌƐŝƐƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŝŵĞĂŶĚƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐĂƵŶŝĨŝĞĚŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ͘/ŶƚŚĞǀŝƐƵĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ͕ƚŚĞĨŽǀĞĂ /ŵĂŐŝŶĞŝĨƐŽŵĞŽŶĞǁĞƌĞƚŽŽĨĨĞƌƉůĞŶƚŝĨƵůŐŝĨƚƐ ŐĂƉŝƐĨŝůůĞĚŝŶ͖ŽƉƚŝĐĂůŝůůƵƐŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĐƌĞĂƚĞĚŽƵƚŽĨůŝŶĞƐĂŶĚƐŚĂƉĞƐ;Ğ͘Ő͘ƚŚĞƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞƐͿ͖ǁĞΗƐĞĞΗ dŽƚŚĞdŚƌĞĞ:ĞǁĞůƐĨŽƌĂƚŚŽƵƐĂŶĚŐŽĚůǇǇĞĂƌƐ͘ ǁŚŽůĞŽďũĞĐƚƐ͘dŚŝƐŝƐǁŚĂƚŝƐŵĞĂŶƚǁŚĞŶŝƚŝƐƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƉƉĞĂƌŝŶŐŽďũĞĐƚ͕ŽƌĂƐƉĞĐƚ͕ŝƐ /ƚŝƐƐĂŝĚŝŶƚŚĞƐƵƚƌĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĞƌŝƚŽĨƚŚŝƐŐĞŶĞƌŽƐŝƚǇ ͞ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŶ͘͟ /ƐƐƵƌƉĂƐƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞŵĞƌŝƚŽĨĞǀĞŶĂŵŽŵĞŶƚ͛ƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶ KŶŝŵƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶĐĞ͕ĞŵƉƚŝŶĞƐƐĂŶĚƐĞůĨůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐ͘ dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƚŚĞŶƚǁŽŵĞŶƚĂůƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ͘KŶĞŝƐƚŚĞŶŽŶͲĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĚŝƌĞĐƚĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŶƐŽƌǇ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ͕ǁŚŝĐŚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĨĂůůĨŽƌƚŚĞŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŝŶƚŚĞĂƐƉĞĐƚďǇŐƌĂƐƉŝŶŐŝƚ͘/ƚƐƚŝůůƐĞĞƐƚŚĞ dŚŝƐŝƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐƐĂǇƚŚĂƚ ǁŚŽůĞŽďũĞĐƚƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƐďƵƚĚŽĞƐŶΖƚŐƌĂƐƉĂƚƚŚĞŵĂƐƌĞĂůͲƵŶŝƚĂƌǇĂŶĚ dŽƌĞĐŝƚĞƚŚĞ&ŽƵƌ^ĞĂůƐŽĨƚŚĞDĂŚĂǇĂŶĂŚĂƌŵĂ ƐŽĨŽƌƚŚ͘ /ƐĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐ /ŶƚŚĞĞŝŐŚƚǇͲĨŽƵƌƚŚŽƵƐĂŶĚƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŚĂƌŵĂ͘

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Page 9 ƚŚĂŶƚŚĞŵŝŶĚ͕ƚŚĞŶďǇĞǆĂŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŝŶĚ͕ǇŽƵĂƌĞĞǆĂŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĂůů ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ͘dŚĞŶĂŶĂůǇǌĞĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐůŝŶĞƐ͘KŶƚŚĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůĞǀĞů͕ƚŚĞ ŵŝŶĚƚŽŽĐĂŶŶŽƚƚƌƵůǇĞǆŝƐƚ͘,ŽǁĐĂŶƚŚĞŵŝŶĚƚŚĂƚƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞƐƚŚĞĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ ;ĂͿůŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐŽƵƚĞƌŽďũĞĐƚƐ ĨŽƌŵƐĂŶĚƐŽŽŶͲǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƵŶƌĞĂůͲĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐŝŶƚŚĞƐĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐĞǀĞƌďĞƌĞĂů͍:ƵƐƚĂƐƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůĨŽƌŵƐĂŶĚƐŽŽŶĂƌĞĨĂůƐĞ͕ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŵŝŶĚŝƐ dŚĞƌŽŽƚƚĞǆƚƐĂǇƐ͗ ŶŽƚƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵ͕ŝƚƚŽŽŝƐĨĂůƐĞ͘ ϭ͘ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂůůƚŚŝŶŐƐĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚƐĂƐĚƌĞĂŵůŝŬĞ͘ tŚĞŶǁĞĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŵŝŶĚǁŝƚŚǁŝƐĚŽŵŝŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ͕ǁĞĨŝŶĚƚŚĂƚ ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇŵŝŶĚŝƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚŶĞŝƚŚĞƌŝŶƐŝĚĞŶŽƌŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ͘EŽƌŝƐŝƚƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ dŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚŝƐŝƐĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚŝŶ^ƚĂŐĞƐŽĨDĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ//͗ ƐŽŵĞǁŚĞƌĞĞůƐĞ͘dŚĞŵŝŶĚŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƐƚŝƐŶŽƚƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ͖ŶŽƌŝƐƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ͘ dŚĞŵŝŶĚƚŚĂƚĂƌŝƐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŽŽŝƐŶŽƚƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ͘tŚĞŶƚŚĞŵŝŶĚŝƐďŽƌŶ͕ ΗdŚŝŶŐƐĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚƐΗ;ŽƌĚŚĂƌŵĂƐͿ͕ŝŶƐŚŽƌƚ͕ĂƌĞĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞĚŽĨƚŚĞĨŝǀĞĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞƐ͕ ŝƚĐŽŵĞƐĨƌŽŵŶŽǁŚĞƌĞ͕ĂŶĚǁŚĞŶŝƚĐĞĂƐĞƐ͕ŝƚŐŽĞƐŶŽǁŚĞƌĞ͘DŝŶĚŝƐŶŽƚ ƚǁĞůǀĞƐĞŶƐĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ;ĂǇĂƚĂŶĂͿ͕ĂŶĚĞŝŐŚƚĞĞŶĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ;ĚŚĂƚƵͿ͘dŚĞƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů ĂƉƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝďůĞ͕ŝƚĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞƉŽŝŶƚĞĚŽƵƚ͕ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů͘ ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞƐ͕ƐĞŶƐĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ͕ĂŶĚĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞ͕ŝŶĂŶƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞƐĞŶƐĞ͕ ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŵŝŶĚ͘tŚĞŶƚŚĞǇĂƌĞďƌŽŬĞŶĚŽǁŶŝŶƚŽƐƵďƚůĞͲ ƐƚŚŝƐƐĂǇƐ͕ǁŚĞŶǁĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĂůůĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞƐĂƌĞƚŚĞŵĂŐŝĐĂůŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ŵŽƐƚƉĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƉĂƌƚƐ͕ ŵŝŶĚ͕ĂŶĚǁĞĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƚŚĞĞƐƐĞŶĐĞŽĨŵŝŶĚƵƐŝŶŐƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ͕ǁĞĂƌƌŝǀĞĂƚƚŚĞ ŶŽƌĞĂůŶĂƚƵƌĞĐĂŶďĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝǀĞůǇŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ͘ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐďĞǇŽŶĚĂůůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐ͕ƐƵĐŚĂƐŽƵƚĞƌĂŶĚŝŶŶĞƌ͖ ƉĂƐƚ͕ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ͕ĂŶĚĨƵƚƵƌĞ͖ĂƌŝƐŝŶŐĂŶĚĐĞĂƐŝŶŐ͖ĂŶĚƐŽŽŶ͘ dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ͕ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĨŽƌĐĞŽĨĂŐĞͲŽůĚĐůŝŶŐŝŶŐƚŽĨŽƌŵƐĂŶĚƐŽŽŶ͕ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞŝŶ ĨĂĐƚƵŶƌĞĂůͲũƵƐƚůŝŬĞƚŚĞĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞƐŝŶĂĚƌĞĂŵͲǀŝƐƵĂůĨŽƌŵƐĂŶĚƚŚĞůŝŬĞĂƉƉĞĂƌ ;ĐͿůŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĂŶƚŝĚŽƚĞŽĨŵĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ƚŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇďĞŝŶŐƐĂƐŝĨƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƚŽƚŚĞŵŝŶĚ͘zĞƚǁĞŵƵƐƚĞǆĂŵŝŶĞ ƚŚĞŵ͕ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽŶƚŚĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůĞǀĞů͕ƚŚĞƐĞĨŽƌŵƐĂŶĚƐƵĐŚĂƌĞŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŽƚŚĞƌ dŚĞƌŽŽƚƚĞǆƚƐĂǇƐ͗ ƚŚĂŶĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨŵŝŶĚ͘ Ϯ͘>ĞƚĞǀĞŶƚŚĞĂŶƚŝĚŽƚĞďĞĨƌĞĞĚŝŶŝƚƐŽǁŶƉůĂĐĞ͘ ĞƋƵŝƉŽŝƐĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂŶǇĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽƌĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ͕ƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽƌĂďƐŽƌƉƚŝŽŶ͕ĞĨĨŽƌƚ ĂŶĚĞǆĞƌƚŝŽŶ͕ŽƌƚŚĞůŝŬĞ͘ ^ƚĂŐĞƐŽĨDĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ//ƐĂǇƐ͗ ^ƚĂŐĞƐŽĨDĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ//ƐĂǇƐ͗ /Ĩ͕ŝŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ͕ƚŚĞĨŝƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐĂƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĐĂŶďĞŝŐŶŝƚĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƉƌĞĐŝƐĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞŶũƵƐƚůŝŬĞĨůĂŵĞƐƐƉĂƌŬĞĚďǇƌƵďďŝŶŐƐƚŝĐŬƐ tŚĞŶĞŶƚĞƌŝŶŐŝŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƐĞůĨůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĂŶĚ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ͕ŝƚǁŝůůĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƚŚĞǁŽŽĚŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ͘dŚŝƐƚŚĞƵĚĚŚĂ ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ͕ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐƚŽďĞĚŽŶĞ͕ǇŽƵŐĂŝŶĨƌĞĞĚŽŵĨƌŽŵ ŚŝŵƐĞůĨŚĂƐƐĂŝĚ͘ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐĂŶĚĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ͘DĞŶƚĂůĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĞŶƚĞƌƐ͕ŶĂƚƵƌĂůůǇĂŶĚƐƉŽŶƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ͕ ŝŶƚŽĂƐŝŶŐůĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚŝƐďĞǇŽŶĚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͘ /ŶƚŚĞŶŽďůĞůŽƵĚŽĨ:ĞǁĞůƐ^ƵƚƌĂ͕ŚĞƐĂŝĚ͕Η/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽďĞĨƌĞĞŽĨĂůůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐ͕ƚŚĞŽŶĞǁŚŽŝƐƐŬŝůůĞĚŝŶĚŝƐĐĞƌŶŝŶŐĨĂƵůƚƐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐƚŚĞǇŽŐĂŽĨ tŝƚŚŽƵƚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝǌŝŶŐ͕ƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŵĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůĐůĂƌŝƚǇƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ŵĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶĞŵƉƚŝŶĞƐƐ͘ ƌĞĂůŝƚǇŝƚƐĞůĨ͘ŶĚǁŚŝůĞĂďŝĚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĂƚƐƚĂƚĞ͕ĚŽŶŽƚĂůůŽǁƚŚĞĨůŽǁŽĨŵŝŶĚƚŽďĞ ĚŝƐƚƌĂĐƚĞĚ͘ ^ƵĐŚĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ͕ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚŵĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶĞŵƉƚŝŶĞƐƐ͕ǁŚĞŶƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶŐ ƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚůǇĨŽƌƚŚĞŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚƐŽĨŵŝŶĚΖƐĚŝƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ dŚĞǁĂǇƚŽĚŝƐƉĞůĚƵůůŶĞƐƐĂŶĚĂŐŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇďĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ͘ ĚĞůŝŐŚƚ͕ƌĞĂůŝǌĞƐƚŚĞŵƚŽďĞĞŵƉƚǇ͘tŚĞŶƚŚĞŵŝŶĚŝƚƐĞůĨŝƐĂůƐŽĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚ͕ŝƚŝƐ ƌĞĂůŝǌĞĚƚŽďĞĞŵƉƚǇ͘tŚĞŶǇŽƵƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶĞǀĞƌǇǁĂǇĨŽƌƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨǁŚĂƚŝƐ ;///ͿŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂĐƚŝŽŶ ƌĞĂůŝǌĞĚďǇƚŚĞŵŝŶĚ͕ƚŚŝƐƚŽŽŝƐƌĞĂůŝǌĞĚƚŽďĞĞŵƉƚǇ͘dŚƌŽƵŐŚƌĞĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐƵĐŚĂƐ ƚŚŝƐ͕ǇŽƵĞŶƚĞƌŝŶƚŽƚŚĞǇŽŐĂŽĨƐŝŐŶůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐ͘Η dŚĞƌŽŽƚƚĞǆƚƐĂǇƐ͗ ƐƚŚŝƐĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐďǇĚƌĂǁŝŶŐƵƉŽŶƚŚĞ^ƵƚƌĂƐ͕ǁŚĞŶǁĞŵĞĚŝƚĂƚĞ͕ŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŶĂůǇǌĞĚďŽƚŚ

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Page 11 ĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĂĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨŚŽǁƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƚŽďĞ ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐƵĐŚƐĂĐƌĞĚŐůŝŵƉƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƚŚƚŽůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͘ ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ͘dŚŝƐŚĂƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇďĞĞŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ͘ ͘WZd/dtE^^^/KE^ ƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞƐ͕ŝŶĂůůƚŚĞŝƌǀĂƌŝĞƚǇ͕ĂƌĞŵŝŶĚΖƐŵĂŐŝĐĂůŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ͕ ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŵŝŶĚŝƐĂŶĚĂůǁĂǇƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶƵŶďŽƌŶ͘ dŚĞƌŽŽƚƚĞǆƚƐĂǇƐ͗ dŽƚŚŽƐĞǁŝƚŚǁŝƐĚŽŵďĞǇŽŶĚĚƵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐĐĞŶĚŝŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ͕ ŝŶǁŚŽŵƚŚŝƐŝƐƌĞĂůŝǌĞĚŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůǇĂŶĚǁŝƚŚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ͕/ƉƌŽƐƚƌĂƚĞ͘ ϲ͘ĞƚǁĞĞŶƐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ͕ďĞĂĐŽŶũƵƌĞƌŽĨŝůůƵƐŝŽŶƐ͘ ƐƚŚŝƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐ͕ĚƵƌŝŶŐĂůůŽƵƌĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ͕ŚĂǀŝŶŐĨŝƌƐƚĂƌŽƵƐĞĚŐƌĞĂƚ ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ͕ǁĞŵƵƐƚǁŽƌŬĨŽƌƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ͕ǁŚŝůĞŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐŝůůƵƐŽƌǇ ŵŝŶĚĨƵůŶĞƐƐĂŶĚǀŝŐŝůĂŶĐĞ͘^ƚĂŐĞƐŽĨDĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ//ƐĂǇƐ͗ ^ŚŽƵůĚǇŽƵƐƵĨĨĞƌĨƌŽŵƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůŚĂƌŵĂŶĚƚŚĞůŝŬĞ͕ƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞǁŽƌůĚĂƐ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽĂŶŝůůƵƐŝŽŶ͕ĂŵŝƌĂŐĞ͕ĂĚƌĞĂŵ͕ĂƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŵŽŽŶŝŶǁĂƚĞƌ͕ŽƌĂŶ ŽƉƚŝĐĂůŝůůƵƐŝŽŶ͘ŶĚƚŚŝŶŬ͗Η^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞǇĚŽŶŽƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚ ƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐ͕ƚŚĞƐĞďĞŝŶŐƐĂƌĞŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝƌĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƐĂƌƉƐĂƌĂ͘ΗŶĚďǇ ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ͕Η,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ/ĐĂŶ͕/ŵƵƐƚŚĞůƉƚŚĞŵƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƌĞĂůŝƚǇ͖ΖĂƌŽƵƐĞŐƌĞĂƚ ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚďŽĚŚŝĐŝƚƚĂ͘ ŶĚ͗ dŚĞŶƐůŽǁůǇƌŝƐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐƌŽƐƐͲůĞŐŐĞĚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƉƌŽƐƚƌĂƚĞǇŽƵƌƐĞůĨďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞ ďƵĚĚŚĂƐĂŶĚďŽĚŚŝƐĂƚƚǀĂƐŽĨƚŚĞƚĞŶĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ͘DĂŬĞŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐƐƚŽƚŚĞŵĂŶĚ Page 12 Page 13 Page 14 Page 15 Page 16 Page 17 Page 18 Page 19 Page 20 Page 21 Page 22 Page 23 The Middle from Beginning to End 295

ses. Being empty is just their nature, whether we analyze them or not. Through the analytical approach, we proceed toward realizing for ourselves how things really are. If we do not apply essential Buddhist notions to the deeply ingrained habitual tendencies of our belief systems and only work with them on a superfi- The Center of the Sunlit Sky cial intellectual level, the teachings will be merely words without a deeper impact on our experiential world. As it is said, mind and dharma will not blend into one. Madhyamaka in the Kagyü Tradition This is especially important with such key Buddhist topics as emptiness, personal identitylessness, and phenomenal identitylessness, since it is precisely the instinctive assumption of a personal self and really existent phenomena that gov- erns our experience and actions. To address these topics and make them person- Karl Brunnhölzl ally relevant to our life cannot be accomplished without some degree of personal investigation, which entails honestly looking into our own view of the world and being willing to revise it. AtıŸa’s Centrist Pith Instructions, Called The Open Jewel Casket highlights the essential points of the entire process: Including a Translation of Pawo Rinpoche’s Commentary on the Knowledge Section of ⁄›ntideva’s The Entrance One may wonder, “From where did all of this come in the first place, to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life (Bodhicary›vat›ra) and to where does it depart now?” Once examined in this way, [one sees that] it neither comes from anywhere nor departs to anywhere. All Page 24 inner and outer phenomena are just like that. Therefore, everything is the illusory magical display of one’s own mind. It is appearing yet delusive, and delusive while appearing. Thus, all of it is contained in the body, and the [body] is again contained in the mind. As for the mind, it has no color and no shape. It is natural luminosity that is primordially unborn. The very knowledge that discriminates this is also luminosity. In this interval, consciousness is nothing whatsoever, does not abide as anything, is not established as anything, and has not arisen as any aspect, and all discursiveness without exception is completely at peace. This meditative concentration of space-vajra that is without appearance and in which the entire dust of characteristics has vanished is like the very center of the sky that is lit up by the autumn sun. In it, dwell as long as possible.668

The Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness The systematic, gradual succession of meditations that deal with personal and phenomenal identitylessness is often called the progressive stages of meditation on emptiness.669 These stages are briefly outlined in the sÒtras and further Snow Lion Publications explained in Centrist texts such as N›g›rjuna’s Commentary on the Mind of ithaca, new york ✦ boulder, colorado Enlightenment and his Stages of Meditation,670 Bh›vaviveka’s Jewel Lamp of Cen- trism, Jñ›nagarbha’s Path of Yoga Meditation, KamalaŸıla’s Stages of Meditation 296 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 297

and Entrance into Yoga Meditation, AtıŸa’s two Centrist Pith Instructions, N›g›rjuna further emphasizes that the reason the Buddha taught the aggre- Jñ›nakırti’s Instructions on the Stages of Meditation of the Vehicle of Perfections and gates, sources, and constituents was solely to negate a personal self and not to Entrance into True Reality,671 and Vimalamitra’s Topics of Gradualist Meditation.672 establish what is contained within these aggregates and so on as really existing From among these, KamalaŸıla’s three-volume Stages of Meditation gives by far the entities. The text continues: most detailed instructions. This text also calls the meditative progression “the stages of prajñ› meditation.” The teachings on the aggregates, constituents, and so on To illustrate this gradual progression, N›g›rjuna begins his Commentary on the Are for the purpose of stopping the clinging to a self. Mind of Enlightenment673 by saying that bodhisattvas, after having generated the By settling in mere mind, aspiring mind of enlightenment, should generate the ultimate mind of enlight- The greatly blessed ones let go of these too.675 enment through the power of meditation. Thus, he commits to explaining the meditation on this mind of enlightenment that destroys cyclic existence. The In the above four verses, N›g›rjuna clearly presents the intermediate step of actual progression of this meditation starts with analyzing for the lack of a real realizing that all appearances occur solely within one’s own mind as the expres- personal identity. The reason to start with negating personal identity is that it rep- sions of this mind. However, just like all other Centrists, he does not stop at that resents the object of a coarser level of clinging to real existence than the clinging point but—as the following verses and all his other texts show—negates the real to a real identity of all phenomena. Accordingly, N›g›rjuna first shows that there existence of the mind as well. Candrakırti’s Entrance into Centrism also mentions is no personal self within the five aggregates, the twelve sources, and the eight- this step as a help for those who do not immediately see that, just as all other een constituents. appearances, the mind as their experiencer is empty too: Next, N›g›rjuna turns to phenomenal identitylessness. He negates the possibility of infinitesimal material particles—as asserted by various non-Buddhist The Buddhas said, “If there are no knowable objects, Page 25 schools as well as the Buddhist Followers of the Great Exposition and the SÒtra One easily finds that a knower is excluded.” Followers—by showing that such particles can be broken up infinitely without If knowable objects do not exist, the negation of a knower is established. any remaining indivisible core ever being found. As a consequence, N›g›rjuna Therefore, they first negated knowable objects.676 states that whatever appears and is experienced is nothing but an appearance in one’s own mind and that there are thus no outer material objects that are estab- Thus, in terms of the view, Centrists make sure to refute all philosophical sys- lished as something other than or independent of mind. His text says: tems that assert any kind of truly established mind. At the same time, in the context of the progression of an individual’s personal meditation and realization of As the entities of apprehender and apprehended, emptiness on the path, the intermediate step of seeing that, just as in a dream, all The appearances of consciousness appearances are nothing but mental images is considered crucial, for it elimi- Do not exist as outer objects nates the clinging to a solid and really existing material world that “leads a life of That are different from consciousness. its own” apart from our perceiving mind. According to Centrists, the main reason the Buddha taught the three realms to be “mere mind” was in order to refute Therefore, in the sense of having the nature of entities, any kind of creator or agent that creates the world. Rather, everything in cyclic In any case, outer objects do not exist. existence appears as the result of the karmic actions that originate and are expe- It is these distinct appearances of consciousness rienced within the minds of individual sentient beings. Another reason for the That appear as the aspect of form. expedient teachings on mere mind is to temporarily calm people’s fear of the complete emptiness of all phenomena without any reference point to hold on to. Just as people with dull minds As N›g›rjuna says: See illusions, mirages, And the cities of scent-eaters, The teaching of the Sage that So do form and such appear.674 “All of these are mere mind” 298 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 299

Is for the sake of removing the fear of naïve beings The emptiness that is called “nonarising,” And not [meant] in terms of true reality.677 “Emptiness,” and “identitylessness” Is what inferior beings meditate on. The third step in N›g›rjuna’s analysis is that mind itself is also unarisen, with- It is not the meditation on the [actual emptiness]. out nature, and empty. He describes what this emptiness means and why the example of space is used to illustrate it. What has the characteristic of the stream Of positive and negative thoughts being cut off It is without characteristics and unarisen, The Buddhas taught to be emptiness. Not existent, and free from the ways of speech. The other [emptinesses] they did not declare to be emptiness. Space, the mind of enlightenment, And enlightenment have the characteristic of not being two.678 To abide without observing the mind Is the characteristic of space. In his Exposition of The Commentary on the Mind of Enlightenment, the Fourth Their meditation on emptiness Shamarpa Chökyi Tragba679 (1453–1524) explains this emptiness of mind. He Is declared to be space meditation.681 starts by quoting the Indian master Sm¸ti’s commentary on N›g›rjuna’s text: Chökyi Tragba comments: Our own mind is primordially unarisen. It has the nature of emptiness. One may wonder, “Is there a difference between being skilled and being unskilled in the way of meditating on emptiness?” [These verses] Page 26 and continues: teach that there is a difference. [The three emptinesses as misunder- This meaning of Madhyamaka in our own [Buddhist] system—as it is stood by inferior beings] are the [kind of] emptiness that [merely] rep- expressed in the lines [of N›g›rjuna’s verse 46]—is extensively taught. resents the lack of reality. They are called [1] “nonarising” of all [Madhyamaka or emptiness] means being without characteristics that phenomena, these being like sky-flowers, define true reality. It [means] to be unarisen, since it is neither existent nor nonexistent. It is neither something existent that has already arisen [2] “Emptiness” that is a nonimplicative negation, nor something nonexistent that is not suitable to arise. It is free from And [3] “identitylessness” even on the conventional level.682 being demonstrable through words and expressions by the [various] ways of speech. This [emptiness] has the characteristic that space as its Inferior beings are those of weak insight, which is to say those without suitable example, nonconceptual wisdom (the mind of enlighten- much study or beginners who have not trained in knowledge. The empti- ment), and enlightenment that clearly realizes all phenomena in an ness in the sense of extinction on which they meditate in these [three] unmistaken way are not two [that is, not different]. The meaning of ways is not the meditation on this [actual] emptiness of true reality. . . . this is as follows: Conventionally, space exists, but ultimately it is unobservable. Likewise, enlightenment exists on the seeming level, but Positivity means to abandon killing and such. Negativity means to ultimately it does not exist. Also the nonconceptual mind of enlight- engage in the karma of putting [others] down and so on. Or, positivity enment can be expressed in conventional terms, but it is without [can refer to] sharp knowledge that analyzes conceptuality, while neg- nature when analyzed. Therefore, the characteristics of these [three] are ativity is its opposite, ignorance. [However, all] such thoughts are [just not different.680 various forms of] clinging to characteristics in terms of the factors to be relinquished and their remedies. Only [the meditation on empti- Fourth, N›g›rjuna presents the defining characteristics of the proper medita- ness] that is characterized by the stream of [these thoughts] being cut tion on emptiness and identifies three ways of misunderstanding emptiness. off is what the Buddhas taught to be the supreme nonconceptual meditation on emptiness. They did not declare that [to meditate on] the 300 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 301

other [emptinesses listed above] is the meditation on emptiness and By resting in the observed object of suchness, identitylessness. One should go beyond mere mind too.

Therefore, to abide within the state that is without observing any con- Going beyond mere mind, ceptual characteristics with regard to nonconceptual wisdom (the ulti- One must even go beyond the nonappearance [of apprehender mate mind of enlightenment) refers to the characteristic of space that and apprehended]. was explained above. Hence, the proper meditation of yogic practition- The yogic practitioner who rests in nonappearance ers on emptiness is declared to be the meditation that is nonconceptual Sees the great vehicle. like space. . . . This meditation that is praised by noble N›g›rjuna in such a way is proclaimed by some earlier and later Tibetans to be the This spontaneously present, peaceful resting meditation of the Chinese Hvashang. However, in this treatise, Is completely purified through aspiration prayers. [N›g›rjuna] takes it to be the style of the great bodhisattvas.683 Genuine identityless wisdom Sees by way of nonappearance.685 To summarize this quote, meditation on emptiness is mistaken when emptiness is misunderstood as (1) absolute nonexistence (such as the nonexistence of a The meaning of this is as follows: First, yogic practitioners should ana- sky-flower), (2) a mere nonimplicative negation, or (3) total identitylessness or lyze phenomena with form that are imputed by others as outer objects, utter nonexistence of things even on the conventional level. such as visible forms. “Is it that these are something other than con- Fifth, N›g›rjuna states that both cyclic existence (ignorance) and liberation sciousness, or is it consciousness itself that appears in this way? Is this (realization of true reality) occur within and depend on our mind. Thus, the just like in a dream?” Thus, they investigate infinitesimal particles Page 27 meditation and realization of emptiness is not spacelike in the sense of a blank external to consciousness. When these infinitesimal particles are exam- nothingness, but it is an open, nonreferential state of mind that is at the same ined as to their parts, yogic practitioners do not see such [outer] time profoundly peaceful and blissful. objects. Since they do not see them, they reflect, “All of these are mere mind, while outer objects do not exist.” Thus, it has been said above: The seeming comes from afflictions and karma. Karma originates from the mind. By relying on mere mind, The mind is constituted by latent tendencies. One does not imagine outer objects. Freedom from latent tendencies is bliss. This refers to relinquishing conceptions about phenomena that have This blissful mind is peacefulness. form. For when one analyzes what [first seems to] possess the charac- A peaceful mind will not be ignorant. teristic of being suitable to be observed, it is not observable. After one Not to be ignorant is the realization of true reality. has investigated phenomena that have form, those that have no form The realization of true reality is the attainment of liberation.684 should be investigated. Here, “mere mind” means that when there is nothing apprehended, an apprehender is not reasonable [either], KamalaŸıla’s Stages of Meditation presents the exact same progression of med- because an apprehender depends on something apprehended. There- itation on emptiness but in a much more detailed way. The meditation likewise fore, the conclusion is that mind is devoid of something apprehended starts with personal identitylessness and then proceeds to phenomenal identity- and an apprehender and is just without this pair [or nondual in this lessness. As a sÒtra source for these stages of meditation, KamalaŸıla quotes three sense]. This is the characteristic of nonduality [on this level]. By rest- crucial verses from The SÒtra of the Arrival in Laºka for a brief overview and ing in the observed object of suchness, you should go beyond mere then explains them in detail: mind too. Go far beyond [any] aspect of an apprehender and thus rest in the nonappearance of this pair [of apprehender and apprehended], By relying on mere mind, that is, in consciousness without these two. Thus, having gone beyond One does not imagine outer objects. 302 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 303

mere mind, go beyond even this consciousness without the appear- without any shape. Since they are just like space, they are not estab- ance of this pair. Since it is not justified that entities arise from them- lished. Or, they are free from unity and multiplicity. Thus, they are selves or something other, apprehender and apprehended are nothing without color and utterly without appearance. but delusive. Since such a [consciousness without apprehender and apprehended] does not exist apart from these two, it is also not real. What is without form is the mind. As for that [mind], the past mind Having examined [in this way], also abandon reification with respect has [already] ceased and perished. The future mind has not [yet] arisen to such a consciousness without this pair. This means that you should or originated. As for the present mind, it is also difficult to examine: solely rest in the wisdom that is without [even] the appearance of non- It has no color and is without any shape. Since it is just like space, it dual wisdom. In other words, rest in the realization that all phenom- is not established. Or, when analyzed and scrutinized with the weapon ena are without nature. Through [your] resting in this [realization], of reasoning, it is free from unity and multiplicity. In other words, it supreme true actuality and thereby nonconceptual meditative con- is unarisen. Or, [it may be said that] it is natural luminosity and so on. centration are entered. Therefore, one realizes that it is not established.

At the point when yogic practitioners rest within the wisdom that is At the point when these two [what possesses form and what is with- without the appearance of nondual wisdom, they dwell on the path of out form] definitely do not exist and are not established as [having] any seeing. Therefore, they see the great vehicle. Seeing genuine true real- nature whatsoever, the very knowledge that discriminates them is not ity is called the great vehicle. As for the seeing of genuine true reality, established either. . . . once all specifically characterized and generally it is the very fact that there is nothing to be seen, when the light of per- characterized phenomena are established as nonexistent [through fect wisdom dawns through the examination of all phenomena with knowledge], this knowledge itself is without appearance, luminous, Page 28 the eye of supreme knowledge. This is also expressed in the sÒtras: and not established as [having] any nature whatsoever. . . . For as long as neither characteristics nor the enemies and robbers of thoughts arise, One may wonder, “What is seeing the ultimate?” It means that consciousness should rest in such a [state]. When wishing to rise [from all phenomena are not seen. the meditation], slowly open the cross-legged position and stand up. Then, in an illusionlike frame of mind, perform as much positivity Here, [the Buddha] talked about “not seeing” by having in mind that with body, speech, and mind as possible.687 there is no such seeing [of any phenomenon]. However, this “not seeing” is not like not seeing when the conditions [for seeing] are incom- These stages of meditation on emptiness by N›g›rjuna, KamalaŸıla, and AtıŸa plete (such as in a blind person and when closing one’s eyes) or when are presented here in detail to clearly put forth the standard outline of the Cen- one does not mentally engage [in seeing]. . . . It is through this trist approach to such meditation. In addition, the way in which these masters sequence of meditation that one should meditate on the true reality [of unfold this progression shows a clear continuity in what is known as the progres- all phenomena].686 sive stages of meditation on emptiness as they are explained in the Kagyü lineage. The Kagyü version of such meditation on emptiness, as presented by Khenpo These successive stages of Centrist meditation on emptiness represent the basic Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche, names the above stages after certain Buddhist structure of KamalaŸıla’s entire text. The major portions of his work consist of philosophical systems as they are presented in Tibetan Buddhism. His book Pro- detailed elaborations on the various aspects of the above progression. AtıŸa’s Cen- gressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness lists the following five stages: trist Pith Instructions agrees on the same outline: 1) the hearers688 Entities are of two kinds: those that possess form and those that are 2) Cittam›tra without form. Those that possess form are collections of infinitesimal 3) Sv›tantrika particles. When these are analyzed and broken up in terms of their 4) Pr›saºgika directional parts, not even their minutest [part] remains and they are 5) Shentong-Madhyamaka 304 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 305

These correspond respectively to meditating on ing arrived in the area in question, we have to find this particular fingerlike rock 1) personal identitylessness with our own eyes, dig up the treasure with our own hands, and enjoy its beauty 2) mere mind without the duality of an internal subject and external objects with our own senses. In the same way, we are gradually guided toward the real- 3) emptiness as a spacelike nonimplicative negation ization of emptiness, but in the end the true nature of our mind can be seen by 4) emptiness as utter freedom from discursiveness nothing but this mind itself. 5) emptiness and luminosity inseparable Since a number of books provide detailed instructions on how to proceed through these progressive stages of meditation, I will offer just a few practical As the book says at the outset, these stages are given the names of these schools, remarks here.690 The above five stages as they are outlined in all the texts men- but in terms of actually practicing such analytical meditations, the point is not to tioned simply sketch the gradual dwindling of all our reference points in terms ascertain these schools’ precise positions nor to look for the exact historical and of personal and phenomenal kinds of real identity. This is just another way of say- philosophical correspondences between these five stages and the views of the schools ing that emptiness is initially understood on increasingly subtle, conceptual lev- whose names they bear. The presentation of these stages is meant to be under- els and finally directly realized. stood as a pedagogical model for the progression of the personal insights of a prac- The first step—the meditation on personal identitylessness, or looking for a self titioner who meditates on emptiness. This is, for example, evident from many in relation to our five aggregates—can basically have two approaches. First, we Autonomist texts in general and the quotes from The Stages of Meditation above, may compare all the various parts of our five aggregates with what we sponta- in which the Autonomists themselves say that the notion of emptiness as a mere neously or experientially feel our self to be. We simply ask ourselves questions nonimplicative negation has to be left behind. Moreover, Autonomists also empha- such as: Is my body my self? Is my head my self? Do I think that my mind is my size the freedom from discursiveness and its inseparability from luminosity.689 self? Are my emotions my self? Are they controlled by my self? If so, how? For So the crucial point here—and this cannot be overemphasized—is that the many of these questions, our spontaneous answer will be no. For example, dur- Page 29 focus of this progressive meditation is not at all on what various people or schools ing analysis, we do not feel that our self is limited to only our body or any of its say or think but on the development of experience and realization in the minds parts. This simply is not our experience of “me.” However, when it comes to of individuals who are actually engaging in such meditation. Thus, these stages mind, emotions, and so on, the answer might not be that straightforward. When represent a succession from a coarse understanding to increasingly subtle and not sure, we should analyze further. We could ask: If our mind is our self, how refined insights that culminate in the direct seeing of emptiness or true reality. exactly is that so? Is it our entire mind or just parts of it? Does this correspond Except for a few especially gifted persons, most people cannot immediately to our experience of “me” in all situations?691 By going deeper with our analysis, grasp—let alone fully realize—the more subtle aspects of the teachings on empti- sooner or later we will inevitably hit the crucial question that actually should ness. Rather, they have to take a gradual approach by starting with the most fun- have been posed at the beginning of our search: What exactly is my self? damental issues and then proceeding to the subtle points, just as physicians do This leads us to the second, more systematic and thorough approach of inves- not start their careers by performing open-heart surgery but first study the tigation. In general, to compare two things, we must know what each of them anatomical and physiological basics. All the details of the very subtle states of is. We cannot really compare the five aggregates with our self if we do not know mind during the more advanced stages of meditation on emptiness are not likely what this self is. So the next step is to try to define or describe our self. This pro- to be understood if we have not gone through the basic levels of this process. In cess in itself is already very illuminating in terms of whether the self exists or not, other words, in order to be able to tackle our subtle mental obscurations and to since—apart from a definite “feeling” that we have a self—most people have a see the true nature of our mind, we have to start with its coarser obscurations. very hard time coming up with an exact description of what it might be. Para- Otherwise, we would not even be aware that we have these subtle obscurations, doxically, one of the major reasons we are convinced that we have a self is that just as a person whose entire body is in severe pain due to cancer is not aware of we don’t actually know what it is or what it looks like. Since our sense of hav- a minor twinge that is caused by a little scratch on the back. ing a self is so vague, it is open to almost any kind of projection or identifica- This progressive approach can also be compared to a treasure hunt. If we are tion. In fact, we constantly shift the objects on which we build this idea of a self. told about a treasure somewhere under a finger-shaped rock in a remote place, Sometimes we relate it more to our body, sometimes more to our thoughts, we first have to get a large-scale map that shows us how to get to the area where sometimes to our emotions, sometimes to our career, and so on. We tend to say this treasure lies. Then we need a small-scale map of that area. Eventually, hav- such things as “I am sick,” “My head hurts,” “I am a doctor,” “I quit being a doc- 306 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 307

tor,” “I think,” “There are too many thoughts in my mind,” “I am sad,” or “My the slightest doubt that there is no personal self of any kind. This then is the de pression has worsened.” All of these statements expose a variety of different realization of personal identitylessness. ways of assuming and relating to an underlying self, yet we usually do not see The discussion up to this point has concerned the first step of the progressive the contradictions. Therefore, it is easy to take the existence of some underly- stages of meditation on emptiness, the stage of the hearers who investigate the ing true “I” somewhere in our five aggregates for granted and to constantly refer lack of a personal self. Now, from the second step (Cittam›tra) onward, we deal to it only with phenomenal identitylessness. This second step of “mere mind” basically As was said earlier, in Buddhism in general, a personal self is described as some- says that all our experiences, whatever they and their objects may look like, do not thing that is single, lasting, and independent or in control. These are very gen- occur anywhere other than within our mind. In other words, both the appre- eral features that for most people apply to their sense of self. Usually, we think hending subject and the apprehended object are of a mental nature. The analy- that we have a single self and not multiple selves; that this self has a lasting qual- sis here involves two parts: ity and does not constantly change; and that we are—more or less at least—in control of or independent in what we think and do. However, when doing the 1) Through analysis, the existence of outer objects as anything other than men- actual analysis here, it is very important to try to come up with our own descrip- tal experiences is negated. tion or definition that applies to our personal sense of self and corresponds to our 2) The meditator rests in nondual experience without subject and object. actual experience of “me.” Otherwise, we are just comparing our five aggregates with some vague general notion of self that has little to do with how we experi- The first step—negating outer objects—is approached from three sides: ence our own self in everyday life. Once we have found such a description— even if it is not completely satisfying—we should then see whether something can 1) breaking them down into infinitely smaller pieces be found in our five aggregates that matches this identification of our self. To do 2) analyzing the object and our perception of it on a causal time line Page 30 this in a systematic way, we can use the sevenfold reasoning of a chariot that was 3) seeing the subjectivity of every appearance and experience explained earlier. We may compare this analysis to searching a house for a lost car key. First, we The issue of whether there are any really existing outer objects can be analyzed have to know what this key looks like—otherwise, what are we looking for? We through an approach very similar to that of modern physics: by breaking up these are not looking for just any key. We also have to know how many rooms the objects into smaller and smaller parts without finding any indivisible core. If house has and where they are, including the basement and the attic. Then we can there are no identifiable external objects, we must conclude that what we experi- systematically go through each room, open all the closets and drawers, look under ence as outer objects is nothing but a projection in our mind, just as in a dream, the beds, and so on. Once we are sure that this key is not in one room, we go on in which we also seem to experience outer objects while clearly there are none. to the next. Finally, when we have not found it any place, we have to conclude Second, the analysis focuses on whether there is any causal relation between that there is no such key in the house. As we probably all know, when searching objects and our perception of them. We consider that, in terms of our personal for something, we sometimes remain unsure and think, “It must be here some- perception, we can only speak about the existence of an object once we perceive where.” Then we go back and repeat our search even more thoroughly. This may it. As long as we do not perceive it, we have no way of directly knowing whether happen several times before we finally have no doubt that there is no key, since there is such an object. Thus, it is obvious that what we call an object and the sub- we have turned the whole house upside down. In a similar way, when we look for jective consciousness that is aware of this object occur simultaneously. However, our self, we have to know what we are looking for, and we must clearly identify if there were outer objects that exist external to our mind and serve as the causes the places in which we are looking for it, that is, our five aggregates. If we do not for our perception of them, they would have to exist before the perceptions that search in every corner of them, or if we still have doubts as to whether there is are their results. For, causes must precede their results in time and must also something that corresponds to our individual notion of a self, we have to repeat cease before the arising of these results. But if these outer objects existed before our analysis until we are absolutely sure that there is no such self in our aggregates. our perception of them, what would we perceive, since they are already gone at If we still think there must be some self, we can go back and repeat the same the time of this perception? This is the background for one of the two major rea- search with an alternative description of what this self might be. In this way, we sonings that are used in this context of denying outer objects, which is called have to go through this process again and again until we never again experience “the invariable co-observation”692 of appearances and mind. 308 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 309

The third approach focuses on the subjectivity of perception. If we consider experience free from duality. This nonfinding of all phenomena, or the absence what exactly we know of objects, then we see that every perception is only a sub- of an inherent real nature of all phenomena—a nonimplicative negation—is then jective experience in our mind as the perceiver. If we touch or smell a rose, “its the object of our meditation in the third stage. softness” or “its fragrance” is nothing but our mental experience of softness or fra- The fourth step in the progressive stages of meditation on emptiness is called grance. This accords well with what modern science says: that there is no other the stage of Consequentialists and presents emptiness as utter freedom from dis- or “objective” softness and fragrance apart from what we subjectively experience. cursiveness. As was explained, any nonimplicative negation is still a conceptual It is this fact that is expressed by the second major reasoning concerning the object and thus a reference point. So even the nonimplicative negation of empti- nonexistence of outer objects, which is called “invariable sameness of appear- ness in the sense of the mere absence of a real nature, nonarising, and such (as in ances and mind as the nature of mere lucidity.”693 It says that there are no objects the third step) is still a subtle reference point. In order for our mind to be able outside of the mind, because all our perceptions and what they perceive are alike to fully relax within the space of the expanse of dharmas free from center or edge, in that they are nothing but immaterial clear appearances in our mind. In other it has to let go of even its most subtle grasping at any reference point including words, objects are not different from the cognizing consciousness because of the the freedom from reference points. This is the space of the actual freedom from very fact of being cognized. The reason is that consciousness—lucid awareness all discursiveness that we allow for during the fourth step. that neither consists of particles nor has spatial extension—can only cognize what The fifth step in the progressive stages of meditation on emptiness is named has the same nature as consciousness, but not some material objects that have an after Shentong-Madhyamaka and presents emptiness as inseparable from mind’s altogether different nature (that is, lacking cognizance, consisting of particles, luminosity. Since the very freedom from discursiveness and reference points and possessing spatial dimensions). Consequently, objects in a dream and in the described in the last step is not just some blank space or mere absence (which waking state are not fundamentally different. Both seem to perform their func- would be the extreme of extinction or nihilism), it is also described as luminos- tions in their respective contexts, but in actual fact, none of them is really exis- ity, or the unity of wisdom and expanse. Hence, in terms of the actual nature of Page 31 tent as something separate from our experience. This is not to deny that the mind, the fifth stage is not really an additional or higher stage above the freedom objects of our perceptions appear to us as if they existed externally. However, from discursiveness. As Sakya Pa˚˜ita says in his Distinction of the Three Vows, apart from the fact that it subjectively appears this way, there is no evidence that the very attempt to go higher or beyond the freedom from all reference points there really are external objects in any way other than what appears as such objects would just mean to fall out of nonreferentiality by inevitably creating a reference in the mind. The relatively greater stability and regularity of daytime appear- point again.694 Thus, the fourth and fifth stages indicate the two aspects of the ances in comparison to, for example, appearances in a dream, is said to be expe- nature of our mind, which is the undifferentiable unity of the freedom from dis- rienced only because of comparatively more stable and regular patterns of cursiveness and luminosity. Moonbeams of Mah›mudr› also highlights the even- habitual tendencies for such appearances in our minds. tual experiential unity of the last two steps: In the second part of the stage of “mere mind,” the meditator rests in the nondual experience of the lack of subject and object. If there are no really existent There are many ways in which mind is similar to space, but here this objects, neither is there a really existent corresponding subject that perceives refers to the following: When one analyzes through discriminating them. However, since our mind is not just nothing but is full of experiences, knowledge, finally, also the very [process of] discrimination subsides, clarity, and movement, the meditation and realization of this step is said to be upon which [the mind] becomes pure as [a state of] nonconceptuality, resting in bare mental experience without the duality of subject and object. just as seeing ceases through looking at space. As Tilopa says: The third step in the progressive stages of meditation on emptiness is named after the Autonomists and refers to emptiness as a spacelike nonimplicative nega- For example, through looking at space, seeing will cease. tion. Even if we realize that there are neither really existent outer objects nor Likewise, when mind is looking at mind, subjects to perceive them, there is still the subtle clinging to the reality of our mere The collection of thoughts ceases and unsurpassable enlightenment mental experience free from perceiver and perceived. Therefore, through the five is attained . . .695 great Centrist reasonings and such, we proceed to the stage of seeing that this lucid momentary experience too is empty of an intrinsic nature. Thus, starting First, one analyzes [the mind] through discriminating knowledge. It is with our self, we find neither any material objects nor mental subjects nor a bare explained that, through this, the very [process of] discrimation itself 310 The Center of the Sunlit Sky Endnotes 889

subsides, upon which nonconceptual wisdom dawns. You may then 660 VI.175a–c. wonder whether there is some difference between mind and space. 661 Tib. gzung ba la mi dmigs pa’i rnal ’byor. Yes, there is, since space is not a cognition that personally experiences 662 Tib. ’dzin pa la mi dmigs pa’i rnal ’byor. itself. When mind is realized, this in itself is explained to be personally experienced wisdom.696 663 Skt. animittayoga, Tib. mtshan ma med pa’i rnal ’byor. 664 ACIP TD3916@049B–050A. In summary, we could outline the progression of our experiences and realiza- 665 ACIP TD3916@050B–051A. tions while meditating on emptiness in this way as follows. We start with the 666 These are the four applications of mindfulness, the four correct exertions (Skt. catv›ri meditation and realization of personal identitylessness. Then, in terms of phe- samyakprah›˚›ni, Tib. yang dag spong ba bzhi), the four limbs of miraculous powers (Skt. nomenal identitylessness, we proceed from the coarse notion of real outer objects catv›ra ¸ddhip›d›¯, Tib. rdzu ’phrul gyi rkang pa bzhi), the five faculties (Skt. pañcendriy›˚i, via the more subtle notions of mere nondual mental experience and emptiness as Tib. dbang po lnga), the five powers (Skt. pañcabal›ni, Tib. stobs lnga), the seven branches of enlightenment (Skt. saptasa˙bodhyaºg›ni, Tib. byang chub kyi yan lag bdun), and the a nonimplicative negation all the way up—or rather back—to just letting our eightfold path of the noble ones (Skt. ›ry›˝˛›ºgam›rga, Tib. ’phags pa’i lam yan lag brgyad). mind be in its natural state of nonreferential freedom, unconditionally aware of As for the four correct exertions, while prah›˚a can mean either “relinquishment” or “exer- its own radiant display. tion,” it is always rendered as the former in Tibetan (spong ba). However, here, the term clearly refers to four activities in which one exerts effort. 667 For more details on this fourfold practice of mindfulness, see the translation of Pawo Rin- Mental Nonengagement in Meditation poche’s commentary below (3.2. Phenomenal Identitylessness). One of the main issues in the well-known debate at Samye, where the Indian 668 P5325, fol. 107a.6–107b.2. master KamalaŸıla is said to have defeated his Chinese opponent Hvashang Page 32 669 Skt. ŸÒnyat›bh›van›krama, Tib. stong nyid sgom rim. Mah›y›na, was whether meditation on the ultimate is to be understood as just 670 As Lindtner (1997, p. 164) reports, all the verses of this text are found in Chapter X of The letting the mind settle in a state that is completely without any thought or focus SÒtra of the Arrival in Laºka. or whether analysis and some focus are required. This is related to the question 671 P4532 (fols. 69a.7-74b.4). of whether progress on the path is gradual or instantaneous. Since that time, the designation “Hvashang meditation” has become Tibetan shorthand for an exclu- 672 P5334. In terms of both layout and content, this text can be considered as an abbreviated version of KamalaŸıla’s three-volume Stages of Meditation. As a counterpart, Vimalamitra also sive cultivation of a thought-free mental state as representing the realization of the wrote The Topics of Instantaneous Nonconceptual Meditation (Skt. *Sak¸tpr›veŸikani rvikalpa - ultimate. It goes along with a complete rejection of the aspect of means, such as bh›van›pada, Tib. cig car ‘jug pa rnam par mi rtog pa’i sgom don, P5306). the accumulation of merit and proper ethical conduct. It was after this debate that 673 Even if N›g›rjuna’s authorship is disputed, the text is clearly written from a Centrist KamalaŸıla wrote his Stages of Meditation in order to clarify such issues by estab- point of view and outlines the typical sequence of the progressive stages of meditation as found lishing the gradualist approach and describing in detail how to train in medita- in all the other Centrist texts on this topic listed above (see the more detailed presentation in tion on emptiness. Despite the different accounts of what the view of the Chinese KamalaŸıla’s Stages of Meditation below). master Hvashang really was and what exactly happened during the debate at 674 Verses 22–24. Samye, all of its issues continued to be major points of controversy between the 675 Verse 25. 697 different schools of Tibetan Buddhism. 676 VI.96. One of the key terms in the context of how to properly cultivate meditation 677 Verse 27. He elaborates on this in the next verses by stating that the three natures—the on emptiness is what is called “mental nonengagement.” Pawo Rinpoche sum- imaginary nature, the other-dependent nature, and the perfect nature—are nothing but enu- marizes the correct understanding of mental nonengagement: merations of emptiness in relation to labeling our mind as being without nature. Further- more, he refutes a ground consciousness and self-awareness as ultimately existing real entities. Its meaning is to rest one-pointedly on the focal object [of medita- For more details on the Centrist interpretation and use of the teachings on “mere mind,” see Chapter 4. tion], without being distracted by other thoughts. If this [one-pointed resting] were stopped, all meditative concentrations would stop. There- 678 Verse 46. fore, in general, “mental nonengagement” has the meaning of not 679 Tib. chos kyi grags pa. 890 The Center of the Sunlit Sky

680 Chos kyi grags pa 2001, p. 94. 681 Verses 49–51. 682 These two lines are again a quote from Sm¸ti’s commentary. 683 Chos kyi grags pa 2001, pp. 95–97. 684 Verses 69–70. 685 X. 256–258 (ACIP KL0107@270A). The first two verses are also found in N›g›rjuna’s Stages of Meditation (verses 54–55). 686 ACIP TD3915@033A–033B, 037B. The above three verses are also quoted in ⁄›ntarak˝ita’s Commentary on The Ornament of Centrism (ACIP TD3885@79B) and explained in KamalaŸıla’s subcommentary (fols. 137a–138a). Just as an aside, the above quote and many others from The SÒtra of the Arrival in Laºka show clearly that it is highly inappropriate to categorically char- acterize this whole sÒtra as just teaching “Mind Only” in the sense of a really existing mind that is ultimate reality. 687 P5324, fols. 105b.4–106a.7. 688 Here this term refers to the philosophical systems of the Followers of the Great Exposi- tion and the SÒtra Followers. 689 For more details on this, the problem of a “Mind Only school,” and whether there is a Shentong school, see Chapters 3 and 4.

Page 33 690 See mainly the works by Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche in the Bibliography. 691 See also the section above entitled “The Two Types of Identitylessness” for more ideas on similar questions (such as what happens to our self when we lose some parts of our body or how we use language when referring to “I” and “mine”). 692 Skt. sahopalambhaniyama, Tib. lhan cig dmigs par nges pa. 693 Tib. snang ba dang sems gsal tsam gyi ngo bor gcig par nges pa (in Western scholarship, following Iwata (JIBS 1984), often referred to as “the sa˙vedana inference”). These two reasonings are found, for example, in Dign›ga’s Compendium of Valid Cognition (I.9-10) and its autocommentary as well as in Dharmakırti’s Ascertainment of Valid Cognition (Pram›naviniŸcaya I.55bff). The first one also appears in his Commentary on Valid Cognition (v. 388-391) and the latter in ⁄›ntarak˝ita’s Synopsis of True Reality (lines 2001, 2003, and 2029- 2033). 694 Tib. sdom gsum rab dbye (Sa skya pa’i bka’ ’bum, vol. 5, Tokyo: 1968, p. 311.2.5). 695 Dvags po bkra shis rnam rgyal, n.d., p. 357.3–6. 696 Ibid., pp. 359.1–4. 697 There are at least two Tibetan versions of this debate, and the more verifiable one presents quite a different account of what Hvashang actually said. For details, see Karmay 1988, the Bsam gtan mig sgron by Nubchen Sangye Yeshe (Tib. gnubs chen sangs rgyas ye shes ) from the eighth/ninth century, and the Sba bzhed chronicle. Chinese sources refer to this debate but do not elaborate on any of its issues, obviously not considering them as problems to be addressed. 698 Dpa’ bo gtsug lag phreng ba, n.d., p. 325. 699 Skt. S›garamatiparip¸cch›sÒtra, Tib. blo gros rgya mtshos zhus pa’i mdo. Introduction to Emptiness 10. From Analysis to Insight* as taught in tsong-kha-pa’s

Great Treatise on the Insight Requires Analysis

Stages of the Path Tsong-khapa insists that nondualistic insight into the nature of reality must be founded upon careful and thoughtful analysis of how things exist. He cites a Guy Newland sutra that describes how a bodhisattva’s insight—while based in a one- pointed concentration—is itself an analytical, differentiat- Page 34 ing mind:

Regard inwardly and with discernment the mental image which is the domain of the meditative concentration on the topics upon which you have refl ected . . . [A]ny differentiation of the meaning of these topics, or . . . thorough analysis, . . . view, or thought is called “insight.”

