America's 'Greater Middle East' and Europe

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

America’s ‘Greater Middle East’ and Europe Key Issues for the Transatlantic Dialogue

Volker Perthes SWP Comments

Within the next few years, if not over the next few decades, the Middle East will become the focus of international geopolitics and thereby largely determine relations between Europe and America. The US administration has embraced the cause of bringing a ‘new order’ to the region and has underscored this by announcing a ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ (GMEI), for which it will seek transatlantic approval at the forthcoming June 2004 NATO and G8 summits.

The content of that initiative comprises a Republican administration. Even a Demo- series of political, military and economic cratic administration is likely to make the programmes. These will include multilat- reform and re-making of the Middle East eral and bilateral measures to democratise part of its own, as well as a transatlantic Middle Eastern countries, offers of free agenda. trade made to individual countries, the At the same time, America’s GMEI is still geographical extension and deepening of far from worked out to the last detail. In the OSCE-Mediterranean partnership and a fact, the grandiose geopolitical concept em- programme of military co-operation akin to bodied in the title of the initiative partly NATO’s Partnership for Peace. The initiative conceals a lack of fresh ideas. This situation reflects a growing awareness in Washing- constitutes an opportunity for Europe: ton, in the wake of the war in Iraq, that in instead of merely tagging along with (or the fight against terrorism and the prolif- rejecting) US initiatives, it can – and should eration of weapons of mass destruction – play a prominent role in shaping the (WMD), it is not enough to make military debate about a comprehensive transatlantic threats to unfriendly regimes or to topple strategy towards its southern neighbour- them. Belatedly, Washington has also hood. Europe’s approach will differ, at realised that structural problems in the least in part, from the American one. This region need to be tackled. Europe should has been hinted at by Germany’s Foreign expect quite assertive demands from Minister, Joschka Fischer, in his speech at Washington to take part in a reorganisation the Munich Security Conference. This paper or restructuring of the ‘Greater’ Middle outlines some of the key issues that will East. This will be the case not only under a dominate the debate about a common

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1 policy on the Middle East and describes them with punitive measures, sanctions what it sees as the German and European and maybe even the possibility of an positions in this transatlantic discussion. externally imposed regime change, Euro- pean policy-makers will likely try to sup- port reform-minded forces within the The democratisation of Arab and countries in question and nudge existing Middle Eastern countries regimes towards the path to reform The US and the EU agree that a democratic through dialogue, material support, and transformation of the Arab world or the forms of conditionality. These different wider Middle East is a goal that should be approaches become particularly obvious pursued. Europeans will likely remind their with regard to Iran. Despite shared trans- US counterparts that Europe has pursued atlantic interests (not the least of which is this goal even before September 2001, and the abandonment of Iran’s nuclear weap- has not merely “discovered” the lack of ons programme), the United States and democracy in the Arab world in the context Europe continue to regard Iran through of its struggle against international ter- fundamentally different prisms, and this rorism. As a matter of fact, democracy- will no doubt continue to stand in the way building, the support of civil society, the of any joint policy. Washington still con- rule of law, and human rights have been siders Iran to be a ‘rogue state’ whose key elements of the political and security regime refuses to adapt the country’s chapter of the “Barcelona process” (the domestic and foreign policy to Western Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) both in (and, probably, popular) demands. Europe, its multilateral and bilateral dimensions in contrast, sees Iran as a problematic part- (Barcelona Declaration and individual ner, but also as a complex society with association agreements). From a European enormous possibilities for progressive viewpoint, therefore, what is needed is not domestic policy developments. It also a “forward strategy of freedom” (George W. views it – as may occasionally be pointed Bush), but a common perspective for out – as currently the most pluralistic political, economic and social change in system in the Gulf. Europe’s neighbourhood that builds on Europe’s pragmatic efforts to foster the potentials in these countries and takes democratisation often entail embracing their societies on board, respects their the unsatisfying principle of ‘taking dignity, and realises the linkages that exist countries from where they are’ and rather between political and economic under- banking on good examples set elsewhere development on the one hand and un- (best practices) and dialogue than on resolved territorial conflicts on the other. threats of regime change. In other words, European policy-makers may well be prepared to support even minor reform Complex processes steps (education, administrative reform, or In the transatlantic debate, Europeans may economic policies) in a country like Syria, also have to point out that democratisation even if the speed of political development is not a linear process, but rather a lengthy, in that country lags way behind what complicated undertaking full of contradic- Europe would like to see, while criticising tions, political battles and setbacks. Some- countries like Tunisia, Palestine, Lebanon what simplified, the differences between or Israel for deficiencies of democratic the American and European approaches development or human rights violations can be described as follows: whereas the that may be comparatively less serious. One United States tend to cite the democratic of the lessons of the Barcelona process is deficits of governments that oppose West- that it may be wise to break up the concept ern interests in the region and threaten of “democracy” into its constituent ele-

