NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
The Infrastructure of Authoritarianism:
State‐Society Relationships, Public Sector Organizations,
and Regime Resilience in Putin's Russia
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
for the degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Field of Sociology
By
Natalia Forrat
EVANSTON, ILLINOIS
September 2017 2
Abstract
This dissertation uses the case of Putin’s Russia to examine how authoritarian regimes build relationships with their societies in a way that strengthens authoritarian rule. In contrast to the existing scholarship, which concentrates on redistributive politics, that is, on the autocrat’s capacities to buy the loyalty of the masses, I suggest an infrastructural mechanism of authoritarian resilience, which is alternative and complementary to redistribution. This infrastructural mechanism is linked to Michael
Mann’s concept of infrastructural state power, i.e. the ability of the state to penetrate society to the grass roots level. I argue that the embeddedness of state organizations in people’s everyday lives allows an autocrat to control lower level political processes even without redistributing significant amounts of goods.
Particularly valuable for such infrastructural control are organizational hierarchies and networks in the social public sector – education, healthcare, community and social services. In societies similar to the Russian one, such organizations share three important qualities that allow them to enhance infrastructural state power significantly. These qualities are (1) embeddedness in people’s everyday lives, (2) population’s trust, and (3) direct connection to the state apparatus. They make social public sector employees more convenient and effective agents of the regime than police officers, bureaucrats, or party activists.
This dissertation also suggests that the distinction between infrastructural and redistributive mechanisms stems from two different patterns of state‐society relationships or, in other words, that the role of public sector organizations in authoritarian resilience depends on the pre‐existing pattern of state‐society relationships. Under the integrative pattern, people view the state as the embodiment of the public will, cooperate with it at the community level, and allow state officials to build or mediate community ties. In such an environment, social public sector organizations form an administrative 3 machine that routinely manages grass roots politics and makes the regime less dependent on redistribution. Under the autonomous pattern, people conceptually detach the state from the public will and resist the state’s attempts to intervene in community matters. In such an environment, communities turn the state’s requests for cooperation into bargains for material resources, making the regime directly dependent on the redistribution of material perks.
To demonstrate the infrastructural mechanism of authoritarian resilience and the two patterns of state‐society relationships empirically, I use a quantitative subnational comparison and five case studies. Through the analysis of the regional variation of the 2012 presidential election results, I show that Putin’s regime used schoolteachers for agitation and electoral fraud. Schoolteachers, who are usually trusted by the population, frequently serve as members of precinct‐level electoral commissions, and state officials forced them to commit fraud under the threat of job loss. This mechanism allowed
Putin to win the election convincingly and demonstrate the strength of the regime to the public at the critical moment when the regime’s popularity decreased.
Through the historical study of Kemerovo region, which has been an outlier on the Russian electoral map that supported Putin’s regime in large numbers, I show how the long‐term regional governor, Aman Tuleev, has used social public sector organizations to manage mass politics in the region. In particular, I describe the history of his relationships with the pensioners’ organizations and residential committees to show that an autocrat may deliberately develop social public sector organizations for the purpose of increasing infrastructural state power rather than increasing redistribution.
The two patterns of state‐society relationships manifest themselves in the comparison of the two groups of regions, those with high and low infrastructural power according to the results of the quantitative analysis. As I show through interviews, media publications, and organizational documents, 4 in the regions with high infrastructural power, the Kemerovo region and the Republic of Tatarstan, social public sector organizations work as a centralized administrative machine routinely used for monitoring grievances and mobilization of the population for regime‐supported projects. In the regions with low infrastructural power, the Rostov region and the Republic of Altai, public sector organizations defend their autonomy from the state apparatus while actively contributing to clientelistic political practices. In the Tomsk region, which occupied a middle position between these two groups, I observed a mixture of integrative and autonomous patterns.
This interaction effect of the integrative and autonomous patterns of state‐society relationships on the work of social public sector organizations can have a larger application in studies of other aspects of mass politics. Researchers of bureaucracies, corruption, popular protests, and democratization can incorporate this variable in their analysis as I have done for the study of infrastructural state power. The introduction of these two patterns of state‐society relationships as an interaction variable may help reconcile the contradictory findings of previous studies into a coherent theoretical model.
5
Acknowledgements
This dissertation owes a debt of gratitude to a number of individuals and institutions. I would like to thank my dissertation committee – Ann Orloff, Bruce Carruthers, Linda Cook, and James Mahoney
– for years of intellectual, organizational, and moral support that I received from the time I conceived this project to its current stage. The Department of Sociology and the Buffett Institute for Global Studies at Northwestern University have provided an institutional home and material support that made this dissertation possible. Northwestern University Library has not only provided one of the best offices on campus but also responded to my research needs by signing up for the much needed Integrum database. Special thanks for the latter go to Jeannette Moss.
My fieldwork was greatly facilitated by people and institutions in different parts of Russia. I thank the Department of Sociology at Tomsk State University and personally Artem Rykun for providing a local affiliation during my fieldwork year. Anna Tolkacheva, Elena Ialbacheva, Margarita Astoiants,
Maria Abramova, Olga Shvakova, Raisa Adarina, Sergei Biriukov, and Svetlana Tiukhteneva have greatly helped with local insights and logistics. The librarians of the local history department at Kemerovo regional library have provided very generous and highly professional help by introducing me to some of the secrets of library science.
As I worked to analyze and understand the data I collected, I had a number of opportunities to present my research and receive useful feedback. For that, I thank the participants of the Comparative‐
Historical Social Science workshop at the Buffett Institute and the participants of the writing group organized by Ann Orloff. I also thank Bill Reisinger and Ted Gerber for inviting me to present parts of this dissertation at the Universities of Iowa and Wisconsin‐Madison, which have been valuable experiences.
The last stages of the analysis and most of the writing have been completed during my pre‐ doctoral fellowship at the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford 6
University. I thank all the faculty, fellows, and staff at the Center for welcoming me to the sunny
California and providing both material resources and a lot of intellectual stimulation. My very special thanks go to Kathryn Stoner, Frank Fukuyama, and all the post‐doctoral fellows of my cohort.
Finally, I want to thank my family and particularly my parents, Liubov and Vladimir Forrat, who provided a home to return to from all my journeys and who facilitated all my achievements by never caring much about them.
7
Table of Contents
Abstract ...... 2
Acknowledgements ...... 5
List of Tables and Figures ...... 12
Chapter 1. Authoritarianism, infrastructural power, and the social public sector ...... 14
The social public sector as a missing component of infrastructural state power ...... 15
Empirical findings ...... 17
Theoretical argument ...... 19
Authoritarian resilience ...... 21
Authoritarian resilience and the politics of redistribution ...... 22
States and societies ...... 25
State power, authoritarianism, and redistribution ...... 27
Study design and methods ...... 32
Subnational comparison ...... 32
Nested analysis strategy: a model‐building study design ...... 33
Phase one: quantitative analysis ...... 34
Phase two: case selection ...... 36
Phase two: fieldwork and qualitative analysis ...... 39
Chapter outline ...... 40
Chapter 2. Schoolteachers and infrastructural state capacity in Putin’s Russia ...... 43
The autocrat’s electoral dilemma ...... 43 8
The 2012 electoral challenge of Putin’s regime ...... 44
The chapter argument ...... 47
Teachers’ involvement in electoral manipulation: qualitative evidence ...... 48
Teachers and Electoral Agitation ...... 50
Teachers and Electoral Fraud ...... 52
Civil society resistance and the moral divide in the teachers’ community ...... 54
Impact of teachers on election result: quantitative evidence ...... 57
Measuring regime resilience ...... 58
Measuring leverage over teachers ...... 59
Alternative hypothesis and their indicators ...... 60
Structure of analysis ...... 62
Results: systematic effects and effect sizes ...... 62
Chapter 3. Kemerovo region: a case of socially‐oriented authoritarianism ...... 68
The electoral anomaly of Kemerovo region...... 69
Kemerovo region as the center of workers’ movement in the late 1980s and the 1990s ...... 72
The rise of Aman Tuleev ...... 75
The origins of Tuleev’s populism ...... 76
Tuleev’s political pragmatism ...... 78
Consolidation of Tuleev’s power: handling big business and the communists ...... 80
Media monopoly and Tuleev’s image of a caring leader ...... 82
Social policy and redistribution in Kemerovo region ...... 85
Support for Tuleev among the population ...... 96
Chapter 4. Community organizations in Kemerovo region ...... 100 9
Pensioners’ organizations in Kemerovo region ...... 101
A short history of veterans’ (pensioners’) organizations in the Soviet Union and post‐
Soviet Russia ...... 102
The history of Tuleev’s relationship with the Veterans’ Councils in Kemerovo ...... 106
Community centers and residential committees in Kemerovo‐city ...... 116
A short history of community organizations in the Soviet Union and post‐Soviet
Russia ...... 116
The development of residential committees and community centers in Kemerovo
...... 120
Embeddedness, trust, and connection to the state apparatus ...... 127
Embeddedness ...... 127
Trust ...... 130
Connection to the state apparatus ...... 131
Political functions of community organizations ...... 133
Mobilization and cooptation ...... 134
Management of existing and potential discontent ...... 136
Control of public space and discourse ...... 137
Chapter 5. SPS Organizations Under Integrative and Autonomous Patterns of State‐Society
Relationships ...... 142
General comparison ...... 144
Structure of SPS organizations and their development: the integrative pattern ...... 145
Commonalities and differences between Kemerovo region and Tatarstan ...... 145 10
Youth and educational organizations in Tatarstan: top down development and
governance ...... 148
The blurred boundary between the state and civil society ...... 151
Pensioners’ organizations in Tatarstan ...... 152
Other common features of the integrative pattern ...... 154
Structure of SPS organizations and their development: the autonomous pattern ...... 155
Laissez‐faire governance and bottom‐up organizational development ...... 155
Maintenance of the boundary between the state and civil society ...... 161
The political utility of SPS organizations under integrative and autonomous patterns ...... 162
The source of power legitimacy as the root of the different patterns of state‐society
relationships ...... 168
The community and the state as the sources of power legitimacy ...... 168
The sources of power legitimacy and community ties ...... 171
State‐society relationships and the regional variation in regime resilience ...... 178
Conclusion ...... 182
Summary of findings and contributions ...... 182
Further questions and a theoretical implication ...... 185
References ...... 187
Secondary and Academic Sources ...... 187
Primary, Journalistic, and Limited Availability Sources by Chapter ...... 193
Chapter 2 ...... 193
Chapter 3 ...... 196
Chapter 4 ...... 199 11
Chapter 5 ...... 202
Sources in Appendices ...... 204
Appendix 1. Profiles of regions selected for case studies ...... 205
Appendix 2. List of interviews ...... 207
Appendix 3. Information on Quantitative Analysis ...... 210
Appendix 4. Data on social policy in Kemerovo region ...... 223
Appendix 5. Newspaper publications related to veterans’ (pensioners’) organizations and their
role in politics ...... 226
Appendix 6. Newspaper publications related to residential committees and community
centers in Kemerovo and to their role in politics ...... 233
12
List of Tables and Figures
Table 1. Regression Coefficients† (t‐values in parentheses) ...... 65
Table 2. Characteristics of SPS organizations under different patterns of state‐society relationships .... 145
Table 3. Economic and demographic profiles of the regions ...... 206
Table 4. Information about variables and data sources (all variables measured at the regional level) ... 210
Table 5. Variable generation for models ...... 215
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the models ...... 216
Table 7. Correlations between the predictors included in the models (absolute values less than 0.2 are
shaded; larger than 0.4 are marked in bold italic) ...... 219
Figure 1. Theoretical contribution ...... 20
Figure 2. Case selection ...... 38
Figure 3. Putin’s approval index and the regime’s presidential candidate electoral percentage, March
2008 to March 2012...... 45
Figure 4. Kemerovo region on the Russian map ...... 69
Figure 5. Turnout in Kemerovo region and nationwide for the federal level elections in 2003‐2012 (error
bars correspond to the first and the third quartile of regional distribution) ...... 71
Figure 6. Pro‐regime voting in Kemerovo region and nationwide for the federal level elections in 2003‐
2012 (error bars correspond to the first and the third quartile of regional distribution) ...... 71
Figure 7. Portrait of Aman Tuleev in the regional public library (author’s photograph)...... 84
Figure 8. Regional budget expenditures of on social security, per capita, 2003 prices (author’s
calculations based on Russian Federal Treasury data) ...... 87 13
Figure 9. Regional budget expenditures on education, per capita, 2003 prices (author’s calculations
based on Russian Federal Treasury data) ...... 87
Figure 10. Regional budget expenditures on benefits for vulnerable population groups, per capita, 2005
prices ...... 92
Figure 11. Kemerovo region budget expenditures on benefits for vulnerable population groups, per
capita, 2005 prices ...... 92
Figure 12. Share of in‐kind benefits in all benefits for vulnerable population groups ...... 93
Figure 13. Governor’s Tea Room in Kemerovo regional library, March 2014. (Author’s photo.) ...... 95
Figure 14. Approval index of Russian regional governors, February 2011 ...... 97
Figure 15. Tuleev’s approval index, February 2011 ...... 97
Figure 16. Percentage of people who report encountering situations inducing desire to participate in
protests, February 2011 ...... 98
Figure 17. Percentage of people who say they may personally participate in protests, February 2011 ... 98
Figure 18. Structure of the main pensioners’ organization of Kemerovo region, March 2014 ...... 113
Figure 19. Available statistics on the number of TOSes and TOS activists in Kemerovo city...... 124
Figure 20. Locally registered TOSes in Russian regions...... 125
Figure 21. Cases on the Russian map ...... 205
Figure 22. Pension Fund expenditures, per capita, 2003 prices ...... 223
Figure 23. Number of pensioners per 1,000 population ...... 223
Figure 24. Gini coefficient ...... 224
Figure 25. Share of population with per capita income below subsistence level ...... 224
Figure 26. Subsistence income level ...... 225
Figure 27. Social Insurance Fund expenditures, per capita, 2003 prices ...... 225 14
Chapter 1. Authoritarianism, infrastructural power, and the social public sector
World politics of the 20th century was marked by the entrance of the masses into the political arena. Urbanization and industrial growth, the expansion of suffrage, world wars, the consolidation of
Western liberal democracies, the Declaration of Human Rights, and the emergence of welfare states have all been the manifestations of the radical shift in how power was distributed and contested. After the fall of the Soviet Union, it seemed that gradually but surely this inclusion of the masses would lead to democracy, the power of the people, across the globe. At the turn of the 21st century, though, authoritarianism got its second wind and began to expand its realm and undermine the democratic systems.
Compared to their pre‐modern counterparts, contemporary autocrats do politics under very different circumstances. Mass politics has altered the challenges for autocratic power, while many of the tools for dealing with these challenges – state institutions above all – has developed greater capacities than their pre‐modern counterparts. No longer does the population only contact a state bureau once a year during the tax season; the contemporary state infiltrates people’s everyday lives through enforcement rules and regulations, as well as through the provision of public goods. The infrastructural power of the contemporary state, which Michael Mann distinguished from despotic power,1 allows autocrats to work with the masses in much more refined ways than overt repression, bread, and circuses.
1 Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State.” 15
The social public sector as a missing component of infrastructural state power
This dissertation seeks to answer the question of how contemporary autocrats build relationships with societies using the infrastructural powers of the states they control. Specifically, I am interested in the organizational aspect of that power, i.e. the organizations that exist on the border between the state and society being simultaneously connected to both. I call this realm of organizations
“the social public sector” (SPS) to reflect the fact that such organizations provide public goods directly related to human development. Such goods include various kinds of education, health care, development of community ties, and improvement of living environments and the welfare of various population categories.
This face of infrastructural state power has largely escaped scholarly attention because the SPS organizations have been mostly thought of only as the vehicles for redistribution.2 When talking about infrastructural state power and about its value for an autocrat, scholars have concentrated on the territorial reach of the coercive apparatus, state bureaucracies, and the party.3 The value of SPS organizations in existing scholarly discussions is often reduced to the effective delivery of public goods and services, which would generate loyalty among the population and, therefore, strengthen the rule of an autocrat.4 Without denying the importance of this mechanism for bolstering authoritarian power, I point to the value of lower‐level organizational infrastructure beyond exchanging goods and services for loyalty. The very presence of organizational structures connected to an authoritarian state in the
2 Mares and Young, “Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes,” 271–72; Oliveros, “Making It Personal: Clientelism, Favors, and the Personalization of Public Administration in Argentina.” 3 Levitsky and Way talk about the scope – the size and quality of organizational infrastructure – of state’s coercive capacity and the party, which is analogous to their infrastructural power (Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 58–64.) 4 See, for example, Slater and Fenner, “State Power and Staying in Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability.” See also the discussion of literature on clientelism and authoritarian social contracts later in this chapter. 16 citizens’ everyday lives provides an autocrat with a leverage she cannot gain through the development of the coercive state apparatus or the state bureaucracy alone.
Three qualities make SPS organizations a unique tool in an autocrat’s hands. First, these organizations are embedded5 in the everyday life of a population like no other part of the state apparatus. Educational, health care, and community organizations penetrate society and interact with the masses of the population on a daily basis. The social embeddedness of these networks extends that of state bureaucracies, state‐owned enterprises, or the party because public sector organizations reach out to the population as a part of their daily work.
Second, SPS employees are usually trusted by communities more than police officers or state bureaucrats.6 The expansion of social infrastructure is usually welcomed by the population. The perceived connection of SPS organizations to public goods as well as their formal partisan neutrality adds to that trust and may render teachers, doctors, and social workers more popular agents of the regime than party activists.
Third, public sector organizations are tied into networks and hierarchies connected to a centralized state (or party‐state) apparatus. This connection makes it easy to send orders down the line and control their implementation. These organizational hierarchies may be used in conjunction with other parts of the state or party apparatus for surveillance, propaganda, mobilization, low‐intensity repression, or for organizing electoral fraud.
The connection to the state does not mean that SPS organizations I study are always legally part of the state apparatus. They may take a form of an NGO, a GONGO, or a social movement with limited
5 The embeddedness that is important for me here is similar to Peter Evans’s concept of embeddedness (see also the discussion later in this chapter). Unlike Evans, though, I investigate it at a lower level of state‐society relationship, not at the level of elite actors (Evans, Embedded Autonomy.) 6 Pepinsky, Pierskalla, and Sacks, “Bureaucracy and Service Delivery,” 259; Tendler and Freedheim, “Trust in a Rent‐ Seeking World.” 17 legal powers. What is common for all such organizations, though, is that the state officials stay in regular contact with their leadership and play an important role in determining their goals and activities. This common feature also means that an organization that used to be independent from the state can develop a connection to the state, i.e. the state is not the only creator of SPS organizations.
Finally, although SPS organizations are heavily influenced by the state, their most important value lies in the connection to the society. The population’s attitude to SPS organizations is an important part of the story that impacts the utility of these organizations to an autocrat. SPS organizations are most successful in enhancing infrastructural state power when they manage to obtain people’s trust and cooperation, an important focus of my analysis.
Empirical findings
To investigate the role of SPS organizations in authoritarian regimes, I use the case of post‐
Soviet Russia. It is a country that has a large public sector infrastructure inherited from the Soviet Union and that has experienced a backsliding to authoritarianism after a relatively democratic period in the
1990s; indeed, post‐Soviet Russia plays an outsize role in scholarly analyses of democratic backsliding and the re‐emergence of authoritarian political forms in the 21st century. My argument on the role of
SPS organizations has three parts.
First, to show that SPS organizations provide autocrats with unique capacities that can help them meet political challenges, I analyze the 2012 presidential election, when Vladimir Putin needed to demonstrate high electoral support despite his decreased popularity. I show that he resolved this challenge at least partially by utilizing the leverage of regional governors over schoolteachers across the country. Using the embeddedness of teachers in their communities and their trusted status, regional 18 governors forced the teachers to work as agitators and to falsify the electoral results while serving as members of precinct‐level electoral commissions.
Second, to show that autocrats may deliberately nurture the infrastructural capacity of SPS organizations, I develop a historical case study of the relationships of the governor of Kemerovo region,
Aman Tuleev, and two networks of SPS organizations, pensioners’ organizations and residential committees. Kemerovo region has been an outlier on the Russian electoral map supporting Putin’s regime in high numbers despite having a profile not typical for a region that votes pro‐regime. I show that such performance has been partially due to the dense network of SPS organizations that Tuleev purposefully cultivated by taking over the organizational infrastructure of the existing social movement in the case of pensioners’ organizations and by creating such a network from the ground up in the case of residential committees. Institutionalizing the link between the state and society helped Tuleev to strengthen and stabilize his rule over a long period of time.
Third, to demonstrate the interaction effect of the pre‐existing state‐society relationship with infrastructural state power, I compare two groups of regions with high and low infrastructural power in the social public sector respectively, Kemerovo region and the Republic of Tatarstan to the Rostov region and the Republic of Altai. I show that in the communities with integrative state‐society relationships, in which people cooperate with the state and allow it to mediate their community ties,
SPS organizations form a top‐down administrative hierarchy that increases the effect of infrastructural state power on regime resilience. In places with an autonomous state‐society relationship, in which people resist state interference with their community ties, the attempts to build a top‐down administrative machine fail as communities turn them into clientelistic hierarchies that weaken the effect of the infrastructural power on regime resilience. 19
Theoretical argument
In more general terms, I argue that the infrastructural state power of the social public sector increases regime resilience, but the size of its effect and the mechanism through which it works are conditional on the preexisting pattern of state‐society relationship (see Figure 1). Embeddedness, trust, and connection to the state apparatus of SPS organizations, which I described above, are always of value for an autocrat. However, these qualities of SPS organizations work to strengthen the regime the most under the integrative pattern of state‐society relationship when (1) the people regard the state as the embodiment of the public will and cooperate with it and (2) the state makes an effort to legitimize itself by demonstrating appreciation and care for the people. Under this pattern of state‐society relationship, political support is not directly connected to the amount of material goods and favors that people receive. Material rewards are only one way to show appreciation of people’s loyalty; there are many other ways to do this symbolically as well. And the value of even material rewards lies to a large degree in the symbolic realm: people frequently perceive state‐provided goods and benefits as signs of care and appreciation for their contribution to the public good rather than an exchange aimed to maximize the profit for both sides. Under the integrative pattern of state‐society relationship, some provision of material goods by the state is important to ensure popular support. No provision or a clearly inadequate one would be a signal to the people about the lack of care on the side of the state. However, as my study of Kemerovo case shows, beyond the minimal level, the size of the provision is not directly connected to political support: as long as the state is perceived as making enough effort to care for the people, people will cooperate with it even if the effort does not match the outcomes. Such predisposition for cooperation with the state is what allows an autocrat to build a ramified hierarchy of
SPS organizations that penetrate the society and to use its infrastructural power to increase the resilience of an authoritarian regime. 20
Figure 1. Theoretical contribution
In contrast to the integrative pattern of state‐society relationship, under the autonomous one people conceptually separate the state from the public will and resist the state’s attempts to interfere in community life. In this context, people trust informal community leaders much more than they trust state officials, and these informal leaders turn the state’s requests for cooperation into a bargain.
People in such communities are interested in getting the most from this bargain, in maximizing their profit rather than in receiving appreciation and care from the state. Usually, there are multiple lower‐ level communities, each with its own demands. SPS organizations existing in such context do not easily follow orders from above as they do under the integrative pattern of state‐society relationship. To make
SPS organizations work towards maintaining the authoritarian regime under the autonomous pattern of state‐society relationship, an autocrat has to satisfy all the communities with the material perks they receive in exchange for regime support. In this case, political support is directly related to the size of the material reward. This link weakens the infrastructural effect of SPS organizations on regime resilience and increases the dependence of the regime on the economic resources it is able to redistribute. 21
Authoritarian resilience
The main focus of my study is authoritarian resilience and its variation across the territory of the state. Authoritarian resilience should be distinguished from the duration of authoritarian regimes. Many scholars have studied the factors that influence the longevity of autocratic rule, frequently using large datasets documenting the number of years authoritarian regimes across the world have been in power.7
Researchers have analyzed how the regime type, elite consolidation, the strength of opposition, and resource distribution influence the ability of an autocrat to hold to power longer.
The number of years in power, though, is a crude measure. When used in quantitative analyses, it obscures the historical sequencing of events, which is crucial for studying causality. It does not allow us to evaluate the capacity of the regime to face political crises, nor to comprehend the time horizons of political actors, both of which are important to understand the motivations of political players.8
Scholars have suggested alternative concepts that would capture better the important qualities of authoritarian regimes. Slater and Fenner proposed to study durability instead of duration, while defining durability as the capacity not only to meet and overcome a crisis but also to avoid or decisively resolve it in the regime’s favor.9 Heydemann and Leenders went further with the concept of authoritarian resilience, using this term to emphasize the institutionalized political structures that adapt to the changing domestic and international conditions.10
In my study, I will use the term authoritarian resilience that combines these two alternative approaches. I will be interested in (1) the institutionalized systems of rule rather than the combinations
7 For examples and overviews of such research, see Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?”; Ezrow and Frantz, Dictators and Dictatorships; Haggard and Kaufman, “Democratization During the Third Wave.” 8 Grzymala‐Busse, “Time Will Tell?” 9 Slater and Fenner, “State Power and Staying in Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability.” 10 Heydemann and Leenders, Middle East Authoritarianisms: Governance, Contestation, and Regime Resilience in Syria and Iran, 5. 22 of political coalitions and (2) the capacity of these systems to avoid and resolve political crises in the regime’s favor. The focus on infrastructural state power allows me to concentrate on the institutional aspects of authoritarian rule, i.e. on the stable social structures that connect individuals and the state, and to see how those stable structures are used by the regime to avoid or overcome political challenges.
The 2012 presidential election in Russia will serve as an example of a challenge that threatened authoritarian rule, thereby stimulating a counteraction by Putin. As Chapter 2 will show, it was during this election that Putin’s regime faced the possibility that if the electoral results accurately reflected people’s opinions, the regime’s weakness would be publicly revealed, further decreasing regime support. To avoid this crisis, the state apparatus in general and schoolteachers, in particular, were called upon to compensate for the low support and to deliver a high percentage of voters in favor of the regime.
Authoritarian resilience and the politics of redistribution
My explanation of authoritarian resilience highlights a new – infrastructural – mechanism as a complement to the more widely‐studied redistribution of material resources as a contributor to regime resilience. The theory of the “selectorate” is a good example of a theory connecting political regimes and material redistribution;11 its authors build a model connecting the type of political regime and its internal dynamics to the size of the winning coalition, whose members receive private benefits from the political leader. Other scholars have explored how various factors, such as the abundance of natural resources12 or the presence of elections and parliaments,13 affected autocrats’ redistributive politics and
11 Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival. For a critique of this theory, see Gallagher and Hanson, “Power Tool or Dull Blade? Selectorate Theory for Autocracies.” 12 Morrison, “Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability”; Haber and Menaldo, “Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse”; Richter, “The Rentier State: Relevance, Scope and Explanatory Power”; Ross, “What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?” 23 their abilities to deal with political challenges. Most of these studies have paid particular attention to the redistribution of material resources among the elites since it is the elites who are considered to be the main source of political challenges to an autocrat.
The studies of mass politics in authoritarian regimes have taken a similar direction, emphasizing the significance of redistributive policies in shoring up regimes. Buying loyalty is considered one of the main tools of an autocrat along with repression,14 and researchers have investigated the strategies and mechanisms that authoritarian leaders have used to exchange material benefits for the political support of the masses. Most theories dealing with this issue can be roughly divided into theories of clientelism, which explain the provision of private goods, and theories of social contract, which explain the provision of public goods. The distinction between clientelism and social contract may get blurred, particularly when the state’s larger contract with the society offers more privileges to certain population groups than to others – making “public” goods less than universal. Nevertheless, I here separate these approaches because the political logic they describe is somewhat different.
Clientelism is generally defined by researchers as an exchange of material goods or services for political support.15 The understanding of clientelism that was prevalent in the academic literature in the
1970s portrayed it as an asymmetrical face‐to‐face relationship between the patron and the client maintained by the norms of reciprocity,16 for example, in James Scott’s classic study of political machines in American cities.17 In the context of representative political institutions, political support is manifested in voting for a particular party or candidate, who reciprocate with providing private goods
13 Gandhi and Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.” 14 Wintrobe, The Political Economy of Dictatorship. 15 Stokes, “Political Clientelism,” 605. 16 Scott, “Patron‐Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” 92. 17 Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change.” 24 and services to their supporters.18 Given that many contemporary authoritarian regimes hold elections, clientelistic practices are widely used by autocrats to maintain popular support.19 For example, in her seminal study, Beatriz Magaloni shows how the distribution of spoils conditional on the support of the ruling party in Mexico has helped to sustain its rule for several decades.20
In contrast to clientelism, the term social contract is broader than a series of exchanges and includes a component of legitimacy. It refers to “a set of norms or shared expectations about the appropriate organization of a political economy in general. Such norms shape perceptions concerning whose interests need to be taken into account in making economic and social policy, which actors have a legitimate claim on state resources, which institutional forms are accepted as legitimate mechanisms for organized interest representation, what kinds of demands state actors can legitimately make on interest groups, what mechanisms are available to both state and social actors to resolve conflicts, and what kind of policy instruments state actors can legitimately deploy to achieve their aims.”21 Linda Cook uses a narrower definition directly related to redistribution, and describes the social contract as “a tacit agreement to trade social security for political compliance.”22 Social security in this context encompasses not only what has been traditionally included in social policy (unemployment benefits, health care, education, pensions), but also government‐sponsored employment, which was very much the case in the Soviet Union23 and is the case in the Middle East and North Africa now.24
18 Stokes, “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina.” 19 Stokes, “Political Clientelism,” 604; Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship, 112. 20 Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy. See also Díaz‐Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni, The Logic of Poverty Relief. 21 Heydemann, “Social Pacts and the Persistence of Authoritarianism in the Middle East,” 25. 22 Cook, The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed, 1. 23 Breslauer, “On the Adaptability of Soviet Welfare‐State Authoritarianism”; Cook, The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed. 24 World Bank, Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa. 25
Regardless of the exact distinction between clientelism and authoritarian social contract, one thing that they have in common is that in both cases authoritarian rule is sustained through redistribution of material resources to generate the population’s loyalty. My analysis here investigates an alternative and complementary to redistribution‐based loyalty, the infrastructural one. To uncover the workings of this alternative mechanism in bolstering authoritarian regime resilience, I switch my attention from material redistribution to the organizational aspects of the state.
States and societies
Organizational strength is the main quality that distinguishes contemporary states from their predecessors. Michael Mann has famously developed the distinction between despotic and infrastructural power, arguing that the former has declined, while the latter has significantly increased in modern states.25 For Mann, state elites’ despotic power is “the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups.” The infrastructural power constitutes “the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.”26 The presence of the state in the citizens’ everyday life and the dependence of this everyday life on the state is the main component of the power of a modern state.
Building on Mann’s classic distinction and on the works of others who “brought the state back in” to analytic focus, a great deal of scholarship in political sociology and political science has investigated the many aspects of increased state power. For example, researchers have studied the always shifting and contested boundary between the state and society by examining “the concrete ways
25 Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State.” 26 Ibid., 113. 26 in which states do the work of governing”27 and by paying attention to the role of different actors and levels of the state apparatus in implementing particular policies. Scholars have also looked at the role of the state in shaping societies through stratification mechanisms in shaping the normative order that defines its very boundaries.28
Amidst the wealth of scholarship on contemporary states’ power and structure, research investigating varying state‐society relationships in Third World countries has been particularly valuable for my study as I have found remarkable parallels to the internal variation of state capacities in Russia. In his study of “weak states and strong societies,” Joel Migdal pointed out that one of the key conditions for the development of state capacity is the transfer of the control of institutional mechanisms of group survival from society to the state.29 If such transfer occurs, it serves as the basis for a strong state; if it does not occur, the state exists in rivalry with other institutions that seek to control society.
The two patterns of state‐society relationship that I distinguish in my research on Russia build on Migdal’s idea. Under the integrative pattern, in which people regard the state as the embodiment of the public will, it is the state rather than non‐state elites who successfully claims the responsibility for group survival. Under the autonomous pattern, group survival mechanisms rest with the community, and people perceive the state as an external force that should be resisted.
The works of James Scott and Peter Evans also offer parallels to the suggested distinction between the patterns of state‐society relationship. In his research of South Asian and other states, Scott has shown that economies, social structures, and cultures of many societies have been fundamentally shaped by their systematic resistance to the state.30 Such resistance could be hidden from the public
27 Morgan and Orloff, The Many Hands of the State, 9. 28 Ibid., 11–15. 29 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States. 30 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance. Hidden Transcripts. 27 eye, but it nevertheless exists as a “hidden transcript.” The relationship between the state and society that Scott describes is similar to the autonomous state‐society pattern that I observe in my case studies.
I also document systematic resistance to the state at every level that is rarely expressed openly in the public space.
In his study of the Korean state, Evans documented an opposite situation in which the state has worked in close conjunction with society enjoying both the embeddedness in social networks and autonomy from the interests of private actors.31 Such an arrangement proved to be particularly beneficial for state‐led economic development. In my study, I show that a similar pattern of state‐ society relationship, which I call integrative, not only improves the efficiency of economic policies but also makes authoritarianism more durable and less prone to the risks connected to economic crisis.
State power, authoritarianism, and redistribution
The main theoretical contribution of my work lies in combining authoritarian resilience, infrastructural state power, and redistribution in one explanatory model. In this model, state‐society relationships serve as an interaction variable reconciling the effects of redistribution and infrastructural state power as the mechanisms of authoritarian resilience. Researchers have previously studied the relationships of each of these two concepts, but have not tried to understand how all three may be connected.
I have already discussed the link between authoritarianism and redistribution. There are two other significant relationships, between (1) authoritarianism and infrastructural power and (2) infrastructural power and redistribution. Michael Mann distinguishes four ideal types of states depending on the levels of despotic and infrastructural power, respectively: feudal (low, low), imperial
31 Evans, Embedded Autonomy. 28
(high, low), bureaucratic (low, high), and authoritarian (high, high).32 In a recent publication, he revisited this classification and changed the names of the last two types to democracy and single‐party states.33
Mann made the change to emphasize that “infrastructural power is a two‐way street: It also enables civil society parties to control the state,”34 and it may serve democratic or authoritarian ends depending on the context. He connected that context to pluralism or monopoly of the party system. In all contemporary states, parties35 are the tools for mobilizing the masses. In democracies “many parties and pressure groups compete for power,”36 while single‐party states “have enjoyed significant state autonomy from civil society—but only because they had invented the mass party that could penetrate the pores of everyday life.”37
Although Mann does not develop this idea further, it is quite clear that he connects the infrastructural power to authoritarianism through the party apparatus in a single‐party state. A similar approach is taken by Lai and Slater38 who regard the party as a better alternative to the coercive institutions of the state for the purposes of mobilizing the masses and deterring elite defections. They find that single‐party regimes are less likely to initiate military disputes than military regimes. Single‐ party regimes are also better at nurturing their infrastructural power that helps them control society.
Levitsky and Way39 use a slightly different approach to connect infrastructural power with the strength of authoritarian regimes. They regard infrastructural power, which they call the scope,40 as one
32 Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State,” 115. 33 Mann, “Infrastructural Power Revisited.” 34 Ibid., 356. 35 Mann does not make a conceptual distinction between parties and states: “Provided that one counts the party as well as the bureaucracy as “the state,” …” (Mann 2008, 357). 36 Mann, “Infrastructural Power Revisited,” 356. 37 Ibid., 357. 38 Lai and Slater, “Institutions of the Offensive.” 39 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism. 40 Ibid., 58. 29 of the aspects of the two main components of the organizational strength of the state: the coercive apparatus and the party. Scope refers to “the effective reach of the state's coercive apparatus”41 and
“the size of a party’s infrastructure, or the degree to which it penetrates the national territory and society.”42 A wider scope of the party or the coercive apparatus works to strengthen authoritarian rule by ensuring timely elimination of political challenges, mobilizing the masses, and maintaining elite cohesion.43
My research highlights what I call the social public sector organizations as a new component in the relationship of infrastructural state power and authoritarianism. I see them as complementary to previously studied coercive apparatus, bureaucracies, and the party. I argue that the social penetration of the party in contemporary authoritarian regimes is frequently not as deep as the social penetration of other state‐run organizations: schools, hospitals, and establishments providing social services. While other elements of the state apparatus such as the police and the state bureaucracy also have a ramified infrastructure, many citizens interact with the state in their everyday lives through the organizations related to public goods and social provision.
I argue that social public sector organizations, once created, may be used for different purposes: mobilization or demobilization of the masses, manipulating electoral turnout and support, identification of potential opposition leaders, cooptation, and limiting the resources potentially available for regime
41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., 64. 43 There is also a less nuanced body of literature that connects authoritarianism exclusively with cocercive (despotic) power and democracy with the infrastructural one (see, for example, Andersen et al., “State Capacity and Political Regime Stability”; Fortin‐Rittberger, “Exploring the Relationship between Infrastructural and Coercive State Capacity.”). In a similar vein, the researchers of the contemporary Russian state have distinguished between the state quality and state capacity, associating capacity with coercion (see Fritz, State‐Building; Taylor, State Building in Putin’s Russia.). 30 challengers. The case of using schoolteachers for electoral agitation and fraud, discussed in Chapter 2, is an example of such abuse of the existing infrastructure of the social public sector.
If an autocrat was not lucky enough to inherit a developed organizational infrastructure in the social public sector, it is still possible to create it. In Chapters 3 and 4, I show how the governor of
Kemerovo region both created new social public sector organizations and made an effort to develop the existing ones. By showing that the Kemerovo case was the case of a purposeful creation of SPS organizations to increase infrastructural capacity rather than to redistribute material resources, I suggest a new theoretical lens for understanding regime resilience and regime social policy. My research exhibits some similarities with existing research that explored these phenomena without categorizing them as such. For example, Rimlinger notes that in Prussia conservative capitalists who sided on many questions with the authoritarian state, favored the centralized social protection system in the mining industry over mutual assistance funds because the former gave the employer a dominant administrative position, while in the latter workers were in charge.44 This position makes little sense from the redistribution perspective but fits well an explanation based on infrastructural power. Steinmetz characterized Prussian social policy as “designed to contain the working class by recognizing its social existence while attacking its organizational base.”45 More recently, Adams examined the reasons why the Cameroonian state decided to support feminist organizations,46 showing that one of the reasons for adopting “state feminist” policies was the creation of the “women’s national machinery” that could channel “women’s activism toward state‐delineated projects and goals.”47 Thus, building up infrastructural capacity of the state, so beneficial for authoritarian resilience, may be the reason for
44 Rimlinger, Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America, and Russia, 109–10. 45 Steinmetz, Regulating the Social, 43. 46 Adams, “‘National Machineries’ and Authoritarian Politics.” 47 Ibid., 176. 31 adopting certain kinds of social policies and constitute a distinctive logic of social policy development under authoritarianism.
The relationship between infrastructural power and redistribution has received less attention from researchers than the relationship of either of these to authoritarianism. Moreover, most of the time, their connection has been discussed outside of the context of political regimes, but in the context of the developing world, where lack of infrastructural state capacity was an impediment for the provision and redistribution of public goods.48 Another line of research, which is closer to studies of authoritarianism, develops the idea that public goods provision enhances infrastructural state capacity by increasing the legitimacy of state organizations.49 This kind of legitimacy was the goal of the many state rulers during the period of modern state‐building, as when, for example, Rimlinger writes that
Bismarckian policies were motivated by the need to secure the loyalty of the industrial worker to the monarchy. "The social insurance legislation of the 1880s made social and economic relations among individuals an object of statecraft. It was a conscious attempt at cementing the social fabric of the industrial order, with the interests of the state instead of the welfare of the worker as the prime objective."50 Scholars of social policy of the Middle East and North Africa region in the post‐colonial era have also noticed the link between the development of welfare provision on the one hand and state and nation‐building on the other.51
My research contributes to this literature by pointing out that the relationship between the infrastructural state power and redistribution depends on the pattern of state‐society relationships in which state organizations operate. Under the integrative pattern, redistribution is necessary to maintain
48 See, for example, Gough et al., Insecurity and Welfare Regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 49 Soifer and vom Hau, “Unpacking the Strength of the State: The Utility of State Infrastructural Power,” 227. 50 Rimlinger, Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America, and Russia, 93. 51 Karshenas and Moghadam, Social Policy in the Middle East, 4. 32 the legitimacy of state organizations, which is in line with what previous research has suggested.
However, the legitimacy of the state and the regime is not directly connected to the level of redistribution. As I show in my study of Kemerovo case, it was not the amount of redistribution per se that increased the legitimacy of the regime, but rather the framing of that redistribution as revealing the governor’s and the state’s care for the people. With the right framing and the organizational infrastructure that worked to maintain that framing, Kemerovo governor was able to achieve much more impressive political results than other regions that redistributed a similar amount of resources. In contrast, under the autonomous pattern of state‐society relationship, redistribution does not increase the legitimacy of state organizations but rather leads to increased demands for resources. In such conditions, political support is tightly connected to the amount of redistributed resources, which makes an autocrat vulnerable if those resources vanish.
Study design and methods
Subnational comparison
To investigate authoritarian resilience and infrastructural power, I conducted a subnational comparison, exploiting the fact that spatial variation is one of the key features of infrastructural state power, and thus that I have a good range of the empirical indicator that measures it. As Soifer and vom
Hau put it, “The ability of states to carry out their projects is territorially organized and crucially shaped by the organizational networks that they coordinate, control, and construct. Thus, examining state infrastructural power draws attention to sub‐national territorial variation in the ability of the state to 33 exercise control and regulate society, and draws scholars to subnational comparison in addition to cross‐ national research.”52
In addition to being a convenient tool for studying infrastructural state power, subnational comparison is also an excellent tool for studying countries with high internal heterogeneity, of which
Russia is a prime case. National‐level analysis obscures regional differences and different political mechanisms at work, capturing only the aggregate effect. Subnational comparison allows for deeper analysis of the differences in regional political systems and state structures.
Analyzing the subnational level also allows the researcher to increase the number of observations. Russia, with its almost 80 subnational units, offers the opportunity to take full advantage of subnational comparison. Together with increasing the number of observations, analyzing subnational units helps construct controlled comparisons, in which the cases are matched on cultural and historical dimensions.53 All Russian regions, even those with different structures of the economy, history, and culture, still have a common historical past as units within the Soviet Union and even now exist in the common legal and political space of the federal state. This commonality holds constant many possible macro‐level causes of variation and allows me to concentrate on the micro‐level factors.
Nested analysis strategy: a model‐building study design
The data collection and analysis have been organized in two phases using a nested analysis strategy that allows me to create a mixed‐method study design in which large‐N and small‐N analysis reinforce each other.54 This study design starts with a preliminary large‐N analysis exploring the relationship between the variables in question. If the results of this preliminary analysis are robust, then
52 Soifer and vom Hau, “Unpacking the Strength of the State: The Utility of State Infrastructural Power,” 222; see also Soifer, “State Infrastructural Power: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement,” 242. 53 Snyder, “Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method.” 54 Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed‐Method Strategy for Comparative Research.” 34 the small‐N analysis deployed during the next phase serves the purposes of model testing and provides additional insights into the mechanisms connecting the variables under investigation. If the results of the large‐N analysis are not robust, then the small‐N analysis allows the researcher to investigate the unexplained variation and build an improved theoretical model.
Following the nested analysis strategy, my study design included two phases. During the first one, I investigated the relationship between infrastructural power and authoritarian resilience using a large‐N subnational comparison of Russian regions. Since this analysis revealed significant regional variation of the connection between the infrastructural power and regime resilience, I then used contrasting case studies to examine this variation during the second phase. Fieldwork data in five selected cases, historical investigation of one case, and case comparison allowed me to correct the initial theoretical model by introducing the pattern of state‐society relationship as an interaction variable.
Phase one: quantitative analysis
During the first phase of my study, the quantitative analysis, I examined one of the dimensions of infrastructural state power in the social public sector and its connection to authoritarian resilience.
This dimension was leverage over schoolteachers; this helped Vladimir Putin to win the presidential election in 2012 convincingly and to demonstrate the strength of his regime to the public at the time when popular support of the regime was decreasing.
Before conducting the quantitative analysis, I reconstructed the mechanism of pressure on teachers through media evidence – journalists’ investigations, observers’ reports, testimonies of whistleblowers, and the documented in the media resistance of teachers’ community. I showed how teachers have been used for agitation in their communities and committing electoral fraud while serving 35 as members of precinct‐level electoral commissions. They were threatened with losing their jobs or benefits if they refused to cooperate.
The quantitative analysis that followed allowed me to answer two questions: (1) was the pressure on teachers systematic across the country? and (2) how much did pressure on teachers change the electoral result? To answer these questions, I used a dataset of the 79 Russian regions.55 I compiled this dataset from the publicly available voting data, regional statistics, and Russian treasury data on regional budget expenditures.56 In this analysis, I used the density of teachers (the number of teachers per population unit) as the main independent variable and a proxy for infrastructural state power. This variable captured the regime’s ability to put pressure on teachers through the threats of job loss. The main dependent variable was regime resilience, which I defined as the ability of the regime to demonstrate strength by maintaining high electoral percentages in the situation of decreased popular support. To measure regime resilience, I used Putin’s official electoral percentage in 2012 controlled for
Medvedev’s percentage in 2008 to capture whether particular regions were able to maintain the official electoral support of the regime candidate or not.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the two main variables in the analysis, which I subsequently used for case selection. The results of the quantitative analysis have confirmed that the leverage over schoolteachers explains part of the regional variation in regime resilience. In addition to revealing this relationship, the regression model allowed me to calculate the size of the impact of teachers on the electoral result and to show that it had a non‐trivial effect.
55 Two cases were excluded due to missing data. Also, the number of Russian regions has been changing during the last two decades mainly because of merging regions with very small populations to their larger counterparts. 56 Sources of data can be found in Appendix 3, Table 1. 36
Phase two: case selection
During the second phase of my study, I examined regional variation of the regime’s leverage over schoolteachers uncovered by the quantitative analysis in the first phase. Figure 2 shows that the relationship between the infrastructural power and regime resilience is not very robust: there is a lot of variation around the regression line. In some regions, the regime proved to be much more resilient than the model with teacher density predicted, while in others it turned out to be much less resilient. To understand what factors caused this variation, I used case studies of the regions situated above the regression line – that is, those with higher than predicted resilience – and those below the regression line – those with lower than predicted resilience. Out of the 79 regions included in the quantitative analysis in the first phase, I chose five regions. Kemerovo region and the Republic of Tatarstan were situated above the line, while Rostov region and the Republic of Altai were below the line. One case,
Tomsk region, occupied a position in the middle to serve as an example of the central tendency.
Besides their positions on the scatterplot, I had several other considerations. First, the practical considerations of doing fieldwork in the regions made me think about the academic contacts I had in different regions that could serve as points of entry to the field. Academics in Russian regions are usually in contact with the regional government and some NGO leaders. Not infrequently, university faculty themselves have the experience of working either in the government or in a non‐profit sector. I planned to ask my academic colleagues to provide me with some initial contacts in the region together with the information about the specifics of regional politics. For this reason, all else equal, I preferred the regions where I personally knew someone in the region’s academic community.
Second, I chose the regions above and below the regression line in a way that allowed me to control for one additional variable – whether the region is a non‐Russian one, i.e. whether it is a titular ethnic region. Being a titular (non‐Russian) region is considered an important factor in Russian politics, 37 and this variable is commonly included in the studies of electoral outcomes in Russia.57 To be able to understand the potential impact of regional ethnicity on infrastructural power, I made sure that one of the cases both above and below the regression line was a titular ethnic region and another one was a majority Russian region. This way I was able to understand the mechanisms that enhanced or suppressed infrastructural power, which are not necessarily connected to ethnic identities and social structures.
Appendix 1 presents general information about the population and economy of the regions.
Three of them are situated in Western Siberia (Tomsk and Kemerovo regions, the Republic of Altai), one in Volga region (the Republic of Tatarstan), and one in the south of the European part of Russia, on the border with Ukraine (Rostov region). The Republic of Altai stands out as (1) a much smaller region than the other cases in terms of its population (it is about twenty times smaller than Rostov region and five times smaller than Tomsk region) and also as (2) the most rural region (only about 30% of urban population compared to 70‐80% in other regions). Kemerovo region stands out as the region with the smallest share of working population employed in agriculture (3.6%) and the largest in mining (10.5%).
Three of the regions (Rostov and Tomsk regions and the Republic of Tatarstan) experienced a change of leadership in 2010‐2012 when new governors were appointed to replace their predecessors who had been in power since the early to mid‐1990s. In contrast to these cases, the governor of Kemerovo region, Aman Tuleev, has been in office since 1997, which is the longest term for the head of the region among the chosen cases and one of the longest in the whole of Russia.
57 See, for example, Treisman, “The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post‐Soviet Russia”; Reisinger, Russia’s Regions and Comparative Subnational Politics; Reuter, “Regional Patrons and Hegemonic Party Electoral Performance in Russia.” 38
Figure 2. Case selection 39
Phase two: fieldwork and qualitative analysis
In each of the selected cases, I conducted fieldwork for about four weeks. I used this time to familiarize myself with the main political players and practices in the region, which could help me understand why in some cases Putin’s regime had higher electoral resilience than in others. I started with using local history catalogs in regional libraries that listed all printed publications (newspaper and magazine articles, brochures, books, etc.) related to the region. For each region, I compiled a database of bibliographic records on the most important political events in those regions, main political players, the developments in the realm of social policy, the main SPS organizations, and the expressions of popular discontent. Reading through the full texts of some of these publications and annotations of others allowed me to identify the organizations and people I could interview for further information on the role of SPS organizations. I collected about 15 interviews on average in each case (see Appendix 2 for information about interviews). People I interviewed included current and former state officials, NGO leaders, employees of SPS organizations, journalists, and social scientists studying the region. During the interviews, some of them provided me documents related to SPS organizations. In other cases, I obtained the documents from the web sites of regional and city governments and SPS organizations.
