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The Accidental Guerrilla This page intentionally left blank The Accidental Guerrilla Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One david kilcullen 1 2009 1 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offi ces in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Copyright © 2009 by David Kilcullen Published in North America by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kilcullen, David. The accidental guerrilla : fi ghting small wars in the midst of a big one / David Kilcullen. p. cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-19-536834-5 1. Guerrilla warfare. 2. Counterinsurgency. 3. Military history, Modern—20th century. 4. Military history, Modern—21st century. 5. Afghan War, 2001–06. Iraq War, 2003–07. War on Terrorism, 2001–08. United States—Military policy. I. Title. II. Title: Accidental guerrilla U240. K49 2009 355.4'25—dc22 2008054870 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper Contents List of Abbreviations vii Acknowledgments xi Preface xiii Prologue: West Java, December 1996 xxi 1 The Accidental Guerrilla 1 2 “The Crazies Will Kill Them”: Afghanistan, 2006–2008 39 3 “The Twenty-First Day”: Iraq during the Surge, 2007 115 4 “Terrain, Tribes and Terrorists”: Confl icts from Indonesia to Europe 186 5 “Turning an Elephant into a Mouse”: Beyond the War on Terrorism 263 Conclusion 291 A Note on Sources and Methodology 303 Notes 307 Index 341 This page intentionally left blank List of Abbreviations ADZ Afghan Development Zones (ISAF development and security project) AFF Ameriya Freedom Fighters (Iraqi tribal fi ghters opposed to AQI) ANA Afghan National Army ANAP Afghan National Auxiliary Police ANCOP Afghan National Civil Order Police ANDS Afghan National Development Strategy ANP Afghan National Police ANSF Afghan National Security Forces AQ al Qa’ida AQI al Qa’ida in Iraq (Iraqi AQ affi liate) ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations AUSAID Australian Agency for International Development BCT brigade combat team (United States Army) BRN Barisan Revolusi Nasional (Patani Malay Muslim guerrilla movement) BRN-C Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinasi (successor movement to BRN) CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program (rapid aid/devel- opment funds for counterinsurgency) CFC–A Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CLC concerned local citizens CN counternarcotics CNRT Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense (Timorese National Resistance Council) CPA Coalition Provisional Authority DAC District Advisory Council (Iraq) DEA Drug Enforcement Administration (United States) DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia) DFID Department for International Development (United Kingdom) DI Dar’ul Islam (Indonesian separatist Muslim guerrilla movement) DOD Department of Defense (United States) DOS Department of State (United States) viii List of Abbreviations EFP Explosively-formed Projectile (especially lethal form of IED) EPRT Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team FALINTIL Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas (central region of the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier) FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce (United Kingdom) FID foreign internal defense (military technique of indirect sup- port to at-risk government) FRETILIN Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente (Timorese guerrilla movement) FSP Força Sigurança Popular (People’s Security Force; CNRT security organization) GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka GIA Groupe Islamique Armée (Algerian terrorist group) GOA Government of Afganistan GSPC Groupe Salafi ste pour La Prédication et le Combat (North African al Qa’ida affi liate) HiG Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin HUT Hizb-ut Tahrir IED improvised explosive device INL International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (U.S. State Department) INP Iraqi National Police INTERFET International Force East Timor IO information operations IRD Information Research Department (of the FCO) ISAF International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) ISI Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistani intelli- gence service) ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance JAM Jaysh al-Mahdi JI Jema’ah Islamiyah (Southeast Asian AQ Affi liate) JI Jemaat e-Islami (Pakistani political party) JIATF Joint Interagency Task Force KMTC Kabul