Tsong-khapa retells a traditional story in which the Chinese master Ha- shang Mahayana—having seen this statement that meditative insight involves things such as analysis and differentiation—exclaimed, “I don’t know how this can be a sutra!” In frus- tration, Ha- shang then kicked the text. According to traditional Tibetan accounts, the Chinese monk Ha- shang Mahayana was the loser in a late eighth-century debate to determine whether Tibet would follow Buddhist teachings snow lion publications ithaca, new york arriving from India or those from China. Ha-shang simply could

* Based on the Great Treatise, Volume 3, Chapters 25–27. 102 ? introduction to emptiness from analysis to insight ç 103

not believe that any sutra could identify meditative insight with Withdrawal Is Not Enough analysis because it was his conviction that any kind of conceptualization whatsoever is a distorting reifi cation. To fi nd liberation, he There is a very large gap between, on the one hand, analytical rea- taught, we should dispense with all analytical thought and medi- sonings such as those described in the previous chapter and, on tate on reality by not bringing anything to mind. the other hand, the bodhisattva’s direct, nondualistic experience Throughout the Great Treatise, Ha-shang functions as a stock of emptiness in nirvana. It is clear that Ha- shang is not the only character representing this perspective. Tsong- khapa argues (Vol- one who sees this as an unbridgeable gap; he is simply a character ume 3, page 16) that this wrong- headed approach will leave Ha- deployed to epitomize an extreme form of that opinion. It seems shang and anyone who is like- minded with a great many sutras to that long after Ha-shang, even in Tsong- khapa’s day and down kick. The Cloud of Jewels Sutra says, to the present, there have been Tibetans teaching that because enlightenment is nondualistic and nonconceptual, our practice Serenity is one-pointed attention; insight is proper dis- should from the very outset emulate that condition to the maxi- cernment. On the basis of genuine concentration, sta- mum degree. In their perspective, any practice that involves ana- bilizing your mind is serenity and the wisdom that lytically searching for a philosophical understanding of reality differentiates phenomena is insight. will only bring about further entanglements in discursive and dualistic thought. Thus, we should instead stabilize our minds in Page 35 Thus, the liberating insight that will set us on the path to freedom a state completely free from any thought. They argue that setting is not a “spacing out” or “emptying the mind.” It is a precise, rigor- the mind in a condition where it apprehends no object at all brings ous meditative analysis that breaks through false appearances. it into alignment with the ultimate reality because nothing exists Tsong- khapa reports that the Indian scholar Kamalashila in the face of emptiness. refuted Ha -shang in debate with an extremely apt citation from Tsong-khapa is intent upon refuting this approach in any of the King of Concentrations Sutra: its variations. Has this meditator who is setting his mind without any thought fi rst understood the idea that this objectless condition If you analytically discern the lack of self in phenomena will harmonize his mind with ultimate reality? If so, Tsong-kha- And if you cultivate that very analysis in meditation, pa says, then he has in fact studied and adopted a philosophical This will cause the result, attainment of nirvana; view—the nonexistence of everything—and then meditated in There is no peace through any other means. accordance with that. So it is not really the case that he is doing no analysis. Rather, he has instead made an error in his analysis and Kamalashila argues, negated too much. That no object is found “in the face of emptiness” is true in the If you say that you should not think about anything, you sense that when one searches for anything with ultimate analysis, abandon the wisdom which has the nature of correct ana- it is not found. However, this does not at all mean that the mind lytical discrimination. The root of sublime wisdom is cor- of ultimate wisdom has no object of realization. It realizes emp- rect analytical discrimination. tiness, the utter absence of intrinsic nature. As discussed above, 104 ? introduction to emptiness from analysis to insight ç 105

emptiness exists. It is fully compatible with dependent arising and as intrinsically existent. The infl uence of thisparticular misconcep- all conventional truths. tion is present in both ordinary perception and ordinary thought, In response, these teachers simply insist that all conceptual but the error itself is one that can and must be refuted by careful thoughts—about emptiness or anything else—are fraught with reasoning based on defi nitive scriptures. dualistic reifi cation and on that account bind us in cyclic existence. Tsong- khapa acknowledges that those who hold their minds in They do not distinguish between correct thoughts and incorrect nonconceptual states do not, at that time, think of things as intrin- thoughts because all thinking is dualistic and brings about further sically existent. On the other hand, they also do not realize that reifi cation. Liberation is attained by setting the mind in a state of intrinsic existence is false. Therefore, they are not practicing a path nonconceptual suspension. that will liberate them. When they emerge from meditation, they In addition to showing that this contradicts scriptures such as will soon fall back under the spell of the still -unrefuted misconcep- those cited above, Tsong- khapa reiterates an argument Kama- tion of intrinsic existence. Referring to the intrinsically existent self lashila used against Ha- shang: This would make it impossible of persons and the intrinsically existent self of other phenomena, to practice generosity, compassion, nonviolence, and many other Tsong- khapa advises, aspects of the Mahayana path. The cultivation of these virtues, critical to the bodhisattva path as described in many scriptures, You must distinguish between (1) not thinking about true requires that one consider other beings and their needs. As noted existence or the existence of the two selves and (2) know- Page 36 above in Chapter Three, perfect enlightenment is attained through ing the lack of true existence or the nonexistence of the two a synergy of practices of wisdom and practices of virtue for devel- selves. Remember this critical point. oping merit. If one holds that wisdom cancels out any thoughtful engagement with other living beings, then one cannot develop the Not thinking about a problem is not enough. We must know the virtues of an enlightened buddha. truth. One version of the “no thought” teaching compares the discur- If simply withdrawing the mind from thought were a path to sive, conceptual mind as it goes out after its object to throwing a liberation, then people would become buddhas just by fainting or ball. After a thought reaches out to its object, we could then use falling deeply asleep. Teachers could use a quick upper-cut to the analysis to chase after the mind’s dualistic elaborations and try jaw in order to induce a supposed “objectless” awareness in stu- to run them down, like a dog chasing after a ball. But it would be dents. But suspending all thinking is just like burying your head better to stop the mind before it goes out after its object—like a in the sand or closing your eyes in the face of danger. dog jumping up to snatch a ball before it can be thrown. On this Rather than living in denial, we have to confront our mis- view, “those who train in scriptures and reasonings that determine taken way of thinking, challenging it directly by using analysis to the view” are devotees of an inferior practice that does not get at become absolutely certain that it is wrong. The buddhas are called ultimate reality because it does not attack the problem right at its “conquerors” because they have faced the enemy of ignorance and source—the mind’s endless elaboration of dualistic concepts. defeated it utterly with the weapon of analytical wisdom. With- Of course, Tsong-khapa argues that the problem is not concep- drawing from all thought is not only cowardly but ultimately tual thought per se, but the gravely mistaken reifi cation of objects futile and self- defeating. 106 ? introduction to emptiness from analysis to insight ç 107

conclusion established in analysis, the object of serene attention. Serenity on the Path of Wisdom Serenity focused on emptiness is itself still a conceptual mind. The initial realization of emptiness is a profound certainty arrived This is because emptiness, having been realized through inferen- at through the analytical, introspective meditative process we tial analysis, presents itself to the bodhisattva’s mind as a concep- have described. While it is a very powerful experience, it is a con- tual image. It is this image/idea of emptiness that is then taken as ceptual and therefore dualistic understanding. Nirvana is attained the meditative focal point for serenity. only through a direct, nonconceptual, nondualistic experience of emptiness. How can one get from one to the other? Preparing for Insight In order to begin to refi ne a conceptual and thus dualistic understanding of emptiness into a liberating nondualistic experience, It is possible that one may analyze and even realize emptiness fi rst, the bodhisattva uses the power of serenity, a powerful concentra- and then set out to attain serenity; it is also possible that one may tion developed through stabilizing meditation. Serenity is a state in attain serenity without yet having realized emptiness. In either which the mind and body have become pliant as the mind focuses case, one must not do extensive analytical meditation while work- fi rmly and one-pointedly upon its object. One- pointed absorption ing to achieve serenity for the fi rst time. This is because the discur- on a single object of concentration weakens the ordinary dualis- sive movement of the mind from object to object as it analyzes is tic sense of subject and object. Pliancy means that your mind and quite different from the nondiscursive stability of serene concen- Page 37 body are serviceable, responsive. There is no resistance to practice. tration on a single object. Tsong- khapa says, You take delight in focusing your mind on a virtuous object, while your body feels light and buoyant (Volume 3: 81–84). It is impossible to achieve serenity if, prior to achieving To develop serenity, you use mindfulness (keeping your atten- insight, you repeatedly alternate between analysis and tion on an object) and vigilance (watching carefully to see when post-analytic stabilization . . . attention begins to slip) to focus your mind and to maintain attention continuously and clearly, without distraction. Eventually, the However, once serenity has been attained, one must return to mind stabilizes, resting naturally where you have set it. When this the practice of analytical meditation, working again and again practice develops to the point that your body and mind are pliant through reasonings demonstrating that all things are empty of and blissful, then you have attained serenity. The Tibetan term for intrinsic nature. serenity (zhi gnas) suggests a quieting (zhi) of mental movement Tsong-khapa emphasizes that you cannot develop true insight toward distracting external objects and abiding (gnas) on an inter- simply by realizing emptiness once in analysis and thereafter nal object of meditation. practicing only serenity meditations in which you stabilize your Bodhisattvas defi nitely must learn to focus their minds in this mind on that conclusion. Rather, you have to sustain your under- way. This is what creates the mental power that allows them to standing of emptiness by repeatedly returning to analysis, using begin to progress from discursive analysis of reality to direct, nonmultiple lines of reasoning, and working through them again and dualistic realization. Having attained serenity with regard to any again. In this way, you become deeply accustomed to the certain object, and having separately realized emptiness through anal- knowledge that things are empty. Tsong-khapa says, “Ascertain- ysis, the bodhisattva then learns to make emptiness itself, the ment of the view becomes strong, long- lasting, clear, and steady to 108 ? introduction to emptiness from analysis to insight ç 109

the extent one becomes accustomed to what one has determined.” your wisdom. This is the path leading to sublime insight. Tsong- Insight is impossible if emptiness is something that you analyzed khapa advises us, one time and then only remember having realized. Tsong-khapa says, You alternate (1) developing certainty, profound certainty, that there is not even a particle of true existence When you have determined [the view of emptiness], you in any thing or nonthing whatsoever, and (2) stabilizing repeatedly analyze it using discriminating wisdom. Sta- your mind on the conclusion thereby reached. bilizing meditation alone, without sustaining the view, will not create insight. Therefore, when you meditate One has to strike a balance between serenity and analysis, two after having attained serenity, you must sustain the view kinds of practice that are superfi cially discordant. Analysis is through continued analysis. required to see into the nature of things, but too much analysis weakens the mind’s stability. Serene stability is required to give the It is especially important to Tsong- khapa to emphasize that dis- mind focused power, but one cannot afford to become so absorbed cerning analysis is a critical and continuing part of a practitioner’s in one’s object that one forgets to use analysis to renew the cer- meditation practice. It is not something that one does just at the tainty of one’s conclusions about the nature of reality. Kamalashila beginning, until one can attain serenity focused upon emptiness. explains that when too much analysis weakens one’s serenity, the Page 38 He shows that this point is supported by the treatises of Kama- mind is like a fl ame placed in the wind. It wavers, becoming unfo- lashila, Chandrakirti, Bhavaviveka, and Shantideva. For example, cused, so that it does not see reality clearly. On the other hand, if Bhavaviveka explains meditation on emptiness as an inquiry into one practices too much serenity focused on emptiness, but does how things exist that is built upon the foundation of a previously not refresh one’s certainty about emptiness with more analysis, attained mental stability: “After your mind is set in equipoise, this then one “will not see reality very clearly, like a person who is is how wisdom investigates . . .” This does not at all mean that asleep.” That is, the stability of the mind is strong, but the clarity there is no analysis of emptiness before one attains serenity— of the object, emptiness, is weakening due to not being refreshed clearly, there is. However, it emphasizes the importance of con- with more analysis. tinuing analysis even after serenity has been achieved. The order of the six perfections, with meditative stabilization preceding wis- Insight dom, also reinforces this key point. On the other hand, it will not work to do only analytical med- Eventually, after long practice, the bodhisattva’s analytical wis- itation after attaining serenity. Just as the force of your certainty dom itself spontaneously induces the blissful and pliant condition about emptiness will weaken if it is not sustained by repeated anal- of serenity. The term “insight” (lhag mthong) refers to an analyti- ysis, the strength of your serenity will degrade if it is not refreshed cal wisdom that—in the same session of meditation and without with the repeated practice of stabilizing meditation. Therefore, interruption or effort—brings about serenity focused upon the you must alternate between the practice of stabilizing meditation, object one is analyzing. Literally, insight (lhag mthong) means a reinforcing your serenity, and analytical meditation, building up superior or special (lhag pa) kind of seeing (mthong). This practice in 110 ? introduction to emptiness from analysis to insight ç 111

which profound analytical insight naturally gives rise to serenity and focuses upon an image or idea of emptiness. At this point, the is called the union of serenity and insight. bodhisattva knows emptiness through the medium of that men- The union of serenity and insight is a fusion of analytical power tal representation. Can a conceptual understanding of something, and sublime one-pointed focus. It is a mind that powerfully and however profound, set the stage for a nondualistic perception of analytically discerns its object without in any way fl uctuating from that same object? pliant and one- pointed absorption. Tsong- khapa says that one One of Tsong-khapa’s key messages in the Great Treatise is that should not think of it as “a small fi sh moving beneath still water the answer to this question is, “Yes, absolutely, if you know what without disturbing it.” This striking image suggests that some you are doing. Moreover, it is only by starting out with conceptual Tibetans explained the union of serenity and insight as a compos- analysis that you have any chance of coming to know the ultimate ite mental state in which just a small portion of the mind engaged reality in a direct, nondualistic manner.” In support of this, Tsong- in penetrating analysis of ultimate reality without disturbing a khapa quotes the Buddha, who—in the Kashyapa Chapter Sutra— vast ocean of mental peace. In contrast, Tsong-khapa sees it as teaches, a fully empowered and activated analytical mind, penetrating its object with serene and laserlike focus. Kashyapa, it is like this. For example, two trees are Analytical wisdom is called insight only at the point where it is dragged against each other by wind and from that a fi re able to induce serenity. Prior to that point, deep analytical wisdom starts, burning the two trees. In the same way, Kashy- Page 39 is considered “an approximation of insight.” Therefore, it is not apa, if you have correct analytical discrimination, the the case that one fi rst attains true insight and then later, after much power of a noble being’s wisdom will emerge. With its more practice, unites it with serenity. Tsong- khapa says, “From emergence, correct analytical discrimination will itself be the time that you fi rst attain insight, you will have that union.” burned up. Analytical wisdom is true insight when, within that very session of meditation, analysis induces and becomes fused with serenity. In other words, powerful and correct analysis of emptiness, while While our concern here is analysis of the ultimate nature of phe- conceptual and dualistic, gives rise to the ultimate mind—noncon- nomena and serenity focused upon that, it is worth noting that ceptual, direct perception of emptiness. Such direct realization is serenity and insight each may be focused on either the ultimate utterly nondualistic. In the fi re of this wisdom, all of the dualism nature of all phenomena (emptiness) or on some conventional of the original analysis is burned away. object of meditation. The term “insight” can sometimes refer to Some may object that this is a contradiction because there is a analytical wisdom discerning a conventional object, such as imper- lack of harmony between the cause—dualistic analysis—and the manence, as long as that wisdom is able to induce serene concen- effect—nondual wisdom. Tsong- khapa points out that causes are tration upon that object. often quite different from their effects. Fire is unlike smoke. A grey The attainment of insight into emptiness is a crucial step for- seed is unlike a green sprout. In this case, there is a great harmony ward on the path. This locks in one’s cognition of ultimate real- between cause and effect in the sense that both are forms of wis- ity by linking it to the supernormal power of meditative serenity. dom knowing the emptiness of intrinsic nature. Nonetheless, even at this point, insight is a conceptual knowledge To reinforce his point, Tsong- khapa returns to cite a passage of emptiness. It is dualistic in the sense that the mind apprehends from the King of Concentrations Sutra. In a sense, the entirety of the 6

R angtong and S hentong Madhyamaka The R l - M E An Overview ofMadhyamaka P hilosophy he Buddhist teachings that spread in Tibet were a of Jamgon Kongtrul the Great union of the sutras and tantras. In relation to the Sutrayana Taspect of Tibetan Buddhism, there is a saying that its conduct f the Sarvastivada Vinaya and its view is the Madhyamaka philosophy. All A STUDY OF THE BUDDHIST four schools of Tibetan Buddhism agree that Madhyamaka, or the Mid- LINEAGES OF TIBET Page 40 dle Way, is the highest philosophy. To summarize Madhyamaka, one could say that the ground is the union of the two truths, the path is the union of the two accumulations, and the result is the union of the two Ringu Tulku kayas. All the schools concur on this. However, within the view of Ma- dhyamaka there are inner differences. These differences revolve around Edited by Ann Helm how the* relative and ultimate truths are understood. In terms of the relative truth, some people distinguish three views within the Madhyamaka: Sautrantika Madhyamaka, Yogachara Ma- dhyamaka, and the Madhyamaka that accepts the common consensus. To distinguish these three, Jamgon Kongtrul says in the Treasury o f Knowledge that the Sautrantika school asserts that external reality does exist on the relative level. This was taught by Bhavaviveka and others. The Yogachara school asserts that external reality does not exist, even conventionally. This view comes from Shantarakshita and others. The third group makes no philosophical statements as to whether the relative world exists or not. They do not question the way ordinary people conceive of external reality. This is the view of Chandrakirti and others. So, these three categories of Madhyamaka are based on their understanding of the relative truth.1 Shambhala Then, for the ultimate truth, there are two schools of Madhyamaka: Boston & London 2006 those who assert the ultimate is the illusory nature, and those who make 194 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I I95

no assertions. To explain further, the first says that the illusory nature Rangtong Madhyamaka is established when the perceiver of an object experiences a perception of that object as being unreal. This view was put forth by Kamalashila, Wisdom, a Root Text on the Middle Way is the foremost text by Nagarjuna. Shantarakshita, and other proponents of the Svatantrika Madhyamaka Different interpretations of this text led to the formation of the various school. Their view is clearly explained in Mipham Jamyang Gyatsos Madhyamaka schools, particularly the Prasangika, or Consequence, commentary on Shantarakshitas Ornament of the Middle Way. This school and the Svatantrika, or Autonomy, school. The Prasangika Ma- commentary by Mipham Rinpoche is often considered the most impor- dhyamaka school follows the commentary entided Buddhapalita, which tant philosophical text of the Nyingma lineage in Tibet, particularly for was written by the scholar Buddhapalita, and the Clear Words by Chan- those who follow Mipham Rinpoche’s understanding of the Shentong drakirti. Other important treatises for the Prasangika system are Chan- Madhyamaka view. drakirtis Entrance to the Middle Way, Shantidevas Way o f the Bodhisattva, The second way describes the ultimate as being when appearance and Atishas root text and autocommentary called the Entrance to the is seen to be free of all elaboration and that is fully seen again. It is deci- Two Truths. sively seeing appearances as free of existing or not existing. This view was held by Buddhapalita and others. T he Svatantrika Tradition There are several other ways of categorizing Madhyamaka philosophy. Acharya Shantarakshita distinguishes two ways of understanding The Svatantrika school follows Bhavavivekas Lamp o f Wisdom, which

Page 41 relative truth: one that sees the relative as consciousness, and one that is his commentary on Wisdom, a Root Text on the Middle Way; B h a v a - sees the relative as habitual tendencies. Acharya Maitripa has two cat- vivekas followers Jnanagarbha, Shantarakshita, and Kamalashila are egories of the ultimate truth: in his first category the ultimate is illusory known as the Three Rising Suns of Svatantrika, and their adherents and nondual; it is seeing that everything is an illusion. In his second cat- make up the Svatantrika school. Some of their important texts are egory all phenomena are completely nonabiding; there is not even the Jnanagarbha s root text and autocommentary called Distinguishing the concept of an illusion. Two Truths; Shantarakshitas root text and autocommentary called the The Kashmiri pandita Lakshmi forms three divisions: Sautrantika Ornament of the Middle Way; and Kamalashilas Ninefold Volume, the Madhyamaka, Yogachara Madhyamaka, and Prajnaparamita Madhya- Light o f the M iddle Way,1 and his Stages ofMeditation: The First Treatise, maka. The differences between them are in the way the ultimate is said Intermediate Treatise, and Final Treatise. to be empty, and especially in the way the relative truth is defined. Each These texts were introduced in Tibet through the translations by of the schools is a little bit different, and there are many different ways Pandita Jnanagarbha and Chokro Lui Gyaltsen of Nagarjunas Wisdom, in which the relative and ultimate truths are explained. a Root Text on the M iddle Way and Bhavavivekas Lamp o f Wisdom. The According to Jamgön Kongtrul, there are the two general categories study and practice of Svatantrika Madhyamaka developed in Tibet of Sutrayana Madhyamaka and Tantrayana Madhyamaka. Within through the teaching of Shantarakshita. Later, during the second Sutrayana Madhyamaka he describes two further categories, Rangtong, spreading of the dharma in Tibet, Ngok Lotsawa Loden Sherap stud- “empty of self,” and Shentong, “empty of other.” This chapter focuses ied and taught the Lamp o f Wisdom and many other Madhyamaka trea- on how the Rangtong and Shentong understand the Middle Way phi- tises. He taught these to the seat holders of Sangphu Monastery, and losophy, and how their views differ. We will begin by surveying the view particularly to Chapa Chokyi Senge and his students who were called of Rangtong Madhyamaka and how it developed. the Eight Great Lions. All of them upheld the Svatantrika system. Later on, the great master Ma-we Senge Rongton Sheja Kunzik reestablished the Svatantrika tradition in Tibet. In the nineteenth century, 196 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I I97

Mipham Jamyang Gyatso started a special way of teaching Shantarak- main practice lineage of this system of Madhyamaka came from Atisha shitas Ornament o f the Middle Way, which is still spreading. The way Dipankara to his students who became the Kadampa lineage, and from Mipham explained the Ornament of the Middle Way goes beyond the there it spread to all the schools of Tibetan Buddhism. Svatantrika view and becomes more like Yogachara Madhyamaka. There are several ways of defining the difference between the Because of this commentary, many scholars say that the philosophical Prasangika and Svatantrika systems. According to Kongtrul Yonten position of the Nyingma school is based on Svatantrika Madhyamaka. Gyatso:

These schools differ in the way the ultimate view is generated in T he Prasangika Line a g e in Tibe t one's being. The Prasangika school was established in Tibet by Patsap Lotsawa There is no difference in what they assert the ultimate nature to be. Nyima Dragpa. He went to Kashmir and studied for twenty-three years with the two sons of Sajjana and other teachers. He translated into In his autocommentary to the Treasury o f Knowledge Kongtrul Tibetan the texts Wisdom, a Root Text on the Middle Way; the Entrance elaborates:3 to the Middle Way; Aryadevas Four Hundred Stanzas on Madhyamaka; and their commentaries. He brought these back to Tibet and estab- After Bhavaviveka saw Buddhapalitas commentary on Wis- lished this tradition through studying and teaching them. His main dom, >a Root Text on the Middle Way; he criticized it and es-

Page 42 students, called the Four Sons of Patsap, were Gangpa Sheu, who was tablished his own system. Then, Bhavavivekas system was very learned in the words; Tsangpa Dregur, who was very learned in the refuted by Chandrakirti, who upheld the view of Buddha- meaning; Maj Jangtson, who was learned in both; and Shangthang palita. This is how these two systems developed. The differ- Sagpa Yeshe Jungne, who wasn’t learned in either the words or the ence is in how the view of the ultimate truth is generated in meaning. Together with their own students they firmly established the ones being. There is no difference in their assertion of the Prasangika school in Tibet on the basis of Chandrakirti s treatises. By actual nature of the ultimate truth. All the great scholars who explaining, writing, and debating on his works, they opened wide a are unbiased say that both of these schools are authentic path for future students to follow. Madhyamaka. All the ways of teaching Prasangika Madhyamaka in Tibet came from this source. It was especially through Shangthang Sagpa, the one who T he Common V ie w of was said to be unlearned but was actually quite good, that the future gen- P rasangika and Svatantrika erations of Prasangika scholars developed. These included the holders of Patsap’s center at Sangphu Monastery; the scholars of the Sakya lineage; These two schools share common views on many points. For both the great master Buton Rinpoche; Je Rendawa, who was the teacher of Prasangika and Svatantrika, the main things to be eliminated by prac- Tsongkhapa Lozang Dragpa; and Tsongkhapa himself. Since that time ticing the path are the two obscurations— the afflictive emotions and these teachings have been held by the Gelugpa lineage, Karmapa Mikyo the subtle, habitual ignorance. It is said that through cultivating under- Dorje, Padma Karpo and his followers in the Drugpa Kagyu lineage, standing, you realize the selflessness of the person and the selflessness and many others. There are countless learned masters in all four schools of phenomena. In analyzing the perceiver, you find two aspects: that of Tibetan Buddhism who regard the Prasangika as the heart essence of which appears, and that which makes imputations about the appear- Madhyamaka philosophy. Through teaching, writing, and debating they ance. It is not correct to negate what appears. As long as your igno- have spread this teaching to the present time without degeneration. The rance and habitual tendencies have not been purified, the illusory 198 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I I99

appearances to the six senses do not cease. Even if you try to stop them, worldly people as the interdependent arising of causes and conditions on it cannot be done* and it is not necessary to negate them. All the prob- the relative, perceptual level, although on the ultimate level they do lems that arise are not because of the appearances, but because of refute the existence of interdependence. So there are two levels of refu- attachment to the appearances. Nagarjuna says in Reversing Disputes: tation— one at the relative level and one at the ultimate level. Nothing more is being done than to merely refute the perceiver as Some people think an illusory woman inherently existent and real. As Nagarjuna says: Created by a magician is a real woman. The initial illusion can be dispelled This understanding is that there is no essence; it is not the I f a second illusion removes that misunderstanding elimination of arising.

In his autocommentary to the same text, Nagarjuna explains:4 And Nagarjuna says in Reversing Disputes:

Some people think that a magically created woman, who is I f I made some assertion. empty by nature, is a real woman. Because they misappre- Then I could be at fault. hend her as real, desire arises to be with her. Then, the Bud- But since I make no assertions, dha or his disciples can create an illusion which clears up that I am free o ffaults.

Page 43 misapprehension. In the same way, even though my words are I f something is observable empty and illusory, they can reverse the misunderstanding As an object of direct perception, and so forth, that all things are not empty by nature. Just like the magically There would be something to establish or refute. created woman, people take phenomena and my words to be But since I do not have that, I cannot be criticized. real, but that misunderstanding can be reversed. So, nó matter what imputation is made about a thing, the thing does W hen a magician creates a beautiful girl, he does not become not exist in that way. In summary, the Prasangikas use nonaffirming attached to her. In the same way, when something appears but you are negations, which merely eliminate what is imputed. They merely remove not attached to it, then you are not fettered by the appearance. Children what is to be refuted. A nonaffirming negation is a mere separation from think something magically created is really there, so they get attached conceptual elaboration and establishes nothing else. to it, and when there is attachment, the afflictive emotions increase. Intentionally negating appearance is a big mistake. Emptiness should T he Fiv e Great Reasonings of Madhyamaka not become a reason for things to disappear; in that case, emptiness would be understood as nothingness. If you meditate on emptiness in Emptiness free of extremes is proved by the two basic aspects of logic: that way, you will fall into the extreme of nihilism. refuting and establishing. Madhyamaka has five great reasonings: the Therefore, what Madhyamaka refutes are the imputations—the labels first four are connected with refuting misunderstandings, and the fifth and assumptions about appearances. All of those who uphold the Ma- is connected with establishing correct understanding. In terms of what dhyamaka approach agree that a permanent, singular, and independent is refuted, first, causes are analyzed and invalidated through the reason- self is not established even as relative truth. They also agree that the ing called “the diamond fragments.” Second, results are analyzed and object of refutation, the imputed self, does not exist, even on the rela- invalidated through the reasoning called “the production and cessation tive level. However, Madhyamaka does not negate what is accepted by of existence and nonexistence.” Third, causes and results are analyzed 200 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I 201

together and invalidated through the reasoning called “the production or not the result exists in the cause. For example, if you say that a plant and cessation of the four alternatives.” Fourth, the nature itself is ana- grows, is the plant there at the time of the seed or not there at the time lyzed and invalidated through the reasoning called “free of one and of the seed? If the plant is there at the time of the seed, then the plant many,” and fifth, emptiness is established by analyzing appearances already exists and does not arise from the seed. If the plant is not depend- through the reasoning of interdependence. ent upon the seed, then the cause or seed is not needed. The first four reasonings eliminate the misunderstandings posited On the other hand, if the plant is not present at the time of the seed, by materialists who say that things exist by their own nature. They are then the seed does not have the plant in it. The seed does not function sometimes called “the four reasonings that get rid of the extreme of at the time of the plant growing, and the plant does not function at the existence.” The first of these reasonings comes from the Rice Seedling time of the seed being there. So where is their causal connection? Tra- Sutra, the fourth comes from the Lankavatara Sutra, and the second and ditionally, this is compared to the horns of a rabbit: the cause does not third are found in many sutras. Now I will go through these four rea- have the result just like a rabbit does not have horns. sonings and give a very brief overview of each. If you say that the plant is both existing and not existing at the time The first great reasoning, “the diamond fragments,” examines the of the seed, that would be impossible—logically, either it is there or it cause of an existent thing. For example, if you say that a plant grows, is not. In addition, saying the result is both there and not there has the then what is its cause? There are four possibilities: it arises from itself, faults of both of the previous arguments. Then, for the final alternative, from something else, from both itself and something other, or without that the result is neither existent nor nonexistent at the time of the

Page 44 any cause at all. cause, that too is impossible. How could a plant actually arise if not In brief, if it causes itself to grow, then it would have to grow all the from a seed or some sort of cause? time. As long as the plaht was there, it would grow endlessly; there The third great reasoning analyzes the cause and result together, using would be no reason or cause for it not to grow. the reasoning of “the arising and ceasing of the four alternatives.” When If the cause is something other, that means the cause would have to you cannot find a singular thing that truly exists, it automatically negates he something totally different from the plant. The absurd consequence the possibility that many of those things truly exist. Therefore, the four of a thing arising from something completely separate is that, for exam- alternatives cannot truly be there: (i) that many results come from one ple, darkness could come out of light. There would be no connection cause, (2) that one result comes from many causes, (3) that one result between the cause and the result because they are totally distinct. comes from one cause, and (4) that many results come from many causes. If a thing like a plant is caused by both itself and something else, then This reasoning establishes the unborn nature of phenomena, and the faults indicated by each of the previous reasonings still apply. If the points to a correct understanding of interdependence. Interdependence cause is neither itself nor something else, that is not possible because it is not merely that cause and result operate. Cause and result do not could not be born. A plant cannot suddenly be there without any causes. function because things are really there; they function because things are This reasoning of the “diamond fragments,” which analyzes the cause, magical illusions. There are many similar statements in Wisdom, a Root points to interdependent arising. The Buddhist view is that things Text on the Middle Way, such as “there is no birth, no cessation, and no appear due to many causes and conditions coming together. This reason- dwelling.” ing refutes the notion that something existent could arise from itself, The fourth great reasoning analyzes the nature itself with the reason- from another truly existent thing, from both of them, or without any ing of “free of one and many.” This fourth reasoning further clarifies the cause at all. third reasoning, which was called “the arising and ceasing of the four The second great reasoning analyzes the result through “the arising alternatives.” When you examine something like a plant, since you can- and ceasing of existence and nonexistence.” Flere the question is whether not find even one plant that is independently existing, it is impossible 202 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I 203

for there to be many plants that are independently existing. This reason- There is no way to attain the peace o f nirvana ing establishes the Unreality of apparent phenomena. You begin by exam- Other than by following the path ofArya Nagarjuna. ining a single thing and see that it can be broken down into smaller Followers o f other schools corrupt both the relative and pieces, thereby negating singular existence. This analysis automatically ultimate truth, refutes multiple existence as well, since there must be one before there So they have no way to accomplish liberation. can be many. This reasoning of “free of one and many” is regarded as the root reasoning of all the Buddhist philosophical systems for negating The Prasangika masters do not follow the tenets of Chittamatra and the true existence of things. Sautrantika concerning the relative truth; they say that the relative truth As I mentioned earlier, emptiness free of extremes is proved by the two follows the conventional thinking of ordinary people. In other words, main aspects of reasoning—refutation and establishment. The previous the Prasangikas assert that the ultimate truth accords with the percep- four reasonings clear away misunderstanding, so they are part of the cat- tion of enlightened beings, and that the relative truth accords with the egory of refutation. Now we will look at the fifth great reasoning, which perception and terminology of worldly beings. is connected with the establishment of emptiness. So, Prasangika and Svatantrika have different ways of positing the rel- Emptiness is established through analyzing mere appearance with ative truth. In their statement of the relative, the proponents of the great reasoning of interdependence. This reasoning is found in the Svatantrika say that the relative level is conventionally true. This con- Sutra Requested by the Naga King Madrdpa. Using the logic of interde- trasts with the Prasangika, who do not accept the relative as even con-

Page 45 pendent arising clears both extreme views of nihilism and eternalism. ventionally true. In the Entrance to the Middle Way Chandrakirti says: The extreme of nihilism is eliminated because the relative, perceptual level is not nonexistent. The extreme of permanence is eliminated The way you accept the dependent nature as being real because everything depends on many causes and conditions. The rea- Is something that I would not assert even on the relative level. soning of interdependence is known in Madhyamaka as “the king of Although things are not there, I say they are there reasonings” because it establishes the emptiness of reality. There is no Just to go along with the perceptions o f worldly beings. disagreement between the various schools of Madhyamaka about these reasonings and the ultimate truth. Therefore, the Prasangikas accept the relative truth only because others see it as true; it is not asserted from their own point of view. Also, when they debate, there is a difference between Svatantrika and D ist in c t io n s betw een Prasangika and Prasangika as to whether they put forth their own assertions or not. S vatantrika M adhyamaka The Svatantrikas do put forth assertions, at least on the relative level, If there is no disagreement about the way of reasoning, then what are because they say one must show reasoning about what is correct and the differences between Prasangika and Svatantrika? As I have said, incorrect, and give examples to prove what is true. The Svatantrikas there is no difference at all in the way they posit the ultimate truth, say it is wrong for the Prasangikas not to make any assertions and sim- but there are a few differences in the way they posit the relative truth. ply negate others’ views, because that is just attacking others without For the relative level, the Svatantrika school uses terminology similar to having anything better of their own to propose. They think that one the Chittamatra, or Mind-Only, school, and the Sautrantika, or Sutra- first needs to use valid cognition to establish emptiness and the unborn Follower, school. However, according to the Prasangika school, the nature, because merely criticizing others’ views is not enough to estab- Chittamatra and Sautrantika descriptions of both the ultimate and the lish emptiness. relative are incorrect. Chandrakirti s Entrance to the Middle Way states: The Prasangikas respond to this criticism by saying: “Since we have 204 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I 205

nothing to posit, then we do not need a way to establish it.” The Entrance approach. He said that one should not assert a position of one s own, to the Middle Way states: but use the reasoning of negation merely to show the internal contradictions in others views. In Prasangika there is no attempt to establish Both refitting and establishing are only negation or negate anything about ones own system, but for the sake of others, Because in reality there is nothing to establish and nothing to refute. one simply negates wrong views by means of the four types of valid cognition and the four reasonings. When the Prasangikas say, “Actually, there is nothing to negate, not The four types of valid cognition are: (i) valid cognition based on even the tiniest particle,” then the question is asked, “Then why do what is known in the world, (2) direct perception, (3) inference, and (4) you negate things?” The Prasangikas reply, “It is not because we feel scriptures based on the authentic experiences of highly realized beings. hatred for others views or we just like to debate, but those with wrong The four reasonings are: (1) to use an inference drawn from what is views are caught in ignorance and clinging. We have nothing to estab- known in the world, (2) to show the contradictory consequence of what lish; we are just trying to eliminate others wrong views.” is asserted, (3) to offer an equally valid reason that reaches the opposite According to the Prasangika approach, they negate others’ assertions conclusion, and (4) to show a reason is invalid because it merely reiter- to clear up misunderstanding. The true nature cannot be understood ates the thesis. through the logical analysis of refuting and establishing. The natural These four special reasonings of the Prasangikas can be applied to state is free of all fabrications; it cannot be an object of conceptual each of the four alternatives already mentioned to examine how an exis-

Page 46 examination. The Entrance to the Middle Way states: tent thing cannot actually arise. In other words, does an object, like a plant, arise from itself, from something other, from both self and other, Samsaric beings are bound by their concepts, or from neither self nor other? Since these are the main reasonings used Whereas yogic practitioners without concepts will be liberated. in the Prasangika approach, I will show how they are applied to the Learned beings say that the result o f analysis positions of various Indian philosophies by quoting Jamgön Kongtrul Is the collapse o f mistaken thinking. from his Treasury o f Knowledge?

There are some other differences between Prasangika and Svatantrika, To begin with, the Samkhya philosophy of India claims that and various Tibetan scholars have their individual views about what a thing arises from itself. This means that a thing can arise the distinctions are. However, I will not elaborate on these here. only if it is there at the time of its cause. Or put the opposite way, if the thing is not there at the same time as its cause, then it cannot be born. They use the example of being able A n Overview of the Prasangika A nal ysis to extract oil from a sesame seed because the oil is already Among the four schools of Tibetan Buddhism—Sakya, Geluk, Kagyu, there at the time of the seed. One cannot extract oil from and Nyingma—the great majority of those who uphold Rangtong sand, because oil is not already present. Madhyamaka agree that the Prasangika school has the ultimate view. All To negate that, from among the four special reasonings, four schools emphasize the approach of Prasangika Madhyamaka. So at the Prasangikas begin with the second, showing the contra- this point I will give a summary of the Prasangika view according to the dictory consequence of the Samkhyas’ statement. They use understanding of Jamgon Kongtrul. the following syllogism: There is no purpose in a thing being The supreme scholar of Prasangika Madhyamaka was Chandrakirti, born since it is already present at the time of its cause. If it is whose works on Madhyamaka are the classic texts for the Prasangika already there, then it cannot, and need not, be born again. 206 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I 207

If the Samkhya proponent says this reasoning is some- these four reasonings to the first alternative of how somewhat acceptable but it does not cover everything, then the thing could arise from itself. Prasangika opponent responds with another reason. The Next is an overview of how these reasonings are applied to consequence of arising from itself would be endless birth; the second alternative, that a thing arises from something the thing would repeatedly reproduce itself. When people other than itself. This view was put forth by the Buddhist say that something has arisen, that means it was not there Vaibhashika, or Substantialist, school. For example, they before. This is an example of the third type of reasoning, would say that a sprout arises from a seed, and that these are the reasoning of equal weight, where ones reason has no different entities. The Prasangikas reply that they cannot be greater or lesser weight than the opponents reason, but totally different things, because for one to arise from the other comes to the opposite conclusion. With the example of there must be a connection between them; and if there is a extracting oil from a sesame seed, the oil was not already connection between them, then they are not totally distinct. there in the form of oil. If it was, there would be no need to If they do exist separately, then one cannot be affected by the extract it from the seed. other. So, this is the reasoning of showing the contradictions. The Samkhyas reply that they agree, the potential oil in the If the Vaibhashikas say that this is not always true, then seed and the extracted oil are not the same. The oil is the result the Prasangikas reply that if the cause and result have no and therefore it arises; it is born, so to speak. When the oil is connection but are totally separate things, then it would

Page 47 extracted it is not an unending birth; it just arises once when follow that anything could come out of anything. Even the seed is pressed. The Samkyas give another example: a pot something opposite could arise, for example, darkness could is made from clay. Even at the time of the cause, which is the come from light. This is using a reasoning of equal weight clay, there is the potential of it becoming a pot. There was no that reaches the opposite conclusion. The Vaibhashikas visible pot, but when the clay is shaped it becomes a pot. The reply that some things have the capacity to cause growth pot does not produce pots, but the clay produces pots, and the •and other things do not have that capacity; everything can- pot is clay. not produce everything. The Prasangikas reply that this is The Prasangikas reply: “How can you say that a pot is adding a special condition, rather than simply asserting that there when only clay is there? To say that there is an unseen things arise from separate entities. Therefore, sprouts are pot in the clay is absurd. When the pot is invisible, no pot not caused by seeds, because these are essentially two differ- is there.” This is the fourth type of reasoning: showing that ent things. the reasoning is invalid because the reason given is the same Next, the Jain school of Indian philosophy put forth the as what is to be established. It is simply a reiteration of the view that a thing arises from both itself and something other assertion, saying that the assertion is a reason, when no rea- than itself. Their example is that the pot comes from the clay, son is actually given. So, any phenomenon, whether out- which is coming from itself, but it also comes from the pot- side or inside the mind, does not arise from itself if the ter, his thread tool, the water, and so forth, which makes it phenomenon is already there. And if it is not already there, also coming from other things. The Prasangikas reply that one cannot assert that it is there. This is something every- logically, if something cannot come from itself and also can- body understands, so it accords with the first reasoning, an not come from something other than itself, then how could inference that is drawn from what is known by people in the it come from both of them? Each of these possibilities has world. This is an example of how the Prasangikas apply already been shown to be invalid. Therefore, something can- 208 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I 209

not come from both itself and another. The Entrance to the Briefly, these are the tenets o f the ultimate commentator on the Middle Way states: Collection of Reasoning.

It is not reasonable that something arises from both itself As it says, the first special point is that the conceptual mind is utterly and others deluded. Because that would entail both o f the faults previously Then, for Chandrakirti s second point, the Commentaries by Bodhi- stated. sattvas states: The fourth possibility, arising from neither self nor others, was asserted by the Charvaka school of Indian philosophy, In the contexts o f dreaming and being awake, who are known as the Hedonists or Nihilists. They assert There is no difference in how things function. that things arise without any cause. To negate that, the Prasangikas ask, if there are no causes, then why are things So, the pure relative truth perceived by yogis and the impure relative there at certain times and not there at other times? They say truth perceived by ordinary people are not different in that they both that if something without a cause could be perceived, then, function. for example, people could perceive flowers growing in the His third special point is explained in the Entrance to the Middle Way: sky, because there is no cause for that to happen. This is using

Page 48 the reasoning of equal weight. If the Charvakas say there is a Whether things are seen correctly or mistakenly, difference in that the flowers in the earth are there, but the They are true in that they function, but they are perceived in flowers in the sky are not there, then the Prasangikas reply two ways. that the flowers are in the earth because of causes for them to Seeing things rightly is suchness, the ultimate truth; be there. Therefore, things in the world do not arise without Seeing things mistakenly is the relative truth. causes and conditions. Something arises when its causes and conditions are present, and when those are absent, the thing The two truths can be categorized by saying that what is true for the does not arise. This is using inference based on what is known person whose mind is deluded is the relative truth,, and what is true for in the world. the person whose mind is undeluded is the ultimate truth. These three points are considered to be the unique tenets of Chandrakirti.

T he Three Spe c ia l Points of Chandrakirti T he Eig h t Spe c ia l Points of T so ng khapa Most Tibetan scholars regard Chandrakirti as the definitive commentator on Nagarjunas five Madhyamaka texts known as the Collection o f As for other special tenets of the Prasangika school, Tsongkhapa and the Reasoning. According to Jamgon Kongtrul in his Treasury o f Knowledge, great Gelugpa scholars propose what are called the Eight Great Theses Chandrakirti s philosophy is characterized by three special points: of the Prasangika. Four of them are stated as negations and four are stated as affirmations. The first four, the negations, apply even on the The conceptual m ind is necessarily a deluded mind. relative level: (i) they do not accept that things have inherent charac- Both the accurate and the mistaken relative truth are equally teristics; (2) they do not accept any reasonings that assert what is true; functional. (3) they do not accept self-awareness as direct perception; (4) they do The two truths are defined as deluded and undeluded. not accept the alaya. The latter four theses that the Gelugpas attribute 210 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I 211

to the Prasangikas are affirmations: (i) they accept that there is some A ll phenomena dissolve such that ones enlightenment only appears outer reality, in other words, there is interdependence and everything for the perception o f others. is not simply the mind; (2) from among the two obscurations, clinging to true existence is the obscuration of the afflictive emotions, not the In his autocommentary, he explains these five points more fully: subtle habitual obscuration; (3) they accept that the absence of something is in itself a thing; and (4) when the shravakas and pratyeka- 1. In their own system and in relation to the world, the Prasangikas buddhas attain the realization of an arhat, they realize the selflessness do not engage in reasoning or conceptual definitions of what is of phenomena. validly cognized and what is not validly cognized. They completely There is a great deal of debate on these eight theses, particularly the abandon making these distinctions, saying that they are irrelevant. third affirmation, that the absence of something is a thing. This point On the relative level, there is no phenomenon, whether outer or is very sensitive to the Gelugpas, and has been one of the main topics of inner, or cause or result, which truly exists on its own. Everything debate since the time Tsongkhapa proposed it. These eight theses were is imputed by the mind and exists merely as a designation. The specifically addressed by Serdok Panchen Shakya Chogden. He and his horses and cows seen in the waking state and the horses and cows followers say the Prasangikas would accept that arhats realize the selfless- seen in a dream are equally unreal.7 ness of phenomena to some extent, but as for Tsongkhapas other seven 2. If something is compounded, there is no activity in the first theses, the Prasangikas never even dreamed of them. Many refutations instant of its existence, but in the second instant it has changed

Page 49 have been applied to these points. In particular, the Sakya lineage holder, and is no longer there. If one analyzes through reasoning, com- Gorampa Sönam Senge, compiled eighty contradictions to refute pounded things cannot be established as existent. Anything we Tsongkhapas eight theses. Recently, these eighty contradictions were identify is deceptive and false because it is constantly dissolving. extensively used by the Sakya khenpo, Khenpo Rinchen, who was a great There is no mutual ground for what is compounded and what is logician of the twentieth century, in his debates with the Gelugpas. validly established. If one analyzes more deeply, even nirvana and anything that might be beyond it are not truly established. How- ever, if one does not go that deep but only analyzes a little bit, T he Fiv e Spe c ia l Points of Kongtrul then enlightenment is not deceptive; there is some truth there. As Jamgön Kongtrul did not affirm or negate any of Tsongkhapas eight it is said: theses, but formulated his own presentation of the Prasangika view in Nirvana alone is true. five main points. These five are delineated in the following root verse This was taught by the Buddha. and autocommentary from the Treasury o f Knowledge:6 So, enlightenment is the only thing which is somewhat true; every- Conceptual imputations are abandoned; all things are merely thing else is compounded and therefore unreal. designations. 3. The root cause of samsara is holding things to be real. This is the Compounded phenomena are deceptive; nirvana is not deceptive. obscuration of the afflictive emotions. It is the perception of things The root ofsamsara is clinging to true existence, which generates the as truly existing, and includes everything that follows from that, obscuration o f the afflictive emotions. such as attachment and other mental afflictions. It is not correct Since the first three yanas have the same way o f seeing reality, there is to say that the perception of the three spheres of subject, object, only one path ofseeing. and action is the subtle habitual obscuration. Fixating on real 212 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I 213

things in terms of a perceiving subject and perceived object is not T agtsang Lotsawa’s W ay of the habitual obscuration; it is only the obscuration of the afflictive T eaching Prasangika M adhyamaka emotions. As the Entrance to the Middle Way states: In general, when teaching the Madhyamaka root texts of Nagarjuna As long as there is clinging to the five aggregates, and Aryadeva, most scholars use the system developed by Tagtsang Lo- There is clinging to the self. tsawa and his followers who explain the texts in three levels: for those So, clinging to things as true is definitely the root cause of sam- who have not done any analysis, for those who have done a little analy- sara. Since this is part of the obscuration of afflictive emotions, sis, and for those who have done a thorough analysis. As it is said: the shravakas and pratyekabuddhas who become arhats must realize the egolessness of phenomena as well as the emptiness of A t the first level, one eliminates nonvirtue, the self. A t the second level, one eliminates self-clinging, 4. For the first three yanas of the shravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and A t the fin a l level, one eliminates all bases for having a view. bodhisattvas, there are no distinctions at the level of the path of seeing, in terms of the sixteen moments, the fifteen moments, the To explain these in more detail, first, the ground with its aggregates, twelve moments, the four moments, and so on. For all of them, it elements, and sense bases, the path with its conduct and methods, and is the same level of seeing the true nature. As the Entrance to the the result with its kayas and enlightened activities, all exist for people Page 50 Middle Way states: who have not done any analysis. These aspects of the dharma are taught according to worldly terminology and conventional ways of seeing. The wisdom that sees suchness is not different nor changing. Most of these aspects are already well-known in the world or could be So, the Prasangikas accept that the path of seeing is the same for known. This is how many teachers explain the relative truth of the practitioners of all three lower vehicles. world and the relative truth that appears to realized yogis in meditation 5. The form kaya of a buddha and the buddha-activities are beyond and post-meditation. Even without analysis, these teachings are very comprehension by our thoughts and words. They are like the wish- beneficial. fulfilling jewel or the Garuda Stupa. After the Garuda Stupa was At the second level, correct reasoning is presented for those who have built, it continued to bestow blessings without having any concept analyzed a little bit. After negating the existence of the individual self of doing so. Once one is enlightened, one need not have the inten- and the self of phenomena, then one establishes the unborn nature, tion to benefit beings; it just happens due to ones past aspirations emptiness, and the ultimate truth. and the positive karma of sentient beings. So, enlightenment Third, for those who have analyzed deeply there is a final, ultimate appears only to the perception of others. Aryadeva wrote of what stage of explaining Prasangika Madhyamaka. The Entrance to the M id- it is like from a buddhas perspective: dle Way states:

When one awakens from the sleep o f ignorance, A ll aspects ofsamsara are no longer visible. Right from the beginning, in the unborn nature There is nothing to be refuted and nothing to be established. So, at that time all the consciousnesses and phenomena have dis- A t the level o f the unborn, there is no distinction of solved, and a buddha appears only for the perception of others. Attaining nirvana or not attaining nirvana. 214 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I 215

The unborn nature itself is also not there, the master Chandragomin, and their followers. Later on, Shantipa and Because there is no thing which is unborn. others spread this approach even more widely. In Tibet, many of the There is no relative and no absolute. third-turning sutras and shastras were translated during both the earlier There are no buddhas and no beings. and later spreadings of Buddhism in Tibet. During the later spreading, the main teaching lineage for the latter There is no view and nothing to meditate on. four treatises of Maitreya came down from Ngok Lotsawa, and the main There is no conduct and no result. practice lineage came down from Tsen Khawoche. The great translator The mind is the meditation; Ngok Lotsawa received teachings on Maitreyas latter four treatises and The mindfree o f concepts rests in its own place. their commentaries from the Kashmiri master Sajjana, and Ngok later taught these extensively in Tibet. Tsen Khawoche, who was a student of There is nothing that recognizes and nothing that is distracted. the first terton in Tibet, Drapa Ngonshe, also received the teachings There are no characteristics, and the meditation is very clear. from Khache Sajjana on the Sublime Continuum and other treatises. Tsen Khawoche passed on these teachings to Changrawa and others, This quotation shows the ultimate view, in which all fabricated charac- and this teaching lineage continued for a long time. The writing of Situ teristics have completely dissolved. Chokyi Jungne describes the approaches of Ngok and Tsen Khawoche:

Page 51 The lineage of Ngok Lotsawa explains Maitreyas teachings as Shentong Madhyamaka Madhyamaka, and the lineage of Tsen Khawoche explains them as Chittamatra. In Tsen Khawoche s writing, conscious- T he Sources of Shentong ness is asserted to be free of the duality of perceiver and per- As mentioned earlier, Jamgon Kongtrul divides Sutra Madhyamaka ceived; it is self-aware, self-luminous, truly established, and into the two categories of Rangtong, ‘empty of self,” and Shentong, the cause of buddhahood. “empty of other.” The Shentong view is the essence of the third-turning teachings on buddha nature, which are elaborated in twenty differ- In this way Situ Chokyi Jungne affirmed that Tsen Khawoche followed ent sutras. These sutras were explained by the regent and future buddha, the Chittamatra view when he asserted consciousness to be self-know- Lord Maitreya, in the latter four of his Five Treatises ofMaitreya. These ing and truly established. latter four treatises are the Ornament of the Mahayana Sutras, Distin- In general, Indian scholars such as Vasubandhu, Dignaga, and Sthi- guishing Phenomena and the True Nature, Distinguishing the Middle and ramati explained the books of Maitreya as being Chittamatra treatises, the Extremes, and the Sublime Continuum. and this interpretation spread widely. There was also a lineage of expla- The holders of the Shentong view also claim as their source the third- nation that stemmed from the great siddha Maitripa, which was con- turning teachings written by Arya Nagarjuna called the Collection o f veyed as a special hearing lineage for highly capable students. This Praises. In these texts Nagarjuna taught this view at three levels: praising lineage evolved in Tibet through Su Ga-we Dorje and Tsen Khawoche, the nature and knowing the nature at the level of the ground; praising who passed this teaching on to the siddha Yumowa, who was the first skillful means and wisdom at the level of the path; and praising the indi- author to write on the latter four books of Maitreya according to the vidual three kayas and the view of the nature at the level of the result. Shentong view. Then, Dolpopa Sherap Gyaltsen, who was born in the Commentaries on these treatises and this system of teaching and Water Dragon year of 1292, commented on Yumowas writing, and he learning were fully expounded by Asanga and his brother Vasubandhu, is considered to be the founder of the Shentong tradition. It is generally 2i6 i chapter 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA | ZlJ

understood that before Dölpopa there was no terminology of “Rang- Generally, most Tibetan scholars would agree that teaching the three tong” and “Shentong.” yanas as totally separate is not in keeping with Madhyamaka. However, Later on, Serdok Panchen Shakya Chogden, Jetsun Taranatha, and the masters who hold this position say that a teacher is not excluded from many others expounded the special points that constitute the Shentong the Madhyamaka system just because he teaches that arhats can enter philosophy. However, Kongtrul says that previously, Karmapa Rangjung parinirvana without remainder and never enter the Mahayana path. They Dorje and Longchenpa had already clearly stated the main points of say that the system of Madhyamaka is defined on the basis of its view, not Shentong. Although Rangjung Dorje and Longchenpa did not use the on the basis of how the path to enlightenment is defined. The master terminology of Shentong, Jamgön Kongtrul says they asserted the same Kamalashila gives three points that define the Madhyamaka view: all phe- definitive view. Later on, Minling Terchen Gyurme Dorje and his nomena are of one taste in being empty, all sentient beings have buddha brother Lochen Dharma Shri, along with Situ Chökyi Jungne and their nature, and everyone has the capacity to become enlightened. Even those followers, called the Shentong view “the tradition of Great Madhya- who teach the three yanas as separate would agree on these three points. maka, the definitive meaning that goes beyond Chittamatra.” They held Jamgon Kongtrul contrasts Shakya Chogdens understanding with the Shentong view very dearly, and they clarified it and spread it. that of the great Jonangpa, Dolpopa, who says that the five books of Maitreya have no difference in their view. Most Tibetan scholars think that the Ornament o f Clear Realization is a Rangtong text, but Dolpopa T he V ie w s of Shakya Chogden and D ölpopa disagrees. He also does not think there is a lesser level of Shentong for

Page 52 It is said that even within the Shentong tradition there are slightly dif- the shravakas and pratyekabuddhas who hear and contemplate the teach- ferent ways of teaching it. Jamgön Kongtrul summarizes these in two ings, and a greater level of Shentong for the bodhisattvas who actualize main views, those of Silung Panchen Shakya Chogden and Jonang the teachings in meditation. Dolpopa says there is only one level of Kunkhyen Dölpopa Sherap Gyaltsen. First, Shakya Chogden teaches Shentong, that no one would say that ultimately there are three separate two levels of Shentong: that the first three books of Maitreya reflect yanas since all beings have the potential for full enlightenment. Yogachara Madhyamaka, and the last, the Sublime Continuum, reflects Dolpopa says that many Tibetan scholars think the first three books the definitive, ultimate Madhyamaka. These two approaches to Ma- of Maitreya are not Madhyamaka but Chittamatra, and in particular, the dhyamaka have no real difference in their views; the difference is that the part of the Chittamatra school called the False Aspectarians. He says first three books of Maitreya do not mention some of the points covered that the designations of False Aspectarians and True Aspectarians were in the Sublime Continuum, and they teach that ultimately there are imputed by the Tibetans. The treatises of Maitreya do question whether three distinct yanas—the Shravakayana, the Pratyekabuddhayana, and the mind that appears as subject and object is true or false, but there were the Bodhisattvayana. never separate tenet systems in India called the False Aspectarians and the The Sublime Continuum teaches that ultimately there is only one yana, True Aspectarians. and that each yana leads to the next one. Because there are different lev- Silungpa Shakya Chogden strongly posits the Sublime Continuum as els of disciples, the Sublime Continuum discusses the ordinary disciples a Madhyamaka text. He reasons in this way: level of ignorance and habitual tendencies, as well as the extraordinary disciples’ level of rebirth through undefiled karma. Disciples begin by There is no scripture or reasoning that establishes the Sublime clearing their doubts through study and contemplation, and gradually Continuum as a Chittamatra text, and within the Sublime actualize the true meaning through meditation. In the Sublime Contin- Continuum there is no scripture or reasoning given which uum these three ways of cultivating wisdom are all stages of a single path validates that assertion. If one can apply scripture and reason- and not segregated into separate yanas. ing from outside sources to establish one point and criticize 2l8 I chapter 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I 219

another, then there is no teaching that can be established as small differences in the way the two truths are stated by the different totally Madhyamaka. Maitreya and Asanga say that the view groups of Madhyamaka, such as Prasangika, Svatantrika, Rangtong, expressed in the Sublime Continuum is Madhyamaka, and that Shentong, and so on. To clarify the Shentong view, I will give Jamgon should be enough to establish it as Madhyamaka, since there Kongtruls explanation of the Shentong way of describing the ground could not be a higher authority on the text than its authors. as the union of the two truths.8 Nagarjunas texts are established as Madhyamaka because Bhavaviveka and Kamalashila say that Nagarjuna was an arya, The two truths are the relative truth and the ultimate truth. a highly realized being, who was predicted by the Buddha. If First, to clarify the relative truth: consciousness exists on the rel- that reasoning is valid, then since Maitreya and Asanga were ative level as impure, mistaken perception of the arising of var- also aryas and predicted by the Buddha, then it is appropri- ious appearances. Although appearances are there, the way they ate for the Sublime Continuum to be Madhyamaka as well. are grasped dualistically, as a subject who is perceiving objects, In the Sublime Continuum, from among the three natures, is merely imputed by the mind. These imputations do not the perfected nature is said to be the ultimate truth. If some- exist, even as relative truth. Therefore, relative truth is free of one says that a reference to the perfected nature shows this the two extremes of true existence and true nonexistence. Since text is not Madhyamaka, that is not a sufficient reason. There consciousness is there on the relative level, then the extreme of are many Tibetan scholars who say that the emptiness which nihilism is avoided; and since the perceiving subject and per-

Page 53 is a nonaffirming negation is the ultimate truth. But then ceived objects are not true, and all interdependent arising is that understanding would similarly not qualify as Madhya- merely imputation, then the extreme of eternalism is avoided. maka, because according to Madhyamaka the definition of Next, the ultimate truth is the primordial wisdom of empti- ultimate truth is being free of all elaborations. ness free of elaborations. Primordial wisdom is there in its very According to Maitreya and Asangas own system, there are nature and is present within the impure, mistaken conscious- no other treatises except the Sublime Continuum which give ness. Even while consciousness is temporarily stained, it the real Madhyamaka view. This is said within the Sublime remains in the wisdom nature. The defilements are separable Continuum itself, as well as in other texts such as the Four and can be abandoned because they are not the true nature. Collections and Asangas two compendia, the Compendium of Therefore, the ultimate truth is also free of the two extremes Abhidharma and the Compendium o f Mahayana Commen- of nihilism and eternalism. Since emptiness is truly estab- taries. Furthermore, the third-turning teachings clearly state lished, then the extreme of nihilism is avoided; and since all that one should not take literally the sutras which say that all phenomena and concepts of subject-object grasping do not phenomena are essenceless. Taking them too literally would truly exist, then the extreme of eternalism is avoided. It is said make one a nihilist, because that view lacks wisdom and in Distinguishing the Middle and the Extremes: clear light. Impure conceptual mind exists. But duality does not exist in that; T he Shentong V ie w of the Ground Madhyamaka Emptiness exists in that A nd that exists in that. In general, all the Madhyamaka systems accept the view that the ground is the union of the two truths, the path is the union of the two That is not empty nor nonempty. accumulations, and the result is the union of the two kayas. There are That is how everything is explained. 220 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I 221

In relation to what exists, does not exist, and exists, the perfected nature. First, the imaginary nature is defined as That is the path of the Middle Way. whatever is grasped by mental designations. This includes nonentities, like the sky; objects that one thinks about; and In addition, the Treasury o f Knowledge says: the relationships between names and objects, such as grasping The relative is merely deluded appearance, empty o f the name as being the object, or mistaking the object for the nature. name. Characteristics such as outer and inner, center and edge, The true nature is unchanging and not empty o f nature. big and small, good and bad, directions and time— all the things that are imputed by the mind and that can be grasped The perceiving subject and perceived objects of the relative by the mind—are the imaginary nature. level are only deluded appearances arising; they have no real- The second of the three natures, the dependent nature, is ity of their own. Deluded appearance is empty of its own defined as just awareness or as consciousness, which arises as nature, and it is impossible for something to be established on the basis for the perceiving subject and perceived objects. It the basis of another’s nature. Deluded appearances are empty is called “dependent” because appearances are dependent on all the time, so there are no things that are not empty. the habitual tendencies created by ignorance. The primordial wisdom nature, the dharmata, always exists The third nature, the perfected nature, is defined as self- in its own nature and never changes, so it is never empty of aware, self-luminous, and free of all fabrications. It is the its own nature and it is there all the time. Page 54 dharmata, or nature of reality; the dharmadhatu, or sphere of reality; the tathata, or suchness; and the ultimate truth— it

T he Shentong Underst anding of has many synonymous names. the Three N atures The imaginary nature and dependent nature are equal in being untrue, deluded appearances, relative, and false. They The Treasury o f Knowledge also says: are classified separately because the imaginary nature is not there, even on the level of relative truth, but the dependent Although the imaginary nature does not exist at all, the nature is there as relative truth. The perfected level is not dependent nature exists on the relative level. there on the level of relative truth but is there on the level of The perfected nature does not exist on the relative level, the ultimate truth. but it exists on the ultimate level. These three exist as imputed, exist as substantial, and If this is true, then what about the statements in the sutras that exist as unfabricated. the dharmadhatu, the sphere of reality, is also empty? Yes, it is They are the emptiness o f the nonexistent, the existent, said that everything is empty, because everything that is other and the ultimate. than primordial wisdom—which means everything that is fab- Their characteristics, arising, and ultimate essence do ricated or an aspect of subject-object perception— is empty. not exist. Every characteristic placed on primordial wisdom is empty. That is why we say that everything is empty or emptiness. As the root verse summarizes, the imaginary nature exists In general, the Shentong school categorizes all phenomena through imputation, the dependent nature exists as substantial, into the three natures of the imaginary, the dependent, and and the perfected nature does not exist in these two ways but 222 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I 223

is beyond fabrications. The imaginary nature is the emptiness of the relative level. It does not arise, dwell, or cease, it does of what does not exist, the dependent nature is the emptiness not come or go, it is not one or many, it is not cause or effect. of what does exist, and the perfected nature is the emptiness of In its very nature, it is free of characteristics, the concept char- the ultimate. acterized, and the basis for the characteristics. It is free of all Jetsun Maitreya explains: elaborations, such as directions and times, so it is permanent by nature. It is indivisible and cannot be divided into sepa- I fyou understand the emptiness o f what is nonexistent, rate parts. It is the nature of everything, so it is ever present And likewise the emptiness o f what is existent, and all pervasive. And the emptiness o f the nature, Most other aspects of the Shentong presentation of the Then it is said that you understand emptiness. ground, path, and result generally accord with the Chittama- Furthermore, in the imaginary nature, the characteristics tra system. are essenceless; in the dependent nature, what arises is essenceless; and in the perfected nature, the ultimate is essenceless. Shentong I s N ot th e Same as C hittam atra There are three aspects of the essence and three aspects of essencelessness. Through these, all phenomena are taught to be Since the Shentong Madhyamaka system and the commentaries of the natureless. Chittamatra masters are both based on the same third-turning sutras,

Page 55 many scholars say that Shentong is Chittamatra and is not Madhya- The Treasury o f Knowledge goes on to say: maka. So we will look at why Jamgon Kongtrul says the Shentong view is not the same as the Chittamatra view. The Treasury o f Knowl- Therefore, every phenomena is pervaded by emptiness. edge says: The perfected nature in its essence is not connected with relative phenomena. The False Aspectarians within Chittamatra say that the It is without characteristics, the concept characterized, nature o f consciousness is established as true and the basis fo r the characteristics. And within the realm o f the mind. In Shentong\ It is posited as free of fabrications, permanent, primordial wisdom indivisible, and omnipresent. Is posited as true but uncompounded. The other presentations in Shentong concur with the The Shentong view is free o f the fault o f saying that the Chittamatra view. ultimate is an entity.