While collecting these materials, I was trying to understand what factors could facilitate or hinder the use of SPS organizations for political purposes. I paid attention to their sources of funding, formal and informal hierarchies, relationships with municipal and regional authorities, and, very importantly, the history of their development. I was interested to see who initiated the creation of various SPS organizations, what relationship they might have had to the organizations that existed in the
Soviet Union, and how their organizational structure and the relationship with state authorities changed over time. 40
After completing fieldwork, I chose one case, Kemerovo region, for an in‐depth historical study.
This region exemplified the highest degree of political utilization of SPS organizations, and this look into history allowed me to trace the roots of this relationship between society and the state. Using secondary historical sources as well as primary sources collected during the fieldwork and available remotely, I (1) revealed the process of building an administrative machine in the region consisting of not only teachers but also residential‐based community organizations and (2) showed that the tight coupling between the state and society was not an inherent property of the region, but rather the result of conscious effort of the regional governor acting in a cooperative social environment. The latter insight helped to frame the last step in the analysis – the comparison of contrasting cases and theory building.
Comparing the cases situated above and below the regression line, I paid particular attention to the signs of societal reactions to state initiatives in my fieldwork materials. Based on the difference of those reactions, I suggested a model of two patterns of state‐society relationships, one of which helps and another one hinders the use of SPS organizations to increase regime resilience. I hypothesized that these patterns were associated with the different sources of power legitimacy: the state in one case and the community in another.
Chapter outline
The following chapters present the results of my analysis. Chapter 2 contains qualitative and quantitative evidence of the impact of schoolteachers on regime resilience, which supports my contention that SPS organizations provide autocrats with infrastructural power that helps them strengthen the regime. The chapter describes the mechanism by which the regime puts pressure on teachers. It shows that teachers are both trusted by students and parents and frequently serve as members of electoral commissions, which makes them good agitators and provides them with the 41 ability to falsify election results. Explicitly or implicitly, municipal‐level bureaucrats threaten school principals and teachers with the loss of jobs or benefits if they don’t cooperate. The quantitative comparison of Russian regions confirms that this mechanism works throughout Russia, if to a different degree, and that its impact on electoral results is non‐trivial.
Chapters 3 and 4 present the historical study of Kemerovo region. Chapter 3 shows that this region has been a true outlier on the Russian electoral map. It has supported the regime at a rate unexpected from a region with a similar socioeconomic profile and a history of mass protests, which characterized Kemerovo region in the past. In this chapter, I also introduce the figure of the regional governor, Aman Tuleev, and trace his political career since the late 1980s, showing how he sharpened his political skills of pacifying the “disobedient” masses. I analyze the content of his social policies to demonstrate that the size of expenditures is not enough to explain the transformation of the region from the troublemaker to the bastion of Putin’s regime.
In Chapter 4, I analyze the development and activities of the two largest networks of SPS organizations in Kemerovo region – the Veterans’ Councils (pensioners’ organizations) and residential committees. The first is the example of a social movement that was organizationally captured by
Tuleev’s regime and steered towards the regime’s goals to effectively serve as a part of the state apparatus. The second is an example of an organizational network that was created from above and that deeply embedded the state in society. I analyze the different ways these organizational networks help mobilize the population, prevent manifestations of discontent, and control the public space.
Chapter 5 compares the pattern of state‐society relationship observed in Kemerovo to those in other cases, mainly in the Republic of Tatarstan, Rostov region, and the Republic of Altai. Having analyzed the similarities and differences in the development and the political involvement of SPS organizations, I suggested that (1) the cases situated above and below the regression line demonstrated 42 different patterns of state‐society relationships and (2) these patterns stemmed from the different sources of power legitimacy. In the cases above the regression line, where infrastructural power was high – Kemerovo region and Tatarstan, people view the state as the embodiment of the public will. As a result, people allowed the state to create and mediate community ties, which made it easy to create top‐down organizational hierarchies controlled by the regional government. In the cases below the regression line, where the infrastructural power was low – Rostov region and Altai, people detached the state from the public will, which they located at the community level. As a result, the attempts of the state to create top‐down structures failed as people turned such structures into clientelistic networks serving their constituencies.
The Conclusion discusses the questions that my dissertation left unanswered and posed anew together with the implications of the suggested theoretical model to other countries and areas of inquiry. 43
Chapter 2. Schoolteachers and infrastructural state capacity in Putin’s Russia
This chapter examines the relationship between the infrastructural state power in the social public sector and regime resilience. Using the administrative leverage over schoolteachers as an indicator of state power, I demonstrate that (1) SPS organizations (in this case, schools) provide the state with a unique kind of infrastructural capacity and (2) Putin’s regime has used this capacity to demonstrate the regime’s strength through high electoral percentage in the face of decreased popular support.
The autocrat’s electoral dilemma
Most contemporary authoritarian regimes hold not‐completely‐ritual elections despite the threat, however small, of losing power.58 The benefits of elections, which actually increase regime stability, include domestic and international legitimacy, the opportunity to verify the regime’s bases of support, and the chance to co‐opt potential or actual competitors and wider population groups by sharing resources and power. Elections also allow local elites to flex their political muscle and make sure that only the most capable ones are co‐opted by the regime.59 In the case of Russia, it was true for the elections both at the regional and local levels.60
The main electoral risk that autocrats have to manage is not the risk of losing the vote, but the risk of revealing the regime’s weakness.61 Winning by a small margin may signal the potential elite competitors and the masses that defection may yield a positive outcome. In an effort to retain the
58 Gandhi and Lust‐Okar, “Elections Under Authoritarianism”; Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism. 59 Gandhi and Lust‐Okar, “Elections Under Authoritarianism.” 60 Kalinin, “Signaling Games of Election Fraud”; Reuter et al., “Local Elections in Authoritarian Regimes: An Elite‐ Based Theory With Evidence From Russian Mayoral Elections.” 61 Simpser, Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections. 44 benefits of the elections, while minimizing the risks, authoritarian regimes have developed a rich toolkit, unavailable for democratic leaders. They can prevent competitors from running by changing electoral rules or harassing the opposition. They can influence public opinion through state‐controlled media or buy people’s loyalty through material giveaways. They can coerce the regime‐dependent population to show up for the election and to cast the right vote. Finally, they can also use fraud with much less cost than democrats when the result does not come out as good as they hoped for. The analysis in this chapter shows how Vladimir Putin’s regime has used some of these tools when it faced an electoral challenge in 2012.
The 2012 electoral challenge of Putin’s regime
In March 2012 Vladimir Putin won his third presidential election with 64 percent of the vote.
This may not seem surprising, given his previous electoral success and the years of economic prosperity that rendered his regime popular. When he came to power in 2000, the country recovered from the economic crisis and rising oil prices accelerated the restoration of its financial health. Real incomes of the population began to grow, which drove Putin’s popularity during his first two terms.62 This performance legitimacy, however, deteriorated after the global economic crisis of 2008. Putin’s approval index declined 45–50 percentage points between the spring of 2008 and the same period in 2012 (see
Figure 3). In addition, after the federal parliamentary elections in December 2011, Moscow faced the largest mass protests since the fall of the Soviet Union, which were directed against the rigged election results.
62 McAllister and White, “‘It’s the Economy, Comrade!’ Parties and Voters in the 2007 Russian Duma Election”; Colton and Hale, “The Putin Vote: Presidential Electorates in a Hybrid Regime”; Treisman, “Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime.” 45
100 90 78 80 72 70 64 60 70 50 40 37 30 20 27 10 0 08 08 08 09 09 09 10 10 10 11 11 11 12 08 09 10 11 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ June June June June March March March March March December December December December September September September September
Putin's approval index Medvedev's and Putin's electoral percentage
Figure 3. Putin’s approval index63 and the regime’s presidential candidate electoral percentage, March 2008 to March 2012.64
Putin’s strong electoral performance in March 2012, though, illuminated the fact that high popular approval of the regime was not a necessary condition for its existence and stability, which could be maintained in other ways. As an autocrat concerned with staying in power more than with his legacy,
Putin did not use the time and resources of the prosperous 2000s to implement structural economic reforms that would launch Russian economy into decades of prosperity. Rather he used this period of readily available performance legitimacy to structurally change the Russian political system and prepare his regime for the difficult times.65
63 The approval index is the difference between the percentage of those who approve of and those who disapprove of Putin’s actions. 64 Levada‐Center (Yuri Levada Analytical Center), “Odobrenie organov vlasti.” 65 On the general trajectory of consolidating Putin’s power see Gel′man, Authoritarian Russia. 46
One of the most important transformations of Russian politics in the 2000s concerned the relationships of the federal center with regional governors. Through the change in the tax code, which undermined the financial base of regional budgets, and the introduction of governor appointments,
Putin curbed the autonomy of regional leaders that they enjoyed in the 1990s and aligned their political interests with those of the federal center.66
This maneuver allowed Putin not only to reduce the threat of being challenged by powerful regional elites but also to establish a better control of mass politics in the country. The result of this political move was a steep decline in public protest67 and deterioration of electoral integrity as regional political machines began to work for the benefit of the central regime.68 The electoral performance of the United Russia or Putin himself in a particular region became an indicator of the governor’s rather than the regime’s performance.
This chapter reveals a bottom‐level mechanism that regional governors used to deliver a satisfactory electoral result. I argue that the governors’ administrative leverage over schoolteachers was crucial for the strong performance of Vladimir Putin at the 2012 election. Schoolteachers, fearing job loss, worked as agitators and as members of precinct‐level electoral commissions who falsified electoral results. Other public sector workers whose structural position in society was not as beneficial for carrying out agitation and fraud did not have a similar influence on the election.
66 Stoner‐Weiss, Resisting the State; Hale, Why Not Parties in Russia?; Reisinger and Moraski, “Regional Changes and Changing Regional Relations with the Centre.” 67 Robertson, The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes. 68 Goode, The Decline of Regionalism in Putin’s Russia; Reuter, “Regional Patrons and Hegemonic Party Electoral Performance in Russia.” 47
The chapter argument
I argue in this chapter that Vladimir Putin’s strong performance at the 2012 presidential election in Russia was to a large degree the result of deploying the infrastructural capacity of the social public sector at the regional level. Specifically, I show that municipal authorities used schoolteachers to manipulate the election result through agitation or fraud. Teachers occupy a unique position in society both for convincing people to vote a certain way and for manipulating the vote count. In addition to daily interactions with the community, teachers in Russia also frequently work as members of precinct‐ level electoral commissions since the vast majority of polling stations are situated in schools.69
Schoolteachers serve as the bottom level of the administrative hierarchy through which the elections have been manipulated. Regional governors, who had long been made responsible for regime’s electoral performance in their regions, put pressure on municipalities to deliver high percentage for Putin. Municipal authorities, who control school budgets and appointments, in their turn,
69 This argument is closely related to the findings of the recent study on the electoral influence of the Teachers’ Union in Mexico (Larreguy, Montiel Olea, and Querubin, “Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teacher’s Union.”). There are a number of important differences between this study and my analysis of Russian data, though. First, Larreguy and his coauthors choose to frame the phenomenon that they study in terms of clientelistic exchanges and brokers’ behavior, despite the fact that they have not found any effects of monitoring of brokers’ behavior on electoral result and suggest that “brokers” are mostly motivated by their (apparently programmatic) partisan attachment. I use the framework of infrastructural power, which seems to be more relevant because it can potentially accommodate various motivations of teachers as regime agents. Second, they think of the Teachers’ Union as a case of a labor union rather than of a public sector organizational network despite providing a brief mention of the importance of the public sector and its connection to what I call embeddedness and trust in the very last paragraph. I view embeddedness and trust the key characteristics of SPS organizations, of which schools are the case. Third, the phenomena the authors study looks very similar to the teachers’ role in Russian election at the bottom level (with the exception of much weaker emphasis on direct fraud), but at the top level Mexican teachers are a part of the organizational infrastructure of a union that is an autonomous political player while Russian teachers become an extension of the state apparatus abused by an authoritarian regime. The bottom‐level similarities, however, are striking; they demonstrate that my analysis of the situation in Russia indeed highlights a process, the variations of which can be traced in other countries (for another related research see Pierskalla and Sacks, “Personnel Politics: Elections, Clientelistic Competition, and Teacher Hiring in Indonesia.”). 48 force teachers and school principals to manipulate the election result under the threat of loss of job or benefits.
To substantiate this argument, I have two kinds of evidence. Qualitative evidence shows how the administrative hierarchy comprised of the regional government, the municipal government, and the school system worked during several recent electoral cycles to force teachers to agitate or commit electoral fraud. This evidence includes testimonies of whistleblowers, observers’ reports, journalist investigations, and the facts of resistance in the teachers’ community.
Quantitative evidence demonstrates that (1) teachers fearing job loss have influenced the 2012 presidential election result throughout the country and (2) their influence has substantially changed the final vote count. For this analysis, I use regional level statistics, Russian Treasury data on regional budget expenditures, and voting data from the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections.
Teachers’ involvement in electoral manipulation: qualitative evidence
Russian regional governors seek to boost turnout and regime support at the elections through various means,70 and one of their most important resources is public sector organizations (e.g. local bureaucracies, municipal‐owned companies, and the social public sector) controlled by municipalities.
Although by the Russian law state bureaucrats and municipal authorities cannot engage in electoral campaigns, setting up campaign headquarters staffed by municipal bureaucrats right in a town hall has become a common practice.71 This phenomenon is so widespread that in some smaller towns municipal
70 An overview of these means is done by Kynev et al., Vybory Presidenta Rossii 4 marta 2012 goda. Involvement of employers is specifically addressed by Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi, “Political Machines at Work Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace.” For the analysis of the employers’ role in a different historical and geographic context see Mares and Zhu, “The Production of Electoral Intimidation: Economic and Political Incentives.” 71 Tat’iana Iurasova, “Mytishchi‐Geit.” 49 staff publishes official documents about the creation of such headquarters and the division of responsibilities 72 because it does not occur to them that such a universal practice is actually illegal.
Similar to other state‐dependent employers, municipalities exploit their access to and power over all their employees to impact their political behavior. Using small amounts of cash or threats of negative consequences at the workplace, authorities mobilize them to vote for the right candidate or party, to participate in pro‐government rallies, or to hand over their absentee ballots for further use in fraud schemes.73 Teachers are frequently subject to such pressures together with other employees of state‐owned or state‐dependent organizations, including street cleaners and plumbers.
There are two tasks, though, that fall disproportionately on the social public sector workers, especially on teachers: agitation and fraud. These tasks require not only dependency on state bureaucrats, but also social embeddedness of the school system that provides teachers with a regular contact with the population and access to the multiple locations where votes are turned in and counted.
Being in frequent contact with the families of their students and often respected by them, teachers are uniquely positioned to influence people’s decisions about voting. And serving as members of electoral commissions at the polling stations situated in schools makes them the single74 occupational group whose actions are most consequential for electoral integrity.
72 “ ‘Golos’ obnaruzhil nezakonnyi shtab ‘po organizatsii vyborov’ v Krasnoznamenske;” Melkonyants, “Ocherednaia ‘bomba’ s nezakonnym shtabom pri administratsii.” 73 See, for example, Sergei Smirnov, “ ‘Soberite otkrepitel’nye i prinesite nam’;” Nikolaeva, “Vybory. Fal’sificatsii. Chast’ vtoraia;” Petlianova, “Dlia pedagogov vvodiat otkrepitel’noe parvo;” Rybina, “Poteshnyi polk;” “Sotrudnikov biudzhetnykh organizatsii prinuzhdaiut idti na miting ‘Krymskaia vesna’;“ “Karta narushenii.” Another case: a director of an educational center in Zelenograd, Elena Travina, refused to send teachers to a pro‐Putin rally and was fired from her job. After articles in newspapers about her case, the decision to lay her off was cancelled (Rybina, “Ya ne otpravila liudei na Poklonnuyu. Menya uvolili.”) 74 Other representatives of the social public sector, namely doctors and social workers, have also engaged in both agitation and fraud (see, for example, on social workers: Barova, “Ne ponravilos’ ‘EdRo’ – von s raboty!”; Karavaeva, “Sotsrabotniki sdelali vybory. Chto im za eto budet?”; Markova, “Sud’bu vyborov reshit golos babushka;” on doctors: Aleshkovskii, “Kak fal’sifitsirovali vybory v Moskve: ‘delo vrachei’;” “Karta narushenii;” Iurasova, “Mytishchi‐Geit.”) However, their potential of influencing election results is smaller than the teachers’
50
Teachers and Electoral Agitation
Taking advantage of teachers’ relationships with the families of their students and the community at large, municipal authorities force them to agitate for pro‐regime candidates and use the space of educational establishments to display agitation materials.75 Usually, it is framed as a request for volunteer help with no material reward, but there is always an implied threat, credible or not, of negative consequences. School principals are particularly vulnerable because their contracts are not regulated by the usual norms of the labor law and can be ended by the municipal government at any time.76 Teachers are asked to collect signatures for particular candidates or to convince people to vote for them. This agitation usually happens during parents’ gatherings at schools or when teachers purposefully walk around the neighborhood and knock on doors.
The story that happened in 2011 in the city of Lipetsk is an example of the pressure that municipalities put on schools. Elena Dumcheva, the principal of school N 70, told the journalists of a local internet‐media Gorod 48 that the head of the municipal department of education, Anna Shamaeva, forced school principals to collect signatures for a mayoral candidate. In Lipetsk, as in many other cities, the head of the municipal education department was also the head of the informal campaign headquarters of the incumbent city mayor. Knowing that Dumcheva was respected by the parents of her students, Shamaeva also asked her to agitate for an incumbent mayor at the parents’ gatherings.77 This case could have become one of the many such reports buried in local media outlets, but this time three
one. They do not serve on electoral commissions in similarly large numbers and have a more restricted access to the population. In the case of social workers their impact is largely restricted to the elderly who require regular care. In the case of doctors the scale and character of their contacts with the population is limited by the structure of Russian healthcare system, which still has a weak primary care component and a very developed specialized one. 75 Rybina, “My ne pisali sochineniia na uchastkakh;” “Karta narushenii.” 76 “Dazhe direktora shkol nachali soprotivliat’sia.” 77 “Direktor shkoly prizyvaet kolleg ne prinimat’ uchastiia v nechestnykh predvybornykh igrakh;” “Davlenie Edinoi Rossii na direktorov shkol.” 51 of Dumcheva’s colleagues, principals of city schools publicly joined her protest, confirming that they received similar requests,78 and the story became widely known.79
Another example is the case of Raivo Shtulberg, a schoolteacher from the village Olkha in
Ukholovo municipality, Ryazan’ region. On July 25, 2015 he posted a video on Youtube,80 in which he demonstrated the “mobilizator’s scripts” and blank forms that teachers were supposed to fill with the data of the United Russia supporters. His video received 15,000 views and became the basis for an official complaint to the prosecutor from the oppositional RPR‐PARNAS party in Ryazan’ region. After such a publicity, though, the school administration compelled Shtulberg and his mother, also a teacher in that school, to leave their jobs.81
During my own fieldwork in Altai Republic, I discovered a case when the regional governor,
Alexandr Berdnikov, explicitly prohibited using teachers as agitators during the local electoral campaign in 2013. Far from caring about election integrity, though, what he tried to accomplish was to deprive his political opponent, an oppositional municipality head, from one of his most valuable political resources
– the leverage over schoolteachers. Teachers from several municipalities of the region whom I interviewed said that people in their region certainly expected teachers to serve as an example and many followed teachers’ recommendations about voting for certain candidates. They also said that educational officials at the municipal and regional levels routinely engaged in agitation, and school principals who supported a loser at the election risked their jobs.82
78 Barova, “Ne ponravilos’ ‘EdRo’ – von s raboty!” 79 “Dazhe direktora shkol nachali soprotivliat’sia.” 80 Shtulberg, “Zastavliaut golosovat’ za Edinuiu Rossiiu, ili agitator, uchi menia dumat’.” 81 “ ‘Ia – mos’ka, kotoraia oblaiala Volan‐de‐Morta’;” Bobrova, “Odni protiv sistemy.” 82 Interview Altai‐08, December 2013, Gorno‐Altaisk. 52
Teachers and Electoral Fraud
Besides agitation, teachers are also well‐positioned to impact electoral results through direct fraud. They comprise a large share of the members of precinct‐level electoral commissions who are supposed to ensure the integrity of the voting process on the election day. The exact number of teachers working in electoral commissions is unavailable since the commissions are not obliged to publish workplaces or occupation of their members. But people closely involved with elections estimate the share of teachers at precinct commissions to be around 50%.83
Involvement of schoolteachers in electoral fraud had been reported before,84 but in the 2011‐
2012 election cycle the number of such reports exploded.85 Many cases were reported by independent observers and opposition parties,86 but several most famous ones involved whistleblowers among teachers themselves. The best known whistleblower was Tatiana Ivanova, a teacher in school N 575 in
St. Petersburg, who had been the head of the local electoral commission N 99 in Vasileostrovskii district during the parliamentary elections in December 2011. According to her account, the pressure to rig the elections in December 2011 was not comparable to the pressure in any other electoral cycle during the
14 years she had led the commission. She said that the heads of local electoral commissions were gathered three times before the elections for instruction on how to falsify vote count. The instructors were members of the city‐level electoral commission and, like in other cases of pressure on teachers, the head of the district educational department. They told local commissions’ heads to keep the observers far away from the ballot box, to help stuff the box with fake ballots, and to falsify the
83 For example, the head of City Electoral Commission in Moscow, Valentin Gorbunov, said to journalists in 2009 that about 50 percent of local commission members are teachers because they are asked to fill staff shortages existing in most commissions (Pichugina, “Izbiratel’nyi defitsit.”) See also “Press‐konferentsiia rukovodstva KPRF v ‘Interfakse’;” Iurasova, “Mytishchi‐Geit.” 84 “Press‐konferentsiia rukovodstva KPRF v ‘Interfakse’ “; Ozerova, “Nepodsudnye vybory.” 85 Rybina, “Zamministra obrazovaniia: ‘Ia ne znaiu, zachem na uchitelei daviat pered vyborami’.” 86 See, for example, Murtazin, “Skrytnye kamery;” Safronova, “Uchitelia – makhinatory‐falsificatory.” 53 signatures of those voters who did not show up. In return, they promised each head 70,000 rubles (2‐
3 months of teacher salary).87 After Tatiana Ivanova refused to falsify election results, the district educational department forced her to leave her teaching job and later sued her, claiming her interviews with journalists damaged “honor and dignity” of the department’s head.88
During the 2011‐2012 electoral cycle, journalists have reported similar cases in many cities across the country (Saratov, Volgogradskaia Oblast’, Omskaia Oblast’, Briansk,89 and Tambov,90 among others). When schoolteachers and principals were approached to commit fraud91 by a representative of the municipal government, they might have been promised some bonus payments or money for school renovation. Most frequently, though, they were implicitly or explicitly threatened with the loss of their job92 and benefits or the reduction of the non‐permanent part of their salaries.93
In subsequent years, the reports of involvement of teachers in fraud at the lower level elections have continued.94 And the 2016 election to the federal parliament, when many polling stations have already been equipped with web‐cameras, provided a solid set of video recordings of ballot‐box stuffing
87 Rybina, “Za zakrytymi dveriami po piat’ chelovek obrabatyvali.” 88 “V Peterburge budut sudit’ uchitelia, otkazavshegosia uchastvovat’ v fal’sifikatsii vyborov.” 89 “Segodnia — Den’ uchitelia.” 90 A primary school teacher in Tambov, Yulia Kapichnikova, officially reported on 600 fake ballots thrown into the ballot box, and was hounded from the school where she worked by the school’s deputy principal (“Za otkaz v fal’sifikatsii resul’tatov vyborov – uvol’nenie;” “Ekzekutsiia v shkole;” “Pytalis’ uvolit’ uchitel’nitsu.”) 91 Stuffing the ballot box is not the only fraud technique that is used in Russia or elsewhere. Some of the others are carousels with absentee ballots, placing ballots to wrong piles while counting, and falsifying the final protocols. All fraud techniques are at least visible to electoral commission members, and many require their direct participation. 92 A Facebook user writes that in one of the precincts in the city of Saratov, the members of the local electoral commission, including the school principal, for the past seven years have been writing a letter about voluntarily leaving their job with an unfilled date, which was to be filled in if the results of the elections were “wrong” (Novoselov,. Facebook post). 93 Chizhova, “Kto zashchitit uchitelia ot vyborov?” 94 See, for example, an observer’s report from the 2013 election to the regional parliament in Rostov oblast’: kartofanisch, “Obidno chto osnovnye fal’sifikatory vyborov eto uchitelia! UIK 2556!” 54 by teachers.95 The lawyers of Golos (“Voice”), a Russian civil society organizations monitoring the integrity of elections, have filed many complaints and even some law suits, trying to punish those involved in falsifications, but all these cases have resulted in symbolic fines that were surely compensated by the benefits provided to commission members by local elites.96
Civil society resistance and the moral divide in the teachers’ community
The unprecedented pressure on teachers in the 2011‐2012 election cycle triggered reactions from the professional community of teachers and civil society. Many active members of the professional community had publicly addressed teachers across the country before97 and after the parliamentary elections in December 2011 urging their colleagues to stick to their moral principles during the upcoming presidential elections in March 2012.98 This letter was signed by almost 150 teachers and published in the opposition newspaper Novaya Gazeta on February 2, 2012:
We appeal to the teachers' community all over Russia to exercise the utmost
responsibility and integrity, to prevent law violations and fraud, to prevent any
activities that may put into question the legitimacy of the election results. […]
Teachers are able to do a lot to make elections fair: voting frequently takes place
in schools, and teachers and school principals often serve as members of
electoral commissions. […]
95 Sulim, “Obychnyi izbiratel’nyi uchastok;” “Massovye vbrosy biulletenei (video).” 96 Chizhova, “Poniat’, prostit’ i nagradit’.” 97 Kuchanov, “Vybory 4 dekabria – ‘ekzamen’ dlia uchitelia. Obrashcheniie k rossiiskim uchiteliam.” 98 Berulava et al. “Glavnaia tema dnia;” Bunimovich, “Vy zhe nam govorili, chto 2+2=4?”; Mezentsev, “Vybory vsegda zakanchivaiutsia. Gde tvoi chest’ i dostoinstvo, uchitel’?!” 55
The future of Russia to a large extent depends on whether our concerted effort is
able to protect the people’s will from falsification in the upcoming presidential
elections.99
Before almost every subsequent major election, famous teachers, teacher organizations, and politicians publicly addressed the teacher community pleading to resist the pressure on the election day.100 One of those addresses was posted on Youtube on September 2, 2013 by Tamara Eidelman, a
Distinguished Teacher of Russia, who teaches history in Moscow school N 1567.101 She asked her colleagues:
If you falsify the protocols at the polling stations or let others do it, how will you
enter the classroom after that? How will you look into the children’s eyes? We all
know children have a great intuition – they always feel the lies. These lies will eat
you away and will not allow you to continue being a teacher, regardless of what
subject you teach. I urge all teachers who will work in electoral commissions to
simply obey the law.102
The reaction of civil society to the reported involvement of teachers in electoral fraud ranged from providing legal help to public shaming. In support of the professional community’s efforts to prevent teachers from engaging in fraud, independent media and some opposition deputies offered their help to teachers who reported falsifications. Novaya Gazeta declared the day of the presidential election, March 4, 2012, “Teacher Day” and offered help in publicizing all instances of fraud reported by
99 “Pochti 150 uchitelei obratilis’ k kollegam s prizyvom proiavit’ ‘maksimal’nuiu printsipial’nost’ ‘ na vyborakh presidenta.” 100 “Otkrytoe obrashchenie uchitelei k kollegam po tsekhu, rabotnikam izbiratel’nykh komissii;” “Lev Shlosberg prizval rossiiskikh uchitelei prepodat’ uchenikam na vyborakh urok chestnosti.” 101 Seliverstova, “Zasluzhennyi uchitel’ prizvala kolleg ne dopustit’ fal’sifikatsii na vyborakh.” 102 “Tamara Eidel’man: Obrashchenie k uchiteliam.” 56 teachers.103 In St. Petersburg, two deputies of the regional parliament created an association “Teacher‐
Citizen” to provide legal help for the teachers who decided to report fraud.104
Together with support for the whistleblowers, civil society activists engaged in public shaming of teachers reported to have committed fraud. Just after the presidential election in March 2012, the activists of the Voters’ League, a social movement striving for fair elections, created a list of teachers involved in falsifications in Moscow and St. Petersburg as reported by observers. The list was called “A
Memo for a First‐Grader”, and its declared purpose was to prevent the falsifiers from teaching children.105
The resistance of individual teachers, independent professional organizations, and the civil society created a moral divide in the teachers’ community. On the one side of it, those who have chosen to become whistleblowers argued that everyone had a choice, even if a hard one, and teachers who engaged in fraud did not have a moral right to teach.106 They were also saying that teachers in electoral commissions frequently falsified the results even without much pressure from the outside, trying to win favors from the authorities.107 Voices from the other side of the divide are rarely heard in public, but at least one of them has recently appeared in Novaya Gazeta. Irina Viktorovna, a teacher in the city of
Samara who skillfully stuffed the ballot box at her polling station, agreed to talk to journalists to counterbalance, as she said, the attempts of the media to present teachers as the main case of all
Russian misfortunes:
103 “Vnimanie, aktsiia: ‘4 marta – Den’ uchitelia’.” 104 “Shishkina: Uchitelia stali uchastnikami makhinatsii.” 105 “Uchitelei, oskandalivshikhsia na vyborakh, pomestili v chernyi spisok;” “Uchitelia poshli po spiskam;” Koval’chenko, “Delo uchitelei.” 106 Bobrova, “Odni protiv sistemy.” 107 Rybina, “ My ne pisali sochineniia na uchastkakh.” 57
Why did I do this? For a simple reason that I value my work and want to continue
teaching children. Of course, from your point of view, I could have refused. But
someone else would agree, and overall nothing would change. It would,
however, change my own life because it is clear that the school administration
would not forgive such behavior and sooner or later find a way to get rid of me.
And I, by the way, am a good teacher, my students get into colleges in large
numbers, and if you think that I should leave because of some abstract ideals and
a worse teacher should replace me, I just do not agree with you.
She also said that the United Russia was winning the 2016 parliamentary elections even without falsifications, and her actions had not changed anything.108
Interestingly, despite what Tamara Eidelman said in her address, the specialization of teachers seemed to matter for the probability of engaging in fraud. Tatiana Yurasova, a journalist who conducted an investigation of electoral fraud in the city of Mytishchi in Moscow region, noticed that among the teachers in the 68 commissions where she detected fraud there were many math and science teachers, very few language teachers, and no single historian.109
Impact of teachers on election result: quantitative evidence
Qualitative evidence about involvement of teachers in electoral manipulation is comprehensive, but it still cannot answer two important questions. First, was the influence of teachers systematic across the country rather than localized in the regions where violations were reported? Second, if it was systematic, how much has it changed the election result?
108 “Vbros.” 109 Iurasova, “Mytishchi‐Geit.” 58
Measuring regime resilience
The main issue with evaluating the systemic effects of teachers on the electoral result is that it is difficult to separate genuine support for the regime from the support (real or fake) that would not have happened without teachers’ influence. A closer look at the historical situation of the 2012 election and the political tools at the regime’s disposal can help us grasp this variable of interest.
Administrative pressure on teachers and other public sector workers is not the only and, most probably, not a preferred tool of achieving a strong electoral result for Putin’s regime. As any coercion, such pressure bears a risk of breeding hidden discontent among the population. Genuine popularity based on good economic performance of the country used to be another, much safer tool that worked great for the first two Putin’s terms. Unfortunately for Putin, the economic growth stalled during
Medvedev’s presidency, and genuine support rapidly declined.
This declined support was a stress‐test for Putin’s regime, and the regime has demonstrated its resilience. I hypothesize that it is in this situation that the administrative leverage over the public sector workers, gradually cultivated by the regional governments during the years of economic prosperity,110 was called to compensate for the lost support. Such compensation was necessary to demonstrate that the regime’s popularity had not declined substantially since the golden year of 2008. A strong electoral win in 2012 was even more important for Putin than in previous elections because a signal of regime weakness in the situation of declining popularity could threaten the regime stability. For the purposes of this analysis, I will define the ability of the regime to maintain high electoral percentage despite declined popular support as regime resilience. I hypothesize that the resilience that Putin’s regime demonstrated
110 Reuter, “Regional Patrons and Hegemonic Party Electoral Performance in Russia.” 59 in the 2012 election was achieved at least partially due to a more intense utilization of administrative pressure over teachers than in 2008.
To measure regime resilience, I take the regional variation of Vladimir Putin’s 2012 electoral percentage as an outcome and control it for the 2008 Medvedev’s percentage. Such a combination allows seeing whether regime’s electoral support in a particular region fell since 2008 together with regime’s real support or not.111 This predictor automatically controls for a number of factors that may have impacted voting but stayed constant between 2008 and 2012, allowing to test the factors that impacted the regime resilience. The less the 2012 electoral percentage fell or the more it rose relative to the 2008 percentage, the more resilient the regime was in a particular region. The regional variation of this measure was significant: while the nationwide electoral support of Vladimir Putin fell by about 7% compared to Dmitry Medvedev’s 2008 result, support in the regions varied from a fall of 25% in Moscow to a rise of 11% in Chechnia.
Measuring leverage over teachers
Qualitative evidence indicates that teachers were explicitly or implicitly threatened to lose their jobs or benefits had they failed to cooperate during elections. To measure the leverage that municipal authorities had over teachers, I use a variable that reflects the credibility of such threat and the ability of teachers to cope if the threat is realized. This variable is the number of teachers per population unit, which I call teacher density. High teacher density indicates, among other things, an abundance of
111 An ideal measure of regime resilience would also control for the level of real support of the regime in a particular region. However, regional data on real regime support at the time of the 2012 presidential election are not publicly available. An attempt was made to estimate regional values of Putin’s approval before the presidential elections in 2012 using a Levada‐Center nationally representative data set and small‐area estimation techniques. Unfortunately, the variance in Putin’s approval was insufficient for the algorithm to converge and produce estimates. Given this fact, the assumption of equal support decline in all regions that my analysis has to make is imperfect, but not completely ungrounded. 60 teachers on the labor market and the easiness of replacing a teacher. Also, it is a sign that teacher jobs comprise a larger share of all jobs in the region, leaving fewer opportunities for alternative employment.
Low teacher density means that it is harder to find a replacement for a teacher because fewer teachers are on the market. Also, there are more alternative employment opportunities if teacher jobs occupy a smaller share of the job market.
Together with teacher density, I also use two additional variables. The first one, also measuring opportunities for alternative employment, is the unemployment rate in a region.112 High unemployment indicates the potential difficulty of finding a different job and increases the cost of losing one for an employee. The second one is the 2007‐2011 dynamic of dependency of regional budgets on transfers from the federal budget. Previous research has shown that federal transfers have been used to stimulate and reward governors’ loyalty.113 Governors of the regions that became more dependent on the federal budget since the 2008 election likely had a stronger stimulus to deliver the electoral percentage at the 2012 elections by putting pressure on municipalities to engage teachers.114
Alternative hypothesis and their indicators
A number of factors can potentially impact both the teacher density and regime resilience making their relationship spurious. In my analysis, I test several alternative explanations.
Economic voting. Regions whose economies performed better between 2008 and 2012 or suffered less during the economic crisis of 2008‐2009 may prove more resilient at the 2012 elections
112 The unemployment rate among teachers would be the best measure here, but no public data on teacher unemployment are available. 113 Starodubtsev, Platit’ nel’zia proigryvat’; Kalinin, “Signaling Games of Election Fraud.” 114 An analysis of the United Russia performance at the 2011 parliamentary election using similar conceptual categories (governor’s dependency on the federal center, governor’s capacity to organize fraud, and vulnerability of the population) but very different empirical indicators can be found in Bader and Ham, “What Explains Regional Variation in Election Fraud? Evidence from Russia: A Research Note.” 61 and also have higher teacher density because they can afford to hire more teachers. To measure economic performance, I use the 2007‐2011 dynamic of three variables: income per person, yearly inflation rate, and unemployment rate.
Increased social spending generating population’s loyalty. Higher teacher density may also be the result of increased social spending, which could both increase the number of teachers and retain genuine regime support at higher levels. To test this hypothesis, I use the 2007‐2011 dynamic of regional budget expenditures on education, health care, and social security.
Genuine regime support by public sector employees. Previous scholarship shows that public sector employees in Russia support Putin’s regime more than private sector employees.115 It is possible that regions with high teacher density had experienced an expansion of public employment since the previous election, and this expansion could explain higher support in 2012. To account for this, I use the
2007‐2011 dynamic of the number of teachers, doctors, executive government employees, and pensioners116 in the regions.
It is also possible that not only public sector employees’ support the regime more but their support is more resilient, meaning that it stays high in the situation when support among other groups declines. In this case, the regions with a higher share of public sector employees will be more resilient even if the number of such employees does not change since the last election. If this is true, the relationship between higher teacher density and higher resilience may not be specific to teachers, but rather reflect the resilience of all public sector employees’ support. To see whether teachers have a
115 Rosenfeld, “Varieties of Middle Class Growth and Democratic Preference Formation.” Note, however, that the size of the public sector workforce has also been found not to affect regime’s electoral performance – see, for example, Reuter, “Regional Patrons and Hegemonic Party Electoral Performance in Russia.” 116 Pensioners are another group whose well‐being depends on the state budget, which makes them similar to public sector employees. 62 distinct leverage over election result, I control for the density of doctors and government employees at the end of 2011 together with teacher density.
Urbanization and ethnic factors. Finally, I include two variables known to impact voting in Russia and elsewhere. They are the level of urbanization, measured by the share of urban population, and the ethnic composition of the region, measured by a binary variable of whether the region’s titular nation is non‐Russian.
Structure of analysis
I use an OLS regression to estimate the systematic effect of each variable on the outcome (see the Note on the interpretation of a population rather than a sample model in Appendix 3). Table 1 shows regression coefficients of three models. Model 1 tests the factors that could impact the dynamic of genuine regime support and includes all predictors except for the ones related to the leverage over teachers. Model 2 adds the variables related to the leverage over teachers. The number of variables (17) in Model 2 is large for the number of cases (79), which may impact the clarity of the effects. Model 3 reduces the number of independent variables in half, using the eight predictors that showed the most systematic relationship to the outcome in Model 2.
Results: systematic effects and effect sizes
The quantitative analysis seeks to answer two questions: whether teachers had a systematic effect on the 2012 election result and, if yes, how large that effect was. It has discovered that the administrative leverage over teachers was indeed systematically related to regime resilience and that its impact on the electoral result was substantial.
As Model 1 shows, the factors that could impact the genuine support of the regime between
2008 and 2012 do not explain the regional variation of regime resilience. Neither economic performance 63 of the region nor the dynamic of social expenditures are systematically related to the change in regime support: their t‐values are either low or unstable in subsequent models. Even the effect of the financial dependency on the federal budget, which is usually considered one of the driving forces of regional loyalty, is weakly related to regime resilience. Its t‐value of 1.68 means that the systematic effect of this predictor is only 1.68 times stronger than random noise. The dynamic of the number of public sector employees in Model 1 also does not explain changes in regime support.
After the introduction of variables related to the administrative leverage over teachers in
Model 2, the picture has changed. First, teacher density has become the predictor most systematically related to regime resilience (t=2.57, 2.57 times stronger than random noise) in the direction supporting the hypothesis: regions with higher teacher density have shown a stronger capacity to maintain electoral percentage in 2012 compared to 2008. Importantly, this effect is specific to teachers: neither doctors nor government employees have a comparable effect on regime resilience.
Second, the effect of federal transfers on regime resilience has manifested itself and shown its connection to teacher density. The dynamic of federal transfers has significantly increased its t‐value, from 1.68 to 2.49, after controlling for teacher density in Model 2. Increased dependency on federal transfers has indeed incentivized governors to deliver the electoral percentage, but their ability to do so was restricted by the leverage over schoolteachers. Until this leverage was held constant, the effect of transfers could not be detected.
Third, the dynamic of teacher density, which did not show a clear effect on the outcome in
Model 1, has now shown a clear relationship that went against one of the alternative hypothesis but fitted the explanation about the administrative leverage over teachers. The dynamic of teacher density has increased its absolute t‐value from 0.56 to 2.01 in Model 2. Such an increase of systematic effect is characteristic of teacher density, but not of doctor or government employee one, which would be the 64 case if changing numbers of public employees supporting the regime explained changes in electoral results. Even more importantly, the sign of the coefficient of teacher density dynamic is negative, meaning that it was the regions with decreased teacher density that were more resilient in 2012. This relationship may seem counterintuitive at first sight (doesn’t a region need high teacher density to be resilient?), but it actually fits well with the argument. Descriptive statistics of teacher density dynamic
(see Table 6 in Appendix 3) shows that most Russian regions had been laying teachers off between 2007 and 2011: teacher density has decreased by 14% on average. Teachers in the regions where their density decreased the most had seen many of their colleagues lose jobs in the previous years, which made the threat to lose their own one more credible. Controlling for teacher density at the end of 2011, layoffs in previous years increased rather than decreased the administrative leverage over teachers.
Model 3 helps to adjudicate between the possible effects of two other predictors, healthcare expenditures and unemployment rate. Their effects in Model 2 were not as clear as the effects of teacher density, federal transfers, and teacher layoffs, but they were more pronounced than the effects of other predictors. After reducing the number of predictors in Model 3, which is equivalent to increasing statistical power in sample models, the effect of healthcare expenditures blurs (t‐value drops from 1.81 to 0.75), while the effect of unemployment rate becomes clearer (t‐value increases from 1.79 to 2.23). The coefficient is positive, meaning that higher unemployment increases regime resilience, which would not make sense if regime support was based on economic performance, but fits well with the explanation based on administrative leverage over teachers.117
117 The impact of unemployment here is similar to the findings of other researchers about labor scarcity reducing the willingness of employers to engage in electoral intimidation in other countries (Ardanaz and Mares, “Labor Shortages, Rural Inequality, and Democratization.” 65
Table 1. Regression Coefficients† (t‐values in parentheses)
Outcome: Electoral support for Putin in 2012 1 2 3 Electoral support for Medvedev in 2008 0.779 0.709 0.753 (7.996) (7.435) (8.812) Change from 2007 to 2011 in: income per person ‐0.016 ‐0.027 (‐0.282) (‐0.506) yearly inflation rate ‐0.373 ‐0.375 (‐0.980) (‐1.033) unemployment rate ‐0.014 ‐0.027 ‐0.018 (‐0.846) (‐1.673) (‐1.193) regional budget expenditures on education 0.024 0.000 (0.451) (‐0.002) regional budget expenditures on health care 0.055 0.071 0.024 (1.303) (1.805) (0.751) regional budget expenditures on social ‐0.043 ‐0.042 security (‐1.628) (‐1.564) teacher density ‐0.057 ‐0.193 ‐0.174 (‐0.558) (‐2.009) (‐2.003) doctor density 0.021 0.080 (0.446) (1.532) executive government employee density ‐0.105 ‐0.144 (‐1.012) (‐1.399) pensioner density 0.092 †† (0.700) the share of federal transfers in the total 0.032 0.047 0.047 income of regional budgets (1.680) (2.485) (2.684) Unemployment rate in 2011 0.004 0.004 (1.794) (2.227) Teacher density in 2011 0.001 0.001 (2.573) (2.173) Doctor density in 2011 ‐0.001 ‐0.0002 (‐1.605) (‐0.359) Executive government employee density in 2011 0.000 (‐1.015) Share of urban population in the region at the end of ‐0.098 0.091 2011 (‐1.611) (1.199) Non‐Russian region 0.024 0.003 (1.278) (0.150) † N=79. Cells with t‐values more than 2 are marked in bold italic. This marking is introduced for readability purposes and does not imply any statistical or substantive thresholds. †† Pensioner density was dropped from this model due to high correla on with the unemployment rate in 2011. 66
Overall, the regression models have shown that four factors have been systematically related to
Vladimir Putin’s regime resilience at the 2012 election (see Model 3): (1) the dynamic of federal transfers to regional budgets, (2) teacher density, (3) teacher layoffs (the dynamic of teacher density), and (4) the unemployment rate right before the election. Increased dependency on federal transfers created incentives for governors to increase pressure on municipalities, while higher teacher density, a higher rate of teacher layoffs in recent years, and high unemployment strengthened their leverage over teachers.
Revealing the factors that influenced regime resilience still leaves the question of how much those factors have actually changed the result. To estimate the effect sizes, I calculated how much
Putin’s electoral percentage in 2012 would change if each of the identified factors changed by one standard deviation (SD). Also, to provide a comparison context, I calculated the same number for the strongest, but trivial, predictor in the model – Medvedev’s electoral percentage in 2008. The results were the following:118
for every one SD increase in Medvedev’s percentage, Putin’s percentage increased by 5.6%;
for every one SD increase in the share of federal transfers, Putin’s percentage increased by 1.6%;
for every one SD increase in teacher density, Putin’s percentage increased by 2.6%;
for every one SD increase in teacher layoffs, Putin’s percentage increased by 1.6%; and
for every one SD increase in the unemployment rate, Putin’s percentage increased by 2.2%.
As these numbers show, the effect sizes of these factors are non‐trivial. In a hypothetical world where the impact of these factors was removed and all Russian regions had decreased their dependency
118 Calculations are based on Model 2. 67 on federal transfers, had low teacher density and low unemployment, while actively hiring teachers,
Putin’s nationwide electoral support in 2012 would be 45%,119 and the election would go to the run‐off.
I argued in this chapter that one of the mechanisms that made Vladimir Putin’s strong performance at the 2012 election possible was the administrative leverage that regional governors had over schoolteachers. The authorities took advantage of the unique position of teachers in society – their ubiquity and daily interactions with the population, trusted status in the community, and dependency on local bureaucrats – to turn them into regime agents. Under the fear of job loss, teachers agitated for the regime and falsified the vote count at the precinct level. Teachers in the regions with increased dependency on the federal budget, high density of teachers, high unemployment, and a large number of teacher layoffs in recent years have been most vulnerable to the pressure.
Although this mechanism explains part of the variation in Putin’s regime resilience in 2012 across the Russian territory, a large part of the variation remains unexplained (see Figure 2 in
Chapter 1). This may mean that either there are factors that help or hinder the work of this mechanism in particular regions or that other mechanisms, including those related to SPS organizations, are in play.
The following chapters look into the regional variation to investigate these questions.
119 The number was obtained by fitting to Model 2 the minimum values for the dynamic of federal transfers, teacher density, and unemployment, and the maximum value for the dynamic of teacher, while keeping other variables at their means. 68
Chapter 3. Kemerovo region: a case of socially‐oriented authoritarianism
This chapter will introduce a historical study of Kemerovo region – the case with a high infrastructural power in the social public sector (see Figure 2 in Chapter 1). This region is a puzzling case that turned from a troublemaker to one of the strongest supporters of the federal regime. Before moving to the role of the social public sector organizations in the next chapter, I discuss the political history of the region and the figure of the governor, Aman Tuleev, who has been in power for two decades. I show that despite his social policies that satisfy population’s basic livelihood needs, the region still has a potential for public discontent that SPS organizations help to address.
Kemerovo region is a coal mining area situated in the south of Western Siberia (Figure 4). It is the most densely populated area east of the Ural Mountains. 86% of its 2.7 million population live in cities (nationwide average is 74%), and mining produces 27% of gross regional product (its share in
Russian GDP is 11%). 10.5% of the workforce in the region work for the mining industry (1.6% nationwide), and only 3.6% work in agriculture (9.7% nationwide).120
By the mid‐2010s Kemerovo region acquired a reputation of “a sultanate of Aman Tuleev121,” which refers to the unrestricted power of the governor in many spheres including election results.
Indeed, the region behaved at the elections similarly to some non‐Russian regions, dominated by powerful ethnic elites. Its population turned out to vote in very high numbers and provided support for the United Russia throughout the 2000s and for Putin in 2012, which was much higher than the national average (Figure 5, Figure 6).
120 The data are for the year of 2012 and come from Regiony Rossii. Sotsial’no‐ekonomicheskie pokazateli 2014: Statisticheskii Sbornik. Moskva. 2014. Tables 2.2, 2.3, 3.4, 10.4. 121 Oreshkin, “Zazerkal’e izbiratel’noi kampanii.” 69
Figure 4. Kemerovo region on the Russian map
The electoral anomaly of Kemerovo region Such voting numbers are not to be expected from a region with a Kemerovo profile. More urbanized regions usually vote pro‐democratic or against Putin’s regime in larger numbers. Kemerovo contradicts this pattern: 85% of its population lives in cities,122 which makes it the 9th most urbanized out of about 80 Russian regions, but it still votes for the regime in soaring numbers. Scholars have also proved that Russian regions, whose budgets heavily depend on federal transfers, tend to vote for the regime.123 Kemerovo doesn’t fit this pattern either: despite the fact that only 13% of its budget in 2011
122 Data for the end of 2011. Regiony Rossii 2013. Table 2.3. 123 Starodubtsev, Platit’ nel’zia proigryvat’. 70 came from federal transfers with the median transfer share for Russian regions being 30%,124 it still delivered a very high electoral percentage for Putin’s regime.