Military Training Center KOPASSUS Komando Pasukan Khusus (Indonesian special forces) LeT Lasykar e-Tayyiba (Pakistani terrorist group) LZ Landing Zone MANPADS man-portable air defense system List of Abbreviations ix MNC-I Multi-National Corps—Iraq MNF-I Multinational Force—Iraq MSF Medecins Sans Frontieres NAC Neighborhood Advisory Council (Iraq) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDS National Directorate of Security (Afghan intelligence service) NGO Nongovernmental organization NII Negara Islam Indonesia NSS 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States 2002 NWFP North-West Frontier Province PRT provincial reconstruction team PULO Patani United Liberation Organization PUPJI Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jema’ah Islamiyah (General Guide to the Jemaah Islamiyah Struggle—JI strategy document) QDR Quadrennial Defense Review QJBR Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi l Bilad ar-Rafi dayn (former name of AQI) R Bureau for Public Diplomacy (U.S. State Department) RCT regimental combat team (United States Marines) RPG rocket propelled grenade RPKAD Resimen Para-Kommando Angkatan Darat (Indonesian Army Airborne Forces) RTF reconstruction task force SAI Sahawa al-‘Iraq (the Iraqi Awakening:tribal revolt against AQI) SAM surface-to-air missile SASR Special Air Service Regiment (Australia) SOA Sons of Anbar SOF special operations forces SOFA Status of Forces Agreement TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian military) TNSM Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan UNAMI United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq UNTAET United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor USAID United States Agency for International Development USIA United States Information Agency (abolished 1999) USM–I United States Mission–Iraq UW unconventional warfare This page intentionally left blank Acknowledgments This book, like its wars, is a hybrid: part fi eld study, part personal recollec- tion; perhaps too academic to be popular and too populist to be purely aca- demic. I wrote it between combat operations, research trips, diplomatic meetings, scholarly conferences, and policy planning sessions; on long- haul fl ights in commercial airliners, corporate jets, and military trans- ports; in hotels, apartments, and cafes, library reading rooms, earthen bunkers, and armored trailers, on the couches and at the kitchen tables of friends and relatives. I amassed a desk full of research notes in battered, dusty, gridded Moleskine notebooks, and went through three laptop com- puters, none designed to suffer the abuse I infl icted on them. Though its errors are mine, the book could never have happened with- out the support, advice, and review of many. I can acknowledge only a few, but I hope the others—especially those who would be at risk if named in a book like this, by someone like me—will recognize their infl uence and accept my thanks. My family was there for me, during a time of incredible turmoil, when no one would have expected them to be. My mentors, whose insights are everywhere refl ected in this book, included Eliot Cohen, Hank Crumpton, and David Petraeus. Hank, particularly, was far more than a boss to me. My oft-neglected Ph.D. supervisor, Carl Thayer, nurtured me—not always wittingly—throughout the decade-long process of putting my thoughts in order. My tolerant superiors—Eliot, Hank, Justin Kelly, Peter Leahy, and Condoleezza Rice continually amazed me with their understanding of my eccentricities. Meghan Bradley was a wonderful friend and insightful traveling companion in some of the worst, and best, places in the world. Virginia Palmer was a true friend when I needed one. Akbar Ahmed, Alexis Albion, Dean Bowley, Mike Brennan, J. B. Burton, Sarah Chayes, Chris Cavoli, Alexa Courtney, Audrey Kurth Cronin, Patrick Cronin, Terry Daly, Dave Dilegge, Toby Dodge, Karl Eikenberry, Andrew Exum, Ben Fitzgerald, Michele Flournoy, Robert Ford, Tom Friedman, Randy Gangle, Russell Glenn, Dan Green, T. X. Hammes, Bruce Hoffman, Frank Hoffman, Michael Howard, Harold Ingram, Karl Jackson, Tom Johnson, Colin Kahl, Justin Kelly, Terry Kelly, Bob Killebrew, Dale Kuehl, Elisabeth Kvitashvili, Larry Lamborn, Clare Lockhart, Larry Legree, Joe L’Etoile, Tom Mahnken, xii Acknowledgments Sloan Mann, Carter Malkasian, Pete Mansoor, Jim Mattis, Kathleen McInnis, HR McMaster, Eric Meissner, John Nagl, Bill Nagle, Mick Nicholson, George Packer, Michelle Parker, Tom Ricks, Barney
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