As the root verse says, according to the system of Shen- To explain this root verse, there are two groups within tong Madhyamaka, all phenomena are pervaded by empti- Chittamatra, which are called the False Aspectarians and the ness and essencelessness, and the perfected nature is established True Aspectarians. According to the False Aspectarians, the as true. If the perfected nature is true, then one might won- nature of the all-ground consciousness is established as true. der whether it arises, dwells, or ceases. Does it come or go or Most Tibetan scholars believe that Chittamatra says the all- change? Does it have directions or times? Is it one or many? ground consciousness is within the experience of the unen- No, none of these. lightened mind. If one asserts that, then one becomes a If those qualities were there, then it would not be true. Vaibhashika, or Substantialist, rather than a follower of The perfected nature is never connected with the phenomena Madhyamaka. 224 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I

Shentong Madhyamaka certainly does not assert that. In Some critics say that the Shentong assertion that buddha this system, the sphere of buddha nature is asserted as true, nature is permanent makes it a non-Buddhist system. but it is beyond ordinary consciousness. Not only do the When they say that, they are rejecting the Tathagatagarbha Shentongpas assert the presence of the very nature of primor- sutras. It is illogical to declare that “permanent” must mean dial wisdom free of elaborations, but that the primordial wis- that something always continues. If that was enough to dom free of extremes is uncompounded. So, they do not incur make something permanent, then all compounded phe- the fault of asserting that the ultimate truth is a substantial nomena would be permanent, since even samsara and entity. dualistic grasping always continue. Another related criticism says that if the buddha nature was first impure and later becomes pure, then it must be T aranatha’s Refutation of impermanent. From the perspective of the sphere of S hentong as Vedanta absolute reality, it was not initially impure and later purified; whether it seems impure or pure depends upon the Some of the assertions made by the Shentong masters seem to disagree mindstreams of the individuals. Just because an individ- with the Madhyamaka view and agree with the statements of non- uals perspective changes, that does not mean the true Buddhists, particularly those of Vedanta. There have been many mis- nature changes. understandings and refutations of this philosophy in Tibet. In order When they argue that it is unreasonable for the mind-

Page 56 to clear up these misunderstandings, I will quote some points extracted stream of sentient beings to contain the primordial wis- from the teachings of Taranatha, which Jamgon Kongtrul quotes in the dom of the buddhas, they are contradicting the direct Treasury o f Knowledge. Taranatha says:9 statement of the Buddha: “Because the wisdom of the buddhas abides in the multitude of sentient beings.” Some scholars cite the Lankavatara Sutra, which says: They also disagree that sentient beings mindstreams If buddha nature has all the marks and signs, then isn’t it have the enlightened qualities. For example, they say that the same as the atman of the non-Buddhists? In reply, the if sentient beings have the ten powers in their mind- Buddha said, “It is not the same because it is emptiness.” streams, such as the power to discriminate what is appro- They say that the buddha nature is not true, because if priate and inappropriate, then it follows that they should it had all the signs and marks, it would be just like the non- be omniscient about what is appropriate and inappropri- Buddhist traditions. They say buddha nature is not estab- ate. This is a wrong understanding of what is being said. lished as anything; it is like space. We are not asserting that sentient beings’ mindstreams are I would reply that their identifying emptiness as mean- enlightened. If so, then saying that a buddha and the bud- ing “untrue and nothing whatsoever” is a fault coming from dha qualities abide in the mindstreams of sentient beings attachment to their own tenet system. In addition, the would be analogous to saying that if a buddha abides on a sutras say that this view is not the same as the non-Buddhist throne, then the throne must be omniscient. There is no view because the signs and marks are established as empti- way that the eight consciousnesses in the mindstreams of ness but are not established as nonexistent. Explaining the sentient beings are enlightened. The enlightenment that buddha nature with its radiant, perfect marks and signs as abides in sentient beings does not abide in the relative sense a provisional teaching is simply a mistaken, worldly mis- like the contents in a container. It abides as the true nature understanding. in the ultimate sense. 226 1 CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I 22J

ultimate truth. Seeing things as not truly established, as mere T he Main D if f e r e nc e s betw een absolute negations and vacuous emptiness, is true for the rela- R angtong and Shentong tive level, but the emptiness of the ultimate nature is not like In the Treasury o f Knowledge, Jamgon Kongtrul presents the main di that. The ultimate nature is primordial wisdom, which is ferences between Rangtong and Shentong. He says:10 devoid of subject-object discrimination, but is self-awareness. The Shentong tradition is very similar to the enlightened intent For both Rangtong and Shentong the relative level is of the great tantras. It has reached the pinnacle of Madhya- empty, maka, and its profound view is a bridge between the sutras and And in meditation, allfabricated extremes have ceased. the tantras. However, they differ in their terminology about whether dharmata is there or not there in post-meditation, And in the ultimate analysis, whether primordial wisdom E qual Respect for the Traditions of is truly established or not. N agarjuna and Asang a Many earlier and later Tibetan scholars, as well as many of the Indian Shentong says that i f the ultimate truth had no established panditas, dissociated this system from Madhyamaka and said it belongs nature in Chittamatra. Not only that, but they held this system as being gready And was a mere absolute negation, then it would be a

Page 57 inferior to the Madhyamaka treatises of Nagarjuna. vacuous nothingness. The Buddhas teaching is like the sky, and the two great charioteers, Instead, the ultimate is nondual, self-aware primordial Nagarjuna and Asanga, adorn it like the sun and moon. The scriptural wisdom. traditions of other Buddhist masters cannot compare with theirs. The Shentong presents a profound view which joins the sutras supreme paths of the two charioteers do not contradict each other, but and tantras. are supportive—one is mainly outer and the other is mainly inner. For both Rangtong and Shentong Madhyamaka, all phe- Therefore, it is good to study, contemplate, and meditate on them with nomena included in the relative truth are established as empti- equal dedication and respect. ness, and in meditation there is the cessation of all fabricated The great master Shakya Chogden also says that the teachings by extremes. Their views do not differ on these points. Asanga and Nagarjuna are both necessary. He says: However, in relation to post-medrtation, to clearly distinguish the tenet systems, merely in terms of the way they use ter- Without the treatises taught by Asanga, which include the system o f minology, Shentong says that the dharmata, the true nature, is the alayavijnana there, and Rangtong says the dharmata is not there. In the ulti- And the presentation o f the three types o f emptiness, mate analysis, using the reasoning that examines the ultimate, How could one explain the ground ofpurification and the purifier Shentong says nondual primordial wisdom is truly established taught in the vajrayana scriptures, and Rangtong says primordial wisdom is not truly established. A nd the presentation o f the three aspects o f outer, inner, and other These two statements delineate their main differences. in the Kalachakra Tantra? In relation to the three natures, the holders of the Shentong philosophy say that the imaginary nature and the dependent How could one explain nondual primordial wisdom and the way nature are the relative truth, and that the perfected nature is the everything is empty o f essence 228 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA | 229

Without the explanations o f the Prasangika and Svatantrika The Rangtong system is accepted as Madhyamaka by the great mas- treatises? ters of Prasangika and Svatantrika. Nagarjuna explains the emptiness of How could one quit clinging to the concept ofprofound and clear the Rangtong view by saying: primordial wisdom as being true, And give up clinging to the sublime deities? Whatever arises interdependently Is taught to be emptiness. The Madhyamaka philosophy of the Buddhas teachings has two Whatever is dependently imputed aspects: the ultimate essence of the definitive meaning as presented in Is the path o fMadhyamaka. the texts of Maitreya, and the ultimate essence of the definitive meaning as presented in the texts of Nagarjuna. In the first aspect of Madhya- The Shentong system is accepted as Madhyamaka by Asanga and his maka, which comes from Maitreyas texts, the primordial wisdom is free brother Vasubandhu. Maitreya explains the emptiness of the Shentong of the dualistic grasping of subject and object. This view is explained in view, with its three types of emptiness, when he says: his two “ornament” texts— the Ornament o f Clear Realization and the Ornament of the Mahay ana Sutras; in his two “distinguishing” texts— In relation to what exists, does not exist, and exists, Distinguishing the Middle and the Extremes and Distinguishing Phenomena That is the path o f the Middle Way. and the True Nature—as well as in the Sublime Continuum. The treatise

Page 58 Distinguishing the Middle and the Extremes is the text that establishes this The Tibetans think that from among the four philosophical schools of view as Madhyamaka philosophy, and Distinguishing Phenomena and the Buddhism—Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and Madhyamaka— True Nature is the text that shows how to bring this view into one s per- that the Madhyamaka school generally refers to the systems of Prasangika sonal practice. and Svatantrika. From among those two, Prasangika alone is superior. The second aspect of Madhyamaka, which comes from Nagarjunas Chandrakirti says: texts, negates all fabricated extremes, and it is simply an absolute negation or a negation in which nothing is affirmed. This view is explained That which was just explained [the Prasangika view] is very in Nagarjunas texts called the Collection o f Reasoning. However, the profound and frightening, and it is realized only by those understanding expressed in Nagarjunas Collection o f Praises is the same accustomed to it from past lives. Even those who study exten- as the teachings of Maitreya. sively cannot fully comprehend it. The main expounders of these two systems of Madhyamaka are Nagarjuna and Asanga. The Rangtong system establishes both the rela- There are two possible responses to this quote. The first merely con- tive truth and the absolute truth as empty of nature. The Shentong sys- firms the assertion. For instance, if someone uses the reasoning that tem establishes only the relative truth as empty of nature, and through Rangtong Madhyamaka is the highest Madhyamaka because Chan- that it automatically eliminates elaborations about the ultimate truth. drakirti says so, then one could say that Shentong Madhyamaka is the There are two other systems particularly worthy of note: that of Hari- highest because Asanga says so. Asanga says that the Rangtong view bhadra, whose Rangtong interpretation of Maitreyas Ornament of Clear understates the ultimate nature, making it less than it is, and this is the Realization was very influential; and the system of Jigme Chokyong view put forth by overbearing people who just talk loud. Therefore, if Shap, who interpreted Nagarjunas Collection o f Reasoning as Shentong. one tries to identify the most definitive meaning, the same authority All four of these systems are within the Madhyamaka path and their that is given to the texts of Chandrakirti to prove or disprove something treatises are considered to be authentic. could be given to the texts of Asanga. Actually, Asanga would be more 230 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I 231

authentic because in the sutras Buddha predicted that Asanga would be A sutra says: the master who defined the provisional and definitive meanings. Chan- The sphere o f beginningless time drakirti, who is a great Mahayana master, does not accept the Shen- Is the domain o f all phenomena. tong scriptures as part of Madhyamaka. But then the arya Asanga, who is also an undisputed master of Mahayana, says that Rangtong is not the A tantric scripture says: scriptural tradition of Madhyamaka. In conclusion, determining which philosophical school is the highest is basically a matter of debate. I pervade all o f this There is a second possible response to the quote from Chandrakirti. And do not see any other nature o f beings. When teaching the intention of Nagarjuna, the Rangtong system is And another tantra says: supreme; and when commenting on the intention of Maitreya, the Shentong system is the most profound. The scriptures and reasoning of Outside o f the precious mind each system cannot refute the other. Otherwise, we would have to give There are no buddhas or sentient beings. more weight to Asangas texts and logic, because he had reached the spiritual level of an arya, a bodhisattva on the bhumis, and he was pre- Rather than just reciting the words of the tantras, if you con- dicted in the sutras as the one to clarify the definitive meaning. Also, he template their meaning, you will understand that it is unrea- was the first to found a philosophical system within the Mahayana. sonable to say that Chittamatra and Vijnanavada are the same.

Page 59 Chandrakirti does not say that Asanga does not understand Madhya- maka; he merely says that Asanga does not explain the intention of It is clear that the Vijnanavada scriptures say that the dharmadhatu Nagarjuna. must be understood as nondual wisdom, as the natural dharmakaya. The Vijnanavada doctrine is not Chittamatra; it is a much higher view because it is also in the tantras. D ist inguishing V ijn a n v a d a and Chittamatra There are also quotations from the sutras that establish that the It is also relevant to distinguish between the Chittamatra school and the Shentong view is Madhyamaka. For instance, it says irí^the Ultimate Vijnanavada school. Establishing the Ttuo Systems as One states: Emptiness Sutra:

Many Tibetan scholars teach that the Chittamatra and Vijna- When a thing is not there, there is the emptiness of that thing, navada are the same in meaning, but those scholars are but what remains is there. This is the Madhyamaka path, the deluded in stating that awareness and primordial wisdom are view of emptiness, genuine and unmistaken. pervaded by the conceptual mind and mental factors, and deluded in not distinguishing between consciousness and wis- There are many similar quotations in the sutras. Also, it says in the dom. This misunderstanding comes from not having thor- Ornament of the Middle Way: oughly studied the terminology of the third-turning teachings. For those of you who assert that Chittamatra and Vijnana- Therefore, form and so on are the mind itself; vada are the same, it is said in scripture: They are not asserted to be external. Based on the Chittamatra view, Other than the dharmadhatu, the sphere o f reality. One should understand that there are no external, There are no existent phenomena. substantial things. 232 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA | 233

Having that system as a basis, then on top ofthat, Is clearly taught in the texts such as the Five Stages and One should fully understand selflessness. the Trilogy of Commentaries by Bodhisattvas.

In the Entrance to the Three Kayos, Nagamitra says: For the Madhyamaka that comes from the tantras, the most important aspect is nondual wisdom, which makes Tantra Madhyamaka more in accord with Yogachara Madhyamaka. That which is called “the path o fMadhyamaka” The nature of the mind, which is clear light, free of all fabri- Is none other than mere awareness. cations and characteristics, is the self-aware, true nature of all Once one has analyzed with reasoning, phenomena, and it is timelessly and spontaneously that way Nothing else is acceptable. This understanding is clearly elaborated in the third-turning teachings of the Buddha, and it is established and practiced in And Shantarakshita says in the Ornament o f the Middle Way: the tantras. Furthermore, being naturally clear light and distinguished Here I will explain the two truths, by great bliss, the emptiness aspect is designated by the sylla- In conjunction with valid cognition and scripture, ble E and the compassion aspect by the syllable VAM. This As they are taught by Maitreya and Asanga prisdne wisdom is the union of clarity and emptiness, bliss and And agreed upon by Nagarjuna. emptiness, and so forth. This meaning is clarified and elabo- Page 60 rated in tantric commentaries such as the Five Stages and the In this way, both Shentong and Rangtong are free of the fault of not Trilogy o f Commentaries by Bodhisattvas, and should be under- being Madhyamaka. They accord in espousing a view free of all fabri- stood through those teachings. cated extremes. Not only that, but in most schools of Tibetan Bud- dhism there were masters who were lineage holders of both systems, and The general understanding of Tantra Madhyamaka has two aspects: nobody looked upon them as having wrong views. one related with creation stage practice, and one related with completion stage practice. Within the creation stage, there are also two aspects: first, the bases for generating the deity; and second, after the deity has Tantra Madhyamaka been accomplished, the way of concluding without fabrication. First, the bases for generating the deity are the seed syllables and symbolic As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Jamgön Kongtrul broadly implements, which arise from nondual primordial wisdom. They arise categorizes Madhyamaka into Sutra Madhyamaka and Tantra Madhya- from emptiness and are no other than the dharmadhatu wisdom. This maka. Having discussed Sutra Madhyamaka, we will complete this chap- view accords with the teaching of Shentong Madhyamaka. ter with a synopsis of Tantra Madhyamaka. Kongtrul Rinpoche says in In the second aspect of the creation stage, the way of concluding the the Treasury o f Knowledge: accomplishment of the deity without fabrication, one begins by estab- In the profound view of Tantra Madhyamaka, the nature lishing the deity as clarity-emptiness. In this context, clarity refers to o f all phenomena clearly seeing all the characteristics and details of the deity and its man- Is naturally clear light, distinguished by great bliss. dala, and emptiness refers to not conceptualizing or clinging to the The primordial wisdom that is the union of clarity- deity at all. If one clings to the characteristics of clear appearance, emptiness and bliss-emptiness one will not transcend samsara. On the other hand, it is not simply a 234 I CHAPTER 6 RANGTONG AND SHENTONG MADHYAMAKA I 235

matter of stopping thoughts. Through the mere absence of thoughts and Tantra Madhyamaka is in die perceiving subject or practitioner; one can transcend suffering, but one will not reach the state of union, there is no difference in terms of the perceived objects, which are in so that approach is still poisonous. themselves free of all extremes. One needs to practice clarity and emptiness in union. While the To summarize the main points of all the Madhyamaka schools, Jamgon deity clearly appears it is empty, and while the deity is empty it clearly Kongtrul says in the Treasury o f Knowledge: appears. In the pith instructions, particularly in the Sakya lineage, Whatever appears in relative truth is not denied, the union of clarity and emptiness is called “the inseparability of sam- And the natural state is free o f all fabricated extremes. sara and nirvana.” At that time, one sees perceived objects as the This is the ground. union of appearance and emptiness and the perceiving consciousness as the union of clarity and emptiness. When one arises from this stage With profound wisdom, one abandons all grasping at of meditation, without losing the pride of the deity, one then engages characteristics, in the outer yogic practices. This is an overview of the creation stage And with compassion, one accumulates what is positive practice. for the benefit o f others. This is the path. Next, the Tantra Madhyamaka of the completion stage practice also By accomplishing the peace o f the dharmakaya, and has two parts: letting go of attachment to the creation stage, and the through the form kayas, real wisdom of the completion stage. The first is when the entire man- One acts without concepts to benefit beings. This is

Page 61 dala of the deity and environment is no longer maintained but is dis- the result. solved, and the practitioner remains in a state without reference point. A ll the teachings o f Madhyamaka are condensed in This is the same approach as in Rangtong Madhyamaka, and it is this way. supreme in dissolving the elaboration of thoughts. However, this is not the real wisdom of the completion stage practice because it is not the All the main points of the various systems of Madhyamaka experience of self-aware primordial wisdom. can be summarized in this way. By not denying any of the rel- The real wisdom of the completion stage has three aspects: what is to ative appearances, one is free of nihilism. Since the natural be experienced, the methods through which one experiences it, and the state, the ultimate truth, is free of all fabricated extremes, then stages of actualizing it. What is experienced is self-awareness simultane- one is free of eternalism. This is the Ground Madhyamaka, ous with the wisdom of great bliss. The method through which this is the union of the two truths. experienced is the process of blessing oneself, also called the wisdom of Through the wisdom of prajna, by not holding on to any self-awareness. This is nonconceptual, undeluded wisdom, which is the phenomena or characteristics, one is free of eternalism. view free of poison. Through compassion, by accumulating a great collection of However, simply generating this experience does not mean that one positive deeds for the benefit of others, one is free of nihilism. has reached the level of an arya or the first bhumi, because this is just This is the Path Madhyamaka, which is the union of the two the example wisdom. This experience is called the wisdom that is the accumulations. union of bliss and emptiness, or the wisdom that is the coemergent Through attaining the dharmakaya, which is the pacifica- melting in bliss. This explanation is according to the general tantras; its tion of all conceptual complexity, one is free of eternalism. special presentation is found in the Kalachakra Tantra, but that will not Through the endless activity of the two form kayas to bene- be explained here. The main difference between Sutra Madhyamaka fit both supreme and ordinary beings, one is free of nihilism. The Middle from Beginning to End 231

Illusory Lions Killing Illusory Elephants: Empty Reasonings for Liberation Some Essential Points of Centrist Reasoning The Center of the Sunlit Sky The root of all Centrist arguments is the praise to the Buddha that N›g›rjuna proclaims at the very beginning of his Fundamental Verses on Centrism: Madhyamaka in the Kagyü Tradition I bow down to the perfect Buddha, The supreme orator, who taught That dependent origination Karl Brunnhölzl Is without ceasing and without arising, Without extinction and without permanence, Without coming and without going, Not different and not one. It is the peace in which discursiveness is at complete peace. Including a Translation of Pawo Rinpoche’s Commentary on the Knowledge Section of ⁄›ntideva’s The Entrance Accordingly, there are four root arguments: to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life (Bodhicary›vat›ra) 1) Outer and inner entities are without ceasing in the end and without abiding Page 62 in the middle, because they do not arise in the first place. 2) Outer and inner entities are without extinction, because there is no permanence. 3) Outer and inner entities are without coming, because going is not established. 4) Outer and inner entities are not established as different, because there is no entity that is one.

All other Madhyamaka arguments, such as the five great Centrist reasonings, derive from these four basic arguments. It is said that the negation of the eight reference points—arising, ceasing, permanence, extinction, going, coming, oneness, and difference—in the opening verses of The Fundamental Verses represents a brief synopsis of both this treatise and Centrist reasoning in general. For the negation of oneness and difference is nothing other than the reasoning of the freedom from unity and multiplicity, while the six other negations of arising and so on primarily depend on the negation of oneness and difference. There are three essential steps in all these reasonings that analyze for the ultimate:

1) One picks a certain phenomenon, such as a book, as one’s basis of attribution or analysis. Snow Lion Publications 2) One searches for a nature of this phenomenon that is not self-contradictory. ithaca, new york ✦ boulder, colorado 3) Within this basis of attribution, one looks for something, such as its attributes, that is contradictory to its nature. 232 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 233

Hence, from among all Centrist arguments, the following two are the main tence of what does not exist. Therefore, as far as Centrists are concerned, “real exis- reasonings in that they respectively correspond to steps (2) and (3): tence” is just something that occurs in a psychological or subjective sense but certainly does not exist in any ontological or objective sense. Consequently, the force a) the reasoning of the freedom from unity and multiplicity in order to analyze of Centrist negation strikes only the realm of our fixed ideas and not something a nature that would appear on any hypothetical level of real or substantial existence. More- b) the vajra sliver reasoning in order to analyze the attributes over, as was elaborated above, the words and concepts in Centrist reasonings are as unreal as the words and concepts that they negate. However, from our mental The many other enumerations of arguments that are explained in Centrist perspective, they still serve their purpose of making us let go of our rigid ideas. texts are merely branches of these two reasonings. In particular, the reasoning of Centrist reasonings do not negate mere seeming arising or existence in a categor- the freedom from unity and multiplicity is the root of all reasonings that negate ical way, nor do they take away the possibility of conventionally experiencing real existence. both single and many things in our everyday lives. Instead, these reasonings tackle These reasonings are explained in detail below, but to briefly illustrate the the wrong notions of real arising, real existence, real unity, and real multiplicity. above three essential points, we may start, for example, by taking a book as the As for the actual techniques of reasoned analysis, the standard framework of object of our analysis. When searching for the book’s nature, initially, we might formulating Centrist reasonings is to present dilemmas or even tetralemmas of think that it really exists and that it is its nature to be a real unity. However, such mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities for something, such as existence an assumed nature of being a unity is self-contradictory, since a book can be bro- or arising, which then are refuted one by one. For example, the reasoning of the ken down into infinitely many parts. If we then think that the book must be a freedom from unity and multiplicity is presented as a dilemma, that is, really real multiplicity, this is also self-contradictory, since we cannot find any real uni- existing things can only exist as a real unity or as a real multiplicity. There is no ties in it that could serve as building blocks for a real multiplicity. And since third possibility, since all existing phenomena are included in these two mutu- Page 63 there is no third possibility for the book to really exist, we have to admit that the ally exclusive and exhaustive categories of existence. only nature of this book that is not self-contradictory is that it does not exist From among the five Centrist reasonings, the three reasonings that negate real either as a real unity or as a real multiplicity. In other words, the book does not arising go even further and investigate four possible ways of arising, such as whether really exist altogether. Finally, we look for possible attributes of this book—such things arise from themselves, from something other, from both, or from neither, as that it really arises—that are contradictory to its nature of lacking real existence. which is to say, without any cause. These four possibilities are mutually exclusive This means that if we were to find some real arising of the book, this would obvi- and cover all theoretically imaginable ways in which things might arise.551 Thus, ously contradict its nature of lacking real existence. However, under analysis, we through the refutation of each one of these possibilities, it is shown that things do will find that the book does not really arise from itself, nor from something other, not really arise at all. The same principle is applied to other issues, such as whether nor from both itself and something other, and also not without any cause. In a cause produces a result that is already existent, nonexistent, both, or neither; summary, the book does not really arise at all, which perfectly well accords with whether an object exists before, after, or simultaneously with the consciousness that its nature of lacking real existence. In this way, the nature of this book (its lack perceives it; and whether some assumed productive potential in a cause is identical of real existence) and its attribute (its lack of real arising) are found neither to be to the cause or different from it. On the not so serious side of things, probably the self-contradictory nor to contradict each other. shortest summary of this approach is to say that the classic Madhyamaka statement Although the actual Centrist reasonings always negate, their point is not to to which all others can be reduced is “neither nor, nor neither.” negate away something that really exists, since something really existent cannot be Within this framework of analysis, its actual result—elimination of reifica- negated anyway. They also do not remove or negate something nonexistent. Since tion—can be achieved either through using formal probative arguments with the a nonexistent cannot be an object, there is no object to which to refer in the first three modes of a correct reason (also called “autonomous reasoning”) or through place. “Negating” just means to demonstrate that things do not exist in the real drawing unwanted consequences from other people’s positions. Somewhat sim- and solid way that we think they do. Thus, the object of negation of reasoning is plified, one could say that autonomous reasoning in this sense refers to any pro- not something that does not exist anyway (such as a truly existing nature of bative argument with the correct three modes that says “how things are” (either things). Technically, the object of negation is merely the mental image that conventionally or ultimately). On the other hand, absurd consequences do not appears for the reifying conceptions of people who mistakenly believe in the exis- have all three—or even none—of the correct modes, whether they include a rea- 234 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 235

son or not. This means that they are just consequences that follow from another sonings that negate arising are formulated in terms of the individual moments of position that is already wrong in the first place. Thus, they are logically correct, the process of causality, such as considering the relationship between the last but their explicit meaning must be false, since it is just an absurd result of a pre- moment of the cause that immediately precedes the first moment of its specific vious false statement. result or whether there exists any simultaneous moment of cause and result dur- For example, if someone holds that a vase is permanent, this wrong notion may ing which there is some causal interaction between them. be dispelled by stating what is correct and giving a proper reason for it, such as “A As for the interaction of this approach of negating mutually exclusive and vase is not permanent, because it arises from causes and conditions and thus must exhaustive alternatives with the subjective side of our mind that grapples with disintegrate at some point (such as now when I let it drop).” Here, the three modes such reasonings, Centrists just utilize the natural structure of our black-and-white are established. Alternatively, one may draw absurd consequences from the posi- thinking, since this is precisely the way in which dualistic clinging operates. Usu- tion that a vase is permanent, such as saying, “Then it follows that a vase neither ally, when we find that something does not exist or is not permanent, we imme- arises in the first place nor ceases to exist later.” Obviously, in this consequence, diately think that it then must be nonexistent or impermanent. On the the question of the three modes does not apply, since there is no reason. Some- checkerboard of our dualistic mind that is grounded in really existing things, this times the opponent’s position is added as the reason to such a consequence, such may make sense in that the exclusion of one of these possibilities necessarily implies as by saying, “It follows that a vase does not arise and cease, because—according the presence of the other. However, from the perspective of the Centrist view of to your claim—it is permanent.” In that case, from the perspective of the oppo- all appearances’ fundamental lack of any real existence, all such possibilities as nent, all three modes are established, since a vase is claimed to be permanent and permanent, impermanent, existent, and nonexistent are just vain attempts by our whatever is permanent necessarily does not arise and cease. Therefore, the oppo- dualistic fixation to hold on to something within the infinite openness of mind’s nent must accept this unwanted consequence of his or her position. From the natural expanse, which cannot be boxed in in any way. In other words, Centrist perspective of correct worldy conventions, when regarding a vase as an imperma- reasonings beat our fixating mind with its own weapons. When dualistic mind Page 64 nent phenomenon, only the second and third modes are established (which is pre- progressively analyzes its own dualistic structure and function, this inevitably leads cisely the correct but, in relation to such an impermanent phenomenon, absurd to its own collapse altogether. When it sees all its reference points dwindle, includ- consequence that whatever is permanent necessarily does not arise and cease). ing itself as that which creates these reference points, it simply goes out of busi- From the perspective of Centrists, ultimately also this is not established, since nei- ness. Thus, the radical and relentless use of Centrist dilemmas and tetralemmas is ther a vase nor something permanent exists and thus cannot be said either to arise a deliberate, systematic, and—in a sense—therapeutic technique to pull each piece and cease or not to. There are also many consequences in which all three modes of the patchwork of our two-dimensional referential carpet from under our feet are not even conventionally established, for example, the consequence “It follows and explore the nondimensional, boundless space of mind’s true nature. that things do not arise from themselves, since their arising would be pointless and endless” that is drawn from the assertion that things arise from themselves.552 Disillusionment with Phenomenal Identity All Centrists agree and emphasize that their formulations of negations or The Five Great Madhyamaka Reasonings absurd consequences in no way imply their reverses or anything else, for that matter. Thus, they are all exclusively nonimplicative negations. For example, to In general, various Centrist masters present many different arguments that deter- state, “Things do not arise from something other, since then everything could mine phenomenal identitylessness. In the system of N›g›rjuna and his spiritual arise from everything”553 does not imply that things either arise from themselves, heirs, these are mainly “the five great Centrist reasonings”: from both themselves and others, or without a cause. This is further evidenced by the fact that Centrists explicitly negate all of these possibilities one by one, and 1) the negation through the analysis of an intrinsic nature: the reasoning of free- there is no fifth possibility. dom from unity and multiplicity Another characteristic feature of Centrist reasonings is that they often analyze 2) the negation through the analysis of causes: the vajra sliver reasoning554 things in terms of infinitesimal parts and moments in time. For example, in the 3) the negation through the analysis of results: the reasoning that negates an aris- reasoning of the freedom from unity and multiplicity, one seeks for the final, ing of existents and nonexistents smallest parts of things that could represent a hypothetical indivisible unity. Most 4) the negation through the analysis of both causes and results: the reasoning of the arguments and consequences in the context of the three great Centrist rea- that negates arising from the four possibilities 236 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 237

5) the analysis of mere appearances: the reasoning of dependent origination own nature. Therefore, they all serve to relinquish the first extreme of existence. The fifth reasoning simultaneously eliminates the extremes of existence and Scriptural Sources for the Five Great Reasonings nonexistence. Moreover, it induces certainty about the unity of emptiness and As for their scriptural references in the sÒtras, the first of these reasonings is, for dependent origination. example, found in The SÒtra of the Arrival in Laºka,555 the second in The Rice In what follows, these five reasonings are explained through a three-part rea- Seedling SÒtra,556 and the fifth in The SÒtra Requested by the N›g› King “The Cool soning (inference for oneself) and the three modes of a correct reason that were One”557 as well as in The SÒtra on Dependent Origination.558 The third and fourth explained above. To reiterate, each such reasoning has a subject, a predicate, and reasonings are found in various other sÒtras. a reason. Its validity is tested by checking the three modes of subject property, In Centrist treatises, the reasoning of the freedom from unity and multiplic- positive entailment, and negative entailment. ity is extensively explained in both ⁄›ntarak˝ita’s Ornament of Centrism559 and ⁄rıgupta’s (seventh century) Commentary on Entering True Reality. It is also used I. The analysis of a nature: the reasoning of freedom in N›g›rjuna’s Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness,560 ﬁryadeva’s Four Hundred Verses,561 from unity and multiplicity and the first volume of KamalaŸıla’s Stages of Meditation.562 A. The formulation of the reasoning The explanation of the vajra sliver reasoning is one of the main themes in All phenomena—such as sprouts—do not really exist, because they lack unity and N›g›rjuna’s Fundamental Verses and also forms the major portion of the sixth multiplicity, just as a reflection in a mirror. chapter of Candrakırti’s Entrance into Centrism. It is taught in detail in the ninth chapter of ⁄›ntideva’s Entrance to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life 563 and also pre- B. The three modes of the reason sented in KamalaŸıla’s Stages of Meditation.564 The subject of this reasoning is just mere appearances without examination and As for the negation of the arising of existents and nonexistents, it is taught in analysis. The subject property that applies to this subject is as follows: These mere Page 65 the three just-mentioned texts by N›g›rjuna,565 Candrakırti,566 and ⁄›ntideva.567 appearances are not a real unity, because they possess many parts. Each of these It is also mentioned in The Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness.568 parts can in turn be broken down into many subparts. Since this process can be The negation of arising from the four possibilities is found in Jñ›nagarbha’s infinitely repeated, there is not a single smallest particle that is a really existent Distinction between the Two Realities569 and explained in detail in its autocom- and indivisible unity. Without even one real building block, how could you put mentary570 and the subcommentary by ⁄›ntarak˝ita571 as well as in Haribhadra’s together many so as to create a really existent thing? Consequently, there can be Illumination of The Ornament of Clear Realization.572 It is also used in KamalaŸıla’s nothing that is a real multiplicity, because there is no real unity to begin with that Illumination of Centrism573 and his Establishing that all Phenomena are Without could build up such a multiplicity. To be sure, this reasoning does not negate the Nature.574 mere conventionality that one thing has many parts. The point here is that nei- The reasoning of dependent origination is the major theme of N›g›rjuna’s ther the thing in question nor its parts really exist by themselves. Thus, what is Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness. It also appears in his Rebuttal of Objections,575 in denied is not the mere appearance of unity and multiplicity on the level of seem- Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning,576 in several chapters of his Fundamental Verses,577 and ing reality but the existence of any unity or multiplicity that is really established in Candrakırti’s Entrance into Centrism.578 and findable as such. The first known summary of four of these five reasonings (excepting the For example, our body consists of its head, torso, and limbs. The legs can be fourth) is found in Bh›vaviveka’s Summary of the Meaning of Centrism (lines further broken down into the thighs, knees, calves, ankles, and feet. The feet can 14–17). Later, AtıŸa gave a more detailed overview of the same four reasonings in be divided into the heel, the toes, and so on. The toes are just an assembly of sin- his autocommentary on verses 48–52 of The Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment.579 gle knuckles consisting of bone, cartilage, blood vessels, and so forth. Examining KamalaŸıla explains all five in his Illumination of Centrism.580 the microscopic level of each of these constituents, one arrives at their molecu- lar, atomic, and subatomic structures. The Detailed Explanation of the Five Great Reasonings At various points in this process, different Buddhists and non-Buddhists claim Together, these reasonings refute the extremes of existence and nonexistence. that there are smallest (sub)atomic particles that cannot be broken down further. Since our clinging to real existence is far stronger than our clinging to nonexis- Thus, what is particularly refuted through this reasoning is the existence of such tence, the first four reasonings eliminate the imputation that things exist by their infinitesimal particles, which often are regarded as partless and dimensionless, 238 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 239

similar to a mathematical point. In addition, they are said to be the building there is no cause. The fourth possibility of things arising from something other— blocks of all coarse material phenomena. However, if these particles do not have the position of most other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools—is refuted any parts or spatial extensions, they cannot aggregate with others of their kind, through Centrist texts alone. since there are no surfaces or sides to contact anything else. Also, even many such The vajra sliver reasoning analyzes arising by taking the example of a seed (the dimensionless particles could never add up to some larger phenomenon that is cause) growing into a sprout (the result) and investigating their exact relationship. perceptible by our senses, since even a million times zero spatial extension is still For example, we will search for the precise time when the seed is no longer a zero spatial extension. On the other hand, if these particles could align with oth- seed and becomes a sprout instead. ers in order to build up larger three-dimensional things, they would have to have at least six sides—front, rear, left, right, top, and bottom—to allow for any form A. The formulation of the reasoning of contact with other particles in order to create a three-dimensional object. This, A sprout is without arising, because it is without arising from itself, from others, however, contradicts the claim that these particles are partless and extensionless. from both, and from neither, just like an appearance in a dream. Thus, since no indivisible units or smallest possible particles can be found, there are no real multiplicities of phenomena that are built by them.581 B. The three modes of the reason The positive entailment here means that the reason (whatever lacks real unity The positive and negative entailment cannot go beyond these four extremes of and multiplicity) may only be found in the homologous set of the predicate arising: Whatever does not arise from itself, from something other, from both, (everything that does not really exist). In other words, whatever is neither a real or from neither (that is, without any cause) necessarily does not arise at all. On unity nor a real multiplicity must necessarily not really exist. The reverse of this— the other hand, if things were to arise, they necessarily would have to arise either the negative entailment—is that if something really exists,582 then it must neces- from themselves, from something other, from both, or from neither. There are sarily be either a real unity or a real multiplicity, because unity and multiplicity no other possibilities. This is the case whether one looks at it from the perspec- Page 66 are mutually exclusive and there is no third possibility. This is the law of the tive of analyzing for real existence or just in terms of mere arising. It should be excluded middle that is accepted by all realists. clear, however, that this reasoning does not deny the mere appearance of some- From among the three doors to liberation, this reasoning teaches the door of thing arising on the bare experiential level, where, because of ignorance, it seems emptiness. as though things arise. Here, establishing the subject property has four parts, since there are four pos- II. The analysis of causes: the vajra sliver reasoning sibilities of arising to be negated. The vajra sliver reasoning bears this name because—just as a vajra is indestructi- ble and at the same time capable of destroying everything else—it is able to shat- 1. Establishing the reason that entities do not arise from themselves ter the huge rock mountain of wrong views that cling to real existence, while The classic example in Centrist texts for people who assert that things arise from being completely unassailable itself. It is explained as it is found in The Funda- themselves are the Enumerators. They claim, “A sprout is merely a manifestation mental Verses on Centrism: of the sole cosmic cause, which is the permanent primal substance. This really existing primal substance is the sprout’s nature. Therefore, this sprout arises from Not from themselves, not from something other, its own nature, which is a permanent entity.” By this, they mean that cause and Not from both, and not without a cause— result are one and the same in terms of their nature, substance, and time. At any place and any time, This position, however, leads to absurd consequences. For example, the same All entities lack arising.583 thing would be both the phenomenon that is produced and the phenomenon that produces it. This means that the sprout would be identical to both the primal Three of these four possibilities of arising are refuted by all Buddhist texts that substance and the seed (the latter being just an expression of this primal sub- deal with Centrism or valid cognition in general.584 These positions are exempli- stance). Furthermore, it would not be justified that the seed from which the fied by the Indian non-Buddhist schools of the Enumerators, who assert that sprout has arisen ceases to exist, since this seed is nothing but an expression of the things arise from themselves; the Jainas, who assert that things arise from both permanent primal substance. Consequently, the seed would either permanently themselves and something other; and the Mundanely Minded, who assert that exist or arise all the time. However, if the seed as the cause of the sprout does not 240 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 241

cease, then one would not find its result—the sprout—since results can only The Enumerators may continue, “There are two different phases in the process of appear after their causes. In addition, if cause and result—seed and sprout—are arising. If a vase is made out of clay, it is the unmanifest vase in its state of being a the same and if the one arises from the other, the sprout should look exactly the lump of clay—the cause—that arises as a manifest vase—the result—later. Of course, same as the seed. If the seed, however, loses its own nature and turns into some- we do not think that the vase that is already clearly manifest as the result arises again. thing else—a sprout different in color and shape—it cannot have a real and Therefore, there is a difference between these two phases of the vase in that it is either unchangeable nature of its own. clearly manifest or not.” In general, in the context of causality, the result of a specific cause can only be However, if the vase already existed as an entity, it would be utterly pointless perceived once this cause has ceased. However, if seed and sprout are not differ- for it to arise again. On the other hand, if “it” arose from its state of not being ent, once the seed ceases, the sprout should also disappear. Or, once the sprout clearly manifest, then it would be nothing other than a nonexistent that newly is visible, the seed too should be visible at the same time. Both possibilities con- arises. Here, the Enumerators do not explicitly assert that the clearly manifest tradict the notion of causality altogether. In addition, if things were to arise from result as such does not exist at the time of the cause, but this is what follows from themselves, all the distinct things that are agents and the objects upon which their claim that it becomes clearly manifest only later. In fact, they deny that the these agents act would be one and the same. Thus, that things arise from them- result is entirely nonexistent at the time of the cause and that it arises completely selves is neither reasonable on the ultimate level nor accepted on the level of con- anew. However, implicitly, this is exactly what their position boils down to, ventional worldly reality. because by claiming that the result exists as a potential, they just obscure the dis- The Enumerators also say, “In general, only such things that exist already at the tinction between the nonexistence of the result at the time of the cause and its time of their causes arise, whereas previously nonexistent things can never arise. later existence. Saying that it is not manifest at the time of the cause amounts to For example, sesame oil comes forth from sesame seeds when they are ground, saying that it does not exist. Through talking about “the unmanifest vase in its because it already existed before in the seeds. The reason that sesame oil does not state of being a lump of clay,” the Enumerators simply blend two different things Page 67 appear from grinding sand is that it does not exist in sand.” The basic assumption into one, for a lump of clay is clearly not a vase. For one, a lump of clay cannot behind this statement is the impossibility of something arising from nothing. be said to be a vase, because it does not manifest as a vase. Nor does an “unman- Hence, a result cannot arise later without existing at the time of its specific cause. ifest vase” make sense, because then it would equally follow that it is an unman- Moreover, there are no other causes apart from its specific cause either that could ifest cup, an unmanifest statue, or whatever else could be made from that clay. transform a result that does not exist in the first place into an existent result later. This would lead to the consequence that not only a vase but all these other Thus, the Enumerators say, the result must preexist at the time of the cause. unmanifest things too should arise from this one lump of clay. However, if things—that is to say, results—arise from themselves alone, it Moreover, if the result existed at the time of the cause, it would have to be implicitly follows that they need no other factors for their arising. So why does observable at this point. However, from that, it would follow that an apple tree one have to struggle to grind sesame seeds or farm, since the harvest already exists can be perceived in an apple seed or milk in the grass eaten by a cow. One of the when the seeds are present? In addition, if the result is the same as its cause, why classic consequences is that an ant should carry around an elephant, the elephant should the result arise again, since it exists already? In general, if a thing is not yet being the karmic result of the existence as an ant to become manifest in one of present, it does not exist as a result. If it is already present, it is pointless for it to the ant´s future rebirths. In fact, the entirety of all infinite results of a given cause arise again. And if the result would still arise even though it exists already, then over time should then be observable at the same time in this cause. On the other it would have to arise endlessly. As Buddhap›lita’s commentary on Fundamen- hand, if the result is not observable at all at the time of the cause, how can it be tal Verses I.1 says: said to exist? There is no third alternative of saying that the result is partially existent, Entities do not arise from their own intrinsic nature, because their although this is precisely what the Enumerators (and many others) try to do by arising would be pointless and because they would arise endlessly. For their formulation of an “unmanifest vase.” However, even if there were such a entities that [already] exist as their own intrinsic nature, there is no partial existence of a vase, what would it look like? Even a partial existence should need to arise again. If they were to arise despite existing [already], there be observable at the time of the cause, but this is not the case. And if the result would be no time when they do not arise; [but] that is also not asserted were partially existent at the time of the cause, where would the lacking portions [by the Enumerators].585 of its complete existence come from? In general, it is impossible to identify a 242 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 243

distinct point in time at which the result turns from nonexistence into existence. is no third possibility. Thus, being other is not a question of degree: Things are It is also impossible to identify distinct points in time that are related to a grad- other whether they differ in all or in just one of their many features. Thus, all sim- ual increase in the result´s existence, such as “Up to here it exists at about 30 per- ilar things must necessarily be different from each other, since what is identical cent or 50 percent, and from here onward it exists at 100 percent.” Nor does it is not similar. In other words, the categories of same and different are mutually make any sense that the result would leap from some degree of partial existence exclusive and exhaustive. to full existence in the next moment. In addition, the most fundamental prob- One of the consequences of this clear delineation is that if things could arise lem in that respect lies in the Enumerators´ own claim that the primal substance from causes that are other than themselves, it would absurdly follow that anything as the single and final cosmic cause is not something perceptible in the first place. could arise from anything. For example, deep darkness could originate even from In a very general sense, when it is said that all manifestations are potentially bright light. As The Entrance into Centrism says: present in and as the primal substance and just become manifest at certain times, this would lead to the conclusion that all possible future results exist right from If something were to originate in dependence on something other than it, the very beginning. Furthermore, since all causes and results are said to be iden- Well, then utter darkness could spring from flames tical, at any given point in time, all possible results within the past, present, and And everything could arise from everything, future of the universe as well as all their causes would have to exist simultaneously. Because everything that does not produce [a specific result] is the same in being other [than it].588 2. Establishing the reason that entities do not arise from something other (the second part of establishing the subject property of the vajra The reasons for this consequence are as follows: If we consider a wheat seed and sliver reasoning) a rose seed, they are equal in that they are both something other than a rose Our usual idea about causes and results is that things arise from something other sprout, and, in terms of real things, their being other than the rose sprout is Page 68 than themselves. On the level of worldly seeming reality, both Buddhist and something that is established through their own specific natures. Thus, since a non-Buddhist realists586 say, “We agree that entities do not arise from themselves, wheat seed and a rose seed are equally other than a rose sprout, either both or nei- but their arising from something other is established through valid cognition. ther of them should be able to produce the rose sprout. There are reasons for this. Factually concordant types of consciousness arise from We usually think that such phenomena as a rose seed and a rose sprout have the four conditions,587 and in general most things arise from causal and dominant a close connection, such as sharing some similarities or being in the same con- conditions. Both causes and results are not just mere mental imputations, but tinuum, or that the seed as the specific cause has some causal efficacy or poten- they are established from the object’s own side. The fact that they arise with- tial to produce the sprout as its specific result. On the other hand, we think that stands analysis. You cannot simply reason them away.” there is no such connection between a wheat seed and a rose sprout and even less There are many reasonings to negate this position, but they are all contained so between fire and water or light and darkness. However, none of these notions in two: of a relation between certain phenomena that we consider as causes and results solves the issue of arising from something other. They just perpetuate the mere a. Arising from something other is impossible. assumption that things arise from something other: Even if causes and results b. In the context of arising, something other is in itself impossible. are similar and in the same continuum, or if there were a certain productive potential in some things—the specific causes—and not in others, this does not a. Arising from something other is impossible. change the basic fact that causes are still other than their results. Thus, the same Much confusion regarding what is “same” or “other” comes from our very loose consequences as above apply. and vague use of these notions, such as saying, “other but still similar or same” Moreover, when analyzed, there is just as much “causal connection” between or “a little bit other” as opposed to “completely other.” For example, we may a rose seed and a rose sprout as between fire and water: none whatsoever. For think that, compared to ice, fire is “more other” than water. In the context of there is never any time in the process of arising when the cause actually meets the Centrist reasoning, the notion of “other” is as strict and literal as can be: Things result so that the cause or its productive potential could have any effect on the are either the same or different. Either cause and result are assumed to be iden- result. As long as the cause exists, the result is not yet present, and as soon as the tical (as the Enumerators state) or they have to be different, that is, other. There result appears, the cause has necessarily ceased. So when would the cause unfold 244 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 245

its productive potential? The cause can obviously not unfold it when the cause than another one? Also, if there is no thing that is really established in itself in any itself does not exist. If it were an existent cause that displays this productive way, how could there be something other whose otherness depends on this first potential, this would still not make the result appear. It cannot appear during the nonexistent thing? As The Fundamental Verses says: existence of the cause, since cause and result cannot exist simultaneously. Oth- erwise, they could not function as cause and result in the first place. In order to If an entity in itself does not exist, speak of causality, the cause has to precede the result.589 So if the cause must be An entity other [than it] does not exist either.592 first and cannot exist simultaneously with the result, there is no connection between cause and result and also no chance for a hypothetical productive poten- The refutation of things arising from something other is likewise accomplished tial of the cause to bring about or interact with the result, since they never meet. by analyzing the four conditions. They include all possibilities of arising from Therefore, eventually, this position of realists that things arise from something something that is other than the result. The result, however, is found in none of other entails the self-contradictory consequence that a sprout cannot arise from the four. As The Fundamental Verses says: a seed, because—according to them—seed and sprout are something other through their respective specific natures. Conditions are fourfold: Causal, objective, b. In the context of arising, something other is impossible. Immediate, and dominant. In the context of a result arising from a cause, the notion of “otherness” is alto- There is no fifth condition. gether inappropriate. The reason for this is that in order to speak of two things as being other, they must exist at the same time. To elaborate, in terms of oth- The nature of entities erness that is based on really existing and substantial things and does not just Does not exist in conditions and such.593 Page 69 refer to a mental image of something that is not present, there have to be two distinct things in the first place that can be contrasted as being “other.” These can Thus, the nature of a rice sprout does not exist in any of its conditions. It does only be two phenomena that are simultaneously observable as existing in the not exist in its causal conditions (water and manure), nor in its object condition present, such as the left and the right horn of a cow or two persons in the same (the harvest), nor in its immediate condition (the last moment of the rice seed), room. This then excludes the possibility of cause and result being other, since they nor in its dominant condition (the person who planted the seed). are by definition never simultaneous. Saying it in reverse, nonsimultaneous things cannot be other. Thus, since the Causal Conditions result is not present at the time when the cause exists, at the time of the cause, If causal conditions, such as water and manure, intrinsically have functions or there is just one phenomenon (the cause itself) and not two, that is, no result that productive capacities—such as giving rise to a sprout—they would have to pro- could be identified or perceived as other than this cause. The same principle duce sprouts all the time. And if they do not have any such functions or capaci- applies to the time when the result exists and the cause has ceased. Consequently, ties, there could never be any production from them. In this case, however, why if cause and result were other, they would have to be simultaneous, but this con- would they be presented as conditions for a result at all? Moreover, N›g›rjuna says, tradicts the process of causality. The simultaneity of cause and result is also the relationship between conditions and their assumed functions cannot be settled: refuted through the examination of whether the result that is produced already exists or does not exist at the time of the cause.590 Thus, The Lucid Words says: Function is not something that entails conditions. [Conventionally, however,] there is no function that does not entail Entities also do not arise from something other, because there is noth- conditions. ing other.591 [Thus,] what does not entail a function is not a condition, And there is none that entails a function.594 Looking at this issue from the perspective of the reasoning of the freedom from unity and multiplicity, if all things do not really exist and even lack an iden- Further absurd consequences can be drawn when the result and its conditions tifiable nature of their own, what in them should determine one thing to be other are placed on a time line. Most people think that water, manure, and such are 246 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 247

the conditions of a sprout, since the latter arises in dependence on the former. exist anymore, it is also not suitable to serve as a condition. Hence, an immedi- However, in terms of each moment of the sprout’s arising, as long as its respec- ate condition is also not established. tive moments have not arisen and thus are nonexistent, any preceding moments of water and so on cannot be its conditions. And once the sprout’s respective If phenomena have not arisen, moments have arisen, there is no more need for any conditions. Hence, when Cessation is not justified. would they be the conditions of the sprout? Therefore, the immediate condition is not reasonable. If it has ceased, what would be such a condition?597 This is consensus: “Since something arises in dependence on these, Therefore, they are its conditions.” Dominant Conditions As long as this [something] does not arise, The notion of dominant conditions is mostly used in the process of perception. How could these not be things that are not its conditions? It refers to the respective sense faculties based on which specific consciousnesses arise, such as the eye consciousness arising on the basis of the eye sense faculty. For [both] nonexistents and existents, Since all of the above (and the following) refutations equally apply to dominant Conditions are not reasonable: conditions, N›g›rjuna does not treat them separately. If something does not exist, the conditions of what would they be? Still, Buddhists might argue, “This contradicts the Buddha’s teaching. In terms If something exists [already], what are conditions good for?595 of dependent origination, he said, `Since this exists, that originates. Since this has arisen, that arises. Due to the condition of basic unawareness, there is formation In general, upon analysis, any existing or nonexisting phenomenon disinte- and so on.’” The Lucid Words states: grates and thus is not established. If no phenomenon can be established, then how Page 70 could its causes or conditions be established? These teachings of arising in the sense of dependent origination and so on are not meant in terms of the nature of the object of the uncon- Once phenomena are not established taminated wisdom of those who are free from the blurred vision of As existent, nonexistent, or [both] existent and nonexistent, basic ignorance. “To what do they refer then?” They are meant in How could one speak of “productive causes”? terms of the objects of the consciousnesses of those whose eyes of It would be unreasonable, if such applied.596 insight are impaired by the blurred vision of basic ignorance.598