The official electoral percentage in Russian elections, though, does not always reflect the real voter’s preferences. Attracted by an unexpected voting pattern of Kemerovo region, electoral forensics analysts have looked at the different falsification indicators and have universally agreed that the rate of falsification in Kemerovo region has been very high, starting in the late 2000s.125 A phone survey of
Kemerovo voters, which was conducted after the 2016 parliamentary election, revealed that in contrast to the official 77% support for the United Russia party in Kemerovo region, its real support (38%) was even lower than the national average (42%).126 His estimate of the number of falsified votes for the
United Russia in 2016 election was over one million, which is about a half of all registered voters in the region.127
124 I calculated the shares based on the regional budget data provided by the Russian Federal Treasury. The share of federal transfers in the income of Kemerovo region never exceeded 30% in 2000‐2015, making it much less financially dependent on the federal government than the majority of Russian regions. 125 Although electoral forensic methods are imperfect, the evidence of falsifications in Kemerovo seems overwhelming: “Tatarstan nakhimichil, Kemerovo obnaglelo;” Shpilkin, “Istoriia kemerovskoi anomalii i nemnogo konspirologii;” “Mukhlezh na vyborakh: proverka v dva scheta.” 126 The survey was conducted by the Anti‐Corruption Foundation of Alexey Navalny, a Russian opposition politician and anti‐corruption activist (Naval’nyi, “Sotsopros FBK: kak na samom dele golosovala Kemerovskaia oblast’ – tsitadel’ ‘Edinoi Rossii’ .”) 127 Another author has supported this estimate – see Sergey Shpilkin, “Istoriia kemerovskoi anomalii i nemnogo konspirologii.” 71
100% 90% 80% 70% 60%
50% Kemerovo Region 40% Russian Federation 30% 20% 10% 0% Parliament President Parliament President Parliament President 2003 2004 2007 2008 2011 2012
Figure 5. Turnout in Kemerovo region and nationwide for the federal level elections in 2003‐ 2012 (error bars correspond to the first and the third quartile of regional distribution)
100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% Kemerovo Region 40% 30% Russian Federation 20% 10% 0% United Putin 2004 United Medvedev United Putin 2012 Russia Russia 2008 Russia 2003 2007 2011
Figure 6. Pro‐regime voting in Kemerovo region and nationwide for the federal level elections in 2003‐2012 (error bars correspond to the first and the third quartile of regional distribution)
72
Proving that Kemerovo voting is substantially falsified still does not resolve the puzzle.
Falsifications usually follow a pattern similar to the pro‐regime vote: there are fewer falsifications in more urban, Russian‐majority regions with relatively low dependence on the federal budget.128 Given that Kemerovo is an urbanized Russian‐majority region with a low dependence on federal transfers, electoral fraud should not have been so extreme there. The question, thus, remains: why is it that the industrial region of Kemerovo produces falsifications on an industrial scale?
Kemerovo region as the center of workers’ movement in the late 1980s and the 1990s
The puzzle becomes even more intriguing if we look thirty years back into the political history of
Kemerovo region. In the late 1980s and through the 1990s, this region was the troublemaker for both
Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s governments. Coal miners of Kuznetsk Basin (or Kuzbass, situated in
Kemerovo region) started the largest wave of miners’ strikes in the Soviet Union in 1989, which Egor
Gaidar129 later called the beginning of the collapse of socialism.130 Throughout the 1990s, Kuzbass miners continued their protest activities, seriously challenging the government once again in 1998 with “rail wars” and several months‐long street protests in Moscow. During those years, Kuzbass miners demonstrated a high level of self‐organization, the ability to defend their economic interests, and a low degree of ideological indoctrination.
The nationwide strike wave of 1989 demonstrated how quickly and effectively Kuzbass miners organized around their interests and forced the Soviet government to negotiate with their leaders. A week after the first strike, which began on July 10th, 1989, in Sheviakov mine in the city of
128 Bader and Ham, “What Explains Regional Variation in Election Fraud? Evidence from Russia: A Research Note”; Kalinin, “Signaling Games of Election Fraud.”; Dmitrii Oreshkin, “Zazerkal’e izbiratel’noi kampanii.” 129 The leader of Russian economic reforms in the early 1990s. 130 Parfenov, “Namedni. 1989.” 73
Mezhdurechensk and included only 344 miners,131 the strike in Kuznetsk Basin grew to include 167 enterprises with 181,000 workers. A few days later, the whole mining industry of the Soviet Union was on strike, including enterprises in Dnepropetrovsk, L’vov, Volyn’ (all in contemporary Ukraine), Rostov
(contemporary Russia), and Karaganda (contemporary Kazakhstan). The first demands of miners related to everyday economic needs: higher salaries, different salary structure, better provision of goods to stores. However, the agreement their leaders signed with the Soviet government on July 19th, 1989, already contained clauses that would destroy the very basis of the socialist economy, had they been fulfilled. Kuzbass miners demanded that Kemerovo region would receive economic autonomy from the government in Moscow and that the enterprises in the region would become economically and legally independent with diversified property form. They would be able to set coal prices and trade independently in the USSR and abroad.132 Since it was clear early on that the Soviet government would not stick to these promises, the miners continued strikes and protests throughout 1990‐1991, extending their demands to the resignation of Gorbachev together with the Soviet government and the parliament, prohibition of the Communist Party, and de‐politicization of the state, media, and education institutions.133
In the post‐Soviet years, Kuzbass miners continued to play an important role in labor strikes. The largest one happened in 1998 when many Russian enterprises and the public sector had several months‐ long salary arrears, and desperate workers organized strikes and other protests throughout the country.134 Miners from several Russian regions were one of the most visible protest groups who started
131 Lopatin, Istoriia rabochego dvizheniia Kuzbassa (1989‐1991 gg.), 66; Cook, The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed, 161. 132 Lopatin, Istoriia rabochego dvizheniia Kuzbassa (1989‐1991 gg.), 66–68. 133 Zabolotskaia, Ugol’naia promyshlennost’ Sibiri (konets 1890 – nachalo 1990‐kh gg.). Istoricheskoe issledovanie, 287. 134 Naumov and Urmantsev, “Goriachee leto 98‐go.” 74 the “rail war” – blocking the railroads in order to make the government listen to their demands. Kuzbass miners blocked the Trans‐Siberian Railroad on May 14th, 1998, effectively cutting off the East of the country from the West. Within a week a wave of the rail war and other forms of miners’ protests spread from Rostov‐on‐Don (South‐West border of Russia) to Sakhalin (the Far East of Russia), halting cargo transportation all over the country.135 A few weeks later, miners from Kemerovo region joined their fellow workers from other parts of the country in a street protest on Moscow’s Gorbatyi Bridge in front of the Russian House of Government. The miners set up a camp and took turns banging their helmets against the pavement for hours, days, and weeks,136 until the crash of the Russian economy after the currency crisis in August 1998 deemed the protest futile.
During these and other protest episodes, the miners demonstrated a high capacity for self‐ organization and defense of their economic interests detached from either the communist or the market‐liberal ideology that defined the political spectrum at the time. Within just a few days after the beginning of the 1989 strike, miners elected local and regional strike committees that not only negotiated with the government on miners’ behalf but also teamed up with the local police forces to ensure public safety during strikes.137 After the first strike, the committees were renamed into workers’ committees and united into the Council of Workers’ Committees of Kuzbass to continue holding the
Soviet government accountable for the fulfillment of the signed agreement.138 Workers’ committees obtained wide powers as watchdogs – they were given access to the internal documentation of state organizations and enterprises, and they used these powers to maintain their pressure on the
135 See Emchenko and Kosvintsev. “Shakhtery legli na rel’sy;” Fedorov et al., “Shakhtery na rel’sakh;” Kosvintsev, “A na rel’sy legli shakhtery.” Miners from Andzhero‐Sudzhensk and other Kuzbass cities blocked the Trans‐Siberian railroad again on July 3rd, 1998, being unsatisfied with how the government carries out its promises (see Shalakin, "Anzherka vnov’ vstaet na rel’sy;" Sagara, "Shakhtery opiat’ shagnuli na rel’sy.") 136 “V Gosdumu s Gorbatogo mosta;” Kachaeva, " ‘Simphonia’ Gorbatogo mosta.” 137 Lopatin, Istoriia rabochego dvizheniia Kuzbassa (1989‐1991 gg.), 56. 138 “Istoricheskaia spravka NPG.” 75 government.139 Later, in 1990‐1991, the miners formed the Independent Labor Union of Miners, an organization alternative to then‐existing labor union fully controlled by the Soviet state.140 Although in the early 1990s miners strongly supported Yeltsin and his political agenda of market reforms, by the end of the decade they turned into an opposition to Yeltsin’s regime, disillusioned by the outcomes of transition to market economy. Miners have always been able to act according to a straightforward assessment of their economic self‐interest rather than to any political ideology.141 Boris Nemtsov, who negotiated with the striking miners in 1998 as the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, noted: “I was surprised that miners were not susceptible to the “red” or any other influence. It is a workers’ movements in its pure form. … Miners do not view [the politicians] as saviors, which is a sign of a high level of maturity. As pilots, they work in harsh conditions and risk their lives every day. And they have a special sense of brotherhood. That’s why miners are organized and dangerous for the political regime.”142
The rise of Aman Tuleev
How has the region, where these dangerous miners set the political tone for a decade, turned into a bastion of Putin’s regime? The label “a sultanate of Aman Tuleev” gives us a preliminary answer to this question: to understand this transformation we have to look at the figure of the governor.
Aman Tuleev has been the governor of Kemerovo region since 1997 – for almost 20 years so far, which is one of the longest governor terms in contemporary Russia. Boris Yeltsin appointed Tuleev as
Kemerovo governor trying to alleviate the socioeconomic tensions in the troublemaking region.143
139 Lopatin, Istoriia rabochego dvizheniia Kuzbassa (1989‐1991 gg.), 89–91. 140 Zakharchuk, Ugol’naia promyshlennost’ Kuzbassa, 212. 141 Cook, The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed, 165–66. 142 “U nas poka net sladkikh piliul’, chtoby davat’ vmeste s gor’kimi.” 143 Luk’ianova, Inna. “Aman vo spasenie.” 76
Although he was Yeltsin’s political rival,144 Tuleev had political experience from the late 1980s and the
1990s that provided him with a good grasp of protest politics, and his popularity in the region made him the best candidate for the job. Over the next years, Tuleev managed to monopolize the power in the region relying on the personal qualities and resources he had cultivated for years: his personal charisma, populist agenda centered around social security, and pragmatic treatment of political allies and rivals.
The origins of Tuleev’s populism
Tuleev crafted his social security agenda in the early 1990s when the plummeting living standards were the starkest problem for the vast majority of Russians. He actively advanced this agenda as the head of the regional parliament in 1990‐1996.145 Some of Tuleev’s first proposals that passed in
1990 included additional social pensions for the non‐working disabled people and a weekly hour and a monthly day off for working women to take care of the household. These proposals clearly opposed the policies of Yeltsin’s government and those of the workers’ leader Mikhail Kislyuk, whom Yeltsin appointed Kemerovo governor in August 1991. Since the parliamentary sessions were broadcast by the local radio station, Tuleev quickly obtained a reputation of an advocate for ordinary people. By the fall of 1990, he became an idol for many, particularly for the unqualified workers, women, and pensioners.146
144 Tuleev has been in strong opposition to Yeltsin: he ran against him for the Russian president in 1991, supported the communists during both the August 1991 coup and the October 1993 standoff between Yeltsin’s government and the Russian parliament, and exited the 1996 presidential race in favor of the Communist candidate. 145 This regional parliament has changed its names and status several times in the political turmoil of the early 1990s in Russia. Also, for a few months, from December 27, 1990 to August 27, 1991, Tuleev’s position – the chair of Kemerovo regional executive committee – combined the functions of legislative and executive branches, which were not divided in the Soviet Union. The government (the Executive Committee) consisted of the deputies of the parliament (the Council of People’s Deputies). The separation was introduced after the coup in August 1991, when Executive Committees were replaced with Administrations, independent from the Councils. 146 Lopatin, Istoriia rabochego dvizheniia Kuzbassa (1989‐1991 gg.), 185–86, 266. 77
Eventually, Tuleev also won over men, qualified workers, managers, and younger people, who were initially on the side of the workers’ movement and the “democrats”. As they grew more and more disillusioned by the market reforms that failed to bring a substantial improvement to their lives,147
Tuleev’s social security agenda was well suited to incorporate their grievances. Still based largely on the notion of economic security stemming from the Soviet social contract,148 Tuleev’s agenda included not only support for those unable to work for one or the other reason but also anything that contributed to the living standards – salaries, social services, etc. Tuleev always supported the miner’s demands for higher wages and the improvement of living and working conditions as they continued their protest activities throughout the 1990s, but he also spoke against strikes as a means of political struggle.149 In
July 1990, when Tuleev was the governor, he urged the miners to send a telegram to the Communist
Party Congress about their situation.150 In the fall of 1994, Tuleev, the speaker of the regional parliament at the time, supported the demands of the 500 workers of Sudzhenskaia mine who interrupted train movements on the Transsiberian railroad for 4.5 hours because of salary arrays.151 He also backed the strikes in Mezhdurechensk and Prokop’evsk that followed a few days later.152 His support of the miners and active advocacy for other social groups together with the disillusionment of people in the workers’ movement made Tuleev a wildly popular politician in Kemerovo region by the mid‐1990s.
147 Feiziev, Abubakar. “Boi idet i radi slavy;” Zakharchuk, Ugol’naia promyshlennost’ Kuzbassa, 214, 216. 148 Cook, The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed. 149 Zakharchuk, Ugol’naia promyshlennost’ Kuzbassa, 208, 210. 150 Not willing to get into a conflict with his party, though, Tuleev later refused to sign this telegram saying the miners’ rally was not large enough. See Lopatin, Istoriia rabochego dvizheniia Kuzbassa (1989‐1991 gg.), 192. 151 Zakharchuk, Ugol’naia promyshlennost’ Kuzbassa, 214. 152 Ibid., 216. 78
Tuleev’s political pragmatism
Tuleev’s social security agenda was a populist and politically pragmatic move rather than an ideological stance. Although he always emphasized social security (i.e. providing satisfactory living standards for the population) as a goal, he never favored any particular means of achieving it. As a result, he was frequently able to stay above the ideological battle between the market‐oriented democrats and state‐oriented communists, switching sides throughout his career and using the resources of both as he saw fit.
This political pragmatism was an important contributor to Tuleev’s electoral victories. In the late
1980s – early 1990s, when the Communist Party was losing popularity to the workers’ movement in the region, Tuleev managed to use the resources of both “communists” and “democrats”. In the spring of
1989, right before the miners’ strikes, when the anti‐Communist sentiment was on the rise, Tuleev lost the election for the Council of People’s Deputies of the USSR153 and apparently learned that the rules of the game had changed. Having adjusted his strategy a year later, at the 1990 election to the Council of
People’s Deputies of RSFSR,154 he, a candidate from the Communist Party,155 secured the support of the anti‐communist workers’ committees in exchange for funding their newspaper, apparently from the party‐controlled resources. The workers’ leader Mikhail Kislyuk agreed that the candidates from the workers’ movement would not run in the south of Kemerovo region, which made Tuleev’s victory possible.156 Once both Tuleev and Kislyuk found themselves in the Council, the communist deputies insisted that the head of the Council was elected by the deputies themselves rather than by the popular
153 The first competitive election in the Soviet Union. 154 Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic later became Russian Federation. The Council of People’s Deputies of RSFSR gathered at the republic level only for short sessions and operated mostly at the level of regional People’s Deputies Councils. 155 At the time, Tuleev was the head of the Kemerovo Railroad, a position he took in 1988 coming from the regional Communist Party structures. 156 Luk’ianova, Inna. “Aman vo spasenie.” 79 vote, which Tuleev was bound to lose to Kislyuk at the time. Tuleev became the head of the Council and of the Executive Committee – effectively the governor of the region.157 The democrats insisted that
Tuleev should not join the regional leadership of the Communist Party being in his position, but Tuleev complied only formally, keeping close ties with the party leaders,158 who had provided him with organizational support in the recent past.
Tuleev continued to exercise his political muscle when he ran for Russian president in 1991 against Boris Yeltsin, Nikolay Ryzhkov (the Communist Party candidate), and three other candidates.
Despite not being a Communist Party candidate, Tuleev actively used the party structures during the campaign.159 Unlike in 1989, he did not have an endorsement of the workers’ committees this time, but the party propaganda machine created a myth of him as a democrat, affiliated with the committees.
Committees’ representatives publicly denied his affiliation several times, but they could not outvoice the party structures working for Tuleev.160 He came the fourth out of the six candidates nationwide, obtaining 7% of votes; in Kemerovo region, however, he received 45%, more than any other candidate.
In December 1993, when the workers’ movement lost its initial might, Tuleev decisively won the regional election to the Federation Council,161 and in March 1994 his team of candidates got 23 out of 30 spots in the regional parliament. In 1996, he ran for Russian President again but withdrew from the race a few days before the election day in favor of the Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov.
By July 1997, when Yeltsin appointed him the governor of Kemerovo region, replacing Mikhail
Kislyuk, Tuleev was very popular in the region and experienced in winning elections. On October 19,
1997, he won the early governor’s election with 95% of the vote. Despite Yeltsin’s hopes, though, Tuleev
157 See Footnote 145. 158 Lopatin, Istoriia rabochego dvizheniia Kuzbassa (1989‐1991 gg.), 181–82. 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid., 265–66. 161 The upper chamber of the Russian parliament. 80 did not prevent further strikes in the region but rather used them to his own advantage. When miners joined the 1998 nationwide labor strike by blocking the Trans‐Siberian Railroad once again, Tuleev publicly blamed Moscow and the Yeltsin’s government for failing the reforms and not providing
Kemerovo region with the financial resources to which it was entitled.162 Coming off as a defender of the region’s interests in the public eye, he successfully used the threat of new strikes in negotiations with the federal government to obtain funds for the region.163 His own popularity in the region stayed very high even in the difficult period around the 1998 economic crisis. In 2000 Tuleev ran for the Russian president again and received 3% of votes nationwide, almost exclusively from Kemerovo region where his support exceeded 50%. In the next governor’s election, in April 2001, Tuleev received 94% of votes, proving once again that he was the only person who could realistically control the region.
Consolidation of Tuleev’s power: handling big business and the communists
During his first years in office, wide popular support allowed Tuleev to concentrate on getting rid of potential political opponents in the regional elites. The threat might come from two sides: big business and Tuleev’s own allies in the Communist Party.
The communists controlled the regional parliament at the time. Although the parliament was very loyal to Tuleev,164 he began to break away from his former allies and experiment with party structures that would be loyal to him personally. After becoming the governor and obtaining control over the state apparatus, he did not need the support of the Communist Party anymore. In early 1999, right before the election to the regional parliament, he created “The Block of Aman Tuleev” – a political group that nominated candidates in all 35 municipalities in the region. Only three current deputies at
162 “Aman Tuleev: polozhenie khuzhe gubernatorskogo.” 163 Luk’ianova, Inna. “Aman vo spasenie;” see also Robertson, The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes. on how Russian governors used popular protests in their struggles with the federal center at the time. 164 As mentioned earlier, 23 of 30 spots there were occupied by Tuleev allies since 1994. 81 the time, who were personally loyal to Tuleev, made it to that list, and many of his other former allies who eagerly supported his bid for the Russian presidency, felt betrayed.165 They complained to the federal government, parliament, and prosecutor about the illegal actions of Tuleev who publicly supported the candidates while being the governor.166 One of the deputies, who came out of the workers’ movement, sued Tuleev in the regional court for registering “The Block”, but lost the case.167 In addition to creating a quasi‐party structure, loyal to him personally, Tuleev also blocked access of other candidates to the media. He used the state television and the main regional newspaper to convince the population that his competitors were connected to the big business in Moscow that was trying to establish control over the region.168 As a result, Tuleev’s deputies took 34 out of 35 seats in the regional parliament, effectively eliminating any opposition to Tuleev’s power.169 From this 1999 election to the present, the regional parliament has been completely controlled by Tuleev.170
Tuleev’s break with the communists happened not only at the regional level but also at the federal one. At the 1999 federal parliamentary election, Tuleev ran as #4 on the list of the Communist
Party. A few weeks before the election, though, when it was already clear that Putin would be the successor of Yeltsin, Tuleev called the citizens in Kemerovo region to support Putin’s party Edinstvo
(Unity).171 There were likely multiple reasons for such turn towards Putin, including the certain
165 Prikhod’ko, “Zelenyi poias vyborov I lichno Aman Gumirovich.” 166 Goncharov, “ ‘Democratiia’ po‐kuzbasski.” 167 The court ruled that since only the name of Tuleev was used, but not his governor’s title, there was no violation of the law. See Prikhod’ko, “Zelenyi poias vyborov i lichno Aman Gumirovich.” 168 Starozhilov, “Gubernskie golosa.” 169 The workers’ movement that was still alive in 1999, tried to organize a resistance to Tuleev’s power, but this resistance did not go far. See Alekseeva, “V Kuzbasse snova, kak i 100 let nazad, nazrevaet rabochaia revolutsiia.” 170 Tuleev used another political block, “Serving Kuzbass”, in 2003 in a similar manner as the “The Block of Aman Tuleev” in 1999. Starting 2007, he used for these purposes the federal ruling party “United Russia.” 171 The predecessor of the United Russia Party. See Starozhilov, “Kuzbass pril’nul k ‘Medvediu’.” 82 departure of Yeltsin in the nearest future and the ongoing need for federal money in the region to alleviate the situation with salary arrears and other pressing needs.172
Another possible reason, though, was related to Tuleev’s need to establish control over the big business in the region that had already shown its political ambition. The economy of Kemerovo region has been based on the metal and coal mining industries, which bring about 70% of revenue to the regional budget. In 1999‐2000, Tuleev needed the support of the federal government to force two business groups – Alfa‐group and MIKOM173 – to leave the region, and then‐Prime Minister Putin provided such support in September 1999.174 These companies gave way to their competitors – a multinational steel‐making and mining company EVRAZ and a Russian holding company, the Siberian
Business Union.175 Unlike MIKOM, which supported candidates to the regional parliament and openly declared its ambition to influence regional politics,176 these companies did not challenge Tuleev’s power in return for his informal permission to do business in the region.
Media monopoly and Tuleev’s image of a caring leader
Control of the state finances and the major business corporations in the region also provided
Tuleev with virtually full control of the media,177 which he used to cultivate his image of a caring leader
172 Mel’nichenko and Biriukov, “Posle ‘chestnykh vyborov’ v Gosdumu.” 173 MIKOM provoked a conflict with Tuleev by using off‐shore financial schemes to avoid taxation and by supporting several candidates to the regional parliament in 1999 election. In 2000, Kemerovo regional authorities opened a tax evasion case in relation to the company and accused its owner, Mikhail Zhivilo, in the attempted murder of Aman Tuleev, forcing Zhivilo to sell the company and leave the country. See Sokolov, “Profsoiuznyi vozhak atakuet ‘Nornikel’.‘ Aman Tuleev formiruet parlament;” Starozhilov, “Gubernskie golosa.” 174 “MIKOM pod pritselom Moskvy: Pravitel’stvo RF perekhodit k reshitel’nym deistviiam.” 175 This holding owns companies in coal mining, railway transportation, chemicals, machine building, and media industry. 176 Popok. “MIKOM stremitsia k vlasti v Kuzbasse.” 177 See Interview Kem‐01. The only independent newspaper that criticized Tuleev was Kuznetskii Krai, renamed into Krai in 2002. It had a limited resources and audience and ceased to exist in 2006 after its editor died from cancer. Tuleev directly criticized this newspaper for its allegedly non‐constructive and offensive positions (see Sokolov, “Profsoiuznyi vozhak atakuet ‘Nornikel’.‘ Aman Tuleev formiruet parlament.”). 83 and the image the region as “socially‐oriented.” This mantra has been repeated by Tuleev himself since he became the governor, by the media,178 and, ultimately, by the people who live in the region.179
Tuleev presents himself not so much an all‐powerful man, but rather a ruler who is very much like the people he rules and who spends all his time defending their interests, successfully or not. His natural charisma also helps. He has always been an eloquent speaker, able to recognize and address the most pressing issues his audience is struggling with. “He knows exactly what to say to different groups: one thing to miners, another thing to pensioners, a third one to teachers. He knows when to shake hands and when to smile to a woman. When he speaks, the audience’s jaws drop. And his explanations are simple, understandable, making use of colorful Russian phrases. He has no problem publicly calling himself an idiot. He is a genius of populism, and there is no one better than him in Russia.”180
During my fieldwork in the region in March 2014, I observed how his image was cultivated by both the media and the whole institutional infrastructure. Morning and evening prime time on the local
TV channel was filled with the news on how the authorities worked hard to protect the people from all kinds of adverse circumstances: natural disasters, environmental threats, crime, economic crisis, etc.181
This channel also broadcasted meetings of regional officials, where the governor was always the only speaker – literally, no one else would say a word, – giving detailed directions to his subordinates on how to do their job and holding them accountable for protecting the people. He could, for example, explain
178 For example, “Elita edet – kogda‐to budet;” Lavrenkov, “Kuzbassu opiat’ ne khvatit deneg;” Bagaev, Evgenii. “Odoleem li chinoivnich’i bar’ery;” Kozyreva, Anna. “V Kemerovskoi oblasti bisness uzhe stal sotsial’no‐ orientirovannym, utverzhdaet senator Sergei Shatirov.” 179 During my fieldwork I have heard a reference to a “socially‐oriented” region multiple times when I communicated with people in Kemerovo. Frequently, this characteristic came up in the conversation in the very beginning: after I introduced the topic of my dissertation as centered around social policy, people would say something like: “Yes, Kemerovo region is very socially‐oriented,” or “We are very proud of the system of social support in our region.” (See Kemerovo fieldnotes.) 180 Luk’ianova, Inna. “Aman vo spasenie.” 181 Kemerovo fieldnotes and audio‐recording Kem‐05. 84 how to prepare for the spring floods emergency or order to keep workers’ salaries above the subsistence level in a vulnerable area of the region.
Figure 7. Portrait of Aman Tuleev in the regional public library (author’s photograph).
Newspaper publications followed a similar tone and choice of topics, constantly informing the population about the authorities’ actions to solve regional problems with criticism restricted to the effectiveness of the state apparatus’s work. In the center of Kemerovo city, I observed several speakerphones with a sign that this was a street radio station. One day it was on and announcing that a certain number of children from the region have been sent abroad for summer holidays with the help of the regional government.182 A number of propagandist books on Tuleev’s political biography published
182 Kemerovo fieldnotes, February 28, 2016. 85 by loyal journalists also clearly have cultivated Tuleev’s patriarchal image. The two major topics in those publications have been (1) Tuleev’s connection to the ordinary people and his devotion to defending their interests and (2) connection to the elites, which demonstrates his power to protect the people of the region.183 Besides the books, the latter theme has been prominent in the local history museum, which has had a separate room (one of the three that it occupies) devoted to the presents Tuleev received from various public figures.184 The regional library also has a special room displaying expensive special editions of books presented to Tuleev. On the wall by the entrance to this room, there is a framed portrait of Tuleev in a birch forest (Figure 7). A librarian told me that when they had schoolchildren visit the library, she would tell them that if they put their cheek to the frame and think of a wish, this wish would come true.
Social policy and redistribution in Kemerovo region
The argument of this and the next chapters is that Tuleev’s control of the region is largely based on the infrastructural power provided by the network of social and public sector organizations. An obvious competing explanation is that Tuleev consistently delivers according to his political agenda and actually redistributes resources to the masses of the population, which keeps his support high. However, the analysis of social policies structure and spending shows that Kemerovo region is not very different from other regions in the amount of social spending or overall redistribution. Tuleev’s policies specifically target the poorest and are structured in a way that makes them very tangible and visible.
183 Golovanova, O vremeni, o liudiakh, o Tuleeve; Tuleev, Ostavat’sia samim soboi; Cheremnov and Shalakin. Aman Tuleev – chelovek, politik, gubernator; Shatskaia, Doverie. 184 When I visited the museum, in February 2014, the theme of this exhibit was “Sports”, referring to the Winter Olympics held in Sochi in 2014. The museum employee I talked to said that there were about 2000 items presented to Tuleev that were stored in the museum, but there wasn’t enough space to show them all. She was also clearly proud that a recent item was in the museum within two hours from the time it was presented to Tuleev (see Kemerovo fieldnotes, February 28, 2014). 86
Polling data, in their turn, show that Tuleev’s support is high but not nearly as high as his election results. They also show that the demographics of his support base has not changed since the early
1990s: he is still supported by the pensioners much more than by industrial workers.
Available statistics on budget spending demonstrate that Kemerovo region expenditures on social security (see Figure 8) or education (see Figure 9) do not differ much from those in other Russian regions.185 Kemerovo region has been spending slightly less than the national average or the average for
Siberian Federal District on social security and slightly more on education. The graphs are based on absolute numbers, but budget shares show a similar pattern.
The outcomes of social security measures do not distinguish Kemerovo region either. Gini coefficient186 shows that although inequality is lower in Kemerovo region than in Russia on average, it is higher than in other Siberian regions. The share of the population with incomes below subsistence level has been lower in Kemerovo region than the national average for most of the 2000s,187 but this number was at least partly the consequence of a lower subsistence income level.188
185 I will not discuss here expenditures on health care since the data that allow to account for them correctly at the regional level exist only starting 2011. Since the early 1990s, these expenditures have been split between the state budget and the non‐budgetary medical insurance fund, both of which exist at the federal and regional levels. Transfers between the budget and non‐budgetary fund as well as between the federal and regional levels make it impossible to obtain an estimate of total expenditures from the publicly available data by adding all the numbers together. 186 See Appendix 4, Figure 24. 187 See Appendix 4, Figure 25. 188 See Appendix 4, Figure 26. This dynamic of subsistence income level must have been at least partially the result of price regulation for the basic food items (Shipachev, K.V., R.M. Deriabina, and V.A. Shabanov, eds. Mery sotsial’noi podderzhki zhitelei Kemerovskoi oblasti: sbornik informatsionnykh materialov, 14.) 87
4500
4000 Russian 3500 Federation
3000 Siberian 2500 Federal
rubles 2000 District
1500 Kemerovo Region 1000
500
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Figure 8. Regional budget expenditures of on social security, per capita, 2003 prices (author’s calculations based on Russian Federal Treasury data)
8000
7000
6000 Russian Federation 5000
4000 Siberian rubles 3000 Federal District
2000 Kemerovo 1000 Region 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Figure 9. Regional budget expenditures on education, per capita, 2003 prices (author’s calculations based on Russian Federal Treasury data)
88
If both budget spending and social policy outcomes in the region are not outstanding, why is propaganda about the “socially‐oriented” region so successful? There may be several reasons for that.
First, systematic dissemination of detailed information about various benefits by itself has an effect on public opinion.189 It exposes various social policies even to the people who would never be affected by those policies: pensioners might otherwise have never known about the benefits that student families receive and vice versa.
Second, the policies that are advertised may cover fewer people than it seems, amplifying the propaganda effect without extra spending. Some benefits are means‐tested, and the low subsistence income level in the region reduces the number of the beneficiaries. Also, the multitude of beneficiary categories may be deceptive since many of them overlap, and in such cases, the beneficiary has to choose only one.190
Third, funding for social benefits and projects may come from sources other than the regional budget but still work for the image of the governor. Regional propaganda talks not only about regional social policies but also includes the federal ones. For example, the veterans of World War II receive major benefits from the federal budget, which are described in the information materials along with much fewer regional benefits. Although federal benefits are clearly marked as such, they still contribute to an impression of a comprehensive system of social support. Tuleev does not miss a chance to create
189 Besides a constant stream of information in the media, Kemerovo regional and city governments also publish booklets and books with detailed information about the benefits and the procedures to obtain them (see, for example, Fedorova and Administratsiia g. Kemerovo, eds. S liubov’iu k gorodu: informatsionnyi sbornik; Fedorova and Administratsiia g. Kemerovo, eds. Moi gorod – moia sem’ia: informatsionnyi sbornik; Administratsiia Kemerovskoi oblasti. Osnovnye vidy sotsial’noi podderzhki studentam, uchashchimsia I sotrudnikam uchrezhdenii obrazovaniia Kemerovskoi oblasti; Shipachev et al., Kuzbass – veteranam: sbornik informatsionnykh materialov; Shabanov et al., Monetizatsiia mer sotsial’noi podderzhki naseleniia poo plate zhil’ia I kommunal’nykh uslug: informatsionno‐spravochnyi material; Shipachev et al., Mery sotsial’noi podderzhki zhitelei Kemerovskoi oblasti: sbornik informatsionnykh materialov. 190 The consultant in the legal center of the regional library mentioned this to me when talking about one of the regional programs – “Kemerovo pension” (Kemerovo field notes). 89 an association between himself and the federal benefits. For example, WWII veterans all over Russia have been receiving cars from a Russian auto‐producer as one of the benefits. In Kemerovo region,
Tuleev always personally hands car keys over to veterans, which is extensively covered by the media.191
Due to the large presence of mining and related industries with harsh labor conditions, Kemerovo region also receives about 50% more money per capita from the national out‐of‐budget Social Insurance
Fund,192 which could also contribute to an impression of a developed system of social support in the region.
Another important alternative source of funding is the big business in the region. Since the early
2000s, when Tuleev won the war with Alfa‐Group and MIKOM, the owners of large industrial enterprises, represented by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, sign an agreement with the administration of Kemerovo Region and the Federation of Labor Unions.193 This agreement regulates the labor relations, including the benefits and social services that the employers provide to the workers. Usually the employers take responsibility to fund infrastructural projects in the areas with their employees’ dwellings, provide social security benefits for the most vulnerable categories of workers
(families with multiple children, single mothers, pregnant women, pensioners, and people with disabilities), and supply resources for the labor unions to develop cultural and health‐related programs for the employees.194 Kemerovo government has been very explicit that regional businesses owe to the regional government such social responsibility along with an obligation to support other social
191 See, for example, “ ‘Oka’ techet k pozhilym;” Sokolov, “Profsoiuznyi vozhak atakuet ‘Nornikel’.‘ Aman Tuleev formiruet parlament;” “Za doblest’ i muzhestvo;” Gostev, “V Kuzbasse podderzhali veteranov.” 192 See Appendix 4, Figure 27. 193 This federation is the successor of the Soviet labor unions, which were fully controlled by the state, and has no relationship to the Independent Labor Union of Miners formed by the activists of the workers’ movement in the early 1990s. 194 See field materials: Kuzbasskoe soglashenie mezhdu Federatsiei profsoiuznykh organizatsii Kuzbassa, Kollegiei Administratsii Kemerovskoi oblasti i rabotodateliami Kemerovskoi oblasti na 2010‐2012 gody. See also Sokolov, “Profsoiuznyi vozhak atakuet ‘Nornikel’.‘ Aman Tuleev formiruet parlament.” 90 initiatives195 in the region in exchange for investment programs and regional government’s help in lobbying for companies’ interests at the federal level.196
Fourth, and most importantly, the effect on public opinion is amplified by a relatively large share of benefits coming in material or in‐kind rather than monetary forms. Material and in‐kind benefits usually target very specific needs of the vulnerable population groups and make social policy visible, tangible not only for the beneficiaries but also for people in their social networks. Examples of such benefits include:197
‐ sets of food items (vegetables, grains, flour, sugar, etc.),
‐ coal for heating houses,
‐ isolating window packages and landline phones for pensioners,
‐ textbooks for schoolchildren,
‐ kits for newborns,
‐ public transportation for pregnant women outside of large cities to regional perinatal
medical centers,198
‐ public transportation for pensioners to their “dachas”199 in the summer period,
195 For example, in 2005 the regional parliament changed the budget in such a way that extra money paid by the big businesses would be used to pay for free public transportation for the poor (Lavrenkov, Igor Nikolaevich. “Kuzbasskie oligarkhi zaplatiat za besplatnyi proezd.”) 196 Shipachev et al., Mery sotsial’noi podderzhki zhitelei Kemerovskoi oblasti: sbornik informatsionnykh materialov. According to this source, in 2007 only coal mining companies have spent more than 3 billion rubles on social projects in the region, which was about a third of the regional budget expenditures on social security that year. This number, though, should be taken with a grain of salt since it is not clear what exactly was included in this sum. The source mentions construction of subsidized housing, but does not elaborate whether the sum includes only subsidies or the cost of the whole project. 197 See sources listed in Footnote 189 for details. 198 Akimova, “Proezd ostanetsia besplatnym.” 199 Gorkunov, “Pensionnyi proezdnoi.” Dachas are small plots of land outside of the city which urbanites use to build summer houses and grow produce. 91
‐ plots of land and seeds to grow vegetables for the unemployed during the economic
crisis,200
‐ target cash benefit for buying a cow and hay for rural families with three and more
children,201
‐ packages to local sanatoria, etc.
Like in many other regions, Kemerovo region provides a number of targeted cash subsidies for the poor to pay for housing, utilities, daycare, and children’s educational activities, but even these benefits are sometimes constructed in a way that intends to make them as tangible as possible. For example, in 2007, families with three and more children and income below subsistence level received
“bread subsidy”, which was 0.8 rubles ($0.032) a day per child.202 Instead of raising by about $1 the child allowance that such families received anyway ($6‐12 a month), Kemerovo regional government went for a very specific tiny benefit that communicated an important symbolic message: the governor cares that even the poorest people have enough bread on the table.
Analysis of regional budget spending on benefits for vulnerable social groups confirms that
Kemerovo region has been reluctant to give up in‐kind benefits. This reluctance contributed to the overall increase of benefit expenditures since 2005 when monetization of in‐kind benefits was initiated at the federal level (see Figure 10 and Figure 11). The share of in‐kind benefits in Kemerovo was particularly high in 2005 – the first year when official statistics began to distinguish in‐kind and monetary benefits. Given qualitative historical data about social policies in the region, this share was likely to be just as high in the late 1990s – early 2000s. While other regions, which had a smaller share of in‐kind benefits in 2005 to start with, have been gradually converting them to cash payments, Kemerovo
200 Vasil’eva, “Sazhaem kartoshku i vyrashchivaem krolikov.” 201 “Glavnoe ne lenit’sia.” 202 Fedorova, I.F. and Administratsiia g. Kemerovo, eds. Moi gorod – moia sem’ia: informatsionnyi sbornik, 26. 92 region clearly lagged behind (Figure 12). It used cash form for new benefits but was not willing to convert the existing ones.
2000 Russian Federation 1500
Siberian Federal rubles 1000 District
500 Kemerovo Region
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Figure 10. Regional budget expenditures on benefits for vulnerable population groups, per capita, 2005 prices
2500
2000
1500
Cash
rubles 1000 transfers In‐kind 500 benefits
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Figure 11. Kemerovo region budget expenditures on benefits for vulnerable population groups, per capita, 2005 prices
93
1.00 0.90 Russian 0.80 Federation 0.70 0.60 Siberian 0.50 Federal 0.40 District 0.30 Kemerovo 0.20 Region 0.10 0.00 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Figure 12. Share of in‐kind benefits in all benefits for vulnerable population groups
A tangible message of governor’s care can be traced not only in the benefits’ profile but also in various institutional environments. For example, during my fieldwork in the region, I observed the
Governor’s Tea Room in the central hallway of the regional public library – a table with water heater, cups, tea bags, sugar, pretzels, cookies, and a big sign that reads: “Dear fellow countrymen,203 you are invited to the Governor’s Tea Room. We wish you a pleasant tea time and good Siberian health. With best wishes, Kemerovo region Governor A.G. Tuleev” (Figure 13). Later I learned that the money necessary to set up and maintain this tea room came from the library budget, not from any special appropriation from Tuleev personally.204 Judging from the notes that library visitors leave in the notebook on this table, the effect of these small expenditure has been exactly as intended. The visitors write, sometimes in rhyme:
“I thank you for a cup of tea, and for all your spiritual light, for sugar, pretzels, and cookies,
203 Zemliaki in Russian. 204 Interview Kem‐03. 94 which are the tastiest ones. 23.01.2014 A guest from Novosibirsk region [signature]
It feels so good to have hot tea with pretzels coming in with heavy bags from freezing cold outside. Thank you so much! [signature]
Thank you very much! As people say, a little thing, but feels so good! Really appreciate the attention to the people! 25.01.2014 Sukov E.L.
Thanks for the attention to the people from the governor of Kemerovo region A.G. Tuleev. I wish you health and luck. 28.01.2014 [signature]
It is ‐28C outside, and here is hot tea with cookies! Thank you! 30.01.2014 [signature]
Aman Gumirovich! Thank you. It was such a pleasure to have tea in the Governor’s Tea Room in such freezing cold. 30.01.2014 With regards, [signature]
Thank you, Aman Gumirovich! For your kindness to those who love reading. Having a cup of hot tea after coming in from the cold feels like paradise! 04.02.2014 Distinguished culture worker of the Russian Federation
Thanks to A.G. Tuleev for the initiative. Feels good to have tea and just sit at this table. Honored library visitor, Abazhurova N.K.
My dear, beloved A.G. Tuleev! Thank you for your support, for your care about the people! I love, respect, and appreciate you very much. [signature] 95
Figure 13. Governor’s Tea Room in Kemerovo regional library, March 2014. (Author’s photo.) 96
It feels so good to have a cup of hot tea on a cold day. I am a pensioner, just came from the village Leningradskii. What a pleasant surprise! Thank you so much for your attention and care! Good health to everyone! Thank you!!! 17.03.2014 [signature]”
Support for Tuleev among the population My anecdotal observations during fieldwork205 and the polling data206 show that Tuleev’s support among the population has been very high. Figure 14 shows that in February 2011, Tuleev was clearly the most popular governor in Russia The closest competitor, the governor of Bashkortostan
Republic, had an approval index 22 percentage points lower than Tuleev’s.
The political history of Kemerovo region, though, should warn both politicians and researchers from taking such support for granted. As Figure 15 shows, Tuleev’s approval has been uneven across social groups, and the configuration of his support base has not changed much since his early days as a politician. He is still extremely popular among the pensioners and women and much less so among industrial workers and men.
205 Library staff who deal a lot with pensioners coming in for classes and hobby clubs told me that Kemerovo pensioners’ love to Tuleev is similar to the feelings of many Soviet people about Brezhnev: they associate stability and security of their lives with Tuleev personally and sincerely fear what will happen after his departure. I have also heard not once from people in Kemerovo that they got really lucky with the governor, or something along these lines. 206 Regionally representative polling data in Russia are rarely available for researchers. The only polling company known to conduct surveys large enough to provide region‐specific data is FOM (Public Opinion Foundation). Graphs in this section are based on their poll in February 2011, which was the only one available to me. 97
80%
Kemerovo 60% region
40%
20%
0%
‐20%
‐40%
‐60%
Figure 14. Approval index207 of Russian regional governors, February 2011208
100 80 80
60 60 % 40 27
20
0 Population average Qualified male workers Non‐working female (N=801) (N=97) pensioners (N=123)
Figure 15. Tuleev’s approval index, February 2011209
207 Approval index in this and the next graphs is the difference between the number of people who evaluate governor’s work as good and the number of those who evaluate it as poor. 208 Survey data from the Public Opinion Foundation. The sample size in each region varied from 500 to 801. The largest standard error is 3.7%; the largest confidence interval at α=0.05 is [index value]±7.3%. Standard error for Kemerovo region is 2.5%, confidence interval at α=0.05 is 54.9% to 64.5%. 98
100
80
57 60 47 48 % 45 38 37 40 Nationwide (N=54,338) Kemerovo region (N=801) 20
0 Population Qualified male Non‐working average workers female pensioners
Figure 16. Percentage of people who report encountering situations inducing desire to participate in protests, February 2011
100
80
60
% Nationwide (N=54,338) 40 24 30 31 Kemerovo region (N=801) 21 20 14 9
0 Population Qualified male Non‐working average workers female pensioners
Figure 17. Percentage of people who say they may personally participate in protests, February 2011
209 “Qualified male workers” is the category comprised of male respondents with any level of professional education (primary professional, secondary professional, etc.), who identified as “worker” (“rabochii”) in the question about current occupation. “Non‐working female pensioners” is the category comprised of female respondents, age 56 and older, who identify as “non‐working pensioner” in the question about current occupation. 99
Despite Tuleev’s efforts to address the most urgent needs of the poorest population groups, the share of people in Kemerovo region who report encountering situations inducing desire to protest is not lower than in Russia on average, and among qualified male workers, it may even be higher (see Figure
16). The number of qualified male workers that envision themselves participating in a protest is no smaller in Kemerovo region compared to national average (see Figure 17).
Although these protest moods might not have been directed against Tuleev in all cases, his political experience of the late 1980s and early 1990s must have taught him that high approval ratings may well precede the collapse of the system. Losing touch with society and the ability to track and respond to hidden discontent is a problem that many autocrats face. Redistribution of material resources and propaganda cannot address this need, but the social public sector organizations can.
Along with the populist social security agenda and high propaganda efficiency of social policy, Tuleev has been actively supporting and developing various organizational networks which protected him against hidden social threats but also turned out to be useful in the new reality of a hybrid political regime in
Russia.
100
Chapter 4. Community organizations in Kemerovo region
Kemerovo region is the champion among other Russian regions not only in being socially‐ oriented and supporting its governor in high numbers but also in the scope and cohesion of social public sector organizations. The extent of their development makes sense when we think about the political history of the region and the political biography of Aman Tuleev. Having witnessed the birth and development of the workers’ movement in Kuzbass and having dealt with the workers as a politician,
Tuleev apparently learned that two things were important to prevent mass protests. First, people’s basic subsistence needs should be satisfied before they turn into the basis for opposition consolidation; second, population’s self‐organization should be closely controlled because social movements quickly turn from subsistence demands to political ones.
Tuleev’s social policy that has mostly targeted the poorest has helped to reduce the number of potential protest triggers. However, any policy is a reactive tool, it can only satisfy the needs that have been identified. Prevention of protests requires an organizational infrastructure that would constantly monitor people’s lives and help recognize the nascent problems. Conveniently, if such infrastructure has a wide scope and is controlled by the ruler, it also fills the public space that could otherwise be occupied by grassroots structures of civil society, further reducing the threat of emergence of a social movement.
This chapter will address the history and political functions of the two largest and densest organizational networks in Kemerovo region – pensioners’ organizations called the Veterans’ Councils and residential committees and community centers in the city of Kemerovo. The Veterans’ Councils is an example of a mighty social movement that was successfully hijacked and effectively converted into a part of the state apparatus. Community centers and residential committees are an example of a similar infrastructure created anew from above using a Soviet template. These centers have been a part of the 101 state from the very beginning but also enjoyed the advantage of deploying an army of residential committees’ volunteers reducing the cost of the whole endeavor.
The Veterans’ Councils and community centers have been the most vivid example of organizational structures on the border between the state and society that have helped Tuleev stay in power. They, however, are not unique in this capacity. He has also used labor unions, women’s organizations, student labor squads, orthodox church, and organizations for people with disabilities, not to mention all the organizations that are formally part of the social public sector (e.g. schools, social services). All these organizations are embedded in everyday life, enjoy population’s trust, and function as a part of the state apparatus while being heavily involved in maintaining the current political regime.
The history of relationships of Aman Tuleev with the Veterans’ Councils and community centers shows that these organizational networks were deliberately created or developed to help Tuleev handle mass politics in the region. While prevention of protests and electoral mobilization were likely the initial motives driving this relationship, later these organizational networks became convenient tools of social control in the situation of low political competition.
Pensioners’ organizations in Kemerovo region
A dense network of pensioners’ organizations is not unique for Kemerovo. The so‐called
“Veterans’ Councils” are present in all Russian regions, although the activity level of these organizations varies a lot. Understanding their role in politics requires a look into their history, which determined a number of paradoxes embedded in their structure and their relationships with the political regime. 102
A short history of veterans’ (pensioners’) organizations in the Soviet Union and post‐
Soviet Russia
The Russian Veterans’ Councils originated from the social movement of World War II veterans in the USSR, which emerged right after their demobilization in the late 1940s.210 The key characteristic of this large group that shaped its political agenda was a strong sense of entitlement: veterans shared a conviction that their battlefield sacrifice for their country and communities earned them a right to a special treatment after the war. Veterans vigorously defended their entitlements after a number of privileges established during the war were abolished in 1947 for economic reasons. They voiced their demands through letters and personal visits to the state and party structures, and in the late 1970s, the state reluctantly yielded to some of these requests.211
Veterans struggled not only for the recognition as a separate privilege group but also for having an organization of their own. The Soviet government stymied their efforts for decades, but could not eliminate the grassroots movement. Veterans kept gathering to celebrate the Victory Day, organized clubs and assistance committees by museums, Komsomol cells, or local military enlistment offices, where they worked to preserve the memory of the war and to advocate for their economic needs.212
Although the economic demands of veterans have always been resisted by the Soviet government, it actually needed the support of veterans for propaganda work and constantly struggled to channel the activities of veterans’ organizations in this direction. The primary mission of the Soviet
Committee of War Veterans created in 1956 was exactly that – international and domestic propaganda
210 For a comprehensive source on the veterans’ movement in the USSR see Edele, Soviet Veterans of the Second World War. This section largely relies on the information from this book. 211 Ibid., chap. 8. 212 Ibid., chap. 7. 103 work.213 Veterans across the country, though, interpreted its creation as the recognition of their demands and its mission as advocacy for the veterans’ needs. They not only flooded it with complaints about their everyday issues but also increasingly demanded to create the local organizational infrastructure for the committee across the country.214
The development of veterans’ organizations in the decades that followed reflected this tension between the Soviet regime goals and societal demands: veterans were needed by the Soviet regime for propaganda purposes, but any political organization independent from the party‐state would threaten the political monopoly of the regime. The Soviet government allowed the creation of limited organizational infrastructure and then scaled it back several times before Mikhail Gorbachev finally allowed the institutionalization of the veterans’ movement at the national level in 1986. It was only then that all the diverse organizational forms that existed at the local level were somewhat standardized and the hierarchical structure of the Veterans’ Councils from the national to the local level was formed. By
January 1991, it consisted of more than 180 regional‐level units, about 5,000 municipal‐level ones, and about 180,000 local organizations.215
The sense of entitlement, of earned privilege that initially united the veterans continued to give a meaning to the organizational name “the Veterans’ Council”, although since the late 1980s this name has become increasingly misleading. When the national veterans’ organization was created in 1986, it united war veterans with the so‐called labor veterans (people who devoted a large part of their career –
10‐15 years – to a particular occupation or enterprise)216 and labor pensioners in general. The official title of the nationwide veterans’ organization created in 1986 reads as “The National Public Organization
213 Ibid., 161–64. 214 Ibid., 164–74. 215 Ibid., 183. 216 The official title of a labor veteran was a form of moral encouragement in the Soviet Union. Starting in 1995, a Russian federal law “On Veterans” established a number of in‐kind benefits for labor veterans. 104 of Veterans (Pensioners) of War, Labor, Army and Law Enforcement Agencies”, which includes labor pensioners in its scope. Nowadays the activities of the Veterans’ Councils do not distinguish between the pensioners, regardless of their war or labor veteran status.217 The Veterans’ Councils have essentially become the organizations for all pensioners united by the sense of earned retirement after a life‐long service to the country. As the actual WWII veterans have been passing away, the organization has been successfully sustained by the new retirees and the mission of advocating for the needs of the older generation.
