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AND THE CHALLENGES IN GREATER MIDDLE Conference report

Organized by DIIS . Danish Institute for International Studies and University of Copenhagen on 10 November 2015 China and the Challenges in Greater – Conference report 1 This conference report is published by DIIS · Danish Institute for International Studies Østbanegade 117, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark Tel: +45 32 69 87 87 E-mail: [email protected] www.diis.dk

Layout: Allan Lind Jørgensen Printed in Denmark by Eurographic Danmark

ISBN 978-87-7605-838-8 (print) ISBN 978-87-7605-839-5 (pdf)

DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge or ordered from www.diis.dk

© Copenhagen 2016, the authors, DIIS and KU

2 China and the Challenges in – Conference report TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 5 Lars Erslev Andersen, Yang Jiang and Camilla Sørensen

CHINA’S DIPLOMACY IN THE GULF : ENERGY AND (IN)SECURITY 10 Marc Lanteigne

CAN CHINA BE A PILLAR OF GCC SECURITY? 17 Imad Mansour

CHINA-MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS: NEW CHALLENGES AND NEW APPROACHES 22 Zhang Jiadong

CHINA’S MIDDLE EAST CONUNDRUM AND PROSPECTS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY 27 N. Janardhan

CHINA IN SEARCH OF ‘LEGITIMATE’ GREAT-POWER INTERVENTION 33 Camilla Sørensen

CHINA’S PROACTIVE DIPLOMACY IN : A CHALLENGE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE 40 Miwa Hirono

AUTHORS 46

PHOTOS 47

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 3 4 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report INTRODUCTION in the region, especially the role of Chi- na. Whereas US Middle East policy has been Lars Erslev Andersen, Yang Jiang and subjected to endless academic analyses, this Camilla Sørensen new axis between the and China has not received much attention. This collection of short papers is an outcome of an international conference entitled China China has been expanding its economic in- and the Challenges in Greater Middle East, volvement in the Persian Gulf, not least in oil: organized by the Danish Institute for Interna- the majority of its oil comes from the region. tional Studies and Copenhagen University on Although China is trying to diversify its ener- 10 November 2015. The conference sought gy supplies away from the Middle East, it will answers to the following questions: Is the remain dependent on the Arab States and balance of power between the US and China for years to come. With expanding trade, changing in the Persian Gulf? Will China’s investment and contract work in the Persian increasing economic interests in the Gulf Gulf, China is seeking to protect its assets lead to a more activist Chinese foreign and and citizens there. As argued, and as shown security policy there? What are the expecta- in the papers by Camilla T.N. Sørensen and tions the Arab Gulf States have of China, and Miwa Hirono, China can no longer follow will China meet them? the old diplomatic strategy of keeping a low profile and keeping business and politics The background to the conference was Chi- separate. China especially has learned from na’s increasing interest in the Persian Gulf si- the crises in and and is gradu- multaneously with what has been interpreted ally changing its policy from one of non-in- as America’s gradual retreat from the region. tervention to what is often termed ‘active Even though the US has been providing the mediation’, ‘limited intervention’ or ‘creative security umbrella in the region, its handling involvement’. of ethnic conflicts and civil wars has irritated members of the Doubts remain, both within the GCC and (GCC). Political developments, including in Chinese policy-making circles, as to the 9/11 and the , have forced the extent to which China should be strategical- GCC member states to take action to avoid ly involved in the Middle East. China is not the spread of democratic movements and seeking to challenge or replace the US as revolutions while seeking to handle their own the security provider in the region. However, affairs without interference from the US, there is no doubt that ‘active pragmatism’ the EU and the UN. Problems in GCC–US has become China’s guiding diplomatic strat- relations have also made GCC states look egy and that we will see more political and eastwards for new partners, providing a strategic activity from China in the region power vacuum and opportunity for China to while it continues to pursue its economic insert itself. interests. China will also a more active role in fighting extremism at home, as well as The Middle East is in a process of radical re- in the Greater Middle East, including - structuring following the Arab Spring of 2011, istan and . How will this combination of the escalation of sectarian conflict in Iraq strategies be played out? and the outbreak and development of the civil war in . These circumstances have In order to these themes and dis- given rise to enhanced security concerns. In cuss the questions mentioned above , we order to understand the post-9/11 regional brought researchers from China and the security dynamics, we need to challenge the Arab Gulf states together and added a few oft-repeated perception of American hege- other researchers who focus more broadly mony and analyze the rising importance of on China’s new approach to the international

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 5 economy and foreign and security policy, as the foreseeable future, however, Zhang and well as on confronting extremism. Lanteigne agree that the region remains im- portant for China’s energy security, as well We are grateful to the participants in the as for other commercial interests, as part conference for agreeing to summarize their of the trade route to and , and presentations in the form of short papers, also as export markets in their own right. thus making it possible to disseminate the This is also significant in that several of the conclusions of the conference to a broader regional states are also members of the audience. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), one of the new China-sponsored internation- al development banks that are seeking to Energy and commercial interests as main expand infrastructure investment through drivers international collaboration. Whereas China once viewed developments and events in the Middle East primarily Compared to its limited involvement in through the lens of a revolutionary ideology, security, China is aggressively and steadily its relations with Middle Eastern states are consolidating energy and other commercial now driven mainly by energy and commercial ties with the region. Marc Lanteigne’s paper interests. It has a strong and growing need discusses China’s energy diplomacy in the for access to energy and natural resources Greater Middle East. Although perceived as in order to maintain . The hypocritical by some regional actors for just Middle East, in particular the Persian Gulf, is taking the economic benefits without military the main region involved, with involvement, China’s pursuit of economic and Iran both being major suppliers of oil to interests without security involvement has China. The Persian Gulf as a whole is China’s achieved significant results, in particular in largest oil provider, and it is estimated that diversifying the energy trade for China and by 2020 annual trade between China and the in establishing itself as a pivotal alternative Persian Gulf will top $350 billion. A free-trade consumer for the region. Regional instabil- agreement with China is also a priority for ities, including the Arab Spring and the rise the GCC, and Chinese state-owned compa- of Islamic State, call into question the status nies are continuously bidding for contracts of the Middle East as a provider of ‘energy in the Persian Gulf. There is a clear Chinese security’ to China. However, as the most im- presence in regional commerce. portant region for energy supply, the Greater Middle East is a focus of China’s economic The Middle East has thus been China’s ma- diplomacy, including through a free-trade jor oil and gas supplier, and it falls into the agreement with the GCC, involvement in category of ‘China’s greater neighborhood’ OBOR and membership in AIIB. as far as Chinese is con- cerned. At the same time, China is diversi- In particular, several papers stress that Chi- fying its energy suppliers among regional na’s ‘ Road Economic Belt’ and ‘21st-cen- states and states outside the region, as tury Maritime ’ (Belt and Road or well as developing new supply routes and OBOR) initiative is giving another boost to port facilities. According to Jiadong Zhang, relations between China and the needs to rethink its policy towards Middle East. China sees the region as a knot the Middle East because of the declining oil in the initiative. The OBOR initiative involves price, terrorist threats and the lower de- the Greater Middle East in both terrestrial and mand expected for fossil fuels in the future. maritime routes as both important points Marc Lanteigne instead sees China’s energy of connectivity and economic partners. But consumption shifting away from domestic because the definition of the initiative is still coal to cleaner, imported fossil fuels. For vague and ever changing in its scope, states

6 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report in the region continue to compete for China’s Like many other states outside the region, favor. China has had to make a rapid adjustment to its Middle East approach and policies follow- ing the Arab Spring. still is attempt- To intervene or not to intervene ing to retain a neutral stance on the many The principle of non-intervention is one of conflicts and uprisings in the region, while it China’s key traditional foreign and security continues to seek to improve economic as policy guidelines. Due especially to China’s well as political relations in the region. How- expanding global role, interests and capa- ever, China’s neutral stance is increasingly bilities, however, adhering to this principle is being challenged and is leading to criticism becoming increasingly challenging for Chi- both inside and outside the region. For exam- nese leaders. ple, China’s unwillingness to support harder sanctions against Syria’s President Assad Generally, China has started to interfere in has been sharply criticized by the US and developments and conflicts in other Europe, as well as by several Arab govern- and states. In response to several interna- ments. Such criticism has contributed to a tional conflicts and crises, Chinese leaders more active Chinese approach and growing have presented diplomatic suggestions and conflict-mediation efforts. For example, offered to play a mediating role. Beijing still China came up with the four-point proposal insists that it is sticking to the principle of for Syria in late 2012, calling on all sides to non-intervention. It is clear, however, that the stop fighting and initiate a political transition current Chinese foreign and security policy and an inclusive constitutes a more flexible and pragmatic process. The proposal, however, generated Chinese interpretation – and implementation little international interest. In May 2013, China – of the principle of non-intervention. also sought to take a more active role in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with As Camilla T. N. Sørensen notes, China is a four-point proposal – similar to that involv- becoming more pragmatic and flexible in ing the conflict in Syria – calling for a peace- its diplomatic approach toward the Greater ful resolution to the conflict and stressing Middle East. Growing energy and commercial diplomatic dialogue and inclusive economic interests and ties are resulting in a new pres- development. Consequently, China has be- ence and a great-power role for China in the come much more actively involved in conflict Middle East, which coincides with the latter’s mediation in the Middle East in recent years, growing expectations of China’s ability and as Miwa Hirono also points out in relation to willingness to play a stabilizing role in region- the development of the Chinese approach al affairs. The regional states, on the other and policies towards Afghanistan. hand, increasingly look to China as a provider of global and regional public goods. That is, China’s diplomatic skills are becom- ing more sophisticated as its interests be- However, in contrast to the clear Chinese come more widely spread geographically and presence in regional commerce, China is multifaceted. Still, China is playing a wait- playing a small, albeit growing role in regional and-see game in the region when it comes to politics and security. The Chinese leadership political and military conflicts. China usually is still very careful and uncertain about how presents itself as impartial, neither govern- to put its growing capabilities and influence ment-biased nor rebel-biased, and builds in the region into play and to what extent. In on the assumption that both or all sides are short, China’s role and activities in regional responsible for the initiation, escalation and politics and security are growing, but this solution to the conflict. Chinese proposals is more out of necessity than as part of an often have a focus on building trust and the overall strategic ambition or plan. necessary conditions for inclusive economic

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 7 development, that is, economic development they are friends with each other, including that includes and benefits all sides in a con- Iran and the GCC states, and , flict so that it becomes too costly for all sides and Iraq and (UAE). to return to violence. Chinese proposals and Moreover, as Jiadong Zhang argues, China mediation strategies often refrain from taking now also needs to balance its relations with a position on the question of right or wrong the Middle East and its own global image and and hence on who to blame. status.

Jiadong Zhang’s chapter represents a widely The states in the region are also playing a held Chinese perspective that China is re- balancing game between the US and China. garded as a fair arbitrator in the region. China There is a general trend in the region to ‘look prides itself in helping broker the nuclear deal East’, building ties with Asia and particular- between Iran and the P5 Plus One. However, ly China. Despite their efforts to be more to some regional states, China’s reluctance to independent in security policy, the GCC pick sides means siding with the other side. states have not succeeded in this, nor have Taking no risk can be the greatest risk for Chi- they developed a unified security frame- na, as both Imad Mansour and N. Janardhan work. They still rely on the major powers, point out. in particular the US, to provide security, but Imad Mansour does not see an opportunity Regarding what capabilities to put into play, for China to become a security pillar for the China, unlike the US, does not have formal region in the foreseeable future: it will not set alliances in the Middle East or air and na- the parameters of regional security archi- val bases in the region. And despite recent tectures, as the US has so far done. There advances, the Chinese navy and air force is neither the supply of the role of pillar by still cannot match those of the US. It has, China, nor a demand for such a role by the however, other forms of leverage such as its GCC, not least because there are important growing economic influence and the attrac- points of divergence in the security perspec- tiveness of access to its market and to its tives between the two sides, and China’s investments and aid. Beijing has started to perceived avoidance of regional conflicts use such leverage more proactively to protect and competition is also seen as an impedi- and promote Chinese security, political and ment. Personal ties and understandings of economic interests, as well as Chinese citi- each other’s political mind-sets take years to and their activities in the Middle East. cultivate as well, as Mansour suggests. Along similar lines, Jiadong Zhang concludes that in the foreseeable future China will not serve Filling the vacuum created by US as a substitute for the US due to ‘China’s withdrawal: balancing games limited capacity and self-restrained tradition- In the context of the reduced US presence in al culture’. Marc Lanteign is more optimistic the region, its ‘pivot to Asia’ and the shift of that China can quickly close its knowledge economic power from the West to the East gap about the complexity of the region. All as perceived by the region, both China and authors underline the importance of mutu- states in the Greater Middle East are pursuing al understanding and deep engagement in balanced diplomacy and playing balancing enhancing relations between China and the games. states in the Persian Gulf.

Compared with the earlier ideological bias in While N. Janardhan argues that ‘the United its foreign policy, China is enhancing ties with States is worried about Chinese inroads in a wide array of states and regional organisa- the Middle East’, he also underlines that there tions in the Greater Middle East regardless is the potential for great-power cooperation whether they are allies of the US or whether in Middle East affairs too. He specifically

8 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report observes that the cooperative relationship built up between ‘the U.S. and -China duo’ to reach a deal on Iran could be repeat- ed, together with the GCC, to reach a deal on Syria.

Summary In short, there are growing expectations in the region of China’s ability and willingness to play a stabilizing role in regional political and security affairs. The regional states increasingly also look to China as a provid- er of global and regional public goods. The Chinese are not yet ready to play such a role and take on such responsibilities. One reason is that this risks conflicting with the long-held principle of non-intervention and also with China’s self-perception as a different kind of great power: in contrast to the Western great powers, China does not intervene in the politics of other regions and states, nor does it have alliances or military bases outside its own . Another reason is that the Chinese still do not have the diplomatic and military capabilities to play such a role – to fill the vacuum if the US withdraws from the region. There seems to be a clash of expec- tations. On the one hand, China focuses on protecting and promoting its energy and commercial interests; in order to do so, it is willing to become more actively involved in regional politics and security. On the other hand, the regional states expect China to assume more holistic concerns about region- al development, stability and security and to play a strong and active role in regional politics and security.

