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Middle East, North Africa MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA Shifting Dynamics in Yemen as Houthis Advance East of Sana’a OE Watch Commentary: When the Yemen war began in 2015, the stated goal of the Saudi-led coalition was to push the Houthis out of Sana’a. Despite near-absolute control of the skies, the Saudi-led coalition was unable to penetrate the capital. The front dividing Sana’a and Marib, the key centers of gravity for the Houthi-led military/Popular Committees and the Saudi- backed Yemeni National Army respectively, has been largely static since 2016. In mid-January 2020, a missile (attributed to but never publicly claimed by the Houthis) struck a forward base of the Saudi-backed forces, killing over 100 people. The Houthis then began moving eastward toward Marib, pushing their opponents out of Nihm District (Sana’a Province) and into Marib and neighboring al-Jawf, in what Saudi-backed forces described as a “tactical retreat.” The Houthis claimed that their eastward advances were defensive, in response to attempted incursions toward Sana’a by their adversaries. There are many ways of viewing movement along this long- static, key front, as noted in the accompanying passage from the southern Yemeni newspaper Aden Ghad. The Houthis themselves have emphasized the military element, with the report claiming that they were able to take full control of adversary communications networks “to the point that the National Army’s 7th Military Zone and those fronts became completely isolated.” In a lengthy press conference by their Advances in territorial control on the Nihm Front as presented by Houthi military spokesman. military spokesman Yahya Saree, they also emphasized how Source: Yahya Saree Twitter account, https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1222530400930738176/photo/1, Public Domain their air defense systems, “including the Fater-1” (unveiled last August and resembling a 3M9 missile from a Soviet-era 2K12 [SA-6] pre-Houthi Yemeni military air defense system), forced coalition aircraft toward higher altitudes. The Houthis have recently been keen to emphasize their air defense capabilities. Houthi military claims are often bombastic, and some in Yemen appear to believe that the “near-total absence of coalition aircraft” during the offensive, as one newspaper described, was due less to Houthi capabilities than to a Saudi “conspiracy.” It does seem odd, as one of the accompanying passage highlights, that the Saudi-led coalition’s media channels “completely ignored” this important battle. Some seem to believe that Saudi Arabia is recalibrating its support for the National Army, which is plagued by corruption, driven by parochial interests and largely controlled by the Islah Party. The Houthi offensive coincided with a visit to Riyadh by Tareq Saleh, nephew of former longtime Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and leader of a reconstituted Yemeni Republican Guard, who has positioned himself to become Saudi Arabia’s new key partner in Yemen, potentially at the expense of current leaders in Islah and the National Army. The Houthi military spokesman concluded his press conference on the Houthi offensive by making direct appeals to the tribes and people of Marib Province. The Yemeni conflict will be won through alliances and tribal politics, and it appears that the relationships between the major players, at least in what was formerly North Yemen, may be up for a consequential realignment. End OE Watch Commentary (Winter) “This time the battle occurred with the near- total absence of coalition aircraft.” OE Watch | March 2020 50 MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA Continued: Shifting Dynamics in Yemen as Houthis Advance East of Sana’a تقرير يبحث يف أسباب وأبعاد تجدد املعارك يف جبهة نهم رشق العاصمة صنعاء.. معارك جبهة نهم.. ما الذي يحاول أن يقوله كل طرف؟ :Source “Report on the Causes and Dimensions of Renewed Battles in the Nihm Front East of the Capital Sana’a,” Aden Ghad, 1 February 2020. http://adengd.net/ news/440574 Each side to the conflict, the Houthis and the Yemeni army - which some describe as being under the control of Islah - claims military and field victories, without providing a clear picture of the clashes. With the exception of the Yemeni army’s admission that it has withdrawn “tactically,” ambiguity still dominates the scene on the Nihm front... According to military sources, one reason the Houthis made such progress was that they were able to penetrate the national army’s wireless communications network and issue fake orders for them to