The sense of entitlement and the mission of advocacy for the needs of the older generations are the important characteristics of pensioners’ organizations218 that derive from their history and shape their role in contemporary Russian politics.219 These organizations represent the constituency consisting of about 30 million retirees,220 whose entitlement sentiment, although not as strong as that of WWII veterans, is still very much present in their political statements and public discussions. A large number of these retirees are core supporters of the Communist Party, but this support is driven primarily by
217 See Interview Altai‐15. 218 I am talking here only about the the Veterans’ Councils affiliated with the “The National Public Organization of Veterans (Pensioners) of War, Labor, Army and Law Enforcement Agencies,” which is the largest pensioners’ organization in Russia. Although it is the largest, it is not the only one. The main competitor organization is the Pensioners’ Union, which was created in 1994, almost ceased to exist in the following years, and was revived in 2006. This organization, being formally a civil society one, functions in most regions as a branch of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation: the heads of the regional branches of the Pensioners’ Union are frequently current employees of the Pension Fund and their offices are usually situated in the Pensions Fund building (the list of regional branches of the Pensioners’ Union can be found at http://www.rospensioner.ru/regions; simple Internet search confirms that many heads of the regional branches currently work in the Pensions Fund; see also Interview Altai‐16). 219 A lot of information about the activities of the post‐Soviet Veterans’ Councils and public discussions in these organizations has been obtained from the publications in the national newspaper Veteran, Kemerovo regional newspaper Zemliaki, and other media sources. The structured list of these sources is available as Appendix 5. I will give references to particular sources from this list as appropriate, but more general statements deriving from this body of publications will be made only with a reference to the list as a whole. 220 30 million is the approximate number of pensioners in Russia in the 2000s. The the Veterans’ Councils claim all of them as members of the organization, granting membership automatically to all retirees. This number, therefore, should be treated as an estimate of the constituency size rather than the number of active members. 105 socioeconomic agenda and the entitlement sentiment rather than communist ideology. The Veterans’
Council has remained an organization independent from political parties and open to collaboration with other political forces that would respond to its demands.221
The organizational structure of the Veterans’ Councils is a hybrid of a social movement and a party: it has a developed hierarchy of branches from the national to the local level with about 2.5 million activists,222 but it would be a mistake to think of it as a chain of top‐down command. Although the activists in the local Veterans’ Councils look up at the regional and national ones for guidance, they expect the upper levels of the organization to serve as advocates for the common needs of the elderly.
Their support of the organizational units above them stems not from formal subordination, but from their understanding of the political utility of a unified stance on policy issues.
The lack of leverage of the national organization over its branches creates the situation when the regional level organizations become important political players. It is frequently at this level that the relationship between the Veterans’ Councils and the government, including the material resources available for the Councils, is negotiated. While in some regions governments limit their contacts with the
Veterans’ Councils to the good old propaganda work, now called “patriotic education,” and targeted help for the neediest pensioners, in other regions, including Kemerovo, governments work with the pensioners’ organizations more systematically in order to use their full political potential.
221 For example, in one of my case studies, the Republic of Altai, the head of the municipal Veterans’ Council attempted to declare official support of the Veterans’ Council for the National People’s Front – a movement started by Vladimir Putin in 2011 to revitalize the United Russia Party that was losing popularity. The members of the Council, though, did not support this initiative arguing that the veterans might be willing to support different political parties, and the Veterans’ Council as an organization should treat everyone equally regardless of political orientation (Interview Altai‐15). 222 “Osnova uspekha – v pervichnykh organizatsiiakh!” 106
The history of Tuleev’s relationship with the Veterans’ Councils in Kemerovo
Tuleev’s relationship with the Veterans’ Councils spans almost three decades. In the late 1980s and 1990s, as he developed his political agenda focused on social security, the Veterans’ Councils frequently supported Tuleev because of this leftist agenda aligned with that of the Communist Party.
Being the head of the regional parliament, Tuleev did not have much control over the region’s finances, and the material resources he could provide for the Veterans’ Councils were limited. Once he became the governor in 1997, he had more room for maneuver and managed to steer the Veterans’ Councils in the region away from the Communist Party and towards supporting him personally. In 2003 he helped his deputy, Nina Nevorotova, to become the head of the regional Veterans’ Council, essentially monopolizing the control over the organization from that point on.
Tuleev and the veterans against the “democrats” in the 1990s
In the political spectrum of the late Soviet Union – early post‐Soviet Russia, both Tuleev and the
Veterans’ Councils appeared to occupy the far left side of the spectrum, which supported the
Communist Party and opposed the market‐oriented “democrats”. Their relationship dates back to at least April 1989, when the Presidium of the regional Veterans’ Council nominated Tuleev as a deputy secretary of the regional Communist Party Committee.223 In the next few years, when Tuleev was the head of the regional parliament, he actively developed his alliance with the Veterans’ Councils by advocating for various veterans’ privileges and developing organizational and symbolic connections with them.
223 Nevorotova, Kuchnikova, and Togulev, Otdat’ svoi opyt liudiam...”, 2:28. 107
For example, in early 1991 the regional Veterans’ Council sends Tuleev a letter asking to keep veterans’ privileges for the scarce food supplies, a concern that Tuleev has raised earlier himself.224 In subsequent years, the veterans used Tuleev’s help to raise many more issues related to the benefits for veterans and pensioners.225 Tuleev, in his turn, used the demands of the veterans to establish his own reputation as a defender of the interests of the elderly and other vulnerable groups. In 1992, he created a special commission on social security in the regional parliament, vocally opposing the actions of the current Kemerovo governor and the former workers’ movement leader Mikhail Kisliuk.226 The message that Tuleev was sending to the pensioners and the general public was that he was an even more principled advocate for them than their own organizations. Not only did he raise social security issues in the regional parliament, but he also criticized the Veterans’ Council and the labor unions for political weakness and willingness to compromise with the regional administration.227 In 1994, Tuleev created the Council of the Elders under the auspices of the regional parliament,228 which could not be an alternative to the Veterans’ Councils because of the latter’s sheer size, but was still an organizational unit targeting the same constituency (the pensioners) and loyal personally to Tuleev. Simultaneously,
Tuleev developed connections with the Veterans’ Councils by attending their conventions,229 participating in commemorative events related to the Great Patriotic War (World War II),230 and attending to the veterans’ demands for public symbolic recognition of their special status.231
224 Ibid., 2:149–51. 225 Ibid., 3:25–32. 226 Ibid., 3:72. 227 Ibid., 5:32–33. 228 Ibid., 5:9, 34–35. 229 Ibid., 2:91; Ibid., 6:50–51, 97. 230 Ibid., 3:33; Ibid., 6:7–8, 35. 231 Ibid., 5:29. 108
During various elections in the 1990s, the Veterans’ Councils of Kemerovo region frequently supported Tuleev in their public statements and provided him with their organizational resources. In
1991 the regional Veterans’ Council supported Tuleev’s bid for the President of RSFSR,232 recommended that the municipal Veterans’ Councils agitate in favor of pensioners voting for Tuleev,233 and later issued a public statement protesting against hounding and defamation of Tuleev by the workers’ committees and the media.234 Similar support was provided for Tuleev at the 1993 election to the Council of
Federation (the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament)235 and the 1994 election to the regional parliament.236
Veterans’ Councils’ support, however, was not always unified and unequivocal. In 1995‐1996 the opposition between the regional parliament headed by Tuleev and the regional government headed by
Kisliuk reached its peak237 and created cleavages in the veterans’ community. In 1995 the Veterans’
Councils supported Tuleev’s political bloc “Narodovlastie” (“People’s power”)238 at the regional level.
They took a very active part in both regional and federal parliamentary elections by nominating their own candidates, organizing town halls and agitation (for their candidates or the ones they support), collecting signatures, working in electoral commissions of different levels as their members and observers.239 In 1996, though, the veterans’ leadership split regarding the presidential election: while
232 Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the predecessor of contemporary Russia. 233 Ibid., 2:147–48. 234 Ibid., 2:151–53. 235 Ibid., 4:20–22. 236 Ibid., 5:9, 109. 237 Ibid., 6:6, 27. 238 Ibid., 6:5. It is important to note, though, that general support for Tuleev’s bloc at this time did not mean automatic support of anyone associated with Tuleev. T.G. Avaliani, a communist deputy in the 1996‐1999 Duma (the lower chamber of the Russian parliament) from Kemerovo, tells how Tuleev unsuccessfully tried to get the Veteran’s Councils to support a candidate from the Agrarian Party instead of communist Avaliani at the 1995 federal parliamentary election (see Avaliani, “Naglost’ pravit bal.”). 239 Ibid., 6:97–119. 109 most members of the Presidium supported Tuleev’s presidency bid240 and even engaged the lower level the Veterans’ Councils to help collect signatures for him,241 the deputy chair of the regional Veteran’s
Council, V.I. Mil’sitov, called for support of Boris Yeltsin in the presidential race.242 Later that year
Kemerovo governor Kisliuk, an ally of Yeltsin and a “democrat”, attempted to create alternative veterans’ organizations in the region243 while hindering access of existing Veterans’ Council to resources.244 As a reaction to that, the head of one of the municipal Veteran’s Councils in the region called for Kisliuk’s resignation and asked Tuleev to run for Kemerovo governor.245 Despite the cleavage in the organization, in the 1990s the Veterans’ Councils remained primarily Tuleev’s allies while maintaining their own political independence.
Tuleev’s takeover of the Veterans’ Councils in 2003
As I have already mentioned in the previous chapter, within two years after Tuleev became the governor of Kemerovo region, he began to break away from the Communist Party. He called to support
Putin’s party Edinstvo (Unity) at the 1999 parliamentary election while running himself as a Communist and announced this call at the veterans’ convention (“plenum”).246 The way he tried to resolve this apparent contradiction was by accusing the Communist Party leadership of the lack of real progress during the previous years when they controlled the parliament, and in establishing privileges for themselves while forgetting about the ordinary people, including veterans. He also criticized their lack of
240 Ibid., 7:58. 241 Ibid., 7:6. 242 Ibid., 7:96. 243 Ibid., 7:98–100. 244 Ibid., 7:85–91. 245 Ibid., 7:224–25. 246 Starozhilov, “Kuzbass pril’nul k ‘Medvediu’.” 110 desire to work with non‐communists and stressed the need for professionals in the government rather than people of particular political orientation.247
This move by Tuleev was risky since a lot of core supporters of Tuleev among pensioners were also supporters of the Communist Party, but the risk was justified. It allowed Tuleev to test the loyalty of his supporters and alienate those who leaned more towards the communists than towards him.
Although many veterans supported Tuleev’s turn,248 the opposition was also significant. The tension between the regional government and the part of Veterans’ Council leadership that did not support
Tuleev’s reorientation began to build up. The Veteran’s Council’s head, Vladislav Galkin, publicly spoke up against Putin and United Russia, which threatened Tuleev’s relationships with Moscow, and Tuleev suggested behind the scenes that Galkin should consider leaving his position as the head of the regional
Veterans’ Council. In 2003 Galkin resigned citing health reasons and the inability to handle the conflict with the regional government.249
After Galkin’s resignation, the presidium of the regional Veterans’ Council elected Nina
Nevorotova, Tuleev’s former deputy on social policy issues who had just turned pension age, as the head of the organization. This change of leadership effectively marked Tuleev’s takeover of the regional
Veterans’ Council since Nevorotova was Tuleev’s informal appointee. She started her career as a schoolteacher; later she became a school principal and then worked as the head of the municipal education department in the city of Kemerovo, on the team of Vladimir Makarov, a long‐term Kemerovo mayor and a close ally of Tuleev. When Tuleev became the governor, he appointed Nevorotova as his deputy overseeing social policy issues. It was one of the key positions in the late 1990s given the dire state of the Russian economy and a wave of public protests at the time. Nevorotova’s move from the
247 Ivanov, “Aman Tuleev: ‘Naberu bol’she golosov – Kuzbassu budet legche zhit’ ’.” 248 Starozhilov, “Kuzbass pril’nul k ‘Medvediu’.” 249 Sorokin, “Kommunisty ne stanut ugozhdat’ vlastiam.” 111 governor’s deputy to the head of the Veterans’ Council did not mean a downgrade for her; rather, she, as an experienced and reliable political cadre, was called to cope with an independent and therefore potentially dangerous organization and to turn its power to Tuleev’s benefit. She has been heading the
Veterans’ Council since 2003 while continuing her affiliation with the regional government as the governor’s advisor on social policy.250
The expansion of the Veterans’ Councils in Kemerovo region after 2003
Once Nevorotova took over the Veterans’ Council, she began to expand the organizational network and strengthen its connection to the masses of pensioners. She increased the number of primary organizations by more than 20% from 2005 to 2009 (1491 to 1827)251 and created additional
Veterans’ Councils by occupation, paying particular attention to the retirees of the coal mining industry.
Their regional‐level Veterans’ Council was created in 2006, and it included the miners retired from the enterprises that went out of business.252 By 2014, the main regional veterans’ organization had 13
Veterans’ Councils by occupation with their own primary organizations and 34 municipal‐level Councils that united 1,892 of their “primary cells”. All the major Councils had offices equipped with phones and computers.253 About 10,000 activists were involved in these organizations throughout the region (see
Figure 18).
For the heads of primary organizations, Nevorotova developed a special training system. During group workshops and individual interviews, they were taught how to handle pensioners’ issues in their
250 See the list of sources in Appendix 5. 251 “V pole zreniia – 800 tysiach sudeb;” “Glavnoe vnimanie pervichkam.” 252 Churpita, “Byvshikh shakhterov ne byvaet;” Ermakova, “Pregrady na puti pervoprokhodtsev.” Including the miners retired from the enterprises that ceased to exist was important because they were the people who would otherwise fall through the cracks. Currently existing enterprises, frequently under pressure from Tuleev, provided their retirees with support and benefits, but if the enterprise did not exist anymore the pensioners were left without this kind of support. Since quite a few coal mines in Kemerovo region went bankrupt in the 1990s, the number of such people was significant. 253 Startsev, “Stupen’ka v zavtra.” 112 territory, mostly regarding material and housing conditions and health care. They met with the representatives of the Pension Fund and local social security departments who explained to them the recent legislative changes regarding various benefits and gave them a package of materials to use when explaining the new policies to the pensioners in their primary organizations.254
Besides working with the issues that pensioners faced, the primary organizations received instructions on organizing paperwork and regular reporting together with bureaucratic forms developed specifically for them. This paperwork included individual records of all pensioners regarding their former employer, special needs, involvement with veterans’ organizations, participation in events and competitions, presents and perks they may have received, etc. Nevorotova also worked with local police stations to arrange desks and information boards for the local Veterans’ Councils inside the stations. An information board displayed the names of the activists, the work plan of the organization, the hours when pensioners could come and talk about their issues, and the relevant official documents. The heads of primary organizations were also trained in documenting their meetings and putting together standard reports. Every year the regional Veterans’ Council has been giving awards to the best primary organizations in order to encourage the development of a smoothly functioning system that allows for an easy reach of every single pensioner in the region.255
254 “Tsentr raboty – pervichki.”; Ermakova, “Kogda delo ladinsia.” 255 “Tsentr raboty – pervichki.”; Mikel’son, “Znat’ kazhdogo – po pasportu;” Ermakova, “O chem skazhut ‘nezabudki’;” Fedorova, “Initsiativy, prodiktovannye zhizn’iu.” 113
Presidium (23 members)
Plenum (92 members)
Conference (≈ 350 delegates elected based on quotas)
10,000 activists
34 territorial organizations 13 organizations (one in each municipality; by occupation 56 primary organizations (miners, teachers, doctors, on average in each) law enforcement officers, firefighters, etc.)
Press Centers 1,892 primary Primary organizations (newspaper "Zemliaki territorial at enterprises, public Kuzbassa", organizations institutions, government collaboraton with the (383 members on agencies, etc. national pensioners' average in each) newspaper "Veteran")
Figure 18. Structure of the main pensioners’ organization of Kemerovo region, March 2014256
256 Interview Kem‐07; “Tochki prilozheniia usilii;” “Glavnoe vnimanie pervichkam.” 114
While the heads of primary organizations have been mostly volunteers from among the retirees, they have often been given various perks and signs of recognition for their service, e.g. packages to local sanatoria, priority medical check‐ups, a thank you letter or a medal from the regional or municipal government, etc. Some heads of occupational veterans’ organizations, which existed under the auspices of an enterprise or establishment, have received a monthly salary from their former employers. Striving to strengthen the organization and guarantee its uninterrupted functioning, Nevorotova also worked with primary organizations to encourage them to reach out to the recent, younger retirees and involve them in the organizations’ activities in order to have a trained reserve of cadres that can take over the organization.257
To ensure better communication between the different levels of the organization and in particular a better familiarity of the regional Veterans’ Council with the local ones, Nevorotova actively traveled across the region258 and quickly introduced a practice of holding veterans’ conventions
(“plenums”) in different municipalities. These conventions were attended not only by pensioners but also by local authorities and representatives of public sector organizations who participated in discussions of pensioners’ problems and development of their solutions.259 Right after taking over the organization in 2003, Nevorotova also introduced a regional program of no interest loans for pensioners260 which were given out by the regional Veterans’ Council members during their visits to different municipalities.261 As one of the members of the regional Veterans’ Council told me, they do not simply give out the money to the pensioners – they always talk to each of them during the process,
257 “Tsentr raboty – pervichki.”; Belousova, “Vpisany v zolotuiu letopis’ goroda.” 258 Nevorotova, “I s bedoi i s radost’iu idut k nam.” 259 Bal’zanova, “Khoroshikh del nemalo;” Ermakova, “Vmeste v dobryi put’!”; “Nina Pavlovna Nevorotova.” 260 The loans up to two monthly pensions were given for a year with repayments made through the Pension Fund. 261 Bal’zanova, “Khoroshikh del nemalo;” Miliutina, “Prednaznachenie – zashchishchat’;” “Nina Pavlovna Nevorotova.” 115 listen to their complaints, and provide information about the activities of the Veterans’ Council that can help them.262
Another important development that happened under Nevorotova leadership was a significant expansion of the “media complex”.263 The regional Veteran’s Council had had its own newspaper
“Zemliaki”264 since 1990. At different points in time, it was funded by the Communist Party,265 the regional administration under Mikhail Kisliuk,266 and personally Tuleev.267 The newspaper had been disseminated through the lower‐level Veterans’ Councils which subscribed themselves and recruited pensioners to subscribe.268 In addition to this newspaper, Nevorotova created press centers in all 34 municipal‐level Veterans’ Councils. Activists in those press centers have worked closely with the local media and with the regional veterans’ newspaper “Zemliaki”. They have reported on pensioners’ issues and the policies of the regional government that address them, written about local history, and participated in “patriotic” education. They have also gathered in Kemerovo to share their experiences and report on the work completed.269
Finally, through Nevorotova, Tuleev took control not only over the regional Veterans’ Council but also over the regional branches of alternative national organizations and political parties that could potentially attract dissenters from among the pensioners. The regional branches of Russian Pensioners’
Union and Russian Pensioners’ Party were established in Kemerovo in 2006, and Nevorotova became
262 Interview Kem‐07. 263 “Golos starshego pokoleniia.” 264 An approximate translation is “fellow countrymen”, people from the same land. 265 Nevorotova, Kuchnikova, and Togulev, Otdat’ svoi opyt liudiam...”, 2:170–71; Ibid., 3:133. 266 Ibid., 5:7–8. 267 Ibid., 5:60. 268 Ibid., 3:136. 269 Miliutina, “Ni dnia bez strochki.” 116 the head of both of them.270 During the same year, Just Russia Party, which also attracts some supporters from among the pensioners, also created a regional branch in Kemerovo. Not surprisingly,
Nevorotova was put in charge of this organization too.271 As a member of the regional Veterans’ Council told me in an interview: “The policy in our region is such that all pensioners should be in one fist, so that they don’t disperse.”272
Community centers and residential committees in Kemerovo‐city
Another organizational network that works in close connection with the Veterans’ Councils is residential committees (TOSes)273 and community centers in the city of Kemerovo. If the Veterans’
Councils were a Soviet‐style social movement steered towards the regime’s goals, residential committees and community centers emerged as a result of a conscious effort to extend the reach of the state apparatus deeper into civil society. To do that, Tuleev and his ally, the long‐term mayor of
Kemerovo Vladimir Mikhailov,274 used a Soviet template of community organizing, which they successfully attuned to the new political needs.
A short history of community organizations in the Soviet Union and post‐Soviet Russia
Mobilized participation of citizens in public affairs was one of the key features of life in the
Soviet Union. Residential community organizations, along with job places and trade unions, were one of
270 Soiuz pensionerov Rossii; “V Kemerovskoi oblasti poiavilos’ regional’noe otdelenie ‘Rossiiskoi partii pensionerov’.” 271 Nevorotova and Ermakova, “Miloserdie natseleno v zavtra.” 272 Interview Kem‐07. 273 TOS stands for territorial’noe obshchestvennoe samoupravlenie (territorial public self‐governance). 274 The reason why the residential committees and community centers are present in such numbers only in the regional capital is probably related to the fact that Kemerovo’s long‐term mayor, Vladimir Mikhailov, has been Tuleev’s ally, while the mayors of another major city in the region, Novokuznetsk, have been in more complicated relationships with the governor. Mikhailov had been in office for over 26 years (1986‐2013), after which he retired citing health reasons. The long‐term horizon that he had together with Tuleev’s support have probably contributed to the successful development of the social public sector infrastructure in the city. 117 the frameworks within which such mobilization happened. These organizations were “by no means spontaneous or independent groups,” but rather “the creatures of the local authorities”275 who set up
“the legitimate frameworks of participation, determining their agenda and tone.”276
There were three kinds of residential self‐help organizations in the Soviet Union, whose realms frequently intersected: (1) neighborhood patrols and comrades’ courts concentrated on control and prevention of deviant behavior; (2) house, street, and neighborhood committees that mobilized people for various regime projects often centered around community affairs; and (3) volunteer councils and repair squads that supplemented social and community services provided by the state.277 Neighborhood committees could also “spawn sub‐organizations of a specialized nature”: women’s councils, lecturers’ groups, committees on juvenile affairs, etc., “drawing the web of organization over the entire community and anchoring it as firmly as possible in public institutions.”278 Technically, these organizations helped maintain safe and clean environment in the neighborhood, contributed to infrastructure projects, provided social and cultural services (e.g. day‐care for children, public library services, community events), and fulfilled some other state functions (e.g. maintenance of “passport regime” – keeping records on each person living in the neighborhood). In different locations and years,
5‐15% of the Soviet adult population was officially involved in these organizations.279
The purpose of the Soviet regime in creating such a dense network of community organizations was not so much to provide services, but to set up “grass‐roots frameworks capable of reaching,
275 Friedgut, Political Participation in the USSR, 238. On similar neighborhood organizations in other countries see Read, Roots of the State. 276 Friedgut, Political Participation in the USSR, 30. 277 Ibid., 242. 278 Ibid., 265. 279 Ibid., 244. 118 mobilizing, and controlling all citizens.”280 Although formally these organizations were volunteer ones, in fact, they were “essentially an extension of the state’s capacities.”281 They penetrated the community to make sure that “no violation of morals and rules goes unnoticed.”282 Since they controlled the fate of many citizens’ requests and complaints sent to the Soviet authorities, they were able to induce population’s compliance.283 Although the self‐help organizations supplemented the services provided by the state and accumulated reserve manpower that could be mobilized in crisis, their main function was to serve as “the means by which control is extended down to the level of every Soviet citizen in his home. From the Party, … through the soviets and their active … structured to reach into the community, and finally, through the community volunteers, channels of influence [were] opened and overlapping organizational frameworks created. It [was] in this tight interlacing of organizations that a great part of the volunteer organizations’ importance [lied].”284
The efforts of the Soviet government to blur the boundary between public and private285 lead to resistance in the form of merely formal participation in community organizations in many cases,286 which only began to change during perestroika. In 1988‐1989, when the channels for political discussions and regime criticism slightly opened, some urban communities, especially in Moscow, began to voice their grievances, mostly related to environmental and housing issues. They wrote complaints to state and party officials, collected petition signatures, and staged public protests.287 In an attempt to put these protests under control, the state officials suggested that their leaders form their own self‐
280 Ibid., 238. 281 Ibid., 288. 282 Ibid., 264. 283 Ibid., 266. 284 Ibid., 286. 285 Ibid., 239. 286 Ibid., 283. 287 Levchik, Komitety obshchestvennogo samoupravleniia v Rossii (1988‐1993 gg.), 33–37, 56–58. 119 governance structures (KOSM – komitet obshchestvennogo samoupravleniia, i.e. committee of public self‐governance), which would be able to negotiate people’s demands with the city government.288 In some cases, civil society activists also used existing community structures like residence committees to turn them from a regime mobilization tool to a body representing the community in negotiations with the state.289
Over the next few years of institutional turmoil in the country, Moscow KOSMs290 were the battlefield of civil activists and city officials, who quickly understood the threat that KOSMs posed to their power. Trying to establish control over KOSMs, city government initiated the creation of many of them from above, ending up with largely formal structures similar to Soviet residential committees.
Levchik estimates that about 30% of Moscow KOSMs in 1990‐1991 were real civil society structures that advocated for the interests of residents, about 50% of KOSMs were created from above and existed mostly on paper, and the rest of KOSMs were hard to classify since they possessed the qualities of both.291
The antagonistic tendencies of developing KOSMs from above and from below have continued through the 1990s when KOSMs spread beyond Moscow. After the 1991 law292 defined the legal status of KOSMs renaming them into TOSes, they began to emerge in other cities across Russia. When the
Soviet local governance structures (soviets) that oversaw TOSes were dismantled in 1993, many TOSes
288 Ibid., 36, 67, 74. 289 Ibid., 78. 290 After 1991, KOSMs emerged in other cities too, but their history is not as well documented. Also, Moscow clearly had many more KOSMs than any other city (Ibid., 7–17.). I do not have any reason to believe, though, that the development of Moscow KOSMs is significantly different from that in other cities. 291 Ibid., 83. 292 “Zakon o mestnom samoupravlenii v RSFSR N 1550.” 120 also ceased to exist.293 Those that were formal have lost their supervisors, while those that were real were frequently deemed unnecessary by their activists who either found a more suitable organizational form for their cause in the new political environment (e.g. a party or an NGO)294 or took advantage of the newly emerged opportunities in the private sector. In some locales, though, TOSes filled the vacuum left after the dissolution of soviets and actively supplied community representatives to local legislative bodies.295 Similar to Moscow, though, municipal officials in other cities quickly understood the threat to their power from independent self‐governance organizations and made an effort to limit their influence.296 In the mid‐1990s, municipalities started to include funding for TOSes into their budgets, gradually neutralizing the power of grassroots TOSes with the puppet ones, which served as an extension of the state.297
The development of residential committees and community centers in Kemerovo298
In Kemerovo, the creation of TOSes began in 1997, according to official sources.299 It was a top‐ down process in which municipal officers reached out to community members suggesting to create a committee that would work with the city government to communicate and resolve various issues.300
Since 1997, the development of self‐governance has always been present in city development plans with
293 Levchik, Komitety obshchestvennogo samoupravleniia v Rossii (1988‐1993 gg.), 6; Matveev, Vlast’ i obshchestvo v systeme mestnogo samoupravleniia Rossii v 1993‐2003 gg., 179. 294 Levchik, Komitety obshchestvennogo samoupravleniia v Rossii (1988‐1993 gg.), 97. 295 Matveev, Vlast’ i obshchestvo v systeme mestnogo samoupravleniia Rossii v 1993‐2003 gg., 179. 296 Ibid., 181–82. 297 Ibid., 182; Kokarev, Mestnye soobshchestva i mestnoe samoupravlenie, 87–89. 298 Appendix 6 lists the sources on residential committees and community centers in Kemerovo. I will cite particular sources when the information comes from only a few of them. For more general themes, though, refer to the list as a whole. 299 Totysh, “S pol’zoi i interesom;” “Itogi raboty s nasseleniem za 2016 g.” 300 Interview KEM‐13. In this interview, a TOS activist describes how municipal officials reached out to her and her neighbors suggesting to form a committee a few years ago. It is possible that some early TOSes in Kemerovo emerged from below, but a bulk of evidence suggests that the vast majority have been created from above. 121 a clear goal to increase the number of TOSes and TOS activists.301 By 2001, more than 7,000 people had been enlisted, but it seems that coordination of such a big number of volunteers became too burdensome for the city government and required additional mid‐level structures.
To facilitate interactions with TOSes and their communities, the city government came up with the idea of community centers, which were created using neighborhood police stations as an organizational base. In the city of Kemerovo, whose population in 2002 was 485,000 people,302 there were 49 of such police stations covering the territory of the city. Officers at these stations handled domestic conflicts, watched out for unsupervised children on the streets, made sure that the neighborhood was clean and its safety infrastructure was functioning properly.
In 2002 the city government named creation of community centers one of its major tasks for the nearest future,303 and by the end of 2006, all 49 community centers that are functioning now304 were in place.305 The literal translation of the Russian name of these community centers is “centers for working with the population”.306 The newly organized community centers used the physical infrastructure of police stations as a starting point with subsequent expansion, renovation, and hiring new personnel. If the area had apartment buildings and dorms, a community center could occupy several restructured apartments or dorm rooms on the ground floor. In some other cases, old buildings that used to be social infrastructure in the Soviet Union (for example, former movie theaters) were renovated to become
301 See, for example “Gorod: analiz, uspekhi, problem, perspectivy;” “Itogi raboty s nasseleniem za 2015 g.;” “Itogi raboty s nasseleniem za 2016 g.;” Administratsiia goroda Kemerovo. “Postanovlenie ot 16 sentiabria 2016 goda N 2382.” 302 Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik 2014. Table 4.14. 303 “Gorod: analiz, uspekhi, problem, perspectivy.” 304 Two centers were recently merged with other ones, so there are 47 of them at the moment. 305 Press‐sluzhba administratsii goroda, “Punkty stali tsentrami.” 306 In Russian: Центры по работе с населением. 122 community centers. In several cases, new buildings were constructed either specifically for community centers or in conjunction with other public organizations (e.g. a local public library).307
While the salary of community center inspectors and limited funding for operational expenses came from the city budget,308 the cost of renovation was frequently covered by local businesses. For example, a newspaper reports that while the cost of renovation of one of the old movie theaters
“Komsomolets” was 8.5 million rubles, the city government only paid 660 thousand. The report does not reveal who covered the rest, but the only conceivable option is that local businesses paid for the rest as well as for landscaping of the nearby territory.309 In another case, a local meat producing enterprise financed renovation of several dorm rooms where the center would be placed and purchased furniture and appliances for it.310 In 2009 one municipality in Kemerovo, which turned 65 years old, announced an initiative “A gift to the neighborhood” and managed to get donations from 500 businesses. More than
850 thousand rubles of those donations were used to buy equipment for three community centers, a few schools, and a local health center. More than 24 million rubles went to infrastructure renovations and landscaping.311 In addition to local businesses, the deputies of the city and regional parliaments have helped with their own funds to modernize and equip the centers.312 While the possibility of charity motives behind these donations should not be dismissed, the political climate in the region and the tight control of the regional government over businesses suggest that these donations were not entirely voluntary. Business owners were probably well aware of the possible sanctions in case they refused to
307 “… i mnogo radosti;” Loginova, “Shakhterskii krai goroda Kemerovo.” 308 Fefelova, “Gorod delitsia opytom.” 309 Press‐sluzhba administratsii goroda, “Tsentry est’, rabota budet.” 310 “Ravnykh net v rukopashnom boiu.” 311 “God iubileia.” 312 “K kemerovchanam – s otchetom.” 123 cooperate, which could include unplanned tax and safety audits with penalties, refusal of government contracts and so forth.
In 2006, after the formation of community center network was completed, the city government intensified the creation of TOSes. It issued a decree deliberating the procedures for TOSes, including a special registration certificate, IDs for their members, sample charters, and two volumes describing the best practices in the work of these organizations.313 This decree sped up the process of TOSes’ creation, and by the end of 2006, there were 6,366314 of them in the city (Figure 19). While it is not clear from available sources how the number of TOSes changed before 2006, we know that over ten years since then it only increased by about 22%. The likely reason for that is that the city was already saturated with
TOSes and unable to accommodate many more. Given that the population of Kemerovo in 2006 was 520 thousand people,315 it means that every TOS worked with 82 people on average. By 2016, every TOS worked with 71 people on average, showing that the number of TOSes was at its capacity for the city.
The number of listed activists, though, has continued to increase throughout the 2000s and 2010s: if in
2001 approximately every 70th person in the city was a TOS activist, by 2016 it was already one in 23 people.316
313 “TOS – samaia blizkaia vlast’.” 314 It is usually unclear how exactly the reported numbers were counted. My best guess is that these statistics summed up TOSes of different levels (say, a TOS in an apartment building and a TOS of the whole street where that apartment building is situated). Since I cannot clearly distinguish the upper‐level TOSes from the lower‐level ones and the upper‐level TOSes probably comprise only a small share of the total number of TOSes, I will treat all TOSes as lower‐level ones for my approximate calculations of society penetration further in this paragraph. 315 Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik 2007. Table 4.14. 316 Kemerovo population in 2002 was 485 thousand (data for 2001 are not available), and in 2016 it was 553 thousand (Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik 2016. Table 4.14.). 124
25000 23800 23154
20000 17363
15000 13130 11900
10000 7413 7411 7683 7760 7000 6366 6771
5000
0
Number of TOSes Number of TOS activists
Figure 19. Available statistics on the number of TOSes and TOS activists in Kemerovo city.317
317 Numbers taken from “Gorod: analiz, uspekhi, problem, perspectivy.”; Totysh, “S pol’zoi i interesom;” “TOS – samaia blizkaia vlast’;” “Kto, esli ne my?”; “Rabota s naseleniem;” “Itogi raboty s nasseleniem za 2016 g.” 125
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 Kemerovo Region Krasnodar Region Tver' Region Riazan Region Marii El Republic Buriatiia Republic Orlov Region Yaroslavl' Region Volgograd Region Arkhangel'sk Region Belgorod Region Tambov Region Tula Region Kursk Region Novgorod Region Irkutsk Region Voronezh Region Kaluga Region Ivanovo Region Novosibirsk Region Saratov Region Cheliabinsk Region Perm' Region Аstrakhan' Region Vladimir Region Lipetsk Region Komi Republic Ul'ianovsk Region Tiumen' Region Briansk Region Vologda Region Kaliningrad Region Omsk Region Kurgan Region St.Petersburg City Mordoviia Republic Pskov Region
Figure 20. Locally registered TOSes in Russian regions.318
318 The graph is based on the data from Spencer et al., “Regional Variation in Russian Local Self‐Governance Organizations.” 126
Such a number of TOSes and activists in Kemerovo is unprecedented. According to the data obtained by Sarah Busse Spencer and her colleagues, who collected information on the number of
TOSes in Russian regions, Kemerovo region is the absolute champion in the number of locally registered319 TOSes among the 37 regions that have at least one of them (see Figure 20). The closest competitor, Krasnodar region, has almost twice fewer TOSes. Moreover, all or almost all TOSes in
Kemerovo region are concentrated in the regional capital – Kemerovo city, which turns out to have the densest network of residential community organizations in Russia.
A network of Kemerovo community centers also stands out on the national scale, although no systematic data about community centers in other Russian cities exist so far.320 An Internet search brings up several stand‐alone organizations in other cities, which look similar to Kemerovo community centers, but cannot be compared to the network of 49 of them. In 2007, the municipal authorities in the city of
Perm, Perm Region, began creating a network of community centers,321 with 34 established by 2017.322
However, these centers are different from Kemerovo ones: they don’t have permanent staff and mostly provide space and material resources for TOSes and local NGOs.323 Only about 97 TOSes work in Perm,324
319 TOSes can also register with the Ministry of Justice rather than the city government to obtain the status of a legal entity. The vast majority of TOSes, though, are registered only locally since the registration procedure in the Ministry of Justice is complicated and the benefits are small. In most regions, with few exceptions, the number of locally registered TOSes is much greater than the number of TOSes registered by the Ministry of Justice. In Kemerovo region, no single TOS was registered by the Ministry of Justice in 2015. 320 One of the difficulties with collecting such data is that community centers can bear different names and have somewhat different functions. Unlike TOSes, which have a legal status defined by a federal law, community centers are creatures of municipal authorities, which may come up with different organizational formats, so categorizing an organization as a community center is a separate issue. 321 “Reshenie Permskoi gorodskoi Dumy ot 27.11.2007 N 287 (red. ot 23.04.2012) ‘Ob utverzhdenii Polozheniia ob obshchestvennykh tsentrakh v gorode Permi.” 322 “Obshchestvennye tsentry.” 323 “Polozhenie ob obshchestvennykh tsentrakh goroda Permi. Prilozhenie k resheniiu Permskoi gorodskoi dumy ot 26.06.2012 N 135.” 324 “TOS.” 127 a city twice bigger than Kemerovo. Despite the presence of community centers in Perm, it is hardly possible to talk about a hierarchy of community organizations similar to the one in Kemerovo.
Embeddedness, trust, and connection to the state apparatus
The two organizational networks described above – the Veterans’ Councils and residential committees (TOSes) – fulfill very similar social and political functions and share physical and human resources in the city of Kemerovo where they coexist. Just like in the Soviet Union, volunteer pensioners comprise the activist core in both networks since they have the resource of free time and the need to overcome the social isolation of the old age. Residential committees and community centers in
Kemerovo have a broader appeal and more material resources but narrower geography than the region‐ wide network of the Veterans’ Councils. Both of them, though, share the key characteristics of the social public sector: embeddedness in society’s everyday life, population’s trust, and connection to the state apparatus.
Embeddedness
The ramified organizational infrastructure of residential committees and the Veterans’ Councils puts them in close geographical and personal proximity to any given individual living in the region.
Community centers in Kemerovo and Veterans’ Council desks located at the local police stations outside of Kemerovo cover the territory of the region making it easy to reach out to the community and provide a point of contact for the people seeking to voice their concerns. Moreover, the number of activists in the Veterans’ Councils and TOSes is much greater than the number of these organizations, so almost every individual in the region is likely to know an activist personally, creating a web of personal contacts organized into a hierarchical structure with centralized leadership. 128
TOSes and the Veterans’ Councils actively encourage community involvement by both providing regular services to the population and mobilizing it for common projects. Community centers, for example, provide space for hobby clubs, most of which center around such activities as gardening, handcrafting, folk singing, and dancing. Some clubs are more specialized, for example, clubs for chess, poetry, Slavic culture, Orthodox Christians, or mature Internet users; these clubs are run either by the pensioners having special knowledge and skills or other enthusiasts to whom community center inspectors reach out. The clubs hold their meetings either in a room inside a community center or, in the summertime, in a designated area right outside of it. In locations other than Kemerovo, the Veterans’
Councils also run hobby clubs that meet in available public spaces.
All community centers have sports equipment (volleyball and soccer balls, badminton and ping pong rackets, hockey sticks, pucks, and balls, etc.) that they rent for free to people from the neighborhood. This equipment is most frequently used by schoolchildren and, again, pensioners who frequently organize “health groups” who regularly get together for a light physical exercise or team sports. Usually run by former athletes, such groups can also use the centers’ facilities if those are appropriate for sports.325 Other resources that can be rented out or used at the centers include fiction books, movies, and board games. In some centers, neighborhood people can utilize video equipment to watch movies and computers to use the Internet.
Besides supporting hobby clubs, community center inspectors and volunteers also organize leisure time of schoolchildren during the school year and holidays. They take children for historical tours around the city, organize trips to theaters, river boat tours, and meetings with local celebrities (writers, athletes, activists, etc.). Children can participate in sports or art contests with prizes. During the
325 Most sports classes for the population are organized by “local sports clubs”, which is a different network of 30 organizations around the city. Community centers usually don’t have professional trainers for sports groups, but can provide limited space and equipment. 129 summertime, community centers recruit volunteers among college students to organize games with children living in the area. The Veterans’ Councils team up with schools and community centers in
Kemerovo and organize “patriotic education” events for schoolchildren usually related to World War II.
They may take place in a school museum, in a community center, or some special place in the area (a monument or a memory board with the names of fallen soldiers).
For the community at large, community centers and TOS activists organize holidays celebrations, cultural, educational, artistic, and sports events, further encouraging population’s participation and developing ties with the community. Celebrations take place on all major holidays, whether state, orthodox religious, or traditional Russian. For example, on the New Year’s Eve, the neighborhood inhabitants can enjoy costume parties, performances with traditional Russian characters, potlucks, fireworks, contests with prizes, dancing, and karaoke, and such parties are increasingly popular. Other celebrations are related to national or regional events and initiatives. For example, the Miner’s Day is widely celebrated in the region and many community centers organize parties on that day; Family Year was a national initiative in 2008, which was also the basis for some community events.
Community centers regularly call for volunteers to maintain the neighborhood territory clean and tidy: to clean the surrounding areas, help with snow removal, perform minor landscaping and repairs. Some community centers use volunteers’ help to build “Veterans’ Corners” – areas with flowers, benches, and tables for pensioners to come and socialize. Community centers provide volunteers with necessary equipment and may organize a tea party after the job is done.
An important part of community building strategy is social recognition of outstanding people in the community with presents, certificates, or just special attention during public events. The elderly receive signs of recognition on their anniversaries when they turn 85 or older. Military veterans are 130 recognized during patriotic events. Parents raising a large number of children receive their share of recognition, and the best TOS activists are also rewarded with prizes or titles.
Trust
Community organizations are not only in close contact with the population, but they are also trusted by it. The indicator of that trust is that people do bring their problems to community centers and the Veterans’ Councils trying to resolve them. Although there must be unresolved cases that are not reported by the government‐controlled media, the response must be sufficiently high to continue encouraging people to voice their concerns.326 My contacts with bureaucrats during the fieldwork also confirmed that they are usually surprisingly responsive to requests.327
The first type of issues that community centers and the Veterans’ Councils help people resolve is those related to interactions with government bureaucracy. They may be related to obtaining health care in state hospitals, to law enforcement and public safety in the neighborhood, to infrastructure repairs, etc. Community centers’ inspectors or the heads of the Veterans’ Councils may personally reach out to particular bureaucrats to help resolve a problem (for example, to help a pensioner navigate getting health care in a state hospital). They also organize meetings with local authorities – for example, municipal government officials, the chief of the major utility company, or local police chairman – where concerns can be voiced directly rather than through bureaucratic channels. Community centers also regularly organize professional consultations and public lectures of lawyers, doctors, and social security specialists that address common issues and particular problems that people encounter in their lives.
326 Dimitrov, “Vertical Accountability in Communist Regimes: The Role of Citizen Complaints in Bulgaria and China.” 327 I had regional officials, especially dealing with education and social security, talk to me and help me with information and further contacts despite a clearly high workload in sometimes stressful environment (Kemerovo fieldnotes). An expert interview also confirmed that state officials do respond to people’s complaints (Interview KEM‐01). 131
Another type of concerns that community organizations address is those that can be resolved by community effort. For example, some pensioners, especially those in poor health and living in private homes with little modern infrastructure, may need help around the house and garden. Community centers and Veteran’s Councils help such people by contacting schools and recruiting volunteers among schoolchildren. They also help the poor families by mobilizing the community and business sponsors to help buy school clothes and books for children or to share food with poor households.
Finally, community organizations also engage in social work. Community centers’ inspectors provide help for those having problems with addictions, employment, and means for living. Together with medical professionals, inspectors help people with drug addictions to get treatment and make sure that their children do not wander around unsupervised. Adolescents from troubled families get assistance in enrolling to professional education programs and getting summer jobs.
Connection to the state apparatus
While being embedded in people’s everyday life and trusted by the population, community organizations effectively work as a part of the state apparatus, continuing the Soviet tradition of using volunteer organizations to extend the state further into civil society. Many activists of these organizations, who are usually of older age, not only consider this state of affairs normal but also take pride in representing the state in their community. As the head of a Veterans’ Council in one of the rural municipalities in Kemerovo region put it: “Our Veterans’ Council feels like an authentic unit of municipal administration.”328
Although municipal authorities in Kemerovo region usually provide limited funding and material resources to community organizations, the main channel of influence lies in the active governmental
328 In Russian: “Наш совет ветеранов чувствует себя равноправным подразделением администрации района.” (Ermakova, “Kogda delo ladinsia.”) 132 involvement in developing of these organizations. As already described above, in Kemerovo city, the municipal government not only initiated the creation of TOSes but also provided the templates for their structure, legal arrangement, and activities. The Veterans’ Councils’ and TOSes’ activists regularly gather for government‐organized seminars to discuss their experiences of community work and learn the best practices. State officials, including those from law enforcement agencies and social security administration, regularly meet with activists to inform them about public policy issues and seek their support in interactions with communities. Authorities also hold competitions for the best TOS, best community center, or best primary organization of a Veterans’ Council, in which they determine the selection criteria and the winners. Most active volunteers also receive symbolic awards and material perks.
An important question that arises in light of density of community organizations network and tight government control is the question of formal participation. As the Soviet experience shows, the attempts of the government to intervene into private life may result in resistance and merely formal participation in community organizations, which could be the case in Kemerovo region too. Some limited evidence is available about signs of formal (or at least minimally engaged) membership in the
Veterans’ Councils among retired miners – the group that must be least supportive of Tuleev among the pensioners.329 However, the private sphere in contemporary Russia, including Kemerovo region, is now much more autonomous than in the Soviet Union, which should result in a more balanced relationship
329 In one of the newspaper articles, the author shames some primary organizations of the miners’ Veterans’ Council for ignoring the competition for the best primary organization despite provision of material resources for those organizations (Churpita, “Ne privykli sdavat’sia trudnostiam.”) 133 between the public and private lives and more genuine participation in community organizations than in the Soviet Union.330
Political functions of community organizations
The work of community organizations described above may seem politically benign or even geared towards improving governance, but the practical value of at least part of their activities is questionable. Regular engagement of an army of volunteers to clean up the neighborhood is hardly a better functional solution than mechanization of such labor, but it serves well the purpose of keeping society mobilized. Distributing no interest loans for pensioners during the visits of the regional Veterans’
Council rather than through the local branches of the Pension Fund makes little sense331 unless one wants the pensioners with grievances to attend the meetings and voice their concerns.
The history and the political performance of the region also speak against taking things at their face value. As noted in the beginning of the chapter, the political career of Aman Tuleev equipped him with a first‐hand knowledge of the dangers of popular unrest and steered a lot of his efforts towards preventing one. Another crucial task that most contemporary politicians have to master is electoral mobilization. For both of these tasks, the infrastructural power of a ramified hierarchy of organizations reaching down to the grassroots level provides important advantages, sometimes being the most cost‐ effective or the only way to achieve the goal. The Soviet template of controlled mobilization through community volunteer organizations resonated with the personal experience of both the regional
330 During my fieldwork I personally interviewed one TOS activist, one community center director, and one officer in the regional Veterans’ Council in addition to observing pensioner‐activists in the office of that council. All of them were genuinely engaged in the work they were doing. This anecdotal evidence, though, does not help to estimate the extent of formal participation in community organizations. 331 Pensioners have to bring paperwork from the Pension Fund to get the loan, and they repay the loan in the same Pension Fund. The Pension Fund, therefore, is the most logical place to give out the loans too, unless other considerations are in place. 134 leadership and the population and made the creation of such organizational structures easy. As a result, tens of thousands of volunteer activists involved in the Veterans’ Councils and residential committees became a low‐cost administrative machine that infiltrated the social fabric and opened the channels of political influence.
The political functions of community organizations can be divided into three groups:
(1) mobilization for regime goals and cooptation of activists; (2) working with existing and potential discontent; and (3) control of public space and public discourse.
Mobilization and cooptation
Community work performed by the Veterans’ Councils, TOSes, and community centers cultivates a web of personal contacts that can be easily used for electoral mobilization. Activists who know people in their neighborhood and are frequently aware of their personal situations are much better agitators than outsiders. The Veterans’ Councils, which have developed their skills of patriotic education and propaganda for decades, have actively engaged in door‐to‐door electoral agitation not only in Kemerovo but nationwide, and in the 1990s the Communist Party had greatly benefited from these efforts.332 In Kemerovo, the Veterans’ Councils not only agitate for a particular candidate or party but also increase the turnout on election day. To do that, they organize “Veterans’ Salons” right at the polling stations, in which they showcase their music and dance ensembles, hold arts and crafts exhibits, master‐classes, and serve tea and baked goods.333 While the ballot vote is still secret, it is probably not
332 See the section on pensioners’ organizations’ involvement in elections in Appendix 5. 333 “Veteranskie gostinye;” Budiakovskaia, “Byli ‘nicheinye’, stali – nashi!” 135 very difficult to monitor the turnout of many people in the community and exercise peer pressure to show up as well as selectively mobilize supporters, but not the opponents.334
The activists who are engaged in the mobilization effort are usually those members of the community who have the abilities and desire to engage in public politics. TOSes and the Veterans’
Councils nationwide have frequently supplied deputies to local legislatures.335 In Kemerovo, where the workers’ strikes continued throughout the first year of Tuleev’s term as a governor, uncontrolled self‐ organization could quickly nurture Tuleev’s political opponents, while a managed one has provided
Tuleev’s regime with a trained reserve of local politicians who have helped him to control the municipalities. Other activists who did not end up running for office, have also been very useful to maintain the whole mechanism in the working condition. They have supplied reserve manpower for political tasks, for example, for serving as members of precinct‐level electoral commissions.336
Community centers and TOSes have organized meetings of activists with the members of the city‐level electoral commission,337 as well as training and competitions for high school students on knowledge of electoral procedures and “the political field of Russia.”338 They have also included preparation for electoral campaigns in their reports as one of the areas of work.339
334 For more information about strategies of such selective mobilization see Gans‐Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter, “Varieties of Clientelism.” 335 Matveev, Vlast’ i obshchestvo v systeme mestnogo samoupravleniia Rossii v 1993‐2003 gg., 179. See also the list of sources in Appendice 5 and 6. 336 I downloaded and analyzed a list of precinct‐level electoral commissions in Kemerovo city in 2008. The file was downloaded from the Kemerovo regional government web‐site, but was later moved from its original location (it is available from the author). The occupation of the heads of local electoral commissions was identified in the list, but their involvement in community organizations was unclear. As elsewhere in Russia, the majority of electoral commission heads were teachers (45%), but the directors of community centers and non‐working pensioners added another 10%. It is very possible that other people on the list have also been involved in either community organizations or labor unions at the industrial enterprises, which are also controlled by the governor. 337 “V raionakh goroda.” 338 Rasskazova, “Boi politicheskogo znacheniia.” 339 Ob itogakh deiatel’nosti tsentrov po rabote s naseleniem v 2013 g. 136
Management of existing and potential discontent
Identifying and addressing people’s grievances before they become the basis for self‐ organization is crucial for preventing social unrest. Community organizations are frequently the first place where people would seek help and advice when they are in trouble. The activists in the Veterans’
Councils and TOSes help collect information about people’s grievances by regularly reporting on the main problems in their area. Such regular reporting is encouraged by standardized paperwork templates, which are provided by the authorities. Activists also assist in surveying the population if authorities need information on a specific issue.340 Their ability to collect information from literally every single person can be illustrated by the fact that TOS activists and community centers took an active part in the 2010 National Census in Russia.341
As described above, community organizations not only collect information but also help people resolve at least some of their problems, especially those related to basic livelihood needs. Grievances that cannot be resolved easily can be alleviated through the minor material and administrative help and even by making people feel listened to and heard.342 Grievance monitoring also allows to identify the most vocal dissenters and at least keep an eye on them if the problem cannot be addressed. Community center inspectors do not even have to do it themselves because local policemen kept their offices since the time the centers used to be police stations.