Object Conditions Hence, a result does not dwell in any of its diverse conditions. Thus, if the Likewise, the object condition is not established either. In the context of percep- result is nonexistent at the time of its causes and conditions, how could such a tion, an object is regarded as a condition for the arising of the consciousness that nonexistent arise as an existent later? If it were to arise despite its nonexistence, perceives this object. But if they are placed on a time line, we can see that this can- then it could arise even from things that are not its causes, or it could arise with- not work. If the object existed before the specific consciousness that is supposedly out any cause at all. As The Fundamental Verses says: caused by it, what would this later consciousness perceive? The same applies if the object existed after the consciousness that is its perceiver. And if the object The result does not exist at all existed simultaneously with it, it could not be the cause of this consciousness. In any of its diverse conditions or their assembly. How could what does not exist in its conditions Immediate Conditions Arise from such conditions? In general Buddhist epistemology, it is consensus that the previous moment of consciousness that has just ceased is the “immediate condition,” or the immedi- However, if it does not exist ately preceding condition of the next moment of consciousness. However, since And were still to arise from these conditions, it has already been refuted that there is anything that arises, something that has Why would it not also arise ceased cannot be justified. Moreover, since something that has ceased does not From what are not its conditions?599 248 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 249

Some people might still argue, “Because the result depends on its conditions, tors can in no way result in any power that causes things to arise. For example, the result is something that has the nature of its conditions.” If none of these con- if a single grain of sand has no power to produce olive oil, many such powerless ditions exists as something that even bears its own nature, how could any of them grains are still equally powerless to produce oil. Or, in mathematical terms, many be the nature of the result? On the other hand, conventionally, there is also no times zero is still zero. result that does not depend on conditions. Therefore, causes and conditions are nothing but superimpositions. 4. Establishing that entities do not arise without any cause (the fourth part of establishing the subject property of the vajra sliver reasoning) You might say, “The result is of the nature of its conditions.” [However,] conditions do not have a nature of their own. Most Indian hedonists or materialists claim that things arise without any causes; What is the result of something that is not an entity in itself? that is, that they just arise naturally and spontaneously come into being as they How could it be of the nature of [such] conditions? are. One of their scriptures says:

Therefore, it is not of the nature of its conditions. The roundness of peas, the long sharp tips of thorns, [However,] there is [also] no result with a nature of what are not its The colorful patterns of the feathers of a peacock’s wings, conditions. The rising of the sun, and the downhill flow of rivers— Since results do not exist, All these were created by nobody. Their cause is their very nature. How could nonconditions be conditions?600 However, this position has completely absurd consequences, such as that 3. Establishing the reason that entities do not arise from both themselves and things in general would either arise all the time or never arise. Furthermore, it Page 71 others (the third part of establishing the subject property of the vajra sliver rea- clearly contradicts our everyday perception of results appearing at certain times soning) in dependence on certain things or actions that are their causes, such as a harvest appearing only due to farming. We generally see that results do not occur just by Some people, such as the followers of Vi˝˚u and the Jainas,601 say, “That a clay accident or without a cause. If things could indeed appear without any causes, vase arises from itself means that it is made out of clay and still has this nature of anything nonexistent or impossible could manifest, such as a lotus growing in the clay, thus not being something other than it. That the vase arises from something sky. A further consequence would be that we could not perceive anything in the other means that it arises through the activity of a potter, a potter’s wheel, water, world, because there would be no objects that could serve as causes for our per- and so on. Hence, things do not arise exclusively from themselves nor exclusively ceptions. On the level of common worldly experience, if we see a blue flower, this from others. Rather they arise from a combination of these two ways of arising.” is due to there being a blue flower to be perceived. If there is no such blue flower, This third possibility of arising from both is already implicitly refuted through a perception of it does not arise. As The Lucid Words says: the above negations of things arising from themselves or from something other respectively. Therefore, the negation of the combination of the first two possi- If these beings were empty of being causes, they could not be bilities of arising is usually only touched upon very briefly in Centrist texts. For apprehended, example, The Lucid Words explains: Just like the smell and the color of an utpala flower in the sky.603

Nor do entities arise from both [themselves and others], because this If things arose without causes, no effort would be required to produce or would entail [all] the flaws that were stated for both of these theses and accomplish anything, since things would either arise anyway or not arise even because none of these [disproved possibilities] have the capacity to despite such efforts. For example, meals could appear without any ingredients or produce [entities].602 cooking, or they would not appear at all no matter how diligently we prepared them. In fact, any goal-oriented activity, such as assembling a car, would be com- Thus, if neither things themselves nor something other than these things have pletely pointless, since all these activities would never be the causes of a desired the power to give rise to anything, the combination of two such powerless fac- result, such as a car that could actually be driven. If we are lucky, though, it might 250 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 251

pop up out of nowhere and work anyway. Thus, anything could arise at any time heart, do not exist and cannot be the causes for our staying alive, since we never in a completely haphazard way, such as a blazing fire in the depths of the ocean directly perceive them (seeing them in a corpse or on an x-ray can only lead to or darkness in the middle of a bright lamp. Or, it would follow that an apple tree an inference that we have these organs). could arise not only from an apple seed but also from a rose seed, because— In terms of past and future lives, the hedonists’ justification that these do not according to the position that things arise without a cause—both seeds are equal exist is again that if they existed, they would have to exist in a directly manifest in not being the cause for the apple tree. Also, any fruits should be fully ripened way for our perception. However, since they are not directly perceptible, they are all the time or never, because their ripeness does not depend on any other factors, said to be nonexistent. If these people are asked whether their knowledge that such as chemical processes or time. And since a peacock is not the cause of the such lifetimes are not directly perceptible comes from direct perception or some- colors of its feathers, a crow should also have such beautiful feathers. thing that is not direct perception, their answer naturally is, “It comes from direct One might object, “There is a difference in the case of a flower growing in the perception.” However, then it absurdly follows that the nonexistence of past and sky and such things as a harvest, since the former does not have an existent nature, future lives as things is something directly perceptible, because they say that the whereas the latter have.” However, even such a difference does not remove the lack of direct perceptibility of these lifetimes is directly perceptible. If this is above absurd consequences, since—according to the position that things arise accepted, it follows that this lack of perceptibility—which is nothing but the without causes—a result that is assumed to have an existent nature would still be nonexistence of things—would nevertheless be an existing thing for the hedonists, something that arises without a cause and thus is equally subject to the same since it is directly perceptible, just as existing things are. Then it further follows inconsistencies. that also things do not exist, since there is no such thing as the total “lack of Moreover, the very fact of making any statement or even giving a reason con- things” as a counterpart for things. In other words, “things” cannot be estab- tradicts the original thesis that there are no causes, since making a statement or lished without “the lack of things” and vice versa. If even this is accepted, it fol- giving a reason is a cause that makes other persons understand something. If lows that both the elements’ existence as things and the nonexistence of past and Page 72 things arise without causes, other persons should understand everything without future lives as things are not justified, because neither things nor the lack of things anybody ever saying anything. Or, nobody would ever understand anything, exist. despite being given the most sophisticated explanations and reasons. At this point, these people might object, “Well, it is very easy to know that Other hedonists say, “The only kind of valid cognition is direct perception. something is not directly perceptible, since this is known from the sign or reason Thus, only those things that can be directly perceived exist. Their causes are the that consists in its lack of direct perceptibility.” However, from their above posi- four great material elements—earth, water, fire, and wind—but not such things tion that direct perception is the only kind of valid cognition, it then follows as positive or negative actions, whether they happen in this lifetime or in any that one is not able to infer the nonexistence of past and future lives, because if past or future ones that may be assumed. The same goes for the mind: It is merely the lack of direct perceptibility of these lifetimes is not directly perceived, one is something that evolves from the four elements in our body. Just as the mixture not able to apprehend this lack in any other way at all. If they say, “It is appre- of barley and yeast gives rise to the force that inebriates the mind, the ripening hended through inference,” this disqualifies their standard statements about infer- of the union of sperm and egg gives rise to the mind.”604 ence not being a type of valid cognition, such as, “Since inferring past lives from The first counterargument here is that the elements themselves do not exist. the sign or reason of varying individual degrees of happiness and suffering in this The three preceding possibilities for an arising of things—from themselves, some- life is as unjustified as the story of the wolf’s footprints,605 inference is impossi- thing other, or both—have already been refuted through the corresponding parts ble” and “All that exists is limited to the spheres of the five senses.” Thus, there of the vajra sliver reasoning. Thus, all phenomena—including the four great ele- is no proof that past and future lifetimes do not exist, while there are many rea- ments—do not really arise or exist in the first place. Therefore, the question of sons that suggest their existence.606 whether these elements can be the causes of anything does not apply. As for the claim that the material elements are the causes of mind, this also can- Second, even in the relative world, this position makes no sense. There are a not be justified. In general, phenomena whose characteristics are contradictory number of inconsistencies and counterarguments, even if the above statements cannot function as the cause and result of each other. For example, fire does not on valid cognition, existence, and the body-mind problem are addressed on the arise from water, and permanent things do not arise from impermanent things. mere conventional level. For example, if only directly perceptible things exist Likewise, on the conventional level, the main characteristics of matter are to have and can serve as causes, it would follow that our own inner organs, such as the certain shapes and colors, to have extensions in space and time, to obstruct other 252 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 253

things, to consist of particles, and to not be conscious. On the other hand, mind inevitably lead to logical and—more important—spiritual problems. Thus, in has neither shape nor color nor any spatial or durational extension. Mind does its own terms, seeming reality with all its conventional appearances is not to be not obstruct anything, is not made of particles, and is conscious. Moreover, if the analyzed, since then one already moves away from this very seeming reality. It elements in the body were the causes of mind, any changes in these causes would functions as such only as long as it is not questioned. always have to affect the mind as their result in a strictly corresponding way. For From among the three doors to liberation, the vajra sliver reasoning teaches the example, if the body is healthy or deteriorates, the mind would have to be equally door of signlessness. healthy or deteriorating. However, there are numerous counterexamples, such as a very sharp and flexible mind in a frail or handicapped body or a completely III. The analysis of results: the negation of an arising deranged mind in a perfectly healthy body. In addition, since outer material of existents and nonexistents things also consist of the four elements, there is no reason that stones and the like This reasoning is basically an elaboration of the negation of arising from some- should not also exhibit some manifestations of consciousness as well as some thing other as found in the context of the vajra sliver reasoning. other features that are found only in animate bodies, such as respiration, metab- olism, movement, and reproduction.607 A. The formulation of the reasoning In brief, the appearances of this world do not arise without any causes, because Mere appearances do not exist by their nature, because neither existents nor these appearances arise only sometimes. This reason might seem odd at first. How- nonexistents arise, just like an illusion. ever, as was explained above, if things arise without causes, all of them would have to arise all the time or never. Thus, the fact that certain things only arise at cer- B. The three modes of the reason tain times and not at others is the most powerful indication that there must be Here, the subject property is that mere appearances do not arise either as existents something that accounts for this difference. This “something” is the completeness or as nonexistents. So the question is: “If a sprout arises, does it then arise as Page 73 of all the specific causes and conditions that lead to a certain result. Conversely, something that existed already at the time of the seed, or does it arise as some- if these causes and conditions are incomplete, their specific result does not arise. thing that did not exist at that time? Can it possibly arise as something that is both To summarize the vajra sliver reasoning, it is clear that there is not the slightest existent and nonexistent or as something that is neither?” arising through any of the four possibilities described. However, since it is worldly As explained above, any phenomenon that exists will not arise, since it has consensus that there is arising, such arising is just presented according to this already arisen before. Nonexistents will not arise either, because there is nothing usual way of thinking. Thus, it is not refuted here that, from the perspective of that could arise and because there is no cause whatsoever that could turn a non- mere worldly consensus without analysis, it appears as if things arise. Also, the existent into something existent. In addition, if the sprout were to arise as some- vajra sliver reasoning is definitely not meant to negate the principle of causality thing that already existed at the time of the seed, then it would have arisen either altogether. For, when not analyzed, causality clearly performs its function on the from something other than the seed or without any cause, but obviously not level of seeming reality. However, even on this level, people do not claim that from this seed itself. Moreover, there would be no need for the seed as the sprout’s results arise from themselves or something other and so on. Rather, they just say cause, since the latter is already present without having to arise in dependence on that a sprout arises from a seed, but they do not determine whether the seed is this seed. If the sprout has already arisen in dependence on something other than identical to or other than the sprout. As The Entrance into Centrism says: the seed, what would be the point of a seed as yet another cause? And if it had arisen without any cause, the seed would be equally superfluous. On the other After worldly people have merely implanted a seed, hand, if the sprout arose as something that did not exist at the time of the seed, They say, “I engendered this child” then there would not be the slightest influence or effect that the cause (the seed) And think, “I planted a tree.” could have on such a nonexistent. That the sprout could arise from the combi- Therefore, even on the worldly level, there is no arising from nation of both possibilities—existence and nonexistence—is self-contradictory. something other.608 It is also implicitly refuted through the negations of the first two possibilities, since their inconsistencies just multiply. As for the fourth possibility, there is Thus, in general, according to Centrists, any attempt to justify everyday expe- nothing that is neither existent nor nonexistent, so what would arise? rience through something other than just mere conventional consensus must The positive entailment of the reason here is that whatever does not arise either 254 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 255

as an existent or as a nonexistent does not exist by its nature, since these two pos- B. The three modes of the reason sibilities are mutually exclusive and there is no third. The same reason applies to As for the subject property, when considered just from the perspective of our mis- the negative entailment, since anything that is assumed to exist by its nature would takenness, the following statements are rather unproblematic: “One sprout arises necessarily have to arise either as an existent or as a nonexistent. from one seed,” “One eye consciousness arises from three conditions,” “Many Exemplary proponents of the first possibility—arising as an existent—include children are born from one mother,” and “Many harvests come from many the Enumerators, whose position of the arising of a result that exists already at the causes, such as seeds, water, and manure.” However, from the perspective of rea- time of the cause has been refuted in detail above. The Buddhist school of the soning, an arising from any of these four possibilities is impossible, since, briefly Followers of The Great Exposition claims the arising of a result that already exists put, the reasoning at hand is just an elaboration of the reasoning of the freedom in the future.609 This position is refuted as follows: If a thing that has not yet from unity and multiplicity. As was explained above, there is no phenomenon arisen here and now were to exist in some unknown other place at present, it that is a real unity or a real multiplicity in the first place. From this, it naturally might be reasonable for it to arise here in the future. However, since there is no follows that there are no real single or multiple causes that could give rise to any such place where all future things exist right now, what could arise from this single or multiple results. place later? And even if there were such a place with already existing future things, A more detailed way to look at these four possibilities is found in Jñ›nagarbha’s they would have to be perceptible right now. Otherwise, how could one claim autocommentary on verse 14 of his Distinction between the Two Realities:612 that they exist at present? The Fundamental Verses says: 1. A single result does not arise from a single cause If some nonarisen entity For example, if the eye sense faculty only produced the single result that is the Existed somewhere, next moment of its own continuum, it could not also produce a visual con- It might arise. sciousness in this next moment. In that case, everybody would be blind. On the Page 74 However, since such does not exist, what would arise?610 other hand, if the eye sense faculty produced the single result that is a visual consciousness, its own continuum as an eye sense faculty would have to stop at that As for the second possibility—arising as a nonexistent—there are many Bud- moment. Naturally, the same goes for the remaining sense faculties as well as for dhists and non-Buddhists who assert the new arising of a result that previously other phenomena, such as a candle flame: Either it produces its own next did not exist. However, it is impossible for nonexistents to depend on any causes. moment, and thus no visual perception of itself, or it causes a visual conscious- Consequently, if something that has not existed before can still arise, it would fol- ness in someone but then becomes extinguished in that very moment. low that just about anything can arise, even impossibilities such as a hairy frog. 2. Many results do not arise from a single cause If something that lacks arising could arise, If a single cause all by itself were to produce a second or more results, cause and Just about anything could arise in this way.611 result would lack a causal relationship, since the cause would be single while the result would be multiple. In other words, the singularity of the cause does not From among the doors to complete liberation, this reasoning teaches the door produce a corresponding singularity of the result. However, if a further factor of wishlessness. within or in addition to that single cause is assumed to produce the second result, clearly one is no longer speaking about a single cause. IV. The analysis of both causes and results: the negation of arising from the four possibilities 3. A single result does not arise from many causes A. The formulation of the reasoning This entails the reverse of the problem in (2), that is, that the multiplicity of the Mere appearances lack arising, because a single result does not arise from a sin- cause does not produce a corresponding multiplicity of the result. Conversely, the gle cause; many results do not arise from a single cause; a single result does not absence of multiplicity in the cause would not cause the absence of multiplicity arise from many causes; and many results also do not arise from many causes. in the result either. For, in this case of a single result arising from many causes, the result lacks multiplicity, while the cause does not. Consequently, neither the multiplicity of the result nor its lack thereof would have a cause, since there is no 256 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 257

third category beyond causes and results being either multiple or nonmultiple. The subject property says that all things depend on each other in terms of being Hence, nothing would have a cause. In that case, everything would either exist big or small. In other words, anything that is big in comparison to something permanently or not exist at all or would just arise at random. smaller than itself is at the same time small when compared to some third thing that is even bigger and vice versa. The positive entailment means that whatever 4. Many results do not arise from many causes depends on something else in terms of being big or small is necessarily not really The basic problem of the lack of invariable congruence between cause and result or independently big or small. The negative entailment means that if there were in terms of both being either single or multiple applies here too. Take the exam- something intrinsically big or small, it would have to be independent of every- ple of visual perception: If the cause is multiple (for example, an eye sense fac- thing other in terms of being big or small. The same applies for all other mutu- ulty, a visual form, and an immediately preceding moment of consciousness), ally dependent characteristics, such as existent and nonexistent, good and bad, or then the result (the single resultant moment of a visual consciousness) should beautiful and ugly. invariably be multiple too, but this is obviously not the case. Likewise, in being a result, a clay vase should be multiple due to the multiplicity of its cause (clay, B. Dependence in terms of origination water, a potter, and a potter’s wheel). As for the positive entailment here, it means that whatever does not arise from 1. The formulation of the reasoning these four possibilities must necessarily lack arising altogether. The negative entail- This reasoning is called “the king of reasonings” through which Centrists demon- ment means that anything that arises must necessarily arise from one of these strate that phenomena are empty of any true reality, since it eliminates the extremes possibilities. of both permanence and extinction. Since phenomena originate in dependence on various causes and conditions, on the conventional level of seeming reality, V. The analysis of mere appearances: they are not as utterly nonexistent as a long-haired turtle.614 This eliminates the Page 75 the reasoning of dependent origination extreme of extinction. At the same time, phenomena do not exist as permanent The Precious Garland says: things that are established through a nature of their own precisely because they depend on other causes and conditions and thus lack any real and independent Due to the existence of this, that comes to be, nature. As The SÒtra Requested by the N›g› King “The Cool One” says: Just as something short, when there is something long. Due to the arising of this, that arises, The learned ones realize phenomena that originate in dependence. Just as light due to the appearance of a butter lamp.613 In no way do they rely on views about extremes.

Accordingly, there are two types of dependence: The Fundamental Verses states:

A. dependence in terms of dependent imputation, such as being short in depend- What is dependent origination ence on being long Is explained as emptiness. B. dependence in terms of dependent origination, such as the arising of smoke It is a dependent designation due to the arising of fire And in itself the middle path.

Since there is no phenomenon A. Dependence in terms of imputation That is not dependently originating, 1. The formulation of the reasoning There is no phenomenon For example, it may be said, “All things are neither really big nor small, because That is not empty.615 being big and small depend on each other.” In order to explicitly eliminate the two extremes of permanence and extinction, 2. The three modes of the reason the reasoning of dependent origination can be formulated in two main ways. 258 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 259

a. To exclude the first extreme, the reasoning may be formulated in a negative I do not say that entities do not exist, because I say that they originate way: “Mere appearances do not exist by their nature, because they dependently in dependence. “So are you a realist then?” I am not, because I am just originate, just like a dream.” a proponent of dependent origination. “What sort of nature is it then b. To eliminate the extreme of extinction and to account for seeming reality, the that you [propound]?” I propound dependent origination. “What is reasoning may also be stated in an affirmative way: “All phenomena are not non- the meaning of dependent origination?” It has the meaning of the lack existent like the horns of a rabbit, because they dependently originate.” Another of a nature and the meaning of nonarising through a nature [of its way to say this would be: “Phenomena are illusionlike, because they dependently own]. It has the meaning of the origination of results with a nature originate.” similar to that of illusions, mirages, reflections, cities of scent-eaters,616 magical creations, and dreams. It has the meaning of emptiness and 2. The three modes of the reason identitylessness.617 At first, the reason “dependently originating” may look like an affirming reason. The subject property says that all phenomena necessarily originate in depend- Thus, this reasoning shows that, just like the two sides of a single coin, dependence. In terms of its phrasing, this appears to be an affirmative statement. The ent origination and emptiness—or appearance and emptiness—are not at all con- positive entailment is that whatever originates in dependence necessarily does tradictory but an inseparable unity. This means that although dependently not exist by its nature, is illusionlike, and is also not utterly nonexistent. The neg- originating phenomena lack any ultimately real existence, on the conventional ative entailment means that if there were anything that existed by its nature, was level they are not just completely nonexistent, since—unlike sky-flowers and not illusion like, or was utterly nonexistent, it would necessarily not originate in such—they represent the experiential consensus of our everyday lives. The dependence. In particular, the explicit words of the reasonings under (B) seem Entrance into Centrism says: to affirm something about phenomena, that is, their “existence” or “illusionlike Page 76 being.” However, the meaning that is pointed out by the reason “dependently Just like a vase and such do not exist in true reality originating” is nothing other than that things are empty of real existence or real And at the same time exist as common worldly consensus, arising. Thus, in whatever way this reasoning of dependent origination may be All entities originate in this very same way. formulated, it never becomes a means to ascertain some really existent things, Hence, it does not follow that they are the same as the son of a be they seeming or ultimate, nor does it suggest some really existent kind of barren woman. dependent origination. Since this is clearly a case of relying not on mere words but on the meaning, the reasoning of dependent origination is a negating rea- Since both these [causes and results] are illusionlike, soning in effect, since “arising from dependently originating conditions” means We are not at fault and the entities of the world do exist [as such].618 nothing other than “lack of real arising.” Obviously, the word “arising” is used here in two different ways: In the first phrase, it refers to the mere illusionlike The Fundamental Verses declares: display of causes and conditions due to ignorance, from which we gain the wrong impression that things really arise. The second phrase means the denial Whatever might be used to invalidate emptiness, of any real arising in this illusory display, without denying its mere appearance. That is, dependent origination, As the sÒtras say: Just serves to invalidate The entirety of worldly conventions.619 What arises from conditions does not arise. It does not have the nature of arising. If things were not empty of independent and real existence, the interdepend- What depends on conditions is explained to be empty. ent origination of causes and results in the world would be impossible, since Those who understand emptiness are heedful. nothing could be affected by anything. Thus, none of the appearances and conventions that we constantly deal with would ever come about. However, again, Candrakırti’s Commentary on The Four Hundred Verses says: this seeming dependent origination is not something that is presented as part of a Centrist system of its own. All that Centrists say is that, just from the perspec- 260 The Center of the Sunlit Sky The Middle from Beginning to End 261

tive of ordinary worldly experiences, certain appearances seem to appear in from itself, a thing can neither depend on itself nor act upon itself. Furthermore, dependence on the appearance of certain others, which are called their conditions. if a thing is not established in itself, it can be neither something that depends on Moreover, the presentation of seeming phenomena as dependent origination something else nor something on which something else depends. On the other serves as a proper support to conveniently approach their ultimate reality, which hand, if a thing were established in itself, it would not have to depend on anything. is that causes and results are empty of any nature. All dualistic phenomena (such As for arising from something other, if things are not established in them- as cause and result, subject and object, cyclic existence and nirv›˚a, or seeming selves in the first place, the question of what depends on what as well as the whole and ultimate reality) are just set up in mutual dependence, but none of them notion of “other” is pointless. Even if is assumed that things are established in exists independently through a nature of its own. In this way, the Centrist view themselves, this would mean that they do not have to depend on anything other. is free from the two extremes of permanence and extinction. However, being established by themselves yet still having to depend on something The gist of this is as follows: When Centrists present the arising and ceasing else (such as causes and conditions) is self-contradictory. As for arising from both of dependently originating causes and results on the level of no analysis, they themselves and something other, obviously, all these flaws would just multiply. neither superimpose nor deprecate anything with regard to the seeming worldly The Entrance into Centrism summarizes: reality of mere appearances. Therefore, when Centrists engage in the conventional interactions of adopting certain things and rejecting others, they do not Since entities originate in dependence, deviate from the ways of seeming reality, since they express things in a way that All these thoughts cannot withstand examination. does not add or remove anything from how people deal with these things in the Therefore, this reasoning of dependent origination context of common worldly consensus. While it definitely makes sense to main- Cuts through the entire web of erroneous views.620 tain this approach on the level of no analysis, if Centrists were to assert arising and ceasing in terms of dependent origination on the level of analysis, such would Conclusion Page 77 only amount to superimposition and deprecation with regard to both realities. Each of the five great Centrist reasonings is in itself fully sufficient to produce an Therefore, if Centrists were to approach the ultimate in this way, they would understanding that things lack any real or independent existence. However, as deviate from both realities. From the perspective of analysis, there would be the was shown for the vajra sliver reasoning and the reasoning of the freedom from superimposition of establishing the dependently originating phenomena of seem- unity and multiplicity, they supplement each other in generating incontrovert- ing reality in some sense, while in fact they are not established. To imagine that ible certainty and an all-encompassing realization of this lack of real existence. these phenomena are somehow established would negate the ultimate freedom Moreover, in order to approach such a realization, the various reasonings provide from arising and ceasing and thus deprecate ultimate reality. a range of different avenues that may be more or less convenient or convincing In a broader sense, the reasoning of mere dependent origination is said to be the for individual people with varying capacities, propensities, or particular miscon- king of Centrist reasonings, since it not only dispels the extremes of permanence ceptions. and extinction but also eradicates all kinds of wrong views. For example, it refutes In this context of the five great Centrist reasonings, it should be clear that a real that things arise without any cause, since this would mean that things do not and intrinsic nature of things is impossible among knowable objects. Therefore, depend on anything at all, while dependent origination shows the opposite: that strictly speaking, from among the three modes of a correct reason, the negative things depend on collections of their specific causes and conditions. This reason- entailment cannot be established here. As was explained, the negative entailment ing also negates all notions of a permanent, single, and nonconcordant cause, such means that the reason may never apply to the heterologous set. In terms of the as a primal substance or a creator god. For, if things arose from a single cause, this above five reasonings, the general meaning of the predicate in all of them is “what would contradict our experience that they in fact depend on vast numbers of con- lacks a real nature.” Thus, “what has a real nature” would be the heterologous set. ditions. Nor can things depend on a permanent cause, since something permanent Since it is precisely such a real nature of things that does not exist, it does not is by definition devoid of performing any function or activity, because such already make sense to say that the respective reason—such as “being free from unity and entails a process of change. If things could arise from nonconcordant causes, it multiplicity” or “originating in dependence”—may not apply to a heterologous would be unreasonable that they have to depend on their own specific causes. set (that is, something that has a real nature) that is nonexistent. In other words, Likewise, the reasoning of dependent origination equally refutes that things the question as to whether something can apply to, entail, or include a nonex- arise from themselves, from something other, or from both. In terms of arising istent or not is per se irrelevant. 262 The Center of the Sunlit Sky

However, that the third mode cannot be established in no way invalidates the above reasonings. As was explained, there is no doubt that if there were such a thing as a really existing cup, it would necessarily have to be established either as a cup that is a unity or as a cup that is a multiplicity. The same goes for hypothetical, really arising entities. Furthermore, there are many concordant examples for the nonexistence of a real nature—such as illusions, reflections, and dreams— that can be appropriately employed in these reasonings. Finally, what is to be comprehended through the inferential cognitions that are based on such arguments is nothing but the probandum of these arguments—that all things lack a real nature—and never its opposite. As was explained, there are two types of negating reasons: those that are based on the nonobservation of something connected and those that are based on the observation of something contradictory. The first four Centrist reasonings fall under the first category, and the reason of dependent origination falls under the latter. In general, there is no disagreement between Autonomists and Consequen- tialists about either these conventional issues or the essential point of how they understand ultimate reality. Thus, the five great reasonings of Centrism are common to Autonomists and Consequentialists. Both use these arguments to point Page 78 out phenomenal identitylessness. Their difference is that Consequentialists say that these five reasonings merely follow the conventions of logic as acknowledged by others. On the mere conventional level, Autonomists understand them as autonomous arguments that are acknowledged by both parties.

Other Reasonings Apart from the five great Centrist reasonings, there are two further major arguments that are used to determine phenomenal identitylessness. In the first reasoning, any real existence of the mind as the apprehender is negated through the preceding negation of something apprehended. Thus, through using an appropriate reasoning of one’s choice, one starts by refuting the notion of really and independently existent objects. Once no such objects are to be found, there can be no real subject—the apprehending mind—that cognizes them, since the subject has to depend on the existence of its object. If neither subject nor object really exists, all phenomena do not really exist, since phenomena are either subjects or objects. As The Entrance into Centrism says:

In brief, understand this meaning: Just as knowable objects do not exist, mind does not exist either.

The Buddhas said, “If there are no knowable objects, One easily finds that a knower is excluded.” Page 79 Page 80 Page 81 Page 82 Page 83 Page 84 Page 85 Page 86 Page 87 Page 88 Page 89 Page 90 Page 91 Page 92 Page 93 Page 94 . . Establishing Appearances as Divine: 3 Rongzom’s View on Madhyamaka in Rongzom Chözang on Reasoning, Relation to Mantra Madhyamaka, and Purity

roponents of the Early Translations commonly assert a view of Mantra that supersedes in profundity the view of Sūtra, and by P they often support the validity of this view with the help of reason- Page 95 Heidi I. Köppl ing and logical arguments. Rongzom himself is a good illustration of this, as he argues for the superiority of the Mantra view and pro- poses the application of dialectical tools even on the esoteric level. When Rongzom states that the view of Mantra supersedes the Mad- hyamaka view it is necessary to understand what type of Madhya- maka he is referring to. We will now examine Rongzom’s critique of Madhyamaka and how it illuminates his view of Mantra. We will also explore how this critique may have influenced Mipham, who considers Rongzom an important source of his Madhyamaka presentation. A hermeneutical link can be demonstrated between Rongzom’s critique of Madhyamaka and his promotion of the notion of purity on the esoteric level. Purity is a central theme in the esoteric tradition and, as we have seen, the view of Mantra is often distinguished from Snow Lion Publications that of Sūtra with regard to purity or divinities. In examining Rong- Ithaca, New York zom’s view and critique of the Madhyamaka, insights can emerge about his view of Tantra and purity. Specifically, we shall examine 38 establishing appearances as divine rongzom’s view on madhyamaka 39

Rongzom’s reservations regarding the Madhyamaka principles of especially during the later dissemination of Buddhism, enthusiasti- relative truth and his opposition to a separation of the two truths. cally embraced the teachings of Madhyamaka as their philosophy Although Rongzom is often regarded as an apologist for the par excellence. Over the years, Tibet became a hotbed for debates Nyingma tradition,105 it is useful to investigate the extent to which about which school presented the most authentic and profound his Madhyamaka discussion is apologetic in nature. Was it an attempt Madhyamaka view. In this quest to determine the highest dialec- to thwart polemical attacks against the Dzogchen teachings? Here tical view, the school termed *Prāsaṅgika (thal ’gyur ba) emerged it will be argued that Rongzom should not be considered a source as the clear winner over its rival, the *Svātantrika (rang rgyud pa). for the attempts of subsequent scholars to harmonize or minimize Although the terms Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika are most likely indig- discrepancies between Mantrayāna/Dzogchen and the dialectical enous Tibetan creations,109 their philosophical roots go back to the approach of Madhyamaka.106 Although Rongzom was not against treatises of Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, Bhāvaviveka, Śāntarakṣita, applying methodologies of the dialectical vehicle to establish the Kamalaśīla, et alii. Primarily, Candrakīrti’s perspective on Madhya- validity of Mantra, he clearly abstained from minimizing discrepan- maka became viewed as Prāsaṅgika, while that of masters such as cies between the views of Madhyamaka and Tantra. In this context, Bhāvaviveka and Śāntarakṣita became known as Svātantrika. While it will also be argued that Rongzom’s Madhyamaka exegesis con- the terms might seem to refer to rather self-evident philosophical Page 96 cerns what Mipham, his self-proclaimed follower, would have iden- viewpoints, Tibetan interpretations differ vastly in the way that tified as Svātantrika and it is against this strand of Madhyamaka they identify Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika.110 that Rongzom directs his critique. Although Rongzom never pro- No extensive exegesis on Madhyamaka by Rongzom remains poses a Madhyamaka view that resembles Mipham’s later Prāsaṅgika extant. Yet we can find numerous compositions in which Rong- interpretation in his extant writings, Mipham seems to assume that zom contrasts the view of Madhyamaka with that of Tantra. For Rongzom was aware of both Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika traditions, instance, in the Memorandum on Views Rongzom remarks, when and he claims to base his own Madhyamaka philosophy on Rong- elucidating the view of Mantrayāna, “The assertion that ultimately zom’s exegesis.107 Chapter 3 will include reflections on this apparent there is no birth and no cessation is the same as in Madhyamaka paradox and offer some suggestions as to why Nyingma thinkers and that relatively the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas are mere illu- gradually came to consider the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka (dbu ma sion also concords. [But] in particular, it is a distinguishing feature thal ’gyur ba) philosophy to be the paramount expression of the [of the view of Mantrayāna] that it regards even the characteristics dialectical vehicle. of illusion as the characteristics of complete divine purity, and also that it sees the two truths as inseparable.”111 Rongzom continues to point out that there are numerous other 3.1. Rongzom’s Madhyamaka inconsistencies between Sūtra and Mantra, such as Mantra being While the Madhyamaka was not necessarily considered the perfect the object of experience only of those with keen faculties, those who expression of Buddhist philosophy in India,108 Tibetan scholars, master skillful means, those who have great compassion, etc. 40 establishing appearances as divine rongzom’s view on madhyamaka 41

Within the relative perspective, the difference between Sūtra One might likewise anticipate that his view of the two truths as and Mantra seems clear in that the latter regards illusion not merely propagated by the Madhyamaka school also would diverge from as illusion but as divine purity. This appears to be a unique trait of later interpretations. Rongzom divides the Madhyamaka in the fol- the tantras. However, Rongzom initially asserts that the ultimate lowing way: “Although [the Mādhyamikas] concord in their view in both Sūtra and Mantra is the absence of birth and cessation—a of the ultimate, [the school] is, with respect to [its view] regarding description resonant with the “figurative,” or “categorized,” ultimate the relative [truth], divided into the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka and (rnam grangs pa’i don dam, *paryāyaparamārtha), which, according the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka.”116 to Mipham, is emphasized by the Svātantrika (Svātantrika, rang Rongzom states that the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka school is supe- rgyud ).112 Let us examine whether Rongzom’s view of the ultimate rior to the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka.117 As scholars have already truth of Madhyamaka could be equated to Mipham’s description pointed out, Rongzom’s extant writings make no mention of the of the figurative ultimate. Mipham generally explains the figurative Prāsaṅgika or its chief representative, Candrakīrti.118 Patsab Nyima ultimate as a mere negation of the extreme of existence (yod mtha’ ), Drag (Spa tshab nyi ma grags) (1055-1145?), a contemporary of while the “nonfigurative,” or “uncategorized,” ultimate rnam( grangs Rongzom, provided the basis for the Madhyamaka interpreta- ma yin pa’i don dam, *aparyāyaparamārtha) transcends the fourfold tions that became known as Prāsaṅgika with his translations of Page 97 ontological extremes (catuṣkoṭi), i.e., existence, nonexistence, both, Candrakīrti’s works.119 Hence, the Svātantrika/Prāsaṅgika distinc- and neither.113 In his Commentary to the Garland of Views as Oral tion, as a Tibetan doxographical principle, dates probably from the Instructions, Rongzom defines these two divisions of the ultimate, twelfth century. speaking of the figurative ultimate and the “ultimate beyond men- Rongzom further divides the Madhyamaka into Sarvadharmā- tal constructs” (spros pa dang bral ba’i don dam), in the following pratiṣṭhānavādins (rab tu mi gnas pa) and Māyopamādvayavādins way: “The figurative ultimate is the object of a mind in which men- (sgyu ma rigs grub pa).120 Tsongkhapa and Khedrup both allude to tal constructs have been partially severed, and partially not severed. ancient masters who identified the proponents of Sarvadharmāpra- It is the purport of the terms that demonstrate the classifications of tiṣṭhānavādins with the Prāsaṅgikas and the Māyopamādvayavādins the ultimate, such as the eighteen [types] of emptiness. The ultimate with the Svātantrikas.121 Keeping this in mind, as well as the fact that beyond mental constructs is the nature of the complete pacification many of Rongzom’s writings on the difference between Sarvadhar- of all mental constructs.”114 māpratiṣṭhānavādins and Māyopamādvayavādins listed in Rongpa In his compositions, Rongzom repeatedly explains the ultimate Mepung’s index (tho yig) appear to have been lost, it is problematic Madhyamaka view as being free from mental contructs (niṣpra- to rule out Rongzom’s knowledge of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka. pañca). This excludes the possibility of the ultimate being, in the Still, it is safe to argue that Rongzom’s general explanations of the Madhyamaka context, what Mipham calls “a mere existential nega- Madhyamaka differ in many ways from the Madhyamaka view tion” (med dgag tsam).115 However, Rongzom’s classifications of propagated by Mipham centuries later. Although modern Nyingma Madhyamaka schools differ from those applied by later scholars. scholars may depict Rongzom as a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika, his 42 establishing appearances as divine rongzom’s view on madhyamaka 43

general treatment of Madhyamaka indicates that the Madhyamaka primarily are carried out from an esoteric perspective. For instance, with which he was concerned is exclusively of a type that Mipham at the end of the first chapter of Entering the Way of the Great Vehi- would have identified as Svātantrika. cle, Rongzom relates how the Śrāvakas, the Yogācārins, and the Mādhyamikas refute themselves by asserting aspects of reality that either should be abandoned or differentiated from one another.123 3.2 Rongzom’s Reservations Regarding The Mādhyamikas defeat themselves by differentiating between a Relative Truth Held to Be Distinct from the authentic and the inauthentic relative truths (yang dag pa’i the Ultimate kun rdzob, log pa’i kun rdzob). Rongzom points out that the Mad- Rongzom usually divides the Mādhyamikas into Sautrāntika-Madh- hyamaka is not at fault here simply because the school’s explana- yamaka and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka, yet he also divides the school tion conflicts with the way of unsurpassable Mantra. Rather, the into Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādins and Māyopamādvayavādins. Mādhyamikas “flaw themselves” rang( la gnod pa) because their pre- It is important to keep in mind that when Rongzom discusses sentation is inherently contradictory. Rongzom argues that they fail Madhyamaka philosophy, his extant treatises usually do not indi- to see these flaws because they are attached to their philosophy.124 cate which Madhyamaka interpretation is in question. It is likewise He suggests that the different philosophies of Sūtrayāna defeat Page 98 noteworthy that he on no occasion refers to Candrakīrti, who is the themselves through the inherent fallacies of their assertions, rather paramount philosopher for the majority of later Tibetan Madhya- than through any conflict with the esoteric teachings. Rongzom’s maka exponents. fondness for the tantric perspective quickly becomes apparent in Masters such as Bhāvaviveka and Śāntarakṣita, who are tradi- his writings and on several occasions he targets the Madhyamaka’s tionally considered Svātantrika, adopted the epistemological tra- authentic relative truth (yang dag pa’i kun rdzob) as a principle that dition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti to provide a reasoned account obstructs a final understanding of the ultimate. of convention, while Candrakīrti dismisses this foundational sys- Some Tibetan Mādhyamikas125 perceive a major discrepancy tem of epistemology in his Madhyamaka approach.122 Rongzom, between the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika schools in terms of while critical of Madhyamaka, does introduce Sūtra epistemology whether an ontological commitment on the conventional level is into his explanations, even in the Mantrayāna context. While he made. They criticize the Svātantrika school for applying the founda- dismisses the Madhyamaka approach as imperfect and faulty, he at tional system of Dharmakīrti to relative reality, thereby attributing times employs methods that are characteristic of a Dharmakīrtian true objectivity to functional properties (don byed nus pa’i dngos po) logician. of the authentic relative truth. For these thinkers, the Prāsaṅgika As a whole, Rongzom’s extant corpus leads us to consider him school does not reify relative phenomena in that manner. Instead primarily a tantrika or, perhaps, an advocate of the Great Perfec- of distinguishing between the functionality of objects themselves, tion, who generally favored the suddenist approach to enlighten- they suggest an approach that decides on what is authentic or inau- ment and whose exegesis and critique of the sūtric philosophies thentic simply based on subjective perceptions of the world. By 44 establishing appearances as divine rongzom’s view on madhyamaka 45

avoiding a reification of the relative, the Prāsaṅgika becomes the reasoning and thus [the relevance of the authentic rela- superior view according to these scholars. Rongzom describes the tive truth] is not contradicted by its being invalidated Madhyamaka as a school that divides the relative into authentic and by reasoning.” inauthentic based on the presence or absence of causal efficacy (don Well, [are you then saying] that mere establishment byed nus pa, arthakriyāsamartha) and, therefore, does not appear to on the relative level does not require reasoning? If so, consider Candrakīrti’s approach of establishing the relative based when you say that although they are similar in being on the perceiving subject rather than the object. appearances, the authentic and the inauthentic [relative In this way, Rongzom expends a considerable amount of energy truth] are posited and distinguished with reference to criticizing the Madhyamaka’s two types of relative truth, defined whether or not there is a presence of efficacy, is this then with reference to objective efficacy or the lack of it. For instance, not reasoning? Whether established in reality or estab- in Entering the Way of the Great Vehicle, he argues that both a vase lished merely on a temporary level, if something cannot and its reflection are equally able to perform a function. Accord- even withstand the load of reasoning that pertains to its ing to Rongzom, one must therefore accept that the division of the own specific level of existence, then how could that be relative into authentic and false aspects based on efficacy is simply said to exist even as mere convention! For instance, we Page 99 mistaken.126 Likewise, he continues, the notion of functional things may already have established that an elephant [which can be disproved even on the relative level: when analyzed into their is supposed to] conquer the army of the enemy cannot constituent elements, all relative phenomena lose any appearance of bear the load of being steered by [the mahout’s] hammer being functional things, even on the very level of the relative. Thus, while carrying soldiers on its back. But if a cow [that is the qualities of the authentic and the false relative truth are entirely supposed to] simply plough the fields cannot carry the equal and neither of them possess any greater efficacy than the other. mere load of being steered by a bridle while carrying a Rongzom argues vehemently against any attempt at ascribing a lim- yoke, then how can we establish even the mere conven- ited, i.e., not ultimately valid, sense of authenticity to certain aspects tions of it performing the function of ploughing fields? of the relative with the help of pointed anecdotes: How will [that cow] be any different from goats?127

[Trying to] establish [an authentic relative truth] is Once it has been established that not only can nothing remain as similar to grabbing onto a plant that is rotten from its it appears in the face of ultimate investigation (as illustrated by the root while one is being carried away by a river. It may be example of the elephant), we must also understand that things can- argued, “We do not assert any probandum on the ulti- not retain their apparent status even on a relative level when sub- mate level, and so mere relative [truth] is delightful to mitted to analysis (as indicated by the example of the dysfunctional behold [only] so long as it is not investigated. If, how- cow). Having understood this much, how could one assert a divi- ever, it is investigated, it cannot withstand the load of sion of relative phenomena based on causal efficacy? The functional 46 establishing appearances as divine rongzom’s view on madhyamaka 47

and the nonfunctional will have become indistinguishable and ele- exclaims, “When one realizes that there is no property of a proban- phants, cows, and goats will be equally mere appearances. Rongzom dum whatsoever, then all is at the same level of nonexistence.”130 concludes, “How could this [reference to apparently efficacious rel- The Prāsaṅgikas are generally thought to operate primarily ative phenomena] make the label ‘authentic relative’ applicable, and through prāsaṅga, a reductio type of argument, as the means for how is this view different from that of an ordinary mundane indi- arriving at an insight into emptiness. Thus, no commonly accepted vidual? To hold such a view that isolates [the relative from the ulti- subject is required as a basis for debate. Instead, the opponent’s mate] is a cause for amazement!”128 assertion is simply propelled ad absurdum by exposing its inher- To underscore the fallacy of a view that isolates the two truths ent inconsistencies, without the formulation of an antithesis on from each other, Rongzom relates the story of a king whose desire behalf of the Prāsaṅgika himself. When Rongzom argues against was insatiable, and who was not satisfied even when coming to share the possibility of a probandum being established, such statements, the throne of the gods with Indra. He therefore fell from heaven like his arguments against the authentic relative, resonate with a down to earth, back into the realm of men, and only then discov- Prāsaṅgika approach that, apart from revealing the flaws of the ered what he had lost. Struck by despair, he died of grief, destroyed opponent’s assertion, refrains from making any claims on its own. by his own greedy desire. Rongzom uses this insatiable craving to Rongzom uses the same approach in the concise Black Snake Dis- Page 100 illustrate the detrimental consequences of believing in an authen- course, when he replies to an opponent (pūrvapakṣa) who wants to tic relative truth: “If, since all phenomena are ultimately pacified know what Rongzom is out to prove: “Apart from merely annul- beyond all mental constructs, one sees no probandum whatsoever ling your wicked views, we do not prove anything. Although con- to be proven, and yet at the same time still perceives certain char- ventionally this may be called the view of great equality, there is not acteristics of an authentic relative reality that contains substantial the slightest concept of view.”131 While some of these passages may properties to be abandoned or accepted, that is an extremely inap- sound similar to the approach that Mipham explains as Prāsaṅgika, propriate apprehension, and a cause for amazement.”129 we must keep in mind that Rongzom is not explaining Madhya- Rongzom proceeds to establish the equality of all perceptions maka, but criticizing it. through the well-known example of a rope perceived as a snake. One We have seen Rongzom arguing against a separation of the may first perceive the rope to be a snake and later come to see it as a relative truth into two categories, one less unreal than the other. rope. Yet the rope can also be understood to consist of parts, which According to Rongzom, the inseparability of the two truths is a in themselves again have parts, and so on ad infinitum. An analy- factor that distinguishes the view of Tantra from that of Madhya- sis of what was originally perceived as a snake thus ends up as an maka. Rongzom explains in Entering the Way of the Great Vehicle: understanding of emptiness. However, Rongzom points out, even “The Mādhyamikas assert that all phenomena are withoutsvabhāva the subtle emptiness of the particles in the rope is in fact only estab- . . . but since they do not abandon the concept of two truths, their lished with reference to entities. And since entities themselves are view does not qualify as nondual.”132 not established, emptiness becomes equally unestablished. Thus, he Throughout Rongzom’s writings, we find ample evidence that for 48 establishing appearances as divine rongzom’s view on madhyamaka 49

him a separation of the two truths, in the sense of conceptually iso- rability of the two truths begins to dawn with the tantras, yet it is lating them from each other and ascribing to them each their own only fully perfected in the Great Perfection. When an imaginary ontological status, is an error in the extreme. This also resonates opponent inquires why the Madhyamaka does not set forth such a with Mipham’s Prāsaṅgika presentation.133 In Entering the Way of view of inseparability, Rongzom states that as long as one believes the Great Vehicle, Rongzom says, “If one asserts that there is some- both truths to be true, one will never succeed in discarding the dual- thing to be authentically established, then all the particularities of istic mindset. One could propose that ultimately the two truths the relative—however many there are—are likewise suited to be are inseparable without giving up the idea that illusory phenomena established. If, [however], one does not assert that there is anything exist on the relative level. Thus, even when attempting to establish to be established authentically, then all the particularities of the rel- dharmatā as nondual, one would still retain a dualistic perspective. ative will be on the same level [of nonestablishment].”134 The person who falls into this trap, Rongzom continues, might Thus Rongzom argues that both levels of truth, the relative and argue that what exists by way of imputation is ultimately free from the ultimate, are equally svabhāva-less. He once more points out mental constructs and therefore similar to illusion, yet he will not the futility and absurdity of considering everything to be ultimately assert the same on the relative level, for he cannot accept that phe- unborn and yet continue to divide the relative into the dualism of nomena should lack substantial efficacy even conventionally. Thus, Page 101 authentic and false, thereby objectifying relative phenomena by even while examining the characteristics of substantial existence perceiving them as entities that are to be accepted or rejected. and concluding that indeed such existence is unestablished, one will In the Black Snake Discourse,135 Rongzom explains the differing still not have mentally discarded the two ontological modes. Rong- approaches found within the Buddhist vehicles through the exam- zom illustrates his point by referring to appearances (snang ba): as ple of a black snake’s reflection appearing in water. This discussion long as one assumes that there is an appearance that can be taken as illustrates well Rongzom’s critique of the Madhyamaka for failing to the subject (chos can, dharmin) or used as an illustration (mtshan recognize the indivisibility of the two truths. Rongzom argues that gzhi, dṛṣtānta) in argument, and as long as one considers this prop- the Mādhyamikas claim that, although in reality the snake’s reflec- erty or illustration to be free from mental constructs (spros bral, tion is not substantially established and thus a mere illusion, it can niṣprapañca) and thus mere illusion, one still conceptualizes the nevertheless perform a relative function. Therefore, a Mādhyamika characteristics of appearances. Therefore, the view of great equal- will only dare to approach the snake’s reflection if he possesses a ity remains yet to be accomplished, for by identifying a particular remedy or skillful means that can be applied against the illusory appearance and then concluding that this indeed is beyond mental snake. In this way, Rongzom argues that, among the four types of constructs, the appearance aspect (snang ba’i cha) and the empty existence (yod pa, bhāva),136 the Mādhyamikas do not accept ulti- aspect (stong pa’i cha) become temporarily separated. mate existence (don dam par yod pa), yet they do believe in relative These explanations on the Mādhyamikas’ lack of realization of existence (kun rdzob tu yod pa) and imputed existence (btags su yod the inseparability of the two truths are very telling, for they spec- pa). Rongzom, furthermore, explains that the view of the insepa- ify that appearances’ aspect and their empty nature must be seen as 50 establishing appearances as divine rongzom’s view on madhyamaka 51

inseparable for the view to qualify as great equality. Thus any objec- pure, they could not be equal, and unless everything is absolutely tification of the relative truth that specifies “authentic” (yang dag) equal, one cannot establish the truth of purity. relative principles would separate the two truths and prevent one from the sudden, full, and direct realization of the actual nature. 3.3 The view of equality is also explained as equality inseparable from Rongzom’s Influence on Mipham’s purity. Let us consider a statement from Rongzom’s commentary to Madhyamaka the Garland of Views as Oral Instructions: “The Mādhyamikas are Present-day scholars of the Nyingma school often portray Rong- attached to the relative truth as being the experiential domain of zom as a proponent of Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka and see Mipham impure characteristics.”137 Here Rongzom not only objects to the as a follower of Rongzom’s Prāsaṅgika. We shall now examine Madhyamaka belief in an authentic relative truth and its view of Mipham’s interpretation of Madhyamaka, especially his promotion the two truths as separate identities, but also to the view of the rel- of the “unity of appearance and emptiness” (snang stong zung ’jug) ative as impurity. This underscores Rongzom’s tantric perspective and compare this with Rongzom’s view. and his commitment to purity. Rongzom draws the dividing lines We have noted that the Madhyamaka, in Rongzom’s view, does between Sūtra and Mantra based on a) whether relative truth is rei- not realize the inseparability of the two truths. This position, how- Page 102 fied as distinct from the ultimate, as in the case of Madhyamaka, and ever, contradicts Mipham’s common assertion that the unity of the b) whether, on the relative level, appearances are perceived as purity two truths (bden gnyis zung ’jug) is the hallmark of the Prāsaṅgika’s (Mantra) or impurity (Sūtra). Thus, for Rongzom, there is a clear realization.138 This difference of opinion is not surprising, as Rong- connection between objectification of the relative and the view of zom may not have been aware of Candrakīrti and what Mipham impurity. For a tantrika like Rongzom, the Madhyamaka separa- interprets as his characteristic transcendence of the two-truths tion of ultimate and relative truths and the ensuing division of the dichotomy. One might therefore take Rongzom’s criticism of relative into authentic and inauthentic aspects disparage the cen- Madhyamaka philosophy as an indication that he only had knowl- tral esoteric notions of unity, equality, and purity. By setting forth edge of Yogācāra-Madhyamaka and Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka. Yet an authentic relative and ascribing it a more genuine mode of exis- Mipham often claims to rely on Rongzom as a source for his Madh- tence than what is dismissed as the mistaken relative, one is blinded yamaka presentation. In the Speech of Delight, Mipham’s foremost to the ultimate truth of great equality. Moreover, this equality is Madhyamaka treatise, he lists both Rongzom and Longchen Rab- not realized, as the Mādhyamikas would have it, by a negation of jam as central sources of reference and inspiration for his exegesis relative phenomena. The ultimate equality, the nature of all phe- of Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka.139 The commentator nomena, is inseparable from relative appearances, the appearances on the Beacon of Certainty, Troshul Jamdor,140 remarks, “Whenever of great purity. In conclusion, according to Rongzom’s tantric per- Mipham Rinpoche (’Jam mgon bla ma) spoke of the Prāsaṅgika sys- spective, appearances are by nature pure and therefore need not be tem or the difference between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika, he always negated. As there is nothing to discard within their purity, every- based himself on Rongzom Paṇḍita and Longchen Rabjam.”141 thing remains as great equality. If phenomena were not universally How is it that Mipham bases his Prāsaṅgika explanation on Rong- 146 establishing appearances as divine notes 147

Madhyamaka, he nevertheless also suggests that the subject realizing emptiness is teenth century became a fierce promoter of what he termed Prāsaṅgika and contrib- different from the Sūtrayāna subject in that realization. Tsongkhapa describes the uted greatly to the domination of the Prāsaṅgika view. However, before Tsongkhapa’s subject in the esoteric context as great bliss (bde ba chen po, mahāsukha). See for strong propagation of Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka, Longchen Rabjam already clearly instance Komarovski (2000): 73, n. 103. preferred his version of Prāsaṅgika over the Svātantrika. See chapter 12 of Longchen 101 Sngags rim chen mo. Rabjam’s Precious Wish-fulfilling Treasury. 102 The Stages of Mantra (Snags rim chen mo), 20-21: spyir theg pa che chung stong pa 111 Collected Works of Rongzom, vol. 2, 20-21: don dam par skye ’gag med par ’dod pa ni nyid kyi shes rab kyis mi ’byed par thabs kyis ’byed dgos la/ khyad par du theg pa chen dbu ma dang mthun no/ kun rdzob tu phung po khams dang skye mched sgyu ma tsam po la gnyis su phye ba yang zab mo rtogs pa’i shes rab kyis mi ’byed kyi/ thabs kyis dbye du lta ba’ang mthun no/ bye brag tu na sgyu ma’i mtshan nyid de dag kyang yongs su dgos . . . dag pa’i lha’i mtshan nyid du lta ba dang/ bden pa gnyis kyang dbyer med par lta bas Lopez observes, “Thus, for Tsongkhapa, there is no difference in the profundity of bye brag tu byas pa’// the highest wisdom in Sūtra and Tantra. The superiority of the Tantric vehicle must 112 Speech of Delight, 116: rnam grangs pa’i don dam khas len dang bcas pa de rtsal du bton therefore be found in the domain of method.” (Lopez (2000): 524) nas ’chad pa rang rgyud pa’i mtshan nyid yin la/ rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam khas 103 Lessing and Wayman (1983): 92: /sngags kyi rgyud sde thams cad kyi lta ba thal ’gyur len kun bral rtsal du bton nas ’chad pa thal ’gyur ba yin pa shes par bya’o// ro// Khedrup later indicates that Nāgārjuna likewise did not assert the view of Tan- 113 See Speech of Delight, 62. tra being higher than that of Madhyamaka (334). 114 Collected Works of Rongzom, vol. 1, 323: de la rnam grangs kyi don dam pa ni/ spros pa’i 104 For instance, Do-ngag Tenpay Nyima (Differentiation of Views and Tenets, 83) phyogs re chad pa dang/ phyogs re ma chad pa’i blo’i yul te/ ’di’ ltar stong pa nyid bco’ brg- describes appearance as the aspect of luminosity: ’on kyang snang cha nas gzhal na/ yad las stsogs pa/ don dam pa’i rnam grangs kyi tshig gis bstan par bya ba’i tshig gi don dpal ma h’a yo ga’i lugs kyi snang cha ’od gsal ba’i rang bzhin kun ’rdzob dag pa chen po’i rnams so// spros pa dang bral ba’i don dam pa ni/ spros pa thams cad yongs su zhi ba’i lta ba dang/ a nu yo ga’i lta ba snang cha nas kun tu bzang po gdan gsum lha yi dkyil rang bzhin gang yin pa’o// While we find the term “severed” (chad pa) in Rongzom’s ’khor a ti yo ga’i lta ba zab mo gzhi snang lhun grub kyi dkyil ’khor rnams ni mtshan definition of the figurative, this term is absent in the definition of the nonfigurative. nyid theg par ming yang ma grags pas na mdo sngags kyi lta ba’i khyad par gnam sa Rongzom does not consider exclusion or negation essential for a final understand- Page 103 tsam yod par. “However, if you were to analyze from the standpoint of appearances, ing of the ultimate. then according to the tradition of the glorious Mahāyoga, the appearance aspect is 115 For Mipham the figurative ultimate is an existential negation med( dgag, prasajya- the nature of luminosity, the relative truth, the view of great purity. According to the pratiṣedha) and, as such, still a conceptual construct. Existential negation is distin- view of Anuyoga, the appearance aspect is Samantabhadra, the maṇḍala of the three guished from predicative negation (ma yin dgag, paryudāsa) in that, in predicative divine seats, and according to the profound view of Atiyoga, [the appearance aspect] negation, the affirmation of some property or entity other than the negated is implied is the ground appearances, the spontaneously accomplished maṇḍala. Since even by the negation itself. Existential negation is ultimate in that it leaves nothing implic- such terms [not to mention their meaning] are unknown in the dialectical vehicle, itly affirmed. On the two negations in Indian Buddhism, see Kajiyama (1973). the difference between Sūtra and Mantra is simply [as vast as that] between heaven 116 Collected Works of Rongzom, vol. 2, 18: de yang don dam pa’i lta ba mthun yang kun and earth.” rdzob kyi bye brag gis/ mdo sde dbu ma dang/ rnal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma gnyis su gyes 105 See for instance Karmay (1988) and Wangchuk (2002). (sic) so/ The same classification is found in anonymous textual fragments found at 106 This argument is contrary to John Pettit’s, for instance, who states that the main rea- Tunhuang (see Lang (1990): 130 and n. 12). Yeshe De (Ye shes sde) (ca. 800) in his son for Mipham and Rongzom to comment on the Garland of Views as Oral Instruc- Differentiation of Views (lta ba’i khyad par) mentions Bhāvaviveka and Śāntarakṣita tions was their intention to harmonize the Great Perfection with the highest view of as representatives of these two classifications (see Tauscher (1995): 6, n. 7). the dialectical vehicle, epitomized by Madhyamaka. See Pettit (1999): 86. Although 117 Dreyfus in his article “Would the True Prāsaṅgika Please Stand?” states that Padmasambhava in the Garland of Views as Oral Instructions uses the term Madhya- “Rongzom had a clear preference for Śāntarakṣita’s view, which he described as maka (dbu ma) to describe the view of the higher tantras, we cannot take the simple Yogācāra-Madhyamaka and contrasted favorably with Bhāvaviveka’s Sautrāntika- fact that Rongzom chose to write a commentary on the Garland of Views as Oral Madhyamaka.” Thus, Dreyfus concludes, “for Rong-zom, it is the view that came Instructions as evidence that he tried to harmonize the Great Perfection with Madh- to be classified later as Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka that is to be preferred in yamaka. His other treatises abound with criticism of the Madhyamaka. the context of the Great Perfection.” (Dreyfus (2003): 331) However, no evidence 107 See below, chapter 3.3. supports a perceived compatibility with Dzogchen as a reason for Rongzom to hold 108 See Hayes (1994). Yogācāra-Madhyamaka superior to the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka. In the context of 109 See Dreyfus and McClintock (2003). the passage cited, Rongzom simply states the classifications of Madhyamaka that 110 While the general consensus came to term the supreme view “Prāsaṅgika,” schol- were used in his day, remarking without any reference to Dzogchen that he prefers ars differed widely in how they defined that view. For excellent discussions of this the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka interpretation. subject, see Dreyfus and McClintock (2003). Tsongkhapa, for instance, in the four- 118 See for instance Tauscher (2003): 209. 148 establishing appearances as divine notes 149