withdraw. They also disrupted other communications networks and the Internet, to the point that the National Army’s 7th Military Zone and those fronts became completely isolated… The Houthi rebel group explained the motives that led them to escalate to this degree in Nihm, saying that things were going well between them and the Islah Party, calm on the fronts and a joint call for the return of Yemeni fighters from the border with the Saudi Arabia, and sensing the danger of the coalition’s project west of Taiz as well as the danger of targeting Yemeni unity. They were therefore surprised by the unexpected attack on the Nihm front, with coalition air cover, despite the military understanding of a truce between the two sides. This perspective sees an “Islah” army, so to speak, which is lethargic and has not shown any desire to fight on the mountains of the Nihm front, despite the great military support that “Islah” fighters receive there. This prompted the Arab coalition to abandon the Islah army in Marib and Nihm and turn to a military leader whose stock has risen recently and who seems to be the alternative option for the alliance, namely Brigadier Tariq Saleh, commander of the “Republican Guard” forces and the nephew of late Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Analysts adopting this perspective believe that meetings between Brigadier General Tariq and Saudi leaders in Riyadh a few days ago was the beginning of this approach, adopted by the coalition to find an alternative to the government army, which is controlled by Islah… Some analysts accuse the leaders of the Yemeni army, led by Minister of Defense, Major General Muhammad al-Maqdashi, of “ failing” to prove their field military capabilities; his involvement in financial corruption is no longer hidden to anyone… آخر تفاصيل ملحمة تحرير نهم ومعارك الجوف ومأرب :Source “Latest Details on the Epic Liberation of Nihm and the Battles of al-Jawf and Marib,” Yemeni Press, 31 January 2020. https://www.yemenipress.net/ archives/179416 “The military escalation in Nihm represented an attempt to attack our forces and advance to important locations. The aggressor aircraft launched several raids on our forces, more than 250 in total.” He emphasized that Air Defense Forces participated in the Bunyan al-Marsous operation and that the Fater System 1 played an important role in confusing military aircraft and preventing them from launching attacks. The spokesman for the armed forces stated that after activating the air defense system, the aggressor aircraft resorted to launching high-altitude raids so as not to be exposed to the Fater missiles. He said, “The air defense system succeeded in carrying out more than 25 operations to prevent attacks and force their departure. The continued aggressor raids on the area of operations prompted our forces to respond decisively, and the directives of the leadership were clear in hitting Saudi military installations and bases”… He addressed the sons of Marib, saying, “History, sons of Marib, will preserve your place in its pages, just as we today preserve the place of our ancestors in fighting occupiers and conquerors. Be on the side that corresponds with your history, and that responds to your brotherhood, your uniqueness and your traditions.” تراجع للقوات الحكومية يف نهم والحوثيون يسيطرون عىل جبل املنارة :Source “Government Forces Retreat in Nihm and the Houthis Control al-Manara Mountain,” al-Masdar, 22 January 2020. https://almasdaronline.com/ articles/176716 According to the source, this time the battle occurred with the near-total absence of coalition aircraft. مالمح املؤامرة عىل نهم :Source “Features of the Conspiracy in Nihm,” al-Mawqea Post, 28 January 2020. https://www.almawqeapost.net/special-pens/3914 - Coalition aircraft were absent during the battle of Nihm and al-Jawf, except for symbolic strikes. They continued to fly while the Houthi forces marched in dozens of convoys. One military leader described this on TV as tantamount to the aircraft protecting the Houthi convoys. - Coalition media channels completely ignored events in Nihm and al-Jawf, which were instead busy covering the news of Haftar in Libya… The fall of Nihm is not a coincidence or a defeat in its true sense. It is the result of repeated wrong practices that the coalition adopted a long time ago and for reasons that we all know, the most important of which is to weaken the legitimate government, taking over its decision- making, marginalizing its leaders, and assassinating or dismissing every national leader who opposes and denounces this absurdity. OE Watch | March 2020 51.
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