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2 ments, such as: the rule of law, indepen- Where is the ‘Greater Middle East’? dence of the judiciary, transparency, To develop policies for a particular region accountability, strengthening of civil of the world, it is important to know which society, etc. This may make it easier to take countries one is actually talking about. A the elites of these countries along, and sensibly targeted policy can only be devel- create common interests rather than fears oped if sufficient consideration is given to of externally enforced regime change. regional conflicts and their linkages, to the However, shortcomings in Europe’s self-perception of individual states and policy of trying to further the cause of societies, and to those transnational poli- democratisation should not be ignored. tical, socio-cultural and economic relations Indeed, neither Berlin nor Brussels have dis- that make people feel that they actually cussed the issue of the conditionality of eco- belong to a particular region. Participants nomic aid and political relations in satis- in the US debate on the ‘Greater Middle factory depth, let alone operationalised it. East’ as well as some of their European col- leagues associate the concept with very different geopolitical notions. Phrases like Democracy as an objective, “from Marrakech to Bangladesh” sound not a prerequisite for action by the West good, but they are not particularly clear. In While the democratic transformation of the a preparatory working paper for the June Arab states is clearly a goal, it cannot from 2004 G8 Summit, the US administration a European perspective be considered a has defined the ‘Greater Middle East’ as precondition for political engagement, including the Arab states, Israel, Turkey, especially not for a serious engagement in Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some the Middle East peace process. Occasionally, pundits go further and include all of American or Israeli commentators claim Central Asia or the Caucasus. Yet, at the that only democratic states can make same time analysts often refer to the Arab peace; it would be premature, therefore, to countries alone when they start identifying resume serious peace efforts in the Middle specific problems. East unless major Arab states turn demo- To find a definition that is useful for cratic. Practically, this claim serves as a Europe’s foreign and security policies, pretext for those who do not want to the aforementioned factors – transnational resume serious peace talks; and it is certain- relations as well as the reach of regional ly empirically wrong. The first Arab state conflicts – will have to be taken into con- that made peace with Israel, Egypt, is not sideration. On this basis, it makes sense exactly a model democracy – and yet, the to define the wider Middle East as includ- Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement has been ing the Arab countries, Israel, Iran and stable for a quarter century. The reverse, Afghanistan, but not to extend it beyond however, is true: peace between Israel and these countries. its Arab neighbours would enhance region- Of course, regions are never sharply al and external efforts to bring about a delimited, and some political dynamics link democratic transformation (see below). the countries mentioned here with others, Tying Western attempts to broker peace to like Turkey, Pakistan, the Caucasus or the democratisation of Arab countries, how- Central Asia. However, an excessively broad ever, would merely exacerbate the lack of definition of the region hinders the devel- credibility of US and Western policies in the opment of political strategies. Thus, Euro- region. pean policy-makers should consider Turkey to be a NATO partner and potential EU member. A conceptional “Middle-Eastern- isation” of Turkey could have undesired political consequences, including its