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 9 CHINA’S DIPLOMACY IN THE GULF China’s longstanding practice of separating REGION: ENERGY AND (IN)SECURITY economics from politics in its cross-regional diplomacy, and especially in its relations with Marc Lanteigne resource-rich developing states, has at times failed in the Middle East, most particularly in addressing responses to violence-prone weak إطلب العلم ولو في الصين (‘Seek knowledge, even in China.’) states such as Libya and , and the Traditional hadith more venomous security situation in Iraq and Syria. China has made great strides in widen- China’s Middle East Challenges ing and deepening its MENA policies under Since the 1990s, China’s foreign and security the governments of Hu Jintao and more policy has significantly diversified to include recently . Nonetheless, assuming a the issue of energy security, especially as traditional non-aligned stance in many of the Beijing began to seek deepened partnerships political and security issues and problems with energy-producing states and regions, enveloping the Middle East, and especially including in the Middle East and since the post-‘Arab Spring’ period, due to its (MENA). Unlike the of the United established great power status, has proven to States, Europe and , China’s history be considerably more difficult for China. in Middle Eastern affairs has been much shorter and as a result, Beijing is developing There are some areas of MENA, including energy relationships with MENA at a disad- in the oil-producing Gulf region, in which vantage with respect to its knowledge of and China has been more successful in navigat- diplomacy with the region. At the same time, ing local politics while avoiding the political

10 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report traps previously encountered by other large hopes that a mutually satisfying agreement fossil fuel-consuming states, most notably can be struck. Iran and South Sudan. However, both with the fall of global oil prices during 2015 and China is also approaching the Gulf region China’s developing status as a great power in a stronger position from which to debate and major energy player, Beijing struggles to the issue of energy security, defined as the separate politics from economics in the Gulf need for access to energy supplies in order region while building an effective energy to maintain economic stability and security strategy involving the six govern- security. As global energy prices began their ments represented on the Gulf Cooperation slide in 2015, Beijing became an early bene- Council (GCC).1 Energy politics will continue ficiary of less expensive oil and gas supplies. to take the lead in this area for the foresee- Yet China is also well aware of the volatility able future as China takes a long-term view of energy markets and the unpredictability of of its concerns about access to external fossil-fuel markets, and remains committed supplies. to ensuring that the availability of external energy sources does not result in a large As China continues to grow as a political degree of vulnerability in China’s future eco- and economic power, the country is more nomic growth and modernization. aware of its growing dependence on import- ed fossil fuels as it seeks to distance itself This paper will examine how China’s develop- from environmentally damaging indigenous ing policy of maintaining energy security has coal. Deteriorating air quality in the past begun to form part of the dialogue between few years, culminating in ‘red alerts’ of high Beijing and the major states of the Gulf levels of air pollution in the Chinese capital region, and whether Chinese views of energy during 2015,2 have underscored security will differ from those of the West. the need for China to focus on diversifying Beijing has had to play catch-up in engaging its energy sources while seeking a more the Gulf and in developing a deeper under- ‘green’ energy agenda. The Middle East, in- standing of the complex diplomatic dynamics cluding the Gulf region, is becoming a more of the GCC, but this knowledge gap is quickly important source of both oil and liquefied being closed, and energy security will be at natural gas (LNG) for Chinese markets, and the forefront of any bilateral dialogue between the GCC ? is slowly but steadily developing China and the Gulf states in the near future. as a key energy partner for China. Within this relationship, Beijing has been seeking to diversify its diplomatic ties with the Gulf China and Gulf Politics region alongside the potential for liberal- The (Arabian / Persian) Gulf region, along ized trade between the two actors. Since with the greater MENA area, was an early the turn of the century, as China begins to beneficiary of the cross-regional diplomacy expand its interests in developing bilateral initiated by Beijing under the government of and sub-regional free-trade agreements, Hu Jintao (2002-12). As with other regions, free-trade talks between China and the GCC notably Africa and , energy and have continued, with both sides expressing raw materials formed a platform for many of the diplomatic initiatives that China un- dertook in the Middle East, but there were 1 The members of the Gulf Cooperation Council are Bah- , , , , Saudi Arabia and the United ambitious attempts by China to further widen Arab Emirates. its policies in the region. It was during this 2 ‘Beijing’s Smog Red Alert Enters Third Day as Toxic Haze period that the China–Arab Cooperation Shrouds ,’ Agence France-Presse / The Guardian, 21 De- Forum (CACF) was created to act as a link cember 2015, . States (LAS). Since 2004, the CACF has held

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 11 biennial governmental conferences, the government’s ‘belt and road’ (yidai yilu 一带 most recent in Beijing in June 2014.3 At 一路) trade routes, a concept which began to the same time there was an emphasis on take form after 2013. Both the ‘belt’, meaning the development of greater bilateral ties a series of overland trade routes connecting between China and Middle Eastern govern- China with Europe , and the ‘road’, ments, including energy-producing states. referring to maritime trading routes through During the Hu administration and the the Indian between China on the one first years of the presidency of Xi Jinping, hand and Africa and Europe on the other, summitry between Beijing and Middle East would involve the participation of MENA and policy-makers was frequent. Since 2004, Gulf governments. As a result, China has China’s relations with the Gulf states have been anxious to conclude the FTA with the also been dominated by efforts to develop GCC (along with ) as a means of a free-trade agreement with the Gulf Coop- further cementing its ‘one belt and one road’ eration Council,4 efforts which have been initiative.7 In addition, several Middle Eastern complicated by economic differences and and North African countries agreed to join occasionally by politics. the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in early 2015, including Iran, Israel and Following a June 2009 negotiation meet- , as well as the Gulf States of Kuwait, ing in , FTA talks were temporarily Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab suspended due to concerns within the Emirates. GCC about Beijing’s unwillingness to open its sector to firms from the The Chinese government has occasionally Gulf region.5 Since that time, the Chinese found it difficult to separate its Gulf diplomacy government has called for greater flexibility from its relations with the wider Middle East, and has been supportive of reaching a quick especially in the wake of conflict and insta- conclusion to the negotiations. Part of the bility, along with the rise of the Islamic State reason for this is the major role the Gulf (also known as Daesh) in much of the States play in overall Chinese trade with the region, especially Iraq and Syria. Like many Middle East. Between 2004 and 2014, this other outside actors, China had to make rapid trade increased from approximately US$20 adjustments to its regional diplomacy as a billion to US$230 billion, with per- result of the 2011-12 ‘Arab Spring’ people’s cent being represented by the GCC member- protests, which unseated many longstand- ship. As well, one third of China’s imported ing regional governments, including those of oil now is derived from the GCC states, with , Libya, and Yemen, and resulted Saudi Arabia being the most visible partner.6 in widespread violence and eventually civil The successful completion of a free-trade war in Syria between the government of Pres- agreement would further deepen these ties, ident Bashar Assad and various rebel groups while bringing the region close to the Xi seeking his removal.

Beijing’s attempts to maintain a non-aligned 3 Shannon Tiezzi, ‘China Seeks Expanded Role in Middle policy at the start of the conflict were ad- East,’ The Diplomat, 4 June 2014, . along with Russia, China vetoed a UNSC 4 ‘China FTA Network: Gulf Cooperation Council,’ Ministry resolution calling for Syrian President Assad of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, June 2009 to resign in the wake of the worsening vio- . 5 Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg, ‘China-GCC Strategic Dialogue 7 Chen Jia, ‘ “Belt and Road” Plan “Set to Spur FTA Talks”,’ Resumes,’ Arab News, 19 January 2014, . daily.com.cn/china/2015-04/28/content_20558913.htm>; 6 ‘Soft Power- China’s Expanding Role in the Middle East,’ Salah Takieddine, ‘China Hand in Hand with Arab to Deutsche Welle, 4 February 2015. Push Silk Road Initiative,’ Xinhua, 27 May 2015.

12 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report lence. By the end of 2014, China and Russia While President Xi has, so far, been a less had vetoed four separate UNSC resolutions involved participant in Middle Eastern sum- which sought to address the Syrian conflict.8 mitry in comparison with his predecessor, Beijing justified its decision by suggesting officials in his government have been more that overt support for one side in the dispute active in the region. For example, in Janu- would only lead to a further deterioration of ary 2014, Chinese Foreign Wang Yi conditions in Syria, but many Arab govern- made a highly publicized tour of the Middle ments, including those in the Gulf, were not East, including Saudi Arabia.11 Xi himself had completely convinced. China’s veto and its planned a visit to Egypt and Saudi Arabia in unwillingness to support deeper sanctions April 2015, which would have been his first to were sharply criticized in the the Middle East, but the arrangements had to and Europe and were greeted with unease be postponed due to the worsening fighting among other Arab governments. Relations between the Saudi-backed government of became especially difficult with Saudi Arabia Yemen and Shi’ite Houthi rebels, who had over China’s refusal to support a more con- established a rival government in Sana’a, and certed pressure against the Assad regime, other splinter groups loyal to IS.12 Despite the further contributing to the sluggish pace of comparative lack, so far, of summit diploma- the free-trade talks between China and the cy in the region, the Xi government continues GCC after 2011.9 to view the MENA region, including the Gulf, not only as an important source of energy The events of 2014-15, when Islamic State and resources, but also as an important (IS) began to carve out territory in Iraq and component of the emerging belt and road Syria in the hopes of founding an Islamic ca- initiative after 2013. liphate, erasing the two states’ mutual border in the process, has also posed a dilemma for Beijing. Although declining to formally join The Energy Factor the Washington-led coalition to combat IS, Trade in commodities has also dominated China has joined the international community the Sino-MENA relationship, including in the in condemning the movement and has raised Gulf, as Beijing now views the region as an concerns about a possible demonstration ef- excellent source of raw materials, including fect being created in the far-western Chinese phosphate, manganese, cobalt and fibres, for territory of . More specifically, Beijing China’s burgeoning sector.13 As did the was concerned that the radicalism being United States and Europe in the past, China spread by IS would find sympathy among has paid very close attention to the Middle extremists in China’s far west. Reports which East as a source of fossil fuels, and much of surfaced in November 2015 that a Chinese Beijing’s diplomacy in the region has focused hostage had been beheaded by IS further on energy trade. Notwithstanding its ‘late- indicated that Beijing was not immune to the comer’ status and its need to gather more effects of the deteriorating security situation political and economic information quickly in the Mashriq.10 about its GCC partners, Beijing has been

11 ‘Wang Yi Gave an Interview to Al-Jazeera,’ Foreign 8 ‘Russia and China Veto UN Move to Refer Syria to ICC,’ Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, 9 January 2014, BBC News, 22 May 2014, . wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1116509.shtml> 9 ‘China and GCC to Restart FTA Negotiations,’ Gulf States 12 ‘China state Visit to Egypt, Saudi Arabia Delayed,’ Cairo News, 7 February 2014, . news/144403/news/china-state-visit-to-egypt-saudi- arabia-delayed>. 10 Shannon Tiezzi, ‘ISIS: Chinese Hostage “Executed”.’ The Diplomat, 19 November 2015, . East,’ Journal of Developing Societies 23(4) (2007): 425.

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 13 successful in establishing itself as a pivot- markets are not seriously damaged. Cooling al ‘alternative’ consumer base for the Gulf US–Saudi relations, especially in the wake of region’s oil and gas. Despite China’s attempts the diplomatic convergence between the Unit- to diversify its energy partners mentioned ed States and Iran in 2015-16, further raised above, the Gulf region remains its primary anxieties in Riyadh about the health of its source of imported oil and gas. By 2013 American ties. Beijing’s primary regional oil suppliers were in the Gulf region, especially Saudi Arabia, Iran As noted previously, China has been more and Qatar, and increasingly Iraq and Yemen, inclined to view liquefied natural gas as although the latter two states became less a cleaner alternative to coal, and growing viable as energy partners after their security demand for imported LNG had until recently situations deteriorated in 2014-15. Beijing been a major factor in Chinese relations with then looked to other parts of the Gulf region Qatar. In terms of overall trade the relation- to be more stable politically in comparison. ship has been a healthy one, with volume growing from US$400 million in 2004 to China, like the other large energy-consuming US$10.6 billion ten years later.16 However, Chi- powers, had a vested interest in ensuring en- na’s economic slowdown during 2015, as well ergy exports from the region were maintained as its move away from a concentration and even as prices began to drop. While through- more toward the service sectors, has had the out much of the , China’s interests in additional effect of slowing Chinese demand the Middle East were ideological and stra- for natural gas supplies.17 Despite high hopes tegic, more economic issues began to gain that LNG demand in China would spike in prominence as China recognized the need to 2015 as a result of environmental concerns, import fossil fuels, and Beijing, acknowledg- the levelling off of imports, coupled with gas ing the economic consequences of favour- prices that remain high in China itself, did not ing either side over the other, has sought bring about this anticipated scenario. Qatar is a balance in its policies on the Arab-Israeli the largest external supplier of LNG to China, conflict. The size of the Chinese market and but trade dropped slightly in 2013-14, from its growing economic decision-making ca- 6.76 million metric tonnes to 6.73 million,18 pabilities internationally make it unlikely that and the volatility of the energy market makes Beijing would be subject to a fuel embargo.14 further predictions for future demand dif- The strong American presence in the region, ficult. In early 2016, the Qatari government not only in Iraq, and also Washington’s estab- announced that, like Saudi Arabia, it was lished (albeit wavering) political ties with Ri- seeking to diversify its economy away from a yadh, does present a challenge for long-term high dependence on fossil fuels. China would Chinese energy diplomacy. However, growing be an important partner in this diversification Chinese power and interests in the region do process, especially regarding Qatar’s industri- raise the possibility of more direct diplomatic al sectors.19 competition in MENA between the two great powers.15 Saudi Arabia may increasingly view China as a counterweight to the west, while 16 ‘Qatar – China Trade Volume Hits QR38.6bn in 2014,’ The ensuring that ties to American and European , 17 December 2015. 17 ‘China’s Natural Gas Use Plummets Despite its Pledge to Switch from Coal,’ Syrian Arab News Agency, 11 December 2015. 14 Zha Daojiong, ‘China’s Energy Security: Domestic and In- ternational Issues,’ Survival 48(1) (Spring 2006): 179-90. 18 Colin Shek, ‘China’s gas-import slowdown threatens LNG producers,’ Al-Jazeera, 2 June 2015, < http:// 15 Flynt Leveritt and Jeffrey Bader, ‘Managing China-US www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/06/ Energy Competition in the Middle East,’ The Washington china-gas-import-slowdown-threatens-lng-produc- Quarterly 29(1) (Winter 2005-6): 195-6; G. John Ikenberry, ers-150602104833809.html>. ‘Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in ,’ Political Science 19 Peter Alagos, ‘China Seen as Playing a Key Role in Qa- Quarterly 131(1) (Spring 2016): 9-43. tar’s Diversification strategy,’Gulf Times, 22 May 2016.