119 See Lang (1990). pa tsam ste/ lhag par don ci yang mi sgrub bo/ de la tha snyad du mnyam pa chen po’i 120 See Collected Works of Rongzom, vol. 2, 20: dbu ma’i lta ba mdor bsdus na/ ma ya ste sgyu lta ba zhes ’dogs te/ lta bar zhen pa ni gang yang med do// ma lta bu ’dod pa dang/ a bra ti sti te rab tu mi gnas par ’dod pa’o// Ruegg mentions that 132 Collected Works of Rongzom, vol. 1, 460: dbu ma pa chos rnams rang bzhin myed pa Advayavajra (eleventh century) divided Madhyamaka into Māyopamādvayavādins nyid yin par ’dod pa la/ . . . ’on kyang bden pa gnyis kyi blo mi ’dor bas/ gnyis su myed and Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādins (Ruegg (1981): 58). Rongzom refers to the same par lta ba’i grangs su mi chud de/ subschools using both the Sanskrit names and their Tibetan translations. 133 Speech of Delight, 114-122. Dreyfus remarks on Mipham’s Prāsaṅgika, “Objective 121 Sapaṇ, for example, divides the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādins further into Prāsaṅ- existence is negated by the Prāsaṅgika, according to Mipham, because it involves gika and Svātantrika; see Tauscher (1995): 6 and n. 9. When describing the commen- the provisional separation of the two truths and the assertion of the objective valid- tarial tradition relying on Nāgārjuna, Tsongkhapa presents briefly some opinions of ity of the conventional.” (Dreyfus (2003): 336). earlier scholars regarding the divisions of Madhyamaka, and indicates that to him 134 Collected Works of Rongzom, vol. 1, 422: gang gi tshe yang dag par bsgrub par bya ba these divisions are not acceptable. Later commentators on Tsongkhapa’s particular zhig yod par ’dod pa de’i tshe ni/ kun rdzob kyi bye brag ji snyed du dbye ba thams cad viewpoint disagree on whether he implied that the earlier scholars misinterpreted the kyang de bzhin du bsgrub tu rung bar ’gyur la/ gang gi tshe yang dag par sgrub par relevant assertions of Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādins and Māyopamādvayavādins, or bya ba zhig bsgrub tu myed par ’dod pa de’i tshe/ kun rdzob kyi bye brag thams cad ’go whether he meant that their identification of Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādins with mnyam par ’gyur ro// Prāsaṅgika and Māyopamādvayavādins with Svātantrika is incorrect (see Napper 135 Collected Works of Rongzom, vol. 2, 66-68. (1989): 403-404). 136 The four types of yod pa (bhāva) are 1. kun rdzob tu yod pa, 2. rdzad su yod pa, 3. btags 122 See Tillemans (2003). su yod pa, and 4. don dam par yod pa. 123 According to the higher esoteric teachings there is nothing to be abandoned since 137 Collected Works of Rongzom, vol. 1, 327: dbu ma pa ni kun rdzob kyi bden pa/ yongs su everything is already pure. Secondly, there are no distinctions to be made with regard ma dag pa’i mtshan nyid kyi spyod yul la mngon par zhen pa’o/ to either false or true phenomena, for everything is great equality. 138 See, e.g., Speech of Delight, 114-116. 124 Collected Works of Rongzom, vol. 1, 434-435. 139 Cf. ibid., 76-78, 116, 604-606. Page 104 125 See Tillemans (2003). 140 Khro shul ’jam rdor. 126 Collected Works of Rongzom, vol. 1, 422. 141 Pettit (1999): 389. 127 Collected Works of Rongzom, vol. 1, 423: ’di lta bu bsgrub pa ni chus khyer ba rtsa 142 Speech of Delight, 84. drungs byung la ’ju’ ba dang ’dra’o/ de la ’di skad du/ don dam par bsgrub par bya ba mi 143 See, e.g., Speech of Delight, 56-58. ’dod na/ kun rdzob tsam ni ma brtags na nyams dga’ ba/ brtags na rigs pa’i spungs mi 144 According to Mahāyoga the relative truth consists of great purity (dag pa chen po). bzod pa yin pas/ rigs pas gnod pa la ’gal ba myed do zhe na/ ’o na kun rdzob du bsgrub See chapter 2.1. pa tsam la rigs pa mi dgos pa zhig na/ snang du ’dra yang don byed nus pa dang mi nus 145 Beacon of Certainty, 5: ’phags yul dpal ldan zla ba dang/ bod na rong zom chos bzang pa’i bye brag gis yang dag pa dang yang dag pa ma yin par rnam par gzhag go zhes pa de gnyis/ dgongs pa gcig dang dbyangs gcig gis/ ka dag stong pa chen po bsgrubs/ chos ’di ka nyid rigs pa ma yin nam/ ’di ltar yang dag par sgrub kyang rung/ re shig tsam du sgrub nas dag pa’am/ gdod nas rang bzhin med pa’i phyir/ bden pa gnyis char ma skyes pas/ kyang rung ste/ rang rang gi sa tshad tsam sgrub par byed pa’i rig pa’i spungs tsam yang 146 Speech of Delight, 84. mi bzod na/ tha snyad tsam yang ji ltar ’grub par gyur/ dper na dgra’i dpung ’joms par 147 Candrakīrti classically asserts so in Madhyamkāvatāra VI, 38. byed pa’i glang po che la dpung gi tshogs khur nas tho ba’i lcags kyis bskul ba’i spungs 148 Primordial purity (ka dag), a principle presented in Atiyoga, is distinguished from bzod pa lta bu ma yin du zin kyang/ zhing tsam rmo ba’i bya ba byed pa’i ba la’ang gnya’ the purity (dag pa) taught as the relative truth in Mahāyoga and from the “complete shing khur nas/ ’khri shing gi lcag gis bskul ba’i spungs tsam yang mi bzod na/ zhing rmo purity” (rnam dag) used in the context of Atiyoga. Germano remarks, “Ka Dag is a ba’i bya ba byed ces bya ba’i tha snyad kyang ji ltar ’jug ste/ ra skyes kyi spungs dang bye neologism only found in Great Perfection works, which literally means pure (Dag) brag du gyur pa ci zhig yod/ from the letter ‘A,’ Ka being the first letter of the Tibetan alphabet . . . Longchenpa 128 Collected Works of Rongzom, vol. 1, 423: yang dag pa’i kun rdzob ces kyang ji ltar tha consistently explains this ‘original purity’ as referring to emptiness (sTong Pa Nyid ).” snyad ’jug ste/ ’jig rten phal pa’i lta ba dang bye brag du gyur pa ci zhig yod/ ’di lta bu’i (Germano (1992): 914-915) lta ba ya bral ’chang ba di ni/ shin tu ngo mtshar ba’i gnas yin no// 149 Tibetan text on p. 115. 129 Collected Works of Rongzom, vol. 1, 424: chos thams cad don dam par spros pa thams 150 While Mipham at times extols the virtues of the gradual Svātantrika approach that cad nye bar zhi ste/ bsgrub par bya ba gang yang mi sgrub par lta bzhin du/ yang dag characteristically operates by making distinct claims regarding the two truths, he pa’i kun rdzob kyi mtshan nyid spang ba dang blang bar bya ba’i rdzas yod par ’dzin pa makes it clear that in the final analysis all such claims will necessarily be transcended de ni/ shin tu mi tsham pa ’dzin pa ste ngo mtshar ba’i gnas yin no// (see, e.g., Speech of Delight, 504). 130 Collected Works of Rongzom, vol. 1, 425: bsgrub par bya ba’i chos gang yang myed par 151 The adhyamaka M being considered the highest philosophical school within the rtogs pa na/ don thams cad myed par ’go mnyam mo// Sūtra system. 131 Collected Works of Rongzom, vol. 2, 69: kho bo cag ni khyad cag gi lta ba ngan pa zlog 152 Ketaka Jewel, 3b.

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Page 123 I ̖* ̖ c̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖̖ ̖ *ê ̖ &̖̖A ̖ 3̖ ̖ǖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ! ̖ ̖ Pee½̖ c̖ ̖ ̖ P es̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ h¾ ̖̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ C̖ ̖̖̖ ̖ 53 śă ś :śśśś·ś( ś śś ś 9ś ̖Ȏ̖ ̖Oś Dś Cģ ś h Fś M 3ś ś @<· śś 4 śś7ś ̖ ̖̖ ̖ R ̖ ̖> ̖A ̖ c̖ c̖? !̖̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ &̖ȳ,̖ ̖ ̖A ̖¶ ̖ ·̖?̖ ̖ ,̖̖ ̖?,̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ =̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ = ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ =̖ ̖A ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ 9 ̖6 ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖6̖̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖?̖̖ & ̖,'̖ \ ̖ ̖̖g̖̖ŕ ̖R ̖I ̖Ã̖?̖̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖ ̖5̖,'̖ d)ȝ ²ȝ 48 freedom from extremes

STUDIES IN INDIAN AND TIBETAN BUDDHISM The Structure and Contents of Go rams pa’s Text Distinguishing the Views231 is a middling-size work that Go rams pa says was influenced by the Madhyamaka teachings he received from Byams chen rab ’byams pa, and by the oral commentary on the texts of the founders (gong ma) 232 of the Sa skya school he received from the “great Mus pa,” who, from FREEDOM the language that Go rams pa uses, may have been ill at the time of composition of the work. (We know that Mus chen died that same year.) Go rams FROM EXTREMES pa was urged to write the work by another of his teachers, Gung ru Shes rab bzang po. Gung ru ba had a reputation as a polemicist, and so it is not sur- Gorampa’s “Distinguishing the Views” and prising that he should have been the force behind the composition of Distin- guishing the Views.233 The work was completed within a short timespan in late the Polemics of Emptiness January or early February of 1469 at Go rams pa’s home monastery of Rta nag gser gling in the midst of a phase of tremendous literary activity that coin- cided with the period during which the monastery was being constructed.234 José Ignacio Cabezón and The scribe was Chos rje Dgon po dbang phyug, whom Gdong thog Bstan pa’i rgyal mtshan lists as one of Go rams pa’s twelve chief students.235 Geshe Lobsang Dargyay The text is lucid and structurally very simple, with little complexity in Page 124 its subdivisions (sa bcad). It can roughly be divided into seven parts: three short sections that describe, respectively, Dol po pa’s, Tsong kha pa’s, and Go rams pa’s own views, followed by three much longer sections in which he refutes each of the first two views and sets forth his own position in more detail, responding to possible objections along the way. The seventh and last section of the work consists of 36 stanzas summarizing his arguments. Since these verses—probably meant as a mnemonic device to help students retain the gist of the arguments—add little to what is found in the already lucid prose text, we do not translate them here. Go rams pa uses as a structural device the widely accepted Buddhist notion that in philosophy, as in ethics, one should follow a middle way (madhyamaka, dbu ma) between extremes.236 Distinguishing the Views is then structured so as to demonstrate how Go rams pa’s interpretation of the Indian Madhyamaka, which he calls the “Madhyamaka qua freedom from proliferations” (spros bral kyi dbu ma) or “Madhyamaka qua freedom from extremes” (mtha’ bral dbu ma), is the true middle way between two extremist views prevalent in his day: the eternalistic view of the Jo nang pas, and the nihilistic view of the Dga’ ldan pas. The expression “freedom from proliferations” or spros bral (nisprapanca) has a long history in the Madhyamaka Wisdom Publications • Boston literature of both India and Tibet.237 Go rams pa, however, uses the term as much denominatively as descriptively, which is to say that he uses the term introduction 49 50 freedom from extremes

to designate his particular brand of Madhyamaka—that is, as an appella- rams pa believes that the fourfold negation found in the tetralemma or tion or trademark for a lineage of Madhyamaka philosophical speculation catu˝ko˛i—not x, not non-x, not both, and not neither—is to be taken liter- that includes, but is not limited to, the Sa skya pas—in much the same way ally as a repudiation of, for example, existence, nonexistence, both, and nei- as emptiness of what is other (gzhan stong) came to be the trademark of the ther without the need for qualification. Hence, contra Tsong kha pa, existence Jo nang pas, and Pr›saºgika that of the Dge lugs pas.238 itself is an object of negation for him, there being no need to add the qualifier It is clear that Go rams pa believes that his theory of emptiness represents “ultimate” (as in “ultimate existence”) to make this negation palatable. the orthodox Sa skya pa interpretation. This does not mean that Go rams To explain how existence can be repudiated, Go rams pa resorts to a the- pa relies only on Sa skya pa sources. The lineage of the Madhyamaka that ory that bifurcates the ultimate truth into two parts. Emptiness for him is he describes in the text is exceedingly eclectic but, he says, quite old, includ- therefore of two kinds: the emptiness that is the endpoint of rational analy- ing both the Rngog (eleventh century) and Pa tshab (b.1055) lineages, and sis, and the emptiness that yogis fathom by means of their own individual even Mar pa and his student Mi la ras pa. Although he mentions Rngog’s gnosis.241 The first of these—the emptiness that is arrived at rationally—is Gsang phu lineage,239 Go rams pa calls Pa tshab Nyi ma grags “the one who of two kinds: the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena. introduced the Madhyamaka as freedom from extremes [into Tibet],” indi- Emptiness as the byproduct of rational analysis—that is, the emptiness of cating his greater allegiance to Pa tshab, and therefore to the tradition of truth—is not the real ultimate truth, but only an analogue (rjes mthun) Candrakırti.240 Despite his proclivity for Pa tshab’s lineage—that is, for the thereof, or, put another way, it is the ultimate truth in name only (rnam Pr›saºgika view—Go rams pa is reticent to identify himself as exclusively grangs pa). Since the cognition of this quasi-ultimate requires that the mind Pr›saºgika, and there are probably several reasons for this. First, Tsong kha entertain the empty/nonempty dichotomy, where the first element of the pa had already co-opted this term, and Go rams pa obviously wished to dis- pair is privileged, the conceptual understanding of emptiness must eventu- Page 125 tance his interpretation of the Madhyamaka from that of the Dga’ ldan pas. ally be negated in order to achieve an understanding of the highest form of Secondly, Go rams pa’s unequivocal adherence to the “freedom from emptiness that is the object of yogic gnosis. This latter form of emptiness— extremes” doctrine precludes advocating any strong duality, even the the emptiness that is mystically fathomed—is the real ultimate truth (don Sv›tantrika/ Pr›saºgika one. dam dngos, don dam mtshan nyid pa). Being ineffable, it cannot be expressed in linguistic terms, since it is beyond all proliferative dichotomizing. Both the grasping at duality and at nonduality must be negated, so Nonetheless, for Go rams pa understanding emptiness rationally is a nec- that any object that is grasped in terms of the four extremes cannot essary prerequisite to understanding it in its true, nonanalytical form. be found. It is the non-grasping [of things] in those [terms] that we The style of Distinguishing the Views is quasi-formal and philosophical.242 call “the realization of the Madhyamaka view.” But if there arises a As a scholastic, Go rams pa shares a great deal in common with his oppo- one-sided grasping of the form “this is the Madhyamaka view,” then nents—both doctrinally and methodologically—making it unnecessary for whether one grasps things as empty or as not empty, one has not him to prove petty points on which he knows there is bound to be agree- gone beyond grasping at extremes, and this is not the Middle Way. ment. Where there is disagreement, Go rams pa gives reasons—reasons for why his opponents’ views are implausible and for why his views are supe- Finally, Go rams pa has a wide-ranging and holistic view of the Madhyamaka rior. In some instances, he shows how a view subscribed to by his opponent that permits his reliance on Indian texts usually classified in Tibet as is internally inconsistent. In other cases, he argues that a view is contradic- Sv›tantrika—for example, Jñ›nagarbha’s Satyadvayavibhaºga—making it tory to the positions of texts that are considered authoritative (the texts of difficult for him to side with Candrakırti’s Pr›saºgika to the exclusion of Indian Buddhism—that is, scriptures or the writings of the great Indian other systems of thought. philosophers). Much of Distinguishing the Views is in fact concerned with Go rams pa’s interpretation of Madhyamaka is committed to a more literal arguments of this kind, and so it is as much a polemic over the interpreta- reading of the Indian sources than either Dol po pa’s or Tsong kha pa’s, which tion of texts as it is a polemic over tenets. is to say that it tends to take the Indian texts at face value. For example, Go introduction 51 52 freedom from extremes

his position he cites Rje btsun Grags pa rgyal tshan so as to demonstrate The Refutation of Dol po pa that even the great founders of the tradition were aware of Jo nang pa-like Go rams pa makes it clear that his refutation of Dol po pa’s theory of empti- views, and rejected them. ness is based on Red mda’ ba’s critique of the Jo nang pas. His goal is to demonstrate that the Jo nang pa view is non-Buddhist:243 The Refutation of Tsong kha pa It is not the purport of any of the sÒtra traditions, whether Mah› Go rams pa was not the first critic of Tsong kha pa in the field of Madhya- or Hına y›nist. It is incompatible with all of the four [Buddhist] maka. Five years prior to the composition of Distinguishing the Views, the philosophical schools, and it is not accepted by any Mah›y›nist, founder of Dga’ ldan had already been the object of a polemical attack by whether Indian or Chinese. Hence, it cannot but fall outside of Stag tshang lo ts› ba in his famous Grub mtha’ kun shes (written in 1463).245 the [bounds of the] Buddhist tradition. But even if it is not the first Madhyamaka polemic directed at Tsong kha pa, Distinguishing the Views is arguably the more wide-ranging. Go rams Dol po pa’s theory of emptiness is not consistent with the view of the pa’s refutation of Tsong kha pa is extensive—much more extensive than his Hınay›na schools, says Go rams pa, because Hınay›nists do not accept the treatment of Dol po pa, for example. It is also very detailed and complex. fact that conventional things are empty of their own nature. Hınay›nists It would be beyond the scope of this introduction to discuss it in its entirety. would thus reject Dol po pa’s claim that some things are “empty of them- Suffice it to mention some highlights of the argument, using Go rams pa’s selves” (rang stong). Dol po pa’s theory is not consistent with the views of own outline as a basis. N›g›rjuna, Go rams pa claims, because by exempting the ultimate from the Go rams pa accuses Tsong kha pa of holding a nihilistic interpretation of Page 126 same negative dialectic that deconstructs conventional reality, Dol po pa’s the Madhyamaka. This is somewhat ironic, given that this is precisely the theory implies that there is a form of emptiness that is different from any charge that Tsong kha pa levels against the neither existence nor nonexistence of the three forms explained above.244 Finally, he says, it is not consistent (yod min med min) view to which Go rams pa subscribes. In one sense at with the views of Maitreya, Asaºga, and Vasubandhu because it insists that least, Go rams pa’s accusations of nihilism are puzzling, for his central the- the dependent is empty of its own nature, whereas the Cittam›tra main- sis is that Tsong kha pa and his followers do not go far enough in their nega- tains that the dependent exists substantially. Go rams pa then invokes the tion. While agreeing with the Dga’ ldan pas concerning the need to opinion of his teacher Rong ston pa to the effect that the Jo nang pa is a repudiate true existence, Go rams pa maintains that both the emptiness that “system that, while having strong affinities to the Cittam›tra, never man- is that very negation and its apprehension/conceptualization must also be ages to reach the Middle Way.” This section concludes with Go rams pa’s negated, a view that is anathema to Tsong kha pa. But according to Go rams jibes at what is perhaps the position of his rival, Sh›kya mchog ldan, a pa it is precisely this—Tsong kha pa’s grasping at emptiness—that makes scholar who, while never abandoning his Sa skya pa affiliation, is known to him a nihilist. As Go rams pa says, “Those who grasp at emptiness have not have had strong affinities for the emptiness of what is other perspective of the gone beond falling into the extreme of nihilism.” Jo nang pas: For Tsong kha pa, the object of the analytical/rational/conceptual understanding of emptiness is the real ultimate truth. For Go rams pa it is a con- Certain persons of coarse mental faculty, holding the eternalistic ventional (and not an ultimate) truth. Put another way, for Tsong kha pa, view [of the Jo nang pas] secretly in their hearts, take sides with both inference and yogic gnosis understand the same object—emptiness— the philosophical views of others for the sake of diplomacy, and albeit in different ways. For Go rams pa only yogic gnosis, which is non- claim that the Sa skya and Jo nang pa schools are not incompat- analytical and nonconceptual, is capable of perceiving the true (mtshan nyid ible as regards their philosophical views. pa) ultimate. In Go rams pa’s view, the dichotomizing tendency of the mind that culminates in extremist proliferations (existence/nonexistence, and so Go rams pa sees this as a sellout of the Sa skya tradition, and in support of introduction 53 54 freedom from extremes

forth) is built into the very structure of conceptual thought and, as such, that the mind attributes to objects, whereas for Go rams pa it lies with the any object of conceptual thought, even emptiness, is of necessity contami- very proliferative character of the conceptual mind itself, an aspect of men- nated with the type of dualistic proliferation that is the Madhyamaka’s tal functioning that cannot be entirely eliminated through the selective object of negation. That is why emptiness as the object of conceptual negation of a specific quality (true existence), requiring instead the use of a thought cannot be the real ultimate truth: method (the complete negation of all extremes) that brings dualistic thinking to a halt. In brief, if one accepts that the direct object of the conceptual Given this view, it is not surprising that Go rams pa should repudiate the thought that apprehends things as truthless...is the real ultimate law of double negation, for clearly the negation of existence does not for him truth, then one would have to accept that the generic image (don imply the acceptance of nonexistence. He also rejects the Dga’ ldan pa spyi) of the ultimate truth is the ultimate truth. It would be like charge that the yod min med min view is tantamount to the view of Hwa accepting the generic image of the pot to be the pot. shang—that is, to quietism—claiming that this charge “comes about due to the blessing of demons for the purpose of degenerating the essence of the Hence, everything, including emptiness qua object of conceptual thought, doctrine.” His defense against this charge is, again, quite interesting: is an object of the Madhyamaka critique, and this means that it must be negated—not simply negated as lacking mere inherent existence (as Tsong The Chinese H[w]a shang [believes] that, without analyzing the kha pa maintains), but negated in toto through the fourfold dialectic. object, reality, one should negate ordinary conceptual thoughts Go rams pa is astute in anticipating the Dge lugs objection to this view. and think of nothing whatsoever, and this he accepts to be the Like Go rams pa, Tsong kha pa also believes that emptiness is the object of realization of the ultimate view... We, on the other hand, set forth Page 127 the Madhyamaka critique, not because it is itself to be negated, but because reality as an object using the reasoning that is explained in the its true existence is to be negated. Go rams pa, however, calls this “the decep- Madhyamaka textual tradition. In so doing, we individually tive blithering of individuals of little intelligence and merit, the demonic repudiate each of the conceptions [of the various thoughts] that words that slander the ‘freedom from proliferations view,’ which is the heart grasp at extremes, and at the end [of this process] we reserve the of the teachings.” His reason for leveling this invective against Tsong kha term realization of the Madhyamaka view to refer to precisely that pa is interesting. Why should the Madhyamaka texts claim that all views not-finding of any of the extremes of proliferation, such as exis- and conceptual constructs are to be abandoned if there is one—empti- tence and nonexistence. ness—that should not? Go rams pa implies that Tsong kha pa’s view makes the fourfold structure of the catu˝ko˛i meaningless because it subsumes the Hence, the Hwa shang view repudiates the very process of analysis, while entire Madhyamaka critique into a qualified first ko˛i (the negation of true Go rams pa sees analysis as a necessary prerequisite, but one that must be existence), making the other three ko˛is (the negation of nonexistence, both, transcended through such techniques as the catu˝ko˛i. and neither) pointless. For Go rams pa, the truth of things comes to be These are some of the main points of Go rams pa’s critique of Tsong kha negated (and their illusory nature understood) not through the negation of pa’s theory of emptiness, but Go rams pa’s critique does not end here, for true existence, but through the negation of all four extremes—existence, he also finds fault with Tsong kha pa’s views of the conventional. For exam- nonexistence, both, and neither—without the need for any qualification.For ple, Go rams pa criticizes Tsong kha pa Tsong kha pa, the problem of ignorance lies in the fact that the mind ✦for not properly understanding the meaning of the Madhyamaka claim improperly reifies objects, imputing real or inherent existence to things that that conventional things are mere labels; lack it. For Go rams pa, the chief problem lies in the fact that the mind oper- ✦for accepting the destruction of things to be a real entity (zhig pa dngos ates through a dichotomizing filter that continuously splits the world into po ba), a tenet that he says is more heterodox than Buddhist; dualities (existent/nonexistent, permanent/impermanent, and so forth). ✦and for his theory of perception across world spheres, the controversial Put another way, for Tsong kha pa the problem lies with the false quality introduction 55 56 freedom from extremes

of Dge lugs monastic universities to this day—and it would not be an under- Dge lugs claim that in order to account for the fact that different types statement to say that each is also considered the greatest Dge lugs intellec- of beings in different realms (humans, hungry ghosts, gods, etc.) per- tual of his respective generation. We know of no Sa skya pa ceive the same object differently, a vessel full of liquid must be said to counter-polemical work that responds to the critiques of Rje btsun pa and contain actual water, actual pus and blood, actual nectar and so forth. ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, though given the risks involved in attempting such Finally, Go rams pa criticizes Tsong kha pa in regard to what he calls the a response, at least in those portions of Central and Western Tibet under dGe five ancillary points, the majority of which are subsumed within what the lugs rule, one cannot consider this particularly surprising. Dge lugs pas call the eight great difficult points (dka’ gnad chen po brgyad) of Go rams pa’s work has continued to exert a major influence in Tibetan the Madhyamaka.246 On almost every count, Go rams pa’s views stand Madhyamaka exegesis up to the twentieth century, even outside the Sa skya counter to those of Tsong kha pa. For example, Go rams pa maintains: tradition. For example, the reviver of Rnying ma scholastic studies in Khams, Gzhan phan mtha’ yas (b. 1800), held Go rams pa’s work in high esteem. And ✦that grasping at the truth of phenomena is an “obscuration to omnis- a later important figure in this same tradition, Mi pham rgya mtsho cience” (shes sgrib), and not an “afflicted obscuration” (nyon sgrib),as (1846–1912), was also greatly influenced by the work of Go rams pa,249 as were Tsong kha pa claims;247 other later figures in Mi pham’s lineage like Bod pa sprul sku (1900/1907–59), ✦that Tsong kha pa reifies the “mere I,” making it into a real entity that whose most important work, Distinguishing the Views and Practices (Lta is found when the self is rationally analyzed; sgrub shan ’byed), makes an allusion to Go rams pa’s work in its very title. ✦that not all grasping at the self of phenomena (chos kyi bdag ’dzin) involves grasping at truth (bden ’dzin), as Tsong kha pa claims;

Page 128 ✦that, contra Tsong kha pa, Ÿr›vakas and pratyekabuddhas, while they Conclusion understand the emptiness of true existence (bden pas stong pa), do not understand the ultimate truth that is the freedom from proliferations, In an article entitled “Books, Canons and the Nature of Dispute,”250 G. which, as has been noted, involves more than just the negation of true Thomas Tanselle bemoans the fact that contemporary literary criticism existence; should have become so enmeshed in disputes—in particular, in the dispute ✦that the Dga’ ldan pas err in their understanding of the existence of over authorial intent, a polemic that consumed so much of the field in the external objects, and in their repudiation of the foundation conscious- late 1980s. But he bemoans this state of affairs not so much because it has ness (kun gzhi) and of self-reflexive cognition (rang rig); distracted the discipline from other more important questions, but because ✦that, contra Tsong kha pa, the Sv›tantrikas and Pr›saºgikas do not dif- of its very character as a polemic. Tanselle believes that dispute and con- fer as regards the subtlety of their object of negation; and, finally, frontation make human beings less rational, and perhaps even less human: ✦that Tsong kha pa has misunderstood the Pr›saºgika repudiation of autonomous (rang rgyud kyi) syllogisms (rtags) and theses (dam bca’). The impulse to have one’s own way and to deny the distasteful con- Entire essays could be devoted to each of these various topics, making it clusions of others is apparently so strong as to suppress in many foolish to attempt any detailed treatment of them here. Suffice it to conclude instances whatever desire human beings have to be coherent.251 by observing that Go rams pa’s critique of Tsong kha pa is extensive, detailed, and provocative. That it was seen as a major response to the Dga’ ldan pa tra- Perhaps the greatest irony about Tanselle’s essay is that the plausibility of its dition is witnessed by the fact that it has been responded to by some of the premise—that polemic is less than desirable as a form of discourse—rests on Dge lugs tradition’s most important apologists. Two of them in particular are his ability as a polemicist. As we have already noted, polemic can sometimes worthy of note: Rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469– 1544/46) and ’Jam be exaggerated and grotesque. It polarizes viewpoints, people and schools. But dbyangs bzhad pa Ngag dbang brtson ’grus.248 Each of these figures was a it is precisely this type of polarization—this “differentiation”—that brings writer of textbooks (yig cha)—the works used as the basis for the curriculum great clarity to issues. In fact, it does this for Tanselle himself, as he analyzes three ways of understanding the madhyamaka 71

In general, all of the advocates of the four philosophical schools (grub mtha’ smra ba) 4 believe that the path they set forth in their own philosophical (grub mtha’) system is the middle way that brings an end to eternalism (rtag) and nihilism (chad). This being the case, the realist schools (dngos por smra 1. Three Ways of Understanding the Madhyamaka ba dag) do not call the last of the four philosophical schools “the Madhya- [The Three Systems of Those Who Claim to Be M›dhyamikas] maka” [that is, “the Middle Way School”], but instead refer to it as the “Ni¯svabh›vav›da” [“the School that Advocates Essencelessness”]. Never- theless, in accordance with the passage that states:

And with yogis too, because of the differences in their intellects, The higher trump the lower.5 [Introduction] the M›dhyamikas [claim that], even though the lower philosophical schools Homage to the spiritual master and to the protector MañjuŸrı. eliminate their [own] versions of the extremes of eternalism and nihilism, since they advocate that things exist by virtue of their nature (ngo bo nyid We place our trust in the Buddha, the sun, kyis yod pa), they fail to go beyond either the extreme of eternalism or that Who possesses the brilliance of enlightened actions (phrin las) that of nihilism.6 That is why they say that [the Madhyamaka] method of elim- guide us, systematically: inating the extremes of eternalism and nihilism is essential to the attain- Page 129 The great horse of (his) compassion (thugs rje) drawing the ment of any of the three enlightenments,7 why they set about the task [of sun-disk of (his) gnosis (ye shes) composing] texts [that demonstrate] how their own philosophical position Over the mountains, his disciples, in appropriate fashion.1 eliminates the extremes of eternalism and nihilism, and how through this [method] the three enlightenments are obtained. The path of the Middle Way (Madhyamaka) eliminates the Furthermore, even though the great M›dhyamikas of the Noble Land [of extremes of eternalism and nihilism. India] have a multitude of different ways of explaining texts and using When it is realized, it bestows upon one the enlightenment of terms, there do not appear any differences in their ultimate philosophical the three vehicles (theg pa gsum gyi byang chub) point of view.8 But in this abode of snow mountains [Tibet], though [peo- According to one’s level of mental [development]. ple] profess the Madhyamaka view, it seems that their fundamental philo- [But the Madhyamaka] has been understood variously in this sophical theories are of three kinds: Land of Snows.2 1. Those who claim that the extreme of eternalism is the Madhyamaka 2. Those who claim that the extreme of nihilism is the Madhyamaka So I will distinguish [between these various interpretations]3 3. Those who claim that the freedom from extremes is the Madhyamaka Based upon the treatises of the holy ones, [The texts that] identify the nature of the true view [of emptiness] (yang dag lta ba) That is the essential purport of N›g›rjuna. The First System [The Views of Dol po pa]

This is [the position advocated by] the omniscient Dol bu ba Shes rab rgyal mtshan,9 who is the epitome of knowledge (mkhyen rab) and compassion, a lord of spiritual practice (nyams) and realization (rtogs pa).

69 three ways of understanding the madhyamaka 73 three ways of understanding the madhyamaka 75

Emptiness (stong pa nyid), [according to him,] is of two kinds: the Reality (chos nyid), the real (yongs grub), the ultimate truth (don dam bden emptiness of own nature (rang gi ngo bos), and the emptiness of other nature pa), is not empty of its own nature.19 It is, however, empty of [everything that (gzhan gi ngo bos). Truth (bden pa) is also of two kinds: conventional (kun is] by nature imaginary or dependent, that is, of all compounded (’du byas) rdzob kyi) truth and ultimate (don dam pa’i) truth. Nature (ngo bo nyid) is phenomena that are by nature conventional.20 This [reality] is the perfect, of three kinds: the imagined (kun brtags), the dependent (gzhan dbang), and unmistaken emptiness, the ultimate truth, the dharmak›ya (chos kyi sku), the the real (yongs grub).10 perfect end (yang dag pa’i mtha’), thusness (de bzhin nyid), the emptiness that The imagined and the dependent are conventional truths. Anything that possesses the best of every quality (rnam pa thams cad kyi mchog dang ldan is a conventional truth is, like a dream and an illusion, from time imme- pa).21 It contains, from time immemorial, infinite good qualities that are morial, empty of its own nature; that is why the emptiness of these [con- noncompounded, such as the powers (stobs),22 the fearlessnesses (mi ’jigs ventional truths] is called “emptiness of own nature.”11 Moreover, since [this pa),23 the marks (mtshan),24 signs (dpe byed) 25 and so forth, for the Avata˙- form of emptiness] is, by nature, but a simple absolute negation (med par saka SÒtra explains it using the example of the great silk cloth of the three dgag pa tsam),12 it is a nihilistic emptiness (chad par stong pa nyid), an inan- thousand [worlds] (stong gsum dar yug chen po),26 and the Tath›gatagarbha imate emptiness (bem po’i stong pa nyid), and a partial emptiness (nyi tshe SÒtra explains it extensively by employing the nine examples.27 Moreover, it ba’i stong pa nyid).13 It is not the ultimate truth—the perfect, unmistaken is something that possesses the qualities of permanence (rtag pa), stability emptiness. (brten pa), eternality (ther zug), and unchangeability (mi ’gyur ba’i chos can);28 It is intending the fact that the conventional is empty of its own [nature] it is limpid (gtsang ba), blissful (bde ba), permanent (rtag pa), and it is the that the Perfection of Wisdom sÒtras say that all phenomena, from form up perfection of the higher self (bdag dam pa’i pha rol tu phyin pa).29 to omniscience, are empty of their own nature.14 The commentaries on the This ultimate truth that is empty of what is other is clearly spoken of in Page 130 purport of those [sÒtras], the philosophical works (rigs tshogs) of the Vener- the later sermons [of the Buddha] (bka’ tha ma)—that is, in the ultimate able N›g›rjuna,15 chiefly teach this self-emptiness, this nihilistic emptiness definitive sÒtras (don dam pa rnam par nges pa’i mdo),30 such as: qua simple negation. But those sÒtras and the treatises [of N›g›rjuna] do 1. the ﬁryadh›ra˚ıŸvarar›ja SÒtra 31 not give a complete and clear exposition of the ultimate truth. When the 2. the D¸dh›dhyaŸayaparivarta SÒtra 32 Perfection of Wisdom sÒtras state that all phenomena, from form up to 3. the ⁄rım›l›[devı]si˙han›da SÒtra 33 omniscience, are nonexistent (med), they intend that teaching—that 4. the Tath›gatagarbha SÒtra 34 [things] are imaginary, illusory, and dreamlike—[to refer to] the depend- 5. the AnÒnatv›pur˚atvanirdeŸa SÒtra 35 ent. They do not teach the real, the ultimate truth, to be nonexistent, false 6. the Mah›bherı SÒtra 36 (rdzun pa), and so forth,16 for the A˝˛as›hasrik›pi˚˜›rtha states: 7. the Jñ›n›lok›la˙k›ra SÒtra 37 8. the RatnacÒda SÒtra 38 The word “nonexistent” 9. the A˚gulim›liya SÒtra,39 and Repudiates all that is imaginary; 10. the Mah›[pari]nirv›˚a SÒtra,40 etc. And the examples of the illusion and so forth Illustrate [the nature of] the dependent. The commentarial literature on these [scriptures] clearly teaches [this doc- Through the teaching that purification is fourfold,17 trine of the emptiness of other] in such texts as the last [three] works of It teaches the real.18 Maitreya,41 such as the the Mah›y›nottaratantra, in the treatises of Asaºga and his brother [Vasubandhu],42 and in the ›rya N›g›rjuna’s devotional works (bstod tshogs), such as the Madhyamakadharmadh›tustava.43 In this [system of Dol po pa], it is because conventional truths are empty of their own natures, and because they have never, from time immemorial, existed in reality, that is, as the ultimate truth, that [this position considers three ways of understanding the madhyamaka 77 three ways of understanding the madhyamaka 79

itself to be] free from the extreme of eternalism. It is because reality, the real, has not been understood either by the great Sv›tantrika scholars of the has never not existed, that it is primordially true, permanent, and so forth; and Noble Land [of India],53 or by the M›dhyamikas who preceded him in it is because of that that [this position considers itself to be] free from the Tibet. Let me here give just a rough overview [of Tsong kha pa’s view] under extreme of nihilism.44 That is why [according to Dol po pa] this is the path of three headings: the Great Madhyamaka free from the extremes, as confirmed by such [pas- 1. His exposition of emptiness, the ultimate sages] as this one from the [Abhidharma]samuccaya: 2. His exposition of appearances, the conventional 3. Some points that follow from those [first two] [To notice] the absence of something in something else is to see the fact [that the former] is empty of [the latter], but what remains in [the former] does exist therein. This [is what it [Tsong kha pa’s Exposition of Emptiness, the Ultimate] means] to understand things exactly as they are. It is called “the nonerroneous”—that is, the perfect and exact—entrance into The ⁄Ònyat›saptati states that since the twelve links [of dependent arising] emptiness.45 arise from the grasping at truth—that is, from grasping at things (dngos po) to be true—this [form of grasping] is the ignorance that is the root of cyclic And also: existence.54 The Catu¯Ÿataka states:

It is with reference to this that the Lord understood things exactly Consciousness is the seed of existence, as they are—that is, what exists as existent, and what does not And its domain is all objects. Page 131 exist as nonexistent.46 When objects are seen to be selfless, The seed of existence is eliminated.55 Therefore, this system is taught in the sÒtras of definitive meaning, and it represents the quintessence (snying po dam pa) of the teachings, com- [That same text] also states that destroying delusion (gti mug) destroys all mented on by Mah›y›na [scholars], and meditated on by accomplished of the afflictions (nyon mongs), and that seeing interdependence (rten ’brel) yogis. On the other hand, those who content themselves simply with the stops the emergence of delusion.56 The commentaries to these [texts] state emptiness of self [-nature] do not properly realize the meaning of the empti- that the ignorance that grasps [things as] true is the root of cyclic existence;57 ness that is the essence of the teachings. This is what [Dol po pa] believes. therefore, the grasping at truth—that is, the grasping of persons and phenomena to be true—is the sole “Madhyamaka object-to-be-negated” (dbu ma’i dgag bya).58 To negate it, it is necessary to [first] identify the “truth” The Second System [That of Tsong kha pa] that is the object constructed (zhen yul) within that [ignorance], and then to repudiate (sun phyung) it.59 [These are the views of] the easterner, Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa As regards the measure (tshad) of the “truth” [that is the object-to-be- [1357–1419],47 a man who beautified himself with the ornaments of such negated, Tsong kha pa says] that the Sv›tantrikas believe that [it refers to] good qualities as compassion and altruism (sems bskyed) and who, with his the existence of objects in their own right,60 without their depending on the fine analytical intellect, commented, on his own (rang stobs kyis),48 on the mind (blo la ma ltos par yul rang gi sdod lugs kyi ngos nas grub pa); if some- purport of the scriptures. From his glorious lips have emerged [such texts thing has such existence, then it must be truly existent (bden par grub pa), as] his expositions of the MÒlamadhyamaka[k›rikas] 49 and the Avat›ra,50 as ultimately existent (don dam par grub pa), and perfectly existent (yang dag well as the Elucidation of the Definitive and Provisional.51 [In these works] par grub pa). Hence, all of these are objects-to-be-negated. But because there seem to be many unique philosophical tenets and interpretations,52 [things] exist nominally (tha snyad du) by virtue of their own characteristic such as when he says that the main point of the Pr›saºgika Madhyamaka (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa),61 because they exist inherently (rang bzhin three ways of understanding the madhyamaka 81 three ways of understanding the madhyamaka 83

gyis grub pa), and exist naturally (ngo bo nyid kyis grub pa) [at the conven- [four] extremes hold a view similar to that of the Chinese Hwa shang.69 tional level], these [latter ways of existing] are not [for the Sv›tantrikas] Hence, the mind that understands reality is the apprehension of emptiness objects-to-be-negated.62 alone—that is, of the emptiness of truth [that is arrived at] after having [According to Tsong kha pa,] the Pr›saºgikas believe that what the negated truth. If one properly identifies [what it means] to apprehend Sv›tantrikas take to be objects-to-be-negated are [only] rough (rags pa) [things] as true (bden ’dzin), one will come to understand that there are objects-to-be-negated and that the subtle one is [as follows]:63 the measure many conceptual thoughts that are neither of the two forms of the grasp- [of something] being truly existent is that it is found when the object ing at truth [of self and phenomena].70 This counteracts all of the mistaken labeled [by a certain name] is searched for (btags don btsal ba’i tshe rnyed views (log rtog) that believe that every object that is apprehended by a con- pa).64 That is itself the subtle object-to-be-negated, and because the ceptual thought is negated by means of the reasoning that analyzes reality.71 Sv›tantrikas do not accept that as an object-to-be-negated, it is a doctrine that is specific to the Pr›saºgika system. [Tsong Kha Pa’s] Exposition of Appearances— The simple negation of such “truth”—[that is, the truth] that is not that Is, of the Conventional [World] 72 found when it is searched for by means of the reasoning that is explained in the Madhyamaka texts—is emptiness; it is a non-affirming negation (med The Sv›tantrika M›dhyamikas accept that nominally (tha snyad du), phe- dgag), and it is the ultimate philosophical viewpoint of the Madhyamaka; nomena exist by virtue of their own characteristic and, since [Tsong kha pa it is the real (mtshan nyid pa) ultimate truth (don dam bden pa) and the ulti- believes that] this is not accepted in the [Pr›saºgika Madhyamaka system], mate reality (gnas lugs mthar thug pa) of phenomena. Once “truth” has been how then does [the Pr›saºgika, according to Tsong kha pa,] posit persons negated in this way, the [concomitant] conceptualization (mngon par zhen and phenomena nominally (tha snyad du)? When one employs terms (tha Page 132 pa) of emptiness as the negation of truth should not be negated,65 for (a) it snyad) such as “This is Devadatta,” or “This is Devadatta’s ear,” and so forth, is a mental state (blo) that understands the reality of that object and (b) the Devadatta and Devadatta’s ear, etc., are posited as existing by virtue of those object-to-be-negated in the Madhyamaka is “truth” alone, and that [con- terms. There is no process of positing [their existence] apart from that one; ceptualization of emptiness] does not grasp [things] as true. and this is what we mean [when we—i.e., Tsong kha pa and his followers— [Objection:] Does this not contradict the passage that states: say that they] nominally exist. When one searches for what it is that is labeled by the terms in those [expressions], nothing is found. Nonetheless, [Things] do not exist, nor are they nonexistent, nor [both] existent causality and so forth [can be] posited as simply labeled by terms. This is a and nonexistent unique [tenet] of this system.73 Nor are they by nature neither.66 Even though the foundation [consciousness] (kun gzhi) is not a part of [Tsong kha pa’s] exposition of the conventional,74 this does not preclude [his for such [passages] state that the reality of objects is the freedom from the attempts to] account for karma and its effects. Given that a karmic action proliferations of all four extremes, and that the mind should not grasp ceases immediately after it has been created, the karmic action does not sur- things in terms of any of the four extremes? vive up to the time of the effect. If this is so, how can a karmic action that [Tsong kha pa replies:] The meaning of that passage is as follows. [Things] has long since ceased give rise to an effect?75 do not exist ultimately, nor are they nonexistent conventionally. Hence, the In this regard, the Vaibh›˝ikas believe that when the karmic action ceases, mind should not apprehend them in those ways. This is what it means.67 there arises [an intermediate entity called] “karmic inexhaustibility” (las kyi [The claim] that things are neither existent nor nonexistent should not be chud mi za ba), and that it is this that gives rise to the effect.76 The Sau- taken literally, for, according to the law of double negation (dgag pa gnyis tr›ntikas believe that there arises [something called] “karmic attainment” kyi rnal ma go bas),68 if something does not exist, it must be nonexistent, (las kyi thob pa), and that it is this that gives rise to the effect.77 The Citta- and if it is not nonexistent, it must exist. Therefore, those who believe that m›tras believe that “latent traces” (bag chags) [are deposited] in the foundation the Madhyamaka view consists of the mind’s nonapprehension of any the consciousness, and that it is these traces that give rise to karma and its three ways of understanding the madhyamaka 85 three ways of understanding the madhyamaka 87

effects.78 But these are systems that accept things differently [from the omniscience] consist of (a) the latent traces of the afflictions and (b) their Pr›saºgika], insofar as they believe karma and its effects to exist by virtue of effect, which is the aspect that causes error [by making things] appear dualis- their very nature (ngo bo nyid kyis grub pa). Having refuted those [other tically (gnyis snang ’khrul pa’i cha).85 views], it is the unique position of [Tsong kha pa’s interpretation of the Pr›saºgika system] that karmic action gives rise to “destruction qua entity” [How Tsong kha pa Identifies the Two Selves] 86 (zhig pa dngos po ba), and it is this, in turn, that gives rise to the effect of the karmic action.79 The [Sv›tantrika] master Bh›vaviveka believes that the mental conscious- At the site of a cup full of water there appear six [different things] to the ness (yid kyi rnam par shes pa) is the person (gang zag).87 This [Pr›saºgika] six classes [of sentient beings]:80 [humans] see water, [pretas] see pus and system [instead maintains] that the referent object (dmigs pa’i yul) of the blood, and so forth. When this occurs, the eye consciousnesses [of these var- thought “I” as it is apprehended by the innate form of self-grasping (ngar ious beings] cannot be distinguished as to whether or not they are in error ’dzin lhas skyes) is the “mere I” (nga tsam);88 how it appprehends it—that is, (’khrul pa) [since they are all accurate in regard to their object, the fluid]. the mode of apprehension—is as truly existent. The first of these [that is, Therefore, just as [that fluid] has a portion of water-substance within it, it the mere “I”] is the person, and the self. The latter [that is, the true exis- has portions of the other substances within it as well, [and each being is wit- tence of the person] is the self of the person. The self of phenomena [Tsong nessing that portion of the liquid that it has a karmic propensity to see].81 kha pa] posits as a kind of independent existence (rang dbang du grub pa)— that is, as a lack of dependence on anything else, which, if it existed, would constitute the reality (de nyid) [of phenomena].89 Some Points that Remain [to Be Discussed]

Page 133 in the Wake of These [Discussions] [How Tsong kha pa Propounds the Differences between This has five [subdivisions]: What the Hına- and Mah›-y›nas Accept as the Objects 1. [How Tsong kha pa] identifies the two obscurations (sgrib pa) to Be Abandoned and Realized [spang rtogs]] 90 2. [How Tsong kha pa] identifies the two selves (bdag) 3. [How Tsong kha pa propounds] the differences between what the All [branches] of the greater and lesser vehicles are similar in that they all Hına- and Mah›-y›nas [accept as] the objects to be abandoned and realize (rtogs pa) emptiness, the mere negation of truth, as explained above. realized (spang rtogs) Since there is nothing greater than this to be realized, there is not the slight- 4. How [Tsong kha pa] accepts external objects (phyi don), given that est difference in regard to their view [of the ultimate].91 [he] does not believe in the foundation [consciousness] (kun gzhi) or Is there then no difference [in the two vehicles] as regards their ability to in reflexive awareness (rang rig) eliminate the obscurations to omniscience? The difference in their ability 5. What it means for there to be no autonomous reasons (rang rgyud kyi to eliminate the obscurations to omniscience [that is, that the Mah›y›na rtags) and no theses (dam bca’) can, and that the Hınay›na cannot, do so,] is due to the difference in the length of their [respective] meditations, and in [the extent to which] they are aided (grogs) by practices like compassion (snying rje) and altruism (sems [How Tsong kha pa Identifies the Two Obscurations [sgrib pa]] 82 bskyed). But there is no antidote to the obscurations to omniscience that is What other M›dhyamikas accept as an obscuration to omniscience (shes different from, or greater than, that previously [explained] view that is the sgrib)—namely, the grasping at the self of phenomena (chos kyi bdag ’dzin)— realization of emptiness. is for this [Pr›saºgika] system an afflicted obscuration (nyon sgrib), for it is a As regards the difference in the [process of] eliminating [the obscura- form of ignorance that is [contained] among the twelve links.83 The tions], since the Ÿr›vaka arhats must have eliminated every afflicted obscu- Avat›rabh›˝ya states that the obscurations to omniscience are the latent traces ration (nyon sgrib), they must have eliminated all grasping at [things as] true of the afflictions (nyon mongs pa’i bag chags).84 Therefore, [the obscurations to (bden ’dzin). The Mah›y›na does not eliminate the grasping at [things as] three ways of understanding the madhyamaka 89 three ways of understanding the madhyamaka 91

true until the attainment of the eighth bhumi, since throughout the seven that believe that if these [things] exist, then they must exist by virtue of their impure bhumis the grasping at the truth [of things] arises in a manifest own characteristic and that if they do not exist by virtue of their own char- (mngon gyur ba) way. Therefore, only afflicted obscurations are eliminated acteristic, then they must be nonexistent. This [interpretation of the during the seven impure bhumis. It is impossible to eliminate the obscura- Madhyamaka, that is, Tsong kha pa’s,] rejects the foundation [conscious- tions to omniscience until the grasping at the truth [of things] and its seeds ness], for it maintains that it is possible to posit a connection between have been overcome. That is why the threshold—or the point from karma and its effects without [having to assume the existence of] a foun- which—the obscurations to omniscience are eliminated is taken to be the dation [consciousness].101 eighth bhumi.92 Both external objects and consciousness must be [equally] operative [as Therefore, [Tsong kha pa’s interpretation of the Pr›saºgika] does not existent things], since the Perfection of Wisdom sÒtras state that they are find acceptable the claims of those who believe that the grasping at the truth equally empty of essence (rang bzhin gyis stong pa); and the Abhidharma [of things] is an obscuration to omniscience—claims like the one that explains that [their] specific and general characteristics (rang dang spyi’i maintains that obscurations to omniscience are divided into nine [grada- mtshan nyid) are equally existent. But [external] objects and consciousness tions: three in each of the three categories of] small, medium and large, with are similar insofar as neither [exist ultimately, since neither] is found when each being eliminated during one of the nine [stages of the] path of medi- their mode of existence as labeled objects—[as objects] labeled by terms— tation (sgom lam), the second bhumi and so forth; but this has yet to be is analyzed. Likewise, there is no difference [between the two in so far as] explained.93 they can both be posited as conventionally existing, that is, [as existing only] There is, [according to Tsong kha pa,] one [type of] individual who, by virtue of the terms [used to designate them]. without obtaining the path of seeing (mthong lam) of any one of the three Page 134 vehicles,94 eliminates the manifest afflictions (nyon mongs mngon gyur pa) of [What It Means for There to Be No Autonomous Reasons the three worlds (khams gsum) 95 by directly realizing (mngon sum du rtogs [rang rgyud kyi rtags] and No Theses [dam bca’]] 102 pa), and then continuously meditating on, the sixteen aspects of the four [noble] truths,96 such as impermanence and so forth. But since that [indi- [Tsong kha pa believes that] if one accepts existence by virtue of own char- vidual] has not understood the selflessness of phenomena, he/she cannot acteristic, then one must definitely accept autonomous [syllogisms] (rang eliminate even the manifest [portion, let alone the seeds] of the affliction rgyud), like our own [Buddhist] realists, and like Bh›vaviveka, and so that grasps at the truth [of things]. They can only eliminate the [relatively forth. If one does not believe that phenomena exist by virtue of their own more trivial] manifest afflictions whose objects and aspects (dmigs rnam) are characteristic even nominally, then one must, without a doubt, reject [the explained in the Abhi[dharma]. That is what [Tsong kha pa] says. The five notion of] autonomous [syllogisms]. Hence, [the issue of whether or not [Bodhi]cary›vat›ra verses from “Even though monkhood is the root of the one accepts autonomous syllogisms] boils down to [whether or not one] teachings,” up to “Therefore, one should meditate on emptiness,” he negates the subtle object-to-be-negated.103 explains as referring to such an individual.97 Therefore, because Bh›vaviveka and [other Sv›tantrikas] accept that phenomena exist by virtue of their own characteristic, they must accept autonomous syllogisms in order to prove that [thesis]; and because the Mas- [How [Tsong kha pa] Accepts External Objects [phyi don], Given that ter Candra[kırti] and [other Pr›saºgikas] do not accept that phenomena [He] Does Not Believe in the Foundation [Consciousness] [kun gzhi],or exist by virtue of their own characteristic, it makes no sense for them to in Reflexive Awareness [rang rig]] 98 accept autonomous reasons and theses. There are other M›dhyamikas who reject the foundation [consciousness] [Tsong kha pa] believes that the Prasannapad› [passage] that states that, and accept external objects;99 and there are some who reject [the existence of] external objects and accept a foundation [consciousness].100 Nonetheless, [since these are both subschools of the Sv›tantrika school, they are] systems three ways of understanding the madhyamaka 93 three ways of understanding the madhyamaka 95