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3 turning away from Europe. Also, unlike the exchange between the EU and the Afghanistan, the Caucasus countries (much United States regarding initiatives as- the same as Bosnia-Herzegovina) cannot be sociated with the region and the practical viewed within a Middle Eastern framework; problems arising from them. For instance, they should rather be seen within a post- in many respects the US Middle East Partner- Communist European setting. Not without ship Initiative launched by the US adminis- reason did the Georgian opposition rely on tration’s foreign policy team at the end of Serbia’s experience as a role model: the 2002 resembles a geographically more examples of Arab or Iranian protest move- extensive, but less extensively funded and ments would have been of little help to it. more bilaterally inclined version of the Pakistan is involved in Afghanistan, and its Barcelona Process (Euro-Mediterranean nuclear programme has benefited from Partnership) that has existed since 1995. Saudi financial aid. But if a suitable policy Admittedly, the fact that ‘Barcelona’ and vis-à-vis Pakistan is to be developed, one has Europe’s experience with this long-term, to fully appreciate the centrality the con- multilateral and multidimensional process flict with India has for the country. Middle was barely acknowledged and responded to Eastern developments, in contrast, have by Washington has partly to do with the little relevance for Pakistan’s policies. Like- fact that the EU has shown no interest in wise, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, unlike the allowing the United States, whose role as a potential arsenals of Iran or Libya, has security policy actor in the Mediterranean nothing to do with the Gulf or with con- cannot be ignored, any form of participa- flicts with Israel and should also play no tion, not even as an observer. role if one day the creation of a WMD-free The EU, in fact, already has a defined and zone in the Middle East is on the agenda. well instrumentalised common policy in The populations of the former Soviet place regarding a large part of the region. republics of Central Asia are mostly Muslim; In addition to the Barcelona Process, which however, in political terms Russia remains led to the conclusion of association agree- far more important to these countries than ments with most southern and eastern the Near East or the Arabian Peninsula. Mediterranean states, and a common strategy And while Afghanistan does not like being for the Mediterranean region, Europe’s treated as a ‘post-Soviet’ region (a fair approach also includes numerous common number of the Afghan elite studied and positions vis-à-vis the Arab countries, Israel lived in Cairo, Riyadh or Jeddah), Central and Iran, the Wider Europe – Neighbourhood Asia’s elites have largely been socialised Programme vis-à-vis the EU’s neighbouring in a Moscow-centred environment. West- regions in Europe, North Africa and the ern policy-makers will have to take into Near East, a co-operation agreement with account such backgrounds if they want to Yemen, regular consultations between the build partnerships with these countries, EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) convince their societies of the value of such and the still unfinished, highly politicised relations, and support the establishment of negotiations concerning a trade and co- regional structures. operation agreement with Iran. The Euro- pean Security Strategy adopted in Decem- ber 2003 also defines the risks that could The EU as a reference framework emanate from the region from Europe’s German Middle East policy is embedded in point of view, as well as European princi- a European framework. Consequently, co- ples of action, and delimits a common ap- ordination with the European partners proach regarding the use of military force. should – in case of doubt – take precedence At the same time, the only existing trans- over transatlantic co-ordination. Having atlantic framework for political initiatives said that, it would be advisable to improve towards parts of the ‘Greater Middle East’ is

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4 NATO co-ordination with regard to Afghani- Multilaleralism and stan. The NATO and OSCE ‘Mediterranean American leadership dialogues’ are of limited relevance in prac- The Middle East Quartet and its ‘road map’ tice, and certainly do not constitute a for the Middle East peace process clearly framework within which joint initiatives exemplify this multilateral approach, even with or vis-à-vis these countries could be though the plan has not yet been imple- developed. mented. Multilateralism allows for full use to be made of the specific relations and instruments at the disposal of the individ- Complementarity rather than ual actors in their relationship with Middle competition Eastern countries. The road map was drawn The Arab-Israeli conflict and peace process up in Berlin and other European capitals, in particular have shown how important it but Europe has good reason not to claim is for the USA on the one hand, and the EU ownership. Its adoption by Washington and and its member states on the other, to co- its labelling, in US media, as the ‘American ordinate their positions, preferably – as has road map for the Middle East’ is just fine been the case with the ‘Middle East Quartet’ from a European viewpoint. What really – together with the United Nations and matters is whether the plan is implemented Russia. No progress will be made in the or not. peace process as long as regional parties US leadership in this context is indeed can play the Americans and Europeans off vital, not least so because of Washington’s against each other. In this context, the EU greater influence over Israel and the fact speaks quite rightly about complementar- that Israel trusts the United States – but ity, which is shorthand for saying that both does not trust Europe. The EU, on the other parties have specific comparative advan- hand, enjoys much more trust among the tages which enable them, with their respec- Palestinians. Indeed, Europe made its in- tive instruments, to perform certain tasks fluence show by providing energetic assis- better than others, and than the other tance when the Palestinian Authority con- party. ducted its – largely successful – internal Thus, to give but two examples, Wash- reform. ington holds greater sway with Israel, while the Europeans enjoy greater credibility among the Palestinians. Also, the USA is in The centrality of the a better position to bring military pressure Arab-Israeli conflict to bear and to offer security guarantees, The European Security Strategy quite while Europe can hold out the prospects of rightly stresses the key importance that association and integration, which also a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli exert a normative force at the political (and above all Israeli-Palestinian) conflict level. This being the case, Europe and the would have for the political, security policy US should use this range of different and economic development of the region. It political resources to achieve common has therefore defined the resolution of the objectives, including peace in the Middle Arab-Israeli conflict is “a strategic priority East, the strengthening of democracy and for Europe.” Without such a resolution, human rights, the fight against terrorism the Strategy continues, “there will be little and the limitation of regional arms races. chance of dealing with other problems in This does not imply that Europe simply the Middle East,” i.e., such European goals follow the US lead, but rather calls for close as democratisation and liberalisation, co-ordination in major policy areas. regional economic co-operation, the estab- lishment of a free trade zone, and regional security co-operation will likely not be