Grievance monitoring also allows to quickly adjust regional policies in order to alleviate critical issues before the civil society mobilizes. In an interview with the head of an NGO for people with disabilities, I heard a story about such policy correction that deemed civic action unnecessary: “Our
340 Zinchuk, “Chto znaete o l’gotakh?”; Svarovskii, “Zasluzhili vsei zhizn’iu.” 341 Kikioi, “Reshaem vmeste;” see also Fefelova, “Gotovimsia k perepisi.” 342 The regional administration sometimes publishes a report about citizens’ complaints, analyzing its dynamic and informing about the steps taken to improve the situation (see, for example, “Barometr obshchestvennykh nuzhd.”). The main message of such reports to the population is “we hear you.” 137 governor sometimes just amazes me. I will give you a simple example. Once there was a time when we started to have problems with [free] medicines. That’s it, the end of the world! People with diabetes start dying, it was really horrible! We started to have this problem in January, and while we, the activists, have still been thinking what to do, the governor issued an order in early February saying that the regional budget will compensate all the expenses for medicines, that is if we pay cash, we can get the money back! What a graceful move! I was truly shocked.”343
Control of public space and discourse
The work of community organizations allows them to maintain control over physical and informational public spaces which helps with both electoral mobilization and prevention of uncontrolled consolidation of civil society. Be it incumbents or potential challengers, they all have to use public spaces to build political support among the population, and controlling that space provides the regime’s allies with a significant advantage.
The physical space of a neighborhood is under constant surveillance of community organizations. In addition to regular police patrols, community centers help organize volunteer patrols to prevent neighborhood crime and report to the police the places selling drugs or illegal alcohol.
Together with adult local activists, squads have also enlisted university students and even adolescents.344 TOSes, community centers, and the Veterans’ Councils, frequently with the volunteer help of the larger community, take care of the neighborhood territory, organizing meeting spaces with benches and tables, planting flowers and trees, and keeping them clean. The city government regularly holds competitions for the best courtyard or apartment hallway encouraging such engagement.
343 Interview KEM‐10. 344 Brezhneva, “Na dobrovol’nykh nachalakh;” “Slovo activistov.” 138
One of the important political advantages of such control of neighborhood physical space is the ability to influence the display of visual political ads, which is one of the most effective ways to increase a politician’s recognition and popularity. Such ads are placed on boards, walls, and other visible places in the neighborhood. Many apartment buildings have special plastic‐covered boards by each building entrance, half of which is used for announcements from utility companies and another half for ads. Such boards get guaranteed attention of everyone living in the building, and access to such boards is very important during electoral campaigns.345 In Kemerovo, special boards for agitation materials are installed in addition to regular ones during campaign time, and TOS activists are responsible for their maintenance.346 Dissemination of printed leaflets in the neighborhood is a common practice even beyond the scope of political campaigns: TOS volunteers, frequently with the help of schoolchildren, use leaflets to inform the population about traffic and fire safety rules, the need to keep the neighborhood clean, changes in government regulations regarding public order or benefits, etc.347 At the same time, using leaflets that are allegedly unrelated to elections but still contain information about election candidates has been used in different Russian regions to give an advantage to the regime candidates.348
Visual ads placed on specially protected boards work even right before the election when active agitation is forbidden, becoming the last thing voters see before casting their ballot.349 And constant surveillance of the neighborhood and maintaining its “cleanliness” guarantees prompt removal of any unsanctioned agitation materials.
345 Buzin, Administrativnye izbiratel’nye tekhnologii: moskovskaia praktika, 143–44. 346 “Korotko,” Kemerovo, February 8, 2008. 347 See, for example, “Korotko,” Kemerovo, August 24, 2007; Zinchuk, “Chto znaete o l’gotakh?”; Brezhneva, “Na dobrovol’nykh nachalakh;” “Ni dnia bez dela.” 348 Buzin, Administrativnye izbiratel’nye tekhnologii: moskovskaia praktika, 145. 349 Ibid., 144. 139
Another great opportunity for agitation that community organizations provide to the regime candidates is town‐hall style community meetings and engagement with voters during public events.
During campaigns and in between the election cycles, the deputies of the municipal and regional legislative bodies, the vast majority of whom represent United Russia,350 meet with the constituencies, inform them about their work, and collect concerns to bring them up in the city or regional council.351
Some community centers run youth voter clubs (“Clubs of Young Voters”, “The Choice of the Young”) giving the opportunity to the youth wing of the United Russia, the Young Guard, to target the youth audience before elections.352
Community organizations, along with the regime‐controlled media, help to shape and control public political discourse. Current deputies use community centers for establishing contacts with TOS activists, who can pass the message down to the rest of the population. For example, during the implementation of one of the most controversial social reforms in Russia in the 2000s – the so‐called monetization353 – the municipal social security department worked together with community centers and TOS activists to explain the details of the reform to the population and answer questions that people might have had. One of the officials from the social security department specifically noted that neighborhood councils were so useful because they know the population of their territories and are trusted by it.354 This work, together with delaying the monetization of many benefits, helped Kemerovo avoid the biggest mass protests of the 2000s that happened in many other regions. Veterans’ “plenums”
350 I was not able to find a single mention of a representative of another party holding a meeting with the constituency in a community center. 351 On using public events for agitation purposes outside of Kemerovo see also Buzin, Administrativnye izbiratel’nye tekhnologii: moskovskaia praktika, 154–55. 352 Press‐sluzhba gorsoveta narodnykh deputatov. “ ‘Molodaia gvardiia’ ukrepliaet tyly.” 353 The replacement of in‐kind benefits for certain population groups with monetary compensations, which started in 2005. 354 “Khoroshee nastroenie delaem sami;” Il’ina, “Doiti do kazhdogo.” 140 essentially serve the same goal – to provide pensioner activists with the message about the regime’s agenda and actions that they can then disseminate. This dissemination can happen not only through interpersonal communication but also during various “patriotic” events, including those with schoolchildren that the veteran’s councils have been holding for decades.
Community organizations also prevent the consolidation of alternative social forces by simply occupying the public space and pushing away the undesirable content. They fill public discussions and people’s time with positive and politically benign topics and activities – helping each other and those in need, strengthening community ties, making life in the neighborhood more comfortable and pleasant, developing people’s creativity, etc. Such an agenda is very attractive to the people bombarded daily by negative news on national TV channels. General emphasis of community centers on practical improvements and community values makes it very easy to dismiss alternative political opinions from the public space on the grounds that they only criticize instead of helping. Such avoidance of political discussion is not entirely imposed from the top355 but is actively supported and reproduced by community organizations.356
Community organizations in Kemerovo are not limited to the Veterans’ Councils and residential committees. The web of organizations also includes women’s councils, various volunteer organizations for schoolchildren and students, the Orthodox church, NGOs, etc. Some of them were created or recreated from above; others emerged as grassroots initiatives. But most are now attuned to reproduce
355 Avoidance of political discussions and actions while concentrating on community issues is certainly not unique for Russia (see Eliasoph, Avoiding Politics for the analysis of a US case). 356 The “cheerleading” – celebrations and community events – in which community centers engage is similar to what bots do on Chinese internet: instead of engaging into political discussions and taking the side of the government, they fill online discussion with benign positive information about life in general, successfully distracting the attention of the audience from political issues (King, Pan, and Roberts, “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument.”). 141 the Soviet model of community organization that has helped Tuleev keep Kemerovo region under tight political control. He recently proved his grasp of regional politics during the 2015 reelection, which took place when Vladimir Putin reintroduced governors’ elections after their cancellation in 2004. Tuleev’s result – 97% of votes with 92% turnout, the best in his career – has clearly shown that his administrative machine not only has been maintained in the working condition but has also grown to be stronger than ever. 142
Chapter 5. SPS Organizations Under Integrative and Autonomous Patterns of State‐Society
Relationships
This chapter presents the comparison of case studies selected based on the quantitative analysis in Chapter 2. The case comparison allows exploring the variation of infrastructural state power in the social public sector and the factors that help or hinder its development. Kemerovo region, which was analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4, was an extreme case demonstrating very high infrastructural state power in the social public sector. It can serve as a useful point of comparison for other cases in this study that are similar or different in terms of infrastructural power strength. Among the four other cases, the
Republic of Tatarstan is positioned similarly to Kemerovo region and expected to control SPS organizations tightly, while the Republic of Altai and Rostov region stand out as having low control of
SPS organizations. The case of Tomsk lies in the middle, together with the vast majority of other Russian regions. The current chapter will compare these cases and examine the causes of their similarities and differences.
Two arguments are at the core of this chapter. First, I show that the attempts to use SPS organizations for political purposes are present in all examined cases, but the pattern of their use is different in regions with high and low infrastructural power. In Kemerovo region and Tatarstan, SPS organizations form a top‐down hierarchy at the regional level and are used for routine monitoring and mobilization of society. In Rostov region and Altai, SPS organizations maintain a significant degree of autonomy from state bureaucracies and are used as clientelistic political machines. These two structures of SPS organizations correspond to the integrative and autonomous patterns of state‐society relationship, which I introduced in Chapter 1. 143
Second, I show that this difference stems from the different sources of power legitimacy and the structure of community ties that different authorities foster. In the regions where the state serves as a source of authority (Kemerovo region and Tatarstan), it can actively foster community ties and sometimes create them. When the association with the state is a matter of prestige and pride, local politicians win elections because they are supported by the regional government and can use its material and symbolic resources. When local politicians owe their rise and political survival to the higher level regime and when the people do not resist (and sometimes eagerly join) state initiatives, it is easy for the regional government to build a regional top‐down administrative machine and enhance infrastructural capacity. The presence of such a machine allows the regional government to monitor popular grievances, prevent public discontent through preemptive policy changes, and increase the margins of electoral victories. Such political setup increases regime’s resilience to the fluctuations of popular support since the chances of opposition consolidation are minimal.
In the regions where community serves as a source of authority (Rostov region and Altai), people maintain community ties without the state as a mediator. Even if the state attempts to play a role, these efforts either fail or get redirected away from their initial goals. To win a municipal‐level election in such a context, a politician needs the support of the community more than the support of the regional government. Elected municipal representatives and officials in such regions have a tighter connection to their constituencies, which hold them accountable for delivering goods to their families and territories. In the situation, in which low‐level politicians need to maintain constituency support or face a real chance of being voted out of office, the attempts to build a top‐down administrative machine at the regional level fail. To build such a machine while municipal authorities actively lobby for the interests of their territories, the regional government would have to build a personal clientelistic relationship with every municipal head, who would not support the regional government without some 144 kind of benefit in exchange. Given that material resources are always limited and municipal heads may change unexpectedly, long‐term maintenance of such a machine even for the voting purposes is a difficult task. Such organizational structure also gives the regional elites little opportunity to forestall political opposition by routine monitoring of grievances and discontent and preemptive policy actions.
Such political setup is, therefore, more sensitive to the changes of popular support and the limits of material redistribution.
General comparison
The characteristics of SPS organizations in Kemerovo region and Tatarstan differ from those in
Altai and Rostov region in several ways. In the first group, they are centralized at the regional level, while in the second group municipalities are the major players. The pattern of the development of voluntary organizations is different too: in Kemerovo region and Tatarstan, many of them are created from above, while in Rostov region and Altai they usually emerge from below. Finally, the role of SPS organization in politics varies: in one case they are used to increase turnout and the margins of victory in the absence of a real opposition and to perform routine monitoring of society, while in the other case they serve more frequently as clientelistic political machines, especially at the municipal‐level elections
(see Table 2).
145
Table 2. Characteristics of SPS organizations under different patterns of state‐society relationships
Pattern of state‐society relationships
Integrative Autonomous Characteristics of SPS (Kemerovo region, (Rostov region, organizations Republic of Tatarstan) Republic of Altai)
SPS organizations from above from below development
Level of centralization regional municipal
routine monitoring of social Political utility of SPS problems and political dissent; clientelistic political organizations for an increasing turnout and margins machines authoritarian regime of victory
Structure of SPS organizations and their development: the integrative pattern
Commonalities and differences between Kemerovo region and Tatarstan
I observed the integrative pattern of state‐society relationships in Kemerovo region and
Tatarstan, with Kemerovo region being a particularly clear case and Tatarstan exposing the same pattern but less vividly. Similarly to Kemerovo region, Tatarstan has also been an outlier on the Russian electoral map357 with a very high estimated level of falsifications. Two factors likely helped Tatarstan’s government achieve the needed electoral results with less reliance on SPS organizations than in
Kemerovo region. First, the ethno‐regional identity of people in Tatarstan is an important mobilizing force. Many people in the region back up the federal regime as long as the regional government supports it since people believe that the interests of Tatarstan’s political elites at the federal level are
357 “Tatarstan nakhimichil, Kemerovo obnaglelo.” 146 well aligned with the interests of the regional population as a whole.358 Such logic is by no means absent in other Russian regions, including Kemerovo, but it is particularly strong in Tatarstan due to the fact that Tatarstan is an ethnic republic where ethnic identity intertwines with the regional one. Second,
Tatarstan is a richer region compared to Kemerovo, and performance legitimacy must be higher there too. Tatarstan’s regional budget expenditures per capita in 2014 were 21% higher than in Kemerovo.359
Together with multiple modernization projects in the city of Kazan’ (the regional capital) and across the region in the late 2000s – early 2010s, they must have boosted regime support.
Despite some regional differences, the common features of the integrative pattern of state‐ society relationships are apparent in both Kemerovo region and Tatarstan. The previous chapter has shown that pensioners’ organizations in Kemerovo region form a region‐wide hierarchy whose expansion and development was directed and materially supported by the regional government. TOSes and community centers display a similar pattern of organizational development from above: their emergence was initiated from the top, and their network was structured from the very beginning as a part of the state apparatus. Although TOSes and community centers exist only in Kemerovo city, their creation was possible not because of the autonomy and political weight of Kemerovo city mayor, but because of his close alliance with Tuleev.
Another Kemerovo example of the regional government’s control of SPS organizations is the school system. Legally, municipalities have a lot of influence on how schools function: they handle school budgets and principals’ appointments. In Kemerovo region, though, not only does Tuleev control municipalities through loyal administration heads and local deputies,360 but there is also an informal
358 Interview KAZ‐14. I heard a similar explanation from different people during my fieldwork in Tatarstan, so it seems to be a widespread point of view. 359 Budget data are provided by the Russian Treasury and Rosstat (Russian Statistics Service). 360 See Chapter 3 for information on how Tuleev consolidated his regime. 147 control of all important appointments in education and of teacher attestation through the so‐called
“pedagogical clan”.361 The head of that clan is Natalia Emil’evna Kasatkina, who leads the pedagogical department in Kemerovo State University and a dissertation council,362 which has produced dozens of advanced degree holders in the pedagogical field. Kasatkina’s daughter, Elena Rudneva, served as the head of the regional education department in Tuleev’s administration and later as his deputy. In 2012, she became the rector of Kuzbass Regional Institute for Development of Professional Education363 – the institution that handles all teacher training and attestation in the region.364 Through this institute, the regional administration has a leverage over teachers which works in addition to the control through municipalities.
In both Kemerovo region and Tatarstan, the SPS organizations that represent the integrative pattern of state‐society relationships most clearly are organizations dealing with youth and pensioners.
However, in Tatarstan, the pattern is more visible in youth organizations, while in Kemerovo region – in the pensioners’ ones. This difference in focus is likely caused by the social issues that were most pressing in respective regions at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. If in Kemerovo the late
Soviet political and economic crisis led to the strikes of industrial workers and social security issues, in
Tatarstan and especially in its capital, the city of Kazan’, it reactivated youth gangs.365 These gangs challenged the authority of the weakened state and frequently acted as “violent entrepreneurs”
361 Interviews Kem‐01, Kem‐11; Trigubovich, “Pedagogicheskaia poema Kuzbassa.” 362 In Russia, the academic degrees of “candidate of sciences” and “doctor of sciences”, roughly equivalent to a PhD, can only be awarded by a permanent dissertation council specializing in a certain subfield. 363 “Elena Rudneva ushla iz administratsii v institut.” 364 More about this institution can be found on its web‐site http://www.krirpo.ru/ . 365 Clines, “Kazan Journal; Street Gangs Return, and Soviet City Is Chagrined”; Stephenson, “The Kazan Leviathan.” 148 towards nascent private businesses. Later, since the 2000s, the threat of the spread of radical Islam among the youth in the region has kept youth affairs on the agenda of the regional authorities.366
Youth and educational organizations in Tatarstan: top down development and
governance
Many of youth organizations in Tatarstan derive from their Soviet counterparts – Young
Pioneers and Komsomol – and have continued to function in a centralized manner. Unlike in many other regions, there was almost no historical gap between the Soviet youth organizations and the post‐Soviet ones in Tatarstan since the regional Committee on Youth Affairs, one of the first ones in post‐Soviet
Russia, was established in the mid‐1990s.367 The successor of this committee, the Ministry of Youth
Affairs and Sports is now the main hub that funds, coordinates and evaluates the work of most youth organizations in the region.
The Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports deals with both the regional and the municipal youth organizations. An example of a municipal organizational network is the 210 residential teen clubs that
Tatarstan authorities promptly put under municipal control after the collapse of the Soviet Union.368
Later, regional authorities opened 27 youth centers in addition to the clubs. These teen clubs and youth centers are officially municipal organizations, but municipalities are only responsible for the funding of their basic operational needs (e.g. small salaries, rent, some office supplies). All funding for the activities of these organizations come from the regional Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, which holds yearly
366 More than half of Tatarstan’s population are Tatars, who usually identify as Muslims, although not all Tatars are equally religious. Young urbanites among the Tatars are particularly active in searching for the “right” versions of Islam (see Interviews KAZ‐05 and KAZ‐14) that would help them reclaim their ethnic and religious identity, which was somewhat eroded during the Soviet times. On the problem of youth extremism in Tatarstan see also Profilaktika ekstremizma v molodezhnoi srede Respubliki Tatarstan. 367 Interview KAZ‐03. 368 2017 data from Deti Tatarstana (web‐site). See also Interview KAZ‐03. 149 grant competitions for municipal organizations and sets their agenda through those competitions (for example, one year they may concentrate on intercultural dialog and another year – on suicide prevention).369 In 2013, the regional government included performance indicators of youth policy in the ranking of municipalities, which gave the Ministry an additional leverage over municipalities in the sphere of youth policy.
In addition to municipal organizations, the Ministry handles 11 regional youth centers that specialize in cultural and creative projects, sports, volunteering, summer camps, support of talented youth, etc.370 Some of these centers have a developed organizational infrastructure in the region. For example, “Forpost”, a center for youth squads that help maintain public order, has 858 primary organizations that unite more than 11,000 volunteers 14‐30 years old. The center was founded in 1998 by the Ministry of Youth Affairs and the Ministry of Interior of Tatarstan Republic.371 Other centers work through their branches in different municipalities and existing youth and educational organizations to involve tens of thousands of children and youth in their programs. The centers coordinate and fund the activities, organize region‐wide gatherings of activists, provide training for them, and the recognition of the best.372
Interestingly, the regional government in Tatarstan intrudes not only the territory of municipal organizations, but also that of the federal ones. In particular, it has a significant influence on universities despite the fact that higher education institutions fall within the federal jurisdiction.373 One of the
369 Interview KAZ‐03. 370 The Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports of the Republic of Tatarstan (web‐site). 371 Respublikanskii tsentr molodezhnykh (studencheskikh) formirovanii po okhrane obshchestvennogo poriadka “Forpost” (web‐site). 372 Interviews KAZ‐03, KAZ‐09. 373 Interview KAZ‐11. The interviewee, a high‐level administrator at a large state university in Kazan’, said that Tatarstan’s government believes that the universities should coordinate any significant organizational changes with it, otherwise cooperation between the regional government and the universities on any matters would suffer. 150 mechanisms of such influence is the Coordination Council on Student Affairs,374 officially working under the auspices of the regional Rectors’ Union.375 The monthly meetings of the Council are attended by the provosts on student affairs from all higher education institutions in the region, the regional Ministers of
Education and Youth Affairs, the representatives of the Student League,376 and few other organizations dealing with students. During these meetings, the regional government informs universities’ representatives about the regional youth initiatives and assigns tasks to all participants. Usually, these tasks include recruiting participants for programs and events and help with organizational logistics.377
Thus, despite the universities officially being subject only to the federal regulations of the Russian
Ministry of Education, in Tatarstan they work in close and regular contact with the regional government providing quick access to the student masses.
A similar top‐down pattern is reproduced at the level of universities under the cover of democratic procedures. A provost of a small private university in Kazan’ described for me how student organizations work in the institution. Rather than being created by the students, they are established by the provost for student affairs. Students may suggest the creation of a particular organization, but it is ultimately the provosts who decides. Every year, freshmen are recruited into these organizations during a fair where the organizations present themselves. Freshmen also fill out a questionnaire about their extracurricular skills, and student activists use this information for targeted recruiting. There is also a student president in the university, who is elected for a two‐year term at a competitive election that includes public debates, agitation, and a quiet period right before the voting day. For the voting day, the
374 Interview KAZ‐09; The Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Tatarstan (web‐site). 375 The Russian Rectors’ Union is a national organization of university presidents. 376 The Student League of Tatarstan Republic is a region‐wide organization that was created in 1996. Nowadays, it unites over 100,000 students in 23 largest universities in Tatarstan. The number is so large because all students in those universities are automatically counted as organization members (Regional’naia molodezhnaia organizatsiia “Liga studentov Tatarstana” (web‐site)). 377 Interview KAZ‐09. 151 university borrows the ballot boxes used during the real political elections from the city administration, and everyone in the university – students, faculty, and staff – vote on a student president. Once elected, the president has the right to change all the leaders of existing student organization to her appointees.378
The blurred boundary between the state and civil society
The top‐down development pattern frequently leads to a blurred boundary between the state and civil society, examples of which can be found in both Kemerovo region and Tatarstan. In Kemerovo, the Veterans’ Councils and TOSes regularly used material resources of state organizations (e.g. community centers, municipal and regional governments) as well as shared human capital (e.g. Nina
Nevorotova, the head of Kemerovo regional Veterans’ Council, has continued to serve in the regional administration). In Tatarstan, NGOs frequently coexist with state organizations sharing office space, funding, and personnel. As one of my interviewees said: “There are civil society organizations, there are quasi‐civil society organizations, and there are organizations that change their faces once in a while.”379
Such quasi‐NGOs are created by former or current state employees in order to have legal flexibility in attracting funding380 and demonstrate state‐society partnerships in grant reports. The websites of such
NGOs are frequently hosted by the official website of the regional government and they are included in the internal electronic workflows of the regional government.381
One example of such an NGO is Kazan’ Public Foundation “Choice” dealing with substance addiction.382 It was created in 1998 by the employees of the municipal Addiction Prevention Center
378 Interview KAZ‐09. 379 Interview KAZ‐06. 380 Many Russian and international donors give grants to NGOs but not to state organizations. 381 Interview KAZ‐03. 382 Obshchestvennaia palata Respubliki Tatarstan, Kazanskii obshchestvennyi fond “Vybor” (web‐site). 152
“Choice” who felt that the power boundaries of government ministries and departments restricted their possibilities to implement complex projects. The Foundation “Choice” allowed them to receive government grants for projects structured as they deemed necessary, while being essentially a virtual organization since its legal address, material base and personnel coincided almost perfectly to those of the Center “Choice”.383
Another example is the Tatarstan Center for the Development of Volunteering.384 It was created in 2011 by the former deputy director of one of the regional youth centers, who oversaw various volunteer projects in the region in 2006‐2011. Creation of the Center (i.e. obtaining a status of legal entity) changed the paperwork but not the essence of her real work. She stayed in the same office and continued to interact with the same organizations (governmental and non‐governmental), using state resources without being bounded by many bureaucratic regulations. Following the common top‐down development pattern in the region, the Center continued to develop the organizational infrastructure.
By 2014, it coordinated the activities of 11 volunteer centers in different municipalities across the region, which worked with about 700 volunteer organizations uniting about 40,000 youth volunteers.385
Pensioners’ organizations in Tatarstan
As mentioned above, the pensioners’ organizations in Tatarstan also have a structure typical for the integrative pattern of state‐society relationships, but they are not as centralized and developed as in
Kemerovo region. If in Kemerovo all possible organizations that could attract pensioners are effectively united into one structure, the Veterans’ Councils, in Tatarstan alternative organizations exist. Similarly to most Russian regions, the largest pensioners’ organization is the regional Veterans’ Council. In 2016,
383 Interview KAZ‐06. 384 Regional’naia molodezhnaia obshchestvennaia organizatsiia “Tsentr razvitiia dobrovol’chestva Respubliki Tatarstan” (web‐site). 385 Interview KAZ‐03. 153 it had more than 3,000 primary organizations and 55 municipal‐level ones, which united over 1,130,000 veterans and pensioners.386 In addition, it had seven supervisor centers across the regions that ensured smooth communication between the regional Council and the municipal‐level ones.387 This ramified structure, though, was integrated with the state apparatus only in the 2010s: the regional government supplied computers to all of the Veterans’ Councils and connected their paperwork to the regional state archive.388 In Kemerovo, such integration happened in the mid‐2000s, once Nina Nevorotova became the head of the organization. Unlike its Kemerovo counterpart, Tatarstan’s Veterans’ Council has never had its own newspaper and began to publish supplements to two regional newspapers only in 2012.389
In addition to the Veteran’s Council, Tatarstan has several alternative organizations for pensioners and veterans. One of them is the regional branch of the Russian Pensioners’ Union. In 2017, it had over 23,000 members in 52 local organizations across the region. The head of Tatarstan’s
Pensioners Union, Liubov Nikolaevna Mishina, used to be a Communist Party functionary in the Soviet
Union, later worked in the regional government of Tatarstan, and currently combines the positions of the head of the Pensioners’ Union and a member of the regional Coordination Council of United Russia
Party Allies.390 Another alternative organization, Tatarstan’s Veterans’ Union, is geared specifically to military and law enforcement veterans. As of 2012, it had 39 municipal‐level organizations in the region391 and was mostly involved in patriotic education and propaganda in the region.392
386 “Otchet Respublikanskogo Soveta regional’noi obshchestvennoi organizatsii veteranov (pensionerov) Respubliki Tatarstan za 2016 god.” 387 “Otchet ‘O rabote obshchestvennoi organizatsii veteranov (pensionerov) Respubliki Tatarstan v 2012 godu’.” 388 Interview KAZ‐08. 389 “Otchet ‘O rabote obshchestvennoi organizatsii veteranov (pensionerov) Respubliki Tatarstan v 2012 godu’.” 390 “Storonniki Edinoi Rossii. Mishina Liubov’ Nikolaevna.” 391 “Respublikanskaia obshchestvennaia organizatsiia veteranov (invalidov) ‘Soiuz veteranov Respubliki Tatarstan’. Structura.” 392 “Respublikanskaia obshchestvennaia organizatsiia veteranov (invalidov) ‘Soiuz veteranov Respubliki Tatarstan’. Planirovanie i organizatsionnye materialy.” 154
Other common features of the integrative pattern
Similar to the Soviet society built on social mobilization, issues of merely formal participation to comply with the requirements from above also exist in Tatarstan and Kemerovo region. For example, in
2010 there were officially 1,200 youth volunteer organizations in Tatarstan. Since then, the regional government made an effort to filter out the non‐active organizations and leave only the functioning one, cutting down the number to 700.393 An example of some Veterans’ Councils with low activity in
Kemerovo region was discussed in Chapter 4.
Another common feature of the integrative pattern of state‐society relations in Kemerovo region and Tatarstan is the active role that the government plays in stimulating corporate social responsibility of large businesses and donations to social causes from smaller ones. In Kemerovo region, large industrial companies have been signing yearly agreements with the regional government and labor unions outlining their commitments to the social support of their employees. Smaller businesses have donated to community organizations during the donation drives organized by municipalities.394 In
Tatarstan, the Republic’s president has an assistant who is responsible for the participation of the business in social projects. In particular, she collects information about the resource needs and puts them together in a “gift registry”, from which the businesses can choose the projects to donate. Some businesses, particularly those that are publicly traded (e.g. IKEA), take on projects that are in line with their existing corporate social responsibility policies.395 Many others, though, frequently resist
393 Interview KAZ‐03. 394 See Chapter 4 for details. 395 Interview KAZ‐04. 155 participating in social causes citing taxes they pay as fulfillment of their social obligations. Those companies that refuse to donate are left out from governmental investment projects in the region.396
The integrative pattern of state‐society relationships has clear connections to the Soviet legacy – the initiative from above, centralization, monitoring of issues and moods of society, increasing election turnout in the absence of opposition have all been features of the Soviet system. Not in all regions, though, the Soviet institutions have had the same impact. The next section will contrast Kemerovo region and Tatarstan to two other regions with a different pattern of state‐society relationships.
Structure of SPS organizations and their development: the autonomous pattern
In contrast to the integrative pattern of state‐society relationships observed in Kemerovo region and Tatarstan, Altai Republic and Rostov region follow the autonomous pattern. Their SPS organizations frequently develop from below, and a clear boundary between the state and civil society is maintained by both sides. Instead of routine monitoring and mobilization, such organizations often engage in low‐ level (municipal) politics and serve as clientelistic political machines during election campaigns.
Laissez‐faire governance and bottom‐up organizational development
A striking feature of the regions with the autonomous pattern of state‐society relationships, which is particularly pronounced in Rostov region, is a laissez‐faire approach to governance in the regional administration. Time and again during my fieldwork, the officials at the regional and municipal levels in Rostov told me that whenever possible they try to refrain from creating additional governmental structures and either make do with the existing ones or rely on civil society to accomplish
396 Interview KAZ‐02. 156 a particular task.397 For example, a department of youth affairs in Rostov regional administration was only created in 1999, in contrast to other regions where such departments were established in the early
1990s, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union. A similar department in the municipal government of
Rostov city began its work only in 2006, and even then there was minimal guidance from the municipal leadership about the goals of this unit. As one of my interviewees said, the department was created because it was getting awkward that almost every other city in Russia had such a department, but
Rostov did not.398 This late creation of government structures was not due to the general lack of attention to this sphere, but rather to the reluctance to create an overarching governmental organization. The regional youth policy program was adopted in 1994 together with the corresponding budget, but this money were used to fund various projects of the existing youth organizations rather than have a governmental structure determine the particular tasks and accomplish the work similar to how it happened in Tatarstan. Even when the municipal department of youth affairs was created in 2006 and chose volunteering as a general focus of youth policy, it refused to create even a citywide volunteer center and preferred to rely on the six largest existing youth organizations and allow them to develop the theme of volunteering in their own directions.399 This development pattern stands in striking contrast to Tatarstan, where the centralization of volunteer initiatives at the regional level started in the same year (2006) and resulted in the creation of a GONGO volunteer center in the regional Ministry of
Youth Affairs.
397 Interviews ROS‐03, ROS‐04, ROS‐08. 398 Interview ROS‐04. 399 Interview ROS‐04. 157
As a result of such laissez‐faire approach, SPS organizations in Rostov region and Altai mostly develop from below. Only in Rostov city, there are 1500 registered youth organizations400 of which 54 are the most active.401 Most of these organizations derived from the Soviet Komsomol structures and burgeoned as independent or relatively autonomous municipal organizations in the 1990s, when the regional government retained limited financial support for them, but removed the supervising structure.402 They took over the sphere of youth activities and extracurricular education that was at the periphery of the regional government attention at the time. Many of the newly created organizations actively participated in grant competitions held by foreign donors, which allowed them to survive and develop in the 1990s.403 At the same time, the regional and municipal governments have not shown much interest in the active development of youth organizations even after it created the youth affairs department not to be an outlier among other Russian cities. City and regional officials have not understood for a long time what kind of benefits youth organizations might bring to them considering everything unrelated to economic development as unworthy of their attention. Only with time, they realized that by supporting volunteer organizations they get access to an easily mobilized labor squad that can be deployed for various local projects and to the system that allows most active volunteer organizers to stand out and be noticed as potential government employees.404
400 In Tatarstan there was about 700 volunteer youth organizations for the whole region. This figure does not capture all youth organizations (for example, teen clubs would not count as volunteer organizations) but even this rough comparison shows that the number of low‐level organizations in a particular social sphere under integrative and autonomous patterns can be comparable. 401 Interview ROS‐04. 402 In Tatarstan these organizations were redirected under municipal control. 403 Interview ROS‐08. 404 Interview ROS‐04. 158
Another example of a grassroots organization in Rostov I encountered during my fieldwork is a socially‐oriented NGO for families having children with special needs “Cooperation” (“Sodeistvie”)405 In contrast to Tatarstan’s NGO “Choice” which was an alternative incarnation of a municipal service, this
NGO formed as a volunteer team of people who worked in different educational organizations and realized the need to have specialized programs for children with special needs. They teamed up with the parents of such children to create a weekend family club. At first, they had trouble finding a free and suitable space to meet until a Catholic charity organization connected them to a Catholic church that had a proper room and allowed to use it for free. Later, a priest in this church suggested applying for a grant of an international Catholic charity, which has been providing basic funding for the organization ever since, although none of the employees of the organization and only one family among the clients are Catholic. Unlike organizations in Tatarstan or Kemerovo region, this organization began to reach out to the state structures only after it obtained some experience and financial ground. Even then they not only received municipal grants for particular projects but also provided free training for the state specialists who had to interact with special needs children during their work.406
The case of “Cooperation” reflects a general approach of the regional government in Rostov region to the funding of any kind of bottom‐level initiatives, be they related to social or economic development. The main rule of this approach is: before asking the regional government about anything, organizations or municipalities should mobilize their own resources and find partners willing to contribute resources to the project, and only then the regional government will join the team and cover the rest of the cost.407 This way the regional government resists the perception of it as a cash cow in the society. One of the regional officials dealing with NGOs went at length in the interview about the
405 Interview ROS‐07. 406 Interview ROS‐07. 407 Interviews ROS‐03 and ROS‐08. 159 dependency mindset of many organizations. He blamed for the development of this mindset not only the Soviet legacy but also the Western foundations, which gave out large sums of money in the 1990s without proper selection of grantee projects or strict transparency requirements. This official, who used to work in NGOs in the 1990s, emphasized that the goal of the regional government interactions with
NGOs now was to make them independent, able to survive without state support. The activities of his department were geared towards educating NGOs about how to develop projects with real impact and about the rules of using governmental funding. He saw these activities as useful not only for the interactions with the government but also for the ability to build partnerships with businesses. One of the requirements for the regional NGO grants that his department introduced was that all proposals must have co‐funding in monetary form (i.e. a sum of money on their bank account rather than free space rental or equipment use). He believed that this requirement stimulated NGOs to show that they were able to reach out and convince the community and businesses that their project was of worth.408
This laissez‐faire governance in Rostov region results in the lack of large regional projects that are common in Kemerovo region and, particularly, Tatarstan, and in an interesting effect that federal‐ level social initiatives have in the region. When in the mid‐2000s the federal government dramatically increased funding for youth initiatives, trying to divert the threat of a color revolution, an ambitious regional official in charge of youth affairs at the time used this federal attention to youth policy to advance many local initiatives. Under the cover of fighting off the Orange Revolution,409 he obtained large funding which, despite being partially stolen, helped to kick off systematic governmental support for local youth projects and develop physical infrastructure for youth initiatives in the region.410 Unlike in
408 Interview ROS‐08. A similar general rule about co‐funding from the regional government applies to the requests of municipalities for infrastructure projects (Interview ROS‐03). 409 The popular uprising in Ukraine in 2004 against presidential election results. 410 Interview ROS‐04. 160
Kemerovo region, where the bottom‐up veterans’ organization was appropriated by the regional government, in Rostov, the regional government appropriated and reinterpreted the federal policies in the interests of bottom‐level organizations.
The Altai Republic has a similar pattern of state‐society relationships, but it is less apparent because of the sheer size of the region (it has about twenty times smaller population compared to
Rostov region). The regional government is equally uninterested in developing region‐wide organizations, concentrating on targeted developmental projects. For example, the Veterans’ Councils exist in Altai, but its city‐level organization in the regional capital, Gorno‐Altaisk, is much more active than the regional one. Some pensioners from other municipalities in the region prefer to address their requests to this city organization rather than to the regional one.411 The Pensioners’ Union, an alternative pensioners’ organization under the auspices of the Pension Fund, also exist in the region, but it does not get the governmental support comparable to the branches of this organization in many other regions. The head of this organization does not approach the regional government with initiatives because he recognizes that the regional government will not be willing to fund them.412
An example of an Altai NGO, similar to “Cooperation” in Rostov, is the Society for Children with
Disabilities “Renaissance” (“Vozrozhdenie”). A group of enthusiasts established it in 2002,413 and the organization has successfully worked with international donors and facilitated training of public sector professionals according to international standards.414 In 2006, one of the organization’s leaders, Alena
411 Interview ALTAI‐15. 412 Interview ALTAI‐16. 413 Organizational data taken from the database of the Federal Tax Service, https://egrul.nalog.ru/, access date May 5, 2017. 414 Gritsko, M. “Mezhdunarodnyi proekt – v zhizn’.” 161
Kazantseva, got elected to the regional parliament, where she continued to advance the interests of people with disabilities.415
Finally, Altai has a strong regional Teachers’ Union, which frequently stands in opposition to the regional government on policy issues.416 This Union closely watches the changes in the structure of teacher salaries and benefits and has experience of successfully suing the regional government in court.
It also gets involved in cases of unlawful layoffs of teachers, including those who head local electoral commissions, and helps to reinstate them to their positions through court decisions. The Teachers’
Union is the only professional union in the region that has a lawyer on payroll and provides consultations for teachers and school principals on how to file legal complaints.417 The regional government made an attempt to create an alternative teachers’ union in 2011, which failed to gain enough support in the teachers’ community,418 illustrating the difficulties that organizations created from above face in places with autonomous relationships between the state and society.
Maintenance of the boundary between the state and civil society
The autonomous pattern of state‐society relationships differs from the integrative one, in particular, by a clear boundary between the state and civil society that is considered a norm by all the participants and is routinely maintained by both sides. The idea that the regional government can initiate the creation of NGOs seemed odd to my interviewees in Rostov: “How can we establish an organization that does not already exist?”419 Even with the existing NGOs, the regional government policy was to (1) invest in their autonomy and ability to work without state interference and (2) to
415 “Kazantseva Alena Borisovna.” 416 Interview ALTAI‐14. 417 Interview ALTAI‐14. 418 Interview ALTAI‐14; Savin, “ ‘Zheltaia’ initsiativa.” 419 Interview ROS‐08. 162 enforce strict transparency requirements about spending budget rubles and emphasize that budget money are different from other funding they may receive.420 Equally odd was the idea that the regional government may suggest businesses to make donations to social causes: “That would be considered pressure from the state, this is not serious, we don’t do this.”421 Regardless of whether these words reflect the real practice in the region, the difference in norms between Rostov region and
Tatarstan/Kemerovo region is striking. In Tatarstan and Kemerovo region the facilitating and almost coercive role of the government in attracting private money for social projects was considered normal and frequently positive, although in Tatarstan the resistance of businesses was more pronounced in the public discourse. It would not occur to people there to deny the fact that the government had a clear role in attracting business donations, and my interviewees spoke openly about it. In Rostov, even governmental SPS organizations (e.g. schools) strive to maintain the separation from the state apparatus and to preserve their autonomy. For example, schools make sure that the decisions about the distribution of the total salary pool are made strictly inside the school community to avoid potential pressure from municipal authorities.422 Again, regardless of whether this is always true, the awareness about the possible pressure of state officials and a clearly negative attitude to such pressure is apparent.
The political utility of SPS organizations under integrative and autonomous patterns
The different patterns of state‐society relationships led to the different utility of SPS organizations for politicians. Under integrative pattern, SPS organizations serve as institutional channels for mobilization and monitoring of grievances and dissent, while under autonomous pattern, SPS organizations become the basis for clientelistic networks of exchanging favors and material perks for
420 Interview ROS‐08. 421 Interview ROS‐08. 422 Interview ROS‐15. 163 political support. These different roles of SPS organizations explain why in Kemerovo region and
Tatarstan Putin’s regime proved to be much more resilient than in Rostov region and Altai.
Chapter 4 has shown how pensioners’ and community organizations in Kemerovo region routinely mobilize the population for various regime‐backed projects and co‐opt the activists, help monitor discontent, and control public space and discourse. Other SPS organizations in the region act in similar capacities wherever they have the organizational capacities. For example, Orthodox parishes in the region collect information for the regional administration about the neediest people and form lists of beneficiaries for various social programs. What the regional administration values in the cooperation with the church is that the priests, being close to the people in their parishes and knowing them personally, are able to provide an informal assessment of neediness.423 They help to identify grievances that may be missed by the formal criteria of benefit programs and alleviate them before they become the basis of public protests.
In Tatarstan, the routine mobilization at least of the younger part of the population for regime projects is successfully carried out by the Ministry of Youth Affairs and the network of organizations, including universities, that it supervises. The volunteer center regularly supplies participants to the regime‐sponsored rallies, which is considered an obligation of a state‐supported organization.424
Universities have similar obligations: they supply volunteer student force not only to regional rallies and celebrations425 and larger events like Universiade426 but also for the electoral campaigns of local deputies427 and, probably, United Russia Party given its close affiliation with the regional government.
Similar to Kemerovo region, Tatarstan has a centralized organizational network that controls
423 Interview KEM‐08. 424 Interview KAZ‐03. 425 Interview KAZ‐09. 426 Interview TOM‐03. 427 Interview KAZ‐09. 164 neighborhood space – the youth squads “Forpost”, which are in the position to disseminate and supervise visual ads during the elections.428
My fieldwork data contain no evidence of routine monitoring of social grievances in Tatarstan using SPS organizations, which may be the consequence of Tatarstan being a relatively affluent region with little potential for economic protests.429 However, I have documented at least one example of bureaucratic responsiveness and a policy change in response to a citizen’s complaint.430 Youth delinquency is likely to be monitored more closely than purely economic grievances through the network of teen clubs and volunteer networks like “Forpost” since reporting from youth organizations is centralized at the regional level.431
Finally, similarly to Kemerovo SPS organizations, youth organizations in Tatarstan help identify and recruit local activists. Not only do they organize various gatherings and training for the most active volunteers432 but they also supply them with detailed recommendations, developed at the regional level by the Council of Youth Organizations of Tatarstan Republic, about how to run for an elected office.433
These instructions teach how to analyze the electorate, how to run a campaign in urban and rural settings, advice about public speaking, etc. Recruitment of politically active youth early on and their inclusion in the regime‐sponsored system reduces the chances of political dissent and increases regime resilience.
428 Interview KAZ‐03; Respublikanskii tsentr molodezhnykh (studencheskikh) formirovanii po okhrane obshchestvennogo poriadka “Forpost.” 429 Interview KAZ‐14. 430 In that case a mother complained to the regional Ministry of labor and social security about the problems with distribution of fresh baby food, and the Ministry immediately extended the number of beneficiaries and allocated additional funding to solve the problem (Interview KAZ‐04). 431 Interview KAZ‐07. 432 Interview KAZ‐03. 433 Sovet molodezhnykh organizatsii Respubliki Tatarstan, Agrarnoe molodezhnoe ob’edinenie Respubliki Tatarstan. Primenenie izbiratel’nykh tekhnologii v usloviiakh goroda i sel’skoi mestnosti. 165
The example of recruiting politically active youth provides an opportunity to draw a contrast between Tatarstan and Rostov region, where recruiting is common as well. In Tatarstan, though, the activists use youth organizations to prove their loyalty and organizational abilities to the government, and once they become state officials, they weaken the connection to their launching organizations and seek to develop the higher‐level structure that they are now a part of. The director of the volunteer center is an example of such trajectory: in the early days of her career as a state official, she used to channel state resources towards the organizations that worked on addiction problems since her previous experience was connected to them. Quickly, though, she switched the gears and redirected state resources towards the theme of volunteering and the development of a different kind of organizations that were more in line with the current goals of the regional government.434 In a similar situation in Rostov, youth activists who found their paths to either the regional parliament or the regional government continued to lobby the interests of their organizations. This was the case for the
Don Youth Union (former Komsomol) and a number of other youth associations, whose leaders either got official governmental positions or developed a close connection to government officials and were able to advance the interests of their organizations this way.435 These leaders have been maintaining and developing the connection to their former organizations because it was those connections that gave them political weight.
This example with youth organizations illustrates how in the regions with the integrative pattern of state‐society relationships SPS organizations develop to be suited for routine mobilization and monitoring, while in the regions with the autonomous pattern they develop to potentially serve as clientelistic networks. During my fieldwork, I came across multiple instances of clientelism (i.e. direct
434 Interview KAZ‐06. 435 Interview ROS‐04. 166 exchange of goods and favors for political support at the elections) in Altai and Rostov region and none in Tatarstan and Kemerovo region. In Altai, people would exchange anecdotes about an old man in a village who came to the polling place and said that an election candidate provided mixed fodder for his cattle, so, he guessed, he now had to vote for that candidate.436 Or about a village leader saying that his village “won” a minivan because they all voted for the United Russia, while simultaneously complaining about United Russia policies.437 One of the best examples of the involvement of SPS organizations into clientelistic exchanges I came across in Altai was an election in one of the rural municipalities where two competing candidates had approximately equal chances of winning. As it happens in other Russian regions, the person responsible for the agitation campaign of the incumbent candidate was the head of the municipal education department. This person had a leverage over school principals and teachers, who, as Chapter 1 has shown, are a great resource for agitation. In this case, however, out of 16 school principals in the municipality only 8 supported the incumbent and another 8 supported the opponent.
After the opponent won the election, he appointed a new head of education department who refused to renew job contracts with the school principals who supported the former incumbent.438 After this election, the regional governor, who was an ally of the displaced incumbent, publicly prohibited using teachers as agitators in the region.439 A similar situation happened at the regional level: the current
Teachers’ Union leader used to campaign for the former regional governor, Mikhail Lapshin, who was successfully elected. However, after governors’ elections were abolished in Russia in 2004, Vladimir
Putin appointed Lapshin’s competitor, Aleksandr Berdnikov, as a governor. When the Union’s leader
436 Interview ALTAI‐08. 437 Interview ALTAI‐09. 438 Interviews ALTAI‐08 and ALTAI‐14. At the time when I left the region, three of the eight school principals were officially fired and the rest were in limbo. 439 Interview ALTAI‐08. It is illegal to use teachers as agitators according to the Russian law, but this norm is routinely ignored. What the governor did in this case, was that he sent a message that the law may actually be enforced. 167 attempted to negotiate with him on policies, the response was: “What kind of collaboration can we have with you? You did not work for me.” It took about two years for this relationship to improve.440
Interestingly, the awareness about possible pressure from the state and resistance to that pressure (see the example about school autonomy in distributing salary fund which I described above) leads to the situation when brokers – in this case school principals – become important players in the political game. They defend their autonomy from the state in order to be able to build their clientele and increase their own political weight. In Altai, interviewees have told me multiple stories about nepotism of school principals and unfair distribution of school salary funds.441 The leverage that school principals have over teachers through salary redistribution makes them key players in municipal politics who have access to a powerful agitation resource.
Another contrast between the regions with integrative and autonomous patterns can be observed in the use of public spaces and formation of public discourse. Under integrative pattern, politics in the form of public discussions of state power issues is pushed away from the public space, but any other needs related to public goods and public interest (e.g. non‐political clubs and events or public health campaigns) have easy access to it. Under autonomous pattern, politics is not avoided in the public space, but access to it for a non‐political common good may be a problem. An illustration of this difference is the use of public libraries in Kemerovo and Rostov regions. In Kemerovo, the library hosts a lot of hobby clubs and educational workshops, mostly for pensioners but also for younger people.442 The space rental is free, but the application has to be approved by the library management. When I asked what kind of organizations may not get the approval, the librarians told that they avoid the political
440 Interview ALTAI‐14. 441 Interviews ALTAI‐07, ALTAI‐08, and ALTAI‐14. 442 Kemerovo fieldnotes. 168 ones.443 In contrast, Rostov Regional Library readily hosts the events of various political parties, some of which I observed during my fieldwork,444 most probably because these parties pay for space rental. In a similar vein, Rostov newspapers, which influence the regional public discourse, refuse to work for the common good unless they are paid: in response to the request of the municipal government to publish articles that would promote a balanced view of social conflicts in the region and would not picture them blatantly in ethnic terms, the newspapers usually reply: “Pay, and we will write whatever you want.”445
The source of power legitimacy as the root of the different patterns of state‐society
relationships
The preliminary finding from my fieldwork data is that the different patterns of state‐society relationship stem from whether the source of power legitimacy is the state or the community. In
Kemerovo region and Tatarstan, the state is the embodiment of the public will, while in Rostov region and Altai the public will is detached from the state.
