DOCSLIB.ORG

Russian Regional Report (Vol

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Russian Regional Report (Vol. 10, No. 1, 14 January 2005) A bi-weekly publication jointly produced by the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich (http://www.isn.ethz.ch) and the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) at American University, Washington, DC (http://www.American.edu/traccc) TABLE OF CONTENTS Regional Perspectives The Yukos Affair: A View from Tomsk Russian Border Abkhazia Elects New Leader Torture in Russia Marii El Group Exposes Police Abuse Political Parties Kursk Governor Leaves Communist Party Regional Elections Volgograd: Communist Nikolai Maksyuta Wins New Term Astrakhan, Ulyanovsk: United Russia Wins Governors' Races RRR on-line (with archives) - http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/rrr/ TraCCC in the News - http://www.american.edu/traccc/tracccinthenews.html REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES THE YUKOS AFFAIR: A VIEW FROM TOMSK. In December, the federal government auctioned off one of Yukos's key assets, effectively destroying the company. Since 2003, when Yukos head Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested, the campaign against Yukos has had a large impact on the regions where the company's business activities were concentrated. In 2004, the Tomsk oblast authorities had their own share of troubles with the Yukos affair since the company played a major role in the region's economy. Tomskneft, a fully owned Yukos subsidiary, provided one third of the oblast budget's revenues. The region's second most important industrial center, Strezhevoi, with a population of more than 40,000, is fully dependent on oil production. The situation of Tomskneft affects every aspect of its economic and social life. Until the Kremlin launched its attack, Yukos was steadily expanding its involvement in the economy of the oblast and the city of Tomsk. The company controls 50 percent of the gas stations in the capital and practically 100 percent of the stations in the rest of the oblast. The firms also was making substantial investments in energy production, transportation, and other sectors. At least once it provided the oblast administration with an emergency loan when there was a budget shortfall. Yukos was also funding a range of education, scientific, cultural, and social projects. From 1997 through 2004, when Yukos was part of regional life, both the company and the oblast leaders progressed through a long learning curve. Governor Viktor Kress recalls one of his first encounters with Khodorkovsky, who, looking at a regional map in the governor's office, flatly stated that he only cared about his business and, apart from paying taxes, the life of the oblast was not his concern. But Khodorkovsky's views evolved. By 2003, Yukos was sponsoring dozens of socially-oriented events and programs, from equipping village schools with computer classes, to building a youth center, to setting up a fund for small business credit support. Massive funding went to Tomsk Polytechnic University, financing everything from scholarships to creating an international degree program. In 2003, Yukos' contribution to social programs was 250 million rubles. For its part, the oblast administration was able to overcome the suspicions of this powerful economic player, which had business interests that stretched far beyond Tomsk and unpredictable political ambitions, and engage the "oligarchs" in a constructive win-win relationship, identifying grounds of mutual benefit rather than searching for means of "asymmetrical warfare." When the pressure on Yukos began to build in 2003, oblast officials sought to stay out of the conflict as long as politically possible. In early September 2003, the oblast procurator's office discarded a July request from the general procurator to file a case against Tomskneft for alleged tax evasion in 1999. Tomskneft and the former Menatep Bank provided proof that they had paid the necessary taxes and oblast prosecutor Yuri Sukhopluev did not find grounds for bringing charges. In early October 2003, he was forced to step down, and his Moscow-appointed successor initiated a criminal investigation against the Yukos-owned Tomskneft as soon as he was appointed. (Sukhopluev moved on to become one of the governor's deputies). In summer 2004, in the course of the main assault on Yukos, the federal government froze the stock and bank accounts of Yukos subsidiaries, including Tomskneft. In September 2004, the oblast for the first time reported that Tomskneft had stopped paying its taxes. However, anxiety increased throughout the year, as production declined and uncertainty disrupted the normal course of life in the north of the region. Up to late 2004, Kress took a public stand moderately sympathetic to the plight of Yukos. However, as a seasoned politician, he never came close to crossing the line by engaging in principled dissent. In early December 2004, after a long-scheduled working meeting with President Putin, Kress announced his decision to join