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5 achieved. The US debate, in contrast, all too somewhat sceptical about wide-ranging often ignores the centrality of the Arab- plans to bring a ‘new order’ to the Middle Israeli conflict and peace process for devel- East. They tend to favour the establishment opments in the wider region. of regional structures that can help to There are several reasons why the unre- reduce the potential for conflict, and insti- solved conflict constitutes a barrier to tutionalise co-operative relations that positive processes of political and economic would enhance security for all parties and change in the region. Among other things, facilitate the processes of transformation in several Arab regimes are continuing to hide the countries in question. Lessons learned behind the conflict with Israel, with the within the CSCE process can provide useful elites in power rejecting internal reforms points of departure. by pointing to the state of war and conflict. One should be aware that not only Were the conflict resolved, this pretext authoritarian regime elites, but important would no longer apply and authoritarian segments of the societal elites in the Middle structures would be delegitimised and East consider the perspective of a “re-order- weakened. The continuation of the conflict ing” of the region from abroad a serious is also underpinning the role of the mili- threat. At the same time, these same elites tary – in the Arab states as well as Israel – have an interest in containing regional and bolstering the acceptance of military conflict potentials and enhancing regional solutions. The ongoing conflict legitimises security. The idea of a Conference on a continued misallocation of resources, Security and Cooperation in the Middle with defence budgets taking precedence East (CSCME) was first raised by regional over such matters as educational reform. actors such as Jordan’s former crown prince Peace between Israel and its Arab neigh- Hassan bin Talal. Most probably, it is still bours, in contrast, would most likely help too early to launch and implement such a the spread of democratic values, strengthen comprehensive project. Ultimately, a CSCE- the civil societies and reduce the appeal of type process will only be crowned with religious and nationalist extremists. success if the territorial conflict between These are not the only considerations Israel and its neighbours is resolved, or if a that US policy occasionally overlooks. It solution is within sight. also often fails to acknowledge the extent Even before a process involving all the to which the West’s credibility in the relevant countries and all the respective region depends on the seriousness of problems in the region is launched, how- American and European efforts to find a ever, there are good prospects for estab- fair peaceful solution of the Middle East lishing certain more limited forms of conflict. And while Europe may enjoy some- regional security policy co-operation in what more credibility in this context, that which the United States, the EU and other credibility does have its limits. A large actors from outside the region should also proportion of the general public in Arab be involved. For example, it would make countries and Iran have become convinced sense to set up a ‘6 plus 4 plus 1’ contact that Europeans only put on a friendlier group for Iraq (comprising Iraq’s neigh- face – while ultimately hiding behind the bours, the members of the Middle East United States so as avoid any concrete Quartet, and the new Iraqi government) action in practice. both as an instrument of co-ordination and as a confidence-building measure whose very existence might prompt the regional Building regional structures parties to sort out their legitimate interests versus re-ordering the region with regard to Iraq in a constructive way. Conditioned by Europe’s colonial experi- ences, European policy-makers tend to be