14 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report China has also sought to maintain energy nuclear programme under international su- relations with Iran, despite an ongoing inter- pervision. Beijing has been supportive of this national campaign led by the United States process and has expressed hopes that the to isolate and sanction , especially tentative nuclear deal signed with Iran in July in light of concerns about possible Iranian 2015 would see Teheran finally emerge from nuclear weapons development. China has international isolation. Beijing had tradition- been seen as a primary investor in Iranian ally resisted the use of economic coercion or energy infrastructure, much of which had the threat of force to settle this issue main- deteriorated in the wake of US-led sanctions taining the view a diplomatic dialogue is the since the . Subsequent Chinese deals best way to prevent a potential nuclear cri- 22 in Iran included a 2004 investment agree- sis. It remains to be seen, however, how the ment in the Yadavaran area and a 2007 joint warming of relations between Iran and the venture to develop natural gas in the North west will affect Sino-Iranian energy relations Pars region.20 Iran’s status as a primary in the coming years. producer of fossil fuels meant that Beijing felt it could ill afford to ignore the benefits What’s Next? of maintaining economic ties with Tehran even during the sanctions era. Once those Although fossil-fuel prices were continuing sanctions began to be lifted in 2015, Beijing to fall at the end of 2015, China continued to was quick to suggest new potential trade and build an energy security policy in light of its development deals, the cornerstone being an growing dependence on outside fossil-fuel economic partnership to increase bilateral sources in order to maintain growth and trade to US$600 billion over the next quar- continue its process of domestic econom- ter of a century.21 However, with the United ic reform. Beijing will therefore continue to States and Europe also eyeing the Iranian seek deeper relations with a diverse array of post-sanctions market, it remains to be seen energy partners, especially in regions which whether Beijing can maintain the same de- are considered stable. In the case of the Gulf, gree of visibility in Iranian trade. As well, Iran although the region’s monarchies were able may become a key component of the ‘one to ride out the turmoil of the Arab Spring belt and one road’ plan, given the country’s protests relatively intact, the conflicts of the strategic location along both the overland greater MENA region, including Libya, the and routes. Islamic State crisis and Yemen, continue to chip away at the walls of the GCC and call As with other parts of the Gulf region, Beijing into question the security of the energy rela- has sought to expand its diplomacy with Iran tionship between China and the Gulf region. beyond strictly matters of energy. In April As well, China remains a recent arrival in the 2015, an initial breakthrough was reached game of Middle Eastern energy relations, now between Tehran and the ‘P5 Plus One’ group- having to compete with many western actors ing, which included China along with the US, that have engaged with the Gulf for decades Russia, and western European governments, and have much more multifaceted economic that would impose restrictions on the Iranian ties with the Gulf economies.

A wild card in the China–GCC relationship remains their mutual free-trade negotiations, 20 Marc Lanteigne, ‘Energising Links,’ The World Today 63(7) (July 2007): 7; Alyssa Rallis, ‘China–Iran Trade to Hit US$25 Billion,’ Global Insight Daily Analysis, 1 July 2008. 21 Golnar Motevalli, ‘China, Iran Agree to Expand Trade to 22 ‘China Urges Flexibility in Iran Nuclear Talks,’ Reuters / $600 Billion in a Decade,’ Bloomberg, 23 January 2016, < International Herald Tribune, 18 July 2008, 3; ‘Full Text of http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-23/ the Iran Nuclear Deal,’ Washington Post, 14 July 2015, < china-iran-agree-to-expand-trade-to-600-billion-in-a-de- http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/ cade>. full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1651/>.

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 15 which will be an important additional step it will integrate key parts of the Gulf region in the development of this bilateral linkage. more fully into these diplomatic processes. The negotiations appear to be back on track Ultimately, however, it will be energy in the due to growing summit diplomacy between form of oil and LNG that will continue to set Chinese officials and local Gulf governments, the tone for the growing diplomatic process and a successful visit to the region by Presi- between China and the Gulf, as Beijing devel- dent Xi, expected in 2016, would likely elevate ops its role as the alternative pole in region. the process to an even better position. China has been successful in concluding difficult free-trade talks in recent years, including with the large economies of and South in 2015, and Beijing is very interested in further cementing its cross-regional eco- nomic diplomacy by adding the GCC to its list of free trade successes.

After much delay, President Xi was finally able to tour the Middle East in January 2016, visiting Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia. At the top of the list of Xi’s interests during the tour were energy deals, as well as broader inter- ests in expanding Chinese trade in the region. In his speech to the in Cairo during his trip, President Xi sought to stress the economic dimension of China’s region- al partnership while seeking to avoid the impression that Beijing was seeking to fill a supposed ‘power vacuum’.23 As well, many of China’s emerging Middle East policies have begun to be integrated into a larger ‘one belt and one road’ strategy, which has included developing stronger maritime trade ties with the Middle East and North Africa. At the end of 2015, China also announced its intentions to construct a logistics centre across from the Gulf Region in ,24 another sign that Beijing is placing a higher priority on trade security in the region and subtly bal- ancing the west there. As China deepens its economic and energy relations with MENA,

23 Cary Huang, ’Back to the Future: Chinese Presi- dent Xi Jinping’s Middle East Visit ... and His Middle Kingdom Dream,’ South China Morning Post, 22 Jan- uary 2016’; Spotlight: Xi’s Speech at Arab League Charts Course for China-Arab Cooperation,’ Xinhua, 28 January 2016, . 24 ‘China Hints More Bases On Way after Djibouti,’ Reuters, 8 2016.

16 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report CAN CHINA BE A PILLAR OF GCC ons systems; rather, as a pillar, a major power SECURITY? would be central in setting the parameters of the regional order and/or organizing regional Imad Mansour security . How should we think about the possibility of a committed security Increasing China’s political involvement glob- relationship of this sort, and what alternative ally and expanding China–Gulf Cooperation relationships are likely? Council (GCC) trade in hydrocarbons have been hypothesized by some as the precur- In this paper I consider the question of sors of an expanded relationship between whether China could be a pillar of GCC secu- the two sides in the security realm. In fact, rity in four steps: first, I look at the reasons since at least 2004, GCC leaders have been why China is often discussed as a security establishing contacts with their Chinese partner; second, I examine the historical counterparts to discuss the potential and roots of two security-seeking strategies on parameters for what they term ‘a strategic the part of the GCC; third, I undertake a pre- partnership’. These developments, together liminary consideration of GCC decision-mak- with apparent GCC questioning of current ers’ positions on security ties with China; and American policies toward the Gulf, make fourth, I discuss what China could offer. this an opportune moment to explore Chi- na’s potential contributions to GCC security, asking the pertinent question of what China Dimension one: China as a policy interest can offer to buttress the security interests Three global and regional factors help us of GCC states. Can China be a pillar of GCC understand the growing interest in what security? By pillar is meant more than an ally China can offer. First is the GCC’s question- or provider of military capabilities or weap- ing of American commitments to its security

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 17 in light of what it sees as America’s unfa- to reduce dependence on the major powers vourable policies on Iran, Syria and Iraq. The and external assistance more generally. The second factor is the American ‘pivot to Asia’, idea of consolidating an indigenous security which, while not meaning abandonment, structure that was relatively independent of nevertheless has GCC states thinking of the the major powers was circulating among trade-offs the United States (US) would be Gulf Arab leaders as early as the early 1970s. willing to make in pursuit of its interests that However, pressures from Iran’s policies in would compromise its presence in the Gulf. the aftermath of the 1979 revolution and the The third factor is China’s tactical expansion onset of the Iran– converged to lead into the Gulf and areas in the vicinity of the the GCC states to agree to accept the United GCC, which have further animated talk about States as an order-setter in Gulf relations, China’s potential in ensuring the GCC’s secu- especially in being their main security provid- rity; these moves include conducting training er. This did not prevent local security-building with and Iran, developing ties with the initiatives, one important and progressing UAE and talk of China establishing a base in achievement being the Peninsula Shield Djibouti. In essence, from the perspective of Force (PSF). However, GCC states have not the GCC, China has become more present yet developed a unified military and security regionally, but without a concerted policy in framework, nor one that is independent of which it presents itself as a security partner, major power assistance. let alone a pillar of regional security. Major powers have therefore long been part and parcel of Gulf politics and security. The Dimension two: historicizing GCC security possibility of China partaking more concrete- strategies ly in Gulf security, therefore, is nothing new. GCC states have sought security for them- What is important, however, is how China can selves through alliances with major powers, be part of the regional order, and whether it as well as intra-GCC coordination of capaci- has what the GCC wants? ties. Alignments with major powers predated the formation of most of the GCC sovereign states, and were often developed as means Dimension three: the limitations on China to offset rivalries between regional or local being a GCC security pillar leaders and ; such alignments pre- Despite China’s increased presence in the dated even the discovery of oil in the Gulf Gulf and in policy discussions, I contend that early in the twentieth century, with the British existing indicators all point to a reality that, building or enforcing local alliances to secure for the foreseeable future, it will not be a trade routes to . In the twentieth century, security pillar for the GCC: that is, it will not Britain and the US continued to be involved fix the parameters of regional security archi- in local rivalries, helped develop the oil and tectures, as the US has done so far. This is gas sectors, especially through supporting because China is not prepared to supply the expatriate companies, and aided state-build- role of being a pillar, nor is there any demand ing processes generally after independence. for such a role on the part of the GCC. America’s current security presence in the Gulf developed over the course of the The GCC states and their supporters among mid-twentieth century, starting most con- the major powers to date, Britain and the US, cretely with its intervention to bridge Saudi have so far had significant common grounds Arabia and Iran ties in its ‘twin pillar’ strategy on which they agree and converge in their of the 1970s. strategic perspectives on Gulf security, de- spite occasional disagreement on the specif- Simultaneously, visions of intra-GCC secu- ics. This has been especially true with regard rity were motivated by a drive to the views of the GCC, the US and Britain

18 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report concerning who is menacing the regional gies, especially the potential for the sale of order and who are their potential allies or advanced military capabilities. While China friends. Aside from agreeing to develop trade has promised to sell arms to the GCC states, in energy (and, to a lesser degree, financial it does not seem likely that it would assist investments), points of convergence between them in such sales to such a degree that China and the GCC along these three dimen- they would achieve military parity with Israel, sions today are unclear. Actually, the security or to a degree that would alarm the US. GCC interests of the GCC states remain focused leaders understand that the US is very likely on guarding against threats in their geo- to continue to monitor and probably approve graphical vicinity: in particular, against Iran, international arms sales to the Gulf and the Israel and of late Islamic State. Rather than Middle East in general. Moreover, GCC lead- convergence around these issues, there are ers understand that China would not risk its important points of divergence with China relations with the US over this issue, and they that make a deeper security relationship themselves would not want to do anything to difficult to achieve. end American dominance in the Gulf. There- fore, from this perspective GCC leaders view The GCC states see regional security through the role that China could play in Gulf security an Iran-centric prism: for them, China’s ‘neu- (at least in their favor) as limited. trality’ in foreign policy in effect translates into greater coordination with Iran, which With respect to Islamic State (IS), Iraq and makes China less desirable as a security Syria, the GCC states are alarmed by IS’s abil- partner. However, this GCC convergence ity to threaten their domestic stability directly on Iran (last officially confirmed in the 16 and challenge their legitimacy (discursively September 2014 meeting in Riyadh) does and materially), explosions having been the not preclude divergence within the GCC on most visible manifestation of IS’s intent to strategies to deal with Iran. In addition to spread its operations more widely. In these its established economic and military ties respects, China’s potential has remained al- with Iran, China had played a role in bridging most negligible and seems unlikely to change the American and Iranian positions on the significantly in the medium term. nuclear issue, which did not sit well with the GCC. To this mediation was added Iran’s In sum, from the perspective of the GCC, Chi- framing of its position on Syria as protecting na has not developed clear positions or pol- the latter’s sovereignty and being in the in- icies that would indicate a willingness to act terests of ‘impartiality’: the GCC states seem to contain any Middle Eastern actor that the to see these Chinese positions as resulting GCC perceives as threatening (especially Iran in support of the Iranian position across the and Israel). Not only is China distant from Middle East. Some GCC observers even note the Gulf’s messy and rivalry-ridden politics, that Iran might not have been able to counter it is actively avoiding regional conflicts and US pressures if China had adopted a different competitions and confining itself to bene- position. Thus, against the backdrop of GCC fiting from trade and economic exchanges; security concerns vis-à-vis Iran, and in light some GCC observers consider this Chinese of China’s statist logic, GCC decision-makers position to be ‘hypocritical’. The concern here are unnerved by what they perceive to be the for the GCC is that China is committed to strong ties developing between China and developing its relations with Iran and Israel, Iran, which, importantly, are not paralleled by from which it has been benefiting hand- similar Chinese ties with them. somely from trade in goods, investments and technology. It is clear that the US figures Israel is also of interest to the GCC, which un- prominently in how the GCC perceives its derstands that Israel’s politics and veto pow- options in relation to the major powers. Since er influences America’s Middle East strate- the 2015 Camp David meetings following the

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 19 Iran nuclear deal, GCC decision-makers have the world. The APP, interestingly, referenced made clear their comfort with America being ongoing economic projects, perhaps to indi- their security pillar, tensions notwithstanding. cate successful models to be emulated, or to In general, GCC observers do not see recent signal a significant level of conscious strategic tensions as definitive, but rather as transitory. coordination in its massive administrative body in dealing with issues of interest to Arab audiences. The APP mentions the One Belt, Dimension four: China’s potential for GCC One Road (OBOR) project and its expected security benefits, though without noting how the GCC While currently there are few ‘concrete’ fits with this project; this is curious, since the indicators that China is becoming a pillar of GCC, and the Gulf generally, were also not the GCC’s security, its more realistic con- mentioned in the OBOR map issued by Xin- tributions to GCC security mainly concern hua in 2015. It might be the case that building two issues: 1) the diversification of weapons such a network to incorporate GCC states sources, in line with US approval; and needs a certain level of intra-Gulf coordination 2) the consolidation and securing of trade. and security dialogue, at least between Iran From the GCC’s perspective, it is already and the GCC. President Xi Jinping’s com- diversifying its arms suppliers, a process that ments in Saudi Arabia in January 2016 during implicates China; this does not make China a Middle East tour did note an interest in in- a pillar of GCC security. Moreover, since the cluding GCC members; given Gulf tensions, it GCC needs to secure shipping routes for the might indeed have been prudent for China not export of its hydrocarbons to Asia, it needs to have discussed strategy at this point. Then better ties with China and other Asian states. in February 2016, Iran and China inaugurated Hence, it is not a matter of shifting major a massive international train route that will sig- power alliances, but of improving across-the- nificantly reduce transport times. It remains board relations. to be seen what sorts of trade routes may be developed between the GCC and China. Relative to security or military cooperation, it is clear that economic and trade relations To go back to the APP, in it was an interesting between the GCC and China are bound to mention of collaboration on maritime securi- develop on firmer grounds, including com- ty in the framework of the ongoing efforts of mitments relating to Chinese citizens moving the ‘international community’: close observ- to live and work abroad. China has been ers of the GCC had previously posed ques- expanding its security presence in the Gulf, tions as to why China does not develop – as well as in Africa, in order to protect its from the observer’s perspective – a policy on investments and help those of its citizens maritime Gulf security independently of the who are residents there, for example, in order existing one led by the western powers (i.e. to evacuate them from unstable zones if the international community). The observer’s needed. Therefore, by protecting such in- note indicated how the GCC is processing terests, China will give itself greater military China’s regional politics in tandem with and security visibility in the Gulf. Perhaps what the GCC sees the latter is developing this aspect will be a viable medium for both with other Gulf states, especially Iran. So far, China and the GCC to examine their common China–Iran military exchanges have been security interests. visible, and economic exchanges between them are more diverse than China-GCC ones; this dynamic is likely to continue in the next Conclusion few years. In January 2016 China issued its first Arab Policy Paper (APP) in recognition of the In the absence of any cataclysmic devel- expanding ties between these two parts of opment or shock, GCC leaders are likely to

20 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report continue to assess the benefits of a security relationship with China through the prism of their enduring relationship with the US. That relationship includes hardware and training, as well as the personalized ties that Amer- ican decision-makers have cultivated over decades, and is accompanied by high levels of GCC comfort in dealing with the American political mindset. Perhaps Chinese diploma- cy, if it is interested, can ponder these dimen- sions in developing its own policy towards the Gulf.