M›dhyamikas should not engage in autonomous inferences, for object-to-be-negated, and it is also the main cause of cyclic existence; and they do not accept the other’s position,104 that is why the texts give extensive explanations of the forms of reasoning to negate the “truth” that is the object conceptualized (zhen yul) in that [igno- [should be interpreted to mean] that the non-acceptance of phenomena as rance]. But having negated that, [there is then a tendency to] grasp at that existing by virtue of their own characteristic is posited [by Pr›saºgikas] as very emptiness of “truth” [as if it were a real thing]. Just as someone mounted a reason for not accepting autonomous [syllogisms].105 on a horse may not fall off on the right side, but may still fall off on the left side; likewise, those [who grasp at emptiness] have not gone beyond falling into the extreme of nihilism (chad pa’i mtha’);118 and that is why even [the [Those Who Claim that the Freedom from Extremes grasping at emptiness] must be refuted. And since grasping at [things] as if Is the Madhyamaka] they were both (gnyis ’dzin) [empty and non-empty], and neither (gnyis min) must also be refuted, no object grasped in terms of the four extremes is The third system is the view of the Madhyamaka as Freedom from Extremes found. It is the non-grasping [of things] in [any of those four ways] that we (mtha’ bral dbu ma’i lta ba), a view that has been cultivated and then call “the realization of the Madhyamaka view.” But if there arises a one-sided explained to others as the unanimous opinion and the single melody of the grasping of the form, “this is the Madhyamaka view,” then whether one scholar-practitioners of the Tibetan nation up to the time of the glorious Sa grasps thing as empty [as Tsong kha pa does] or as non-empty [as Dol po pa skya pa scholars G.yag and Gzhon106 from [the time of] the spiritual friends does], since one will not have gone beyond a grasping at extremes, this is not of former times [belonging to the monastery of] of Gsang phu,107 like the the Madhyamaka view. This is what we believe. great translator Rngog,108 the Conqueror’s regent within this Abode of Snow Tsong kha pa appears to have in mind this tenet [that grasping at empti- Page 135 Mountains, and [from the time of] the Lord of Sa skya and his sons,109 who ness is not improper, that holding a fixed view of the Madhyamaka is nec- have no equal in taking up the teachings of the Victor, both in terms of essary] when he states in his ˛ık› on the Avat›ra: explanations and practice, and great beings, like Mar pa and Mi la,110 who have taken up the banner of the teachings of the practice lineage (sgrub When one properly identifies the grasping at “truth” in this way, (b)rgyud), and the translator Pa tshab Nyi ma grags,111 the one who intro- one will come to understand that there are exceedingly many duced (srol ’byed) the [system of the] Madhyamaka as Freedom from conceptual thoughts that are neither of the two forms of self- Extremes [into Tibet], and his direct disciples, Zhang Thang sag pa Ye shes grasping. And [this understanding enables one] to repudiate all ’byung gnas, etc.,112 and also Rma bya Byang chub rtson ’grus,113 and their of the mistaken views that maintain that any object grasped by a followers, Gzad pa ring mo,114 Lce sgom Shes rab rdo rje,115 and so forth, conceptual thought is refuted by means of the reasoning that who explained in an independent manner (rang dbang du) the purport of analyzes reality.119 the definitive meaning (nges don gyi dgongs pa) [of the scriptures] as it emerged from their own understanding. The detailed exposition of this [Freedom from Extremes] system in terms Madhyamaka [literally, “the Middle Way”] refers to the freedom from of decisive reasoning and trustworthy testimony will be explained in the all extremes, like existence and nonexistence, and is and is-not (yod med section [describing] our own system below. dang yin min).116 That is why it is necessary to eliminate all grasping at extremes and all grasping at signs (mtshan ma). Furthermore, since the subsequent grasping at extremes (mthar ’dzin phyi ma rnams) will not be eliminated unless one first negates “the truth” that is the object of the grasping at truth, it is necessary to set forth the truthlessness of all things, both external and internal, by means of such reasoning as “being devoid of being one and many” (gcig dang du bral la sogs pa’i rigs pa).117 This is the rough note to pages 48–49 273 274 notes to page 49

formulae, rhythmic models, fragments of social languages, etc. pass into the text and ba he considers a Pr›saºgika. However, David Jackson, “Madhyamaka Studies,” pp. are redistributed within it, for there is always language before and around the text. 27–28, has argued that although Sa pa˚ studied both Sv›tantrika and Pr›saºgika Intertextuality, the condition of any text whatsoever, cannot, of course, be reduced sources, his philosophical outlook is closer to the Pr›saºgika. Jackson, however, also to a problem of sources and influences.” Cited in Corns, The Literature of Contro- points out that Sa pa˚ upholds a form of tantric Madhyamaka theory that appears versy, p. 2. to be a third option, different from either the Sv›tantrika or Pr›saºgika. Thu’u bkwan also states that Sh›kya mchog ldan began as a Madhyamaka, became a Citta- 231 For an insightful analysis of the role that differentiation or distinction plays in philo- m›tra, and eventually became a Jo nang pa. He continues that many other Sa skya sophical argumentation, see David Goodwin, “Distinction, Argumentation and the pas have been attracted to the Rdzogs chen view, but adds that the Sa skya pas’ own Rhetorical Construction of the Real,” Argumentation and Advocacy 27 (1991): 141–58. special philosophical outlook is the nongrasping of clarity and emptiness (gsal stong 232 These are Sa chen Kun dga’ snying po (1092–1158), Bsod nams rtse mo (1142–82) and ’dzin med) or the indivisibility of samsara and nirvana (’khor ’das dbyer med). This Rje btsun Grags pa rgyal mtshan (1147–1216), Sa pa˚ and ’Phags pa Blo gros rgyal view, in turn, has sÒtra and tantra versions. The sÒtra version, he states, has a tradi- mtshan (1235–80); see David Jackson, “Madhyamaka Studies Among the Early Sa- tion based on N›g›rjuna’s instructions and one based on Maitreya’s. Regardless of skya-pas,” Tibet Journal 10.2 (1985): 21. the accuracy of Th’u kwan’s exposition of Sa skya pa doxography, it is clear that Go rams pa’s exposition of the Madhyamaka in the Lta ba’i shan ’byed is very close to the 233 See Jackson, The Early Abbots of ’Phan-po Na-len-dra, p. 15. N›g›rjuna version of the sÒtra branch mentioned in Thu’u bkwan’s text, implying 234 Of course, once the construction was completed, we know that Go rams pa had of course that Go rams pa’s view would fall squarely within (what Thu’u bkwan, at many duties: instituting the new curriculum of studies and then teaching it, cre- least, understands to be) the Sa skya pa mainstream. See Thu’u bkwan grub mtha’ ating a liturgical schedule for the monastery, blessing all of the new images, and [Lan kru’u: Kan su’u mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1984], p. 199ff. See also Chab spel Tshe so forth. brtan phun tshogs and Nor brang O rgyan, Bod kyi lo rgyus rags rim g.yu yi phreng ba (Lhasa: Bod ljongs dpe rnying dpe skrung khang, 1989), p. 707, which gives the same 235 van der Kuijp, Contributions, p. 120. general divisions found in Thu’u bkwan. An unattributed verse cited in the latter 236 James M. Jasper, “The Politics of Abstractions: Instrumental and Moralist Rhetorics text—a verse that is said to encapsulate the Sa skya pa sÒtra “view”—is worth men- in Public Debate,” Social Research 59.2 (1992): 315–44, discusses what he calls “God- tioning here because, as the reader will see, it is very much in accord with Go rams Page 136 terms,” that is, the “universal trump cards plunked down to win an argument.” These pa’s own views. The verse reads: bsod nams min pa dang por zlog// bar du bdag ni zlog are theories/principles/concepts so fundamental to a culture or worldview that they pa dang// tha mar lta zhig kun zlog pa// gang gis shes de mkhas pa yin//; “At the begin- are axiomatic, as it were. When an argument can be cast so that one’s own side ning, when one is without merit, one overturns [attachment to the world]. In the becomes the upholder of the “God-term,” then victory is guaranteed. Clearly, the middle, one overturns the self. At the end, one overturns all views. Those who under- notion of middle way was for Buddhists such a God-term. stand this are scholars.” The authors of the Bod kyi lo rgyus gloss the last line as follows: tha mar lta ba kun bzlog pa la bden ’dzin gyi spros pa gcod pa dang/ bden med kyi 237 Only a thorough study of the work of Go rams pa’s predecessors can tell us the extent spros pa gcod pa gnyis so; “To overturn all views at the end [means] both to do away to which the term was used in this way prior to him, and therefore the extent to with the proliferations that are the grasping at truth, and to do away with the pro- which Go rams pa’s use of the term as an appellation for a unique interpretive tradi- liferation of truthlessness.” tion is or is not innovative. Jackson, for example, cites a passage from Sa skya Pa˚˜ita that uses the term spros bral in a way that seems central to the latter’s vision of the 239 As David Jackson shows, several of the early Sa skya pa masters either studied Madhyamaka; see Jackson, “Madhyamaka Studies,” p. 27. The term was also used Madhyamaka at Gsang phu or else studied under teachers who were affiliated with widely by non-Sa skya pas, and not only in sÒtra contexts but in tantric ones as well; Gsang phu; see Jackson, “Madhyamaka Studies,” pp. 21–23. see, for example, Dung dkar rin po che, Tshig mdzod, p. 1312, where “the lack of pro- 240 Aside from the Sa skya pa scholars mentioned in the colophon, and aside from Dol liferations” (spros bral) is defined as follows: “From among the four yogas, the sec- po pa and Tsong kha pa, his chief opponents in this work, Go rams pa additionally ond is the yoga without proliferations. This is the realization that one’s own mind either mentions, paraphrases or cites Zhang Thang sag pa Ye shes ’byung gnas (b. lacks the proliferation of the three—arising, cessation, abiding. The Lord Rgod eleventh century), Rma bya Byang chub brtson ’grus (d. 1185), Gzad pa ring mo, Lce tshang pa claimed that it corresponded to the sÒtra system’s path of seeing, and to sgom Shes rab rdo rje, G.yag ston Sangs rgyas ’phel (1348–1414), Red mda’ ba Gzhon the ‘extremely joyful,’ the first of the ten bhÒmis” (my translation); see also Dung nu blo gros (1349–1412), Shes bya kun rig (i.e., Rong ston pa), Rje btsun Grags pa dkar rin po che’s definition of “resting in a state of nonconceptuality that is without rgyal mtshan (1147–1216), and (with obvious disapproval) Bla ma Dbu ma pa (fif- proliferations” (spros med mi rtog ngang la sdod), Tshig mdzod, p. 1312. teenth century). Thu’u bkwan, Grub mtha’, p. 189, makes a cryptic remark concern- 238 Concerning the Sa skya pas’ Madhyamaka outlook, see Jackson, “Madhyamaka ing the area of Thang sag. Citing Karma dkon gzhon, he says that there was nothing Studies.” The later Dge lugs doxographer Thu’u bkwan Blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma but the corpse of a Madhyamaka left in Thang sag before Red mda’ ba resuscitated (1737–1802) has a great deal to say on the question of the Sa skya pa’s philosophical it, and that the fact that scholars and fools alike have a Madhyamaka to talk about view (lta ba), though Go rams pa is never mentioned by name in his discussion. at all, something to label with different names—X Madhyamaka, Y Madhyamaka— Regarding doctrinal affiliation, Thu’u bkwan identifies Sa skya Pa˚˜ita and Rong is due to the kindness of Red mda’ ba. ston pa as being primarily Sv›tantrika in their viewpoint, while the lord Red mda’ notes to pages 50–56 275

241 This distinction is also known to Sh›kya mchog ldan, who uses it to doxographical ends in his History of the Madhyamaka (Dbu ma’i byung tshul). 242 Although Distinguishing the Views employs formal consequence-reason (thal phyir) arguments, it is not as dense or abstract as other works that consist exclusively of strings of such formal arguments. An example of that latter, more formal and logically dense type of literature is the genre of monastic textbooks known as Critical Notes to the Translation Analyses (mtha’ dpyod). 243 On the actual genealogy of Dol po pa’s views, see Cyrus Stearns, “Dolpo-pa Shes-rab rgyal-mtshan and the Genesis of Gzhan stong in Tibet,” Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques 49.4 (1995): 829–54. 244 That is, the two rational forms (the selflessnesses of person and of phenomena) and 1 This verse employs several classical Indian mythological motifs in a metaphorical the true ultimate that is the freedom from extremes. elaboration of the Buddha’s relationship to humanity. The Buddha is the sun; his 245 Only a detailed comparison of Stag tshang pa’s and Go rams pa’s works will allow us enlightened activity, its rays; his gnosis, the actual orb of the sun; his compassion, to determine the overlap between the two views. Clearly there are similarities, but the horses, the active force that pulls the chariot on which the sun is said to ride; and there appear to be divergences as well. It is significant that Go rams pa never men- the mountains, each of different heights, the hosts of disciples, each with their own tions Stag tshang lo ts› ba in the Lta ba’i shan ’byed, perhaps because of the Stag level of spiritual maturity. Similar images are to be found in the RGV (IV, 58–66); tshang pa’s extremist views concerning the nature and function of valid cognitions Jikido Takasaki, A Study of the Ratnagotravibh›ga (Uttaratantra), Being a Treatise on (tshad ma). See Hopkins, Maps, p. 527ff. the Tath›gatagarbha Theory of Mah›y›na Buddhism (Rome: IsMEO, 1966), pp. 369–71. In BRKT, 1b, Rong ston pa begins his text with an almost identical verse. 246 See Cabezón, Dose, p. 397, n. 23. D. Seyfort Ruegg, Two Prolegomena to Madhya- maka Philosophy: Candrakırti’s Prasannapad› Madhyamakav¸ttih on Madhya- 2 In the classical system of Buddhist textual exegesis as expounded in such works as the Vy›khy›yukti of Vasubandhu, this verse, and the next one, constitute what is

Page 137 makak›rik› I.1, and Tsong kha pa bLo bzang Grags pa/ Rgyal tshab Dar ma rin chen’s dKa’ gnad/gnas kyi zin bris, Annotated translations, Studies in Indian and Tibetan called the “motivation for” or “necessity of” (Tib., dgos pa, Skt., prayojana) the com- Madhyamaka Thought, Part 2 (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische position. It is the need to decide between the diversity of Madhyamaka interpreta- Studien Universität Wien, 2002). tions that leads Go rams pa to compose the present text. See José I. Cabezón, “Vasubandhu’s Vy›khy›yukti on the Authenticity of the Mah›y›na SÒtras,” in Texts 247 For a comparative analysis of this issue among a variety of Indian and Tibetan in Contexts: Traditional Hermeneutics in South Asia, ed. J. Timm (Albany: SUNY philosophers, see Alex Berzin, “Eliminating the Two Sets of Obscurations in Sutra Press, 1992), pp. 221–43; and Michael M. Broido, “A Note on dGos-’brel,” The Jour- and Highest Tantra According to the Nyingma and Sakya,” http://www.berzin- nal of the Tibet Society 3 (1983): 5–19. See also BRKT, 1b–2a. archives.com/tantra/eliminating_2_sets_obscurations.html. 3 This line can be seen as constituting what is called in traditional Tibetan oral exege- 248 See Hopkins, Maps, p. 516ff. sis the “commitment to compose (the text)” (rtsom par dam bca’ ba). Explicitly stat- 249 See Pettit, Mipham’s Beacon of Certainty, pp. 136–40. ing the intention to compose the text at the outset is said to create the karmic cause for seeing the composition through to the end—the commitment of the sage, once 250 G. Thomas Tanselle, “Books, Canons, and the Nature of Dispute,” Common Knowl- made, being like writing on stone. edge 1.1 (1992): 78–91. 4 These are the Vaibh›˝ika, Sautr›ntika, Cittam›tra (i.e., Yog›c›ra), and Madhyamaka 251 Tanselle, “Books, Canons and the Nature of Disputes,” p. 80. (the last being understood here as the philosophical school that was systematized by N›g›rjuna and his followers). The first two schools are considered Hınay›na philosophical schools, and the latter two, Mah›y›na schools. From the viewpoint of the Madhyamaka, the first three are considered realist (dngos por smra ba) schools, since they advocate the real or true existence of phenomena. The Madhyamaka is a non- realist (dngos po ma yin par smra ba) or anti-essentialist (ngo bo nyid med par smra ba) school because it repudiates the fact that things exist by virtue of their own nature. See Katsumi Mimaki, ed., “Le Grub mtha’ rnam bzag rin chen phreº ba de Dkon mchog ’jigs med dbaº po (1728–1791),” Zinbun, 14 (1977): 55–112; as well as his Blo gsal grub mtha’ (Kyoto: Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyusyo, Université de Kyoto, 1982); also, Geshe Lhundub Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, Cutting Through Appearances: Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1990); and José I. Cabezón, “The Canonization of Philosophy and the Rhetoric of Siddh›nta in Indo-

277 278 notes to page 71 notes to pages 71–73 279

Tibetan Buddhism,” in Buddha Nature, ed. Paul Griffiths and John Keenan (Reno, Cabezón, “Two Views on the Sv›tantrika-Pr›saºgika Distinction in Fourteenth NV: Buddhist Books International, 1991), pp. 7–26. Century Tibet,” in The Sv›tantrika-Pr›saºgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?, ed. Sara L. McClintock and Georges B. J. Dreyfus (Boston: 5 Bodhicary›vat›ra (IX, 4ab). See Vidushekhara Bhattach›rya, ed., Bodhicary›vat›ra Wisdom Publications, 2003), pp. 289–315. (BCA), Bibliothetca Indica, no. 280 (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1960), p. 185; Louis de la Vallée Poussin, trans., Bodhicary›vat›ra: Introduction a la Practique des 9 Go rams pa uses Dol bu ba rather than the (more common) Dol po pa. We have used Futurs Bouddhas (Paris: Librarie Bloud et Cie, 1907), p. 111; Ernst Steinkellner, Dol po pa throughout the rest of the translation to conform to modern scholarly ⁄›ntideva: Entritt in das Leben zur Erleuchtung (Dusseldorf: Diederichs, 1981), p. 114; usage. On the life of Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (1292–1361), see Cyrus Stearns, Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton, ⁄›ntideva’s Bodhicary›vat›ra (Oxford and New The Buddha from Dolpo: A Study of the Life and Thought of the Tibetan Master York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 115. Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen (Albany: SUNY, 1999), which also contains an excellent overview of his doctrinal views, as well as translations of two important texts; also 6 It is interesting that Go rams pa should accuse the realists of falling not only into the Jeffrey Hopkins, Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism: Dynamic Responses extreme of eternalism, which is to be expected, but into the extreme of nihilism as to Dzong-ka-ba’s Essence of Eloquence I (Berkeley: University of California Press, well. Rong ston pa (BRKT, 3a) explains that they fall into the latter extreme by virtue 1999), pp. 47–55. The collected works of Dol po pa have recently been found and of the fact that they repudiate emptiness or, in his words, because “they consider the published in India (see Introduction); Matthew Kapstein’s introductory volume is repudiation of essentialism to be nihilism”; see also José I. Cabezón, A Dose of Empti- especially valuable as a guide to this vast corpus. It is difficult to say which of Dol po ness (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 107–8. pa’s extensive writings Go rams pa used in compiling the following synopsis without 7 The enlightenment of a Ÿr›vaka, of a pratyekabuddha, and of a buddha. For Tibetan more detailed research, although it would seem that they probably included the lat- scholastics, the locus classicus for the doctrine of the three forms of enlightenment is ter’s monumental work, the Ri chos nges don rgya mtsho (RCNG), his shorter doctri- the Abhisamay›la˙k›ra and its commentaries; RamaŸaºkaratrip›˛hi, ed., Abhi- nal condensation, the “Fourth Council,” Bka’ bsdu bzhi pa (KDZP), translated in samay›la˙k›rav¸ttih Sphu˛›rtha (Sarnath: Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Stud- Stearns, Buddha from Dolpo, and perhaps others of his Madhyamaka-related works, ies, 1977). For a translation of the root text, see Edward Conze, Abhisamay›la˙k›ra: like the Bden gnyis gsal ba’i nyi ma, the Nges don mthar thug de kno na nyid gsal byed, Introduction and Translation from Original Tibetan Text with Sanskrit-Tibetan Index, and, of course, the Lta ba mun gsal and Lta ba shan ’byed. See also S. K. Hookham,

Page 138 Serie Orientale Roma 6 (Rome: IsMEO, 1954); and for a translation of the first seven The Buddha Within: Tath›gatagarbha Doctrine According to the Shentong Interpreta- chapters of Haribhadra’s commentary, see Alex Naughton, The Buddhist Path to tion of the Ratnagotravibh›ga (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991). Omniscience (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin—Madison, 1989). See also E. 10 See, e.g., RCNG, 192ff. On the place of the three-nature doctrine in Dol po pa’s Obermiller, and T. Stcherbatsky, Abhisamay›la˙k›ra-Prajñ›p›ramit›-upadesa-Ÿ›stra, thought, see Stearns, Buddha from Dolpo, pp. 254–55, n. 44. Jeffrey Hopkins, Empti- The Work of the Bodhisattva Maitreya (1929; repr., Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, ness in the Mind-Only School, pp. 55, 108–10, 129, 188, and 226, discusses and trans- 1992); and E. Obermiller, The Doctrine of the Prajñ›p›ramit› as Exposed in the lates Tsong kha pa’s criticism of Dol po pa’s views on this matter. Abhisamay›la˙k›ra of Maitreya, Acta Orientalia 11 (1932), pp. 1–133, 334–54. 11 See Dol po pa’s “A Sun Clarifying the Two Truths,” Bden gnyis gsal ba’i nyi ma, which 8 Go rams pa, unlike Tsong kha pa, believes that the distinction between Sv›tantrika deals extensively with this topic. Concerning Dol po pa’s views about the relation- M›dhyamikas and Pr›saºgika M›dhyamikas is more a difference in style/empha- ship between the two forms of emptiness and the two truths, see KDZP,366; Stearns, sis than in substance. According to Go rams pa, who follows his teacher Rong ston Buddha from Dolpo, p. 129. pa on this point, the differences between Sv›tantrikas and Pr›saºgikas is one of emphasis in regard to logical strategy. For both of these scholars, svatantra forms 12 Also called a “non-affirming negation,” it is a negation that implies no positive thing of reasoning (rang rgyud kyi rtags) are accepted at the nominal or conventional in its wake. Dol po pa will maintain that the real ultimate truth is a form of empti- level, and repudiated at the ultimate level, by both the Sv›tantrikas and ness that does imply something positive; on forms of negation, see Jeffrey Hopkins, Pr›saºgikas. This, as we shall see, goes counter to the position of Tsong kha pa and Meditation on Emptiness (London: Wisdom Publications, 1983), pp. 721–27. his followers. For Rong ston pa’s treatment of this issue see, e.g., BTN, 31–41, but 13 These characterizations of the emptiness of own nature (rang stong) are derived from especially 40: thal rang gnyis su g.yes par bshad pa’i don ma rtogs par lta ba bzang the K›lacakra and its commentarial tradition. For an interesting gloss on the expres- ngan gyi bye brag gis ’byed pa ni ’phags pa yul gyi dbu ma smra ba chen po dag gi lta sions “nihilistic” and “inanimate” emptiness in a passage from Red mda’ ba’s com- ba la sgro ’dogs bskur ’debs su smra ba yin pas/ mchil ma’i thal ba bzhin du dor bar mentary to the K›lacakra, see Stearns, Buddha from Dolpo, pp. 58–59. bya’o/ gzhung gi bshad tshul cung zad mi ’dra ba tsam gyis kyang khyad par phyed pa ma yin; see also BRKT, 97. Mkhas grub rje attacks this view at several points in his 14 Dol po pa’s discussion concerning which of the Buddha’s teachings are definitive Stong thun chen mo; see, e.g., Cabezón, Dose of Emptiness, p. 153, where he states (nges don) and which provisional (drang don) is found, for example, in RCNG, 135, that those who hold such a view “have had their minds and eyes affected by the 173ff.; see also KDZP, 393–95; Stearns, Buddha from Dolpo, pp. 152–54. The early Dol poisonous waters of jealousy,” and especially pp. 173–80, 266. The view being po pa, it seems, follows the Sa˙dhinirmocana SÒtra, which he cites at length in espoused by Go rams pa—that doxographical distinctions among the great RCNG, on this issue. He says (RCNG, 177) that “in the second turning (i.e., in the Mah›y›na scholars of India exist only on the surface—has led Cabezón to classify Perfection of Wisdom SÒtras), for a special purpose (dgos pa’i dbang gis), what is not Go rams pa and his teacher Rong ston pa as “soft doxographers”; see José I. empty of self-nature (that is, the ultimate) is taught to be empty of self-nature. [In 280 notes to pages 73–75 notes to page 75 281

that turning,] things are not well distinguished, the internal contradictions are not Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1969), vol. II (kha), 242ff.; David Seyfort Ruegg, “A resolved. For these and various other reasons [the second turning] is said to be sur- School of Buddhist Ontologists According to the Grub mtha’ Ÿel gyi me loº,” Journal passable, temporary, provisional, and an object of dispute.” It would seem, however, of the Association of Oriental Studies 83 (1963): 74ff. See also Seyfort Ruegg, La théorie that Dol po pa changed his views by the time he wrote his later KDZP, since in that du Tath›gata-garbha et du Gotra (Paris: École Française d’Extrême Orient, 1969), p. latter text he states that the second-turning sÒtras teach principally the emptiness of 325ff. and n. 142; Sgra tshad pa Rin chen rnam rgyal, DZGG, 166; Klong rdol bla other-nature (gzhan stong). ma, Tibetan Buddhist Studies (Mussoorie: Dalama, 1963) 1 237ff.; M. Broido, “The Jo-nang-pas on Madhyamaka: A Sketch,” Tibet Journal 14.1 (1989); S. K. Hookham, 15 For a discussion of N›g›rjuna’s philosophical works, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, The Lit- The Buddha Within, p. 15ff.; Stearns, Buddha from Dolpo, p. 3ff. erature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (Wiesbaden: Otto Har- rassowitz, 1981), pp. 4–47; and Cabezon, Dose of Emptiness, pp. 78–81, 430–32, nn. 21 Lists like these, which give synonyms of the tath›gatagarbha, are found throughout 182–97. RCNG, e.g., 11, 14, 46–47, 59–60, 106, etc.; and throughout KDZP, e.g., 395; Stearns, Buddha from Dolpo, p. 154. The term “possessing the best of all qualities,” 16 See, for example, RCNG, 82ff. sarv›k›ravaropet›, MVy 504, is, for example, found as the last of the 60 good quali- 17 The four forms of purification are explained in the Mah›y›nasa˙graha (P vol. 112, ties of the Buddha’s speech; see also see P. L. Vaidya, ed., A˝˛as›hasrik› Prajñ›- 224) as follows, “Purification can be [related to] essence, to lack of stains, to the path, p›ramit› (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960), p. 183; and RGV (I, 92) and (II, 11); and to a referent. All pure objects can be subsumed into these four catgeories.” dag Takasaki, A Study, pp. 264, 317. pa de ni rang bzhin dang/ dri ma med dang lam dang dmigs/ rnam par dag pa’i chos kyi 22 MVy 119–28; RCNG, 51, quoting the Mah›nirv›˚a SÒtra. rnams/ rnam pa bzhi pos bsdus pa yin/. See also É. Lamotte, ed. and trans., La somme du grand vehicule d’Asaºga (Mah›y›nasa˙graha) [Louvain: Université de Louvain, 23 MVy 130–34; RCNG, 51, quoting the Mah›nirv›˚a SÒtra. 1973], ch. II, para. 26 (vol. 1, p. 37ff.; vol. 2, p. 120ff.). According to Gung thang, the 24 MVy 235–67; RCNG, 199, quoting the Mah›nirv›˚a SÒtra. essential purity of things refers to their emptiness (stong nyid); purity as the lack of stains refers to the truth of cessation (’gog bden); purity related to the path refers to 25 MVy 268–349; RCNG, 199; quoting the Mah›nirv›˚a SÒtra. the truth of the path (lam bden); and that related to a referent refers to the Mah›y›na 26 This parable is found in chapter 22 of the Avata˙saka SÒtra (LK, vol. 44, nga,f.

Page 139 pi˛aka (theg chen gyi sde gnod); see his Drang nges mchan, in The Collected Works of 161b–163a). Bu ston, Bde gshegs nying po gsal ba’i rgyan, in Collected Works, ed. Lokesh Gun-thang Dkon-mchog-bstan-pa’i-sgron me (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, Candra (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1965–1971), pp. 8–11, 1972), 2, p. 873ff. quotes the same sÒtra. There he explains that the term ri mo’i gzhi chen po used in 18 Prajñ›p›ramit›pi˚˜›rtha (i.e., Prajñ›p›ramit›sa˙graha), attributed to Dign›ga, vv. the sÒtra was rendered by Rngog lo ts› ba as dar yug chen po; the passage is translated 28b–29b. P vol. 146, 170. Toh no. 3809, Shes phyin pha, 293b. See G. Tucci, “Minor by Seyfort Ruegg, Le traité sur le Tath›gatagarbha de Bu ston (Paris: École Française Sanskrit Texts on the Prajñ›p›ramit›,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great d’Extrême Orient, 1973), p. 73ff. See also Lambert Schmithausen’s discussion in “Zu Britain and Ireland (1947): 53–75. The present citation corresponds to v. 29. See also D. S. Rueggs Buch La Théorie du Tath›gatagarbha et du Gotra,” in WZKSO (1973), E. Frauwallner, “Dign›ga, Sein Werk und Seine Entwicklung,” WZKSO 3 (1959): 142. p. 131ff. Dol po pa mentions this as one of the similes of the intended meaning of the doctrine in KDZP, 397–98; Stearns, Buddha from Dolpo, pp. 156, 265, n. 111. See also 19 Dol po pa and his followers are not the only Tibetans to make such a claim. For exam- RCNG, 48–51, where Dol po pa discusses the passage from Ratnagotravibh›gav¸tti ple, it would appear that Cha pa (or Phya pa) Chos kyi seng ge (1109–69) adhered related to this. For a translation of this portion of the Ratnagotravibh›ghav¸tti, see to a similar position, albeit for different reasons than Dol po pa. See Jeffrey Hopkins, Takasaki, A Study, pp. 189–92; for the Tibetan, Zuiryu Nakamura, ed., Theg pa chen Maps of the Profound: Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of Buddhist and Non- po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi rnam par bshad pa thogs med gyis mdzad pa in Zß-Wa Buddhist Views on the Nature of Reality (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2003), taiyaku Kukyß ichijß hßshßron kenkyÒ (Ratnagotravibh›ga) (Tokyo: Suzuki Gakujutsu p. 745ff.; Guy Newland, The Two Truths in the M›dhyamika Philosophy of the Ge- Zaidan, 1967), 41, 43–45. In RCNG, 51–52, Dol po pa continues the discussion, rely- luk-ba Order of Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1992), pp. 28–29, 90, and ing this time on the Mah›nirv›˚a SÒtra. 276–77, n. 44. 27 Tath›gatagarbha SÒtra (P vol. 36), 241–43; RGV (I, 96–97); Takasaki, A Study, p. 20 The doctrine that the ultimate is empty of all other natures, but not empty of its own 269ff. See also Seyfort Ruegg, Le traité, p. 71; and RCNG, 4–6. nature—the so-called gzhan stong doctrine—is of course one of Dol po pa’s more controversial theses, treated in one form or another in many of his writings. See, e.g., 28 An explanation of the tath›gatagarbha in terms of these and the following analo- RCNG 195: kun brtags dang gzhang dbang gis stong pa’i chos nyid yongs grub don dam gies, based on the Mah›parinirv›˚a SÒtra, is found in Dol po pa’s RCNG, 46–47. du yod par gsungs pa’i phyir don dam gzhang stong stong nyid du legs par grub po/; “The See also Dol po pa’s comments in KDZP, 375–77, 395; Stearns, Buddha from Dolpo, real—that is, reality—which is empty of the imputed and the dependent, is taught pp. 135–37, 154; and the Ga˚˜avyÒha citation in Stearns, Buddha from Dolpo, p. 256, to exist ultimately; that is why the ultimate exists as the emptiness of what is other.” n. 51. On the use of these terms in the P›li and Indian Sanskrit sources, see T.W. An interesting summary is also to be found in the Jo nang pa chapter of the Thu’u Rhys Davids, ed., The P›li Text Society’s P›li-English Dictionary (London: P›li Text bkwan grub mtha’ (Lan kru’u: Kan su’u mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1989), 212–33; also Society, 1972), p. 85; and F. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary (1953; available in The Collected Works of Thu’u bkwan blo-bzang-chos-kyi-nyi-ma (New repr., Delhi: Motilal Banasidass, 1972), p. 491. On permanent (nitya), stable 282 notes to page 75 notes to pages 75–77 283

(dhruva), and eternal (ŸaŸvata), see Nakamura, Rgyud bla ma’i rnam bshad, pp. 53 self-emptiness and other-emptiness—is the Great Madhyamaka”; rang stong dang and 54ff.; and MVy, nos. 7284–86. On the quality of unchangeablility gzhan stong du phye nas stong pa nyid legs par gtan la ’babs pa’i tshul ’di ni dbu ma (a[vi]pari˚›madharma), see Nakamura, Rgyud bla ma’i rnam bshad, p. 41ff.; and chen po ’phags pa thogs med kyi zhal nas kyang gsungs te/. MVy 7287. 43 Dol po pa cites a variety of Madhyamaka works, including the Dharmadh›tustava, 29 The association of the tath›gatagarbha with the ultimate and with a self is found, at length, in RCNG, 57ff., in order to counter the objection of an opponent to the e.g., in RGV (I, 35, and 37–38). Of course, claims such as this have brought charges effect that “even though the tath›gatagarbha may be accepted as a [doctrine that is] that the view is non-Buddhist. This in turn has caused those who speak of “the per- definitive in meaning (nges don), M›dhyamikas do not accept this.” The prefix fection of the higher self,” “pure self,” “the sphere of the self,” “great self,” etc.—as “Madhyamaka” given by Go rams pa in the title of this work is an anomaly; the Dol po pa, following RGV, does—to defend themselves against such charges; see, work is usually known usually as Dharmadh›tustava; Toh no. 1118. See D. Seyfort e.g., RCNG, 68–69, 76–78. Ruegg, “Le Dharmadh›tustava de N›g›rjuna,” in Études Tibétains dédiées à la mem- oire de Marcelle Lalou (Paris: Librairie d’Amerique et d’Orient, 1971), pp. 448–71. 30 Concerning the scriptural sources on which Dol po pa relied, see Stearns, Buddha On N›g›rjuna’s stavas generally, see Ruegg, Literature of the Madhyamaka School, from Dolpo, pp. 178–79, nn. 12–13. pp. 31–32. 31 LK 148, vol. 57 (da), 299bff.; this text is part of the ’Phags pa de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying 44 See Dol pa pa’s comments in KDZP, 387–88; Stearns, Buddha from Dolpo, pp. 146–48. rje chen po nges par bstan pa, Toh no. 147. See also Seyfort Ruegg, Le traité, p. 7. 45 Abhidharmasamuccaya (II, 1); P. Pradhan, ed., (Santiniketan:Visva Bharati, 1950), 40; 32 In Toh no. 147. The work is cited, e.g., in RCNG, 19. See also Seyfort Ruegg, Le Walpola Rahula, trans., Le Compendium de la super-doctrine (philosophie) (Abhi- traité, p. 23. dharmasamuccaya) d’Asaºga (Paris: École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1971), p. 65; 33 Toh no. 92; the work is cited, e.g., in RCNG, 25. P vol. 112, 252.31. Chos mngon pa kun las btus pa, The Nyingma Edition of the sDe- dge Bka’-’gyur and bsTan-’gyur (Oakland: Dharma Publishing, 1980), text no. 4049, vol. 34 Toh no. 258. This is the first sÒtra cited in RCNG, 4, and is quoted extensively there- 80, 823. This passage from AS is found in the ⁄Ònyat›-nama-mah›sÒtra; vol. 38, 278. after, e.g., 15, etc; for a discussion of the Uttaratantra’s use of this sÒtra, see RCNG, The P›li version is found in the Mah›-suñyat›-sutta, The Collection of the Middle 22–23. See also Ruegg, Le traité, p. 23.

Page 140 Length Sayings, Majjhima Nik›ya, vol. III, trans. I. B. Horner (London: The Pali Text 35 Cited in RCNG, 32, 263, 298–99. Society, 1959), p. 147 (Pali text no. 121). For Dol po pa’s treatment of this passage see, e.g., RCNG, 87–88, and 191ff. See also G. Nagao, “What Remains in ⁄Ònyat›: A 36 Toh no. 222. Cited, e.g., in RCNG, 24. Yog›c›ra Interpretation of Emptiness,” in Mah›y›na Buddhist Meditation: Theory 37 Toh no. 100. and Practice, ed. M. Kiyota and E. W. Jones (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978), pp. 66–82. A similar passage is also to be found in the Laºk›vat›ra SÒtra, ed. 38 Toh no. 91. Bunyiu Nanjio (Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1956), 75. See also Seyfort Ruegg, 39 Toh no. 213. Dol po pa cites this sÒtra extensively in RCNG, 54ff. and 181ff. See also Théorie, pp. 319–46; L. Schmithausen, “The Definition of Pratyak˝am in the AS,” Seyfort Ruegg, Le traité, p. 23. WZKSO 16 (1972): 155. For a Dge lugs pa interpretation of this passage, see Cabezón, Dose, pp. 46–47, 422, nn. 92–93. 40 Toh nos. 119–21. Cited extensively in RCNG, e.g., 6–7, 14, 21, 45, 51, 187. See also Seyfort Ruegg, Le traité, p. 24. 46 Abhidharmasamuccaya, n. 45. 41 On the five works of Maitreya, see Stearns, Buddha from Dolpo, p. 179, n. 14. Dol po 47 On the life and works of Tsong kha pa in Western language sources, see Rudolf pa believed that the last three works of Maitreya (Byams chos spyi ma gsum) are the Kaschewsky, Das Leben des lamaistischen heiligen Tsongkhapa bLo-bzan-grags-pa works that teach the real (yongs grub) to be a positive, true thing (yang dag pa). Lists (1357–1419) dargestellt und erläutert anhand seiner Vita “Quellort allen Glückes” (Wies- of the last three works vary in Tibetan philosophical literature. According to most baden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971), 2 vols; and Robert A. F.Thurman, ed., The Life and Dge lugs pa sources, they are the Uttaratantra, mentioned here, the SÒtr›la˙k›ra, Teachings of Tsong kha pa (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1982). and the Abhisamay›la˙k›ra; see Cabezon, Dose, p. 421, n. 66. In Dol po pa, how- For a brief overview, see José I. Cabezón, “Tsong kha pa,” in Encyclopedia of Religion, ever, the Abhisamay›la˙k›ra is replaced by the Dharmadharmat›vibhaºga. In 2nd ed., forthcoming. Several of Tsong kha pa’s Madhyamaka works are mentioned RCNG, 193–95, Dol po pa explains how the doctrine of the ultimate as empty of by Go rams pa. Not mentioned is the vipaŸyana (lhag mthong) section of his Lam rim what is other is also found in the SÒtr›la˙k›ra, in the Dharmadharmat›vibhaºga, chen mo (LRCM), which has been translated in Tsong-kha-pa, The Great Treatise on and in the Madhy›ntavibhaºga.If this is the list of Maitreya’s three last works, how- the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment: Lam rim chen mo, vol. 3, ed. Joshua Cutler [ed. ever, it would seem to leave no room for the Uttaratantra. See Stearns, Buddha from in chief, Guy Newland, and the Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee] (Ithaca: Dolpo, pp. 146, 258, nn. 65–66; and S. K. Hookham, The Buddha Within, pp. 149–50, Snow Lion, 2002–5). The secondary literature on Tsong kha pa’s Madhyamaka views 268, 325–26, for an alternate list. is extensive; see, for example, Helmut Tauscher, Die Lehre von den zwei Wirklichkeiten in Tson kha pas Madhyamaka-Werken (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Bud- 42 See, e.g., RCNG, 191, where Dol po pa states that “ﬁrya Asaºga also advocates dhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1995), a very useful work that, among other that the proper way of positing emptiness—in terms of the distinction between things, gives the complete sa bcad (divisions) for Tsong kha pa’s major Madhyamaka 284 notes to page 77 notes to pages 77–79 285

treatises; also G. Newland, The Two Truths in the M›dhyamika Philosophy of the Ge- Mind-Only School, Dynamic Responses to Dzong-ka-ba’s The Essence of Eloquence, vol. luk-ba Order of Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1992). D. Seyfort Ruegg, “On 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). pram›˚a theory in Tson kha pa’s Madhyamaka philosophy,” in Studies in the Buddhist 52 Of course, the claim that Tsong kha pa’s exegesis was “unique” is, within the conser- Epistemological Tradition, Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakırti Con- vative scholastic worldview espoused by Go rams pa, an accusation rather than ference, Vienna, June 11–16, 1989, ed. E. Steinkellner (Wien: Verlag der Österreichis- praise; see the Introduction. chen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991), 281–310; D. Seyfort Ruegg, Two Prolegomena to Madhyamaka Philosophy: Candrakırti’s Prasannapad› Madhya- 53 Tsong kha pa, as a “hard doxographer,” makes sharp distinctions between Sv›tan- makav¸tti on Madhyamakak›rik› I.1, and Tson kha pa Blo bzan grags pa / Rgyal Tshab trikas and Pr›saºgikas and claims that the former do not understand emptiness com- Dar ma rin chen’s Dka’ gnad/gnas brgyad kyi zin bris: Annotated Translations (Wien: pletely. As a soft doxographer who seeks to downplay these differences, Go rams pa Arbeitsekreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 2002). will criticize Tsong kha pa. See Cabezón, “Two Views”; and C. Yoshimizu, “Tsong Also, Chizuko Yoshimizu, Die Erkenntnislehre des Pr›sa˚gika-Madhyamaka: nach dem kha pa’s Reevaluation of Candrakırti’s Criticism of Autonomous Inference,” in Tshig gsal ston thun gyi tshad ma’i rnam bŸad des ’Jam dbain b¤ad pa’i rdo rje: Einleitung, McClintock and Dreyfus, The Sv›tantrika-Pr›saºgika Distinction, pp. 257–88. Textanalyse, Übersetzung (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Stu- 54 N›g›rjuna, ⁄Ònyat›saptati, Toh no. 3827, Dbu ma tsa, 26b; see also Chr. Lindtner, dien, Universität Wien, 1996). Nagarjuniana, Studies in the Writing and Philosophy of N›g›rjuna (Copenhagen: 48 When applied to such figures as N›g›rjuna and Maitreya, this expression is meant Akademisk Forlag, 1982), pp. 62–63. The relevant verse is quoted (with insignificant to indicate the fact that they are the ones who reintroduced the teachings of the variations from the canonical version) by Tsong kha pa in various texts: LRCM, 657; Buddha into the world (i.e., that they are the shing rta srol ’byed); see José I. Cabezón, TSTC, 32; LSN, 632; and GR, 178. From the wording, it would seem that Go rams Buddhism and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism (Albany: SUNY Press, pa is here paraphrasing the GR discussion of this verse. 1994), p. 235, n. 25. When Go rams pa applies the expression to Tsong kha pa, how- 55 firyadeva, Catu¯Ÿataka (XIV, 25); Vidhushekhara Bhattach›rya, ed., The Catu¯- ever, it has a double-entendre, implying innovation on the part of Tsong kha pa, and Ÿataka of firyadeva (Calcutta: 1931); see also Karen Lang, firyadeva’s Catu¯Ÿataka: On therefore his departure from accepted tradition. the Bodhisattva’s Cultivation of Method and Knowledge (Copenhagen: Akademisk 49 A complete translation of Tsong kha pa’s commentary to the Madhyamakak›rikas, Forlag, 1986), pp. 134–35; and Geshe Sonam Rinchen and Ruth Sonam, Yogic Deeds Page 141 the Rtsa shes ˛ık chen, is currently being completed by Jay Garfield and Ngawang of Bodhisattvas: Gyel-tsap on firyadeva’s Four Hundred (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1994), p. Samten. For a translation of N›g›rjuna’s root text, see Jay L. Garfield, The Funda- 275. Tsong kha pa discusses the verse in LSN-mi, 462; Thurman, Tsong kha pa’s mental Wisdom of the Middle Way: N›g›rjuna’s MÒlamadhyamakak›rik› (New York: Speech, p. 309. Tsong kha pa also discusses the last two lines of the verse in GR, 178; Oxford, 1995). The full title of Tsong kha pa’s commentary is Dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig Klein, Path, p. 182. The verse is also discussed by Mkhas grub rje in Cabezón, Dose, le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba’i rnam bshad rigs pa’i rgya mtsho (Toh no. 5401), Col- pp. 246–47, where he cites the section of Buddhap›lita that also quotes the verse (see lected Works, vol. ba. Portions of this work have already been translated by Jeffrey Cabezón, Dose, p. 492, n. 818 for further references to the latter). Hopkins, Ocean of Reasoning (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 56 This is a paraphrase of Catu¯Ÿataka VI, 10cd and 11ab; Lang, firyadeva’s Catu¯Ÿataka, 1974); and by William McGee, The Nature of Things: Emptiness and Essence in the p. 66: de phyir nyon mongs thams cad kyang/ gti mug bcom pas bcom par ’gyur/ rten cing Geluk World (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1999). ’brel bar ’byung ba ni/ mthong na gti mug ’byung mi ’gyur/. The verse is cited and dis- 50 Tsong kha pa’s commentary to Candrakırti’s Madhyamak›vat›ra; for a translation cussed by Tsong kha pa in GR, 178; Klein, Path, p. 182; and also in LSN-mi, 463–64; of Candrakırti’s text, see C. W. Huntington, The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Intro- Thurman, Tsong kha pa’s Speech, p. 310. duction to Early Indian M›dhyamika (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989). 57 See GR, 178–79. The full title of Tsong kha pa’s commentary is Dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal (Toh no. 5408), Collected Works, vol. ma. Portions of the work 58 Go rams pa is here referring to what Tsong kha pa calls the lam gyi dgag bya (the have been translated, and/or studied in Jeffrey Hopkins, Compassion in Tibetan “soteriological object-to-be-negated”), that is, the ignorance that stands as an Buddhism (London: Rider, 1980); Anne C. Klein, Path to the Middle: Oral obstacle to progress on the path. The notion that the object-to-be-negated must M›dhyamika Philosophy in Tibet (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994); and Chizuko first be identified (dgag bya ngos ’dzin) before it can be negated is one of the cor- Yoshimizu, Die Erkenntnislehre. nerstones of Tsong kha pa’s interpretation of the doctrine of emptiness. It is most extensively developed in his LRCM, 579ff.; Cutler, trans., vol. 3, p. 126ff. See also 51 Drang nges legs bshad snying po (Toh no. 5396), Collected Works, vol. pha. Complete Mkhas grub rje, Cabezón, Dose, pp. 92, 441–42, nn. 286–88; LNMS, 187b–188b; English trans. in Robert A. F. Thurman, Tsong kha pa’s Speech of Gold in the Essence and his explanation of the difference between the lam gyi dgag bya and the rigs pa’i of True Eloquence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). The first two vol- dgag bya (“the logical object-to-be-negated”), Cabezón, Dose, pp. 127–28. See also umes of Hopkins’ translation and extensive study of this work have also now Paul Williams, Altruism and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Bodhic›ry›- appeared: Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism: Dynamic Responses to vat›ra (London: Curzon, 1998), part 4, for a critical discussion of one of the impor- Dzong-ka-ba’s The Essence of Eloquence, Vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California tant Indian sources that the Dge lugs pas rely on to prove the necessity of Press, 1999); and Reflections on Reality: The Three Natures and Non-Natures in the identifying an object-to-be-negated. 286 notes to pages 79–81 notes to page 81 287

59 On the importance of the notion of identifying the object-to-be-negated in the senses in which, even for Tsong kha pa, the inferential conceptualization of empti- thought of Tsong kha pa, see Tauscher, Die Lehre, pp. 73–177; Elizabeth Napper, ness is to be transcended. (1) If the conceptual understanding of emptiness is the Dependent Arising and Emptiness: A Tibetan Buddhist Interpretation of M›dhyamika result of critiquing the philosophical (kun brtags pa’i) views of, e.g., the realists—that Philosophy Emphasizing the Compatability of Emptiness and Conventional Phenomena is, if it is not being directed at one’s own innate (lhan skyes) ignorance—then no (Boston: Wisdom, 1989); and Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness (London: amount of such conceptual understanding will have the desired soteriological effect. Wisdom Publications, 1983), p. 54ff.; as well as his Emptiness Yoga (Ithaca: Snow Lion Thus, a conceptual understanding of emptiness in these terms must be “tran- Publications, 1987), pp. 123–55. scended” in favor of a more subtle one. (2) If a conceptual understanding of emptiness leads to the reification of emptiness—in which emptiness comes to be 60 Tsong kha pa discusses the measure, or extent, of the Sv›tantrika’s object-to-be- hypostasized into a real thing—then, once again, conceptualization has led one negated in a variety of sources: GR, 175ff.; Klein, Path, pp. 167–70; also LSN–mi, astray; for a discussion of this see, e.g., LRCM, 640ff. (3) Finally, even for Tsong kha 419ff.; Thurman, Tsong kha pa’s Speech, pp. 265–87; but see LRCM, 660–61, where pa, the conceptual understanding of emptiness must be transcended through the Tsong kha pa uses similar expressions to refer to the Pr›saºgikas’ object of refutation: process of meditation, since the inferential (conceptual) understanding of emptiness e.g., 660, blo’i dbang gis bzhag pa min par chos de rnams la rang rang gi ngos nas gnas only has the power to temporarily counteract the reification that grasps things to be tshul lam sdod thsul zhig yod pa. One of the clearest expositions of this topic in Dge true, that is, for as long as the force of that inference has not waned; see Buddhism lugs pa literature is to be found in Mkhas grub rje’s Stong thun chen mo; see Cabezón, and Language, pp. 137 and 250, nn. 36–39. For Tsong kha pa these are all dangers— Dose, pp. 139–47, 460, n. 469. Go rams pa also discusses the issue in TN-CW, 582ff. or, in the latter case, an inherent limit—of the conceptual understanding of empti- See also Donald S. Lopez, Jr., A Study of Sv›tantrika (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1987), chap. ness, but this in no way detracts from the ability of conceptual thought to come to 4; Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, pp. 436–37, 635–36; Hopkins, “A Tibetan a correct and proper understanding of emptiness: one that is not merely speculative, Delineation of Different Views of Emptiness in the Indian Middle Way School,” one that does not reify its object, and one that is used as a stepping stone to medita- Tibet Journal 14.1 (1989): 10–43; and Hopkins, Maps, pp. 698–703, 737–39. tive appropriation. However, Go rams pa, being of the opinion that the conceptual 61 On “existence by virtue of own-characteristic” (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa), see understanding of emptiness that is the end result of rational analysis must itself be Yoshimizu, “Tsong kha pa’s Reevaluation,” pp. 275–76, which makes reference to her negated, is seeking here to set the stage for his subsequent critique of Tsong kha pa previous work on this topic. Also, Seyfort Ruegg, Two Prolegomena, pp. 168–202. by using a term “conceptualization” (mngon par zhen pa) that has this double-enten- Page 142 dre where one of its connotations, “attachment,” is negative. 62 See GR, 175; Klein, Path, p. 169; LRCM, 620–21; and also, Cabezón, Dose, pp. 153, 155, 173, 179–80. According to the Dge lugs pa theory, from a Pr›saºgika perspective, 66 Discussed in a variety of works, e.g., LRCM, 600; see also 637–40. See Tauscher, Die all of these seven terms are equivalent, and are objects-to-be-negated, constituting Lehre, pp. 56–72, and especially pp. 67–69 and p. 69, n. 150. The passage is from the one of the major differences between Sv›tantrikas and Pr›saºgikas, since the former, ⁄›listambasÒtra; see P. L. Vaidya, ed., Mah›y›nasÒtrasa˙graha, pt. 1 (Darbhanga: Tsong kha pa believes, differentiate between the seven terms. See Cabezón, Dose, p. Mithila Institute, 1961), p. 115: na san n›sanna sadasan na c›py anubhay›tmaka˙.The 172, for a more extensive list of synonyms for the object-to-be-negated. See also Hop- verse is also found in the Jñ›nas›rasamuccaya, attributed to ﬁryadeva: Ye shes snying kins, Maps, pp. 825–27; and Ferdinand D. Lessing and Alex Wayman, eds. and trans., po kun las btus pa, Toh no. 3851, Dbu ma tsha, 27b; and C vol. 18, 27a.6: yod min med mKhas-grub-rje’s Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), min yod med min/ gnyis ka’i bdag nyid kyang min pas/. See also K. Mimaki, La réfu- pp. 90–93. tation Bouddhique de la permanence des choses (sthirasiddhidÒ˝ana) (Paris: Insitut de civilization indienne, 1976), pp. 186–89, 204ff. The passage is also cited in a variety 63 See GR, 162–70; also Cabezón, Dose, pp. 140, 173. This distinction is also treated in of Madhyamaka polemical literature in Tibet; see, e.g., Cabezón, Dose, p. 93; Pa˚ ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’s commentary to the Abhisamay›la˙k›ra, Shes rab kyi pha rol chen Blo bzang chos kyi rgyal msthan (1567–1662), Sgra pa Shes rab rin chen pa’i rtsod tu phyin pa’i mtha’ dypod ’khrul sel gang ga’i chu rgyun (i.e., Phar phyin mtha’ dpyod), lan lung rigs seng ge’i nga ro, in Miscellaneous Works of the First Pa˚ chen Blo bzang in The Collected Works of ’Jam-dbyangs.-bzad-pa, vol.7 (ja) (New Delhi: Ngawang Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, reproduced from an incomplete mansucript collection from Gelek Demo, 1973), p. 88ff. the Zangla khar (Rdzang la mkhar) (Gemur, H.P.:Topden Tsering, 1979), 381. For 64 Tsong kha pa discusses this in LRCM, in Collected Works, vol. pa (New Delhi: Dol po pa’s interpretation of the yod min med min passages, see RCNG, 195–96; and Ngawang Gelek Demo, nd), 391b–396a; see also Cabezón, Dose, pp. 100–101, 162, Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan, Lta ba shan ’byed yid kyi mun sel, in The ’Dzam 180–84. thang Edition of the Collected Works (gsung-’bum) of Kun-mkhyen Dol-po-pa Shes-rab- rgyal-mtshan, collected and presented by Matthew Kapstein (Delhi: Shedrup Books, 65 Here Go rams pa is extrapolating from Tsong kha pa’s writings for polemical advan- 1992), vol. 5 (ya): 792–93. Seyfort Ruegg also discusses the verse, and Go rams pa’s tage. The term mngon par zhen pa has both the more neutral connotation of “con- interpretation, in Three Studies, pp. 203–4; see also Ruegg, Three Studies, p. 143 and ceptualization” and the more loaded one of “attachment.” Since for Tsong kha pa the n. 50, for a discussion of the Indian sources. real ultimate truth, emptiness, can be understood inferentially, it can be conceived; see Cabezón, Buddhism and Language, p. 116ff. It is true that for Tsong kha pa this 67 See Cabezón, Dose, pp. 106–7 for a discussion of the meaning of this verse; Mkhas conception should not be negated, since it serves as the basis for the meditative cul- grub rje’s interpretation there varies from that attributed to Tsong kha pa in Go rams tivation that leads to a direct understanding of emptiness; see, e.g., Tsong kha pa’s pa’s account. He states: “Hence, the meaning is this: that existence does not truly remarks in LRCM 492bff., as well as his Dbu ma’i lta khrid. There are, however, three 288 notes to pages 81–83 notes to page 83 289

exist, nonexistence does not truly exist, a third alternative which is both does not of own-characteristic even at the nominal level, (2) a special way of dividing all truly exist, and a third alternative which is neither does not truly exist.” afflictions, such as the grasping at true existence, into two levels of subtlety with two divisions each, (3) how they accept two subtle forms of selflessness, (4) that they 68 That the negation of non-x is x, or, in its more explicitly Tibetan version, that the identify mere imputation by conceptual thought as the meaning of interdependent repudiation of non-x forces one to accept x. This topic is discussed by Tsong kha pa (arising), (5) their special way of positing the self that is the basis of karma and its in TSTC, 51ff. Go rams pa will challenge the law of double-negation below, just as effects, (6) their special way of positing external objects, (7) their special way of not he does explicitly in his Dbu ma’i spyi don; see BPD, 358.4.6. See also Cabezón, Dose accepting the ›laya, svasa˙vedana, and svatantras, (8) their special way of positing p. 102ff., 448, n. 339. The repudiation of the law of double negation is also attributed the two obscurations, and how they are eliminated, (9) their acceptance of the fact to Stag tshang lo ts› ba by the first Pa˚ chen bla ma; see his Sgra pa Shes rab rin chen that Ÿr›vaka and pratyekabuddha ›ryans must understand the essencelessness of pa’i rtsod lan, p. 380. phenomena, (10) their acceptance of the fact that ordinary beings can have yogic 69 See Tsong kha pa’s similar claim in LRCM, 773ff.; Great Treatise, 3: p. 331ff. On the direct perception, (11) their special way of positing the three times, (which involves), views ascribed to the Chinese monk Hwa shang (Mah›y›na) in Tibet see the Intro- e.g., their accepting destruction to be a real entity, (12) their special (tenets con- duction; also, David Seyfort Ruegg, Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Grad- cerning) the way in which the buddha understands phenomena. See also Seyfort ualism in a Comparative Perspective: On the Transmission and Reception of Buddhism Ruegg, Two Prolegomena, pp. 148–49; and Hopkins, Maps, pp. 927–46. in India and Tibet, The Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion 13 (London: School 73 Although an important part of Tsong kha pa’s Madhyamaka theory, this brief pres- of Oriental and African Studies, 1989); Luis Gómez, “The Direct and the Gradual entation of Tsong kha pa’s theory of what it means for things to exist convention- Approaches of Zen Master Mah›y›na”; and Jeffrey Broughton, “Early Ch’an Schools ally or nominally is not one of the “eight difficult points.” Tsong kha pa discusses in Tibet,” both in Studies in Ch’an and Hua-yen, ed. Robert M. Gimello and Peter his views concerning the meaning of “conventional existence” in many of his works; N. Gregory (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press/Kuroda Institute, 1983), pp. see, e.g., LRCM, 626ff.; Great Treatise, 3, p. 177ff.; and Thurman, Speech of Gold, 69–167 and 1–68, respectively; G. W. Houston, Sources for a History of the bSam yas p. 366ff. See also Mkhas grub rje’s explanation of his teacher’s views in Cabezón, Debate (Sankt Augustin: VGH-Wissenschaftverlag, 1980); Paul Demieville, Le Con- Dose, pp. 90–91, 101, 168–71, 176–77; see also Cabezón, Buddhism and Language,p. cile de Lhasa (Paris: Impr. Nationale de France, 1952); Leonard W. J. van der Kuijp, 161ff. Contributions to Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1983), p. Page 143 45. Other Dge lugs pa sources on this issue include Mkhas grub rje, LNMS, 74 The foundation consciousness (›layavijñ›na)—posited, e.g., by the Mind-Only 176a–178a, 193a; Cabezón, Dose, pp. 112–17, 266; and Klong rdol bla ma, on which School—is the repository of karmic seeds, and therefore serves for this school as a see Cabezón, Dose, pp. 400–402, n. 33, for the reference and a translation of the rel- mechanism for explaining the ripening of karma. Candrakırti denies that such a evant passage in Dbu ma’i ming gi rnam grangs. mechanism is necessary to explain karma, and this leads him to deny the existence of the foundation consciousness. Tsong kha pa follows Candrakırti on this matter, 70 This sentence is taken directly from Tsong kha pa’s GR. See the note in the Tibetan and therefore maintains that the ›laya does not exist even conventionally. On the edition of Go rams pa’s text, in this volume. See also Klein, Path, p. 183. foundation consciousness in general, see L. Schmithausen, Alayavijñ›na: On the 71 Tsong kha pa and his followers are of the opinion that not all conceptual thought is Origin and Early Development of a Central Concept of Yog›c›ra Philosophy, parts I a form of ignorance—that is, a form of the grasping at true existence—since there and II, Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series IVab (Tokyo: International are many conceptual thoughts (e.g., the thought that understands composite things Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1989); and William S. Waldron, The Buddhist Uncon- to be impermanent) that are valid. Therefore, not all conceptual thoughts are repu- scious: The ›laya-Vijñ›na in the Context of Indian Buddhist Thought (London: Rout- diated or negated by the reasoning of the Madhyamaka. See LRCM, 659–61; Great ledgeCurzon, 2003). Tsong kha pa, as just stated, believes that in the Pr›saºgika Treatise, 3: pp. 211–13. See also Cabezón, Dose, p. 114; and Klong rdol bla ma, cited Madhyamaka system the ›layavijñ›na cannot be posited as existing even conven- in Cabezón, Dose, p. 401, n. 33. tionally; although, see Sparham’s remarks concerning a possible shift in Tsong kha pa’s position on this issue, in his study of Tsong kha pa’s Yid dang kun gzhi’i dka’ ba’i 72 Much—though not all—of the material contained in this section falls into the cat- gnad rgya cher ’grel pa legs par bshad pa’i rgya mtsho, Toh no. 5414, Collected Works, egory of what has come to be known in Dge lugs pa literature as the “eight great vol. tsha; Gareth Sparham, in collaboration with Shotaro Iida, Ocean of Eloquence: difficult points” of Madhyamaka doctrine (dka’ gnad chen po brgyad). For a list of Tsong kha pa’s Commentary on the Yog›c›ra Doctrine of Mind (Albany: SUNY Press, the eight points, see GR, 277ff. A text by Tsong kha pa’s disciple Rgyal tshab rje 1993), pp. 14–16, 18–22, 33–35, nn. 44–50. Sparham gives references to many of the based on Tsong kha pa’s teachings has been translated by D. Seyfort Ruegg, Two important passages on the ›laya in a variety of Tsong kha pa’s works. See LSN-mi, Prolegomena, section 2. See also Cabezón, Dose, p. 397, n. 23, which contains bibli- 455, and especially 468ff.; Thurman, Tsong kha pa’s Speech, pp. 302 and 315ff. Also ographical references. Daniel Cozort’s study of this subject is based principally on Seyfort Ruegg, Two Prolegomena, pp. 159–68. One of the most important discus- the treatment of the “difficult points” in ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and Lcang skya Rol sions of this topic in post-Tsong kha pa Dge lugs pa literature is found in Mkhas pa’i rdo rje; D. Cozort, Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School (Ithaca: grub rje, see Cabezón, Dose, pp. 314–24 and 504, n. 981, for other bibliographical Snow Lion, 1998). An interesting list of twelve points that are the special tenets of references to both the primary and secondary literature on this subject. See also, the Pr›saºgika is given in a lexicographical work of Lcang skya, Dag yig mkhas pa’i Cozort, Unique Tenets, pp. 147–49, 235–37, 307–13, 435–38; and Hopkins, Maps, pp. ’byung gnas zhes bya ba las dbu ma’i skor (photocopy of unidentified text, no bibli- 928–29. ographical information, Hamburg, cat. no. MVI 610/2), 9b–10a: (1) non acceptance 290 notes to pages 83–85 notes to pages 85–87 291

75 This, of course, is one of the classic problems of Buddhist philosophy. In the jñey›vara˚a, Tib. shes sgrib) are obstacles to the attainment of the omniscience that Madhyamaka, it is treated as early as N›g›rjuna; see MMK (XVII, 6); Pras, 311. is concomitant with full buddhahood. The latter term is explained in N. Dutt, ed., Walleser, trans., Die Mittlere Lehre (MadhyamakaŸ›stra) des N›g›rjuna (Heidelberg: BodhisattvabhÒmi (Patna: K. p. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1966), 26.8: jñeyejn›- 1911), p. 91; K. Inada, ed. and trans., N›g›rjuna, a Translation of his MÒlamadhya- nasya pratigh›ta ›vara˚am, “obscurations in regard to what is to be known,” that is, makak›rik› with an Introductory Essay (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1970), p. 106; J. “obscurations that stand in the way of knowing [all that] is to be known”; a differ- Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom, pp. 233–34. ent definition is offered in Bodhicary›vat›rapañjik› IX, 55: jneyam eva sam›ropita rÒpatv›d ›v¸ti¯, “obscuration consisting in the objects known, given that all objects 76 On las kyi chud mi za ba (Skt. karma-avipra˚›Ÿa), see L. de la Vallée Poussin, trans., are falsely reified [by consciousness]”; P. L. Vaidya, ed., Bodhicary›vat›ra of ⁄›ntideva L. Pruden, English trans., AbhidharmakoŸabh›˝yam (Berkeley: Asian Humanities with the Commentary Pañjik› of Prajñ›karamati (Darbhanga: Mithila Insitute, Press, 1988), 4: p. 1377, n. 157. For bibliographical references to a variety of other San- 1960), p. 211. For Tsong kha pa’s discussion, see LRCM, 651–56, 763–69; GR, 233–39; skrit sources that deal with this notion see Cabezón, Dose, p. 504, n. 984. In Tsong and TSTC, 34ff.; Thurman, Tsong kha pa’s Speech, pp. 308–12. Mkhas grub rje dis- kha pa, see TSTC, 356–60; and GR, 280ff. See also Dose, p. 315 for Mkhas grub rje’s cusses the topic in Cabezón, Dose, p. 127ff., and especially pp. 245–56; a bibliogra- treatment of the issue; and Ruegg, Two Prolegomena, p. 159 passim, for Rgyal phy of secondary literature on the topic is found in Cabezón, Dose, p. 491, n. 812. tshab/Tsong kha pa’s treatment. The topic is usually treated in discussions of the eight difficult points; see, e.g., Sey- 77 On thob pa, Skt. pr›pti, see AbhidharmakoŸa (II, vv. 35–39); Swami Dwarikadas Shas- fort Ruegg, Two Prolegomena, pp. 234–50; and Cozort, Unique Tenets, pp. 243–48, tri, ed., AbhidharmakoŸam (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1970), 1, pp. 209–24; and L. 411–18, 463–69. de la Vallée Poussin/ L. Pruden, trans., AbhidarmakoŸabh›˝yam, 1, pp. 206–19; also 83 This appears to be a paraphrase of Tsong kha pa’s comments on this subject in Cabezón, Dose, p. 315; Hopkins, Maps, pp. 239–40. LRCM, 655–56. 78 On bag chags, Skt. v›sana, and their relationship to the ›laya, see Schmithausen, 84 MA, 393; for Tsong kha pa’s comments see GR, 240; also LSN, 634. The passage is ﬁlayavijñ›na, 1: pp. 178–80; also Waldron, The Buddhist Unconscious, p. 218, n. 15. also cited and discussed by Mkhas grub rje in Cabezón, Dose, pp. 249–50. For the Dge lugs pa exposition of the Yog›c›ra doctrine of bıjas, or “seeds,” see Sparham, Ocean, p. 65; also Cabezón, Dose, p. 56, especially pp. 61–63. 85 See K. Mimaki, Le Grub mtha’, p. 105; and Cabezón, Dose, p. 250.