the pro-Kremlin United Russia political party. Whatever his potential human sympathy toward Khodorkovsky and the apparent frustration his team feels about the demise of the hard-won partnership with a major regional taxpayer and investor, the oblast leadership has acted on pragmatic calculations. In September-December, Tomsk sent envoys to Moscow to ask for compensation for the loss of revenues, reasoning that the federal government should transfer to the oblast some part of the funds received from Yukos in debt settlement. On 1 December 2004 Vice Governor Vladimir Yemeshev said the regional administration hoped that, if Yukos were to be sold at auction, Tomskneft would "go into one pair of hands" and "maximally painlessly." Overall, the oblast administration has always staked its future on "enlightened" loyalty to the center. Apart from Yukos-related problems, the latest changes in budgetary relations between the center and the regions further curtailed revenue sources remaining at the regional level. From 2002 to 2005 the share of the regional tax revenues retained by the oblast shrank from 41.4 percent to 30 percent. For the Tomsk Oblast budget in 2005 this means a gap of about 1.3 billion rubles, about 10 percent of the total budget. Facing this combination of losses, the oblast is building a strategy designed to address immediate problems and stabilize its long- term prospects. The November 2004 auction of 11 small oilfield development sites, in which 7 were sold for the unexpectedly large price of nearly a half billion rubles, brought immediate and benefits to oblast finances and may have a long term pay off as well. In addition, the oblast has been negotiating the involvement of such major players as TNK-BP, Lukoil, Gazprom and ChevronTexaco in oil exploration in the north-east part of the region, where large deposits may be found. By bringing these companies in, the oblast leadership hopes to diversify the oil industry in the oblast. Another priority is to induce Gazprom to process more of the gas that it extracts in Tomsk, thereby expanding, among other things, the regional tax base. Gazprom is the one remaining monopolist working in the region and, since it has close ties to the federal government, is nowhere near as likely as Yukos to disappear. In the long term, Kress and his team would like to shift the oblast economy from resource extraction to knowledge-intensive innovation. Nevertheless, in 2005 the oblast is going to be struggling hard to overcome the difficulties that sprang up in 2004. With the fate of Tomskneft uncertain, a major source of economic and social instability remains, with the potential to subvert many regional plans. - Alla Kassianova in Tomsk RUSSIAN BORDER ABKHAZIA ELECTS NEW LEADER. On 12 January, Abkhazia elected Sergei Bagapsh president in a race in which he ran on the same ticket as his former rival Raul Khajimba, who will now be vice president. Turnout was 58 percent, with about 68,000 of the 123,000 eligible voters participating. The first round of the elections, in which Bagapsh apparently won by a handful of votes, were annulled because of numerous violations on both sides. Khajimba, who represented the interests of current Abkhaz president Vyacheslav Ardzinba and had close ties to Moscow, competed against Bagapsh, who sharply criticized the policies of the authorities and proposed a different path of development. In contrast to the recent standoff in Ukraine, the situation in Abkhazia was extremely explosive. Every adult male in the separatist region is a member of the reserve and has weapons at home given him by the republic's Defense Ministry. In these conditions, the political standoff threatened to turn into an armed confrontation, further destabilizing an already shaky situation. An armed conflict would inevitably spill over into other regions of the Caucasus. This threat was particularly palpable because in the mountainous regions of the republic there is a strong clan tradition. Any member of a tribe must defend the interests of other members of his clan. The system of clan relations penetrates all of the North Caucasus regardless of administrative or international borders. Residents of many regions in southern Russia would be drawn into any conflict in Abkhazia. The situation was so precarious that the authorities in Krasnodar Krai, which borders Abkhazia, closed the border and began making preparations to receive refugees. The border closing put Abkhazia on the verge of an economic crisis. The regions of Southern Russia, particularly Krasnodar Krai are the main source of food and energy for republic which seeks independence from Georgia. In one day, prices on bread and gasoline went up 2-3 times. Also threatened was the ability of the population to export citrus fruit to the northern regions of Russia. The threat of the crisis forced the erstwhile opponents to forget about their previous differences and start negotiating, leading them to create a mixture of democratic institutions and clan traditions.
Recommended publications
  • Russian Analytical Digest No 7: Migration