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 21 CHINA-MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS: and One Road (B&R) initiative to strengthen NEW CHALLENGES AND NEW its economic, political and people-to-people APPROACHES ties with regional countries. At the same time, however, China’s military activity is still Zhang Jiadong very hesitant and limited. Generally, China’s polices towards the Middle East are changing Typically, Chinese interests in the Middle East quietly, slowly, but sustainably. mainly cover four areas: energy, politics, the economy and . Even though ener- gy security is still China’s key concern in the Traditional Chinese interests and policies region, its economic and political interests in the Middle East in the Middle East are also very important. Typically, Chinese interests in the Middle In recent years, the role of the Middle East in East cover four areas. Political ties are the the world has changed greatly due to the de- foundation, while economic and energy ties clining oil price and the rising terrorist threat. are playing a growing role in China’s relations But for China, the importance of the Middle with the region. East has not changed much. China’s energy dependence on the Middle East is increasing, Since the establishment of the PRC, China as is the Middle East’s influence on China in has maintained good political relationships terms of terrorist threats and traditional se- with almost all of the countries in the Middle curity concerns. The strategic vacuum that East. Comparing to its strong political ties, the US has left leaves a lot of challenges and China’s economic, cultural and energy ties uncertainties for China. To respond to these with the region were very weak during the challenges, China has initiated the One Belt Cold War. In China’s first important multina-

22 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report tional show in 1954, the Bandung Conference, and Chinese construction companies. In 2011, among the 29 members there were 14 from Chinese companies received construction the Middle East, namely Egypt, Sudan, Libya, contracts worth about US$21 billion from the Tunisia, , , Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Middle East. In 2012, trade between China and , Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Tur- the GCC reached US$ 15.50 billion. In 2013, key. Another representative from the region trade in energy, goods and services between was the Mufti of Palestine. It is therefore very China and the Middle East amounted to nearly clear that the Middle East was crucial for the US$ 300 billion. Arab countries are therefore PRC’s rise politically in the international arena. key economic partners of China. In 2013, China today has good relationships with al- trade between China and the Arab countries most all the countries in the region, and they reached US$ 240 billion. are partners in many international issues. Clearly, the Middle East has been an import- Geopolitical risk is a new concern for China. diplomatic asset for China for decades. The Middle East is a part of China’s Greater Neighborhood. The Middle East is also the Energy security is China’s key concern cur- religious and cultural center of an Islamic belt rently in the region. China imports more oil stretching from North Africa, through the Mid- from the Middle East than the other regions dle Asia and , to . put together. In 2013, China imported 146.54 This Islamic belt fringes the western and million tons of oil from the Middle East, which southwestern parts of China. The Middle East was 52% of its overall imported oil. In 2014, is also the future direction of China’s outward China imported 53% of all imported oil from sea power. So what goes on in the Middle the greater Middle East (plus North African East not only influences China’s economic Arab countries, such as Egypt, Libya, and Al- interests, it also has an impact on China’s geria).1 Of the top 10 overseas oil suppliers of security situation both abroad and at home. China, the Middle East has 6, which is Saudi The role of the Middle East in China’s foreign Arabia (no.1), Oman (no. 3), Iraq (no. 5), Iran policy has been greatly transformed, from a (no. 6), the United Arab Emirates (no. 9) and politics-driven model, to a politics-plus-energy Kuwait (no. 10). model, to a current combination-driven model that incorporates political, energy, economic Economic interests are a growing factor in and strategic concerns. China’s Middle East Policy. The Middle East is at a crossroads between three . Partly thank to cautious policies and activ- The SLOCs through and surrounding the ities, China has a very good image in the region are the key routes for world trade and Middle East. Almost all countries welcome communications. Trade via the Canal China’s presence in the region. Just as the represents 14% of total world trade. About UAE ambassador to China, H.E. Omar Al 20,000 vessels pass through the canal, 10% of Bitar, said in 2013, ‘the Middle East needs a which belong to China. Since 2011, Europe has fair arbitrator. This arbitrator should not have become China’s biggest trade partner, with double standards and selfish intentions. Arab US$ 567.2 billion worth of trade, and 60% of countries trust China because China is an Chinese exports to Europe pass through the affable and trustworthy country and also one . China-Africa trade is also worth permanent member in the UNSC. over US$ 200 billion. The trade route between China and Africa also goes across the neighboring the Middle East. The Middle East New Challenges for China’s Middle East is also an important market for Chinese goods Policy In recent years, many factors in the world

1 CPCIA website, http://www.cpcia.org.cn/news/hyfx/ and in the Middle East have changed. These 2015-1/144924.shtml, accessed 2015-10-22. will have an influence on China’s policies.

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 23 The change in energy structure is a new fac- have caused a change in China’s conception tor for China. The Middle East is the biggest of its energy security. In the past, China was region of fossil energy resources, but due to mainly concerned how and where it can - for shale gas, shale oil and other tain oil. Today, it is more concerned about en- new energy sources, such as wind and solar, ergy price and quality. China might therefore and progress in energy-conservation technol- also rethink its policies on the Middle East, as ogies, the significance of the Middle East in energy may lose its status as a top priority in the world energy structure is also declining. its diplomatic agenda in the region. The importance of the Middle East for China’ energy security will be also less significant Following the likely decline of the importance in the future. That is, the turning point in of energy, the security risk has become a Chinese energy consumption will be reached growing factor in China’s Middle East poli- much earlier than expected. In the past, cies. Terrorism, pirate attacks and religious many analysts thought that this turning point factional conflicts are threatening not only would emerge around 2030, but according to the region, but also the rest of the world. China’s National Bureau of Statistics’ latest Islamic State, AQAP, Shabab, Al Qae- data, the country’s overall energy consump- da in the and many other radical tion was 3.84 billion tons of standard coal in movements and organizations are exploiting 2014. This represents a decline in the annu- the chaos and conflicts in the region. Iraq al grow rate of 1.4 points compared to the and Syria are becoming the new center of an previous year, the lowest growth rate during international terrorism campaign that im- the past 16 years. China’s energy consump- ports and exports large numbers of terrorists tion in 2015 was also less than expected. from and to other countries. Anti-China ter- According to the CNPC’s report, China’s total rorist organizations are also using the Mid- energy consumption in 2015 was 4.24 billion dle East as a base from which to train and tons of standard coal, an annual growth rate launch terrorist activities against China. In of -0.5%.2 China’s official data show 0.9% September 2015, the Turkistan Islamic Party annual growth, just rising to 4.3 billion tons (TIP, formerly as ETIM) issued a Uighur-lan- of standard coal in 2015,3 its lowest growth guage about its overall activities in rate. Some analysts believe that ‘the turning northwestern Syria and its role in the recent point of China’s energy consumption will be fighting. The highlight is a feature about the reached around 2018’. After 2018, China’s ‘little Jihadists’ who will ensure the future of energy consumption will fall.4 The likely earli- the Uighur Jihad. According to reports, lots er turning point is due to two main reasons: of Uighur people has reached the village of firstly, the slowing down of the Chinese econ- Al-Zenbaka, not far from the city of Jisr al omy, particularly in manufacturing and the Shughur, which has a population of about infrastructure building sector; and secondly, 3,500. The presence of the TIP and other sig- the restructuring of the Chinese economy. nificant terrorist organizations in Syria also The service sector, or tertiary industry, has has a strong impact on China’s relationship been playing a more and more important role with relevant countries in the region. in the Chinese economy. All these factors Geopolitical risk is another issue that China faces. Traditionally, the US is the primary ex- 2 2015年中国能源消费出现30年来首次负增长, http://futures.hexun.com/2016-01-26/182025675.html, ternal factor in the geostrategic structure in accessed 2016-05-22. the Middle East, but following the reduction 3 国家统计局 2015 年中国能源消费同比增0.9%, of America’s oil dependency on the Mid- http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2016-02-29/doc- dle East, the intensity of its involvement in ifxpvutf3673351.shtml, accessed 2016-05-22. Middle Eastern issues is also declining. This 4 去年中国能源消费增速创16年新低 2018年现拐点, http://money.163.com/15/0211/05/AI59CT3P00253B0H. change will cause lots of uncertainties in the html region. China and other countries are looking

24 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report hard to find a perfect option to fill this stra- flicts, but this tradition will be hard for China tegic vacuum. There is a dilemma involved to follow in the new situation. China needs a for China and otherworld powers: the US is more proactive policy, despite its hesitancy declining in its desire and ability to handle and caution. In the process of rebalancing the Middle East situation, but if other pow- its rising capacity and typical self-restrained ers came in, the US would view it as fresh foreign policy, China is taking some new strategic competition and even as a brick initiatives. in a greater strategic game. To avoid giving itself the image of a strategic competitor in China has elevated the status of Middle East- the Middle East, China restrains itself from ern states within its whole diplomatic archi- becoming involved more assertively and is tecture. In October 2013, the Chinese central instead focusing on economic and political government held a high-ranking conference cooperation with the regional powers. specifically on neighborhood diplomacy, and in November 2014, China declared that the China’s changing identity is another factor. neighborhood states are strategically signifi- In the past, China’s national interests were cant for its development and the international narrow and limited, greatly simplifying its environment. Through these statements, Chi- foreign policy in the region. Following the rise na has changed the priority list of its diplo- of China, China’s national interests have ex- macy and has raised neighborhood countries panded to every corner of the world and every to a similar high level with world powers. The arena. These multi-faceted national interests Middle East is also a part of China’s Greater are forcing China to rebalance its relations Neighborhood. with the Middle East and revamp its own international image and status. For example, The B&R initiative is the most ambitious China voted in favor of UNSC resolution 1929 initiative in China’s diplomatic history. Even against the Iranian nuclear program, about though energy ties between China and the which Iran was very angry. In 2012, China’s Middle East may have been reduced tempo- then vice-minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Zai rarily, OBOR will increase the significance of Jun, visited Syria, meeting the Syrian pres- the Middle East in China’s strategic outlines. ident and leaders of the opposition on the In the framework of a ’21st Century Maritime same visit. Even as China has tried its best Silk Road’, the Middle East is the key node to keep a balanced posture, many countries between three continents and also an im- have criticized China’s policy as supporting portant part of mutual communications and one side of the conflict in Syria. More im- mutual linkages. In November 2014, the Qa- portantly, in the past, China’s identity as a tari emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, developing country allowed it to talk to many said that the OBOR will provide important countries in the Middle East. But today, in opportunities for China-Qatar cooperation many countries’ eyes, China is now a devel- in energy and infrastructure development. oped country. The economic gap is therefore In December 2014, Egyptian president Sissi creating a widening gap in attitudes between also hailed B&R and argued that it would China and some countries in the Middle East. revive the great ancient Silk Road between East and West.

China’s New Approaches to the Middle East People-to-people exchange and cultural di- Traditionally, China’s policies toward the plomacy are new approaches for China in the Middle East were based on the principles of Middle East. In order to promote China-Arab sovereignty, equality and non-interference in relations, both sides decided to declare 2014 internal affairs. The main feature of Chinese and 2015 ‘China-Arab Friendship Years’ and foreign policy in the region is to maintain a to host many exchange events. China will neutral stance in all confrontations and con- train 6000 experts and professionals for Arab

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 25 countries within three years and organize 10,000 artists from both sides to visit each other and to establish and support more than 200 China-Arab cultural institutes. In 2016, China, Egypt and Qatar will host different culture-year events respectively.

China will pay greater attention to security and political issues in the Middle East. In the past, China did not have a clear Middle East strategy or policy, particularly in the security sector. But since the anti-piracy operations off Somalia’s coast, China has pursued a soft military presence in the Middle East. This is a notable change in China’s foreign policy.

Short Conclusion Generally, China needs a new conceptual framework for its policy on the Middle East. Following its rise, China has more and more complicated interests in the Middle East, while many regional countries also anticipate that China should do more, and more active in the region. Partly as s respond to these calls, China has transformed itself from a neutral outsider to a strategic participant. However, in the foreseeable future, China will not serve as another strategic stabilizer like the US has done for decades due to its limited capacity and self-effacing traditional culture.