Page 144 79 Tsong kha pa attempts to solve the problem of how karma is preserved by positing 86 This is not generally considered one of the eight difficult points. See Go rams pa, an intermediary entity between the karmic cause and its effect that he calls “the TN-CW, 66–67, where the subject is also treated. Tsong kha pa’s discussion of the destruction of the cause.” See Candrakırti’s comments on this issue in MA (VI, issue is found in, e.g., LSN, 625ff.; GR, 175ff.; LRCM, 662–64. An extensive discus- 39–40), 126–30; MA-Fr, 317–20; Huntington, Emptiness of Emptiness, p. 162ff. Tsong sion is also found in Cabezón, Dose, pp. 185–200. kha pa believes that this “destruction” is not a permanent, unreal phenomenon (dngos 87 The Dge lugs pas attribute this view to Bh›vaviveka on the basis of statements he med), as claimed by some schools, but a “thing” or “entity” (dngos po) that is momen- makes in Tarkajv›la, C, Dbu ma dza, 80b; see also Cabezón, Dose, p. 479, n. 660 tary and evolves causally until it gives rise to its effect. This is the doctrine that Go for references to this passage in the secondary literature; and Thurman, Tsong kha rams pa is referring to here. For references to this theory in the works of Tsong kha pa’s Speech, p. 301ff. pa, and a more detailed discussion of the problem, see Lobsang Dargyay, “Tsong Kha Pa’s Concept of Karma”; and L. Schmithausen, “Critical Response,” both in Karma 88 See Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, p. 177; and ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’s com- and Rebirth: Post Classical Developments, ed. Ronald W. Neufeldt (Albany: SUNY ments on the same topic in his Grub mtha’ rnam bshad, Hopkins, Meditation on Press, 1986), pp. 169–78 and 203–30, respectively. See also Mkhas grub rje’s discus- Emptiness, pp. 678–79, where relevant passages from Candrakırti and Tsong kha pa sion in Cabezón, Dose, pp. 312–15; Cozort, Unique Tenets, pp. 349–67, 471–74; Hop- are cited and discussed. kins, Maps, pp. 596–601, 933–38. 89 See LRCM, 661–62: des na nang gi blo’i dbang gis bzhag pa min par rang gi ngo bo’i 80 Hell beings, “hungry ghosts” (pretas), animals, humans, “demi-gods” (asuras) and sgo nas yul gyi steng du grub pa de la bdag gam rang bzhin zhes zer la/ de nyid khyad par gods, each of which see the cup as containing a different kind of fluid. gyi gzhi gang zag gi steng du med pa ni gang zag gi bdag med dang/ mig sna la sogs pa’i chos kyi steng du med pa ni chos kyi bdag med du gsungs pas/ rang bzhin de gang zag 81 See Tsong kha pa, GR, 338–40; and Mkhas grub rje’s extensive discussion in dang chos kyi steng du yod par ’dzin pa ni bdag gnyis kyi ’dzin par shugs kyis rtogs par Cabezón, Dose, pp. 334–45. Both authors cite Mah›y›nasa˙graha VIII, 20 as their nus so/. “Therefore, ‘objective existence by virtue of self-nature, without being source for this doctrine; see full references in Cabezón, Dose, p. 509, nn. 1046–47. posited by the power of the mind qua inner thing’ is what is meant by ‘self’ or The doctrine that “destruction is an entity” is sometimes found in the list of the ‘essence.’ The non-existence in the person of a substratum with these types of qual- Pr›saºgikas’ unique tenets, and sometimes not. Even when it is not, however, it is ities is called the selflessness of the person. Its non-existence in phenomena like the sometimes treated in the context of the critique of the foundation consciousness; eye, nose, and so forth, is called the selflessness of phenomena. From this, it is pos- see Cozort, Unique Tenets, pp. 112–23; and Seyfort Ruegg, Two Prolegomena,pp. sible to indirectly understand that the [thought] that grasps at that essence as exist- 143, 159–68. ing in the person and in phenomena is a grasping at the two selves.” Tsong kha pa 82 Afflicted obscurations (Skt. kleŸ›vara˚a, Tib. nyon sgrib) are obstacles that impede (LRCM, 661) also states, just prior to the cited passage, that the “anything else” in the attainment of emancipation (mok˝a); obscurations to omniscience (Skt. the expression “not depending on anything else” refers not to “causes and conditions” 292 notes to pages 87–89 notes to pages 89–91 293

(rgyu rkyen) generally, but rather, and more specifically, to the mind—that is, to the 97 See BCA (IX, 45–49), 196–97; L. de la Vallée Poussin, Bodhicary›vat›ra, p. 121; conventionally valid consciousness (yul can tha snyad pa’i shes pa)—in dependence Steinkellner, Eintritt, p. 128; Crosby and Skilton, The Bodhicary›vat›ra, pp. 119–20 on which Pr›saºgikas believe all things are posited as existing. (vv. 44–48). See also GR, 63–65. These verses are treated in an extensive fashion in Cabezón, Dose, pp. 217–21. On this point it is interesting that both Tsong kha pa and 90 This is usually considered one of the eight difficult points. This topic is treated Mkhas grub rje see themselves as challenging the interpretations of two previous by Tsong kha pa most extensively in GR, 60–76, 84; translated in Jeffrey Hop- Tibetan scholars, namely Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) and Brtseg/Rtsags kins, Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, pp. 150–81; see also Legs bshad snying po Dbang phyug seng ge, a student of Phya pa. (Lhasa Zhol ed.), 73b–77b. The fact that Mkhas grub rje treats the subject very extensively in Cabezón, Dose (pp. 201–56, but see also the important discussion 98 On the foundation consciousness, see n. 74. The existence of external objects is usu- on pp. 195–96) indicates that there must have been (or that he perceived that there ally considered one of the eight difficult points on its own; see Seyfort Ruegg, Two might in the future arise) controversy over Tsong kha pa’s position of this issue. Prolegomena, pp. 202–7. Chiefly because Pr›saºgikas seek to accord with worldly For more complete references to a variety of primary and secondary literature on conventions, and because external objects are accepted in the world, Tsong kha pa the subject see Cabezón, Dose, p. 482, n. 706. See also Go rams pa, TN-CW, 32; follows Candrakırti in maintaining the existence of external objects. The repudia- and Rong ston pa’s comments in BJN, 25–31. Cozort discusses and translates the tion of reflexive awareness (svasa˙vedana) is also considered to be one of the eight view of later Dge lugs pa thinkers on the question in Unique Tenets, pp. 243–48, difficult points on its own; see Ruegg, Two Prolegomena, pp. 220–26. Tsong kha pa 411–18, 463–69. discusses the topics that Go rams pa deals with in this section in GR, p. 279ff. and 338ff.; Legs bshad snying po (Lhasa Zhol ed.), 77b–81b; Thurman, Tsong kha pa’s 91 Tsong kha pa grants that there are differences between Hına- and Mah›y›na philoso- Speech, p. 312ff. For Mkhas grub rje’s extensive treatment of the issue, see Cabezón, phers—e.g., between a Vaibh›˝ika and a Pr›saºgika—especially as regards their views Dose, pp. 314–55; and for a brief overview of the issues involved in upholding the doc- of emptiness, but he believes that the same emptiness—the full-blown selflessness of trine of reflexive awareness, with bibliographical references, especially to the Indian phenomena—is taught in the scriptures of both vehicles, that there are Hınay›na and secondary literature, see Cabezón, Dose, p. 511, n. 1066. For an extensive discus- practitioners who come to understand that emptiness, and that, indeed, to achieve sion of the relevant Sanskrit sources and Tsong kha pa’s interpretation of them, see Hınay›na “enlightenment,” that is arhatship, it is necessary to understand the self- also Cozort, Unique Tenets, pp. 160–69, 370–89, 439–47. P. Williams, The Reflexive lessness of phenomena. Go rams pa’s comments here tend to somewhat oversimplify

Page 145 Nature of Awareness: A Tibetan Madhyamaka Defence (London: Curzon, 1998) is Tsong kha pa’s position. probably the most complete and interesting philosophical study of the subject of the 92 For Rong ston pa’s comments on this point see BJN, 25; see also Mkhas grub rje’s Buddhist doctrine of reflexive awareness. See also Go rams pa, Lta ngan mun sel, remarks in Cabezón, Dose, pp. 253–56; and Dkon mchog ’jigs med dbang po, in 620ff. Mimaki, Le Grub mtha’, p. 106; Sopa and Hopkins, Cutting Through Appearances, 99 The reference, of course, is to so-called Sautr›ntika-Sv›tantrika-M›dhyamikas, like pp. 318–19. Bh›vaviveka; see, e.g., Dkon mchog ’jigs med dbang po, Grub mtha’, K. Mimaki, 93 See GR, 134ff.; the paragraph is a verbatim citation from GR, 58. Mkhas grub rje ed., p. 97: rang rig khas mi len zhing/ phyi don rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa khas makes it quite clear (Cabezón, Dose, p. 254) that the division of the path of medita- len pa’i dbu ma pa de…slob dpon legs ldan ’byed lta bu/; Sopa and Hopkins, Cutting tion into nine parts is a provisional teaching of the Buddha that cannot be taken lit- Through Appearances, pp. 283–84. See also Donald S. Lopez, Jr., Study of Sv›tantrika, erally. For a general explanation of the paths in Tsong kha pa’s interpretation of the part 2; and Hopkins, Maps, p. 704 passim. Pr›saºgika, see Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, pp. 96–109. For historical back- 100 Yog›c›ra-Sv›tantrika-M›dhyamikas, like ⁄›ntarak˝ita and KamalaŸıla; see Dkon ground concerning the path structure in the Abhidharma, see E. Frauwallner, Stud- mchog ’jigs med dbang po (Mimaki), Grub mtha’, 97: phyi don khas mi len zhing/ ies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist Philosophical Systems, trans. rang rig khas len pa’i Dbu ma pa de/…slob dpon zhi ba ’tsho lta bu/; Sopa and Hop- Sophie Francis Kidd (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), chap. 7. kins, Cutting Through Appearances, p. 283; Lcang skya, Dag yig, ff. 10b–11a. It is inter- 94 On the path of seeing (Skt. darŸanamarga), see L. Schmithausen, “The DarŸana- esting that Go rams pa focuses on the difference concerning the foundation marga section of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and its Interpretation by Tibetan Com- consciousness, whereas Dkon mchog ’jigs med dbang po focuses on reflexive aware- mentators (with special reference to Bu ston Rin chen grub),” in Contributions on ness. Also Lopez, Study of Sv›tantrika, part 3; and Hopkins, Maps, p. 731 passim. Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy, ed. E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher 101 See above n. 98. (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 1983), pp. 259–74. On the paths of seeing and meditation in the Abhisamay›la˙k›ra, 102 This is traditionally one of the eight difficult points. See LRCM, 672ff.; Great Trea- see E. Obermiller, Prajñ›p›ramit› in Tibetan Buddhism (Delhi: Classics India Pub- tise, p. 225ff.; Thurman, Tsong kha pa’s Speech, p. 321ff. See Seyfort Ruegg’s extensive lications, 1988), pp. 32–38. treatment of Tsong kha pa’s views in Three Studies, pp. 187–90, and Section III. See also Cabezón, Dose, pp. 257–85, 292, 297; for further references to secondary sources 95 That is, the desire, form, and formless worlds (the k›ma, rÒpa and ›rÒpya dh›tus). see Cabezón, Dose, p. 493, n. 834. For a treatment of the issues in some of the San- 96 For a listing of these sixteen aspects, see Obermiller, Prajñ›p›ramit›, pp. 16–17. See skrit sources and in Tsong kha pa, focusing principally on the question of also Cozort, Unique Tenets, pp. 265–66, 342–43. prasaºgavip›ryaya, see Tom J. F. Tillemans, “Tsong kha pa et al. on the Bh›vaviveka- Candrakırti Debate,” in Tibetan Studies, ed. Ihara Shoren and Zuiho Yamaguchi 294 notes to pages 91–93 notes to page 93 295

(Narita: Naritasan Shinshoji, 1992), I: 315–26. For the views of Rong ston pa, see prior to Go rams pa, both figures—G.yag and Gzhon—had by Go rams pa’s time BTN, 28; BJN, 65. For those of Red mda’ ba, see DSG, 185. The issue is also dis- probably already attained a status of somewhat mythical proportions. See David P. cussed by Go rams pa in BPD, 360.1.4. Cabezón has discussed the views of Rong Jackson (in collaboration with Shunzo Onoda), ed., Rong ston on the Prajñ›p›ramit› ston pa on this issue in “Rong ston Sh›kya rgyal mtshan on M›dhyamika Thesis- Philosophy of the Abhisamay›la˙k›ra: His Subcommentary on Haribhadhra’s lessness,” in Tibetan Studies, ed. Helmut Krasser et. al. (Wien: Verlag der Oster- Sphu˛›rtha (Kyoto: Nagada Bunshodo, 1988), p. 1ff.; Thu’u bkvan Lo bzang chos kyi reichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997), pp. 97–105. See also Cabezón, nyi ma, Thu’u kvan grub mtha’ (Lan kru’u: Kan su’u mi rigs dpe skrun khang: 1989), “Two Views”; Cozort, Unique Tenets, pp. 239–43, 369–70, 449–53; and Ruegg, Two 189ff.; Sh›kya mchog ldan, BB, 234; Ngor chen Dkon mchog lhun grub and Ngor Prolegomena, pp. 208–20. chen Sangs rgyas phun tshogs, A History of Buddhism, Being the Text of Dam pa’i chos kyi byun tshul legs par bshad pa bstan pa rgya mtshor ’jug pa’i gru chen zhes bya ba rtson 103 See, LRCM, 705; Great Treatise, p. 261: “There are M›dhyamikas—such as the Mas- ’phro kha skon bcas (i.e., Ngor chos byung) (N. Delhi: Ngawang Tobgay, 1973), pp. ter Bh›vaviveka—who accept that, conventionally, phenomena have essential or 345–45; TT, 193–97. See also GJL: on G.yag phrug, 424–25 (the date of his birth is instrinsic character. The conventional existence of essential or intrinsic character is here given as 1350); and on Red mda’ ba, 420–22. This latter work (GJL, 425; source their reason for accepting autonomous reasons in their own system. Whether one = TT, 193–94) mentions an interesting tradition to explain the pairing of G.yag and posits autonomous reasons in one’s own system finally depends upon what one posits Gzhon. It states that the two disciples of Bu and Dol (= Bu ston Rin chen grub, as the extremely subtle object of refutation.” The very same point is made by Mkhas 1290–1364; and Dol po pa, see above) were Nya and Brtson (= Nya dpon/dbon Kun grub rje in Cabezón, Dose, pp. 273–74. dga’ dpal, fourteenth century; and Mkhan chen, or Mkhas dbang, Brtson ’grus dpal, 104 Pras, 16; Toh no. 3860, Dbu ma ’a, 4b. Cited by Tsong kha pa in LRCM, 677; Great fourteenth century), and that the two disciples of Nya and Brtson were G.yag and Treatise, pp. 230–31. See also LRCM, pp. 690, 712; Great Treatise, pp. 245, 268; and Gzhon. But if this saying is meant to imply two separate lineages (1. Bu-Nya-G.yag; Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, p. 475. and 2. Dol-Brtson-Gzhon), then this would seem wrong, since we know Nya dbon to have been one of the chief disciples of Dol po pa, and G.yag ston to have been one 105 A summary of Tsong kha pa’s position is found in LSN, 650; see also Mkhas grub of the main disciples of Brtson ’grus dpal. More likely implied, therefore, are the lin- rje’s discussion in Cabezón, Dose, p. 272. eages 1. Bu-Brtson-G.yag and 2. Dol-Nya-Gzhon. This leaves us with the result of 106 G.yag phrug (or G.yag ston) Sangs rgyas dpal (1348–1414), student of Sgra tshad pa having to include Red mda’ ba in the lineage of Dol po pa, problematic because we Page 146 Rin chen rnam rgyal (1318–1388), who was in turn one of the main students of Bu know that Red mda’ ba was one of the main critics of the gzhan stong views (as wit- ston (see below; and GJL, 371). G.yag phrug’s main teacher, however, was the great nessed by Go rams pa’s own citation of Red mda’ ba to this effect in the Lta ba’i shan scholar of Sa skya, Brtson ’grus dpal, also a student of Bu ston. G.yag phrug was the ’byed; see below). But TT (195–96) may resolve the situation for us by explaining a main teacher of one of Go rams pa’s own teachers, Rong ston Shes bya kun rig tradition that states that Red mda’ ba at one point in his life turned from the (1367–1449). In his time G.yag phrug was probably the greatest scholar of the Madhyamaka theories of Bu ston to those of Dol po pa, but that he became increas- monastery of Sa skya (see BA, 339; DN, 412–13); among his most important surviv- ingly skeptical of the latter, and eventually renounced them. GJL, 425f., also includes ing works are his commentary on the Uttaratantra and his eight-volume ˛ık› on the Red mda’ ba in the list of G.yag phrug’s students. Abhisamay›la˙k›ra; The Complete Yig-cha for the Study of the Prajñ›p›ramit› Liter- 107 The monastery founded by Rngog Legs pa’i shes rab (see following note); see also S. ature (Dehradun: Pal Evam Chodan Ngorpa Centre, 1985). The other figure men- Onoda, “Abbatial Successions of the Colleges of Gsang phu sNe’u thog Monastery,” tioned is of course Red mda’ ba Gzhon nu blo gros (1349–1412). See Seyfort Ruegg, in Kokuritsu Minzokugaku Hakubutsukan KenkyÒ 15.4 (1990): 1049–71; Seyfort Three Studies, 60ff. According to Thu’u bkvan, Red mda’ ba “heard the Madhyamaka Ruegg, Three Studies, p. 28, n. 53; and Sde srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho, Dga’ ldan chos from Mkhan chen Byang sems” (GJL, TT: “Byang seng”). TT, 188, identifies this as ’byung bai ˜Òrya gser po (Mtsho sngon: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1991), 146ff. one of the abbots of Jo mo nang. Sh›kya mchog ldan, however, states that his main Madhyamaka instructor was a certain “Mdog ldog pa.” This perhaps refers to Mdog 108 Rngog lo ts› ba Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109), student of Rngog Legs pa’i shes rab lo pa Mkhan chen Kun dga’ dpal (that is, Nya dbon Kun dga’ dpal), his ordination (eleventh century), who was his uncle. Legs pa’i shes rab was, in turn, one of the three abbot; see TT, 194. Red mda’ ba was one of Tsong kha pa’s principal teachers, espe- chief disciples of AtiŸa (982–1054) in Central Tibet (Dbus), and was also the founder cially in the field of Madhyamaka, though, interestingly, his chief disciple in the area of Gsang phu monastery. See TT, 112, for mention of some of his other teachers. Hav- of Madhyamaka is listed by TT, 196, not as Tsong kha pa, but as a certain Gon g.yo ing studied among the pandits of Kashmir for seventeen years, Rngog Blo ldan shes Nyi ma grags. His commentary on the Madhyamak›vat›ra survives (DSG); Jurgen rab returned to Tibet at age thirty-four, and began to teach and translate. He is per- Stoter-Tillman, and Ac›rya Tashi Tsering, trans., Rendawa Shonnu Lodro’s Com- haps best known as one of the first systematizers of philosophical studies (at Gsang mentary on the ‘Entry into the Middle’ Lamp which Elucidates Reality (Sarnath: Cen- phu, the abbacy of which he assumed in 1092), and for being the main source for the tral Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1997), which includes a biography of Red teachings of the “Sv›tantrika Madhyamaka” in Tibet. See Seyfort Ruegg, Three Stud- mda’ ba; see also M. Sato, “Die Madhyamaka-Philosophie der Sa skya pa-Schule— ies, p. 28ff. A biography of Rngog in verse by his student Gro lung pa Blo gros ’byung Red mda’ ba gZon nu blo gros,” in Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion gnas (1050–1130) is preserved in Patna, ’Jig rten mid gcig Blo ldan shes rab gyi rnam and Philosophy, ed. Ernst Steinkellner and Helmut Tauscher, Proceedings of the thar (21ff.), bundle no. 545, work no. 1435; see D. Jackson, The ‘Miscellaneous Series’ Csoma de Körös Symposium, 2 vols (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Bud- of Tibetan Texts in the Bihar Research Society, Patna: A Handlist, Tibet and Indo- dhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 1983), II: 43–58. Belonging to a generation Tibetan Studies 2 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1989), p. 198; see also the later 296 notes to page 93 note to page 93 297

biography by Sh›kya mchog ldan, Rngog lo ts› ba chen po’i bstan pa ji ltar bskyangs was the reincarnation of Candrakırti and of AtiŸa. See TT, 116. The latter, unable to pa’i tshul mdo tsam du bya ba ngo mtshar gtam gyi rol mo, in The Complete Works introduce the Pr›saºgika teachings into Tibet effectively, is said to have taken rebirth (gsungs-’bum) of gSer-mdog Pa˚-chen, (Thimpu, Bhutan: Kunzang Tobgay, 1975), 16: as Pa tshab in order to do so. He studied with pandits in Kashmir for 23 years and 443–56. See also BA, 328ff.; DN, 399ff. On the transmission of the Abhisamay›- returned to Tibet to found a monastic study center in ’Phen yul where many of the la˙k›ra through Rngog and eventually to Rong ston (Go rams pa’s teacher) see Jack- works of Candrakırti were translated into Tibetan. Apparently lacking disciples, he son, Rong ston on the Prajñ›p›ramit›, pp. ii, xxi. None of his strictly Madhyamaka is said to have been given students by Sha ra ba (TT, 114). See GJL, 199; TT, 114–19; writings are known to survive, though he is quoted or paraphrased in later Tibetan BA, 341ff.; DN, 415ff.; Sh›kya mchog ldan, BB, 233–34. His four main disciples sources; see Cabezón, Dose, p. 89, where Mkhas grub rje sides with Rngog on the (according to BB) were (1) Rma bya pa Byang chub brtson ’grus (GJL, 199; TT, 114; question of how to divide the Madhyamaka school; and pp. 143, 357–60, where his and BA, 343/DN, 417 all have Byang chub ye shes), (2) Gtsang pa Sar spros (GJL: view “that the ultimate truth is not a knowable phenomenon” is criticized; also see spos; BA/DN: sbos; TT: Sa pa; Stag tshang in TT, 116: Gtsang pa ’Bre snur), (3) Dar Go rams pa, BPD, 361.3.4–361.4.5, where Go rams pa refutes a critic of Rngog on the yul ba Rin chen (GJL and BA/DN: Dar - yul ba - Yon tan grags; TT: Gangs po; Stag same issue of the division of the Madhyamaka; and Stag tshang lo ts› ba, Grub mtha’ tshang in TT, 116, 119: Gangs pa She’u, also one of Rngog’s chief students), and (4) kun shes, 205–6, where he criticizes Rngog. See also Sh›kya mchog ldan, BB, 223, 232 Zhang (Thang sag/zag pa) ’Byung gnas ye shes (GJL and BA/DN: Ye shes ’byung (where he traces Rngog’s lineage, with a gap, upto G.yag ston), 234–35; there BB cites gnas). BB, 234, states that it is through Zhang Thang sag pa that (ten generations two verses from Rngog to show how he attempted to synthesize the Madhyamaka later) the lineage of Pa tshab came to Dmar ston (= Thang sag pa’i sprul sku?) Gzhon and Pram›˚ika traditions; see also BB, 238f. His bsdus don commentaries on the nu rgyal mtshan, who then passed it on to Rong ston Shes bya kun rig (1367–1449), Uttaratantra and on the Abhisamay›la˙k›ra have been published with introduc- the teacher of Go rams pa. None of Pa tshab’s works are known to survive, although tions by David Jackson, where additional bibliographical material is to be found; he is cited and paraphrased by later scholars; see, e.g., Rong ston pa, BTN, 24f. Rgyud bla ma’i don bsdus (Theg chen rgyud bla ma’i don bsdus pa); Commentary on the (where Pa tshab is cited to the effect that M›dhyamikas reject positive theses, but not Ratnagotravibh›ga by Rnog Lotsaba Blo-ldan-Ÿes-rab (Dharamsala, H.P.: Library of negative ones, so that there is no contradiction to their rejecting causality, and accept- Tibetan Works and Archives, 1993). See also van der Kuijp, Contributions, pp. 36–38; ing that rejection), 152 (regarding the subject matter of the thirteenth chapter), and and Dung dkar rin po che, Tshig mdzod, 768. 331 (mdzad byang = colophon). See also Seyfort Ruegg, Three Studies, p. 44ff.

Page 147 109 Sa chen Kun dga’ snying po (1092–1158); see GJL, 220–21; TT, 128ff; BA, 211; DN, 112 Student of Pa tshab (see previous note), and founder of Thang sag/zag monastery, 263–64. He became the third holder of the throne of Sa skya at age nineteen or where the Pr›saºgika teachings were preserved at least until the time of Go rams pa. twenty, in the year 1111. He studied the Madhyamaka under Khyung Rin chen grags For a list of his known writings (none of which survive) and the abbatial succession (a direct disciple of Rngog lo ts› ba), under Ba ri lo ts› ba, and under Mes lhang tsher. of his monastery see BA, 343–44; and DN, 417–18. Zhang Thang sag pa seems to Among his four sons, Kun dga’ ’bar, Dpal chen ’od po, Bsod nams rtse mo have been a controversial figure almost from the outset. BB, 233, states of Rma bya (1142–1182) and Rje btsun Grags pa rgyal mtshan (1147–1216), it is especially the last pa that he had expertise in both the words and the meaning of the doctrines of his two that are probably being referred to here; see David Jackson, “Madhyamaka Stud- master, Pa tshab; but of Zhang Thang sag pa (BB, 234) simply that he was “equal” ies Among the Early Sa-skya-pas,” Tibet Journal 10.2 (1985): 21ff. On Bsod nams rtse (cha mnyam pa) in regard to both the words and meaning, but equally what? Inter- mo, GJL, 255–56, states that he studied the Madhyamaka and Prajñ›p›ramit› at estingly, Stag tshang lo ts› ba, Grub mtha’ kun shes rnam bshad, 244, attributes exactly Gsang phu under Phya pa (1109–1169) over a period of approximately eleven years, the same quality of erudition to Rma bya pa, but states (quite bluntly) of Zhang that and that he became a renowned expert in these fields. He became responsible for Sa he lacked expertise in regard to both words and meaning (gnyis ka la mi mkhas pa; skya after his father’s death, but appears to have preferred meditation and isolated this same tradition is known to Mang thos, TT, 114)! And while the Pr›saºgika retreat to the life of an administrator; see TT, 134. He was also a teacher to his half- Madhyamaka teachings of Zhang Thang sag pa seemed to have been flourishing at brother, Rje btsun Grags pa rgyal mtshan (GJL, 258–60; TT, 134–35), the actual Thang sag at the time of the writing of DN and BB, Thu’u kvan (Grub mtha’, 189) fourth throne holder (from 1172 on), and a teacher of the great Sa skya pa˚˜ita cites Karma Dkon gzhon to the effect that had it not been for Red mda’ ba, the very (1182–1251). See Seyfort Ruegg, Three Studies, pp. 56, 58. mention of the word “Madhyamaka” would have completely disappeared from Thang sag, since before Red mda’ ba “there was nothing but the dead corpse of 110 Mar pa lo ts› ba (1012–1095), and his student Rje btsun Mi la ras pa (1040–1123); see Madhyamaka left there” (dbu ma shi ro gcig las gzhan med). Perhaps this shows, more GJL, 175–77, and 190–92, respectively; also TT, 84–87, and 90, respectively. Biogra- than anything else, that what Thang sag pa considered to be the Madhyamaka was, phies in Western languages include J. Bacot, La vie de Marpa le ‘traducteur’ (1937; at the very least, controversial; see Tauscher, Die Lehre, pp. 33–34, 165ff. This is wit- repr. Paris: P. Geuthner, 1976); Nalanda Translation Committee, trans., The Life of nessed as well by comments such as those of Lcang skya who, in his commentary on Marpa the Translator (Boulder: Prajna, 1980); W. Y. Evans-Wentz, Tibet’s Great Yogi the A ma ngos ’dzin (offprint of xylograph, no bibliographical information), 8b, states Milarepa, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1951); J. Bacot, Milarepa—ses that “except for Thang sag pa, the [Madhyamaka] interpretations of those [other] mefaits, ses preuves, son illumination, 2nd ed. (1925; repr. Paris: P. Geuthner, 1971); and founding scholars accords with our own.” Although Sh›kya mchog ldan mentions, L. Lhalungpa, trans., The Life of Milarepa (London: Grenada Publishing, 1979). See curiously, that Thang sag pa composed many works “based on the notes (mchan) and also Seyfort Ruegg, Three Studies, p. 4, n. 5. subject headings (sa bcad)” of the teachings of his master, Pa tshab, none of his texts 111 Born in 1055, he is the figure associated with the initial dissemination of the so-called seem to have survived, nor do they seem to be cited by later scholars, as are the works “Pr›saºgika Madhyamaka” teachings in Tibet. According to Stag tshang lo ts› ba, he of Pa tshab himself. Rong ston pa, BTN, 334, also mentions Zhang Thang sag pa, 298 notes to page 93 notes to pages 93–97 299

and the special oral instruction (man ngag) lineage of the Madhyamaka that passes Lord [Tsong kha pa] and his spiritual sons there arose in Tibet many errors in regard down from him; and both Rong ston pa and Go rams pa cite him in their respective to the view [of emptiness]…[Like the view] that says that the freedom from prolif- texts, on which see below. See also Yoshimizu, “The Madhyamaka Theories erations, wherein nothing—‘this is so,’ ‘this is not so’—is grasped at, is empti- Regarded as False by the Dge lugs pas,” WZKSO 37 (1993): 207–9, 212–13, where ness…and [the view that claims] that because no phenomenon is found when it is other mentions of Thang sag pa in the works of Rong ston and Go rams pa are given; searched for, [phenomena] are not existent, and because they exist only within the and Seyfort Ruegg, Three Studies, pp. 49–50. purview of erroneous conventionality, they are not nonexistent.” See also Cabezón, Dose, pp. 103, 113–17; LNMS, 176a–177a. 113 One of the four chief disciples of Pa tshab lo ts› ba (see above). DN gives Rma bya Byang brtson’s date of death as 1186 (BA, 329, mistranslates; DN, 400: Phya pa sa mo 117 This is one of the classic forms of Madhyamaka reasoning: that things are not one, glang [= 1169] la gshegs nas lo bcu bdun la Rma bya Byang brtson gshegs); and states later not many, not both, and not neither. See Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, p. 61ff.; that he was one of Phya pa’s lions (see below), and a student of Jay›nanda, and of the Cabezón, Dose, pp. 147–49 and 464, n. 507; T. Tillemans, “The ‘Neither One Nor latter’s student, Khu lo ts› ba (BA, 343; DN, 417), but DN lists the student of Pa Many’ Argument for ŸÒnyat› and its Tibetan Interpretations: Background Infor- tshab as Byang chub ye shes. A note (mchan) in TT, 117, states that Rma bya Byang mation and Source Materials,” Études de Lettres, 3 (1982): 103–28; also found in Con- ye dag pa might have been the student of Rma bya Byang brtson; and the text itself tributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy, ed. E. Steinkellner and continues, “Yol lcags Rma bya Byang chub brtson taught the Madhyamaka to three H. Tauscher (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Uni- (students): Rma bya Byang ye, Zhang thang zag and Gangs mnyan, the student of versität Wien, 1983), pp. 305–20. Through statements like the one here, Go rams pa Gtsang pa Sa”; see also TT, 119. As does BA, Sh›kya mchog ldan (BB, 233) identifies is making it clear that he is not repudiating the necessity of conceptual analysis as Rma bya Byang brtson with Rma bya pa Rtsod pa’i seng ge, one of the eight lions of a stepping stone to the full understanding of emptiness. He will go on to say, how- Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169), on which see GJL, 228–29. GJL, 281, identi- ever, that while such conceptual strategies are necessary, they are not sufficient for fies him as one of Sa skya pa˚˜ita’s (1182–1251) teachers in the field of logic (tshad an understanding of full-blown emptiness, the real ultimate (don dam mtshan nyid ma), but, given the approximate dates of Pa tshab, this, if true, could only have been pa). for a short period in Sa pan’s youth. BA, 147, also identifies him as a teacher of the 118 We have already mentioned as puzzling the fact that Go rams pa considers Tsong kha great Rnying ma scholar-saint Rta ston Jo bo ye shes (1163–1230), on which see also pa a nihilist—puzzling because Tsong kha pa considers the Sa skya pa “neither exis-

Page 148 GJL, 267–68. Although the author of several commentaries on Indian Madhyamaka tent nor nonexistent” position also to be a form of nihilism, since, as Tsong kha pa texts (see BA, 343; DN, 417; and Seyfort Ruegg, Three Studies, p. 52), there survives puts it in LRCM, such a view “refutes too much” (’gag bya khyab che ba). Go rams only his magnificent commentary on the MÒlamadhayamakak›rik›, the Dbu ma rtsa pa is perhaps suggesting here that those who “grasp at emptiness” (i.e., Tsong kha pa ba shes rab kyi ’grel pa ’thad pa’i rgyan (Gangtok: Rumtek, 1975); given the discrep- and his followers) are giving something that is negative (i.e., emptiness) the status of ancies concerning his name in the historical sources, it is worth mentioning that the an ultimate. Insofar as they are fixating on this negation, they are nihilists. This, at colophon of this particular text gives the author’s name as Byang chub brtson ’grus. least, is one possible way of understanding Go rams pa’s claim that Tsong kha pa is See also Paul Williams, “Rma bya pa Byang chub brtson ’grus on Madhyamaka a nihilist. Method,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 13 (1985): 205–25; Seyfort Ruegg, Three Stud- ies, pp. 50–54; David Jackson, “Madhyamaka Studies,” p. 24; and L. W. J. van der 119 GR, 178–79. See n. 65 above. In this passage, Tsong kha pa is making the point that Kuijp, “Phya-pa Chos-kyi Seng-ge’s Impact on Tibetan Epistemological Theory,” the Madhyamaka critique does not destroy our ordinary conceptual understanding Journal of Indian Philosophy 5 (1978): 366, n. 12. of the world: that the Madhyamaka deconstruction of the world, through its negation of the two forms of self-grasping, should not be seen as a critique of conceptu- 114 Ngor chen, Ngor chos byung, 320, identifies a Bzad pa ring mo Dbang phyug as one ality in general. Contra a variety of Buddhist views that see conceptualization itself of the four “scholarly” sons of Sa skya pa˚˜ita, but this would appear to be too late as the problem, for Tsong kha pa there are a plethora of conceptual understandings to be the present figure. Sh›kya mchog ldan, Rngog lo ts› ba, 451, identifies him as a of the world that are valid and must be left intact—including the conceptual under- student of Mnyal pa Dad pa bzang po. standing of the ultimate truth, and of the Madhyamaka. But whether Tsong kha pa 115 BA, 344, and DN, 418, lists a Slob dpon Shes rab rdo rje as the third abbot of Thang is making precisely that latter (and more specific point) in these lines, as Go rams pa sag after Zhang Thang sag pa. BA, 1025 (DN, 1194) mentions Lce sgom Shes rab rdo is implying here, remains to be seen. rje in the lineage of a certain AvalokiteŸvara cycle. 120 For similar critiques in Dge lugs pa sources, see Tsong kha pa’s in Legs bshad snying 116 It is because of expressions such as this that this view came to be known in Dge lugs po, Hopkins, Reflections on Reality, chaps. 16–17; also Mkhas grub rje, Cabezón, Dose, pa circles as the “view that things are neither existent nor nonexistent” (yod min med pp. 329–33; and ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa in Hopkins, Maps, pp. 513–18. min gyi lta ba). Consider, for example, Sum pa mkhan po’s remarks in Sum pa mkhan 121 On Red mda’ ba, see note 106; a very brief biography in English is found in the pref- po Ye shes dpal ’byor, Chos ’byung dpag bsam ljong bzang (Lan kru’u: Kan su’u mi rigs ace to Jetsun Rendawa Shonnu Lodo, Commentary to ﬁryadeva’s ‘Four Hundred dpe skrun khang, 1992), 78: rje yab sras ma byon khong du lta ba’i skor la bod ’dir ma Verses’ (Sarnath: Sakya Students’ Union, 1974). A brief critique of Dol po pa—who, dag pa mang du byung/…’di yin ’di min gang du’ang bzungs med pa’i spros bral stong in fact, is never mentioned by name—can be found, e.g., in Red mda’ ba’s com- nyid yin zer ba dang/…yang chos thams cad btsal na mi rnyed pas yod pa’ang min zhing mentary on Madhyamak›vat›ra (VI, 65); see DSG, 200–204; Stoter-Tillman and tha snyad ’khrul ngo tsam du yod pas med pa’ang min zhes zer ba dang/. “Before the Tashi Tsering, Commentary on the ‘Entry into the Middle,’ pp. 211–15. Red mda’ ba, Page 149 Page 150 Page 151 Page 152 Page 153 Page 154 Page 155 Page 156 Page 157 Page 158 CHAPTER THREE

MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE THE PRESENT ABSENCE

The Ground of the Nyingma Tradition

It is not existent because even the Victorious Ones do not see it, It is not nonexistent because it is the ground of all of sam. sāra and nirvān.a. This is not a contradiction; it is the path of the Middle Way of unity— May we realize the suchness of mind free from extremes! —Rangjung Dorjé, The Third Karmapa Douglas S. Duckworth Page 159 INTRODUCTION

Emptiness is a central topic in Mahāyāna Buddhism and also an extremely complex one. This chapter further addresses Mipam’s interpretation of emptiness, which is a fundamental part of his representation of Buddha- nature. We will see how he describes two aspects of emptiness: (1) as a substrate and (2) as a quality of reality. We will also address a third meaning of emptiness: as the inconceivable unity of appearance and emptiness. In the previous chapter, we discussed the categorized ultimate, emptiness as a conceived absence of true existence. In the case of emptiness that is the categorized ultimate, the empty aspect is conceived as a quality of phenomena. For instance, a cup’s lack of intrinsic existence—its emptiness—is a quality of the cup. As such, a phenomenon (chos) is an empty-ground (stong gzhi); it is a ground of the empty-quality. Another way that emptiness can be conceived is as a lack of something in something else—emptiness as an absence in some location. For instance, like the absence of an elephant in this STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS room. As such, the location of absence (e.g., the room) is empty of something that does not exist there (e.g., an elephant). In this case, the existing substrate that is empty of something is the empty-ground (stong gzhi); it is 55 56 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 57

the ground that is empty of some quality. I will call this representation of When we look into the Geluk tradition, we can see another way that emptiness a locative absence. emptiness is represented: as a quality. Continuing with the analogy of the We can see how both conceptions of emptiness imply a relationship half-empty cup of water, the cup and the water are different; they are other. between a quality and a substrate, and how the referents of quality and sub- The emptiness of one thing in another—the cup’s emptiness of water—is strate are interchangeable: both phenomena (chos) and suchness (chos nyid ) not the meaning of emptiness according to a Geluk view. Tsongkhapa’s can mutually be conceived as either an empty-quality or an empty-substrate. Geluk tradition emphasizes that both the cup and water are empty: the cup For example, in the case of the emptiness of a phenomenon such as a cup, is empty of an inherently existing cup and water is empty of inherently exist- emptiness can be thought of as the empty-quality of the cup, in which the ing water. It is so because when sought after, no true ontological basis for cup is the empty-ground and the lack of a truly established nature of the cup, anything is findable—no truly existent water is to be found or a true nature its emptiness, is the cup’s quality. Alternatively, emptiness can be thought of of cup. Even emptiness is not found when analyzed. Emptiness itself is not a as the empty-ground of all phenomena, in which emptiness itself is the real substrate; hence, it is not to be reified as a metaphysical entity; rather, underlying substrate of all phenomenal qualities, such as cups. A third alter- emptiness itself is empty—as is stated by “the emptiness of emptiness.” In native is emptiness that is inconceivable: emptiness that is beyond the sub- this interpretation, emptiness is a quality of all phenomena; emptiness is strate/quality dichotomy. Such an emptiness is beyond any linguistic and even a quality of emptiness itself! conceptual reference. The inconceivability of emptiness is what Mipam We can see a third representation of emptiness in Mipam’s presenta- emphasizes in his representation of emptiness. tion: emptiness as an inconceivable unity. He contrasts his interpretation It might be helpful here to resort to a familiar analogy to illustrate the of emptiness with the former two emptinesses, which he represents as sub- Page 160 distinction between these three types of emptiness: “Is the cup half-empty or strate and quality, and emphasizes that mind and language cannot access half-full?” This of course is used to show the centrality of perspective—how the consummate meaning of emptiness, which is beyond the dichotomies the role of the observer determines the content of perception: a pessimist of quality/substrate and negation/affirmation. In this chapter, we will see says it is half-empty and an optimist half-full. Although the dependence of how Mipam incorporates elements from both the Jonang and Geluk inter- an objective world on subjective perceptions is also relevant to a discussion of pretations of emptiness and uses their representations to clarify the mean- emptiness, I want to use this example in a different and more straightforward ing of emptiness. way. With the example of the cup of water, the cup is a substrate, and its We will see how he addresses two aspects of emptiness: as a quality of presence, or lack, of water is a quality of that substrate. By identifying this appearance and as an empty-ground. We will also see how he depicts empti- substrate/quality relationship, we can see more clearly into how emptiness ness as beyond the dichotomy of (1) emptiness as an absent quality distinct can be represented in different ways. from appearance and (2) emptiness as an empty-ground distinct from In the example of the half-empty cup, the cup (here metaphorically appearance. We will then be able to better appreciate his portrayal of the understood as the reality of ultimate truth) is the substrate and water (here meaning of emptiness as the unity of emptiness and appearance. In order to understood as the unreality of relative truth) is the quality. Other-emptiness appreciate Mipam’s unique depiction of emptiness, we will first discuss a can be simply stated as the ultimate truth’s lack of the relative truth. The Jonang portrayal of “other-emptiness” to provide a context for contrast with extent to which the cup of water analogy is applicable is limited, however, as Mipam’s exegesis. all analogies are, because both the water and the cup are within the domain of relative truth. In the other-emptiness of Dölpopa’s Jonang tradition, which we will consider in this chapter, the ultimate truth is utterly lacking of OTHER-EMPTINESS IN THE JONANG any and every phenomena of relative truth—including both the cup and the water. Thus, it is other-emptiness—radically “other”; ultimate truth is empty Dölpopa clearly delineates two types of emptinesses in his Ocean of Defini- of what is other (i.e., relative truth). In this interpretation, the ultimate truth tive Meaning: “That which exists within the abiding reality (gnas lugs la yod is a substrate, that which is empty of the quality of relative truth. pa) is other-empty, and that which does not exist within the abiding reality is 58 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 59

self-empty.”1 Dölpopa depicts emptiness as a locative absence, an emptiness oughly established and pervading space, abides within the ground of something in another: which from the beginning is naturally pure and relinquished of all faults.7 The fifteenth [emptiness],2 the emptiness of nonentities, is the meaning of the frequent statement, “that which does not exist in Here, Dölpopa states that the ground of a non-implicative negation is an something, that something is empty of that.” That which is the implicative negation. He seems to be saying that the presence of language, emptiness of own entity is the relative self-emptiness. The sixteenth, even negation, necessarily presupposes an underlying reality. For Dölpopa, the emptiness that is the nature of nonentities, is the meaning of the this reality is cognitive; it is wisdom. He claims that wisdom abides within frequent statement, “that which remains always exists here.”3 That the ground of negation from the beginning. We might say that the cognitive which is the emptiness of another entity is the ultimate other-empti- ground of wisdom is the substrate—or rather the superstrate—of reality and ness.4 its linguistic formulation. Dölpopa asserts a presence of ultimate qualities abiding within the Here we can clearly see Dölpopa’s delineation of two types of emptiness. He ground of emptiness: “All qualities of the ultimate, the empty-ground . . . characterizes: (1) “relative self-emptiness” as the absent phenomena in a loca- always abide within the abiding reality.”8 He also presents the ground of tion and (2) “ultimate other-emptiness” as the remaining location of the emptiness as the Buddha: “The omnipresent expanse of phenomena—the absence. Dölpopa delineates earlier statements of Buddhist doctrine (i.e., ground, free from all extremes such as existence and nonexistence, and so 9

Page 161 first and middle wheels) of emptiness as the nonexistence of one thing in forth—is the Buddha that is the abiding reality (gnas lugs kyi sangs rgyas).” another; he portrays later statements (e.g., last wheel) of non-emptiness as Thus, Dölpopa states that the ground of reality is not only cognitive, but is what remains as always existing. In this way, he shows how Buddhist scrip- the ultimate mind—the Buddha. He says that an ultimate mind exists tures are not contradictory: within reality:

The earlier statements due to the perspective of trainees that all— The ultimate mind is the mind that exists within the abiding reality; liberation and so forth—do not exist, are empty, selfless, and so relative mind is a mind that does not exist within the abiding reality. forth are in consideration of the nonexistence of something in some- Therefore, “the mind which is existent mind” is the ultimate mind thing else, whereas the later statements of non-emptiness, the exis- of awakening, natural luminous clarity.10 tence of self, and so forth are in consideration of that which is the remainder of that nonexistence (med pa’i lhag ma). Therefore, Dölpopa depicts a cognitive presence, an ultimate mind, within reality. Fur- although earlier and later scriptures seem to be contradictory, when thermore, he describes this ground as Buddha-nature: “Moreover, this which analyzed well, they are not contradictory.5 is thusness, the Buddha-nature—having many synonyms such as suchness, and so forth—is the ground of all phenomena.”11 Dölpopa emphasizes the He says that later statements of non-emptiness refer to what is the remainder existence of Buddha-nature as the ground of phenomena. He also affirms the of nonexistence. Thus, an empty-ground is the remainder of absence. Such a existence, or rather, negates the nonexistence, of a pure self (bdag dag pa), the negation that implies something else is, technically speaking, an “implicative self which he says is the great identity of the Buddha (sangs rgyas kyi bdag negation” (ma yin dgag).6 Dölpopa depicts an implicative negation within nyid chen po): the ground of a non-implicative negation (med dgag): Within the abiding reality, the ultimate Truth Body is not nonexist- An implicative negation exists within the ground of a non-implica- ent because [within the abiding reality] thusness which is pure self, tive negation, and wisdom complete with all innate qualities, thor- the self which is the great identity of Buddha, is not severed. Within 60 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 61

the abiding reality, relative form bodies (kun rdzob gzugs sku) do not edge, it is neither an entity nor a nonentity. Consequently, it is also exist because [within the abiding reality] not any relative phenom- established as just a third category, an in-between or middle.15 ena are established.12 Through affirming a third category, an in-between, Dölpopa portrays an Dölpopa depicts relative phenomena as utterly nonexistent in the abiding object of knowledge that is neither an entity nor a nonentity. In representing reality. This ultimate reality is “other-empty,” it is empty of all relative phe- suchness in this way, we can see that he does not subscribe to the law of the nomena. In this way, he portrays the relative as appearances that do not excluded middle. accord with reality. He states that relative phenomena are consciousness’ dis- In Dölpopa’s depiction of emptiness, there is no emptiness of suchness; tortions of reality: suchness is sui generis. Suchness is unique because it is the ultimate ground of reality; there is no ground that is empty of suchness: These karmic appearances mistaken by sentient beings are private phenomena for only sentient beings, yet they are utterly impossible An emptiness of everything does not occur because an emptiness of within the abiding reality—like the horns of a rabbit, the child of suchness does not occur. A ground that is empty of all phenomena barren woman, a space-flower, and so forth.13 occurs; it is suchness. A ground that is empty of suchness does not occur because that is invalidated by an immeasurable [number] of Dölpopa claims that the view that relative phenomena exist within the abid- extremely absurd consequences. Therefore, empty of all and empty