    Russian Analytical Digest No 7: Migration

    No. 7 3 October 2006 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical ddigestigest www.res.ethz.ch www.russlandanalysen.de MIGRATION ■ ANALYSIS Immigration and Russian Migration Policy: Debating the Future. Vladimir Mukomel, Moscow 2 ■ TABLES AND DIAGRAMS Migration and Racism 6 ■ REGIONAL REPORT Ethnic Russians Flee the North Caucasus. Oleg Tsvetkov, Maikop 9 ■ REGIONAL REPORT Authorities Hope Chinese Investment Will Bring Russians Back to Far East. Oleg Ssylka, Vladivostok 13 Research Centre for East CSS Center for Security Otto Wolff -Stiftung DGO European Studies, Bremen An ETH Center Studies, ETH Zurich rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 07/06 ddigestigest Analysis Immigration and Russian Migration Policy: Debating the Future By Vladimir Mukomel, Center for Ethno-Political and Regional Studies, Moscow Summary While war refugees and returnees dominated immigration to Russia during the 1990s, in recent years, most immigrants are laborers who want to benefi t from the Russian economic upturn. Th ese immigrants face ex- tremely poor working conditions and they are socially ostracized by the vast majority of the Russian popula- tion. At the same time, immigration could prove to be the solution to the country’s demographic problems, countering the decline of its working population. So far, Russian migration policy has not formulated a convincing response to this dilemma. Introduction about one million immigrants returned to Russia an- he façade of heated political debates over per- nually from the CIS states and the Baltic republics. Tspectives for immigration and migration policy Most of the immigrants who resettled in Russia after disguises a clash of views over the future of Russia. the dissolution of the USSR arrived during this period Th e advocates of immigration – liberals and pragma- (see Fig.
  • Boris Nemtsov 27 February 2015 Moscow, Russia

    Boris Nemtsov 27 February 2015 Moscow, Russia

    Boris Nemtsov 27 February 2015 Moscow, Russia the fight against corruption, embezzlement and fraud, claiming that the whole system built by Putin was akin to a mafia. In 2009, he discovered that one of Putin’s allies, Mayor of Moscow City Yury Luzhkov, BORIS and his wife, Yelena Baturina, were engaged in fraudulent business practices. According to the results of his investigation, Baturina had become a billionaire with the help of her husband’s connections. Her real-estate devel- opment company, Inteco, had invested in the construction of dozens of housing complexes in Moscow. Other investors were keen to part- ner with Baturina because she was able to use NEMTSOV her networks to secure permission from the Moscow government to build apartment build- ings, which were the most problematic and It was nearing midnight on 27 February 2015, and the expensive construction projects for developers. stars atop the Kremlin towers shone with their charac- Nemtsov’s report revealed the success of teristic bright-red light. Boris Nemtsov and his partner, Baturina’s business empire to be related to the Anna Duritskaya, were walking along Bolshoy Moskovo- tax benefits she received directly from Moscow retsky Bridge. It was a cold night, and the view from the City government and from lucrative govern- bridge would have been breathtaking. ment tenders won by Inteco. A snowplough passed slowly by the couple, obscuring the scene and probably muffling the sound of the gunshots fired from a side stairway to the bridge. The 55-year-old Nemtsov, a well-known Russian politician, anti-corrup- tion activist and a fierce critic of Vladimir Putin, fell to the ground with four bullets in his back.
  • The Meltdown of the Russian Federation in the Early 1990S Nationalist Myth-Building and the Urals Republic Project Alexander Kuznetsov