26 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report CHINA’S MIDDLE EAST CONUNDRUM perspective; the United States’ ‘poke your AND PROSPECTS FOR COLLECTIVE thumb at others’ noses’, while its own is bleed- SECURITY ing, is a lesson in what foreign policy ought not be; in following the United States on most N. Janardhan issues, much of Europe has no independent foreign policy; and the less said the better Introduction about the foreign policies of the Middle East Few would dispute that there is a global countries, which are either with or against the foreign policy crisis – China’s and Russia’s United States and the rest of the west. anti-west foreign policies are more confronta- tional than constructive; Turkey’s ‘zero prob- The question that arises while pondering lem’ foreign policy is witnessing an awful lot over these realities is – what drives foreign of problems;1 India’s ‘play it safe’ approach is policy? At least four Ps come to mind – prin- indeed safe, but non-purposeful from a global ciple, profit, power projection and prestige. From the Middle East perspective, how the principal security guarantor – the United 1 Turkish academic-turned-foreign minister-turned-prime States – has fared on each of these factors minister Ahmed Davutoglu devised the ‘zero problems explains its failures during the last decade, with neighbours’ doctrine in 2004 to overcome ’s 2 disputes in the region. This was also meant to enhance making us wonder about future alternatives. relations among the regional states in the Middle East. However, a combination of Turkish foreign policy and events on the ground has left it with more problems than 2 N. Janardhan, ‘America’s policy crisis,’ Khaleej Times it started with a little more than a decade ago. (UAE), 23 April 2012.

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 27 Adding another dimension to these crises influenced international affairs.4 One of the is the Arab uprisings, which have been most significant fall-outs of the uprisings compared to the 1979 Islamic Revolution was the reversal of rapprochement efforts in Iran, the collapse of the in on several fronts – GCC–Iran, GCC–Syria, 1991 and the 9/11 attacks in 2001, which Syria–west. Suddenly most of these efforts impacted the political-security equations hit roadblocks in 2011, and the very actors in the Middle East, and which have led involved in the rapprochement were and are to geopolitical changes and ideological still at loggerheads. rivalries to fill the power vacuum in the region.3 After largely being ‘neutral’ mediators, Arab countries began to take sides, supplied funds It is ironical that the Arab uprising, which and arms to opposing factions, and even began as an attempt to seek political free- ventured into direct military action in Syria, dom as a way of mending economic depri- Libya and Yemen. vation, has achieved neither. Instead, it ap- pears that did not just The GCC stand on the Syrian crisis, in partic- set himself alight in Tunisia four years ago; ular, became one of the factors that widened the flames from his self-immolation have the Sunni–Shiite divisions in the region, inten- set the entire region ablaze, triggering an sifying Saudi–Iranian rivalry. The hostility be- international power struggle between and tween the two countries and the sects they among both nations and non-state actors, represent became more pronounced than thereby sending the global balance of pow- it was in 2011, thereby worsening regional er into a spin. There are strong indications sectarian divisions and insecurity. Nothing that a transformation of the international demonstrates this better than the gains of order, currently consisting of a unipolar the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). world, is either in progress or would follow as a result. Further, non-state actors have become greater enemies than states – Osama bin Laden may be dead, but the emergence of The Arab uprisings more radicalized outfits like ISIS has become This evaluation is conditioned by the assess- evident across the region. ment that the Arab uprisings have reinforced the regional approach over the international While these developments could be attributed approach. It is understood that most of the to the decline of influence of great powers regional crises were triggered by the adop- like the United States and Russia (until its tion of Western solutions, including the use dramatic intervention and pullback in Syria) of force. This has hastened the development in the Middle East, it is also leading to some of regional perspectives in resolving regional sort of rapprochement between and among issues, which, in the context of the Gulf Co- them. The warring United States and the operation Council (GCC) countries, especially Russia–China duo created a cooperative re- Saudi Arabia and Qatar, could be traced back lationship to reach a deal on Iran, which may about a decade. be repeated, along with the GCC countries, in the search for a political solution in Syria.5 In the present scenario, far from international affairs affecting the region’s politics, it was the events following the Arab uprisings that 4 Mohammad Sayed Rassas, ‘How the Arab Spring altered the region and the world,’ www.almonitor.com, 4 October 2012. 5 Daniel Levy and Julien Barnes-Dacey, ‘Syria: the impera- 3 Kayhan Barzegar, ‘A turning point in the Middle East geo- tive of de-escalation,’ www.opendemocracy.net, 25 May politics,’ Global Affairs (Russia), 24 June 2012. 2013.

28 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report This may eventually facilitate GCC–Iran dia- In this context, it is important to cast light on logue at some point in the future.6 In fact, in the security debate of the Middle East during September 2015, Qatar said it was willing to the last fifteen years, which has revolved facilitate such a dialogue.7 around two points of view: one, less interna- tional involvement in the region’s affairs; and Linking these developments to China re- two, greater internationalization of the region. quires an assessment of their impact on the United States – the “superbroke, superfrugal ”.8 Omni-balancing Since the dominant view favours the second The Arab uprisings have hastened the option, there have been calls to explore the decline of US influence in a region that was idea of incorporating several international already witnessing US fatigue with the re- actors who could act as guarantors of any gion and the region’s fatigue with the United future regional security arrangement. Some States. The fatigue on both sides has been Gulf leaders and intellectuals have issued greatly influenced by the Obama administra- statements in support of this idea.10 Some tion’s efforts to correct the military adven- examples include: ‘The major conflicts in the tures of the George W. Bush administration, world have become too big for one single which affected the US domestic economy, power to handle them on its own’ (Qatar);11 thereby necessitating defence budget cuts and ‘It is clear that the Saudis fully intend to and the ‘pivot’ to Asia. pursue their national security interests much more assertively, even if that leads to a strategic The 2014 pronouncement that, ‘just because break with the United States’ (Saudi analyst we have the best hammer (military) does not Nawaf Obaid).12 mean that every problem is a nail,’ is an im- portant admission in Obama’s continued at- It is this ‘failure of others’ in dealing with tempt to refashion American foreign policy.9 regional issues that has both reinforced the wisdom of exploring local solutions for local The only reason that most Middle East problems, as well as encouraging a ‘real countries are still holding on to the Unit- strategic shift’ in the region’s foreign policy. ed States is due to its security cover in a Owing to the failure of the United States in region that equates ‘national’ security with the region and the shift in the economic pow- ‘regime’ security. In the event that there is er center from west to east, the GCC states likely to be a credible alternative, even in the began building ties with a host of alterna- distant future, American influence is bound tives, particularly in Asia.13 to diminish enormously.

10 For more on the security dynamics of Gulf–Asia rela- 6 Though both are Islamic countries, they have histori- tions, see N. Janardhan, Boom amid Gloom: The Spirit of cally been divided along sectarian lines, i.e. Sunni Saudi Possibility in 21st Century Gulf (Ithaca, 2011). Arabia versus Shiite Iran. This ideological division, exac- 11 Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani said this erbated by the 1979 revolution in Iran, has had profound at the General Debate of the United National General As- political implications, influencing politics involving Bah- sembly in September 2007. rain, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and even the United States, among others. At the root of it is the ‘unfought’ 12 Nawaf Obaid, ‘Saudi Arabia gets tough on foreign policy,’ war for leadership of the region and the , in Washington Post, October 25, 2013. Recent developments that order. in , Syria and Yemen – where Saudi Arabia worked on its own, even if it contradicted the United 7 ‘Qatar offers to host Arab dialogue with Iran,’ www.alja- States – proves that such statements are not mere rhet- zeera.com, 29 September 2015. oric. 8 Thomas Friedman, ‘Superbroke, Superfrugal, Superpow- 13 Christian Koch, ‘Gulf region makes strategic shift in er?’ The New York Times, 4 September 2010. new global system,’ Arab News, 22 October 2006; and 9 Part of President Obama’s speech at a US military acad- ‘Gulf needs more, not less, external involvement,’ www. emy in May 2014. gulfinthemedia.com, 27 January 2006.

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 29 Thus, rather than put all their eggs in one In the realm of international politics, however, basket, this ‘omni-balancing’ means that the Beijing is considered a ‘status quo power that region’s ties with the United States are no often punches below its weight’.17 Nonethe- longer exclusive.14 less it is its energy security issue and global ambitions that keep it interested in West It is in this context that some Asian scholars Asia’s big game. have been pushing the idea of upgrading the GCC–Asia buyer–seller relationship to The prospect of a Chinese role in the re- a strategic one. They are also exploring the gion also arises because of its ties on the possibilities for a new collective security opposite sides of the political spectrum – architecture, which would involve both Asian with both Iran and Israel, as well as Saudi and western powers, including the United Arabia and the Palestinians. Further, as States.15 the water-bound trade picks up steam in the years ahead, China will naturally seek The point is that Asian powers will have to to protect its economic interests in the stop riding piggyback on the US naval pres- region’s waters, which overlaps with the ence in the region’s waters at some point and region’s security interests. The fact that start finding their own means of securing this would occur in a milieu of declining their sea lanes. Assuming that America’s US military interest and political influence involvement in the region will progressively makes it more interesting. (The economic, diminish in the decades ahead, this opens political and security factors mentioned up interesting possibilities by diversifying the here are also applicable to India’s West number of security players catering to the Asia policy in future). region’s security and stability. The Chinese views on regional security are mentioned in government documents. Mili- The China link tary improvements are part of the country’s It is now easy to link this to China and its overall modernization and economic expan- Middle East conundrum: strong, benevolent sion. It sought to ‘lay a solid foundation’ by power (wang dao) or strong, interventionist 2010, make ‘major progress’ by the end of power (bao dao)? This has been, is and will 2020, and ‘reach the strategic goal of build- continue to be China’s predicament not only ing informationized armed forces and being in the region, but in the global context too. capable of winning informationized wars by 2050’.18 Unlike China’s ties with Africa, which are seen as ‘resource ’, Beijing’s interest This possibility is in sync with some predic- in West Asia is referred to as a ‘joining of tions that the Chinese defence budget will equals’. Starting with the ‘exchange of Arab surpass that of the United States by 2036.19 oil for Chinese capital’, it has developed into a web of two-way economic deals during the 16 last decade and a half. 17 John Gittings, cited in Julian Madsen, ‘China Makes Friends in the Gulf,’ www.asiasentinel.com, 30 October 2006. 18 Edward Cody, ‘China Offers Glimpse of Rationale Behind its Military Policies,’ Washington Post, 30 December 2006; 14 Concept propounded by Steven David of Johns Hopkins for more details of the Chinese navy’s modernisation University. plan, see Bernard D. Cole, ‘The PLA Navy’s Developing 15 Ranjit Gupta, N. Janardhan, et al., A New Gulf Security Strategy,’ China Brief, Jamestown Foundation (Washing- Architecture: Prospects and Challenges for an Asian Role ton), 25 October 2006; and ‘China puts on huge show of (Gerlach 2014). force at parade, to cut troop levels by 300,000,’ Agence France-Presse, 3 September 2015. 16 Stephen Glain, ‘The Modern Silk Road,’ Newsweek, 17 May 2008. 19 The Economist, 7 April 2012.

30 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report This also means that with power comes men.22 Further, Beijing is also worried about responsibility. extremist elements in West Asia providing training and inspiration for Muslim separat- Extending its strategy to the West Asia re- ists in its western Xinjiang province. gion, China is increasing its multi-layered en- gagement. Beijing is already looking beyond While these examples indicate that China the protection net provided by the United is quite active in the region, the problem is States, diversifying its energy suppliers, as that ‘Beijing does not want to choose sides well as developing new supply routes and in a region that regularly demands it.’23 In port facilities through which it can import the current context, this is a prudent policy oil. Economically, China has offered billions – one that was acknowledged even by US of dollars in aid and loan guarantees to build President Barack Obama earlier this year – its ‘String of Pearls’ at the Pakistani port of China is a ‘free rider…can’t the United States Gwadar, which is on the doorsteps of the Gulf be a little bit more like China?’24 and the .20 Beijing has long espoused a policy of It also announced the ‘One Belt, One Road’ ‘non-interference’ in other countries’ inter- initiative in 2013, which focuses on con- nal affairs. It opposed the American-led nectivity and cooperation among countries invasion of Iraq in 2003 and voted with primarily in Eurasia, including the West Asian Russia to block action to end Bashar Al countries. Reviving the Silk Road project, an Assad’s rule in Syria. It is not taking part in ancient trade route linking China to Persia the coalition of sixty-odd countries fight- and the , this initiative has two ing ISIS, despite its oil interests in Iraq and components – the land-based ‘Silk Road unsubstantiated reports of three hundred Economic Belt’, and the oceangoing ‘Mari- Chinese Muslims fighting there. time Silk Road’. While these strategies are pri- marily economic in , they also under- While Beijing committed combat troops to line China’s desire to take on a greater role in Mali in 2013 and has more personnel in blue global affairs. helmets in Africa than any other permanent member of the Security Council, it is a re- Politically and strategically, the menace of luctant actor in West Asia. This is because it Somali pirates hastened the involvement of feels it still does not have the ‘ability’ to lead the Chinese navy in the region’s waters a few in resolving current conflicts in the region. years ago. Beijing’s signal in 2008 in sending warships to deal with it was seen as China’s In any case, why should it invest in clearing up ‘biggest naval expedition since the 15th the mess that the West has created? Further, century’.21 China still has plenty of domestic issues to address. Given its vast population, it is still a In late 2012, China rolled out a ‘Four-Point long way from achieving prosperity across the Plan’ for Syria that called on all sides to stop board, which is the key to its political stability. fighting, end the crisis and initiate a political transition, but it generated little international Taking no risk is sometimes the biggest risk, interest. And in March 2015, Beijing sent war- and China is being adventurous in inaction. ships to rescue Chinese nationals from Ye-

22 Ilan Goldenberg and Ely Ratner, ‘China’s Middle East Tightrope,’ Foreign Policy, 20 April 2015. 20 China becomes increasingly involved in the Middle East,’ PINR, 10 March 2006. 23 Ibid. 21 ‘China sends naval fleet to Somalia to battle pirates,’ The 24 Thomas Friedman, ‘Obama on the world,’ The New York Guardian, 18 December 2008. Times, 8 August 2014.

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 31 The recent economic slowdown will encour- Chinese inroads into the Middle East. It is im- age conservatism over adventurism. China portant to note that, while Washington would surely has learnt from America’s misadven- desire ‘a unipolar world and a multipolar Asia, tures in West Asia, where Washington has China would prefer a multipolar world and a earned itself more enemies than friends China-centric unipolar Asia’. How the United over the last few decades. States will reconcile itself with a characterized by an emergent China – one Yet, Beijing released a first of its kind ‘Arab that is not ‘anti-US, but that approaches it as Policy Paper on China’ in January 2016. This if it were a post-US world’ – is crucial.27 sets out the country’s development strat- egies with Arab countries and mirrors its readiness to cooperate with them and to tap each other’s strengths to ensure a win-win situation. More importantly, it reiterates its political commitment to peace and stability in the Middle East, which is mutually benefi- cial.25

Within days of releasing this paper, President Xi Jinping made his first tour of the Middle East since assuming office. By visiting Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt, especially during the height of the Riyadh–Tehran feud, Beijing clearly demonstrated that the region is very much a part its strategic focus, perhaps ex- tending beyond business interests.26

While China is playing a calculated wait-and- watch game in a region torn apart by turmoil, Washington is worried about Beijing’s moves elsewhere in the world, thereby intensifying their overall strategic competition.