The community and the state as the sources of power legitimacy
As I mentioned earlier, Kemerovo region is a mining region. Its rise and development went in parallel to the state‐led industrialization in the Soviet Union, when Kuzbass’s supplies of coal drove industrial production in many parts of the country. The name Kuzbass is an abbreviation from Kuznetsk coal basin, which is situated on the territory of Kemerovo region, and it is frequently used as a nickname for the region. The Miners’ Day is an important holiday in Kuzbass: public celebrations are held in many locales throughout the region, new objects of the social infrastructure are finalized by this day, and
443 Interview KEM‐02. 444 Rostov fieldnotes. 445 Interview ROS‐11. 169 recognition programs are organized for the best people in the profession. The Museum of Miners’ Fame in Kemerovo city is much better maintained and attended than the Museum of Local History.446 Judging from the newspaper archives I worked with, people in the region take pride in the region’s role as a key industrial center in the national economy.
Tatarstan’s primary identity is clearly ethnic. But, importantly, Tatar ethnicity has been historically connected to statehood, i.e. Tatars viewed the state as their own institution. One of my interviewees called Tatars “a subjugated imperial nation”.447 Tatarstan has had a special status in the
Russian Federation since the early 1990s with a larger share of taxes left in the region compared to other Federation subjects. The head of the region is still called “the President”, which makes it the only region in the country holding on to that title despite the pressure of the federal government to replace it with “the head of the republic”. In the early 2000s, Tatarstan attempted to switch the Tatar language, the second official language in the region, to Latin alphabet,448 but the federal government hindered that attempt. Statehood as a component of Tatar ethnicity is probably even more important than blood.
Tatars don’t have clans,449 and although the highest positions in the regional government are usually occupied by ethnic Tatars and the knowledge of Tatar language increases the chances for a governmental career, Tatarstan’s state is rather inclusive of other ethnicities, mainly, Russians. One piece of evidence in favor of that is that there are almost no conflicts between Muslim and Orthodox religious authorities in the region.450 Another example of inclusiveness comes from my interview with an employee of the regional Ministry of Youth Affairs, who was ethnically Russian. She recalled her
446 Kemerovo fieldnotes. 447 Interview KAZ‐ 448 Tatar language is a Turk one, and switching to Latin alphabet would facilitate its connection to other countries with similar languages, mainly, Turkey. 449 Here by clans I mean relatives by blood, not patron‐client networks based on friendships and personal loyalty. 450 Interviews KAZ‐05, KAZ‐14. 170 experience of working in youth organizations in Moscow and the reason she decided to come back to
Tatarstan: “In Moscow or St. Petersburg there is not this spirit when you feel like the Republic is behind you, that I am valued and that the regional government is ready to invest in me.”451
In contrast to Kemerovo region and Tatarstan, Rostov region praises itself as a multi‐ethnic area.
Although according to the official statistics over 90% of the regional population identify as Russian, the actual number of non‐Russian population is larger than 10% because of steady migration from the North
Caucasus that is not captured by the official statistics.452 The different ethnic groups in the region form actual communities when they concentrate on particular territories or occupy a certain economic niche.453 The largest official ethnic group – the Russians – encompasses an important quasi‐ethnic group, the Cossacks. In the Russian Empire, the latter ones were an estate that enjoyed significant autonomy from the state in exchange for its military service to the Czar.454 While the Cossacks have historically served the Russian state, they did it in exchange for a wide internal autonomy and privileges. To date, they have been maintaining the traditions of direct democracy, particularly, at the community level.455
The importance of this group for contemporary regional politics is evident from the fact that the relationship of the regional government with the Cossacks have been a matter of a special policy separate from the general issues of interethnic relationships in the region.456 Generally, in Rostov region, a sizable share of the population identify primarily with their ethnic or cultural groups. On top of that, the population as a whole perceives the region as a unique territory where different ethnic groups have
451 Interview KAZ‐03. In Kemerovo, the sentiment was similar. An employee of governmental social services talked about how they feel the governor’s support and how it motivates people to work (Interview KEM‐12). 452 Khopyorskaya, “Lessons Learned from Addressing Tensions Caused by Ethnic Migration in Rostov,” 42. 453 For example, transportation in Rostov region has been handled by Armenians since the 18th century (Ibid.) 454 For history of Cossacks see Feodoroff, History of the Cossacks; O’Rourke, The Cossacks. 455 Interview ROS‐13. 456 See, for example, the section on Cossacks on the regional government web‐site: “Kazachestvo – Pravitel’stvo Rostovskoi oblasti.” 171 been living freely and peacefully for centuries.457 Even the Internet domain name of the regional government contains a reference to this identity: instead of engaging the official name of the region and its capital, Rostov, the domain is called “donland.ru” after the river of Don and the surrounding area.
In Altai, the ethnic composition is different from Rostov, but regional communities are just as detached from statehood. Although ethnic Altaians comprise about 30% of the population and they are the titular nation for the region, they are divided into 36 clans of different sizes and powers. Clans have a big impact on public and private lives. Marriages inside one clan are considered to be incest and are extremely rare. In the 19th – early 20th century the marriage market was the venue of clan competition for political influence.458 At the elections relatives usually support the representatives of their clans, and the rest of the population, which is mostly Russian, has to get involved in the political games of the
Altaians. The authority that is most influential in people’s everyday lives, therefore, comes from their clans or support group rather than the state represented by the regional government.
The sources of power legitimacy and community ties
How do the different sources of power legitimacy impact the formation of low‐level political and power structures? If the state is the source of power legitimacy and it attempts to engage the people at the community level, such attempts are usually welcomed or, at least, not resisted. The best example of that is the creation of TOSes in Kemerovo: when the city authorities reached out to the population, people were happy to cooperate with the state on solving everyday problems.459 They perceive such initiatives as the recognition of their importance and their value by the state, like the employee of
Tatarstan’s Ministry of Youth Affairs, described above. People, who recognize the state as the
457 Interview ROS‐01. 458 Interview ALTAI‐07. 459 Interview KEM‐13. 172 embodiment of the public will, take pride in their collaboration with the state or in being part of the state.460 And communities, therefore, respect and support people who can demonstrate their association with the state – it is such people who win local elections, i.e. the support of the politician by the state is what brings him the support of the community. Beyond elections, people also welcome engagement with the state and readily provide volunteer help to various state initiatives related to their everyday lives, be it the creation of hobby clubs for children, neighborhood patrols, or a clean‐up
Saturday. If the state pays back with the recognition of people’s contribution and supports the narrative of valuing their needs and interests with tangible actions, it creates the basis for building a ramified top‐ down administrative structure that can benefit from an army of volunteers, deep embeddedness in people’s social lives, and their trust.
If people do not view the state as the embodiment of the public will, community ties are maintained without the state interference and it is the position in the community networks that elevates people to power. In Altai,
… when a person, who has few relatives and, therefore, small support, tries to enter politics, people listen to her and think: “Who is that? Whose is he? How did you even get here? I understand, those people [from larger clans – NF] are powerful, but you?” It is the legitimization of who can claim the positions of power and the benefits that come with it. And since there are a lot of clans in Altai, 36 or so, they all play these games. And “the political game” in this case is not a metaphor, it’s a real game.461
Local politicians in such environment keep a close connection to their constituencies because it is their support, not the support of the state that keeps them in power. In Altai, constituencies are often,
460 In Tatarstan, my interviewees told me multiple times that organizations and businesses in the region pay attention to what the regional government says and try to follow its guidance (Interviews KAZ‐03, KAZ‐04, KAZ‐05, KAZ‐09). 461 Interview ALTAI‐07. 173 but not always,462 clan‐based. It is also very important for the regional population that the people in the regional government are locals, not appointees from outside of the region.463 In Rostov region, constituencies are usually ethnic or territorial. In both cases, the constituents expect their people whom they elevated to power to pay back with benefits and resources that come together with the elected office or a governmental position. Here is how a person who worked in a municipal government in
Rostov region describes such an exchange:
At the end of the month, the deputies travel across the regions to meet with their constituencies. So, one is traveling through Sovetskii464 district [where the interviewee worked – NF]. ‐ Where are you heading? ‐ To Troitsk. ‐ Come over to our place. ‐ Why? You’re doing fine. ‐ And what’s over there? ‐ I’m holding a town hall there, 120 people signed up, they have so many issues. ‐ No, come over, have some tea. [The deputy comes over and sits down to talk and asks:] ‐ So, how are you doing? ‐ We’re doing well. One thing: we need to install a water pipe system in Petrovka village, they still don’t have a centralized water pipe. ‐ How much does it cost? ‐ 800 million rubles. ‐ What?! Come on! Do you understand what you’re asking for? ‐ Wait, wait. Vladimir Aleksandrovich, do you remember who elected you to be the deputy? Did Slaviansk fail you? It did. Did three rural municipalities fail you? They did. And how much did Sovetskii rural district give you? 96% Do you want the same in four years? ‐ Yes.
462 Since there are more Russians in Altai Republic than Altaians, local politicians have to attract their votes too. Most Russians are not a part of Altaian clans network, but this fact does not change the general principle that it is the community support rather than the state one that a local politician needs to get elected. 463 Interview ALTAI‐07. 464 The names of municipal districts, villages, and cities have been changed in this and subsequent quotes to preserve informant’s confidentiality. 174
‐ And how much are you getting in Troitsk? ‐ 3‐4‐5% ‐ So, deliver there for 3‐4‐5% and here for 96%. ‐ And how am I supposed to resolve this? ‐ That’s a different question. Let me explain to you if you don’t get it yourself. Didn’t the governor ask you to attract a billion rubles of investment to Rostov region? ‐ Yes, he did. ‐ So, go to the governor, since this is a regional question, not a federal one, and say: “You want a billion ruble investment, and I have to deliver on the mandates from my constituencies. They need 800 million rubles for a water pipe. You resolve my mandate, and I attract that billion for you.” The logic is simple. God help you!465
This interviewee recognized that not all municipal heads in the region used this strategy. He distinguished between “politicians” and “managers” among them, with the managers being concentrated on economic issues and unwilling to engage in politics both in their municipalities and at the regional level. Managers, as he said, did not understand that one could not attract money and resolve economic issues if she did not engage in politics in a manner described in the above quote. He clearly regarded the understanding of the importance of such games and the ability to play them as crucial for the mastery of the art of politics in the region. When I asked him to comment on the high competitiveness of politics and a relatively weak administrative resource in Rostov region, assuming that those were the indicators of a more democratic environment and that I was making a compliment to the region, he interpreted my question as a hesitation in the abilities of the municipal heads as politicians. In response, he brought up an example of his former boss who has served as a municipal head for over 20 years and still gets elected with 98‐99% support. “Like in the Soviet times!” he said proudly. “And if the result is a bit too high,” he continued hinting at the likely falsification, “it is only for one purpose: he celebrates for a day and then works hard for five years.”466
465 Interview ROS‐03. 466 Interview ROS‐03. 175
This logic – use community support to get to the positions of power and then pay back to maintain the relationship – works not only for municipalities but for any kind of organization. As I mentioned above, when the leaders of youth organizations advance to the regional government or the parliament, they continue to advance the interests of their base organizations. This is how the money allocated at the federal level in the mid‐2000s to fight the “Orange Revolution” was successfully redirected to support various initiatives of the existing youth organizations in the region.
The tendency of local politics to form clientelistic networks is one of the two reasons why the regional government is reluctant to create additional governmental structures. If in Kemerovo and
Tatarstan such structures would become an aid to the regional government in mobilizing, monitoring, and pacifying society, in Rostov, they are likely to turn into another layer of political brokers who would demand their share of resources in exchange for political support. This is how the above quoted municipal employee illustrated the aversion to creating additional structures because there were already too many of them:
[Recollection of the past] I work in a municipality, and there is an electoral campaign. Ok, we’re engaging the administrative resource to work with voters. Everyone who is in the boat has to row in one direction. So, we look around and it turns out there are no ordinary voters. They are all in administrative boats, from the municipal administration to all the civil society organizations and TOSes. For example, there are a couple dozen civil society organizations in the municipality (Afganistan veterans, environmentalists, political parties, etc.). And everyone participates – including schools and teachers – everyone participates, participates, participates in the administrative resource. As civil society, as a party, as bureaucrats, etc. etc. We allocate people responsible for the campaign and then ask ourselves the question: whom are we going to work with? Turns out, only with ourselves. You are the voter and you are the administrative resource. Work on convincing yourself how to vote. There are no ordinary people, a group that you can work with. And I am not exaggerating.467
467 Interview ROS‐03. 176
Not only would the structures created from the top be attracting the resources, they would also be unlikely to provide the leverage over communities because they would lack embeddedness and trust.
When communities are wary of state pressure, suspicious of outsiders, and are not cooperating with the state voluntarily, the only possible way to maintain some kind of connection to them in order to manage mass politics is to build a relationship with an informal leader, an insider.
Everything comes down to informal leaders. If such a leader emerges and takes an office, everything works smoothly. TOSes always speak their own language. The [external] authorities have never been praised. But it is a different matter when an informal leader gets elected – a leader of a homeowners’ association, of a small dwelling, of a block or a street – and he gathers a team of like‐minded informal leaders. … I can bring a lot of examples from my practice. In Sovetskii district, where I worked, there is a village Grivenskaia, 11 thousand people. It was impossible to get their cooperation on anything. Even during the Civil War, Budyonny468 was extremely surprised that this village was not burned down, he just could not do anything with it. And it remains the same today. When I started my job, I was sent to oversee this territory. And I could not understand what those people wanted and why we couldn’t resolve any issues until I got the main principle of doing things there. They have powerful clans and traditions, and they don’t regard as their own even the people who work in sovkhoz across the road, it’s very strict there. Cossacks are particularly powerful. I tried to obtain community support on different issues, gathered them in a public hall,469 it was packed, there weren't enough chairs, and I spoke for a long time trying to convince them until I almost lost my voice. They applauded, I get out, and they say: ‐ Thank you! Everything you said was right. But we, Griventsy, are not going to do that. We are going to do exactly the opposite. ‐ But you just agreed! ‐ We simply felt bad for you. I could not understand what they needed. But then it occurred to me that I should have dealt with informal leaders – it was either an ataman or the head of a block committee. … I began to work through them. They repeated my words exactly, including commas and periods, and were immediately cheered by the people! Everything gets done! And you don’t need any gatherings and discussions. I tell him: say in your own words, and
468 A famous Marshall of the Soviet Union who played a major role in Bolsheviks’ victory in the Russian Civil War 1917‐1922. 469 В Доме Культуры. 177
everything gets done in three seconds. Any issues – social ones and even fundraisers. The [municipal] authorities should not try hard to convince people. You may be a thousand times right and convincing, but they are not going to do it anyway. But if their own person says it, they will go over and above. In this Krivianka, they repaired the bridge between their village and Novocherkassk to avoid a long detour. 80% of the necessary funds were collected from the people and only 20% came from the village administration and the municipality. The money was gathered without any order from the top because the informal leaders announced the call. Before that, the issue remained unresolved for decades because the municipality tried to require something from the people, to say that they had to do it. And the situation did not change until the call went through the informal leaders, which was a completely different game. We underestimate it. We frequently come to power and do not take advantage of this, which is unfortunate.470
The lack of embeddedness and trust of top‐down organizations would also prevent them from serving as an alarm system for the prevention of ethnic conflicts in the region, which is the second reason for the laissez‐faire governance. Rostov is generally a quiet region when it comes to ethnic conflicts, and part of the reason for that is a long‐standing tradition of negotiations between the different communities. Small everyday conflicts between the representatives of different ethnicities that are inevitable in a multi‐ethnic region are routinely moderated and resolved through the community leaders. The governments of Rostov city and the region regularly get together with the leaders of ethnic communities to maintain the contact and discuss common issues.471 The regional government also had to rely on ethnic communities and their leaders during the refugee waves from Chechnia in the 1990s and the early 2000s, and the difficulties of quick assimilation of the new arrivals to the native communities of Rostov region and their inclusion in informal networks was a special point of concern for
470 Interview ROS‐03. 471 Interview ROS‐11. 178 the regional government.472 No top‐down organization would be able to be of much political utility in such an environment.
State‐society relationships and the regional variation in regime resilience
How is the observed difference in state‐society relationships connected to the leverage over teachers that was explored in Chapter 2? The quantitative analysis presented in that chapter examined the factors that impacted the ability of Putin’s regime to maintain the official electoral percentage at a high level when the popular support of the regime decreased. The assumption of the analysis was that the regional administrative machines would be called upon to boost up the percentage through additional agitation, increasing the turnout of Putin’s supporters, suppressing the turnout of his opponents, and committing electoral fraud. The analysis has shown that throughout Russia regime’s resilience to decreased popular support at the 2012 presidential elections was higher in the regions with higher teacher density, unemployment, and teacher layoffs as well as with increased dependency of regional budgets on the federal one. The cases where I subsequently observed the integrative pattern of state‐society relationship showed a much higher regime’s resilience than this model predicted (i.e. their administrative machines performed much better), while those with the autonomous pattern showed a much lower one (i.e. their machines performed much worse).
The case studies have shown that the integrative relationship between society and the state makes it possible to create a centralized regional administrative machine whose functioning is well rooted in non‐political everyday activities and is, therefore, much less dependent on the fluctuations of popular political opinions. The smoothness of interactions between the different levels of this machine
(regional‐municipal, municipal‐organizational, and organizational‐individual) is developed and
472 Khopyorskaya, “Lessons Learned from Addressing Tensions Caused by Ethnic Migration in Rostov,” 53. 179 maintained on the everyday basis through multiple common programs and initiatives. Regular maintenance of the infrastructural power of this administrative machine means that if and when it is called upon to help with elections, it is already at full capacity and ready to be deployed. Teachers are only a part of this machine that includes a web of state and non‐state organizations with well‐developed connections to the regional government. If the regional government has understood the political leverage of such machine, has been fostering it, and is willing to deploy it to support the federal regime, like it happened in Kemerovo and Tatarstan, the region is likely to demonstrate high regime resilience.
The autonomous pattern of state‐society relationships is not conducive to building such a machine. Rather, this pattern breeds clientelistic networks where the connection between each two nodes is a constantly negotiated exchange. Each level of such structure, including municipal authorities and school principals, defends its autonomy from the interventions from above by relying on supporters from below. Each level has a political leverage, and utilizing the multitude of those leverages at once to boost up election result when regime support decreases would require multiple concessions and negotiations. In reality, some negotiations inevitably fail or prove unfeasible, and the always limited material resources constrain the ability of the regional government to buy off all the brokers.
These two patterns of state‐society relationships are apparent when we look at the quite extreme cases. Most Russian regions, though, would not be clearly on one or the other side but would rather combine the elements of both patterns in a moderate form, like I observed it in my fifth case,
Tomsk region. Its long‐term governor, Viktor Kress, has been in office for over 16 years (1995‐2012).
Unlike his neighbor Aman Tuleev, Kress was a democrat during the 1990s. His political stance together with the lack of major protests in the region resulted in the absence of serious attempts to build a centralized administrative machine in the region. 180
Both models of state‐society relationships can be traced in Tomsk region. There are several small but consolidated ethnic communities, mainly those from the North Caucuses and Central Asia (e.g.
Armenians, Uzbeks). Kress used to build relationships with their informal leaders and sought their support during elections. In return, they put forward their own wishes, but neither party was particularly invested in holding the other one accountable. I have learned about at least one rural municipality with competitive local politics, where a local oppositional newspaper has kept political issues on the public agenda. At the same time, there is Seversk, a closed city with a nuclear plant, whose usually uncompetitive local politics has been largely driven by the informal agreements of the regional government and the plant’s management.
The SPS organizations in the region also demonstrate a mixed development pattern. There have been a number of strong grassroots NGOs in the region, particularly in the 1990s and the early 2000s, which began cooperating with the state much earlier than their counterparts in Rostov region. The regional government has initiated reforms of social services, in particular, in the realm of social work with families and children, but the lack of state capacity similar to Kemerovo region forestalled this effort. Kress used to reach out to the large businesses to get donations for occasional projects like the restoration of an Orthodox church, but it has not been institutionalized to the same degree as in
Kemerovo region and Tatarstan. Moreover, some NGOs and even state SPS organizations successfully attract donations from businesses with no involvement of the regional or even municipal government.
The theoretical distinction between the integrative and autonomous patterns allows to identify their elements in mixed cases like Tomsk region and analyze the trends in the development of state‐ society relationships in a region. While further research is needed to explore the coexistence of the two patterns, the findings of my dissertation suggest at least one indicator that can be used for refining the quantitative comparisons of Russian regions that tend to label all organizational resources of the 181 regional governors as clientelism. I suggest that together with the electoral support of pro‐regime candidates in the region, researchers should use the variance of that support between municipalities.473
Politics in the regions where regime support is moderate and the variance between comparable municipalities is high are likely to be driven by clientelistic networks. Politics in the regions where regime support is moderate but the variance is low are likely to be much less clientelistic but lacking state capacity similar to Kemerovo region or Tatarstan. I would expect these two categories of regions to react differently to the changing political environment, in particular, to the economic stagnation or crisis that probably awaits Russia in the nearest future.
473 That should be done taking into account urbanization levels of each municipality. 182
Conclusion
Summary of findings and contributions
This dissertation has developed an argument about the importance of the infrastructural power of the social public sector for authoritarian resilience. Using the case of Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia when it faced a political challenge in 2012, I have shown that the organizational infrastructure penetrating society to the grass roots was crucial for ensuring the regime’s ability to resolve the crisis.
The key component of this infrastructure was the social public sector – the organizations that both provide public goods and help the regime to control society. These organizations are embedded in people’s everyday life because the majority of the population contact social public sector employees on a regular basis. Because of their engagement in public goods provision (education, healthcare, social services), these workers are trusted by the population more than are other state officials. In addition to being socially embedded and trusted, however, these organizations are directly connected to the state apparatus, which is frequently abused by authoritarian regimes for the purposes of their survival.
The case of the involvement of schoolteachers in electoral agitation and fraud during the 2012 presidential election in Russia supports my argument about the value of the social public sector to an autocrat like Putin. Using teachers’ access to the parents of their students and the community trust they enjoyed, Russian state officials increased the efficacy of agitation for Putin as a presidential candidate.
Using the massive presence of teachers in the precinct‐level electoral commissions, they falsified a significant share of votes, which was enough to produce a convincing victory and to show the public that the regime still stood strong.
The theoretical contribution of my study of schoolteachers’ role in regime’s survival lies in demonstrating that the social public sector has been largely overlooked as an important component of 183 the infrastructural state power on which some autocrats depend. These organizations have been previously discussed primarily as agents of social service provision and economic redistribution that won people’s loyalty to the regime. I have demonstrated that regardless of the level of public goods, the infrastructural power of the social public sector has a substantial independent effect on authoritarian resilience.
My study has also shown that the infrastructural state power was stronger in some Russian regions than in others. A historical study of one of the regions in which the infrastructural power was particularly strong, Kemerovo region, allowed me to demonstrate that it was not only schoolteachers but various other organizations on the border of the state and society that were involved in strengthening the authoritarian regime in one or the other way. Some of these organizations, for example, Veterans’ Councils, have existed since the Soviet times and have been taken over by the regional governor and retooled to serve regime goals. Other organizations, for example, residential committees, have been created anew using the Soviet template and structured from the very beginning in a way that would maximize their infrastructural potential to organize social relations at the grass roots.
The study of the Kemerovo case shows that autocrats may purposefully create social public sector organizations not to increase material redistribution to buy people’s loyalty, as previous studies would assume, but to put in place an organizational infrastructure that allows them to easily reach every citizen. Such an organizational reach gives an autocrat many tools of survival in addition to increased redistribution. For example, it allows him to mobilize the population for regime‐supported projects and identify and co‐opt potential political leaders. It also makes possible routine monitoring of potential discontent in order to handle it before it becomes public. Existing discontent can be routinely managed to prevent it from becoming the basis for the consolidation of the opposition. Finally, organizational 184 infrastructure allows the regime to control effectively the public space and discourse at the community level, which also diminishes the chances for a political opposition to mature.
The comparison of cases with high infrastructural power (Kemerovo region and the Republic of
Tatarstan) to the cases with low infrastructural power (Rostov region and the Republic of Altai) led me to the last contribution of this dissertation – describing the distinction between integrative and autonomous patterns of state‐society relationships and the interaction effect on the relationship between the infrastructural state power and authoritarian resilience. I found that the social public sector organizations are most beneficial for the regime’s ability to deal with a crisis when people cooperate with the state because they view the state as the embodiment of their public will. Under such conditions, social public sector organizations form a top‐down hierarchy that serves both political and non‐political goals while being routinely maintained in working conditions. If, though, people perceive the state as a predator rather than the embodiment of the public will, they turn the requests for cooperation from the state into a bargain for material resources preventing the formation of a smoothly functioning organizational hierarchy. In such environment, clientelism finds a fertile ground, which makes the regime dependent on a number of material perks it can provide to local brokers and communities.
The demonstration of this interaction effect is a contribution to the existing literature that has studied the causes of authoritarian resilience and state‐society relationships separately but has not tested whether the causes of authoritarian resilience may be different depending on the character of the state‐society relationship. My study shows that introduction of state‐society relationship as an interaction variable reveals two different mechanisms by which an authoritarian regime can build a relationship with society. 185
Further questions and a theoretical implication
The findings and contributions of this dissertation help us make a step forward in our understanding of states, societies, and political regimes and ask further questions. Among those questions, I will highlight two that are most directly related to my findings.
First, although I have identified and distinguished two patterns of state‐society relationships, both of them represent the extremes of a continuum, on which not only Russian regions but also other states and societies may be situated. Further investigation should look at what happens in the middle of this continuum. Do these patterns simply combine gradually transforming from one to the other? Or does the state‐society relationship gain a distinct quality in the middle of this continuum? If it has a distinct quality, how does it impact the possible causes of authoritarian resilience?
Second, the state and the community are not the only institutions that may serve as the embodiment of the public will. Another obvious candidate is religious organizations. Thus, the question for further research is what happens with the state‐society relationship in the regions where religion plays a major role in politics. How different are the relationships between states and societies in those places compared to what I observed in a predominantly secular Russian society? How does religion change whether people resist or collaborate with the state? And how does this modified relationship between states and societies affect the causes of authoritarian resilience?
Besides these two questions that apply the issues that I studied in Russia to a larger geographical context, the findings of my dissertation also have an implication for other substantive areas of research on states, societies, and political regimes. The interaction effect of state‐society relationships that I demonstrated studying the causes and mechanisms of authoritarian resilience, may be in place for other phenomena too. For example, the effectiveness of state bureaucracy and the patterns of corruption may depend not only on the qualities of the state apparatus or anti‐corruption 186 policies but also on the pre‐existing state‐society relationship. The formation and implementation of social policies may also be partially shaped by whether people view the state as the embodiment of their collective will. Public protests may follow different scenarios depending on whether people resist the state. And finally, the causes and mechanisms of not only authoritarian resilience but also of democratization may crucially depend on what kind of state the authoritarian regime controls. If an autocrat controls the state that people largely view as the embodiment of the public will, which is characteristic, for example, for Russia or China, democratization would mean developing mechanisms to hold the state coercive power accountable to the public. If an autocrat controls the state that people resist at the community level, which is frequently the case for postcolonial nations, democratization would mean developing the mechanisms that would protect the public sphere from being abused by private interests rather than by the state. The introduction of state‐society relationships as an interaction variable allows a researcher to distinguish these two components of democratization and understand their internal logic better.
187
References
Secondary and Academic Sources Adams, Melinda. “‘National Machineries’ and Authoritarian Politics.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 9, no. 2 (2007): 176–197. doi:10.1080/14616740701259846. Andersen, David, Jorgen Moller, Lasse Lykke Rorbaek, and Svend‐Erik Skaaning. “State Capacity and Political Regime Stability.” Democratization 21, no. 7 (November 10, 2014): 1305–25. doi:10.1080/13510347.2014.960204. Ardanaz, Martin, and Isabela Mares. “Labor Shortages, Rural Inequality, and Democratization.” Comparative Political Studies 47, no. 12 (October 2014): 1639–69. doi:10.1177/0010414013512609. Bader, Max, and Carolien van Ham. “What Explains Regional Variation in Election Fraud? Evidence from Russia: A Research Note.” Post‐Soviet Affairs 31, no. 6 (2015): 514–28. doi:10.1080/1060586X.2014.969023. Breslauer, George. “On the Adaptability of Soviet Welfare‐State Authoritarianism.” In Soviet Society and the Communist Party, edited by Karl W. Ryavec, 3–25. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1978. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press, 2005. Buzin, A.Iu. Administrativnye izbiratel’nye tekhnologii: moskovskaia praktika. Moskva: Panorama, 2006. Colton, Timothy J., and Henry E. Hale. “The Putin Vote: Presidential Electorates in a Hybrid Regime.” Slavic Review 68, no. 3 (2009): 473–503. Cook, Linda J. The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed : Welfare Policy and Workers’ Politics from Brezhnev to Yeltsin. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993. Corbulonwrote. “Татарстан Нахимичил, Кемерово Обнаглело.” Livejournal, October 9, 2016. http://corbulon.livejournal.com/325072.html. Díaz‐Cayeros, Alberto, Federico Estevez, and Beatriz Magaloni. The Logic of Poverty Relief: Electoral Strategies and Social Policy in Mexico. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Dimitrov, Martin K. “Vertical Accountability in Communist Regimes: The Role of Citizen Complaints in Bulgaria and China.” In Why Communism Did Not Collapse: Understanding Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Asia and Europe, 276–302. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Edele, Mark. Soviet Veterans of the Second World War: A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society 1941‐1991. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Eliasoph, Nina. Avoiding Politics. How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday Life. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Evans, Peter B. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton Paperbacks. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1995. 188
Ezrow, Natasha M., and Erica Frantz. Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and Their Leaders. New York: Continuum, 2011. Feodoroff, Nicholas V. History of the Cossacks. Commack, N.Y: Nova Science, 2000. Fortin‐Rittberger, Jessica. “Exploring the Relationship between Infrastructural and Coercive State Capacity.” Democratization 21, no. 7 (November 10, 2014): 1244–64. doi:10.1080/13510347.2014.960207. Friedgut, Theodore H. Political Participation in the USSR, 1979. Fritz, Verena. State‐Building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia. Budapest ; New York: Central European University Press, 2007. Frye, Timothy, Ora John Reuter, and David Szakonyi. “Political Machines at Work Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace.” World Politics 66, no. 02 (April 2014): 195–228. doi:10.1017/S004388711400001X. Gallagher, Mary E., and Jonathan K. Hanson. “Power Tool or Dull Blade? Selectorate Theory for Autocracies.” Annual Review of Political Science 18, no. 1 (2015): 367–85. doi:10.1146/annurev‐ polisci‐071213‐041224. Gandhi, Jennifer. Political Institutions under Dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Gandhi, Jennifer, and Ellen Lust‐Okar. “Elections Under Authoritarianism.” Annual Review of Political Science 12, no. 1 (June 2009): 403–22. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060106.095434. Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.” Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 11 (November 1, 2007): 1279–1301. doi:10.1177/0010414007305817. Gans‐Morse, Jordan, Sebastián Mazzuca, and Simeon Nichter. “Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics during Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 58, no. 2 (April 2014): 415–32. doi:10.1111/ajps.12058. Geddes, Barbara. “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 115–44. Gel′man, Vladimir. Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post‐Soviet Regime Changes. University of Pittsburg Press, 2015. Gill, Jeff. “Whose Variance Is It Anyway? Interpreting Empirical Models with State‐Level Data.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 1, no. 3 (October 1, 2001): 318–38. doi:10.2307/40421434. Goode, J. Paul. The Decline of Regionalism in Putin’s Russia: Boundary Issues. BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies. London ; New York: Routledge, 2011. Gough, Ian, Geoffrey D Wood, Armando Barrientos, Philippa Bevan, Peter Davis, and Graham Room. Insecurity and Welfare Regimes in Asia, Africa, and Latin America : Social Policy in Development Contexts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Grzymala‐Busse, Anna. “Time Will Tell? Temporality and the Analysis of Causal Mechanisms and Processes.” Comparative Political Studies 44, no. 9 (September 2011): 1267–97. doi:10.1177/0010414010390653. 189
Haber, Stephen, and Victor Menaldo. “Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse.” The American Political Science Review 105, no. 1 (February 2011): 1–26. doi:10.1017/S0003055410000584. Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. “Democratization During the Third Wave.” Annual Review of Political Science 19, no. 1 (May 11, 2016): 125–44. doi:10.1146/annurev‐polisci‐042114‐015137. Hale, Henry E. Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Heydemann, Steven. “Social Pacts and the Persistence of Authoritarianism in the Middle East.” In Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes, edited by Oliver Schlumberger, 21–38. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2007. Heydemann, Steven, and Reinoud Leenders. Middle East Authoritarianisms: Governance, Contestation, and Regime Resilience in Syria and Iran. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2013. Kalinin, Kirill. “Signaling Games of Election Fraud.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2836775. Karshenas, Massoud, and Valentine M Moghadam, eds. Social Policy in the Middle East: Economic, Political, and Gender Dynamics. Social Policy in a Development Context. Basingstoke [England] ; New York: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Khopyorskaya, Larisa. “Lessons Learned from Addressing Tensions Caused by Ethnic Migration in Rostov.” In Local Governance and Minority Empowerment in the CIS, edited by Elena Filippova and Valery Tishkov, 41–62. LGI Books. Budapest, Hungary: Local Govt. and Public Service Reform Initiative : Open Society Institute, 2002. King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument.” Working paper. http://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/50c.pdf, July 26, 2016. Kokarev, I.E. Mestnye soobshchestva i mestnoe samoupravlenie: tekhnologii uchastiia: posobie dlia organizatorov. Moskva: Moskovskii obshchestvennyi nauchnyi fond, 2007. Kynev, A.V., V.S. Vakhshtain, A.Iu. Buzin, and A.E. Liubarev. Vybory Presidenta Rossii 4 marta 2012 goda: Analiticheskii doklad. Biblioteka Assotsiatsii “Golos.” Moskva: Golos, 2012. Lai, Brian, and Dan Slater. “Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950‐1992.” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 1 (January 2006): 113–26. doi:10.1111/j.1540‐5907.2006.00173.x. Larreguy, Horacio A., Cesar E. Montiel Olea, and Pablo Querubin. “Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teacher’s Union.” American Journal of Political Science, Forthcoming. Levchik, D.A. Komitety obshchestvennogo samoupravleniia v Rossii (1988‐1993 gg.) Biblioteka mestnogo samoupravleniia, vyp. 30. Moskva: Moskovskii obshchestvennyi nauchnyi fond, 2000. Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge University Press, 2010. 190
Lieberman, Evan S. “Nested Analysis as a Mixed‐Method Strategy for Comparative Research.” The American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (2005): 435–52. Lopatin, Leonid Nikolaevich. Istoriia rabochego dvizheniia Kuzbassa (1989‐1991 gg.). Kemerovo: Plast, 1995. Magaloni, Beatriz. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico. 1. paperback ed. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006. Mann, Michael. “Infrastructural Power Revisited.” Studies in Comparative International Development 43, no. 3–4 (December 1, 2008): 355–65. doi:10.1007/s12116‐008‐9027‐7. ———. “The Autonomous Power of the State.” European Journal of Sociology 25 (1985): 185–213. Mares, Isabela, and Lauren Young. “Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes.” Annual Review of Political Science 19, no. 1 (May 11, 2016): 267–88. doi:10.1146/annurev‐polisci‐060514‐120923. Mares, Isabela, and Boliang Zhu. “The Production of Electoral Intimidation: Economic and Political Incentives.” Comparative Politics 48, no. 1 (2015): 23–41. Matveev, M.N. Vlast’ i obshchestvo v systeme mestnogo samoupravleniia Rossii v 1993‐2003 gg. Samara: Izdatel’stvo “Samarskii universitet,” 2006. McAllister, Ian, and Stephen White. “‘It’s the Economy, Comrade!’ Parties and Voters in the 2007 Russian Duma Election.” Europe‐Asia Studies 60, no. 6 (August 2008): 931–57. doi:10.1080/09668130802180959. Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States: State‐Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1988. Morgan, Kimberly J., and Ann Shola Orloff, eds. The Many Hands of the State: Theorizing Political Authority and Social Control. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Morrison, Kevin M. “Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability.” International Organization 63, no. 1 (2009): 107–38. Oliveros, Virginia. “Making It Personal: Clientelism, Favors, and the Personalization of Public Administration in Argentina.” Comparative Politics 48, no. 3 (2016): 373–91. O’Rourke, Shane. The Cossacks. Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 2007. Pepinsky, Thomas B., Jan H. Pierskalla, and Audrey Sacks. “Bureaucracy and Service Delivery.” Annual Review of Political Science 20, no. 1 (May 11, 2017): 249–68. doi:10.1146/annurev‐polisci‐ 051215‐022705. Pierskalla, Jan, and Audrey Sacks. “Personnel Politics: Elections, Clientelistic Competition, and Teacher Hiring in Indonesia.” Working paper, 2017. https://janpierskalla.wordpress.com/working‐ papers‐and‐work‐in‐progress/. Read, Benjamin Lelan. Roots of the State: Neighborhood Organization and Social Networks in Beijing and Taipei. Contemporary Issues in Asia and the Pacific. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012. 191
Reisinger, William M., ed. Russia’s Regions and Comparative Subnational Politics. Routledge Research in Comparative Politics. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. Reisinger, William M., and Bryon J. Moraski. “Regional Changes and Changing Regional Relations with the Centre.” In The Politics of Sub‐National Authoritarianism in Russia, edited by Vladimir Gel′man and Cameron Ross, 67–84. Post‐Soviet Politics. Farnham, Surrey ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010. Reuter, Ora John. “Regional Patrons and Hegemonic Party Electoral Performance in Russia.” Post‐Soviet Affairs 29, no. 2 (2013): 101–35. doi:10.1080/1060586X.2013.780410. Reuter, Ora John, Noah Buckley, Alexandra Shubenkova, and Guzel Garifullina. “Local Elections in Authoritarian Regimes: An Elite‐Based Theory With Evidence From Russian Mayoral Elections.” Comparative Political Studies, 2016. doi:10.1177/0010414015626439. Richter, Thomas. “The Rentier State: Relevance, Scope and Explanatory Power.” In Challenges of the Caspian Resource Boom: Domestic Elites and Policy‐Making, edited by Andreas Heinrich and Heiko Pleines, 23–34. Euro‐Asian Studies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Rimlinger, Gaston V. Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America, and Russia. New York: Wiley, 1971. Robertson, Graeme. The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post‐Communist Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010. Rosenfeld, Bryn. “Varieties of Middle Class Growth and Democratic Preference Formation.” Princeton University, 2015. Ross, Michael L. “What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?” Annual Review of Political Science 18, no. 1 (2015): 239–59. doi:10.1146/annurev‐polisci‐052213‐040359. Scott, James C. “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change.” The American Political Science Review 63, no. 4 (December 1969): 1142–58. doi:10.2307/1955076. ———. Domination and the Arts of Resistance. Hidden Transcripts. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990. ———. “Patron‐Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia.” The American Political Science Review 66, no. 1 (March 1, 1972): 91–113. doi:10.2307/1959280. Simpser, Alberto. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Slater, Dan, and Sofia Fenner. “State Power and Staying in Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability.” Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1 (2011): 15–29. Snyder, Richard. “Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method.” Studies in Comparative International Development 36, no. 1 (2001): 93–110. doi:10.1007/BF02687586. Soifer, Hillel. “State Infrastructural Power: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement.” Studies in Comparative International Development 43, no. 3–4 (December 1, 2008): 231–51. doi:10.1007/s12116‐008‐9028‐6. 192
Soifer, Hillel, and Matthias vom Hau. “Unpacking the Strength of the State: The Utility of State Infrastructural Power.” Studies in Comparative International Development 43, no. 3–4 (December 1, 2008): 219–30. doi:10.1007/s12116‐008‐9030‐z. Spencer, Sarah Busse, Svetlana Suslova, Ekaterina Schvartzaid, Anastasia Bozhya‐Volya, and Olga Mayorova. “Regional Variation in Russian Local Self‐Governance Organizations.” Paper presented at the Convention of the American Society for Eastern European and Eurasian Studies, Washington DC, 2016. Starodubtsev, Andrei Vladimirovich. Platit’ nel’zia proigryvat’: regional’naia politika i federalism v sovremennoi Rossii. SPb.: Izdatel’stvo Evropeiskogo universiteta v Sankt‐Peterburge, 2014. Steinmetz, George. Regulating the Social : The Welfare State and Local Politics in Imperial Germany. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993. Stephenson, Svetlana. “The Kazan Leviathan: Russian Street Gangs as Agents of Social Order.” The Sociological Review 59, no. 2 (May 2011): 324–47. doi:10.1111/j.1467‐954X.2011.02007.x. Stokes, Susan C. “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina.” The American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (2005): 315–25. ———. “Political Clientelism.” In The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, edited by Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, 604–27. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Stoner‐Weiss, Kathryn. Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post‐Soviet Russia. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Taylor, Brian D. State Building in Putin’s Russia : Policing and Coercion after Communism. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Tendler, Judith, and Sara Freedheim. “Trust in a Rent‐Seeking World: Health and Government Transformed in Northeast Brazil.” World Development 22, no. 12 (December 1994): 1771–91. doi:10.1016/0305‐750X(94)90173‐2. Treisman, Daniel. “Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin.” American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 3 (July 2011): 590–609. doi:10.1111/j.1540‐ 5907.2010.00500.x. ———. “The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post‐Soviet Russia.” British Journal of Political Science 26, no. 3 (1996): 299–335. Wintrobe, Ronald. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. Cambridge UK; New York NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998. World Bank. Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa: Toward a New Social Contract. World Bank Publications, 2004. Zabolotskaia, K. A. Ugol’naia promyshlennost’ Sibiri (konets 1890 – nachalo 1990‐kh gg.). Istoricheskoe issledovanie. Kemerovo: Kuzbassvuzizdat, 1995. Zakharchuk, N.P., ed. Ugol’naia promyshlennost’ Kuzbassa. Kemerovo: AO Kemerovskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1997. 193
Primary, Journalistic, and Limited Availability Sources by Chapter (Sources without URLs have been obtained from Integrum database.)