    The Meltdown of the Russian Federation in the Early 1990S Nationalist Myth-Building and the Urals Republic Project Alexander Kuznetsov

    The Meltdown of the Russian Federation in the Early 1990s Nationalist Myth-Building and the Urals Republic Project Alexander Kuznetsov Abstract: In the early 1990s after the collapse of the USSR, the new Russian state faced strong nationalist claims for sovereignty and increased autonomy from the side of regional elites. These nationalist challenges at the sub-national level were seriously considered by many experts to be a potential cause for the further breakup of Russia into a number of new independent states. The nationalist movements in ethnic republics like Chechnya, Tatarstan and Sakha-Yakutia, and their contribution to possible scenario of the disintegration of the Russian Federation, have been researched frequently in post- Soviet-studies literature. However, the examination of the impact of nationalistic ideas in ethnically Russian regions (oblasts) at the beginning of the 1990s has not received the same level of attention from political scientists. The Sverdlovsk oblast is a case study for this research. In the early 1990s, the creation of the Urals republic began in this region. This paper argues that the Sverdlovsk oblast’s claims for increased autonomy included elements of myth-construction within a sub-state nationalist ideology. The first section of this paper briefly contextualizes the events that occurred during the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s that led to the growth of strong sub-nationalist movements in post-Communist Russia. The second section gives details of the Urals republic project, launched in the Sverdlovsk oblast in 1993, and defines the presence of nationalist myth- making elements in this regional movement.
  • Russian Federation State Actors of Protection

    Russian Federation State Actors of Protection

    European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Russian Federation State Actors of Protection March 2017 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Russian Federation State Actors of Protection March 2017 Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union. Free phone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00800 numbers or these calls may be billed. More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). Print ISBN 978-92-9494-372-9 doi: 10.2847/502403 BZ-04-17-273-EN-C PDF ISBN 978-92-9494-373-6 doi: 10.2847/265043 BZ-04-17-273-EN-C © European Asylum Support Office 2017 Cover photo credit: JessAerons – Istockphoto.com Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained herein. EASO Country of Origin Report: Russian Federation – State Actors of Protection — 3 Acknowledgments EASO would like to acknowledge the following national COI units and asylum and migration departments as the co-authors of this report: Belgium, Cedoca (Center for Documentation and Research), Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons Poland, Country of Origin Information Unit, Department for Refugee Procedures, Office for Foreigners Sweden, Lifos, Centre for Country of Origin Information and Analysis, Swedish Migration Agency Norway, Landinfo, Country of
  • 1768-1830S a Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate

    1768-1830S a Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate

    A PLAGUE ON BOTH HOUSES?: POPULATION MOVEMENTS AND THE SPREAD OF DISEASE ACROSS THE OTTOMAN-RUSSIAN BLACK SEA FRONTIER, 1768-1830S A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History By Andrew Robarts, M.S.F.S. Washington, DC December 17, 2010 Copyright 2010 by Andrew Robarts All Rights Reserved ii A PLAGUE ON BOTH HOUSES?: POPULATION MOVEMENTS AND THE SPREAD OF DISEASE ACROSS THE OTTOMAN-RUSSIAN BLACK SEA FRONTIER, 1768-1830S Andrew Robarts, M.S.F.S. Dissertation Advisor: Catherine Evtuhov, Ph. D. ABSTRACT Based upon a reading of Ottoman, Russian, and Bulgarian archival documents, this dissertation examines the response by the Ottoman and Russian states to the accelerated pace of migration and spread of disease in the Black Sea region from the outbreak of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774 to the signing of the Treaty of Hünkar Iskelesi in 1833. Building upon introductory chapters on the Russian-Ottoman Black Sea frontier and a case study of Bulgarian population movements between the Russian and Ottoman Empires, this dissertation analyzes Russian and Ottoman migration and settlement policies, the spread of epidemic diseases (plague and cholera) in the Black Sea region, the construction of quarantines and the implementation of travel document regimes. The role and position of the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia as the “middle ground” between the Ottoman and Russian Empires
  • Organized Crime 1.1 Gaizer’S Criminal Group