Conclusion From a wider perspective, the pursuit of prin- ciple, profit, power projection and prestige by various actors through their foreign policies is transforming Middle Eastern politics, carry- ing the potential to alter the current geopoliti- cal situation based on a unipolar world.

Whether or not China is interested in the region, the United States is worried about

25 Details of the policy paper are available at China’s Minis- try of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1331683.shtml 27 Fareed Zakaria, ‘The future of American power: how 26 For more on this issue, see ‘Well wishing,’ The Economist, America can survive the rise of the rest,’ Foreign Affairs 23 January 2016. (May/June 2008).

32 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report CHINA IN SEARCH OF ‘LEGITIMATE’ eign and security policy approach, Beijing GREAT-POWER INTERVENTION has started to interfere in developments and conflicts in other states and in the interna- Camilla Sørensen tional system to a greater degree and also more proactively. Current Chinese foreign Introduction and security policy reflects a more flexible Thanks to Beijing’s expanding global role and and pragmatic Chinese interpretation – and interests, it is no longer possible for China implementation – of the principle of non-in- to follow its traditional ‘lay low’ [tao guang tervention. This paper examines the search yang hui] strategy and the traditionally rather for ‘legitimate’ great-power intervention that strict interpretation of the principle of non-in- characterizes both the debate among Chi- tervention. Consequently, among Chinese nese IR scholars and current Chinese foreign International Relations (IR) scholars there is and security policy. an intense debate on how China can protect and promote its global presence and interests The paper proceeds in four main stages. while at the same time continuing to ‘stay First, it sets the scene by briefly outlining the within’ the principle of non-intervention. New ongoing developments in and the challenges concepts and approaches are developing as facing Chinese foreign and security policy. the debate progresses. One important exam- Secondly, it provides a critical overview of ple is the growing emphasis on the distinction the debate among Chinese IR scholars about between ‘intervention’ [ganyu] and ‘interfer- whether and how to rethink and reform Chi- ence’ [ganshe] in China’s diplomatic rhetoric na’s key traditional foreign and security policy and toolbox. Several Chinese IR scholars guidelines. Thirdly, it examines China’s more hence stress that, while ‘non-intervention’ flexible and pragmatic interpretation and continues to characterize the Chinese for- implementation of the principle of non-in-

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 33 tervention. In the fourth and last section of China’s globally expanding role and interests the paper the concluding perspectives are are being driven in particular by its growing presented and discussed. The paper draws need for imports of energy and raw materi- on interviews with Chinese IR scholars con- als in order to maintain domestic economic ducted by the author in Beijing and growth and stability, which continues to be in February-April 2014 and October 2015. the top priority for Chinese leaders. However, China’s globally expanding role and interests make it impossible to comply with the tradi- Chinese foreign and security policy in tional ‘lay low’ [tao guang yang hui] strategy its changing domestic and international and the traditional rather strict interpretation contexts of the principle of non-intervention. Increas- The point of departure for this paper is ingly Beijing has its own strong stakes in how two important questions about the further domestic politics in other states develop and development of Chinese foreign and secu- how international conflicts and crises are rity policy. The first of these questions is, managed and resolved (Godement, 2013). how will China’s foreign and security policy change as its role, interests and capabilities The pressure on the traditional ‘lay low’ increase and become more global? In recent strategy also arises from strong concerns in years China’s foreign and security policy has Beijing about living up to growing domestic evolved in a contradictory manner, with signs expectations of how Chinese leaders should of a more assertive, even aggressive, policy more actively and directly protect and pro- on the one hand and of a more cooperative mote Chinese nationals, investments and and constructive, even responsible, policy activities abroad and in the process show a on the other (Sørensen, 2015: 65-69). This willingness to demonstrate or even use Chi- provides the context for the second question, na’s strengthened economic and military ca- which is, what policies have the greatest and pabilities. This relates to growing domestic least likelihood of continuity in the years and demands to (re)gain international status and decades to come? These are broad ques- respect for China as a great power. Strong tions, and therefore the focus below is on nationalist voices, in particular expressed one aspect of Chinese foreign and security online, are spurring such expectations and policy, where the implications of Beijing’s demands (Wang and Wang, 2014). The expanding global role, interests and capabili- Chinese military, the PLA, has also increased ties are directly visible, as well as difficult for the pressure on Chinese leaders to seize op- the Chinese leadership to deal with, namely portunities to try out China’s now improved China’s adherence to the principle of non-in- power-projection capabilities, as seen in the tervention, which is one of its key tradition- evacuation of Chinese nationals from Ye- al foreign and security policy guidelines.1 men in early April 2015 (Duchatel, Brauner However, it was crafted in a different interna- and Zhou, 2014: 15; Panda, 2015).2 Hence, tional environment in which China had few domestic politics play into this as well economic and security interests to protect with the important point here being that, outside its own borders (Duchatel, Brauner in their efforts to deliver, Chinese leaders and Zhou, 2014: 1-4). will most likely effectively end the tradi- tional Chinese policy of non-intervention.

1 The principles of non-intervention [bu ganyu] and non-in- terference [bu ganshe] are often used interchangeably by 2 The 2013 Chinese Defense White Paper for the first time Chinese International Relations scholars and in official underlined the protection of overseas energy resourc- Chinese documents. As discussed further below, how- es and Chinese nationals overseas as major security ever, it seems that a clearer distinction between these concerns and as tasks for the Chinese military; cf. ‘The principles has been emerging recently, as well as greater Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces’, Bei- clarity in their usage. jing: Information Office of the State Council, April 2013.

34 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report With respect to the dimension of domestic interests while at the same time continuing politics, several Chinese IR scholars argue to respect the principle of non-intervention; that Beijing is no longer so concerned that is, how China can intervene – or inter- about other states intervening in China, for fere – in a ‘legitimate’ way. This debate on example, because of or . Chi- intervention/non-intervention is closely re- na earlier insisted on the principle as a way lated to the ongoing debate among Chinese of self-protection as well, which today, with IR scholars on the ‘lay low’ strategy (cf. e.g. the development of a stronger and more Zhu, 2010). self-confident China, no longer appears to be such a big concern (cf. also Duchatel, Chinese IR scholars participating in the Brauner and Zhou, 2014: 7-8). debate on intervention/non-intervention tend to express the same frustrations on Finally, the traditional ‘lay low’ strategy widely different issues and examples. A is challenged by the fact that China can broad consensus seems to be developing no longer free-ride on the US role as ‘the about the need to rethink and reform – few global policeman’ guaranteeing internation- say ‘give up’ – the principle of non-inter- al stability and other international public vention and develop a Chinese approach of goods: the US is no longer willing or able ‘limited intervention’ [youxian ganshe] and to do all the hard work in, for example, the ‘creative involvement’ [chuangzaoxing jieru] Middle East to the same degree. As a con- that could serve Beijing’s expanding glob- sequence, international expectations and al role and interests better (cf. e.g. Wang, demands are growing on China to assume 2012). However, most Chinese IR scholars greater responsibilities and play a more also acknowledge that adopting such an active role in managing and solving interna- approach and a policy that is not afraid to tional conflicts and crises – to be ‘a respon- take sides and that favors particular domes- sible stakeholder’, in other words (Wang, tic outcomes in other states is also very 2011). In this respect, it is interesting to see complicated and opens up a whole array of several Chinese IR scholars stressing how new challenges (cf. Godement, 2013: 1-2). A much Beijing fears the US reducing its pres- key concern driving this debate is therefore ence in the Middle East, rather than seeing how to become more actively and construc- this as a strategic opportunity for itself (cf. tively involved in international affairs on the also Godement, 2013). one hand and better protect and promote Chinese global interests on the other hand, The important point here is that these in- while at the same time continuing to respect ternational and domestic expectations and the principle of non-intervention and not end demands, which are challenging the tradi- up conducting foreign and security policy tional ‘lay low’ strategy and the traditionally like the ‘hegemon’ (that is, the US) and risk rather strict interpretation of the principle of creating greater instability and chaos in the non-intervention, are not leading to or pro- international system. This is not an easy moting the same developments in Chinese puzzle to solve. Added to the complexity is foreign and security policy; rather, they are the key Chinese argument – or insistence – pulling in different directions. that China is a different kind of great power than the US/the west that does not inter- vene militarily or overthrow other regimes Rethinking and reforming China’s key in order to protect and promote its own traditional foreign and security policy narrow interests. This relates to the Chinese guidelines: the debate distinction between the kingly way (‘rule by Among Chinese IR scholars, there is an virtue’) [wang dao] and the tyrant way (‘rule intense debate on how China can protect by force’) [ba dao], which is central to the and promote China’s global presence and Chinese debate and China’s perception of it-

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 35 self as a great power; China, of course, acts non-intervention. China has become more in the kingly way (cf. Zhu, 2010: 23-26). deeply and more proactively involved in the politics of other regions, for example, in the One group of Chinese IR scholars, in em- politics of the Middle East and of Africa, phasizing the importance of China being and Beijing is also seeking to shape political ‘a responsible great power’ [fuzeren daguo] developments in other states to a greater with a positive international image, tends to degree (cf. e.g. Wang, 2012). In relation to promote stronger Chinese cooperation with several international conflicts and crises, other great powers and a more active Chi- Chinese leaders have presented diplomatic nese role in both international and regional suggestions and offered to play a mediating multilateral organizations. However, another role, for example, in relation to Sudan and group of Chinese IR scholars emphasizes Afghanistan. Furthermore, Beijing has been the importance of advancing and protecting seeking to play a more active and construc- China’s globally expanding role and interests. tive international role by strengthening bilat- It therefore argues that China should become eral and multilateral cooperation with other more active in using its growing economic great and emerging powers and regional and military capabilities abroad to promote a organizations, for example, in relation to Iran more active, but also strongly unilateral, Chi- and the Iranian nuclear crisis. nese foreign and security policy. As a result, China’s different balancing games, as in the China’s commitment to and involvement in Middle East, where Beijing generally tries to UN peacekeeping has also been deepened maintain friendly relations with everyone, are further. In September 2015 the Chinese seen as ineffectual. China therefore needs President, Xi Jinping, gave a speech at the to choose and take a stand more clearly, general debate of the 70th session of the UN with a focus on protecting and promoting its General Assembly, announcing that China own interests (cf. Godement, 2013). Related will join the new UN peacekeeping capa- to this argument, some scholars, like Prof. bility readiness system, and even take the Yan Xuetong of , further lead in setting up a permanent UN peace- argue that it is necessary for China to get rid keeping police unit, itself establishing a of its principle of non-alignment entirely (Yan, strong standby peacekeeping force of 8,000 2012). troops. Xi Jinping further reported that Chi- na will establish a ten-year, $1 billion China– The debate among Chinese IR scholars UN peace and development fund ‘to support provides an important window in identifying the UN’s work and promote the multilateral and understanding emerging trends in the cooperation cause’ (Adler and Sidiropoulos, evolving Chinese foreign and security policy. 2015; Xi, 2015). And lastly, indicating the However, before discussing the criteria for growing Chinese emphasis on the impor- ‘legitimate’ great-power intervention that are tance and role of regional organizations, Xi often highlighted by these scholars, it is use- Jinping announced that Beijing will provide ful to examine briefly China’s current foreign $100 million of free military assistance to and security policy. the African Union in the next five years to support the establishment of the long-await- ed ‘African Standby Force’ and the ‘African Rethinking and reforming China’s key Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis’ traditional foreign and security policy (ACIRC) (ibid.). guidelines: the policy The development of Chinese foreign and As a result, during his five-day African tour in security policy in recent years reflects a more early December 2015, Xi Jinping announced flexible and pragmatic Chinese interpreta- a Chinese plan to build a logistics facility for tion and implementation of the principle of its navy in the East African state of Djibouti.

36 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report This was presented as a logical next step To sum up: China has gradually developed a in China’s growing willingness to act as a prudent and pragmatic case-by-case ap- protector and provider of regional security proach, which underlines the extent to which and development, specifically referring to the its position and policies on non-intervention, Chinese role in UN peacekeeping operations territorial integrity and sovereignty are condi- in Africa and in the anti-piracy operations off tional. This in itself is not new – the principle the Somali coast (Page and Lubold, 2015). of non-intervention is a key guideline in Chi- China clearly also has its own narrow inter- na’s diplomatic work and a major rhetorical ests in establishing what is likely to become tool, whereas there has always been a degree its first overseas military base. No matter of flexibility in how China actually conducts whether this is called a military base or not, it its foreign and security policy when it comes represents a clear departure from the tradi- to non-intervention. The important point tional rather strict interpretation of the princi- here, however, is that the context and condi- ple of non-intervention and the long-held Chi- tions are changing, as are Chinese interests nese position that China – in contrast to the and instruments. Beijing now has a stronger US and other western great powers – does role and greater influence in the international not want to deploy its military on a long-term system, as well as greater economic, political basis overseas. and military power to deploy, and this has clearly changed the importance and implica- There are also signs of a kind of Chinese tions of the Chinese intervention or non-inter- ‘stick and carrot’ diplomacy, where Beijing vention. Also, there are, as discussed above, has started to show increased willingness growing expectations and pressures, both to use its now stronger economic and domestically and internationally, on Beijing military strength to influence the domestic to engage and interfere proactively and not politics of other states and to protect and maintain the more passive and reactive ways promote Chinese national economic and of the past. political interests, as shown by China’s use of commercial diplomacy in its relations with several East Asian states (Reilly, 2012). Great power intervention with Chinese With respect to the maritime territorial characteristics in both debate and policy disputes in East Asia, Chinese leaders have As highlighted above, Chinese adherence to also increasingly used coercive diplomacy the principle of non-intervention is not synon- and military means (Sutter, 2015: 110-112). ymous with Chinese inaction, and the debate Lastly, there are cases where Beijing con- among Chinese IR scholars and China’s cur- tinues to insist on the strict interpretation rent foreign and security policy both provide of the principle of non-intervention, as in clues about its evolving ‘management’ of the relation to Syria. The ‘lesson of Libya’ and principle of non-intervention. the general Chinese suspicion of western, especially US, motives for intervention are The typical Chinese way of ‘crossing the often included in China’s arguments for the river by feeling for the stones’ seems best importance of upholding the strict interpre- to characterize the Chinese efforts to find tation of the principle of non-intervention in tactical ways of dealing with the many new general and for the Chinese position on the expectations, demands and interests facing Syrian conflict specifically (cf. Ren, 2014; Beijing both domestically and internationally. Jiang, 2015). The more specific Chinese While insisting that China will stay within the concern here is that the US could use the principle of non-intervention, certain criteria ‘responsibility to protect’ [baohu de zeren] for ‘legitimate’ great power intervention are as an excuse to turn regime change into a being set up – that is, an intervention that new norm in international relations (cf. e.g. does not break with the principle of non-in- Godement, 2013). tervention. However, the criteria then seem to