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6 Structures versus persons: membership. European and German policy- the example of Palestine makers should be aware that the way in In dealing with the Middle East, as well as which the EU and Europe deal with Turkey other regions, Europe generally puts more and its desire to join the Union will be of emphasis on institution-building, while the great importance for Europe’s mid- and US focuses more on the persons in charge. long-term relations with Middle Eastern This is partly a reflection of the different countries. structures of both political entities. In the Turkey’s membership in the EU would US, politics is much more personalised, and radically alter the geopolitical parameters the prime decision-maker is much more of Europe, as Syria, Iraq and Iran would important; in Europe, with its complicated then become direct neighbours of the EU. institutional structure, individual persons But one need not consider Turkey as part of do not make so much of a difference (con- a ‘Greater’ Middle East to reach the con- sider the difference between a presidential clusion that its internal developments and phone call from the White House, and a call the manner in which it is treated by Europe from the president of the European Com- will have a considerable impact on political mission). The clearest example for this debates and developments in the countries difference in approaches can be seen in the of the Middle East. Offering Ankara a EU-US debate about how to deal with serious prospect of EU accession would also Palestinian president Yasir Arafat. US and bolster the credibility of European policy EU policymakers may agree in what they vis-à-vis other Muslim countries. think of Mr Arafat’s personality. But while Whether or not the EU will allow the the US administration has decided to integration of a big Muslim-populated state boycott him, the EU maintains relations, into its constitutional space will have an stressing the importance of maintaining enormous bearing on the general percep- institutions which Europe and the US have tion of Europe in other Muslim countries. themselves helped to create – notably, the Forget the intra-European debate about a Palestinian presidential elections in 1996 reference to God in the European constitu- were supported and monitored by EU and tion – Turkey’s ruling AKP would have no US officials. Rather than demanding a difficulty in subscribing to such a formula. change in the Palestinian leadership, the The question is rather whether or not Euro- EU concentrates on strengthening the Pales- pean policy-makers would refuse an inte- tinian legislative branch and supports wide- gration of Turkey on the grounds of the ranging administrative reforms. Arafat, EU’s supposedly Christian identity. after all, is not an unelected official, but A successful integration of Turkey would the most democratically elected Arab clearly indicate that Islam can really be a leader. The European approach does not part of Europe’s culture, and would at the necessarily reflect sympathy for Arafat or same time destroy the myth of an inevit- the Palestinians, but certainly the convic- able clash of cultures. Moreover, Turkey’s tion that one cannot ignore the choice of integration into the EU (and even the the Palestinian people if one wants one’s process leading to it) will have an impact calls for “Arab democracy” to be taken as on domestic political developments in credible. other Muslim countries, if only because it will show that democracy and pluralism, the rule of law, political modernity, and so Turkey’s integration into the EU forth are not exclusively “Western” charac- In principle, the German federal govern- teristics or properties. Eventually, the im- ment and the US Administration agree – pact of a successful Turkish EU accession albeit for somewhat different reasons – that process will probably be greater than the Turkey needs to be given the prospect of EU ‘domino effects’ which some US quarters

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7 expect from American transformation Europe’s interests in Iraq and the broader experiments in Iraq. region: not least, as already mentioned, the stabilisation and democratisation of Iraq itself. Regarding a possible NATO role in Shared interests in Iraq Iraq, this means that requests for such a Irrespective of the differences regarding the role can hardly be turned down if they need for and the legitimacy of the war in originate from an independent Iraqi Iraq, as well as the analysis of threats that government and are based on a clear UN was used to justify it, the EU and the United mandate. Whether and how individual States share a keen interest in seeing a NATO member countries will become stabilised Iraq and the establishment of a involved will in such a situation ceases to sustainable pluralistic regime in Baghdad be a matter of principle, and becomes a that is based on the rule of law and, prefer- question of possibilities, capacities and the ably, on democratic participation. For acceptance of the troops of particular

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und reasons of geographical proximity, Europe’s nations by the Iraqis. Dispatching Turkish Politik, 2004 interest in the transformation of Iraq into a troops would remain a bad idea, even if All rights reserved participatory, pluralist state is probably the Alliance was called upon for help by SWP even greater than that of the United States. Baghdad and New York. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Anyone who doubts this should be aware A NATO deployment could hardly be Politik German Institute for that the territorial integrity of Iraq – a key justified, however, if all it did was to reduce International and prerequisite for regional stability – can only the burden on US troops. Unless the poli- Security Affairs be maintained today if the new Iraq has tical context in which an international Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 federal structures and a representative force operates changes, NATO units would 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 political system that guarantees partici- hardly be regarded any differently from an Fax +49 30 880 07-100 pation and minority rights. American or coalition occupation force. www.swp-berlin.org [email protected]

Not an object of transatlantic ... and not a role model relational therapy ... Finally, it is particularly important not to For Europe, this interest translates into a overburden the Iraqi experiment. Iraq European responsibility for promoting the should be treated neither as a model (e.g. economic and political reconstruction of for Middle Eastern democracy), nor as a Iraq. That responsibility will also have to bridgehead for external projects to re-order be reflected in financial commitments, the region. Deposing a regime by military including the willingness to cancel debts force and even putting a new government and provide financial support for the coun- in place is relatively easy; building a model try’s economic and social reconstruction. is far more difficult and the attempt to do Bearing in mind Iraq’s potential economic so would probably be asking too much of clout, a kind of new Marshall Plan will be the Iraqi actors. Moreover, making Iraq a required under which the country, once bridgehead for regional projects would be back on its feet again, passes on the sub- a sure-fire way of prompting unfriendly sidies it receives today. reactions on the part of its neighbours – At the same time, decisions on Ger- instead of including them in efforts to many’s and Europe’s policy on Iraq – stabilise the country. regardless of whether they pertain to financial and technical support, police training or military contributions – should not be measured in terms of whether they help to heal transatlantic wounds, but rather in terms of whether they serve

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