    Organized Crime 1.1 Gaizer’S Criminal Group

    INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 4 CHAPTER I. ORGANIZED CRIME 1.1 Gaizer’s Criminal Group ..................................................................................6 1.2 Bandits in St. Petersburg ............................................................................ 10 1.3 The Tsapok Gang .......................................................................................... 14 Chapter II.CThe Corrupt Officials 2.1 «I Fell in Love with a Criminal» ................................................................20 2.2 Female Thief with a Birkin Bag ...............................................................24 2.3 «Moscow Crime Boss».................................................................................29 CONTENTS CHAPTER III. THE BRibE-TAKERS 3.1 Governor Khoroshavin’s medal «THE CRIMINAL RUSSIA PARTY», AN INDEPENDENT EXPERT REPORT «For Merit to the Fatherland» ..................................................................32 PUBLISHED IN MOSCOW, AUGUST 2016 3.2 The Astrakhan Brigade ...............................................................................36 AUTHOR: ILYA YASHIN 3.3 A Character from the 1990s ......................................................................39 MATERiaL COMPILING: VERONIKA SHULGINA HAPTER HE ROOKS TRANSLATION: C 4. T C EVGENia KARA-MURZA 4.1 Governor Nicknamed Hans .......................................................................42 GRAPHICS: PavEL YELIZAROV 4.2 The Party
  • RUSSIA WATCH Duncan Deville, Guest Editor Graham T

    RUSSIA WATCH Duncan Deville, Guest Editor Graham T

    RUSSIA WATCH Duncan DeVille, Guest Editor Graham T. Allison, Director Analysis and Commentary Danielle Lussier, Assistant Editor Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project Editorial Staff: Melissa Carr, David John F. Kennedy School of Government Rekhviashvili, Annaliis Abrego, John Harvard University No. 7, March 2002 Grennan Rule of Law in Russia: The Wild East No More? Russian support for U.S. efforts in The new Criminal the war on terrorism has surprised Procedure Code. Long many Western observers. But this advocated by Western legal was not the only recent surprise experts as an important step in the development of the rule of law, from Moscow Western — the new Criminal Procedure Code advocates for the rule of law in will divest power from Russia’s (continued on p. 3) Russia also had much to celebrate in the closing months of 2001. Under IN THIS ISSUE: strong prodding by President Sergei Stepashin, p. 9 Vladimir Putin, the Duma passed several impressive pieces Chairman of the Auditing Chamber of the Russian Federation of reform legislation, including an entirely new Criminal Rule of Law and the Peculiarities of Russia Procedure Code, a potentially revolutionary land reform * law, new shareholder protections in amendments to the Scott Boylan, p. 10 Joint Stock Company Law, and the first post-Soviet Labor Regional Director for Eurasia, U.S. Department of Justice Long Awaited Russian Criminal Procedure Code is Enacted Code. * All of these bills had been stalled in the State Stephen Handleman, p. 13 Duma since the mid-1990s despite — or because of — Time Magazine International former President Boris Yeltsin’s efforts to get them passed.
  • ANNUAL REPORT Russia the Chamber's Most Important Assets Are N Its Members