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 37 be continuously adjusted, with some criteria military spending for many years, China still being accorded less importance, while new needs many more years to build up its over- ones are added. Hence, it is not so much Chi- seas military infrastructure and its capacities na’s rhetorical support for – and emphasis to project its power globally. on – the principle of non-intervention that is changing, but the Chinese criteria for ‘legiti- Regarding the focus on the involvement of mate’ great-power intervention. the Chinese military, it seems that Chinese IR scholars have recently started empha- The main criterion for ‘legitimate’ great-pow- sizing and further specifying the distinction er intervention stressed by Chinese IR schol- between ‘intervention’ and ‘interference’. As ars and Chinese diplomats alike is that there mentioned above, the principles of non-inter- is a UN resolution in place and thus broad vention [bu ganyu] and non-interference [bu international support behind the interven- ganshe] are often used interchangeably by tion. This focus on UN authorization relates Chinese IR scholars and in official Chinese to how Beijing sees the UN as the highest documents, but this may be changing. New international authority, as expressed in developments here include what looks like a Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech at the narrower definition of intervention, where it is general debate of the 70th session of the UN only defined as ‘intervention’ if military instru- General Assembly in September 2015 (Xi, ments are used. This further implies that Chi- 2015). However, there are indications that a nese involvement or interference in another UN resolution is becoming less of an ulti- state’s economic and political development, mate demand and that the focus is shifting its playing a mediating role, its seeking to more to the importance of an invitation or participate actively in ‘nation-building’ etc. are request from the country in question. None- no longer defined as ‘intervention’. Whether theless it is unclear from whom the invita- this narrower definition develops into an tion is required – all groups in the country? official one remains to be seen, but the fact This is not likely to happen in the case of that several Chinese IR scholars mentioned a political crisis in the country concerned. it in interviews conducted by the author in From the leading group, therefore? But then China in October 2015 at least underlines the China would be taking sides in the country’s strong urge in China to rethink and reform political crisis. In relation to these questions, the principle of non-intervention. If the Chi- there are some Chinese IR scholars who nese definition of (great power) intervention then emphasize the need for a request and is changing and becoming narrower, then for support for Chinese intervention from this makes possible a great deal of ‘legiti- the regional organization involved, such as mate’ Chinese involvement and activities in the African Union (cf. also Duchatel, Brauner other states, as well as generally in the inter- and Zhou, 2014: 5-20). national system.

Another criterion often highlighted by Chi- Summing up, what Chinese IR scholars nese IR scholars, the importance of which tend to stress when presenting their ‘way’ of is also reflected in how Chinese foreign and intervention – the ‘legitimate’ way – is that security policy is conducted, is the involve- the criteria mentioned above are fulfilled ment of China’s own national interests, and that Chinese intervention – or interfer- whether this is a matter of economic inter- ence – always includes and mobilizes all the ests, Chinese citizens, or China’s political and local forces or groups in the particular coun- security interests (cf. also Wang, 2012). This try concerned. It is often emphasized how criterion is also often related to the question domestic groups need to lead the negoti- of China’s military capability and ability to ating process and thus how outside forces intervene, where Chinese IR scholars often such as China can only play a support role. highlight how, despite rapidly increasing The focus is on what Chinese IR scholars

38 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report often term ‘the national interest’ [guojia liyi] Ren, Mu, 2014. ‘Interpreting China’s (Non-)Inter- of the particular country, which implies that vention Policy to The Syrian Crisis, 立命館国際 China always seeks to take in the whole 研究 (Ritsumeikan International Research), June picture and the long-term view, as well as to 2014, pp. 259-282 Sutter, Robert, 2015. The United States and Asia: avoid taking sides or using military instru- Regional Dynamics and Twenty-First-Century ments to create or enforce stability (cf. also Relations, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Wang, 2012). Littlefield, 2015 Sørensen, Camilla T. N., 2015. ‘The Significance As China has gradually integrated itself of Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese Dream’ for Chinese into and expanded within the international Foreign Policy: From ‘Tao Guang Yang Hui’ to system, its foreign and security policy has ‘Fen Fa You Wei’’, Journal of China and Interna- become subtler and more sophisticated, with tional Relations, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 53-73 different dimensions and areas, as well as a Wang Jisi, 2011. ‘China’s Search for a Grand Strat- growing inconsistency between Chinese for- egy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, Issue 2, pp. 68-80 Wang Yizhou, 2012. ‘Creative Involvement: A New eign and security policy principles and prac- Direction in Chinese Diplomacy’, in Marc Leon- tice. Despite the efforts of several Chinese ard, ed., China 3.0., London: European Council IR scholars and diplomats to frame China’s on Foreign Relations, pp. 106-111 growing and more proactive involvement in Wang Jianwei and Wang Xiaojie, 2014. ‘Media other states’ domestic affairs as something and Chinese Foreign Policy’, Journal of Con- other than intervention and interference, temporary China, Vol. 23, Issue 86, pp. 216-235 there is no doubt that current developments Xi Jinping, 2015. Underlying to Inherit and Advo- in Chinese foreign and security policy involve cate Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter, making some fundamental choices about Establish New Type of International Relations strategic priorities and old dogmas and with Win-Win Cooperation as Core and Build doctrines; there are limits to how long these Community of Shared Mankind Destiny, speech delivered at the general debate of the 70th can be stretched and creatively reinterpreted Session of the UN General Assembly, while still retaining their credibility. September 29 (http://www.fmprc. gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/ xjpdmgjxgsfwbcxlhgcl70znxlfh/t1304144. References shtml) Duchatel, Mathieu, Oliver Brauner and Zhou Hang, Yan Xuetong, 2012. ‘The Weakening of the Unipo- 2014. ‘Projecting China’s Overseas Interests. lar Configuration’ in Marc Leonard, ed., China The Slow Shift away from Non-interference’, 3.0., London: European Council on Foreign SIPRI Policy Paper, No. 41, June Relations, pp. 112-117 Godement, Francois, 2013. ‘The End of Non- Zhu Liqun, 2010. ‘China’s Foreign Policy Debates’, Interference’, China Analysis, October Chaillot Papers, Institute for Security Studies Jiang, Xinhui, 2015. ‘From Non-Intervention to (ISS), , September What? Analyzing the Change in China’s Middle East Policy’, All About China Essay, July (http://www.mei.edu/content/map/ nonintervention-what-analyzing-change- china%E2%80%99s-middle-east-policy) Page, Jeremy and Gordon Lubold, 2015. ‘China to build Naval Logistics Facility in Djibouti’, , November 26 (http://www. wsj.com/articles/china-to-build-naval- logistics-facility-in-djibouti-1448557719) Panda, Ankit, 2015. ‘China Evacuates Foreign Nationals from Yemen’, The Diplomat, April 6 Reilly, James, 2012. ‘China’s Unilateral Sanc- tions’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 121-133

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 39 CHINA’S PROACTIVE DIPLOMACY IN A shift in China’s approach to the principle AFGHANISTAN: A CHALLENGE TO THE of non-interference? PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE Analysts of China’s foreign policy have paid attention to the fact that the country Miwa Hirono has shifted its approach to the principle of non-interference since the beginning of the Abstract 2000s. For example, China has agreed to Does China’s diplomatic action in conflict-af- all UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions fected regions still fall within the principle of on peacekeeping authorized under Chapter non-interference, or does it go beyond the 7 of the UN Charter, which authorizes ‘all principle to interfere in domestic affairs if necessary means’ to intervene in countries necessary to defend China’s national inter- (Hirono 2014). These operations are very ests? In answering this question, China’s intrusive in the sense that they effective- approach towards Afghanistan offers im- ly allow various actors to intervene in a portant insights into how China’s diplomacy , but, of the five permanent has become more proactive and interfering members of the UNSC, China is now the today, while it still maintains the principle of biggest contributor to such UN peacekeep- non-interference legally. However, China’s ing operations. More recently, the idea of proactive diplomacy has brought with it a China’s changing approach to the principle new challenge in abiding by the principle of non-interference has also been applied of non-interference, because the extent to to the analysis of China’s efforts in con- which China can maintain the principle in flict mediation. James Chen (2015), for practice is affected by how it manages its example, states that ‘in 2013 China shifted relationship with rebel groups. its principle of “non-interference in other

40 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report countries” to one of active conflict resolu- What does non-interference mean? tion in some of the world’s most intractable Despite the fact that non-interference is a contexts: Israel-Palestine, , and central term in international relations, very Afghanistan’. few studies provide a clear definition of the term. Among the key official documents that One of the contentious issues in China’s provide the international legal basis for the approach to the principle of non-interfer- term are paragraph four of the UN Charter, ence is how it deals with non-state actors. Article 2, and the ‘Declaration on the Inad- In the case of peacekeeping, the host state missibility of Intervention and Interference in is the sole institutional actor that China the Internal Affairs of States, A/RES/36/103’ engages with, whereas in mediation, Chi- (9 December 1981) (hereafter ‘Declaration’) na must deal with rebel groups as well as (Hess and Aidoo 2010). Paragraph four of the host state. China’s diplomacy used to the UN Charter, Article 2, states ‘all Members be based on government-to-government shall refrain in their international relations relations, but now it has been developed from the threat or use of force against the further to be able to deal with rebel groups territorial integrity or political independence in conflict mediation, while still maintaining of any state, or in any other manner inconsis- the principle of non-interference as its key tent with the Purposes of the ’ foreign-policy principle. How do we un- (United Nations, 1945). The ‘Declaration’ derstand this contradiction? What does a points to a number of more specific state shifting approach to non-interference mean rights and duties to protect the principle of in practice in conflict mediation? non-interference. Among them, three are the more relevant to this paper: This paper focuses on the important case of China’s diplomatic action in Afghanistan, 1. ‘The duty of States to refrain in their inter- and assesses the extent to which China has national relations from the threat or use retained or modified its approach to the prin- of force in any form whatsoever to vio- ciple of non-interference. The paper will first late the existing internationally recognized unpack the principle and identify some of the boundaries of another State, to disrupt the key elements that define it. By using these el- political, social or economic order of oth- ements as a starting point for discussion, the er States, [or] to overthrow or change the paper will then examine the extent to which political system of another State or its Gov- China’s diplomatic action in Afghanistan still ernment; remains within the principle of non-interfer- 2. The duty of a State to refrain from the pro- ence. motion, encouragement or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist ac- The paper argues that, despite the com- tivities within other States, under any pre- mon view that China has shifted its ap- text whatsoever, or any action which seeks proach to non-interference, in the case of to disrupt the unity or to undermine or sub- Afghanistan it has actually abided by the vert the political order of other States; principle of non-interference legally, as 3. The duty of a State to abstain from any de- defined by the United Nations. However, famatory campaign, vilification or hostile China’s proactive diplomacy has brought propaganda for the purpose of intervening with it a new challenge in abiding by the or interfering in the internal affairs of other principle of non-interference, because States’ (Declaration). the extent to which China can maintain the principle in practice is affected by I will use these three ‘State duties’ as the how it manages its relationship with rebel starting point of my examination of how groups—an element that China cannot China is approaching the principle of non-in- necessarily control. terference in its diplomatic action in Afghan-

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 41 istan and to analyze why China is acting in rowed the cloak of legitimate intervention, the way it does. but it is actually exceeding its authority and working for its own interests’ (Renmin Ribao Use of force? 2011). Secondly, even since the end of ISAF It is clear that China firmly abides by the prin- operations in 2014, China has still not been ciple of non-interference in relation to the use interested in using armed intervention in Af- of force in Afghanistan, despite international ghanistan because of the inefficacy demon- expectations that it provides force and coop- strated by ISAF over the previous thirteen erates with the International Security Assis- years. Ren Xiao of Fudan University even tance Force (ISAF). First of all, in 2009 the stated that ‘the withdrawal of ISAF and US US suggested that China opens its Wakhan forces from Afghanistan may eliminate one Corridor as NATO’s supply route into Af- of the drivers of conflict in the country’ (Ren, ghanistan, but China ignored the suggestion cited in van der Kley 2014, pp. 5-6). (Bhadrakumar 2013; Szczudlik-Tatar 2014, p. 2). In 2008, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown China’s relations with the Taliban invited China to join ISAF, but China refused With regard to the second duty of a state to (Spencer 2008). Closer to ISAF’s withdrawal ‘refrain from the promotion, encouragement in 2014, there were a lot of expectations and or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or speculation in both the media and the policy secessionist activities’, the key question of in- and scholarly communities about what China terest to this paper is whether, and if so how, could do in post-ISAF Afghanistan (e.g., Ox- China has promoted, encouraged or support- ford Analytica Daily Brief Service 2012; Tiezzi ed the Taliban’s activities. 2014). Given that China uses its military assets for non-UN international operations What follows is a brief history of the relation- such as disaster relief, anti-piracy operations ship between China and the Taliban. Since and non-combatant evacuation operations, the late 1990s, when the Taliban formed the it is not inconceivable that China could use Afghan government, China sought its assur- force (Hirono and Xu 2013), but it has shown ances that it would not let Uyghur militants no interest in replacing ISAF in the future. launch attacks against China from Afghan territory (Small 2015a, p. 129). In December There are two major reasons for this. First, 2000, Lu Shulin, China’s ambassador to Paki- China did not want to place its forces under stan, became one of very few foreigners who the command and control of a foreign force. managed to meet Mullah Mohammad Omar, The historical experience of humiliation the then Afghan head of state, who agreed to deriving from its semi- led China China’s request not to support Uygur mili- to adopt an ‘independent foreign policy of tants (Small 2015a, p. 129; Bangash 2001). In peace’ involving strict independence from return, ‘Omar sought two things from China: foreign militaries. China’s independence in formal political recognition and protection its military affairs was also one of the key from U.N. sanctions’ (Small 2013). Howev- issues in relation to the NATO and EU-led er, China ended up not giving the Taliban international anti-piracy operations in the diplomatic recognition. When it came to , which China refused to join, sanctions, China’s response was ambivalent. instead maintaining its own transit corridor At the UNSC, China used the usual tactic of only five nautical miles away from the NATO abstention from voting on Resolution 1333 and EU-led international corridor (Hirono and relating to sanctions against the Taliban, but Xu 2013). Further, in the case of Afghanistan, did not use its veto (Small 2013; UN 2000), China was critical of the unilateral approach meaning essentially that it tacitly approved NATO has been accused of taking. In the them. At the same time, China also ‘estab- words of Wang Yizhou, ISAF was committing lished trade links that would help mitigate the itself to a ‘new interventionism,’ which ‘bor- impact of the sanctions’ (Small 2013).