Chapter 2 “Davlenie Edinoi Rossii na direktorov shkol.” YouTube, November 13, 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SyEyuAN5cVk. “Dazhe direktora shkol nachali soprotivliat’sia.” Novaia gazeta, December 1, 2011. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2011/12/01/47068‐171‐dazhe‐direktora‐shkol‐nachali‐ soprotivlyatsya‐187. “Direktor shkoly prizyvaet kolleg ne prinimat’ uchastiia v nechestnykh predvybornykh igrakh.” Gorod 48, October 11, 2011. http://gorod48.ru/news/48988/. “Ekzekutsiia v shkole.” March 16, 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rsiQ06AErvc. “Golos’ obnaruzhil nezakonnyi shtab ‘po organizatsii vyborov’ v Krasnoznamenske”. Golos – za chestnye vybory, July 26, 2016. http://www.golosinfo.org/ru/articles/103221. “Ia – mos’ka, kotoraia oblaiala Volan‐de‐Morta.” Praktika.ru, October 30, 2015. https://praktika.ru/articles/culture/shtulberg/. “Karta narushenii: prinuzhdenie k polucheniiu otkrepitel’nykh, zapugivanie izbiratelei, agitatsiia v detsadakh i shkolakh.” Golos – za chestnye vybory, August 24, 2016. http://www.golosinfo.org/ru/articles/106944. “Lev Shlosberg prizval rossiiskikh uchitelei prepodat’ uchenikam na vyborakh urok chestnosti.” Ofitsial’nyi sait L’va Shlosberga, September 2, 2016. http://shlosberg.ru/?novosti=312. “Massovye vbrosy biulletenei (video).” Radio Svoboda on Facebook, September 18, 2016. https://www.facebook.com/radiosvoboda/videos/10153734736897554/. “Otkrytoe obrashchenie uchitelei k kollegam po tsekhu, rabotnikam izbiratel’nykh komissii.” Profsoiuz “Uchitel’ ”, October 9, 2012. http://pedagog‐prof.org/component/content/article/96‐ arkhiv/arkhiv‐novostej/527‐otkrytoe‐obrashchenie‐uchitelej‐k‐kollegam‐po‐tsekhu‐rabotnikam‐ izbiratelnykh‐komissij?Itemid=437. “Pochti 150 uchitelei obratilis’ k kollegam s prizyvom proiavit’ ‘maksimal’nuiu printsipial’nost’ ‘ na vyborakh presidentaю” Novaia gazeta, February 2, 2012. http://www.novayagazeta.ru/ society/50787.html. “Press‐konferentsiia rukovodstva KPRF v ‘Interfakse’: vybory v nyneshnei Rossii – eto samaia bol’shaia lozh’.” Kommunisticheskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, December 7, 2007. https://kprf.ru/vibory2007/chronicle/53640.html. “Pytalis’ uvolit’ uchitel’nitsu.” Priokskaia Pravda (Ryazan’), April 5, 2012. 194
“Segodnia — Den’ uchitelia.” Odintsovo, October 5, 2013. http://www.odintsovo.info/news/?id=37720& comment‐show=y&cn=10. “Shishkina: Uchitelia stali uchastnikami makhinatsii.” Politicheskaia zhizn’ Severo‐Zapadnogo regiona, June 4, 2012. https://www.zaks.ru/new/archive/view/94668. “Sotrudnikov biudzhetnykh organizatsii prinuzhdaiut idti na miting ‘Krymskaia vesna’.“ Telekanal Dozhd’, March 16, 2016. https://tvrain.ru/news/krym‐405552/. “Tamara Eidel’man: Obrashchenie k uchiteliam.” YouTube, September 2, 2013. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g6AFOr‐4sU8&feature=youtube_gdata_player. “Uchitelei, oskandalivshikhsia na vyborakh, pomestili v chernyi spisok.” RBC, March 27, 2012. http://top.rbc.ru/society/27/03/2012/643631.shtml. “Uchitelia poshli po spiskam.” Radio Svoboda, April 3, 2012. https://www.svoboda.org/a/24535300.html. “V Peterburge budut sudit’ uchitelia, otkazavshegosia uchastvovat’ v fal’sifikatsii vyborov.” Rosbalt.ru, April 18, 2012. http://www.rosbalt.ru/piter/2012/04/18/971098.html. “Vbros.” Novaia gazeta v Povolzh’e, September 20, 2016. http://novayasamara.ru/events/25094. “Vnimanie, aktsiia: ‘4 marta – Den’ uchitelia.’ Novaya Gazeta prosit otkazat’sia ot soversheniia ugolovno nakazuemykh deianii i predlagaet svoiu podderzhku.” Novaya Gazeta, January 27, 2012. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2012/01/27/47917‐vnimanie‐aktsiya‐171‐4‐marta‐151‐ den‐uchitelya‐187. “Za otkaz v fal’sifikatsii resul’tatov vyborov – uvol’nenie.” Livejournal, March 15, 2012. http://mr‐ lighter.livejournal.com/19970.html Aleshkovskii, Mitia. “Kak fal’sifitsirovali vybory v Moskve: ‘delo vrachei’.” Livejounral, September 9, 2013. http://aleshru.livejournal.com/3468606.html. Barova, Ekaterina. “Ne ponravilos’ ‘EdRo’ – von s raboty!” Sobesednik.ru, November 11, 2011. http://sobesednik.ru/scandals/ne‐ponravilos‐edro‐von‐s‐raboty. Berulava, Mikhail, Victor Vid’manov, Petr Medvedev, and Vsevolod Sevast’ianov. “Glavnaia tema dnia.” Za pobedu (Krasnoiarsk), November 28, 2011. Bobrova, Irina. “Odni protiv sistemy: kak slozhilis’ sud’by uchitelei, raskryvshikh fal’sifikatsii na vyborakh.” Moskovskii Komsomolets, September 29, 2016. http://www.mk.ru/politics/2016/09/29/odni‐protiv‐sistemy‐kak‐slozhilis‐sudby‐uchiteley‐ raskryvshikh‐falsifikacii‐na‐vyborakh.html. Bunimovich, Evgenii. “Vy zhe nam govorili, chto 2+2=4?” Novaya Gazeta, February 6, 2012. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2012/02/06/48110‐171‐vy‐zhe‐nam‐govorili‐chto‐2‐x‐2‐ 4‐187‐tolko‐vas‐zastavlyayut‐schitat‐inache. 195
Chizhova, Liubov'. “Poniat’, prostit’ i nagradit’.” Radio Svoboda, September 21, 2016. http://www.svoboda.org/a/28004566.html. Chizhova, Liubov’. “Kto zashchitit uchitelia ot vyborov?” Radio Svoboda, April 18, 2012. http://www.svoboda.org/a/24552447.html. Iurasova, Tat’iana. “Mytishchi‐Geit.” Novaya gazeta, December 4, 2016. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/12/04/70762‐kak‐na‐samom‐dele‐proshli‐vybory‐ v‐moskovskoy‐oblasti. Karavaeva, Elena. “Sotsrabotniki sdelali vybory. Chto im za eto budet?” Ekho Moskvy, September 17, 2014. http://echo.msk.ru/blog/karlena5/1401714‐echo/. kartofanisch. “Obidno chto osnovnye fal’sifikatory vyborov eto uchitelia! UIK 2556!” Livejournal, September 14, 2013. http://kartofanisch.livejournal.com/231475.html. Koval’chenko, Sergei. “Delo uchitelei.” RBK‐daily, March 28, 2012. Kuchanov, Il’ia. “Vybory 4 dekabria – ‘ekzamen’ dlia uchitelia. Obrashcheniie k rossiiskim uchiteliam.” “Babr.ru – Sibir’” – Regional’nyi informatsionnyi server, November 18, 2011. Levada‐Center (Yuri Levada Analytical Center), “Odobrenie organov vlasti.” https://www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie‐organov‐vlasti/. Last accessed on July 24, 2017. Markova, Valeriia. “Sud’bu vyborov reshit golos babushki.” August 30, 2016. http://www.mk.ru/politics/2016/08/30/sudbu‐vyborov‐reshit‐golos‐babushki.html. Melkonyants, Grigory. “Ocherednaia ‘bomba’ s nezakonnym shtabom pri administratsii.” Facebook, August 5, 2016. https://www.facebook.com/grigory.melkonyants/posts/1048035861900384. Mezentsev, A.I. “Vybory vsegda zakanchivaiutsia. Gde tvoi chest’ i dostoinstvo, uchitel’?!” Novgorodskaia Pravda (Velikii Novgorod), March 1, 2012. Murtazin, Irek. “Skrytnye kamery.” Novaya Gazeta, September 19, 2012. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2012/09/19/51502‐skrytnye‐kamery Nikolaeva, Liudmila. “Vybory. Fal’sificatsii. Chast’ vtoraia.” Svpressa.ru, January 26, 2012. http://svpressa.ru/society/article/52121/. Novoselov, Andrei. Facebook post. May 17, 2015. https://www.facebook.com/Cherezchur/posts/893521010712260?fref=nf. Ozerova, Marina. “Nepodsudnye vybory.” Moskovskii komsomolets, October 16, 2009. http://www.mk.ru/editions/daily/article/2009/10/16/369173‐nepodsudnyie‐vyiboryi.html. Petlianova, Nina. “Dlia pedagogov vvodiat otkrepitel’noe parvo.” Novaia gazeta, January 26, 2012. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2012/01/27/47918‐dlya‐pedagogov‐vvodyat‐ otkrepitelnoe‐pravo. 196
Pichugina, Ekaterina. “Izbiratel’nyi defitsit.” Moskovskii komsomolets, October 20, 2009. http://www.mk.ru/politics/article/2009/10/20/371086‐izbiratelnyiy‐defitsit.html. Rybina, Liudmila. “My ne pisali sochineniia na uchastkakh.” Novaia gazeta, February 23, 2012. http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/51232.html. Rybina, Liudmila. “Poteshnyi polk.” Novaia gazeta, February 1, 2012. http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/50758.html Rybina, Liudmila. “Ya ne otpravila liudei na Poklonnuyu. Menya uvolili.” Novaya gazeta, February 6, 2012. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2012/02/06/48113‐171‐ya‐ne‐otpravila‐lyudey‐na‐ poklonnuyu‐menya‐uvolili‐187. Rybina, Liudmila. “Za zakrytymi dveriami po piat’ chelovek obrabatyvali.” Novaya Gazeta, January 27, 2012. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2012/01/27/52631‐171‐za‐zakrytymi‐dveryami‐po‐ pyat‐chelovek‐obrabatyvali‐187. Rybina, Liudmila. “Zamministra obrazovaniia: ‘Ia ne znaiu, zachem na uchitelei daviat pered vyborami’.” Novaia gazeta, February 6, 2012. http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/50789.html. Safronova, Ol’ga. “Uchitelia – makhinatory‐falsificatory.” Pul’s Osetii (Vladikavkaz), October 17, 2012. Seliverstova, Irina. “Zasluzhennyi uchitel’ prizvala kolleg ne dopustit’ fal’sifikatsii na vyborakh.” Moskovskii komsomolets, September 2, 2013. http://www.mk.ru/politics/article/2013/09/02/908837‐zasluzhennyiy‐uchitel‐prizvala‐kolleg‐ne‐ dopustit‐falsifikatsii‐na‐vyiborah.html. Shtulberg, Raivo. “Zastavliaut golosovat’ za Edinuiu Rossiiu, ili agitator, uchi menia dumat’.” YouTube, July 25, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ICjJizpAkA. Smirnov, Sergei. “ ‘Soberite otkrepitel’nye i prinesite nam’.” Gazeta.ru, November 23, 2011. https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/elections2011/2011/11/23_a_3845210.shtml Sulim, Sasha. “Obychnyi izbiratel’nyi uchastok: Chto proiskhodilo v rostovskoi gimnazii, gde kamera zafiksirovala dva vbrosa biulletenei.” Meduza, September 18, 2016. https://meduza.io/feature/2016/09/18/obychnyy‐izbiratelnyy‐uchastok
Chapter 3 “Aman Tuleev: polozhenie khuzhe gubernatorskogo.” Argumenty i facty, August 12, 1998. “Elita edet – kogda‐to budet.” Kuznetskii krai, June 9, 2001. “Glavnoe ne lenit’sia.” S toboi, April 12, 2009. “Istoricheskaia spravka NPG.” Nezavisimyi profsoiuz gorniakov Rossii. http://ngr‐ ru.ru/About/history/Istoricheskaja‐spravka‐NPG. 197
“MIKOM pod pritselom Moskvy: Pravitel’stvo RF perekhodit k reshitel’nym deistviiam.” Gubernskie vedomosti, October 8, 1999. “Mukhlezh na vyborakh: proverka v dva scheta.” Troitskii variant ‐ nauka, November 5, 2013. “ ‘Oka’ techet k pozhilym.” Trud, October 2, 2001. “Tatarstan nakhimichil, Kemerovo obnaglelo.” Livejournal. October 9, 2016, http://corbulon.livejournal.com/325072.html “U nas poka net sladkikh piliul’, chtoby davat’ vmeste s gor’kimi.” Novaia gazeta. Ponedel’nik, June 8, 1998. “V Gosdumu s Gorbatogo mosta.” Sovetskaia Rossiia, Moskva, June 18, 1998. “Za doblest’ i muzhestvo.” S toboi, February 22, 2006. Administratsiia Kemerovskoi oblasti. Osnovnye vidy sotsial’noi podderzhki studentam, uchashchimsia I sotrudnikam uchrezhdenii obrazovaniia Kemerovskoi oblasti. Kemerovo, 2007. Akimova, Valentina. “Proezd ostanetsia besplatnym.” Meditsinskaia gazeta, February 11, 2005. Alekseeva, Svetlana. “V Kuzbasse snova, kak i 100 let nazad, nazrevaet rabochaia revolutsiia.” Komsomol’skaia Pravda, November 10, 1999. Bagaev, Evgenii. “Odoleem li chinoivnich’i bar’ery.” Krai, March 7, 2007. Cheremnov, Sergei, and Grigorii Shalakin. Aman Tuleev – chelovek, politik, gubernator: otsenki, priznaniia, otkroveniia. Kemerovo: Tsentr‐Poligraf, 2004. Emchenko, Fedor and Aleksandr Kosvintsev. “Shakhtery legli na rel’sy.” ITAR‐TASS, Trud, May 21, 1998. Fedorov, Maksim, Nikolai Kutenkikh, and Dmitrii Sagara. “Shakhtery na rel’sakh.” Novye Izvestiia, Moskva, May 20, 1998. Fedorova, I.F. and Administratsiia g. Kemerovo, eds. Moi gorod – moia sem’ia: informatsionnyi sbornik. Kemerovo: IPP “Kuzbass”, 2007. Fedorova, I.F. and Administratsiia g. Kemerovo, eds. S liubov’iu k gorodu: informatsionnyi sbornik. Kemerovo: IPP “Kuzbass”, 2007. Feiziev, Abubakar. “Boi idet i radi slavy.” Zhurnal Ogonek, Moskva, August 14, 1995. Golovanova, Alla. O vremeni, o liudiakh, o Tuleeve. Kemerovo: Kemerovskii poligrafkombinat, 1999. Goncharov, Valerii. “ ‘Democratiia’ po‐kuzbasski.” Komsomol’skaia Pravda, April 8, 1999. Gorkunov. “Pensionnyi proezdnoi.” Rossiiskaia gazeta, April 11, 2007. Gostev. “V Kuzbasse podderzhali veteranov.” Nezavisimaia gazeta, December 3, 2007. Kachaeva, Iolanta. " ‘Simphonia’ Gorbatogo mosta.” Trud, August 1, 1998. 198
Kosvintsev, Aleksandr. “A na rel’sy legli shakhtery.” Trud, May 16 1998. Kozyreva, Anna. “V Kemerovskoi oblasti bisness uzhe stal sotsial’no‐orientirovannym, utverzhdaet senator Sergei Shatirov.” IA “FK‐Novosti”, February 27, 2008. Kuzbasskoe soglashenie mezhdu Federatsiei profsoiuznykh organizatsii Kuzbassa, Kollegiei Administratsii Kemerovskoi oblasti i rabotodateliami Kemerovskoi oblasti na 2010‐2012 gody. Brochure located in Kemerovo Regional Library. Lavrenkov, Igor Nikolaevich. “Kuzbasskie oligarkhi zaplatiat za besplatnyi proezd.” Kommersant, January 27, 2005. Lavrenkov, Igor. “Kuzbassu opiat’ ne khvatit deneg.” Kommersant, October 17, 2003. Luk’ianova, Inna. “Aman vo spasenie.” Profil’, July 5, 1999. http://www.profile.ru/arkhiv/item/40853‐ items_3631. Mel’nichenko and Sergei Biriukov. “Posle ‘chestnykh vyborov’ v Gosdumu.” Kuznetskii krai, January 18, 2000. Naumov, Vladimir and Rustem Urmantsev. “Goriachee leto 98‐go.” Trud‐7, July 9, 1998. Naval’nyi, Aleksei. “Sotsopros FBK: kak na samom dele golosovala Kemerovskaia oblast’ – tsitadel’ ‘Edinoi Rossii’ .” Personal web‐site. October 13, 2016. https://navalny.com/p/5095/. Oreshkin, Dmitrii. “Zazerkal’e izbiratel’noi kampanii.” The New Times, October 26, 2016. http://newtimes.ru/stati/temyi/zazerkale‐izbiratelnoj‐kampanii.html. Parfenov, Leonid. “Namedni. 1989.” Historical TV series. Timestamp 33:02. (available from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JE4rmtJadKg&index=1&list=PLFVxGCQSBrnzky11e7WOUTC pH1Rg5evTm.) Popok. “MIKOM stremitsia k vlasti v Kuzbasse.” Kuzbass, April 9‐10, 1999. Prikhod’ko, Nikolai. “Zelenyi poias vyborov i lichno Aman Gumirovich.” Novye Izvestiia, Moskva, April 10, 1999. Regiony Rossii. Sotsial’no‐ekonomicheskie pokazateli [different years]: Statisticheskii Sbornik. Moskva. 2014. Sagara, Dmitrii. "Shakhtery opiat’ shagnuli na rel’sy." Novye Izvestiia, Moskva, July 04, 1998. Sergey Shpilkin, “Istoriia kemerovskoi anomalii i nemnogo konspirologii,” Livejournal, October 14, 2016, http://podmoskovnik.livejournal.com/176737.html; Shabanov, V.A., N.G. Krugliakova, G.V. Zhukova, N.V. Aikina. Monetizatsiia mer sotsial’noi podderzhki naseleniia poo plate zhil’ia I kommunal’nykh uslug: informatsionno‐spravochnyi material. Kemerovo: OOO “Ofset”, 2008. Shalakin, Grigorii. "Anzherka vnov’ vstaet na rel’sy." Sovetskaia Rossiia, Moskva, July 04, 1998. 199
Shatskaia, Taisiia. Doverie. Kemerovo: Kuzbassvusizdat, 2008. Shipachev, K.V., R.M. Deriabina, and V.A. Shabanov, eds. Mery sotsial’noi podderzhki zhitelei Kemerovskoi oblasti: sbornik informatsionnykh materialov. Kemerovo: Kuzbassvuzizdat. 2008. Shipachev, K.V., V.A. Shabanov, M.V. Polukhin, and Krugliakova, N.G. Kuzbass – veteranam: sbornik informatsionnykh materialov. Kemerovo, 2008. Sokolov, Mikhail. “Profsoiuznyi vozhak atakuet ‘Nornikel’.‘ Aman Tuleev formiruet parlament.” Radio Svoboda, April 17, 2003. http://www.svoboda.org/a/24197268.html. Starozhilov, Anton. “Gubernskie golosa.” Ekspert, April 26, 1999. Starozhilov, Anton. “Kuzbass pril’nul k ‘Medvediu’.” Ekspert, November 29, 1999. Tuleev, Aman. Ostavat’sia samim soboi. Kemerovo: Kemerovskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1999. Vasil’eva, O. “Sazhaem kartoshku i vyrashchivaem krolikov.” Komsomol’skaia pravda, April 15, 2009.
Chapter 4 (see also Appendices 5 and 6) “Osnova uspekha – v pervichnykh organizatsiiakh!” Veteran, October 21, 2003. Nevorotova, N.P., M.M. Kuchnikova, and V.V. Togulev. Otdat’ svoi opyt liudiam... Iz istorii veteranskogo dvizheniia Kuzbassa. Vol. 2‐7. Kemerovo: Kuzbassvuzizdat, 2013. Avaliani, T.G. “Naglost’ pravit bal.” Patriot, November 28, 2003. Starozhilov, Anton. “Kuzbass pril’nul k ‘Medvediu’.” Ekspert, November 29, 1999. Ivanov, Sergey. “Aman Tuleev: ‘Naberu bol’she golosov – Kuzbassu budet legche zhit’ ’.” Кузнецкий край, March 10, 2000. Sorokin, Aleksandr. “Kommunisty ne stanut ugozhdat’ vlastiam.” Край, March 12, 2004.
“V pole zreniia – 800 tysiach sudeb.” Zemliaki, October 14, 2005. “Glavnoe vnimanie pervichkam.” Veteran, October 6, 2009. Churpita. “Byvshikh shakhterov ne byvaet.” Zemliaki, July 25, 2008. Ermakova. “Pregrady na puti pervoprokhodtsev.” Zemliaki, November 3, 2006. Startsev. “Stupen’ka v zavtra.” Zemliaki, October 10, 2008. “Tsentr raboty – pervichki.” Veteran, March 27, 2007. Ermakova, Nelli. “Kogda delo ladinsia.” Zemliaki, February 7, 2003. Mikel’son, Tat’iana. “Znat’ kazhdogo – po pasportu.” Zemliaki, November 9, 2007. Ermakova. “O chem skazhut ‘nezabudki’.” Zemliaki, January 12, 2007. Fedorova. “Initsiativy, prodiktovannye zhizn’iu.” Zemliaki, October 13, 2006. 200
“Tochki prilozheniia usilii.” Veteran, November 30, 2010. Belousova. “Vpisany v zolotuiu letopis’ goroda.” Zemliaki, June 15, 2007. Nevorotova, Nina Pavlovna. “I s bedoi i s radost’iu idut k nam.” Zemliaki, September 26, 2003. Bal’zanova, V.Z. “Khoroshikh del nemalo.” Zemliaki, August 12, 2005. Ermakova. “Vmeste v dobryi put’!” Zemliaki, June 9, 2006. “Nina Pavlovna Nevorotova.” Veteran, October 15, 2013. Miliutina. “Prednaznachenie – zashchishchat’.” Zemliaki, December 14, 2007. “Golos starshego pokoleniia.” Veteran, January 26, 2010. Miliutina. “Ni dnia bez strochki.” Zemliaki, March 28, 2008. Soiuz pensionerov Rossii. Obshcherossiiskaia obshchestvennaia organizatsiia. Kemerovskaia oblast’. http://www.rospensioner.ru/region/122. Accessed March 15, 2017; “V Kemerovskoi oblasti poiavilos’ regional’noe otdelenie ‘Rossiiskoi partii pensionerov’.” Kuznetskii krai, August 17, 2006. Nevorotova, Nina Pavlovna, and Nelli Ermakova. “Miloserdie natseleno v zavtra.” Zemliaki, December 29, 2006. “Zakon o mestnom samoupravlenii v RSFSR N 1550,” July 6, 1991. Totysh, Natalia. “S pol’zoi i interesom.” Kemerovo, December 22, 2006. “Itogi raboty s nasseleniem za 2016 g.” http://www.kemerovo.ru/administration/rabota_s_ naseleniem_.html. Accessed March 29, 2017. “Gorod: analiz, uspekhi, problem, perspectivy.” Kemerovo, June 7, 2002. “Itogi raboty s nasseleniem za 2015 g.” http://www.kemerovo.ru/administration/rabota_s_ naseleniem_.html. Access date April 22, 2016. Administratsiia goroda Kemerovo. “Postanovlenie ot 16 sentiabria 2016 goda N 2382 ‘Ob utverzhdenii munitsipal’noi programmy ‘Razvitie obshchestvennykh initsiativ v gorode Kemerovo’ na 2017‐ 2019 gody’.” http://docs.cntd.ru/document/441678836. Accessed March 29, 2017. Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik 2014: Statisticheskii Sbornik. Rosstat. Moskva. 2014.. Press‐sluzhba administratsii goroda. “Punkty stali tsentrami.” Kemerovo, December 29, 2006. “… i mnogo radosti.” Kemerovo, September 14, 2007. Loginova, Ekaterina. “Shakhterskii krai goroda Kemerovo.” Kemerovo, July, 29, 2005. Fefelova, Elena. “Gorod delitsia opytom.” Kemerovo, June 26, 2009. Press‐sluzhba administratsii goroda. “Tsentry est’, rabota budet.” Kemerovo, August 12, 2005. 201
“Ravnykh net v rukopashnom boiu.” Kuzbass, June 1, 2005. “God iubileia.” Kemerovo, January 22, 2010. “K kemerovchanam – s otchetom.” Kemerovo, December 17, 2010. “TOS – samaia blizkaia vlast’.” Kemerovo, January 26, 2007. Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik 2007: Statisticheskii Sbornik. Rosstat. Moskva. 2007. (Russian Statistical Yearbook 2007: Statistical Collection. Moscow. 2007). Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik 2016: Statisticheskii Sbornik. Rosstat. Moskva. 2016. (Russian Statistical Yearbook 2016: Statistical Collection. Moscow. 2016) “Kto, esli ne my?” Kemerovo. January 26, 2009. “Rabota s naseleniem.” http://www.kemerovo.ru/?page=357. Accessed April 22, 2016. “Reshenie Permskoi gorodskoi Dumy ot 27.11.2007 N 287 (red. ot 23.04.2012) ‘Ob utverzhdenii Polozheniia ob obshchestvennykh tsentrakh v gorode Permi.” (document can be obtained through legal databases). “Obshchestvennye tsentry.” (Web‐site of Perm city administration.) http://www.gorodperm.ru/actions/social‐link/society/public_organization/community_center. Accessed: March 31, 2017. “Polozhenie ob obshchestvennykh tsentrakh goroda Permi. Prilozhenie k resheniiu Permskoi gorodskoi dumy ot 26.06.2012 N 135.” (document can be obtained through legal databases) “TOS.” (Web‐site of Perm city administration.) http://www.gorodperm.ru/actions/social‐ link/society/public_organization/tos/. Accessed: March 31, 2017. Churpita. “Ne privykli sdavat’sia trudnostiam.” Zemliaki, September, 19, 2008. “Veteranskie gostinye.” Veteran, April 2, 2013. Budiakovskaia, I. “Byli ‘nicheinye’, stali – nashi!” Zemliaki, March 30, 2007. “V raionakh goroda.” Kemerovo, March 30, 2007. Rasskazova, Irina. “Boi politicheskogo znacheniia.” Kemerovo, October, 26, 2007. Ob itogakh deiatel’nosti tsentrov po rabote s naseleniem v 2013 g. (printed brochure at a community center; copied during fieldwork). Zinchuk, Valentina. “Chto znaete o l’gotakh?” Kemerovo, June 8, 2007. Svarovskii, I.V. “Zasluzhili vsei zhizn’iu.” Zemliaki, October 3, 2008. Kikioi, Tatiana. “Reshaem vmeste.” Kemerovo, May 15, 2009. Fefelova, Elena. “Gotovimsia k perepisi.” Kemerovo, July 3, 2009. 202
“Barometr obshchestvennykh nuzhd.” Zemliaki, August 8, 2003. Brezhneva, Nina. “Na dobrovol’nykh nachalakh.” Kemerovo, July 6, 2007. “Slovo activistov.” Kemerovo, April 4, 2008. “Korotko.” Kemerovo, February 8, 2008. “Korotko.” Kemerovo, August 24, 2007. “Ni dnia bez dela.” Kemerovo, December 17, 2010. Press‐sluzhba gorsoveta narodnykh deputatov. “ ‘Molodaia gvardiia’ ukrepliaet tyly.” Kemerovo, February 16, 2007. “Khoroshee nastroenie delaem sami.” Kemerovo, December 12, 2008. Il’ina, Nadezhda. “Doiti do kazhdogo.” Kemerovo, December 12, 2008.
Chapter 5 “Elena Rudneva ushla iz administratsii v institut.” Sibnovosti.ru, January 16, 2012. http://kem.sibnovosti.ru/politics/178647‐elena‐rudneva‐ushla‐iz‐administratsii‐v‐institut. “Kazachestvo – Pravitel’stvo Rostovskoi oblasti.” http://www.donland.ru/Socialnaya‐ sfera/Kazachestvo/?pageid=75379. Accessed May 7, 2017. “Kazantseva Alena Borisovna.” Gosudarstvennoe sobranie – El Kurultai Respubliki Altai. http://elkurultay.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=207&catid=11. Accessed May 5, 2017. “Otchet ‘O rabote obshchestvennoi organizatsii veteranov (pensionerov) Respubliki Tatarstan v 2012 godu’.” http://veterany.tatarstan.ru/rus/file/pub/pub_168378.doc. Accessed April 23, 2017. “Otchet Respublikanskogo Soveta regional’noi obshchestvennoi organizatsii veteranov (pensionerov) Respubliki Tatarstan za 2016 god.” http://veterany.tatarstan.ru/rus/file/pub/pub_881957.doc. Accessed April 23, 2017. “Respublikanskaia obshchestvennaia organizatsiia veteranov (invalidov) ‘Soiuz veteranov Respubliki Tatarstan’. Structura.” http://www.tatveteran.ru/organization/structure/. Accessed April 26, 2017. “Respublikanskaia obshchestvennaia organizatsiia veteranov (invalidov) ‘Soiuz veteranov Respubliki Tatarstan’. Planirovanie i organizatsionnye materialy.” http://www.tatveteran.ru/plan/. Accessed April 26, 2017. “Storonniki Edinoi Rossii. Mishina Liubov’ Nikolaevna.” https://storonniki.info/person/mishina. Accessed April 26, 2017. “Tatarstan nakhimichil, Kemerovo obnaglelo.” Livejournal. October 9, 2016, http://corbulon.livejournal.com/325072.html 203
Clines, Francis X. “Kazan Journal; Street Gangs Return, and Soviet City Is Chagrined.” The New York Times, July 13, 1989, sec. World. http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/13/world/kazan‐journal‐ street‐gangs‐return‐and‐soviet‐city‐is‐chagrined.html. Deti Tatarstana. Rabota s podrostkami po mestu zhitel’stva. http://www.detitatarstana.ru/. Accessed July 26, 2017. Gritsko, M. “Mezhdunarodnyi proekt – v zhizn’.” Zvezda Altaia, December 9, 2005. Kuzbass Regional Institute for Development of Professional Education. http://www.krirpo.ru/. Accessed July 26, 2017. Obshchestvennaia palata Respubliki Tatarstan, Kazanskii obshchestvennyi fond “Vybor”. http://oprt.tatarstan.ru/vibor.html. Accessed April 26, 2017. Profilaktika ekstremizma v molodezhnoi srede Respubliki Tatarstan: Materialy sots. issled. / Min‐vo po delam molodezhi, sportu i turismu RT, Resp. tsentr molod., innovats. i prof. program. – Kazan’: RTsMIPP, 2010. Regional’naia molodezhnaia obshchestvennaia organizatsiia “Tsentr razvitiia dobrovol’chestva Respubliki Tatarstan.” http://dobrovolets.tatarstan.ru/index.htm. Accessed April 26, 2017. Regional’naia molodezhnaia organizatsiia “Liga studentov Tatarstana.” http://liga.tatarstan.ru/rus/histori.htm. Accessed April 26, 2017. Respublikanskii tsentr molodezhnykh (studencheskikh) formirovanii po okhrane obshchestvennogo poriadka “Forpost.” http://mdms.tatarstan.ru/rus/uchrezhdeniya‐molodezhnoy‐ napravlennosti.htm?department_id= 17966. Accessed July 26, 2017. Savin, Gleb. “ ‘Zheltaia’ initsiativa.” Solidarnost’, November 23, 2011. Sovet molodezhnykh organizatsii Respubliki Tatarstan, Agrarnoe molodezhnoe ob’edinenie Respubliki Tatarstan. Primenenie izbiratel’nykh tekhnologii v usloviiakh goroda i sel’skoi mestnosti: Metodicheskie rekomendatsii dlia kandidatov v deputaty v organy mestnogo samoupravleniia. Kazan’: RTsMIPP, 2011. The Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Tatarstan. http://mon.tatarstan.ru/koor_sovet.htm. Accessed April 25, 2017. The Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports of the Republic of Tatarstan. http://mdms.tatarstan.ru/rus/uchrezhdeniya‐molodezhnoy‐napravlennosti.htm. Accessed April 25, 2017. Trigubovich, Iurii. “Pedagogicheskaia poema Kuzbassa.” Novaia gazeta v Sibiri, February 16, 2007. http://tayga.info/92944. 204
Sources in Appendices Baidakova, Anna. “ ‘Real’no ‘Edinuiu Rossiiu’ podderzhali 15% izbiratelei.” Novaia gazeta, September 20, 2016. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/09/20/69897‐realno‐edinuyu‐rossiyu‐ podderzhali‐15‐izbirateley. Kireev, Aleksandr. “Chto mozhet iskorenit’ fal’sifikatsii na vyborakh v Rossii.” Livejournal, September 30, 2016. http://kireev.livejournal.com/1309515.html. Oreshkin, Dmitrii. “Gibridnye vybory. Predvaritel’nyi otchet ‘Narodnogo izbirkoma’.” Novaia gazeta, September 20, 2016. http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/74635.html.
205
Appendix 1. Profiles of regions selected for case studies
Figure 21. Cases on the Russian map
All information is given for the year 2012 since this year was the focus of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 1.
Governors/President in 2012 and his predecessors
Rostov region Vasily Golubev, since June 2010; predecessor: Vladimir Chub, October 1991 – June 2010
Republic of Tatarstan Rustam Minnikhanov, since March 2010; predecessor: Mintimer Shaimiev, June 1991 – March 2010
Tomsk region Sergei Zhvachkin, since March 2012; predecessor: Viktor Kress, December 1995 – March 2012
Kemerovo region Aman Tuleev, since July 1997; predecessor: Mikhail Kisliuk, August 1991 – July 1997
Republic of Altai Aleksandr Berdnikov, since January 2006; predecessor: Mikhail Lapshin, January 2002 – January 2006
206
Table 3. Economic and demographic profiles of the regions
Source of statistical information: Rosstat. Regiony Rossii. Sotsial’no‐ekonomicheskie pokazateli: 2013. Statisticheskii sbornik. [Russian Regions. Socio‐economic Indicators. Statistical book.] М., 2013.
Rostov Republic of Tomsk Kemerovo Republic of
region Tatarstan region region Altai Population at the end of 4,254,000 3,822,000 1,064,000 2,742,000 210,000 2012 Urban population 68% 76% 71% 86% 29% Number of pensioners per 294 277 263 308 262 1000 population Regional gross product per 197,359 376,889 352,660 261,301 141,442 capita, rubles474 Monthly income per capita, 17,987 24,010 17,867 18,386 14,278 rubles Share of social provision in 22% 15% 24% 23% 28% personal income475 Consumer price index (December 2012 to 106,7% 106,4% 107,4% 107,5% 107,0% December 2011) Unemployment 6.0% 4.1% 9.1% 7.1% 11.6% Share of employed population working in agriculture 13.6% 9.8% 7.4% 3.6% 14.1% mining, oil and gas 0.7% 2.2% 2.4% 10.5% 0.8% extraction manufacture 12.8% 17.5% 15.2% 13.5% 5.0% education 7.6% 9.1% 10% 7.9% 15.1% health care 6.4% 5.5% 6.9% 7.5% 8.4%
474 This statistics comes from the next issue of the statistical periodical: Rosstat. Regiony Rossii. Sotsial’no‐ ekonomicheskie pokazateli: 2014. Statisticheskii sbornik. [Russian Regions. Socio‐economic Indicators. Statistical book.] М., 2014. 475 Including pensions, stipends, social benefits, social insurance, etc. 207
Appendix 2. List of interviews
Republic of Altai (November‐December 2013) Altai‐01 Department head in the regional parliament Altai‐02 Policy specialist of the regional Ministry of Education Altai‐03 Policy specialist of the Budget Department in the regional government Altai‐04 Policy specialist of the Budget Department in the regional government Altai‐05 Faculty member in Economics at a local university Altai‐06 Staff member of the Social Services Department at the regional Ministry of Labor and Human Development Altai‐07 Ethnographer who studied rural population in the region and a former faculty member in Economics at the local university who travelled extensively across the region delivering workshops for local entrepreneurers Altai‐08 Three schoolteachers from different rural municipalities of the region Altai‐09 An oppositional deputy of the regional parliament, who simultaneously served as the editor of the local oppositional newspaper Altai‐10 Deputy of the regional parliament from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Altai‐11 Former faculty member in Economics at the local university who travelled extensively across the region delivering workshops for local entrepreneurers Altai‐12 Senior government official at the regional Ministry of Health Care Altai‐13 Lawyer‐consultant, office of the regional human rights ombudsman Altai‐14 A leader of the regional Education Labor Union Altai‐15 A leader of the municipal Veterans’ Council Altai‐16 A leader of the regional branch of the Pensioners’ Union Altai‐17 Senior government official at the regional Ministry of Education
Kemerovo Region (February‐March 2014) Kem‐01 Faculty member in Political Science at a local university Kem‐02 Staff member of the regional public library Kem‐03 Staff member of the regional public library Kem‐04 A leader of Orthodox scouts organization Kem‐06 A senior specialist at a community center Kem‐07 A leader of the regional Veterans’ Council Kem‐08 Senior member of the Social Services Department in the Kemerovo eparchy of the Russian Orthodox church Kem‐09 Policy specialist at the regional Department of Education Kem‐10 A leader of the regional Association of People with Disabilities Kem‐11 Senior official at the Teacher Training Institute 208
Kem‐12 Division head at the regional Department of Social Security Kem‐13 TOS member
Rostov Region (April 2014) Ros‐01 Faculty member in Sociology at a local university Ros‐03 A leader of the Association of Municipalities Ros‐04 Senior official at the Youth Affairs Department in the city government of Rostov‐on‐Don Ros‐05 Senior government officials at the regional Cossacks Affairs Department Ros‐06 Department head at a local university Ros‐07 A leader at the Center for Children with Disabilities “Sodeistvie” (“Cooperation”) Ros‐08 Senior government official at the regional Department of Civil Affairs (the department deals with civil society organizations) Ros‐10 Senior official at the Social Security Department in the city government of Rostov‐on‐Don Ros‐11 Policy specialist at the Committee for Ethnic and Religious Affairs in the city government of Rostov‐on‐Don Ros‐12 Faculty member at a local university Ros‐13 Faculty member at a local university Ros‐15 A leader of the regional Education Labor Union Ros‐16 Policy specialists at the Education Department in the city government of Rostov‐on‐Don Ros‐17 Deputy of the regional parliament from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation
Republic of Tatarstan (May 2014) Kaz‐02 Policy specialist at the regional Ministry of labor and social security Kaz‐03 A leader of the regional Volunteer Center Kaz‐04 Department head at the Ministry of labor and social security Kaz‐05 Faculty member at a local university Kaz‐06 A leader of the Foundation “Vybor” (“Choice”) Kaz‐07 Senior specialist at the municipal Center for Children and Youth, the city of Kazan’ Kaz‐08 Two leaders of the regional Veterans’ Council Kaz‐09 Provost of a small private university Kaz‐11 Provost of a large public university Kaz‐12 Faculty dean at a local university Kaz‐13 Policy specialist at a municipal Center for Social Services, the city of Kazan’ Kaz‐14 Researcher at a center for cultural studies, a specialist in Islam Kaz‐16 A leader of the regional youth branch of the United Russia Party
Tomsk Region (June 2014) Tom‐01 Former senior government official at the regional government and administration of the regional human rights ombudsman, currently a faculty member at a local university Tom‐02 Head of a committee at the regional Department on Family and Children Affairs 209
Tom‐03 Policy specialist at the regional Youth Affairs Department Tom‐04 Former senior government official who oversaw the relationships with NGOs, ethnic, and religious associations Tom‐05 A leader of a regional NGO working on access of people with disabilities to higher education Tom‐06 Schoolteacher in the city of Seversk Tom‐07 Policy specialist at the Teacher Training Institute Tom‐08 Director of a social services center for families and children Tom‐09 Director of a large NGO Tom‐10 A leader of the regional Veterans’ Council Tom‐11 Senior official at the municipal education department, the city of Tomsk
Appendix 3. Information on Quantitative Analysis
Table 4. Information about variables and data sources (all variables measured at the regional level)
Time of Short name Original Variables measurement Description Source (see Table 5) (day/month/year)
Share of votes received by Vladimir Electoral support for 04/03/2012 Putin12 Putin in the election of the President of Putin Central Election Commission of the the Russian Federation Russian Federation Share of votes received by Dmitrii (http://www.cikrf.ru/; access date Electoral support for 02/03/2008 Medvedev08 Medvedev in the election of the October 9, 2014) Medvedev President of the Russian Federation
Regiony Rossii. Sotsial’no‐ 2007 PIncome07 economicheskiie pokazateli. 2012. Statisticheskii sbornik. [Russian Income per person Average monetary income per person Regions. Socio‐economic indicators. 2012. Statistical handbook.]. 2011 PIncome11 Rosstat. Moscow. Pp. 168‐169. Table 5.2.
Number of Number of teachers in the Unified Interdepartmental schoolteachers in the 2007 Teach07 organizations providing general (i.e. Statistical Information System / region secondary) education Ministry of Education and Science of the Russia Federation /
210
Time of Short name Original Variables measurement Description Source (see Table 5) (day/month/year) Information on the number and structure of employees in the organizations of general education 2011 Teach11 / Number of teachers (http://www.fedstat.ru/; access date October 9, 2014)
2007 Doc07 Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik. 2012. Statisticheskii sbornik. Number of doctors in Number of doctors per 10,000 [Russian Statistical Yearbook. 2012. the region population 2011 Doc11 Statistical handbook.] Rosstat. Moscow. Pp. 271‐272. Table 8.6.
Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik. Number of employees of executive 2008. Statisticheskii sbornik. Number of executive 12/2007 Gov07 government bodies and municipal [Russian Statistical Yearbook. 2008. government employees bodies with executive functions Statistical handbook.] Rosstat. (including municipal Moscow. Pp. 48‐50. Table 2.4. ones) in the region Number of employees of executive Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik. 12/2011 Gov11 government and municipal bodies 2012. Pp. 48‐49. Table 2.4.
Regiony Rossii. 2012. Pp. 163‐164. 12/2007 Pens07 Number of pensioners Number of pensioners registered in the Table 5.5. in the region Pension Fund of the Russian Federation Regiony Rossii. 2012. Pp. 174‐175. 12/2011 Pens11 Table 5.5.
211
Time of Short name Original Variables measurement Description Source (see Table 5) (day/month/year)
Regional budget 01/01/2008 EducExp07 Yearly expenditures on education expenditures on (budgetary code 0700) education 01/01/2012 EducExp11
Yearly expenditures on health care Russian Federal Treasury, Reports 01/01/2008 HealthExp07 (budgetary code 0900); for the year on the Execution of Regional and 2007 expenditures on sports Local Budgets of the Russian Regional budget (budgetary code 0902) are subtracted Federation expenditures on health from health care expenditures to make (http://www.roskazna.ru/byudzhet care 01/01/2012 HealthExp11 them comparable to the year 2011 ov‐subektov‐rf‐i‐mestnykh‐ when sports became a separate byudzhetov/; access date March 27, category 2015); all numbers taken from the column referring to “Executed: Regional budget 01/01/2008 SocSecExp07 Consolidated regional budget and Yearly expenditures on social security expenditures on social territorial state non‐budgetary (budgetary code 1000) security 01/01/2012 SocSecExp11 fund”.
Federal transfers to 12/2007 Trans07 Yearly interbudgetary transfers regional budgets 12/2011 Trans11 (budgetary code 000 202)
Total income of Yearly total income of regional budgets 12/2007 RIncome07 regional budgets (budgetary code 850)
212
Time of Short name Original Variables measurement Description Source (see Table 5) (day/month/year)
Yearly total income of regional budgets (no budgetary code for this year; 12/2011 RIncome11 number located in column 14, row code 010)
Indicates whether a non‐Russian Non‐Russian region Coding by the author ethnicity is titular in the region
Regional population estimate on Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik. 01/01/2008 Pop07 January 1 2008. Pp. 84‐85. Table 4.3. (Information almost identical to the Regional population referenced sources can be found in Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik. 01/01/2012 Pop11 Regiony Rossii. 2012. Pp. 54‐55. 2012. Pp. 76‐77. Table 4.3. Table 3.1.)
12/2007 Infl07 12/2008 Infl08 Change in consumer prices to Regiony Rossii. 2012. Pp. 953‐954. Purchasing power index 12/2009 Infl09 December of the previous year Table 25.1. 12/2010 Infl10 12/2011 Infl11
(Infl08/100)*(Infl09/100)*(Infl10/1 Purchasing power index December 2011 to Change in consumer prices from InflAdj 00)* December 2007 December 2007 to December 2011 *(Infl11/100)
213
Time of Short name Original Variables measurement Description Source (see Table 5) (day/month/year)
Demograficheskii ezhegodnik Rossii. 2012. Statisticheskii sbornik. Urban population in Urban population in the Russian 12/2011 Urban11 [The Demographic Yearbook of the region regions Russia. 2012. Statistical handbook.] Rosstat. Moscow. P. 28. Table 1.7.
2007 Unempl07 Unemployment rate (International Labor Organization standard) – ratio of Regiony Rossii. 2012. Pp. 134‐135. Unemployment rate the number of unemployed to the Table 4.15. 2011 Unempl11 number of economically active in the certain age group
214
215
Table 5. Variable generation for models
Formulae Generated variables included in the models (components correspond to the Original Variables in Table 1) Change from 2007 to 2011 in: income per person ‡ ( ( PIncome11 / InflAdj ) – PIncome07 ) / PIncome07 yearly inflation rate ( Infl11 – Infl07 ) / Infl07 unemployment rate ( Unempl11 – Unempl07 ) / Unempl07 regional budget expenditures on ( (EducExp11 / InflAdj / Pop11 ) – EducExp07 / Pop07 education per capita ‡ ) / ( EducExp07 / Pop07 ) regional budget expenditures on ( (HealthExp11 / InflAdj / Pop11 ) – HealthExp07 / health care per capita ‡ Pop07 ) / ( HealthExp07 / Pop07 ) regional budget expenditures on ( (SocSecExp11 / InflAdj / Pop11 ) – SocSecExp07 / social security per capita ‡ Pop07 ) / ( SocSecExp07 / Pop07 ) ( Teach11/Pop11 – Teach07/Pop07 ) / teacher density Teach07/Pop07 doctor density ( Doc11/Pop11 – Doc07/Pop07 ) / Doc07/Pop07 executive government employee ( Gov11/Pop11 – Gov07/Pop07 ) / Gov07/Pop07 density pensioner density ( Pens11/Pop11 – Pens07/Pop07 ) / Pens07/Pop07 the share of federal transfers in the ( Trans11/RIncome11 – Trans07/RIncome07) / total income of regional budgets (Trans07/RIncome07) ‡‡ Teacher density at the end of 2011 Teach11 / Pop11 * 10,000 Government employee density at the end of Gov11 / Pop11 * 10,000 2011 Share of urban population in the region at the Urban11 / Pop11 end of 2011 Non‐Russian region binary variable: 1 = non‐Russian, 0 = Russian
‡ Inflation adjusted to December 2007. ‡‡ Value of transfers to Moscow has been changed from ‐1.29 to variable minimum of ‐0.48 (see Regression analysis notes in this Appendix for explanation). In addition, the resulting variable was trimmed to remedy the effect of extreme values resulting from the low base. Values more than 1.5 were recoded to exactly 1.5. This trimming affected two cases: Tiumenskaia oblast’ (original value 3.02) and Iamalo‐Nenetskii avtonomnyi okrug (original value 4.86).
216
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the models
Unit N min max median mean SD
Electoral support for Putin vote share 79 0.469 0.928 0.616 0.639 0.097 in 2012
Electoral support for vote share 79 0.593 0.919 0.673 0.696 0.081 Medvedev in 2008
Change from 2007 to 2011
in
monetary income per person, share of personal 79 ‐0.14 0.69 0.24 0.23 0.15 inflation adjusted income in 2007 to December 2007
share of yearly yearly inflation inflation rate in 79 ‐0.09 ‐0.02 ‐0.06 ‐0.06 0.02 rate December 2007
share of unemployment unemployment rate 79 ‐0.48 1.71 0.11 0.20 0.41 rate in 2007
regional budget expenditures per capita on share of 2007 per 79 ‐0.31 0.95 0.18 0.18 0.17 education, capita expenditures inflation adjusted to December 2007
regional budget expenditures per capita on health share of 2007 per 79 ‐0.34 0.65 ‐0.04 ‐0.01 0.19 care, inflation capita expenditures adjusted to December 2007
regional budget share of 2007 per expenditures per 79 ‐0.13 1.21 0.48 0.48 0.28 capita on social capita expenditures security, inflation
217
Unit N min max median mean SD adjusted to December 2007
share of the number of teachers teacher density 79 ‐0.49 0.35 ‐0.13 ‐0.14 0.09 per population unit in 2007
share of the number of doctors doctor density 79 ‐0.23 1.02 0.02 0.04 0.14 per population unit in 2007
share of the number of executive government government 79 ‐0.17 0.34 ‐0.05 ‐0.04 0.07 employee density employees per population unit in 2007
share of the number of pensioner density pensioners per 79 ‐0.07 0.61 0.05 0.06 0.08 population unit in 2007
the share of share of the share federal transfers in of federal transfers 79 ‐0.48 1.5 0.11 0.18 0.34 the total income of in regional budgets' regional budgets income in 2007
number of schoolteachers per Teacher density 79 48.1 155.8 75.7 79.2 21.7 10,000 population in 2007
number of doctors Doctor density per 10,000 79 30.2 87.2 49.1 49.2 11.7 population in 2007
Government employee number of 79 56.2 300.6 104.2 110.6 37.9 density executive
218
Unit N min max median mean SD government employees (including municipal ones) per 10,000 population in 2007
Unemployment rate at the % unemployed 79 1.4 48.8 7.0 7.8 5.3 end of 2011
share of urban Share of urban population population in the 79 0.29 1.00 0.71 0.70 0.13 in the region region in 2011
Ethnic (non‐Russian) binary variable 79 0 1 0.291 region
Table 7. Correlations between the predictors included in the models (absolute values less than 0.2 are shaded; larger than 0.4 are marked in bold italic)
1
‐
t
‐ inc infl soc fed_ educ docD govD Rus pensD health non _exp _exp Δ _exp docD Δ teachD trans govD Δ unempl urban Δ Δ Δ teachD Δ unempl Δ Δ elect% Δ Δ elect%t‐1 1 Δ inc 0.24 1 Δ infl ‐0.01 ‐0.29 1 Δ unempl ‐0.26 ‐0.16 ‐0.13 1 unempl 0.40 0.34 0.06 ‐0.09 1 teachD 0.39 0.33 0.11 ‐0.22 0.56 1 docD ‐0.20 ‐0.31 0.15 ‐0.14 ‐0.22 ‐0.20 1 govD ‐0.10 ‐0.07 0.27 ‐0.04 0.08 0.34 ‐0.05 1 Δ educ_exp 0.03 0.39 ‐0.03 ‐0.14 0.42 0.14 ‐0.05 ‐0.09 1 Δ health_exp 0.01 0.10 0.08 ‐0.11 0.25 0.19 0.00 0.22 0.57 1 Δ soc_exp ‐0.24 0.11 ‐0.15 ‐0.09 ‐0.24 ‐0.01 0.01 0.04 0.31 0.32 1 Δ teachD ‐0.08 0.04 0.22 0.14 0.53 0.20 ‐0.05 0.16 0.43 0.37 ‐0.07 1 Δ docD ‐0.05 0.01 0.18 ‐0.11 0.09 ‐0.06 0.42 ‐0.01 ‐0.02 ‐0.08 0.08 0.05 1 Δ govD 0.19 0.17 0.08 ‐0.05 0.57 0.24 ‐0.13 0.21 0.38 0.36 ‐0.06 0.43 0.06 1 Δ pensD 0.18 0.07 0.25 ‐0.06 0.75 0.3 ‐0.05 0.22 0.37 0.39 ‐0.20 0.66 0.17 0.58 Δ fed_trans 0.12 ‐0.16 0.05 0.14 ‐0.16 ‐0.02 ‐0.07 0.02 ‐0.23 ‐0.13 ‐0.25 ‐0.01 ‐0.1 0.05 0.08 1 urban ‐0.44 ‐0.52 0.10 0.28 ‐0.50 ‐0.63 0.40 ‐0.04 ‐0.10 ‐0.02 0.01 0.09 ‐0.01 ‐0.15 ‐0.09 0.04 1 non‐Rus 0.57 0.16 0.19 ‐0.34 0.36 0.59 ‐0.06 0.15 ‐0.11 ‐0.02 ‐0.20 ‐0.05 0.16 0.20 0.28 0.07 ‐0.45 1
219
220
Variable description for Table 7 elect%t‐1 – Medvedev’s electoral percentage in March 2008, Δ inc – change in personal income from 2007 to 2011, Δ infl – change in inflation from 2007 to 2011, Δ unempl – change in unemployment rate from 2007 to 2011, Δ educ_exp – change in regional expenditures on education from 2007 to 2011, Δ health_exp – change in regional expenditures on health care from 2007 to 2011, Δ soc_exp – change in regional expenditures on social security from 2007 to 2011, Δ teachD – change in teacher density from 2007 to 2011, Δ docD – change in doctor density from 2007 to 2011, Δ govD – change in government employee density from 2007 to 2011, Δ pensD – change in pensioner density from 2007 to 2011, teachD – teacher density at the end of 2011, docD – doctor density at the end of 2011, govD – government employee density at the end of 2011, Δ fed_trans – change in the share of federal transfers in regional budgets from 2007 to 2011, unempl – unemployment rate at the end of 2011, urban – share of urban population in the region at the end of 2011, non‐Rus – dummy variable for a non‐Russian region (national republic).
221
REGRESSION ANALYSIS NOTES
Note on interpretation of a population rather than a sample model Researchers frequently report statistical significance of the quantitative results of subnational unit analysis even when all or nearly all units in a country are included. By doing that, they treat these units as a random sample from a hypothetical population, whose parameters the model estimates. This assumption is rarely explicitly justified, and it provides researchers with conventional cut‐off α levels, which are frequently deployed as indicators of substantive rather than only statistical significance. In contrast I treat my models as population models. Statistical significance is irrelevant in this case since all regression coefficients are population parameters, not their sample estimates. Standard error in this case does not measure estimator reliability, but rather “the variability of the observed effect size (β), subject to model misspecification, autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and measurement error”.1 In a population model, a regression coefficient represents a systematic effect, while standard error represents stochastic effect. Rather than discussing statistical significance of the coefficients, I use t‐values as a measure of the clarity of the systematic effect of a particular factor relative to the stochastic effect. I compare t‐values of the variables related to competing hypotheses to see which factors are more systematically related to the outcome.
Value change for the Mocsow case The value of the variable measuring the change of federal transfer share in regional budgets for the case of Moscow City has been changed from ‐1.29 to variable minimum of ‐0.48. The reason for this is that the value ‐1.29 is a statistical artefact produced by the low base effect and the direction change of the transfer flow between Moscow regional budget and the federal budget in 2007‐2011. The correction allows to bring this value in line with the phenomenon for which the variable is used as a proxy – the financial incentive for the governors to deliver the electoral percentage for Putin. In 2007 Moscow City was the only region that, according to the treasury data, was giving rather than receiving money from the federal budget. By 2011, it was receiving money. Both figures comprised rather small shares of the regional budget, especially the 2007 one that serves as a base. When calculating the change of the share of federal transfers in the regional budget for Moscow, not only is the sign wrong, but also the value is very high because of the low base. The sign could be fixed to reflect the fact that Moscow has become more dependent on federal transfers, but then the value (1.29, which means 129% increase) would create a wrong impression that Moscow came to be very dependent on the federal budget. This value would also ignore the fact that Moscow was the region where the largest protests against electoral falsifications on 2011 parliamentary elections took place. The fear of a new wave of protests led to significantly reduced, almost non‐existent pressure for falsifications in Moscow, which can be verified by normalized turnout distribution at Moscow precincts in 2012 presidential election.2 Changing the Moscow value of transfer dynamic to the minimum one reflects this reduced pressure from the state officials and, therefore, seems preferable to excluding the case, both because the number of cases is limited and because Moscow is a very important region where the hypothesized mechanism should be tested.
222
Cases excluded because of missing data Chitinskaia oblast’/Zabaikal’skii krai – missing budget data for 2011 Chechnia – missing data on income per person in 2007
Model 2 diagnostics 1. Multicollinearity Variance inflation factor (VIF) was calculated for each variable and did not detect problems with multicollinearity (maximum vif=4.9). 2. Influential observations Cook’s distances were calculated for each observation. Two of them had Cook’s distances larger than 10/79 (10/n). They were: a. the Republic of Ingushetiia (Cook’s distance = 0.28), b. Moscow City (Cook’s distance = 0.15). Data for these cases were checked for possible errors, but no errors were detected. Cases were kept in the analysis. 3. Residuals a. The distribution of regression residuals is very close to normal. b. The mean of residuals is very close to zero. c. Residuals are uncorrelated with predicted values and predictors. d. The Studentized Breusch‐Pagan test was performed to detect possible heteroscedasticity. The results (BP = 18, df = 17, p‐value = 0.3616) indicate no problem with heteroscedasticity.