    ANNUAL REPORT Russia the Chamber's Most Important Assets Are N Its Members

    2005 American Chamber of Commerce in ANNUAL REPORT Russia The Chamber's most important assets are n its members. They are our clients, our o i workforce and our strength. Our mission is s to promote the development of commercial s i relations between the Russian Federation and the international community. We seek M constructive solutions to trade and invest- r ment problems, which protect and promote u the legitimate common economic interests O of our member companies. We do so with integrity and respect for our host country. Contents Chairman’s Letter 2 President’s Letter 3 Membership Statistics 4 Calendar of Events 5 Policy Work 5 Committees 9 Programs and Services 12 Chamber Communications 16 Board of Directors: Executive Committee 18 Board of Directors 19 AmCham Staff 20 St. Petersburg Executive Committee and Staff 21 AmCham Financials 22 AmCham Annual Report 2005 1 Chairman’s Letter Just as the Russian economy continues to post impressive annual growth rates, so too does the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia. Membership in the Chamber has grown over 600 percent since AmCham’s founding in 1994 and now tops 800 corporate member companies. Once characterized by firms with operations solely in Moscow or St. Petersburg, members now represent companies with operations in two-thirds of Russia’s regions. From blue-chips to small start-ups, growth has been realized across all membership categories since 1998. Trem Smith As the Chamber has grown in size and complexity, it has developed and implemented a President, comprehensive set of policies and procedures to ensure appropriate corporate gover- Chevron Neftegaz Inc.
  • The Long Arm of Vladimir Putin: How the Kremlin Uses Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties to Target Its Opposition Abroad

    The Long Arm of Vladimir Putin: How the Kremlin Uses Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties to Target Its Opposition Abroad

    The Long Arm of Vladimir Putin: How the Kremlin Uses Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties to Target its Opposition Abroad Russia Studies Centre Policy Paper No. 5 (2015) Dr Andrew Foxall The Henry Jackson Society June 2015 THE LONG ARM OF VLADIMIR PUTIN Summary Over the past 15 years, there has been – and continues to be – significant interchange between Western and Russian law-enforcement agencies, even in cases where Russia’s requests for legal assistance have been politicaLLy motivated. Though it is the Kremlin’s warfare that garners the West’s attention, its ‘lawfare’ poses just as significant a threat because it undermines the rule of law. One of the chief weapons in Russia’s ‘lawfare’ is the so-called ‘Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty’ (MLAT), a bilateral agreement that defines how countries co-operate on legal matters. TypicaLLy, the Kremlin will fabricate a criminaL case against an individual, and then request, through the MLAT system, the co-operation of Western countries in its attempts to persecute said person. Though Putin’s regime has been mounting, since 2012, an escalating campaign against opposition figures, the Kremlin’s use of ‘lawfare’ is nothing new. Long before then, Russia requested – and received – legal assistance from Western countries on a number of occasions, in its efforts to extradite opposition figures back to Russia. Western countries have complied with Russia’s requests for legal assistance in some of the most brazen and high-profile politicaLLy motivated cases in recent history, incLuding: individuals linked with Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the Yukos affair; Bill Browder and others connecteD to Hermitage Capital Management; and AnDrey Borodin and Bank of Moscow.
  • Political Machines and Regional Variation in Migration Policies in Russia

    Political Machines and Regional Variation in Migration Policies in Russia

    Political Machines and Regional Variation in Migration Policies in Russia By Colin Johnson B.A., Rhodes College, 2010 M.A., Brown University, 2012 A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science at Brown University Providence, Rhode Island 2018 © Copyright 2018 by Colin Johnson This dissertation by Colin Johnson is accepted in its present form by the department of Political Science as satisfying the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Date ________________ ________________________________________ Dr. Linda J. Cook, Advisor Recommended to the Graduate Council Date ________________ ________________________________________ Dr. Melani Cammett, Reader Date ________________ ________________________________________ Dr. Douglas Blum, Reader Approved by the Graduate Council Date ________________ ________________________________________ Dr. Andrew G. Campbell, Dean of the Graduate School iii CURRICULUM VITAE Colin Johnson Department of Political Science, Brown University Education d Brown University, Providence, RI. • Ph.D. in Political Science (2018). • M.A. in Political Science (2012). Rhodes College, Memphis, Tennessee. • B.A. in International Studies, Minor in Russian Studies, cum laude (2010). Grants and Fellowships d External • International Advanced Research Opportunity Fellowship, IREX (Sept. 2013–June 2014). • Critical Language Scholarship Program, Kazan, Russia, U.S. Dept. of State (June– Aug. 2010). Brown University
  • NARRATING the NATIONAL FUTURE: the COSSACKS in UKRAINIAN and RUSSIAN ROMANTIC LITERATURE by ANNA KOVALCHUK a DISSERTATION Prese