42 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report During the war from 2001 to 2014, China of other States’. China’s aim in maintaining maintained a low profile (Zhao 2013, pp. contact with the Taliban is, rather, to stamp 5-9; Pantucci 2010), but then became ‘an out overseas bases for Uyghur ‘terrorists’ and active and enthusiastic supporter of recon- to ensure the success of the Afghan peace ciliation between the Taliban and the Afghan process. Therefore, to say that China has government’ (Small 2015b). This is due to ‘violated’ the principle of non-interference is the view among the Chinese policymakers quite out of context. One can conclude that that reconciliation is the only way to prevent China has actually abided by the principle of Afghanistan from ‘becoming a safe haven non-interference legally in its dealings with for Uighur militants and a destabilizing force the Taliban. across the wider region’ (Small 2015b). China hosted the ‘Heart of Asia’ or ‘ Pro- Second, China’s relations with the Taliban cess’ meeting in Beijing in October-November deserve attention, as they go beyond its 2014, which aimed to promote ‘Afghan-led traditional ‘government-to-government’ and Afghan-owned’ reconciliation.1 To that approach. When China’s national interests end, China invited the Afghan government are at stake, it is prepared to make contact and the Taliban to the meeting. Although with rebel groups. China’s current intention the Taliban did not show up, China hosted to maintain contact with the Taliban in the a delegation of Afghan Taliban officials in context of the peace talks also derives from Beijing in December 2014 (Hodge, Totakhil its national interests: preventing terrorism and Chin 2015), and reportedly again in May and safeguarding its security and economic 2015 (Stancati 2015).2 It is not clear what interests in Afghanistan. China’s economic was achieved in those meetings, but a report interests in Afghanistan – particularly copper suggests they ‘aimed at discussing precondi- fields in Mes Aynak – are in the hands of the tions for a possible peace process’ (Stancati Taliban. Further, the One Belt One Road and 2015). China- Economic Corridor will go through Taliban-controlled areas in the north- There are two observations to make here. ern part of Pakistan. China cannot afford to First, if we take the wording of the ‘Declara- endanger an important part of its more than tion’ (i.e., ‘refrain from the promotion, en- $500 billion investment. couragement or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities’) literally, ‘Hostility’? China’s aforementioned support to the Tal- The third duty brings out the question of iban would appear to be an infringement of whether China is responsible for ‘any defam- its duty. However, the spirit of the Declaration atory campaign, vilification or hostile propa- relates to the second half of the sentence: ganda’. Defamation, vilification and hostility ‘any action which seeks to disrupt the unity are subjective terms. To what extent does the or to undermine or subvert the political order Taliban think that China is mounting ‘hostile propaganda’ against it? As mentioned earlier, China has maintained a low profile in Afghan- 1 The ‘Istanbul Process’ meeting delivered ‘Beijing Dec- istan for a long time. Thus, ‘China’s role in Af- laration’, in which participants ‘call[ed] on all parties to ghanistan is seen as neutral as the Taliban encourage the Taliban towards reconciliation’ (Heart of Asia, 2014). [has] never fostered any hostility with their 2 Mullah Abdul Jalil, Mullah Mohammad Hassan Rahmani northeastern neighbour, which does not and Mullah Abdul Raqaq, all of whom are based in Paki- have any military or strategic ambitions for stan, were said to have participated in the talks, but the the country’ (Khan 2014). Taliban claims that the talks did not take place and that only those members in its Qatar-based political com- mission are entitled to participate in peace-related talks. However, a couple of examples show that However, the Taliban often denies publicly the existence of peace efforts, while confirming them privately. See some factions of the Taliban seem to per- Stancati (2015) for details. ceive China as being hostile to it, because

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 43 of China’s policy towards its Muslim pop- Concluding remarks ulations, as well as its close relations with This paper has demonstrated that, despite Pakistan and the current Afghan govern- the common view that China is shifting its ment. The Taliban has attacked China’s Mes approach to the principle of non-interference, Aynak copper mine nineteen times (Brazier it actually abides by the principle legally. It 2012; cited in Downs 2012, p. 78), and dozens has also observed, however, that China has of Chinese engineers and workers have been gone beyond its traditional approach to diplo- kidnapped (Huanqiu 2010).3 Some analysts macy based on government-to-government claim that ‘militants blamed China for the Pa- relations, and has maintained its relationship kistani government’s 2007 decision to launch with the Taliban in order to safeguard its an assault on the Red , a pro-Taliban national interests. The paper has also dis- stronghold in , and duly retaliated cussed the subjective nature of the principle with a series of attacks on Chinese workers of non-interference in the context of whether in Pakistan’ (Small 2013; see also French a state mounts ‘hostile’ propaganda. 2007; Pantucci 2010, p. 23; Parello-Plesner and Duchâtel 2014, p. 80). Added to this, Even though China actively supports recon- China’s relations with the Taliban are now ciliation talks between the Taliban and the experiencing significant challenges, mainly Afghan government, how successfully it can deriving from the death of its leader Mullah maintain relations with the Taliban depends Mohammad Omar – so-called ‘China’s Man’ on the Taliban’s own situation and how China – in 2013. After his death the Taliban became can manage the gap in perceptions between more fragmented, so even though China at- its intentions and what the Taliban considers tempts to maintain contact with the Taliban it is doing to the group, as well as to as to try and bring it to the peace talks, there are a whole. The international community should numerous factions within the group that are have certain expectations with regard to Chi- separate from those who participate in the na’s role, but they need to be realistic, as Chi- talks (Small 2015b). na is grappling with a very complex problem – on that ISAF was unable to resolve during The principle of non-interference is indeed its thirteen years in Afghanistan. tricky. Even though one may intend to abide by the principle, ideas such as ‘hostility’, which are a part of the definition of the References principle, are subjective, so there emerges a Bangash, Zarar. 2001. ‘Lessons from the Afghan perception gap between China and the rebel Imbroglio, 21 Years after Russia’s Invasion’, groups about the nature of China’s activity Middle East News Online, 2 January, retrieved in Afghanistan. China’s proactive diplomacy from Proquest. Bhadrakumar, MK. 2013. ‘A US-China Entente in has brought about a new challenge to the Afghanistan’, 29 January, Asia Times, http:// aim of abiding by the principle of non-interfer- www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ ence, as the extent to which it is perceived to OA29Df02.html. be doing so depends on how well it and the Chen, James. 2015. ‘Can Atheistic China Play rebel groups can manage their relationship. Conflict Mediator in God’s Century’, 26 But of course, when even the identification February, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat. of factions in the rebel groups is difficult, com/2015/02/can-atheistic-china-play- managing a relationship with them could be conflict-mediator-in-gods-century/. a ‘mission impossible’. Downs, Erica. 2012. ‘China Buys into Afghanistan’, SAIS Review 32 (2): 65-84. French, Howard W. 2007. ‘Letter from China: Mosque Siege Reveals the Chinese Connec- tion’, 12 July, The International Herald Tribune, 3 Parello-Plesner and Duchâtel (2014, p. 71) has a useful map showing a number of attacks against Chinese work- http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/12/world/ ers in Afghanistan. asia/12iht-letter.1.6629789.html?_r=0.

44 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report Heart of Asia, ‘Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process: Small, Andrew. 2015b. ‘China’s Man in the Taliban: Deepening Cooperation for Sustainable Why the Death of Mullah Omar is Bad News Security and Prosperity of the “Heart of Asia” for Beijing’, Foreign Policy, 3 August. Region. Beijing, China, 31 October 2014, Small, Andrew. 2013. ‘Why is China Talking to the Beijing Declaration’, http://www.heartofasia- Taliban? Inside Beijing’s Plan to Set up Shop in istanbulprocess.af/wp-content/uploads/ Post-Karzai ’, Foreign Policy, 21 June. 2014/04/Beijing-Ministerial-Conference- Spencer, Richard. 2008. ‘China says no to Brown Declaration-31Oct-2014.pdf. on sending troops to Afghanistan’, 18 Novem- Hess, Steve and Richard Aidoo. 2010. ‘Beyond ber, The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ the Rhetoric: Noninterference in China’s news/worldnews/asia/china/3477605/China- African Policy’, African and Asian Studies 9: says-no-to-Brown-on-sending-troops-to- 356-83. Afghanistan.html Hirono, Miwa. 2014. ‘China’s Principle of Interven- Stancati, Margherita, 2015. ‘Afghan Peace Envoy tion’, 6 April, China Policy Institute Blog, Met Taliban in Secret China Talks; Meeting http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyin- was facilitated by Pakistani Intelligence stitute/2014/04/06/chinas-principle-of- Agency’, Wall Street Journal (Online), 24 May. intervention/. Retrieved from Proquest. Hirono, Miwa and Manshu Xu. 2013. ‘China’s Mili- Szczudlik-Tatar, Justyna. 2014. ‘China’s Evolving tary Operations Other than War’, RUSI Journal Stance on Afghanistan: Towards More Robust 158 (6): 74-82. Diplomacy with ‘Chinese Characteristics” ’, 22 Hodge, Nathan, Habib Khan Totakhil and Josh (58), October, Strategic File, The Polish Institute Chin. 2015. ‘China Creates New Avenue for of International Affairs. https://www.pism.pl/ Afghan Peace Talks’, 6 January, The Wall files/?id_plik=18261. Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ Tiezzi, Shannon. 2014. ‘Can China Save Afghani- china-creates-new-avenue-for-afghan- stan?’, 31 October, The Diplomat, http:// peace-talks-1420564492. thediplomat.com/2014/10/can-china-save- Huanqiu Wang. 2010. ‘Taliban bangjia zhong- afghanistan/. guo gongchengshi: Afugan weilai huocheng United Nations. 1981. ‘Declaration on the Inad- zhongguo mafan [Taliban kidnapped Chinese missibility of Intervention and Interference in engineers: Afghanistan might become China’s the Internal Affairs of States, A/RES/36/103’, trouble in the future]’, 20 January, Huangqiu 9 December, http://www.un.org/documents/ Shibao, http://world.huanqiu.com/roll/ ga/res/36/a36r103.htm. 2010-01/694207.html. United Nations. 1945. ‘UN Charter, Chapter 1: pur- Khan, Tahir. 2014. ‘China may very well be Af- poses and principles’, http://www.un.org/en/ ghanistan’s Only True Friend’, 1 March, The sections/un-charter/chapter-i/. Express Tribune, http://tribune.com.pk/ United Nations. 2000. ‘SC/6979 Security Council story/677428/china-may-very-well-be- Imposes Wide New Measures against Taliban afghanistans-only-true-friend. Authorities in Afghanistan, Demands Action Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service. 2012. on Terrorism Resolution 1333 (2000) Calls “Beijing’s profile is set to rise’, 11 October. for Closure of Training Camps, End to Provi- Retrieved from Proquest. sion of Sanctuary; Ban Imposed on Military Pantucci, Raffaello. 2010. ‘China’s Afghan Assistance’, 19 December, http://www.un.org/ Dilemma’, Survival 52 (4) August-September: press/en/2000/sc6979.doc.htm. 21-27. van der Kley, Dirk. 2014. ‘China’s Foreign Policy in Parello-Plesner, Jonas and Mathieu Duchâtel. Afghanistan’, Analysis, October, Lowy Institute 2014. ‘China’s “AfPak” hinterland’, Adelphi for International Policy. Series, 54 (451): 67-90. Zhao, Hong. 2013. ‘China’s Afghan Policy: The Renmin Ribao. 2011. ‘Xifang guojia dingjin Libiya Forming of the “March West” Strategy?’, The zhanhou anpai (guoji shidian) [Western states Journal of East Asian Affairs, September, 27 (2): keep an eye on arrangements after Libya 1-29. (International perspectives)]’, 1 November. Retrieved from Renmin Database. Small, Andrew. 2015a. The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics. Oxford University Press.

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 45 AUTHORS

Lars Erslev Andersen, Senior Researcher, International Security, DIIS. [email protected]

Yang Jiang, Senior Researcher, Global Transformations, DIIS. [email protected]

Camilla T N Sørensen, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. [email protected]

Marc Lanteigne, Senior Research Fellow at NUPI, Chinese and comparative Northeast Asian politics and foreign policy, as well as Asia- relations, international political economy and institution-building. [email protected]

Imad Mansour, Assistant Professor, Department of International Affairs, Qatar University. [email protected]

Zhang Jiadong, Professor in Center for American Studies, Director of Center for B&R Studies, Fudan University. [email protected]

N. Janardhan, Dr (UAE-based political analyst, Honorary Fellow of the University of Exeter, UK, and author, most recently, of A New Gulf Security Architecture: Prospects and Challenges for an Asian Role). [email protected]

Miwa Hirono, Ph.D, Research Fellow, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham. [email protected]

46 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report PHOTOS

Coverphoto: Saudi Arabia Deputy Crown and Chinese President Xi Jinping, lead their delegations in a meeting in Beijing Page 12: The sun sets behind an oil pump in the desert oil fields of Sakhir, Bahrain Page 17: Group picture during Gulf Coopration Council, GCC 7th summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia Page 22: An ethnic Uighur muslim passes infront of a giant statue of Chairman Mao Page 27: Chinese Navy sailors march past a warship at port before leaving for the Navy’s first oversea operation Page 33: Chinese police officers wearing the United Nations blue helmets practice hand signals with weapons during a demonstration at a training camp Page 40: Afghan Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah walks with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang past the honor guard during a welcoming ceremony in Beijing

China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report 47 DIIS · DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Østbanegade 117 DK-2100 Copenhagen Denmark www.diis.dk 48 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report