Page 162 ing reality is the extreme of existence, a superimposition, and the view that of all phenomena are extremely different because within the abiding the ultimate qualities of wisdom do not exist is the extreme of nonexistence, reality there is an emptiness of phenomena but not an emptiness of a denigration: suchness. This repudiates the assertion that phenomena and suchness are the same with different contradistinctions and also the Whereas relative phenomena do not at all exist within the abiding assertion that they are utterly nondistinct because the two are differ- reality, the extreme of existence is the superimposition that they do. ent [in the sense of] negating that they are one entity (ngo bo gcig pa Whereas the irreducible, omnipresent wisdom of the expanse of bkag pa’i tha dad ).16 phenomena always abides pervading everywhere, the extreme of nonexistence is the denigration that it does not exist, is not estab- Dölpopa makes a distinction between emptiness of all and emptiness of all lished, and is empty of its own essence. That which is the middle phenomena; the abiding reality is empty of phenomena, but is not empty of free from those extremes is the ground free from all extremes such as suchness. He states that the empty-ground of phenomena is suchness, but existence and nonexistence, superimposition and denigration, per- that there is no empty-ground of suchness. In this way, suchness is not a manence and annihilation, and so forth, due to which it is the con- quality because it has no substrate; consequently, suchness is only a substrate. summate Great Middle Way.14 Moreover, Dölpopa claims that suchness is not related to phenomena in a way that the two are essentially the same with different contradistinctions He portrays the Great Middle Way as free from the extremes of existence and (i.e., as conceptually distinct). Nor are phenomena and suchness utterly nonexistence, superimposition and denigration. He also depicts a third cate- nondistinct. Rather, phenomena and suchness are “different in the sense of gory (phung po gsum pa) of knowledge that is beyond dichotomies: negating that they are one entity.”17 We will see how Mipam portrays the relationship between phenomena and suchness, but first we will look further Those who state that all objects of knowledge are strictly limited to into the Jonang tradition. two, entities and nonentities, simply do not realize suchness, the A twentieth-century Jonang scholar, Khenpo Lodrö Drakpa, defines “self- ultimate abiding reality, because although it is an object of knowl- empty” as follows: “‘Self-empty’ refers to the claim that a non-implicative 62 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 63

negation, which is the absence of true establishment, is the consummate ulti- Dölpopa, we can see how he portrays language as implying, or presupposing, mate.”18 He characterizes a “proponent of other-emptiness” as follows: an underlying reality. In the case of the Jonang tradition, that reality is ultimate suchness, which is the cognitive ground of wisdom. “A proponent of other-emptiness” refers to: (1) one who claims that Khenpo Lodrö Drakpa makes a distinction between “Middle Way fol- the ultimate nondual wisdom, the empty-ground, is not empty lowers of the middle wheel” (’khor lo bar ba’i rjes ’brang gi dbu ma pa), a cate- from its own side, and from the beginning is empty of all that is gory under which he classifies the position of self-emptiness, and “Middle other—the conceptual constructs such as a perceived-perceiver Way followers of the last wheel” (’khor lo tha ma’i rjes ’brang gi dbu ma pa), [duality], and (2) in addition to claiming that adventitious phenom- which he identifies with the position of other-emptiness.21 In his Roar of the ena comprising the relative are empty of the essence of the extrinsic Fearless Lion, he characterizes the middle wheel of doctrine as mainly express- ultimate, relative [phenomena] are also said to be empty of their ing the categorized ultimate, which he calls the “temporary definitive mean- own essences.19 ing” (gnas skabs kyi nges don). He says that the last wheel mainly expresses the uncategorized ultimate, “the consummate definitive meaning” (nges don Khenpo Lodrö Drakpa describes a proponent of other-emptiness as one mthar thug pa): who claims that the ultimate is not empty of its own essence but is empty of all conceptual constructs. Additionally, he says that proponents of other- The mode of the relative is what is principally the topic of the first emptiness not only claim that relative phenomena are empty of the extrinsic [wheel], the mode of the categorized ultimate is what is principally ultimate, but they also assert that relative phenomena are empty of their the topic of the middle [wheel], and the consummate uncategorized Page 163 own essences. His characterization of other-emptiness explicitly affirms the definitive meaning is what is clearly, principally the topic of the last claim that relative phenomena are empty of their own essences; hence, [wheel]. Hence, the sūtras of provisional and definitive meaning are other-emptiness is not only the ultimate truth’s emptiness of relative phe- posited in that way in consideration of what is the topic in the nomena. The statement that other-emptiness incorporates relative phenom- sequence of the three wheels in general, from the aspect of taking ena as empty of their own essences is a crucial point. Without explicitly the provisional meaning, the temporary definitive meaning, and the affirming such emptiness, the traditions of other-emptiness risk becoming consummate definitive meaning [respectively,] as what is principally characterized as accepting a naïve metaphysical realism that conflicts with a the topic.22 Buddhist view, particularly the view of emptiness as expressed in the middle wheel of doctrine. Furthermore, he states that the Buddha merely taught “half of the definitive Like Dölpopa, Khenpo Lodrö Drakpa states that ultimate reality is not meaning” (nges don phyed tsam) in the middle wheel of doctrine, but he reduced to simply a mere emptiness; he says that an implicative negation revealed “the ultimate definitive meaning” (nges don don dam) in the last abides within the ground of a non-implicative negation: wheel:

The consummate reality is not reduced to the nonestablishment of In the first [wheel], the relative was taught in the manner of the ordi- everything or simply a mere emptiness that is a nonexistence. nary four truths; in the middle [wheel], the expanse free from the Within the ground of a non-implicative negation, an emptiness of constructs of all signs was taught, merely half of the definitive mean- all relative constructs, the ultimate suchness of luminous clarity, ing; in the last [wheel], the ultimate definitive meaning was taught, which is an implicative negation, abides from the beginning.20 the ground-expanse free from constructs, the great wisdom.23

He affirms that the ultimate suchness of luminous clarity abides from the Khenpo Lodrö Drakpa depicts the expanse free from constructs of all signs as beginning within an absence of relative constructs. Thus, he portrays a non- “merely half of the definitive meaning,” and states that the ultimate defini- implicative negation as contained within an implicative negation. As with tive meaning—the ground-expanse free from constructs, the great wisdom— 64 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 65

was taught in the last wheel. Furthermore, he states that the ultimate truth is ing as true (1) the truly established wisdom that is the subject of the shown to be truly existent in the last wheel of doctrine, “the wheel of doc- teaching of the last wheel and (2) the truly established dependent trine of the thorough differentiation of the ultimate”: and thoroughly established natures in the tradition of the Mind- Only realists. This is so because (1) the wisdom that is the subject of In the last [wheel], the wheel of doctrine of the thorough differenti- the last teaching is truly established due to being true in the abiding ation of the ultimate, for disciples of sharp and extremely mature reality of the basic nature as the object of ultimate reflexive aware- faculties who had trained their mental continua through all the ness free from constructs; and (2) since the truly established depend- vehicles, he mainly taught, through elegantly differentiating: (1) the ent and thoroughly established natures in the Mind-Only tradition ultimate truth itself as truly existing, meaning that it is permanent, are posited from a philosophy that is not beyond the appearance steadfast, and eternal in the perspective of the wisdom of the Sub- factor of consciousness, from the aspect of [their] observing signs as lime Ones because it is the primordially unchanging essence of the true entities, which is an object of negation [in our tradition]— indivisible expanse and awareness; and (2) relative phenomena com- there is a manner of great difference.26 prising the perceiving [subjects] and perceived [objects] as not truly existing, meaning that they are primordially non-arising like reflec- Khenpo Lodrö Drakpa says that the manner that wisdom is truly established tions in a mirror—merely expressions (rnam ’gyur) of the ultimate.24 in the Great Middle Way is different from the manner of true establishment for Mind-Only realists. Mind-Only realists assert the truly established In this way, the last wheel distinguishes the ultimate truth that truly exists dependent and thoroughly established natures from a philosophy that Page 164 from relative phenomena that do not truly exist. Moreover, Khenpo Lodrö observes signs (mtshan ma) as true entities. Wisdom in the Great Middle Drakpa does not differentiate between the scriptures of the last wheel of doc- Way, on the other hand, is truly established due to being true in the abiding trine as “Mind-Only Sūtras” and those of the “Great Middle Way”: reality as the object of ultimate reflexive awareness free from constructs. Thus, we can see a difference between the ways that the dependent and There is no difference between the sūtra collections of those two thoroughly established natures are depicted by Mind-Only realists and in the [Mind-Only and Great Middle Way] because aside from the mere Great Middle Way. Here we can also see a difference between two ways of distinction between better and worse ways of explaining the view- identifying the empty-ground: (1) as the thoroughly established nature or (2) point of one sūtra, actually there are no sūtras to be distinctly as the dependent nature. Dölpopa claims that the dependent nature is the posited. For example, although the Vaibhās.ikas and the Sautrāntikas empty-ground of the imagined nature temporarily (re zhig). He identifies the do not have different sūtra collections, [the difference] is merely thoroughly established nature with suchness, the final (mthar) empty-ground: how they adopt a viewpoint.25 Temporarily, it is said that the aggregates, constituents, and sense- He does not make a distinction between Mind-Only Sūtras and Buddha- fields, which are contained within the dependent nature, is the Nature Sūtras in the last wheel; he makes a distinction based on a viewpoint, ground that is empty of the imagined nature, the self, and self-pos- not based on sūtras. He distinguishes the Great Middle Way from what he sessions. In the end, the ground that is empty of even the dependent describes as “Mind-Only realists” (dngos smra’i sems tsam) as follows: nature is suchness, the thoroughly established nature. . . . In this way, the ground that is empty of the imagined nature is the depend- It does not follow that the subject, the supreme sūtras of the last ent nature. The ground that is empty of the dependent nature is the Word, the [Buddha-]Nature Sūtras and so forth, become the tradi- thoroughly established nature. A ground that is empty of suchness, tion of the Mind-Only realists through the mere teaching that gen- the thoroughly established nature, is utterly impossible because it is erally the nondual wisdom is truly established (bden grub) because the thusness that abides as spontaneously present, all the time and there is a great difference in the utterly dissimilar ways of establish- everywhere.27 66 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 67

Although the dependent nature is temporarily the ground of the imagined the thoroughly established nature; (2) in texts such as the Uttara tan - nature, the final empty-ground is the thoroughly established nature, which is tra, suchness, the thoroughly established nature, is empty of the the ground of the dependent nature. Dölpopa states that a ground that is imagined nature. Therefore, in the essence of the thoroughly estab- empty of the thoroughly established nature is impossible because it is the lished nature—which is the ultimate expanse and the suchness of reality that abides everywhere, all the time. In this way, it is the ground of all, mind—there are no defilements to remove, nor previously absent the existent and the nonexistent. qualities to newly establish, because it is primordially pure by nature and has qualities that are spontaneously present.29

OTHER-EMPTINESS AND THE NYINGMA: LOCHEN DHARMAŚRĪ Lochen describes two traditions of other-emptiness for which he delineates (1) the empty-ground as the dependent nature that is empty of the imagined We will now consider a discussion of other-emptiness in the works of the nature in Yogācāra texts and (2) the suchness that is empty of the imagined Nyingma scholar, Lochen Dharmaśrī (lo chen dharmaśrī, 1654–1717). nature in texts such as the Uttaratantra. The latter resembles what we see in Through this we can begin to explore the view of emptiness in the Nyingma the Jonang presentations, and is also adopted by some Nyingma scholars, tradition in general, and see the relationship between Lochen’s Nyingma such as Getsé Pan.chen, as their own tradition of the “Great Middle Way.”30 view and the view of other-emptiness as presented by the Jonang tradition. Moreover, similar to Khenpo Lodrö Drakpa’s statement that the middle This will allow us to better understand Mipam’s interpretation of emptiness, wheel is “merely half the definitive meaning,”31 Lochen states that in his own as well as help us assess his treatment of other-emptiness. tradition, the middle wheel is “half-definitive and half-provisional” (drang Page 165 Lochen delineates self-emptiness and other-emptiness as two manners of nges phye ma) or “definitive for the time being” (gnas skabs pa’i nges don): eliminating constructs (spros pa gcod lugs). He states: Although there are a lot of discordant assertions regarding what are Concerning the manner of eliminating constructs there are two: the definitive or provisional [meanings] of the middle and last self-emptiness and other-emptiness. [Proponents of] self-emptiness [wheels], since there is no scripture of sūtra that clearly states that assert that the emptiness that is a non-implicative negation is ulti- the middle [wheel] is the definitive meaning and the last [wheel] is a mate because however phenomena may appear, they are empty of provisional meaning, and [this] also would contradict the intended their own essences right from their mere appearance.28 meaning of the metaphors of the patient’s medicine and learning to read, my tradition asserts that the middle [wheel] is half-definitive He states that proponents of self-emptiness assert a non-implicative negation and half-provisional, or definitive for the time being, and the last as ultimate. As for other-emptiness, Lochen delineates two traditions of identi- [wheel] itself is the definitive meaning because it is clearly explained fying the empty-ground (stong gzhi) due to a difference in asserting all objects in sūtras such as the Sam. dhinirmocanasūtra, the Mahā parinir vān .a - of knowledge: (1) in terms of the three natures or (2) condensing objects of sūtra, and the An˙gulimālīyasūtra.32 knowledge into two, the imagined and the thoroughly established natures: Lochen says that there is no scripture that clearly states that the middle wheel In the traditions of the Middle Way that ascertain other-emptiness, is definitive and the last is a provisional meaning;33 as such it would conflict due to the difference of asserting all objects of knowledge within the with the meaning of the metaphors of learning to read [progressively]34 and three natures or condensing objects of knowledge into the imagined medicine.35 He affirms that his tradition asserts the last wheel as the defini- and thoroughly established natures, there are two ways of identify- tive meaning.36 ing the subject (chos can): (1) in Yogācāra texts, the empty-ground is Lochen also shows a difference between the middle and last wheels of the dependent nature, the imagined nature is the object of negation, doctrine in terms of the view of what is to be experienced in meditation. He and the emptiness of the imagined nature in the dependent nature is states: 68 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 69

Regarding the view of what is to be experienced in meditation, tion, Prāsan˙gika is a sharper awareness that cuts through superimpo- according to the explicit teaching of the middle wheel explained in sitions. Also, at the time of ascertaining by experience [the supreme the way of [Nāgārjuna’s] “Collection of Reasonings” (rigs tshogs), knowledge] that arises in meditation, the view of the Middle Way since the definitive meaning is accepted as a non-implicative nega- taught in the last wheel itself is profound and much better because: tion, meditating on nothing whatsoever is said to be meditation on (1) the naturally pure expanse, the ultimate truth that is the self- emptiness, and seeing nothing at all is said to be the realization of existing wisdom, is itself the primordial mode of reality of all phe- thusness. According to the viewpoint of the last wheel explained in nomena, and (2) it is also in accord with the practice of the view the way of the texts of Maitreya, Asan˙ga and [half-]brother that is accepted in the profound tantras of Secret Mantra.38 [Vasubandhu], as well in Nāgārjuna’s “Collection of Praises” (bstod tshogs), meditating on just the wisdom which is free from duality is Here he makes a distinction based on two contexts: (1) study and contem- what is to be experienced, and this also accords with the viewpoint plation and (2) meditation. In the contexts of study and contemplation, he of the profound tantras of Secret Mantra.37 portrays Prāsan˙gika-Madhyamaka as a more incisive means of cutting through superimpositions. However, in the contexts of meditation, he says He depicts two views of what is to be experienced in meditation: (1) accord- that the view of the Middle Way taught in the last wheel is better because (1) ing to the explicit teaching of the middle wheel, in which the definitive mean- self-existing wisdom is itself the primordial mode of reality and (2) that view ing is accepted as a non-implicative negation, meditation on emptiness is said accords with the practice of the view that is accepted in the profound to be meditating on nothing whatsoever and seeing nothing at all is said to be tantras.39 Page 166 the realization of suchness, and (2) according to the viewpoint of the last Dölpopa also makes a distinction in the applied practice of the meaning wheel and the profound tantras, meditating on wisdom that is free from dual- of the last two wheels: ity is what is to be experienced. Thus, he points out a difference between the middle and last wheel in terms of what is experienced in meditation. Although the meaning of the last two wheels of doctrine are the Furthermore, Lochen cites Longchenpa, saying in the Wish-Fulfilling same as the Vajrayāna, when they are practiced, one sets in equipoise Treasury and the Treasury of Philosophies that it is not contradictory that the in the conclusive profound suchness free from constructs in accord Prāsan˙gika method is more effective when ascertaining what is to be identi- with the middle wheel, and then when making distinctions in fied in study while also accepting the reflexive wisdom free from duality postmeditation, one discerns phenomena in an authentic way, at when ascertaining what is to be experienced in meditation: which time one makes identifications upon differentiating well in accord with what is said in the last wheel and in the Vajrayāna.40 If one thinks, “In the scriptures such as the Treasury of Philosophies and the root and [auto]commentary of the Wish-Fulfilling Treasury, Dölpopa affirms that the meaning of both wheels is the same as the is it not a contradiction that: (1) in the context of identifying what Vajrayāna, yet he makes a distinction between the ways the last two wheels of is to be ascertained by means of study, Prāsan˙gika-Madhyamaka is doctrine are practiced. He depicts a practice in accord with the middle wheel established as the pinnacle of the Causal Vehicle of Mahāyāna, and as setting in equipoise in the suchness free from constructs. In postmedita- (2) in the contexts of ascertainment by means of meditative experi- tion, he states that one makes distinctions in accord with what is said in the ence, individual reflexive wisdom free from perceived-perceiver last wheel and in the Vajrayāna. In this way, both the middle and last wheels [duality] is asserted?” There is no contradiction because it is difficult are compatible with the Vajrayāna in different contexts. for an ordinary being to deconstruct the reifications of the mind at Before we turn to Mipam, there is one more point Lochen raises that is the time of ascertaining the view by means of study and contempla- important to address. Lochen states how certain practices of his tradition tion. Therefore, in negating these [reifications of the mind] through accord for the most part with Nāgārjuna; however, he raises a question as to the supreme knowledge that arises through study and contempla- whether the view in the Nyingma tradition is in accord with Nāgārjuna: 70 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 71

In general, due to the essential point that the manner of taking the tating irreconcilable ontological views. Even in the case of emptiness inter- bodhisattva vow stated in the tantras of Secret Mantra, and also the preted as a substance (through an implicative negation) or a quality (through enumerated trainings, are in accord for the most part with the tradi- a non-implicative negation), the two need not be incompatible: a non- tion of Nāgārjuna, our tradition of early translations following the implicative negation can be taken to indicate the absence of conceptual con- master Padmasambhava appears to be in accord with Nāgārjuna also structs in the nonconceptual (what is negated) while an implicative negation in the ritual practice for generating the mind of awakening. How- indicates the nonconceptual presence (the wisdom that remains). This is in ever, it is not certain that the [Nyingma] view is [in accord with] his fact suggested in the words of another Nyingma scholar, Getsé Pan.chen, who because even though it does not contradict Nāgārjuna’s “Collection claimed that: “The two modes of emptiness [self-emptiness and other-empti- of Praises,” [the Nyingma] for the most part are in accord with the ness] are the same in that they both assert that the essence of the view is inex- way that Asan˙ga and his [half-]brother [Vasubandhu] explain pressible, unspeakable, and inconceivable.”42 While Getsé Pan.chen explicitly because of (1) taking the uncategorized ultimate as not a non- endorses other-emptiness, he says that self-emptiness and other-emptiness implicative negation, but taking it as an emptiness that is an need not involve conflicting views.43 implicative negation, and (2) accepting the last wheel as the defini- We will now turn to assess Mipam’s position on other-emptiness. We tive meaning.41 will begin by looking at how Mipam distinguishes his view of emptiness and the way he aligns his view with the Nyingma tradition. Lochen suggests that the fact that the Nyingma (1) accept the last wheel as the

Page 167 definitive meaning and (2) take an implicative negation as the uncategorized ultimate problematizes a simple identification with the view of Nāgārjuna. ANOTHER EMPTINESS? EMPTINESS OF SELF/OTHER In accord with Lochen’s delineation of the Nyingma view, Mipam accepts Buddha-Nature Sūtras of the last wheel (along with the middle wheel Mipam places himself within the tradition of Nāgārjuna, Rongzom, and sūtras) as the definitive meaning; however, whether or not he takes an Longchenpa. He states: “I don’t have any burden of establishing the view of implicative negation as the uncategorized ultimate is a moot point. As we other-emptiness; [I am] in accord with the texts of Nāgārjuna, Longchenpa, saw earlier, Mipam states that the uncategorized ultimate is beyond affirma- and Rongzom.”44 Nevertheless, he also wrote a text that explicitly defends a tions and negations. Therefore, he explicitly states that the uncategorized view of other-emptiness, called Lion’s Roar: Affirming Other-Emptiness,45 in ultimate is not a negation, implicative or non-implicative. However, for which he states: Mipam the ultimate is not a mere absence; he does claim that there is a reality of ultimate wisdom that is beyond thought and language. It may be First it is necessary to ascertain the lack of intrinsic nature of all phe- argued that his claim of the existence of this ultimate wisdom does in fact nomena in accordance with the scriptures of the protector Nāgār- entail that the ultimate is an implicative negation, because the reality of non- juna; because if this is not known, one will not be able to ascertain conceptual wisdom is implied, or presumed, in the negation of conceptual the manner that relative [phenomena] are empty from their own constructs. Indeed, this issue of whether the ultimate is indicated by an side and the manner that the ultimate is empty of what is other. implicative negation or a non-implicative negation is at the heart of the Therefore, one should first ascertain the freedom from constructs debates between proponents of “other-emptiness” and “self-emptiness.” which is what is known reflexively.46 The difference between self-emptiness (via non-implicative negation) and other-emptiness (via implicative negation), however, is not necessarily Here Mipam delineates two manners of emptiness: (1) the manner that rela- one of mutual incompatibility. Like the difference between the Svātantrika tive phenomena are empty of their own essences and (2) the manner that the and Prāsan˙gika we saw in the previous chapter, the difference can be seen as ultimate is empty of what is other. He states that first one should ascertain one of different perspectival contexts rather than a radical difference necessi- the freedom of constructs, the lack of intrinsic nature of phenomena in 72 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 73

accordance with the scriptures of Nāgārjuna. Furthermore, he states: “Cer- pot itself. Just as a cow is absent in a horse, but this is not sufficient tainty in the equality of appearance and emptiness—the Great Perfection— as the emptiness of a horse itself; or while the horn of an ox is empty is seen only through the excellent scriptural tradition of Nāgārjuna.”47 In this of a rabbit horn, this is not sufficient as the emptiness of an ox horn. way, he firmly aligns his Nyingma tradition with Nāgārjuna. Among the seven types of emptinesses stated in the Lan˙kāvatārasū- We will first assess Mipam’s view of emptiness by looking at the posi- tra,53 it is inferior—such as a temple’s emptiness of a spiritual com- tions of other-emptiness he critiques. Mipam characterizes the position of munity; it is to be abandoned.54 other-emptiness as leaving an empty-ground: The lack of one thing in another is inferior and is not sufficient as the mean- Saying, “A pillar is not empty of pillar” or ing of emptiness; an emptiness of another does not necessarily contain an “Suchness is empty of pillar” emptiness of itself. Longchenpa also cites in his Wish-Fulfilling Treasury the Is leaving an empty-ground, which is other-emptiness. statement from the Samādhirājasūtra that: “An emptiness of one thing in These are (1) other-emptiness in words and (2) other-emptiness in another is a lesser emptiness.”55 However, in his autocommentary of Resting meaning.48 in the Nature of Mind, Longchenpa cites Asan˙ga’s commentary on the Uttaratantra56 in an approving portrayal of Buddha-nature as the absence of Saying that a pillar is empty of true establishment, but not empty of itself is a something in another: statement of other-emptiness in that it conveys that something is empty of something else. In the same way, stating that the ultimate nature, suchness, is While Buddha-nature is empty of all that is divisible, separable, and

Page 168 not empty of itself, but is empty of phenomena like pillars also shares the disturbed, it is said to be not empty of the inconceivable, indivisible, meaning of other-emptiness. Both of these claims represent an other-empti- and inseparable qualities of Buddha which are more numerous than ness view: emptiness held as negating some extrinsic quality while leaving a the sands of the river Ganges. In this, one sees authentically that (non-empty) ground. The latter claim characterizes other-emptiness in the which does not exist in something, that something is empty of that; Jonang tradition, where the ultimate suchness of reality is stated to be empty and one authentically knows as it is that which remains always exists of all relative phenomena. Mipam also calls this “ultimate other-emptiness” there57 (de la).58 (don dam gzhan stong).49 The former claim characterizes a Geluk view, in which relative phenomena like pillars are the empty ground(s) of the ultimate We can see a similarity between the depictions of a locative absence (1) as an quality of emptiness (that is, the lack if true establishment). Mipam also inferior view of emptiness and (2) as Buddha-nature. Perhaps a distinction enlists this view as having the meaning of other-emptiness by associating can be made between the two as to whether or not the emptiness of another other-emptiness with the claim that a pot is not empty from its own side, but also contains within it an emptiness of itself. We will see how Mipam distin- is empty of another—true establishment.50 When a (non-empty) ground of guishes his view of Buddha-nature from mistaken conceptions of it in the emptiness is taken as an implication of such claims as “a pillar is not empty of next chapter. Here we will look into his delineation in terms of emptiness. pillar,” in effect it becomes an other-emptiness view.51 He also calls such a First, we will discuss his treatment of the ultimate in the view of other- view “relative other-emptiness” (kun rdzob gzhan stong), and states that while emptiness. the Jonang tradition accepts ultimate other-emptiness and relative self-emptiness, this view accepts relative other-emptiness and ultimate self-emptiness.52 Mipam distinguishes the meaning of emptiness from the locative PHENOMENA AND SUCHNESS absence of other-emptiness by stating that an absence of one thing in another is not the meaning of emptiness: Mipam characterizes the tradition of other-emptiness as accepting something that ultimately exists. In contrast, he says that nothing ultimately exists in If a pot is not empty from its own side, but is empty of another phe- the tradition of self-emptiness. With this distinction, he identifies himself nomenon, this is not sufficient (go mi chod ) as the emptiness of a with the tradition propounding self-emptiness: 74 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 75

In the tradition of self-emptiness, since there is only the ultimately From the perspective of conventional valid cognition analyzing the nonexistent, an ultimately existing phenomenon is impossible. In mode of appearance, the subjects and objects of the incontrovertible the tradition of other-emptiness, what is ultimately nonexistent is accordance between the modes of appearance and reality are called the relative, and what is ultimately existent is the ultimate itself. My “ultimate” and the opposite are called “relative.”65 tradition is clear in the Rapsel Rejoinder,59 the tradition propounding self-emptiness.60 Thus, according to this delineation, the ultimate in other-emptiness is ultimate from the perspective of conventional valid cognition. Moreover, he In this way, he identifies his tradition as asserting self-emptiness; and thus he argues that conventional valid cognition cannot establish something to be denies that anything ultimately exists. not empty of its own essence. Conventional valid cognition does not assess When we consider Mipam’s depiction of emptiness in light of the cate- whether something is truly established or not; rather, that status is assessed gories of “self-emptiness” and “other-emptiness,” we can see that according by ultimate valid cognition. He states that what is truly established—not to Khenpo Lodrö Drakpa’s definitions of a proponent of self-emptiness empty of its own essence—cannot be established by any valid cognition: (claiming a non-implicative negation as the consummate ultimate) and other-emptiness (claiming wisdom as not empty of its own essence),61 Not empty of its own essence, being truly established it is com- Mipam is a proponent of neither self-emptiness nor other-emptiness. pletely impossible to be the suchness of an extrinsic phenomenon, However, according to Lochen’s definitions of self-emptiness and other- etc. It also cannot be the outcome of ascertainment by the valid emptiness,62 we see how Mipam can be said to be a proponent of both self- cognition of ultimate analysis because the affirmation of something Page 169 emptiness and other-emptiness! truly established is not accurate as a handprint [result] of the analy- In order to make sense of Mipam’s interpretation of emptiness in rela- sis of all phenomena lacking true existence—like darkness [arising] tionship to the categories of self-emptiness and other-emptiness, we need to from light. True establishment is not established by conventional identify what these terms mean in the works of the respective authors who valid cognition either because even though [it may appear to be] use them. It is clear that Mipam defines himself as a proponent of self-empti- truly established from that [conventional] perspective, by merely ness—as one who propounds that there is nothing ultimately existent—in that there is never an ability to establish phenomena to be non- accord with his definition of the term.63 We will see below a distinction he empty. Without being able to be established by the two valid makes between language and view (in the context of non-implicative vs. cognitions, the means of establishment has gone the way of a implicative negations), which problematizes the identification of Mipam’s [nonexistent] space-flower; therefore, establishing this becomes view with a view of self-emptiness. As we saw in the previous chapter in his meaninglessly tiresome.66 discussion of Prāsan˙gika, there is an important distinction to be made between (1) view and (2) language in accord with a view, and Mipam is care- He states that something truly established and not empty of its own essence ful to distinguish the two. cannot result from ultimate valid cognition, which establishes the lack of Although Mipam states that emptiness is the ultimate truth, he does not true existence.67 Nor can conventional valid cognition establish something affirm that anything, even emptiness, ultimately exists. Furthermore, he says: to be not empty of its own essence, despite appearing that way from a per- “The manner of establishing the ultimate of other-emptiness is by means of spective of conventional valid cognition. whether or not appearance accords with reality.”64 In his delineation of the However, in his Lion’s Roar: Affirming Other-Emptiness, he shows how two models of the two truths (i.e., appearance/emptiness and authentic/ the claim of a non-empty ultimate can be supported. He argues that just as inauthentic experience), he states that appearance in accord with reality someone may assert that true establishment is to be negated, but not its (authentic experience) is called “ultimate” from the perspective of conven- absence, in a similar way, one can assert that the distorted relative is to be tional valid cognition: negated, but not the undistorted ultimate: 76 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 77

The assertion that although true establishment is negated, the truly established as a pot: “A pot is necessarily truly established (bden grub) absence of true existence is not negated, not to be negated, nor is as pot through conventional valid cognition, just like the truth of causality appropriate to be negated, is similar to [the assertion that] although and the truth of the three jewels.”71 the relative distortions are negated, the undistorted ultimate is not According to Mipam, what is “conventional” is the realm of thought, negated, not to be negated, nor is suitable to be negated.68 words, and physical actions: “The conventional is posited as what is known, expressed, and acted upon by means of the mind, speech, and body.”72 Thus, He argues that an assertion that one should not negate the absence of true a pot can be said to be a conventionally existent phenomenon (since it can be existence is similar to the assertion that one should not negate the ultimate thought, expressed, and acted upon) and a conventional truth (from the itself. In this way, he shows a correlation between the two claims that: (1) the aspect of its appearance). Also, the emptiness of the pot, as an empty quality absence of true existence (the ultimate in the appearance/emptiness two- that is a referent of thought and expression, can be said to be the (catego- truth model) is not to be negated and (2) the undistorted ultimate (the ulti- rized) ultimate truth and conventionally existent. Although he does not mate in the authentic/inauthentic experience two-truth model) is not to be make this distinction explicit in this way, we can see how such a distinction is negated. Furthermore, he uses a similar parallel consequence in his response made in his treatment of existence (yod pa) and truth (bden pa). This distinc- to a hypothetical qualm: tion between existence and truth in Mipam’s works reveals an affinity with Tsongkhapa.73 This affinity is often overlooked due to the fact that most of If a [conventional phenomenon like a] pot, were empty of pot, then Mipam’s polemics target views held within the Geluk tradition.

Page 170 would it not be that a pot would not be a pot, and thus a pot would Mipam delineates the criterion for existence through an epistemological not exist conventionally? [Response:] So be it. Hence, in the same definition: via valid cognition, conventional or ultimate: way, if the ultimate truth were empty of ultimate truth, then the ultimate truth would not be ultimate truth, and thus the ultimate In short, the conventional [existence] of that which is established to would not exist even conventionally.69 exist in the perspective of conventional valid cognition cannot be refuted by anyone at all. The conventional existence of that which is He again shows how a consequence that is used to defend the conventional invalidated by conventional valid cognition cannot be established by existence of phenomena also can support a defense of the (conventionally anyone at all. Nobody at all can affirm that something is ultimately existent) ultimate truth: he shows the conventional nonexistence of the ulti- existent which has been established to not exist by ultimate valid mate as an absurd consequence that would follow if the ultimate truth were cognition.74 empty of ultimate truth. In this way, he shows how an assertion that the ultimate truth is (conventionally) not empty of itself is supported by the same We can see a distinction between ultimate existence and ultimate truth logic that is used to defend a pot’s conventional non-emptiness of itself. In through his framework of valid cognition. For Mipam nothing is ultimately doing so, he depicts how affirmations of the ultimate can be conventionally existent—not wisdom, or even emptiness. Nevertheless, in his authentic/ true, a move on par with an assertion that emptiness conventionally exists. inauthentic two-truth model, wisdom is the ultimate truth. In this way, we can see how a distinction can be made between ultimate Moreover, a distinction between ultimate existence and conventional truth and ultimate existence. A similar distinction can also be made existence also plays a part in Mipam’s depiction of reflexive awareness (rang between conventional truth and conventional existence. For instance, rig) and the universal ground (kun gzhi). He states that reflexive awareness Mipam states that a pot is not empty of pot in terms of the conventional: and the universal ground are conventionally existent, not ultimately existent: “In terms of the conventional, I assert that a pot is not empty of pot, because if it were empty conventionally, the pot would become non- In the ascertainment of the ultimate, reflexive awareness and the existent.”70 Moreover, he says that from a conventional perspective, a pot is universal ground are not necessary. However, they are indispensable 78 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 79

in the analysis of a conventional presentation; and moreover, if it is manent entity, nor a permanent, eternal entity. Although it is established by valid cognition analyzing the conventional, there is unchanging, it is not a mere absence that is a nonentity either. no reason to negate it, saying “it does not conventionally exist.”75 Therefore, since the basis of imputation of great permanence exists, it is not like the assertion of nonentities as “permanent” because He argues that the universal ground and reflexive awareness, while not neces- when the imputation of the permanence of [nonentities] such as sary in the ascertainment of the ultimate, are indispensable in an analysis of space is analyzed, it exists as the mere inverse of what is imperma- conventional reality.76 Mipam’s position here directly contrasts with nent, but there is no basis of imputation at all for permanence.79 Tsongkhapa, who included the rejection of both reflexive awareness and the universal ground among his eight unique assertions of Prāsan˙gika.77 Mipam affirms that conventionally there is a basis of designation for “great For Mipam, conventional existence plays an important role in the way permanence,” which is unlike a permanent entity and unlike what is merely that he shows how conventions in tantra such as “innate mind” (gnyug sems) the inverse of what is impermanent imputed as “permanent.” This is similar and “great bliss” (bde ba chen po) can be compatible with Prāsan˙gika: to Dölpopa’s characterization of suchness as a third category that is neither an entity nor a nonentity. However, Mipam does not affirm that it exists In general in the Prāsan˙gika tradition, the collection of six con- ultimately. sciousnesses is accepted, and there is no presentation of reflexive Mipam also delineates the ultimate and conventional in a description of awareness and so forth, as is clear from their texts. Yet how is it that the relationship between mind and wisdom, reflecting his tradition of the just because there is no assertion conventionally in that [tradition] Great Perfection. In this, we see how Mipam depicts the relationship Page 171 that one must necessarily understand that [these] definitely do not between phenomena (chos can) and suchness (chos nyid ): “The suchness of exist conventionally? For example, like the fact that although there is consciousness is wisdom.”80 He states that mind and wisdom are conven- no point in using conventions such as innate mind and great bliss in tionally not the same, but ultimately are not different: the Prāsan˙gika tradition, it is not that these are conventionally unreasonable.78 Therefore, the two: (1) phenomena, which are the eight collections of consciousness, and (2) the wisdom that is suchness, which is the Through the status of existing conventionally, he shows how such conven- nature of those [consciousnesses], are not asserted as either the same tions as reflexive awareness, innate mind, and great bliss are not necessarily or different. As Longchen Rapjam stated in accordance with the incompatible with the Prāsan˙gika tradition. In this way, he uses a perspectival words in the Sam. dhinirmocana: system to integrate Prāsan˙gika and tantra. Such a perspectival system can be seen as an extension of Śāntaraks.ita’s integration of Dharmakīrti and Nāgār- The character of the conditioned realm and the ultimate, juna. In Mipam’s case, however, it extends to become an integration of Can- Is the character free from being the same or different; drakīrti and Padmasambhava. Thus, those who conceive [them] as the same or different Furthermore, in a compilation of Mipam’s oral instructions entitled Tril- Have entered into an improper view.81 ogy of Innate Mind, Mipam states that suchness is called “the great permanence” (rtag pa chen po) conventionally, but that this does not designate a Therefore, conventionally, the two are not the same because (1) permanent entity or an impermanent entity: wisdom, the suchness of mind, is not realized by merely realizing the mind and (2) [mind and wisdom] are phenomena and suchness. Although suchness, together with the appearances that arise from Ultimately, they are not different because, due to the nature of mind the self-expression of suchness, are all ultimately beyond the being wisdom, (1) when wisdom is realized, the mind is also not extremes of entities and nonentities, conventionally, there is the des- observed as different from that [wisdom] and (2) when wisdom is ignation “the great permanence”; it is neither a momentary imper- realized, the mind arises as self-liberated.82 80 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 81

He states that consciousness and wisdom are not the same conventionally “ground of liberation”; and from the aspect of its being the basis of sentient because they are related as phenomena and suchness; however, ultimately being’s confusion, it is “the ground of confusion.”88 He also describes the sup- they are not different because the nature of mind itself is wisdom. Further- port for both sam. sāra and nirvān.a as the “ultimate universal ground” (don gyi more, he says: kun gzhi), which is a synonym for Buddha-nature.89 Mipam refers to such a ground as the “ground of the primeval beginning” (ye thog gi gzhi).90 One should understand that wisdom does not arise from mind, but Rather than a dichotomous relationship between a separate ground of the is the abiding reality of mind, which is naturally luminous and clear; ultimate and relative, we can say that Mipam maintains a dialectical relation- in the way that emptiness—the suchness of all entities—does not ship between the two truths, a dialectical unity. As such, the ultimate and the arise from entities, but is the abiding reality of entities.83 relative have a common ground; they are only virtually distinct, but not actually so. The difference between the Great Perfection-inspired work of In this way, Mipam depicts the relationship between mind and wisdom in Mipam and the other-emptiness of the Jonang also corresponds with how the same way he describes the relationship between phenomena and such- Dölpopa derides a view that concepts are the Truth Body,91 whereas an inte- ness—neither the same nor different; that is, neither (conventionally) the gral relationship between concepts and the Truth Body is more characteristic same nor (ultimately) different. As with mind and wisdom, neither sam. sāra of the discourses of the Great Perfection.92 and nirvān.a, nor the two truths as authentic/inauthentic experience, are a unity in ordinary conventional terms; the presence of one entails the absence of the other. He states: “It is not at all possible to conventionally be both the DE/LIMITING EMPTINESS Page 172 mistaken sam. sāra and the unmistaken nirvān.a.”84 Thus, the two truths are a unity in terms of the two truths as appearance/emptiness, but the two truths Another difference between Mipam and Dölpopa is Mipam’s consistent cri- as authentic/inauthentic experience are a different case.85 tiques of linguistic and conceptual formulations of the ultimate. Mipam fre- Mipam’s emphasis on the unity of the two truths distinguishes his works quently criticizes mistaken conceptions of suchness as an empty-ground. For from Dölpopa’s representation of the view. Dölpopa emphasizes more of a instance, in his commentary on the Madhyamakālam. kāra, he states: radical separation between two distinct realities—the relative and the ultimate. Reflecting the separation between the relative and ultimate, Dölpopa Without gaining certainty in primordial purity, merely an impas- makes a distinction between the universal ground consciousness (kun gzhi’i sioned thought of a ground that is neither existent nor nonexistent rnam shes) and the universal ground wisdom (kun gzhi’i ye shes).86 This “uni- will bring you nowhere. If you hold onto such a ground, which is versal ground wisdom” is a distinctive term used in the Jonang that I have empty of both existence and nonexistence, as separate and estab- not seen used in the Nyingma works of Longchenpa or Mipam. This termi- lished by its own essence, whether it is called the inconceivable Self, nology reflects how the Jonang preserve a form of dualism in their explana- Brahma, Vis.n.u, Īśvara, wisdom, etc., it is merely a different name tions—a radical dichotomy of (1) the nonexistent relative and (2) the for a similar [mistaken] meaning. The abiding reality that is free existent ultimate. Such a dichotomy is unlike the strong monism we find in from the four extremes—the luminous clarity of the Great Perfec- the Great Perfection, where the ultimate and relative are nondistinct. tion which is realized reflexively—is not at all like that.93 Moreover, Mipam does not assign the ultimate truth of suchness a priv- eleged status apart from the relative truth of appearance; suchness is ulti- He claims that without gaining certainty in primordial purity, holding onto mately not different from appearances. We find a precursor to this undivided an empty-ground as the abiding reality is not the correct view. Furthermore, ground of truth in Longchenpa’s characterization of a “general ground” (spyi he states: “Although traditions may claim to be free from extremes, in the gzhi) as the ground of both sam. sāra and nirvān.a.87 Longchenpa states that end since they constantly depend upon a conceptual reference for a Self, or from the aspect of its being the basis for both sam. sāra and nirvān.a, it is the Brahma, etc., how could this manner be the Middle Way?”94 Mipam distin- “general ground”; from the aspect of its being the basis of liberation, it is the guishes the manner of the Middle Way as beyond conceptual reference. He 82 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 83

says that “the middle” is not a referent object: “‘The middle’ expresses the mate mode of reality of entities—free from all extremes of existence, non- lack of reference to any extreme.”95 Furthermore, he states: “It is said that existence, both, and neither—is therefore not the domain of mind; mind ‘the middle’ should not be identified as a referent object that abides like the and language are relative, not ultimate.”101 Mipam describes the ultimate space between two aligned pillars; the middle is not what is observed.”96 In mode of reality as beyond the domain of mind. He states that conventionally contrast to Dölpopa’s emphasis on the ultimate as an other-empty presence, the ultimate can be said to be an object of knowledge, but not ultimately: Mipam emphasizes that emptiness is beyond reference and conceptuality. A freedom from conceptual constructs is a central part of Mipam’s characteri- Conventionally, based on taking the meditative equipoise of the zation of emptiness. Sublime Ones as the subject and the expanse of phenomena as the Mipam also claims that “Middle Way reasoning will inevitably refute object, it is suitable to say “[the ultimate] is an object of knowledge whatever object the mind takes as support.”97 He depicts the meaning of (shes bya)”; however, if this [ultimate] is said to be ultimately what is emptiness as distinct from determinate conceptions of a metaphysical refer- perceived or known by a meditative equipoise without perceived- ent. Thus, emptiness is not what is held as either (1) a substrate or (2) a qual- perceiver [duality]—are these words not explicitly and implicitly in ity of absence. In his Lion’s Roar: Affirming Other-Emptiness, he states: contradiction? Moreover, the claim that the ultimate is an object of knowledge, because the basis of division of the two truths is objects Just as the assertion of the absence of true existence can become an of knowledge,102 is also by exclusion (rnam gcod ). Here it is [said to] incorrigible view of emptiness as a reified sign of a nonentity, simi- not [be] an object of knowledge determined by inclusion (yongs larly, the assertion of a freedom from constructs can become an gcod ); therefore, there is no contradiction. If one accepts that [the Page 173 incorrigible view in which emptiness is a referent object of an ineffa- ultimate] is also an object of knowledge determined by inclusion, ble entity.98 then emptiness is asserted as an entity.103

He argues that emptiness can be reified as a sign of a nonentity; similarly, it He states that the ultimate asserted as an object of knowledge is an object of can become a referent object of an “ineffable” entity. In this way, he empha- knowledge by exclusion; it is known through explicitly negating what it is not. sizes that suchness is beyond conceptual reference: “As long as the mind The ultimate cannot be an object of knowledge as determined by inclusion— remains with reference or with a perceived-perceiver [duality], appearance through affirming what it is—because that would turn emptiness into an does not accord with reality; suchness is not the object of a mind with a per- entity. Here we can see a tension between the status of the ultimate as a pres- ceived-perceiver [duality].”99 Appearance does not accord with reality when ence and an absence. Mipam incorporates assertions that the ultimate both is the mind remains with reference or is dualistic. Thus, the ultimate, or such- and is not an object of knowledge by stating that they are not necessarily a con- ness, is not an object of a dualistic mind. Furthermore, he states: tradiction when the former is the ultimate that can be known through exclusion and the latter is the ultimate that cannot be known through inclusion. Those who emphatically claim that an inferential cognition analyz- The delineation of the ultimate as not the domain of mind is found in a ing the ultimate, or a wisdom that realizes the ultimate through description of the two truths from Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra: direct perception, sees the essence of an object or even finds it, no matter how much they refute other-emptiness, the heart of their The relative and the ultimate, these are asserted as the two truths. own view has fallen under the power of other-emptiness and they The ultimate is not the domain of mind; the [domain of] mind is just don’t know it.100 relative.104

In this way, he portrays other-emptiness as affirming a determinate ultimate. Incorporating the Madhyamakāvatāra with the way the two truths are repre- In contrast, he emphasizes the transcendence of the ultimate by characteriz- sented in the Bodhicaryāvatāra, Bötrül brings to light two ways in which the ing the ultimate as that which transcends thought and language: “The ulti- ultimate is expressed: 84 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 85

In the root text and [auto]commentary of the Madhyamakāvatāra, with reality, and (2) the phenomena of sam. sāra, which is the natu- the defining character of the ultimate is posited by means of inclu- ral impurity of appearances that do not accord with reality, are sion; in the context of the Wisdom Chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, asserted, like an entity and a nonentity, as the negation of being the defining character of the ultimate is indicated by means of exclu- one. However, it appears that in [Mipam’s] Exposition [of Buddha- sion. Both scriptures indicate the defining character of the relative Nature] and so forth, the two—sam. sāra and nirvān.a—are also by means of inclusion.105 asserted to be neither one nor many in the manner of phenomena and suchness.107 Bötrül says that the ultimate delineated in the Madhyamakāvatāra—the object of authentic seeing—is indicated by means of inclusion. The ultimate Bötrül states that in texts such as the Lion’s Roar: Exposition of Buddha- delineated in the Bodhicaryāvatāra—not the domain of mind—is indicated Nature, Mipam asserts the relationship between the two truths as neither one by means of exclusion. Both texts indicate the relative by means of inclusion, nor many, which accords with the Prāsan˙gika. He associates the Svātantrika namely, false seeings in the Madhyamakāvatāra and the [domain of] mind in with the relationship between the two truths as essentially the same with the Bodhicaryāvatāra.106 different contradistinctions, which was the way Tsongkhapa delineated Bötrül describes the relationship between the two truths in the Svā- them.108 We saw earlier how Dölpopa articulated the relationship between tantrika tradition, based on the categorized ultimate, as “essentially the same suchness and phenomena as “different in the sense of negating that they are with different contradistinctions” (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad ), only con- one entity,”109 which is Bötrül’s third delineation. We also saw that Dölpopa ceptually distinct. In the Prāsan˙gika tradition, based on the uncategorized stated that an implicative negation exists within the ground of a non- Page 174 ultimate, he states that the two truths are “essentially neither one nor many” implicative negation,110 and we will now discuss how Mipam depicts (ngo bo gcig du bral), meaning that they are neither the same nor different. implicative and non-implicative negations. Also, he says that there is another way the relationship is described, as “the negation of being one” (gcig pa bkag pa). This latter delineation is by means of whether or not it is established in the abiding reality (gnas lugs la grub ma EMPTINESS AS THE UNITY OF APPEARANCE AND EMPTINESS grub), which is the two truths of authentic/inauthentic experience. Such a delineation accords with the ultimate in other-emptiness—the object of the Mipam does not delimit emptiness as a substrate that is detached from phe- conventional valid cognition of pure vision: nomena or as merely the quality of absence separate from appearance. Emptiness is not separate from appearance. He states that an emptiness that In general, based upon the Svātantrika tradition’s ultimate that is understood as separate from appearance is an implicative negation. He depends upon two truths—which is the object of valid cognition claims that an implicative negation does not have the meaning of unity analyzing the categorized [ultimate]—it is not appropriate for the because it establishes the essence of another phenomenon: two truths to be divided other than as essentially the same with different contradistinctions. However, the two truths are asserted as An indication that entities lack intrinsic nature is a non-implicative essentially neither one nor many in relation to the consummate negation because an implicative negation establishes the essence of Prāsan˙gika tradition’s view of the ultimate, which is the object of another phenomenon; as such it does not have the meaning of valid cognition analyzing the uncategorized. Moreover, in certain unity. Although appearances are designated as lacking intrinsic contexts concerning the two truths of phenomena that appear in nature, if this is understood to mean something empty separate accordance with reality—which are the objects of conventional from appearance, even though it may be called a “non-implicative valid cognition of pure vision—by means of whether or not they negation” it has become an implicative negation. Appearance itself are established in the mode of reality, the two: (1) the phenomena appears while nonexistent, it is a unity—marvelous—thus, through of nirvān.a, which is the natural purity of appearances in accord abiding as the ineffable indivisibility of appearance and emptiness, it 86 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 87

is beyond the mind because it is free from negation and affirmation From the perspective of the great wisdom of unity, 111 in the consummate meaning. The elimination of the object of negation by “nonexistent” Implies neither a mere existential absence nor a predicative He asserts that an indication that entities lack intrinsic nature is a non-implica- negation— tive negation, not an implicative negation. He thus depicts non-implicative What other phenomenon is there to imply by negation? negations as better indicators of emptiness (qua absence) than implicative Both of these are merely mental imputations; negations. In this way, he emphasizes that emptiness is beyond mind. I assert neither as the [consummate] meaning.114 He states that in terms of only the manner of emptiness, the Nyingma view is a non-implicative negation, and adds that Candrakīrti and Rongzom Mipam describes the view from the perspective of wisdom as neither a non- both affirm the great emptiness of primordial purity: implicative negation nor an implicative negation. In this way, he represents emptiness within the view of wisdom as not a negation (since it is not the It is said that the Geluk (dge ldan) view is a non-implicative referent of thought or words). However, he describes the negative language negation, used to express emptiness as only a non-implicative negation: Other traditions speak of an implicative negation— If one asks, “Which is the tradition of the early translations [of In the context of indicating emptiness, the negation of form, etc. is Nyingma]?” only a non-implicative negation. Since an implicative negation is Considering only the manner of emptiness Page 175 also in the end a fixation upon an entity, it is not suitable to be the When questioned [what is the Nyingma view], it is only a non- meaning of emptiness. Therefore, while it is a non-implicative nega- implicative negation. tion, due to appearing as an unfailing interdependent arising, it is The glorious Candrakīrti in the Noble Land [of India] the unity of emptiness and appearance so any apprehension of nega- And Rongzom Chözang in Tibet tion or affirmation should deconstruct.115 Established with one viewpoint and one voice 112 The great emptiness of primordial purity. He states that the negating language expressed to indicate emptiness is only a non-implicative negation because an implicative negation is in the end a fix- He affirms that, concerning only the manner of emptiness, the Nyingma ation on an entity. Thus, Mipam suggests that emptiness represented by an view is a non-implicative negation. However, he also states that since wisdom implicative negation leads to a reification of emptiness, not the authentic transcends the mind and is not the domain of thoughts and words, there is emptiness. Therefore, he does not accept implicative negations as adequate no partiality for non-implicative or implicative negations, emptiness or indicators of emptiness’s quality of absence. appearance: We can see that neither implicative nor non-implicative negations denote what Mipam characterizes as the view of consummate emptiness, Since wisdom transcends the mind, which is the unity of appearance and emptiness beyond negation and affir- It is inconceivable by an extrinsic thought. mation. Overlooking this distinction between view and language in accord Since it is not an object of language or thought with a view leads to confusion as to how to place Mipam’s view. He can cer- There is no partiality for tainly be understood as a proponent of self-emptiness in the way that he Non-implicative negations or implicative negations, explicitly aligns himself with the tradition propounding “self-emptiness” 113 Difference, appearance or emptiness, etc. (using the language of the tradition for which nothing ultimately exists). However, he does not depict the view of the ultimate as a simple negative; he Furthermore, he states: characterizes the view of the ultimate as nonconceptual. Thus, we can see 88 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 89

why he has no preference for a particular negation or affirmation in terms of is the abiding reality!” Grasping at emptiness, this will become an the view that is beyond language and mind. Moreover, given that the view is incorrigible view. There are two ways to grasp also: grasping at nonconceptual, there is no reason why it could not be evoked by an implica- emptiness as an entity and grasping at emptiness as a nonentity.120 tive negation or even by an affirmation.116 In any case, Mipam argues that, in order to recognize the ultimate, it is Apprehending the absence of true existence eliminates the mistaken appre- necessary to firmly decide on the absence of true existence: “In order to rec- hension of entities; however, it is not the abiding reality. Although it is ognize the own face of the ultimate, one must reach a firm conclusion (phu important, the empty-quality alone is not reality. He shows that the empty- thag chod ) on the absence of true existence.”117 We find that Tsongkhapa quality conceived as distinct from an empty-substrate is not the meaning of makes a similar statement in his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path: emptiness. In this way, we can see how Mipam distinguishes his view from a “Realization of special insight (lhag mthong) will not occur without the cer- view of emptiness as a substrate or a quality. tainty of the view that has reached a firm conclusion (phu thag chod ) on the Mipam clearly delineates two contexts for the interpretation of words meaning of the absence of self.”118 We can see again how Mipam’s approach such as “abiding reality” (gnas lugs), “emptiness” (stong nyid ), “suchness” (chos here shares a close affinity with Tsongkhapa. nyid ), “freedom from constructs” (spros bral), “the expanse of phenomena” Also reflecting the importance he ascribes to reason, Mipam explains (chos dbyings), and “ultimate” (don dam). He states: that it does not help to merely aspire to an absence, without knowing the manner of its absence. He uses as an analogy the way that just thinking, “Abiding reality” that is the emptiness of entities and “there is no snake” does not remedy the confusion of seeing a multicolored “Abiding reality” that is the indivisible two truths Page 176 rope as a snake, but through seeing the manner of its absence, the confusion Although both are the same word, is relinquished: The meanings are as distinct as the earth and space. Likewise, “suchness,” “expanse of phenomena,” Based on this clinging to self and other as real entities “Emptiness,” “freedom from constructs,” “limit of cessation,” One continuously enters the stream of [cyclic] existence. “Ultimate,” etc., are similar expressions, yet The antidote that averts these Since the distinction is vast Is the apprehension of the absence of self. Between the consummate and the partial, Moreover, without knowing the manner of its absence Having delineated the distinctive context, Wishing for its absence does not help, They should be explained without error.121 Like when a multicolored rope is mistaken for a snake It does not help to think “there is no snake,” but He states that it is important to recognize two distinctive meanings of empti- When the manner of its absence is seen, it is abandoned.119 ness in their appropriate contexts because the two meanings of such terms are as different as “the earth and space.” One is partial, referring to the The antidote that eradicates clinging to the entities of self and other is the emptiness of entities that is a quality of phenomena. The consummate apprehension of the absence of self. However, he argues that an emptiness meaning refers to the unity of appearance and emptiness. Likewise, he dis- that is apprehended solely as an absence is not the abiding reality: tinguishes: (1) emptiness as a distinctive quality of appearance from (2) emptiness as the indivisible truth of the unity of emptiness and appearance: Only in the beginning, if a lack of true existence is not taught, there will be no method to extract the beginningless habit of the mistaken Both the emptiness of true existence and the appearance of interde- apprehension of entities; and if merely that [lack of true existence] is pendent arising, which are the components of a division into two taught as the ultimate, some narrow-minded people will think, truths, are separate from the aspect of merely a contradistinction. “The mere absence that is the elimination of the object of negation However, just as impermanent phenomenon and product are not 90 MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE The Present Absence 91

objectively separate, the pair of appearance and emptiness, being ble unity of appearance and emptiness. In his Trilogy of Innate Mind, he essentially of an indivisible nature within the uncontrived funda- affirms that the consummate meaning of suchness is only unity: mental abiding reality that does not abide in any extreme, is called “the indivisible truth” or “the unity of the two truths.”122 Awareness (rig pa) and luminous clarity (’od gsal) are posited from the aspect of appearance, but are not separate from emptiness. Also, He states that a phenomenon’s emptiness of true existence is essentially the “emptiness” is not separate from appearance. In reality, unity alone same as its appearance—the two are only distinguished conceptually, as dif- is suchness; it is thoroughly important that neither emptiness nor ferent contradistinctions. In reality, they are indivisible as “the unity of the appearance on its own is the great suchness, the consummate ulti- two truths.” However, unity is not to be understood (only) as a combination mate. From here the essential points of all of Sūtra and Mantra are of the two aspects of appearance and emptiness: unraveled.125

The appearance that is the object of conventional valid cognition, He affirms that suchness, as the unity of emptiness and appearance, is an The emptiness that is the object of ultimate analysis, and important point through which the meaning of all the sūtras and tantras can The unity that is the aspect of the combination of those two, be known. Thus, he says that suchness refers to unity: “The abiding reality is Since they are objects of words and concepts the unity of appearance and emptiness from the beginning.”126 They are transcended in meditative equipoise.123 Page 177 The unity that is understood as the aspect of a combination of (1) appear- CONCLUSION ance, the object of conventional valid cognition, and (2) emptiness, the object of ultimate analysis, is still within the domain of language and con- Mipam emphasizes nonconceptual unity as the meaning of emptiness. In his cepts. The two truths known by distinct valid cognitions only apply in the presentation, he critiques determinate conceptual and linguistic formula- context of knowledge in postmeditation. Such conceptions are transcended tions of emptiness. We have seen how he critiques two delimited conceptions in meditative equipoise. Although appearance and emptiness are contradic- of emptiness: (1) as solely an absence separate from appearance and (2) as a tory in the context of conventional valid cognition, Mipam affirms that in location that is separate from appearance. These two conceptions of empti- the perspective of wisdom, emptiness and appearance are not contradictory: ness—emptiness as solely a quality or a substrate—are within the domain of mind. In contrast, the consummate meaning of emptiness cannot be known Since this is the context of presenting by the mind because it is the domain of wisdom. In this way, emptiness as The objects seen by conventional valid cognition, such is beyond the substance/quality dichotomy; the consummate emptiness Existence and nonexistence are contradictory in that perspective, is the unity of emptiness and appearance. [but] While conventionally there can be said to be a referent of emptiness, and The two truths existing upon one entity is not contradictory a difference between quality and substrate, ultimately, emptiness is not a ref- Due to being the object of wisdom.124 erent object and there is no difference between quality and substrate. Thus, emptiness does not refer to an empty-ground separate from appearance nor Emptiness and appearance are mutually exclusive in the context of conven- is it only a quality of an appearance distinct from that appearance. Rather, tional valid cognition, but not for wisdom. Wisdom is beyond dichotomies emptiness refers to the indivisible unity of emptiness and appearance. The and perceives the unity of appearance and emptiness. nature and content of the appearing aspect of emptiness bring us squarely Thus, the empty quality alone is not what is meant by terms such as into the subject matter of Buddha-nature. We are now ready to turn to the “suchness,” “ultimate,” and “emptiness”; these terms also refer to the indivisi- explicit topic of Buddha-nature in Mipam’s works. 5 zSJntGnOCS9iGt9

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