    NARRATING the NATIONAL FUTURE: the COSSACKS in UKRAINIAN and RUSSIAN ROMANTIC LITERATURE by ANNA KOVALCHUK a DISSERTATION Prese

    NARRATING THE NATIONAL FUTURE: THE COSSACKS IN UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN ROMANTIC LITERATURE by ANNA KOVALCHUK A DISSERTATION Presented to the Department of Comparative Literature and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy June 2017 DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE Student: Anna Kovalchuk Title: Narrating the National Future: The Cossacks in Ukrainian and Russian Romantic Literature This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Comparative Literature by: Katya Hokanson Chairperson Michael Allan Core Member Serhii Plokhii Core Member Jenifer Presto Core Member Julie Hessler Institutional Representative and Scott L. Pratt Dean of the Graduate School Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. Degree awarded June 2017 ii © 2017 Anna Kovalchuk iii DISSERTATION ABSTRACT Anna Kovalchuk Doctor of Philosophy Department of Comparative Literature June 2017 Title: Narrating the National Future: The Cossacks in Ukrainian and Russian Romantic Literature This dissertation investigates nineteenth-century narrative representations of the Cossacks—multi-ethnic warrior communities from the historical borderlands of empire, known for military strength, pillage, and revelry—as contested historical figures in modern identity politics. Rather than projecting today’s political borders into the past and proceeding from the claim that the Cossacks are either Russian or Ukrainian, this comparative project analyzes the nineteenth-century narratives that transform pre- national Cossack history into national patrimony. Following the Romantic era debates about national identity in the Russian empire, during which the Cossacks become part of both Ukrainian and Russian national self-definition, this dissertation focuses on the role of historical narrative in these burgeoning political projects.
  • Republic of Tatarstan 15 I

    Republic of Tatarstan 15 I

    1 CONTENTS ABOUT AUTHORS 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 INTRODUCTION 10 THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN 15 I. POLITICAL ELITE 15 1. Vertical power structure 19 2. Governance model during the period of the President M. Shaimiev 20 3. Governance model during the period of the President R. Minnikhanov 22 4. Security forces as part of a consolidated project 27 5. Export of elites 28 II. PRESERVATION OF ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY 30 1.The Tatar national movement 30 2. The Russian national movement 34 3. Language policy in Tatarstan 37 4. Results of post-Soviet language policy 47 5. Conclusion 50 THE REPUBLIC OF DAGESTAN 51 I. DAGESTAN ELITES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 51 1. Birth of «clans» 53 2. Adaptation to the growing influence of Moscow 56 3. Mukhu Aliev: attempt to be equidistant from clans 58 4. Elite and the Caucasus Emirate 62 5. Return of the «levashintsy» and attempt at a civil dialogue 64 6. First attempt to eliminate clans 66 II. «EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE» 70 III. PRESERVATION OF ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY 79 1. National movements and conflicts 79 2. Preservation of national languages 82 3. Conclusion 91 FINAL CONCLUSIONS 93 2 ABOUT AUTHORS Dr. Ekaterina SOKIRIANSKAIA is the founder and director at Conflict analysis and prevention center. From 2011 to 2017, she served as International Crisis Group’s Russia/North Caucasus Project Director, supervising the organisation’s research and advocacy in the region. From 2008-2011, Sokirianskaia established and supervised the work of Human rights Center Memorial’s regional offices in Kabardino-Balkariya and Dagestan. Before that, from 2003-2008 Sokirianskaia was permanently based in Ingushetia and Chechnya and worked as a researcher and projects director for Memorial and as an assistant professor at Grozny State University.