Appendix notes
1 Gill, “Whose Variance Is It Anyway? Interpreting Empirical Models with State‐Level Data,” 327. 2 Baidakova, “ ‘Real’no ‘Edinuiu Rossiiu’ podderzhali 15% izbiratelei;” Kireev, “Chto mozhet iskorenit’ fal’sifikatsii na vyborakh v Rossii;” Oreshkin, “Gibridnye vybory. Predvaritel’nyi otchet ‘Narodnogo izbirkoma’.”
223
Appendix 4. Data on social policy in Kemerovo region
All graphs are author’s calculations based on data from the Russian Federal Treasury (http://www.roskazna.ru/) and Russian Federal State Statistics Service (http://www.gks.ru/).
25000 Russian 20000 Federation
15000 Siberian Federal rubles 10000 District
Kemerovo 5000 Region
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Figure 22. Pension Fund expenditures, per capita, 2003 prices
340
320 Russian Federation 300
280 Siberian Federal 260 District 240 Kemerovo 220 Region
200 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Figure 23. Number of pensioners per 1,000 population
224
0.44
0.42 Russian 0.4 Federation Kemerovo 0.38 Region
0.36 Tomsk Region
0.34 Altai Republic 0.32
0.3 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Figure 24. Gini coefficient
25.0
20.0 Russian Federation 15.0 % 10.0 Kemerovo Region
5.0
0.0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Figure 25. Share of population with per capita income below subsistence level
225
3500 1
3000 11 Russian Federation 21 2500 regions 31 month
2000 Kemerovo 41 Region per
Russian
1500 51 person among
1000 61 Kemerovo rank per
71 rank among the other 500 87 regions (right
rubles 81 axes) 0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Figure 26. Subsistence income level
3000 Russian 2500 Federation
2000 Siberian 1500 Federal rubles District 1000 Kemerovo 500 Region
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Figure 27. Social Insurance Fund expenditures, per capita, 2003 prices
226
Appendix 5. Newspaper publications related to veterans’ (pensioners’) organizations and their role in politics
This list was compiled from two sources: (1) the local history catalog in Kemerovo regional library and (2) searches of articles in Veteran newspaper in Integrum database. Most entries are articles in two newspapers published by veterans’ (pensioners’) organizations: the nationwide Veteran and the regional Zemliaki. Texts from Veteran have been downloaded from Integrum; texts from Zemliaki have been photographed in Kemerovo regional library, along with a few articles from other sources unavailable in digitalized databases. Sources are sorted by topic and date476. All texts are available from the author upon request.
I. Publications on veterans’ (pensioners’) organizations across Russia, including Kemerovo region a. Political positions: i. against the current president (Yeltsin, Putin, or Medvedev), his government, the United Russia Party, and current policies 1998‐08‐25. Dorofeev, V. “Vinoven v nashikh bedakh.” Veteran. N 32. 2003‐04‐22. “ ‘Zabot’ o pozhilykh mnogo, dostoinoi zhizni net.” Veteran. N 16. 2004‐07‐15. “L’got lishen’e – eto prestuplenie!” Veteran. N 26. 2005‐04‐05. “Grimasy vlasti.” Veteran. N 13. 2006‐10‐03. “Istinu opredeliaet zhizn’.” Veteran. N 37. 2006‐03‐14. “V kazhdoi stroke – trevoga i bol’.” Veteran. N 11. 2006‐09‐05. “Ne otdavaite dushu bushu.” Veteran. N 33. 2006‐10‐31. “Narod o zhizni trudnoi pishet, no president ego ne slyshit!” Veteran. N 41. 2007‐02‐06. “Nam s ‘Edinoi Rossiei’ ne po puti”. Veteran. N 5. 2007‐06‐05. “Narod o zhizni trudnoi pishet, no president ego ne slyshit.” Veteran. N 21. 2008‐10‐21. “Vse reshaiut den’gi.” Veteran. N 40. 2009‐05‐12. “Narod o zhizni trudovoi pishet, nadeias’, vlast’ ego uslyshit!” Veteran. N 18. 2010‐08‐31. “Chinushi.” Veteran. N 33. 2011‐08‐23. “Predvybornaia likhoradka.” Veteran. N 31. 2011‐10‐25. “Administrativnyi resurs.” Veteran. N 40. 2012‐01‐24. “Vokrug presidentskoi kampanii.” Veteran. N 4. 2012‐12‐04. “Trevoga narastaet.” Veteran. N 46. 2013‐10‐22. “Bez kodeksa morali.” Veteran. N 40. ii. in support for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation or other left political forces 2003‐10‐21. “Osnova uspekha – v pervichnykh organizatsiiakh!” Veteran. N 40. 2003‐11‐18. “Podumaem o detiakh i vnukakh.” Veteran. N 44. 2003‐11‐25. “Predvybornomy piaru – otpor.” Veteran. N 45. 2004‐01‐01. Pechenin, I.I. “My vas podderzhim!” Veteran. N 1. 2007‐09‐11. “Za kogo otdadim svoi golosa?” Veteran. N 34.
476 A few sources are listed several times under different topics.
227
iii. in support of Putin, Medvedev, the United Russia party, or the People’s National Front 2007‐03‐06. “Ne oshibit’sia by!” Veteran. N 9. 2010‐12‐14. “Tsenit’ proshloe, dumat’ o budushchem!” Veteran. N 47. b. Organizational development, activities, and involvement in politics i. Embeddedness of veterans’’ (pensioners’) organizations, their ability to reach a large number of people 2003‐10‐21. “Osnova uspekha – v pervichnykh organizatsiiakh!” Veteran. N 40. 2009‐04‐21. “Vtoroe dykhanie.” Veteran. N 16. 2013‐05‐28. “Initsiativa daet prody.” Veteran. N 20. ii. Connections of veterans’ (pensioners’) organizations and the state apparatus 2006‐10‐24. “V odnoi upriazhke.” Veteran. N 40. 2010‐09‐21. “Avtoritet vozros – otvetstvennost’ povysilas’.” Veteran. N 35. iii. Political involvement of veterans (pensioners) as agitators, election observers, electoral commission members, or candidates for elected offices (nationwide, including in Kemerovo region) 2003‐02‐07. Ermakova, Nelli. “Kogda delo laditsia.” Zemliaki. N 6 (639). 2003‐03‐04. “Konkretnyi vklad.” Veteran. N 9. 2003‐09‐23. “Pered novym ispytaniem.” Veteran. N 36. 2003‐11‐11. “Narodnyi deputat.” Veteran. N 43. 2004‐02‐12. “Golosa – dostoinym.” Veteran. N 06. 2007‐03‐30. Budiakovskaia, I. “Byli ‘nicheinye’, stali – nashi!” Zemliaki. N 13. 2007‐04‐10. “Pustye posuly.” Veteran. N 14. 2007‐04‐24. “Pis’ma prezidentu V.V. Putinu.” Veteran. N 16. 2007‐09‐18. “Bol’she initsiativy!” Veteran. N 35. 2007‐10‐02. “Agitator po zovu serdtsa.” Veteran. N 37. 2007‐10‐30. “Nerazryvnaia sviaz’.” Veteran. N 41. 2008‐06‐17. “Delam veteranskim – bogatstva dushi.” Veteran. N 23. 2008‐10‐10. Startsev. “Stupen’ka v zavtra.” Zemliaki. N 41. 2008‐12‐26. Miliutina and Nina Pavlovna Nevorotova. “Nam mnogoe po plechu… .” Zemliaki. N 52. 2010‐08‐10. “Lechenie po‐serdiukovski.” Veteran. N 30. 2011‐04‐15. “Kharakter lidera.” Veteran. N 15. 2011‐06‐21. “Klub veteranov‐izbiratelei.” Veteran. N 23. 2011‐11‐29. “Verit’ ne obeshchaniiam, a delam.” Veteran. N 45. 2012‐02‐28. “ ‘Deti voiny’, ob’ediniaites’!” Veteran. N 8. 2012‐04‐24. “Dlia dela, dlia dushi.” Veteran. N 16. 2013‐04‐02. “Veteranskie gostinye.” Veteran. N 13. 2013‐09‐03. “Bol’she vnimaniia vyboram.” Veteran. N 33. 2014‐01‐28. “Ne stareem serdtsami… .” Veteran. N 4. 2014‐02‐25. “Pamiatnyi iubilei.” Veteran. N 8. 2014‐05‐27. “Nikolai Grigor’evich Ignatov.” Veteran. N 20.
228
iv. Participation of veterans councils in patriotic education (nationwide, including Kemerovo region) 2006‐01‐10. “Uroki goroda.” Veteran. N 2. 2006‐12‐05. “Sibiriaki chtiat geroev.” Veteran. N 46. 2007‐10‐02. “Agitator po zovu serdtsa.” Veteran. N 37. 2011‐10‐04. “Pamiat’ gody ne ostudit.” Veteran. N 37. 2013‐08‐06. “Stanovlenie patriotov.” Veteran. N 29. v. Other bottom‐level activities of veterans’ (pensioners’) organizations 2003‐10‐21. “Osnova uspekha – v pervichnykh organizatsiiakh!” Veteran. N 40. 2009‐04‐21. “Vtoroe dykhanie.” Veteran. N 16. 2010‐09‐21. “Avtoritet vozros – otvetstvennost’ povysilas’.” Veteran. N 35. 2012‐01‐10. “Na plenume – o pervichkakh.” Veteran. N 2. 2013‐04‐16. “Vystuplenie predsedatelia vserossiiskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii veteranov (pensionerov) voiny, truda, vooruzhennykh sil i pravookhranitel’nykh organov D.I. Karabanova.” Veteran. N 15. 2014‐09‐16. “Kak zhivet pervichka?” Veteran. N 35. vi. Trust and sympathy to the newspaper “Veteran” 2003‐01‐14. “15 strok k 15‐letiiu.” Veteran. N 2. 2004‐07‐08. “Gromche zvuchi, ‘Veteran’!” Veteran. N 25. 2013‐04‐16. “Gazetu ‘Veteran’ – v kazhduiu pervichku!” Veteran. N 15. 2013‐06‐11. “Slovo chitatelei gazety.” Veteran. N 22. vii. Opposition to the creation of alternative veterans’ (pensioners’) organizations 2004‐08‐26. “Otvet raskol’nikam.” Veteran. N 32. 2004‐11‐04. “Raskol, diktuemyi sverkhu.”. Veteran. N 41.
II. Publications on veterans’ (pensioners’) organizations specifically in Kemerovo region a. Political positions: i. Support of Tuleev, his policies, and his political alliances; Tuleev’s use of veterans’ newspaper to voice his position 1999‐11‐29. Starozhilov, Anton. “Kuzbass pril’nul k ‘Medvediu’.” Ekspert. N 45(208). 2000‐05‐25. Tuleev. “Infarktnoe eto delo.” Zemliaki. N 22. С. 2. 2000‐10‐20. Lavrenkov, Igor. “Kemerovchane khotiat Tuleeva: pereizbrat’ na polgoda ran’she.” Kommersant. N 197. 2003‐04‐11. Tuleev, Aman Gumirovich. “Takuiu sistemu sotsial’noi zashchity nado berech’!” Zemliaki. N 18. 2003‐04‐18. “Otkrytoe pis’mo zhitelei Tsentral’nogo raiona zhiteliam Leninskogo raiona.” Zemliaki. N 20. 2003‐04‐18. Tuleev. “ ‘20 aprelia – vse na vybory!’ Obrashchenie A.G. Tuleeva k izbirateliam.” Zemliaki. N 20. 2003‐11‐28. Avaliani, T.G. “Naglost’ pravit bal.” Patriot. N 49. 2005‐04‐08. Grishin, Valentin. “Zvonite i prikhodite: pomozhem.” Zemliaki. N 15. 2005‐08‐19. Ostanina, Nina. “Prishlo vremia vybora.” Zemliaki. N 34 (782).
229
2006‐05‐05. Grishin, V.G. “Rucheek moguchei reki.” Zemliaki. N 18. 2007‐07‐06. Grishin, Valentin and Tat’iana Vladimirova. “Ruka pomoshchi.” Zemliaki. N 27. 2007‐10‐26. Oblastnoi sovet veteranov. “Ne oshibemsia i na etot raz.” Zemliaki. N 43 (895). 2007‐11‐30. Tuleev, Aman Gumirovich, and Svetlana Sergeeva. “Opredeliat’ kurs budem vmeste.” Zemliaki. N 48. С. 5, 6. 2007‐12‐07. “Rassudit sud.” Zemliaki. N 49 (901). 2008‐07‐18. Kolokolova. “Piatiletka doveriia.” Zemliaki. N 29. 2008‐07‐25. Churpita. “Byvshikh shakhterov ne byvaet.” Zemliaki. N 30. 2008‐09‐12. Chekh. “My zabyt’ togo ne vprave…” Zemliaki. N 37. 2012‐11‐06. “Peremeny v Kuzbasse.” Veteran. N 42. 2012‐07‐24. “Kuzbasskim pensioneram zaviduiut.” Veteran. N 28. ii. Support of the communists, including Nina Ostanina 2002‐06‐21. Ostanina, Nina. “Zakon v podderzhku ekstremizma vlasti.” Zemliaki. N 25. 2005‐09‐09. Ermakova, Nelli. “My za referendum!” Zemliaki. N 37. 2004‐04‐09. Ostanina, Nina. “Kuda ne stupit noga demonstranta.” Zemliaki. N 15. 2006‐01‐13. Ostanina, Nina. “Litsom k kazhdomu.” Zemliaki. N 2. 2006‐12‐01. Ostanina, Nina. “Dumskie butaforii: prodolzhenie sleduet.” Zemliaki. N 48. 2007‐05‐18. Ostanina, Nina. “God sem’I, kak malo v etom slove…” Zemliaki. N 20. iii. Critique of Tuleev and politics and policies in Kemerovo region 2000‐12‐15. Kuznetsov, N.S. “Mesto naznacheniia – kotu pod khvost.” Nasha gazeta. N 130. 2005‐04‐05. “Grimasy vlasti.” Veteran. N 13. 2007‐11‐09. Kviatkovskaia, Tat’iana. “Prenebrezhenie sovest’iu.” Zemliaki. N 45 (897). 2008‐10‐21. “Vse reshaiut den’gi.” Veteran. N 40. 2011‐08‐23. “Predvybornaia likhoradka.” Veteran. N 31. 2011‐12‐20. “Na ‘parovoznoi’ tiage.” Veteran. N 48. 2012‐01‐24. “Vokrug presidentskoi kampanii.” Veteran. N 4. 2012‐12‐04. “Trevoga narastaet.” Veteran. N 46. 2013‐10‐01. “Vernite polikliniku i kafe…” Veteran. N 37. 2013‐07‐02. “Vlast’ driakhlee starikov.” Veteran. N 25. 2013‐03‐26. “Po stranitsam pisem.” Veteran. N 12. iv. Concerns about miners’ pensions 2006‐04‐28. Ermakova. “Nas slyshat, no ne khotiat ponimat’.” Zemliaki. N 17. 2007‐01‐26. Popok. “Pro shakhterskie pensii i dostoinuiu zhizn’.” Zemliaki. N 4. 2007‐02‐16. “Zasadnaia. U pechki ia i grust’ moia.” Zemliaki. N 7. v. Discredit of Tuleev’s political opponents 2002‐05‐04. Kuz’min. “Nenavist’ oligarkha.” Zemliaki. N 18. 2002‐06‐07. Tuleev, Aman Gumirovich and Aleksandr Ivanov. “KPRF: vsem ostyt’ i krepko podumat’.” Zemliaki. N 23. 2003‐11‐28. Vladimirova, I. “Stiral’nyi poroshok protiv iznasilovaniia, ili eshche odna taina sem’I Pristavki.” Zemliaki. N 52. 2004‐12‐24. Popok, Vasilii Borisovich. “Palatoshnyi lager’ i ego predsedatel’.” Zemliaki. N 52. 2006‐03‐10. Popok. “Palatu proverili i nashli, chto tam bardak.” Zemliaki. N 10. 2007‐11‐16. Bugaev, Petr. “O chem ne pishut v ‘Nashem Kuzbasse’.” Zemliaki. N 46 (898).
230
2007‐11‐16. “Pereshagnuv porog dopustimogo. Otkrytoe pis’mo pervomu sekretariu obkoma KPRF N. Ostaninoi.” Zemliaki. N 46 (898). 2008‐09‐19. Privalov, K.A. “Kto pod krasnym znamenem?” Zemliaki. N 38. 2010‐10‐15. Popok, V. “Golosui pravil’no, a ne to – proigraesh!” Zemliaki. № 42. b. Organizational development, activities, and involvement in politics i. General articles on history and organizational development 2000‐08‐24. Konovalova, N. “Veteranskomu dvizheniiu v Novokuznetske – 25 let.” Zemliaki. N 35. 2003‐02‐21. Ermakova, Nelli. “My za nastoiashchikh patriotov!” Zemliaki. N 8 (641). 2003‐10‐21. “Soobshchenie.” Veteran. N 40. 2004‐03‐12. Sorokin, Aleksandr. "Kommunisty ne stanut ugozhdat’ vlastiam…” Krai. N 11. 2004‐04‐30. Il’iashenko, M. “Del cherez krai.” Zemliaki. N 18. 2005‐10‐11. “Podkhod – kompleksnyi.” Veteran. N 38. 2005‐10‐14. “V pole zreniia – 800 tysiach sudeb.” Zemliaki. N 42. 2006‐08‐17. “V Kemerovskoi oblasti poiavilos’ regional’noe otdelenie ‘Rossiiskoi partii pensionerov’.” Kuznetskii krai. N 89. 2006‐10‐13. Ermakova. “Est’ takaia partiia!” Zemliaki. N 41. 2006‐11‐03. Ermakova. “Pregrady na puti pervoprokhodtsev.” Zemliaki. N 44. 2006‐12‐29. Nevorotova, Nina Pavlovna, and Nelli Ermakova. “Miloserdie natseleno v zavtra.” Zemliaki. N 52. 2007‐01‐12. Ermakova. “O chem skazhut ‘nezabudki’.” Zemliaki. N 2. 2007‐01‐26. Maiorov. “Vchera – nich’i, segodnia – nashi.” Zemliaki. N 4. 2007‐03‐16. Goncharova. “Znachit – my ne odni!” Zemliaki. N 11. 2007‐05‐18. Tikhomirova, V.P. “Ogni alma‐mater.” Zemliaki. N 20. 2007‐06‐01. Ivachev. “Bankrotstvo ne kosnulos’ ‘sedin’.” Zemliaki. N 22. 2008‐03‐07. Startsev. “V shakhterskom krae i ulitsy shakhterskie.” Zemliaki. N 10. 2008‐03‐28. Miliutina. “Ni dnia bez strochki.” Zemliaki. N 13. 2008‐05‐23. Miliutina. “So vremenem na ‘ty’.” Zemliaki. N 21. 2008‐07‐25. Churpita. “Byvshikh shakhterov ne byvaet.” Zemliaki. N 30. 2008‐10‐10. Startsev. “Stupen’ka v zavtra.” Zemliaki. N 41. 2008‐10‐17. Miliutina. “Iazykom eksponatov o zhizni i datakh.” Zemliaki. N 42. 2008‐11‐14. Konovalova, N.S. “Den’ raspisan po minutam.” Zemliaki. N 46. 2010‐11‐30. “Tochki prilozheniia usilii.” Veteran. N 45. 2014‐07‐08. “Lider veteranov Kuzbassa.” Veteran. N 26. ii. Connections of veterans’ (pensioners’) organizations and the state apparatus 2005‐01‐16. “Kuzbassovtsam l’goty sokhraneny.” S toboi. N 3. 2006‐10‐13. Fedorova. “Initsiativy, prodiktovannye zhizn’iu.” Zemliaki. N 41. 2008‐05‐23. Miliutina. “So vremenem na ‘ty’.” Zemliaki. N 21. 2008‐09‐19. Churpita. “Ne privykli sdavat’sia trudnostiam.” Zemliaki. N 38. 2008‐10‐10. Startsev. “Stupen’ka v zavtra.” Zemliaki. N 41. 2011‐10‐25. “Shakhter – zvanie vysokoe.” Veteran. N 40. 2011‐11‐15. “Sovety nepostoronnikh.” Veteran. N 43. 2013‐01‐22. “Zabotu truzhenikam sela.” Veteran. N 3.
231 iii. Activities of veterans’ councils in Kemerovo region beyond patriotic education 2003‐02‐07. Ermakova, Nelli. “Kogda delo laditsia.” Zemliaki. N 6 (639). 2003‐09‐26. Nevorotova, Nina Pavlovna. “I s bedoi i s radost’iu idut k nam…” Zemliaki. N 43. 2005‐07‐29. Ermakova, Nelli. “Kogda sluzhish’ liudiam...” Zemliaki. N 31. 2005‐08‐12. Bal’zanova, V.Z. “Khoroshikh del nemalo.” Zemliaki. N 33. 2005‐08‐19. Mikhailov, V.D. “Energiia opyta.” Zemliaki. N 34. 2005‐09‐23. Pisareva, N. “Razve mozhet byt’ otsenka vyshe?” Zemliaki. N 39. 2005‐10‐11. “Podkhod – kompleksnyi.” Veteran. N 38. 2006‐06‐06. “I kniga, i muzei.” Veteran. N 21. 2006‐06‐09. Ermakova. “Vmeste v dobryi put’!” Zemliaki. N 23. 2007‐03‐27. “Tsentr raboty – pervishki.” Veteran. N 12. 2007‐12‐04. “Tretii vozrast.” Veteran. N 46. 2007‐12‐04. “Podvor’e liudei kormit.” Veteran. N 46. 2007‐12‐04. “Gorod sem’ei slaven.” Veteran. N 46. 2007‐06‐15. Belousova. “Vpisany v Zolotuiu letopis’ goroda.” Zemliaki. N 24. 2007‐08‐24. Oblastnoi Sovet veteranov voiny i truda. “Ded naputstvuet vnuka, provozhaia v zaboi.” Zemliaki. N 34. 2007‐11‐09. Mikel’son, Tat’iana. “Znat’ kazhdogo – po pasportu.” Zemliaki. N 45 (897). 2007‐12‐14. Miliutina. “Prednaznachenie zashchishchat’.” Zemliaki. N 50. 2008‐07‐01. “Dve prezentatsii.” Veteran. N 25. 2008‐04‐04. Miliutina. “Pomoshch’ fonda ‘Shakhterskaia pamiat’.” Zemliaki. N 14. 2008‐05‐23. Miliutina. “So vremenem na ‘ty’.” Zemliaki. N 21. 2008‐09‐19. Churpita. “Ne privykli sdavat’sia trudnostiam.” Zemliaki. N 38. 2008‐10‐03. Svarovskii, I.V. “Zasluzhili vsei zhizn’iu.” Zemliaki. N 40. 2008‐10‐17. Miliutina. “Iazykom eksponatov o zhizni i datakh.” Zemliaki. N 42. 2008‐10‐28. “Sibiriaki v boiakh ne podveli.” Veteran. N 41. 2008‐11‐14. Konovalova, N.S. “Den’ raspisan po minutam.” Zemliaki. N 46. 2009‐10‐06. “Glavnoe vnimanie pervichkam.” Veteran. N 37. 2010‐01‐26. “Golos starshego pokoleniia.” Veteran. N 4. 2012‐09‐25. “Dlia tvorchestva net granits.” Veteran. N 36. 2012‐12‐02. Potapova, Iulia. “Pridut i pomogut.” Rossiiskaia gazeta ‐ nedelia. N 273 (5352). 2013‐05‐21. “Iubilei delami krasen.” Veteran. N 19. 2013‐10‐15. “Nina Pavlovna Nevorotova.” Veteran. N 39. 2014‐02‐04. “Gorod – sem’ia druzhnaia.” Veteran. N 5. iv. Information about benefits and welfare programs for pensioners and veterans in Kemerovo region 2001‐09‐27. Nevorotova. “Prava i interesy pozhilykh liudei pod zashchitu Federal’nogo zakona ‘O veteranakh’.” Zemliaki. N 40. 2002‐10‐01. Murav’eva, Galina. “Ty etogo dostoin, veteran!” Kuznetskii krai. N 109. 2003‐04‐08. “V Kuzbasse rasshiriaetsia Sistema sotsial’noi zashchity veteranov.” Zemliaki. N 17. 2004‐11‐24. Chistiakova, Olesia. “Monetizatsiia sotsial’nogo paketa l’got.” S toboi. N 93. 2005‐01‐14. “Kolesa diktuiut vagonnye…” Zemliaki. N 3. 2005‐02‐25. Ermakova, Nelli. “Pomogite segodnia. Zavtra budet pozdno!” Zemliaki. N 9.
232
2005‐05‐11. Fillipov, Sergei. “Veteranov ostekiat i telefoniziruiut.” Moskovskii komsomolets v Kuzbasse. N 19. 2006‐08‐25. Velichko, Viacheslav. “Sviazisty rasstavliaiut prioritety.” Kuzbass. N 157. 2007‐05‐06. Fedorova. “Parad i prazdnichnyi saliut dlia veteranov.” S toboi. N 35. 2007‐09‐12. Ivachev. “Zhizn’ prodolzhaetsia.” S toboi. N 72. 2007‐09‐30. Tumanova. “Kachestvo zhizni pozhilykh liudei… uluchshaiut.” S toboi. N 77. 2007‐10‐07. Tumanova. “Veteran – vsegda u nas v pochete…” S toboi. N 79. 2007‐12‐03. Gostev, Konstantin. “V Kuzbasse podderzhali veteranov.” Nezavisimaia gazeta. N 259 (4219). 2008‐04‐16. “Podderzhka veteranov – sviashchennyi dolg.” S toboi. N 30. 2008‐04‐17. Kemerovskaia oblast’. Administratsiia. Press‐sluzhba. “L’goty dlia veteranov.” Kuznetskii krai. N 16. 2008‐11‐06. Panarina. “Naedine so starost’iu.” Kuzbass. N 203. 2008‐10‐12. “Zabota o veteranakh – nash sviashchennyi dolg.” S toboi. N 81. 2008‐12‐13. Shcherbakova, Elena. “O pensiiakh i sotspodderzhke veteranov.” Kuzbass. N 230. 2010‐02‐18. Potapova, Iulia. “Sanatorii na domu.” Rossiiskaia gazeta ‐ nedelia. N 35 (5114). 2012‐02‐05. Ivachev, K. “Doplaty pensioneram.” S toboi. N 9. 2012‐04‐11. “Den’ Pobedy.” S toboi. N 28. 2012‐09‐29. “Zabota, l’goty i podderzhka.” S toboi. N 77. v. Business donations to veterans’ (pensioners’) organizations or programs 2003‐01‐22. “Obnovlenie ‘Kuzbassfarmy’.” Kuzbass. N 11. 2005‐09‐30. Kirikova, Lidiia Timofeevna. “Teplaia osen’.” Zemliaki. N 40. 2005‐09‐30. Kovylina, V.A. “Ne izmeniaia traditsiiam.” Zemliaki. N 40. 2005‐11‐25. “Bez biudzhetnykh sredstv.” Кемерово. N 48. 2006‐05‐05. Maksimliuk. “Kogda podderzhivaet rodnoi zavod.” Zemliaki. N 18. 2006‐09‐29. Vladimirova. “Za druzheskim stolom s ‘koksovym pirogom’.” Zemliaki. N 39. 2007‐01‐12. Ermakova. “O chem skazhut ‘nezabudki’.” Zemliaki. N 2. 2007‐06‐01. Ivachev. “Bankrotstvo ne kosnulos’ ‘sedin’.” Zemliaki. N 22. 2007‐08‐24. Kladchikhin. “Uzel otvetstvennosti.” Zemliaki. N 34. 2007‐09‐28. Shabanov and Tat’iana Kviatkovskaia. “Partnerstvo radi miloserdiia.” Zemliaki. N 39. 2007‐09‐28. Belousova. “Stupeni soglasiia.” Zemliaki. N 39. 2008‐07‐25. Churpita. “Byvshikh shakhterov ne byvaet.” Zemliaki. N 30. 2008‐09‐26. Babarykina. “Vashe zdorov’e – nashi bogatstvo!” Zemliaki. N 39. 2008‐10‐03. “S domom, mashinoi I ne bez deneg.” Zemliaki. N 40.
233
Appendix 6. Newspaper publications related to residential committees and community centers in Kemerovo and to their role in politics
This list was compiled from three sources: (1) documents about residential committees and community centers copied in Kemerovo regional library and one of the community centers; (2) searches of articles related to Kemerovo residential committees and community centers in Integrum database; and (3) the web‐site of the government of Kemerovo city. Most entries are articles in a local government‐controlled newspaper Kemerovo, which have been downloaded from Integrum. Sources are sorted by date. All texts are available from the author upon request.
2002‐06‐07. “Gorod: analiz, uspekhi, problem, perspektivy.” Kemerovo. N 23. 2004‐07‐09. “Novosti v raionakh goroda.” Kemerovo. N 28. 2004‐11‐19. Akulenko, Tat’iana. “Sovmestnymi usiliiami.” Kemerovo. N 47. 2005‐06‐01. “Korotko.” Kuzbass. N 95. 2005‐06‐01. “Ravnykh net v rukopashnom boiu.” Kuzbass. N 95. 2005‐06‐10. Akulenko, Tat’iana. “Priknodite star i mlad.” Kemerovo. N 24. 2005‐07‐22. “Budet gde otdokhnut’.” Kemerovo. N 30. 2005‐07‐29. Loginova, Ekaterina. “Shakhterskii krai goroda Kemerovo.” Kemerovo. N 31. 2005‐08‐10. “Novaia zhizn’ ‘Komsomol’tsa’.” Kuzbass. N 144. 2005‐08‐12. Press‐sluzhba administratsii goroda. “Tsentry est’, rabota budet.” Kemerovo. N 33. 2005‐12‐16. “Fil’m – detiam.” Kemerovo. N 51. 2005‐12‐30. “S Novym godom!” Kemerovo. N 53. 2006‐01‐27. “Vsem delo nashlos’.” Kemerovo. N 4. 2006‐05‐19. Press‐sluzhba administratsii goroda. “Podarki gorodu.” Kemerovo. N 20. 2006‐06‐02. “Deputatskii kontrol’.” Kemerovo. N 22. 2006‐06‐23. Press‐sluzhba administratsii goroda. “Vsem naidetsia delo po dushe.” Kemerovo. N 25. 2006‐09‐08. Akulenko, Tat’iana. “Druzhba i ponimanie.” Kemerovo. N 36. 2006‐09‐22. Akulenko, Tat’iana. “Novoe soderzhanie starogo nazvaniia.” Kemerovo. N 38. 2006‐09‐22. “Tomichi priekhali uchit’sia.” Kemerovo. N 38. 2006‐10‐06. Totysh, Natalia. “Tsentr, v kotorom vse est’.” Kemerovo. N 40. 2006‐11‐24. Press‐sluzhba administratsii goroda. “Pomoshch’ pridet vovremia.” Kemerovo. N 47. 2006‐12‐22. Totysh, Natalia. “S pol’zoi i interesom.” Kemerovo. N 51. 2006‐12‐23. “Komu – vrag, komu – stroimaterial.” Kuzbass. N 241. 2006‐12‐29. Press‐sluzhba administratsii goroda. “Punkty stali tsentrami.” Kemerovo. N 52. 2006‐12‐29. “Chtoby my ne skuchali.” Kemerovo. N 52. 2007‐01‐12. Matiushchenko, Iulia. “K sebe, na elku.” Kuzbass. N 4. 2007‐01‐12. Press‐sluzhba administratsii goroda. “V gostiakh, kak doma.” Kemerovo. N 2. 2007‐01‐26. Koshkina, Elena. “Uiut semeinogo gnezda.” Kemerovo. N 4. 2007‐01‐26. “TOS – samaia blizkaia vlast’.” Kemerovo. N 4. 2007‐02‐02. “V raionakh goroda.” Kemerovo. N 6. 2007‐02‐09. Korogod, Irina. “Kak poiaviaiutsia narodnye biblioteki.” Kemerovo. N 6. 2007‐02‐16. “Za sovet platu ne berut.” Kemerovo. N 7. 2007‐02‐16. Press‐sluzhba gorsoveta narodnykh deputatov.” “ ‘Molodaia gvardiia’ ukrepliaet tyly.” Kemerovo. N 7.
234
2007‐03‐30. “V raionakh goroda.” Kemerovo. N 13. 2007‐04‐06. “Postanovlenie administratsii goroda N 36 ot 02.04.2007 g. ‘O Polozhenii o smotre‐ konkurse sotsial’nykh proektov tsentrov po rabote s naseleniem.” Kemerovo. N 14. 2007‐04‐13. “V raionakh goroda.” Kemerovo. N 15. 2007‐04‐20. “Podelis’ s drugim…” Kemerovo. N 16. 2007‐04‐20. “Slovo i delo deputata.” Kemerovo. N 16. 2007‐05‐11. Kovshova, Galina. “ ‘Zdorov’e’ dlia vsekh.” Kemerovo. N 19. 2007‐05‐11. Liubimov, A.G. “Kontseptsiia razvitiia goroda Kemerovo do 2021 goda.” Kemerovo. N 19. 2007‐05‐11. “Pozdravlenie veteranam.” Kemerovo. N 19. 2007‐05‐25. “Pobedila druzhba.” Kemerovo. N 21. 2007‐05‐25. Shilova, Maria. “S obnovoi!” Kemerovo. N 21. 2007‐05‐25. Shilova, Natal’ia. “Prazdnik vsekh ob’edinil.” Kemerovo. N 21. 2007‐06‐08. “Vopros uchastkovomu.” Kemerovo. N 23. 2007‐06‐08. “Zaboty obshchie.” Kemerovo. N 23. 2007‐06‐08. Zinchuk, Valentina. “Chto znaete o l’gotakh?” Kemerovo. N 23. 2007‐06‐08. “Iz veka v vek.” Kemerovo. N 23. 2007‐06‐08. “Korotko.” Kemerovo. N 23. 2007‐06‐08. Kostina, Galina. “Maksimych.” Kemerovo. N 23. 2007‐06‐08. Noraeva, Nadezhda. “Na primerakh uchimsia.” Kemerovo. N 23. 2007‐06‐08. “Trudovye dinastii.” Kemerovo. N 23. 2007‐06‐15. “Zaiavka na proekt.” Kemerovo. N 24. 2007‐06‐19. “Dazhe v gorode skuchat’ im ne pridetsia!” Komsomol’skaia pravda ‐ Kemerovo. N 86. 2007‐07‐06. Brezhneva, Nina. “Na dobrovol’nykh nachalakh.” Kemerovo. N 27. 2007‐07‐06. “Delo obshchee.” Kemerovo. N 27. 2007‐07‐06. “I rabota, i otdykh.” Kemerovo. N 27. 2007‐07‐06. “Igrushki nashikh mam.” Kemerovo. N 27. 2007‐07‐06. Karetina, Margarita. “Tianutsia k nebu sireni.” Kemerovo. N 27. 2007‐07‐06. “Kogda smeiutsia deti.” Kemerovo. N 27. 2007‐07‐06. “Korotko.” Kemerovo. N 27. 2007‐07‐06. “Krasivo i uiutno.” Kemerovo. N 27. 2007‐07‐20. Voklov, Andrei. “Korotko.” Kemerovo. N 29. 2007‐07‐20. “Est’ delo dlia vsekh.” Kemerovo. N 29. 2007‐07‐20. Zaitseva, Irina Konstantinovna. “Ot chistogo serdtsa.” Kemerovo. N 29. 2007‐07‐20. Karetina, Margarita. “Vsegda pomogut.” Kemerovo. N 29. 2007‐07‐20. “Korotko.” Kemerovo. N 29. 2007‐07‐20. “Povesililis’ ot dushi.” Kemerovo. N 29. 2007‐07‐20. “Pravila znaem.” Kemerovo. N 29. 2007‐07‐20. “Rabota dlia liudei.” Kemerovo. N 29. 2007‐07‐27. “Letnie puteshestvia.” Kemerovo. N 30. 2007‐07‐27. Totysh, Natal’ia. “Kak odna sem’ia.” Kemerovo. N 30. 2007‐08‐10. “Vybiraiut vlast’ zhil’tsy.” Kemerovo. N 32 ;. 2007‐08‐10. “Dobrye dela.” Kemerovo. N 32. 2007‐08‐10. Inozemtseva, Elena. “S sosediami v mire.” Kemerovo. N 32 ;. 2007‐08‐10. “Korotko.” Kemerovo. N 32 ;.
235
2007‐08‐10. “Korotko.” Kemerovo. N 32. 2007‐08‐24. Zonova, Liubov’. “Est’ chto vspomnit’.” Kemerovo. N 34. 2007‐08‐24. Karetina, Margarita. “Schastlivoe chislo – 13.” Kemerovo. N 34. 2007‐08‐24. Korogod, Irina. “Kak u khoroshei khoziaiki.” Kemerovo. N 34. 2007‐08‐24. “Korotko.” Kemerovo. N 34. 2007‐08‐24. “Match druzhby.” Kemerovo. N 34. 2007‐08‐24. “Musei semeinykh tsennostei.” Kemerovo. N 34. 2007‐08‐24. Sabel’nikov, Maksim, Andrei Rabotin, Evgenii Velichko i drugie. “Blagodarim druzei.” Kemerovo. N 34. 2007‐08‐24. Tkachenko, Ol’ga. “Krasota, kotoraia spaset.” Kemerovo. N 34. 2007‐08‐24. “Iubileiu posviashchaetsia.” Kemerovo. N 34. 2007‐09‐07. “Korotko.” Kemerovo. N 36. 2007‐09‐14. “... i mnogo radosti.” Kemerovo. N 37. 2007‐09‐21. “Ulybnis’!” Kemerovo. N 38. 2007‐10‐12. “Nadezhnye liudi.” Kemerovo. N 41. 2007‐10‐12. “Osen’ v nashem boru.” Kemerovo. N 41. 2007‐10‐12. “Skazhite uchiteliu spasibo.” Kemerovo. N 41. 2007‐10‐26. “Korotko.” Kemerovo. N 43. 2007‐10‐26. “Pervyi pasport.” Kemerovo. N 43. 2007‐10‐26. Rasskazova, Irina. “Boi politicheskogo znacheniia.” Kemerovo. N 43. 2007‐11‐02. Press‐sluzhba gorsoveta narodnykh deputatov. “Skhod sprashivaet – deputat otvechaet.” Kemerovo. N 44. 2007‐11‐16. Press‐sluzhba gorsoveta narodnykh deputatov. “Na priem k deputatu.” Kemerovo. N 46. 2007‐11‐22. Krasnosel’skaia, Tat’iana. “Probudit’ initsiativu.” Kuzbass. N 217. 2007‐12‐07. Press‐sluzhba gorsoveta narodnykh deputatov. “Materinskoe teplo.” Kemerovo. N 49. 2007‐12‐21. Kemerova, Valentina Alekseevna. “Skuchat’ ne davali.” Kemerovo. N 51. 2008‐01‐08. “Problemy na kontrole.” Kemerovo. N 6. 2008‐01‐11. “Vmeste veselei.” Kemerovo. N 2. 2008‐01‐11. “Slovo i delo deputata: Priznanie po delam.” Kemerovo. N 2. 2008‐01‐25. Lisitsina, Irina. “30‐letiiu raiona – 30 dobrykh del.” Kemerovo. N 4. 2008‐02‐08. Akulenko, Tat’iana. “Schast’e obshcheniia.” Kemerovo. N 6. 2008‐02‐08. “Korotko.” Kemerovo. N 6. 2008‐02‐08. Nekrasova, Natal’ia. “Pesnia o raione.” Kemerovo. N 6. 2008‐02‐08. “Postanovlenie administratsii goroda N 11 ot 01.02.2008 g. ‘O provedenii smotra‐konkursa sotsial’nykh proektov tsentrov po rabote s naseleniem’.” Kemerovo. N 6. 2008‐02‐08. “Postanovlenie administratsii goroda N 18 ot 05.02.2008 g. ‘O provedenii smotra‐konkursa ‘Tsentr po rabote s naseleniem’ ‘.” Kemerovo. N 6. 2008‐02‐08. “Rovesniki oblasti.” Kemerovo. N 6. 2008‐02‐08. Sedykh, Vera Petrovna. “Chtoby starost’ byla v radost’.” Kemerovo. N 6. 2008‐02‐08. Syvatko, Tat’iana. “Uroki istorii.” Kemerovo. N 6. 2008‐02‐15. “Slovo i delo deputata: Esli obeshchala – sdelaet.” Kemerovo. N 7. 2008‐02‐22. “Umom i smekalkoi syl’ny.” Kemerovo. N 8. 2008‐04‐04. Il’ina, Nadezhda. “Subbotnik naperegonki.” Kemerovo. N 14. 2008‐04‐04. “Korotko.” Kemerovo. N 14.
236
2008‐04‐04. “Slovo aktivistov.” Kemerovo. N 14. 2008‐04‐18. “V komitetakh gorsoveta.” Kemerovo. N 16. 2008‐04‐18. “Korotko.” Kemerovo. N 16. 2008‐04‐18. “Oni rabotaiut na Kuzbass.” Kuzbass. N 69. 2008‐05‐08. “Tsentr mikroraiona.” Kemerovo. N 19. 2008‐06‐11. “Dlia babushek, vnukov i filosofov.” Kemerovo. N 24. 2008‐06‐11. Poliakova, Kseniia. “Pozdravliaem s iubileem.” Kemerovo. N 24. 2008‐06‐11. “S liubov’iu k Kemerovo.” Kemerovo. N 24. 2008‐07‐04. “Spasibo za prazdnik!” Kemerovo. N 27. 2008‐07‐04. Lisitsina, Irina. “Na kontrole.” Kemerovo. N 27. 2008‐07‐11. Akulenko, Tat’iana. “Pamiatnaia ekskursiia.” Kemerovo. N 28. 2008‐07‐11. Kliuchareva, Raisa. “Rabotu sebe vsegda nakhodila.” Kemerovo. N 28. 2008‐07‐11. Podol’skaia, Tamara. “Chei palisadnik luchshe.” Kemerovo. N 28. 2008‐07‐18. “Sredi luchshikh.” Kemerovo. N 29. 2008‐09‐12. “Istoriia – eto interestno.” Kemerovo. N 37. 2008‐10‐24. Vorob’eva, Zhanna. “Proekty dlia zhizni.” Kemerovo. N 43. 2008‐10‐24. Makarova, T. “Takoi u nas deputat.” Kemerovo. N 43. 2008‐11‐28. “V gosti – s podarkom.” Кемерово. N 48. 2008‐11‐28. Press‐sluzhba gorodskogo Soveta narodnykh deputatov. “Rabota v komitetakh.” Kemerovo. N 48. 2008‐12‐12. “A problem obshchie.” Kemerovo. N 50. 2008‐12‐12. Il’ina, Nadezhda. “Doiti do kazhdogo.” Kemerovo. N 50. 2008‐12‐12. Syrovatko, Tat’iana. “Nachalo nachal.” Kemerovo. N 50. 2008‐12‐12. Shilova, Maria. “Khoroshee nastroienie delaem sami.” Кемерово. N 50. 2009‐01‐23. “Kto, esli ne my?” Kemerovo. N 4. 2009‐01‐23. “Telefony i adresa tsentrov po rabote s naseleniem.” Kemerovo. N 4. 2009‐01‐23. Fefelova, Elena. “Zhizn’ v tvorchestve.” Кемерово. N 4. 2009‐01‐30. Fefelova, Elena. “Zdes’ vsegda interesno.” Kemerovo. N 5. 2009‐01‐30. “Khoroshei, rodnoi raion!” Kemerovo. N 5. 2009‐02‐27. Il’ina, Nadezhda. “S liuboi problemoi.” Kemerovo. N 9. 2009‐05‐15. Kikioi, Tat’iana. “Reshaem vmeste.” Kemerovo. N 20. 2009‐05‐15. Kozlova, Natal’ia. “Luchshii, potomu chto neobychnyi…” Кемерово. N 20. 2009‐05‐29. Press‐sluzhba administratsii goroda. “Vsegda riadom.” Кемерово. N 22. 2009‐06‐19. “Platit’ po schetam.” Kemerovo. N 25. 2009‐06‐26. Fefelova, Elena. “Gorod delitsia opytom.” Kemerovo. N 26. 2009‐07‐03. Fefelova, Elena. “Gotovimsia k perepisi.” Kemerovo. N 27. 2009‐07‐31. Kozlova, Natal’ia. “Liudi s bleskom v glazakh.” Kemerovo. N 31. 2009‐09‐04. Letov, Andrei. “Vazhnyi razgovor.” Kemerovo. N 36. 2009‐10‐02. Spiridova, Svetlana. “Okazat’sia riadom.” Kemerovo. N 40. 2009‐10‐09. Letov, Andrei. “Na svezhem vozdukhe.” Kemerovo. N 41. 2009‐10‐16. Tkachenko, Ol’ga. “Vsegda vmeste.” Kemerovo. N 42. 2009‐11‐03. “Zdes’ neskuchno i vzroslym, i detiam.” Komsomol’skaia pravda ‐ Kemerovo. N 165. 2010‐01‐22. “God iubileia.” Kemerovo. N 4. 2010‐01‐29. Fefelova, Elena. “V gosti na bliny.” Kemerovo. N 5.
237
2010‐02‐05. Panfilova, Tat’iana. “Podgotovka k iubileiu ob’edinila vsekh.” Kemerovo. N 6. 2010‐02‐19. “Rezul’tat sovmestnykh deistvii.” Kemerovo. N 8 ;. 2010‐04‐16. “Za konsul’tatsiei k iuristu.” Kemerovo. N 16. 2010‐05‐14. “Eto – Rodina moia.” Kemerovo. N 20. 2010‐06‐11. “Slovo i delo deputata.” Kemerovo. N 24. 2010‐06‐18. “Deistvovat’ logichno.” Kemerovo. N 25. 2010‐09‐10. Ershova, Svetlana. “Dusha Iskitimki.” Kuzbass. N 167. 2010‐09‐17. Shmaikova, Anna. “S iubileem, Anna Petrovna!” Kemerovo. N 38. 2010‐10‐29. Glushakova, Kseniia. “Dobryi primer.” Kemerovo. N 44. 2010‐10‐29. “Na vse voprosy.” Kemerovo. N 44. 2010‐11‐19. Gusel’nikova, Nadezhda Dmitrievna. “U nas v ‘Merediane’.” Kemerovo. N 47. 2010‐12‐17. “K kemerovchanam – s otchetom.” Kemerovo. N 51. 2010‐12‐17. “Ni dnia bez dela.” Kemerovo. N 51. 2010‐12‐24. “Snezhnye volontery.” Kemerovo. N 52. 2011‐01‐28. Zhidkova, Z.V. “Ot zhitelei Iuzhnogo.” Kemerovo. N 4. 2011‐02‐11. “Deputat vedet priem.” Kemerovo. N 6. 2011‐02‐22. “Festival’ zdorov’ia i radosti.” Komsomol’skaia pravda – Kemerovo. N 25. 2011‐05‐27. “Uiutnyi dvorik – veteranam.” Кемерово. N 21. 2011‐07‐16. “Teper’ ne odinoki.” Kuzbass. N 128. 2011‐08‐26. “Grafik priema grazhdan obshchestvennoi priemnoi gubernatora v tsentrakh po rabote s naseleniem raiona.” Kemerovo. N 34. 2011‐08‐31. “Pomoshch’ v riukzachke.” Kuzbass. N 160. 2011‐11‐30. “Dobroe delo – svoimi rukami.” Komsomol’skaia pravda – Kemerovo. N 179. 2011‐12‐20. “Prazdnik sdelai sam.” Kuzbass. N 237. 2012‐02‐17. “ ’Rodnichok’ vdokhnoveniioa i bodrosti.” Kuzbass. N 29. 2012‐03‐15. “Vyknod s lopatami i metlami.” Kuzbass. N 43. 2012‐05‐31. Doronina, Maria. “ ‘Skoraia pomoshch’ dlia podrostkov.” Biblioteka. N 5. 2012‐06‐01. “Za gorodom i vo dvore.” Кемерово. N 22. 2012‐07‐06. Prokop’eva, Elena. “V tesnom kontakte.” Kemerovo. N 27. 2012‐08‐01. “Vmeste my poleznei!” Kuzbass. N 135. 2012‐12‐21. Shmidt, Ekaterina. “Obshchestvenniki podveli itogi.” Kemerovo. N 51. 2013‐03‐22. Chinenova, Natal’ia and Tat’iana Shchavina. “K liudiam s otkrytoi dushoi.” Kemerovo. N 11. 2013‐07‐02. Koshkina, E. “Uchastkovym nuzhna opora.” Ветеран. N 25.
Administratsiia g. Kemerovo, Upravlenie delami. Itogi gorodskogo konkursa “Chistyi, uiutnyi gorod” I munitsipal’nogo grantovogo konkursa sotsial’no znachimykh proektov okruzhnykh komitetov TOS. Kemerovo, 2013. Informatsiia o komitetakh territorial’nogo obshchestvennogo samoupravleniia g. Kemerovo. http://www.kemerovo.ru/?page=273. Accessed April 22, 2016. Konkursy po rabote s naseleniem. http://www.kemerovo.ru/konkurs/rabota_s_naseleniem_.html. Accessed April 22, 2016. Ob itogakh deiatel’nosti tsentrov po rabote s naseleniem v 2013 g. (printed brochure at a community center; copied during fieldwork). Rabota s naseleniem. http://www.kemerovo.ru/?page=357. Accessed April 22, 2016
238
Itogi raboty s naseleniem za 2015 g. http://www.kemerovo.ru/administration/rabota_s_naseleniem_.html. Accessed April 22, 2016. Itogi raboty s naseleniem za 2016 g. http://www.kemerovo.ru/administration/rabota_s_naseleniem_.html. Accessed March 29, 2017. Administratsiia goroda Kemerovo. “Postanovlenie ot 16 sentiabria 2016 goda N 2382 ‘Ob utverzhdenii munitsipal’noi programmy ‘Razvitie obshchestvennykh initsiativ v gorode Kemerovo’ na 2017‐2019 gody’.“ http://docs.cntd.ru/document/441678836 . Accessed March 29, 2017.