The Changing Security Dynamics of the MENA Region By Anthony H. Cordesman With the assistance of Grace Hwang Major Update: March 22, 2021 Please provide comments to [email protected] Photo: JOSEPH EID/AFP/Getty Images Cordesman: Security Assistance and the Changing MENA Region AHC 22.3.2021 2 The Changing Security Dynamics of the MENA Region The security dynamics of the Middle East and North Africa have changed radically over the last decade and will continue to change for the foreseeable future. At the beginning of 2011, most MENA nations were at peace and seemed to be relatively stable. North African countries were at peace under authoritarian leaders. The Arab-Israeli conflicts had been limited to clashes between Israel and the Palestinians. Egypt acted as a stable major regional power. Iran was a large but relatively weak military power dependent on low-grade and dated weapons. Iraq’s Islamic extremists seemed to be defeated. The Southern Arab Gulf states appeared to be unified in a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Yemen was poor and could not meet the needs of many of its people, but it still seemed stable. Military spending and arms purchases were high by global standards, but they were only a limited to moderate burden on local economies. Today, none of those things are true. Regional rivalries, extremism, and the series of political uprisings and conflicts that were once called the “Arab Spring” have turned the MENA region into a fragmented mess. What appeared to be a relatively stable pattern of national security developments in the period before the political upheavals that began in 2011, has now become the scene of local power struggles; internal conflicts; new battles with extremist movements; and major civil wars in Iran, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Instead of a shift towards democracy, many regimes have become more repressive and authoritarian. Civil wars and instability have become as serious of a challenge to the MENA region’s security and stability as military threats, extremism, and terrorism. Efforts at reforming governance and the economy have fallen far short of the needs of most states. The Covid-19 crisis has made things worse, and a number of regimes have gone on with serious arms races at a time when such arms races have become even more unaffordable while their people have even greater needs for effective governance with freedom from corruption, for economic development, and for decent jobs and incomes. Yet, military threats and extremism have also grown – as shown in Figure One, which lists the extremist/terrorist threats of each MENA country. Iran has emerged as a far more serious military threat in the Gulf. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 as well as its fight to defeat extremists and end factional struggles in Iraq that seemed to be ending in 2011, have led to two decades of direct U.S. participation in active combat and combat support of partner forces. While it resulted in the break-up of the ISIS “caliphate” in Iraq, it has left significant ISIS fighters in place while empowering pro-Iranian Popular Mobilization Forces, creating serious uncertainties as to whether Iraq will end up as a U.S. strategic partner or under Iranian influence. Non-state actors like the Hezbollah, Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs), and the Houthis have become significant threats while the U.S. used security assistance – and newly created Security Force Assistance Brigades – to create its own non-state actors in Syria. Other powers like Russia have provided support, combat troops, and mercenaries to support non-state actors in Libya and Syria. More broadly, Iran, the Assad forces in Syria, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the pro-Iranian Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen have created a coalition of hostile powers that threaten both U.S. interest and U.S. strategic partners. There have been important changes in the role of outside powers. The U.S. faces challenges to its security relations with each state in the Middle East and North Africa as well as from nations Cordesman: Security Assistance and the Changing MENA Region AHC 22.3.2021 3 outside the MENA region. The U.S. still is the major outside power in the region, and its European partners remain active in the Mediterranean as well as in North Africa. Britain and France still play a role in the Gulf, but their roles have been tentative, and their power projection capabilities have continued to slowly decline. The U.S. commitment to the region has been undermined by “long wars” and the need to meet the challenge from China in Asia. Key strategic partners like Britain and France still play a role in the Gulf, but their roles are more tentative, and their power projection capabilities have continued to slowly decline. Russia, however, has reasserted itself as a major power and competitor, and it is now playing a major security role in Libya and Syria as well as increasing its share of regional arms transfers. China is emerging as the second ranking global power and as a potential competitor in the MENA region, and there are reports that China may play a major security role in Iran. Turkey is playing a more active military role in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, and one that does more to rival U.S. efforts than support them. At the same time, the military and security forces of every country in the Middle East and North Africa continue to change in size, structure, and force posture. Their current force size and structure by service – as reported in the 2021 edition of the IISS Military Balance – is shown in Figure Two, Figure Three, Figure Four, and Figure Five. These figures show just how different the forces of each MENA state are in size, weapons holdings, and the relative size of each military service and paramilitary forces. However, these figures only show a summary of the force strength in terms of total personnel and major weapons holding. They do not, however, reflect the lack of sustainability and the ability to operate away from major bases in many countries. They do not show the level of dependence on foreign advisors and contractors or the dependence on foreign soldiers. They do not reflect each nation’s different needs for force modernization and the lack of effective command, control, communication, and computer (C4) and advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) capability. They do not reflect the extent to which given countries are seeking to create effective joint warfare capability or all-domain warfare capability. The end result is that many MENA nations with large military and internal security budgets – and that are making massive arms buys – have limited actual warfighting and internal security capabilities, are poorly prepared to deal with the changing nature of the warfighting threats in the region, and are highly dependent on outside powers. This means major changes will take place in the military and internal security forces of MENA countries and in every aspect of outside support and security assistance. Moreover, while many MENA countries still spend massive amounts of money on modernizing and expanding their military forces and their major weapons, they have also greatly expanded their focus on counterextremism, counterterrorism, and internal security. As a result, their dependence on the U.S., Russia, China, and other outside forces will steadily increase and continue to do so indefinitely into the future. Improving force quality has become more important than force numbers or acquiring more major weapons systems. Each MENA country must also develop its own approach to creating new systems of command and control, battle management, secure communications, and dependence on Cordesman: Security Assistance and the Changing MENA Region AHC 22.3.2021 4 space systems. Each must find some way to take advantage of the advances in military software and use of artificial intelligence. Some of these military changes will be destabilizing unless they are carefully managed and coordinated, and these challenges are further compounded by shifts to other new forms of warfare. Israel continues to improves nuclear and precision strike systems. Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Iran all retain chemical weapons capabilities, and they at least have the capacity to develop biological weapons. Several MENA states already have – or seek to acquire – advanced ballistic and UCAV or cruise missiles. Others seek to acquire a wide-range of precision guided weapons, integrated mixes of land-based air and missile defenses, and a wide-range of other developments in military technology and tactics. These systems have already begun to present new threats to neighboring states, require major shifts in military structures, and can increase the risk of uncontrolled escalation unless they are carefully controlled. At the same time, gray area operations, hybrid warfare, and extremist/terrorist threats are added sources of change. So are the threats posed by the support of rebel factions by neighboring and outside states. These changes mean that MENA states must continue to restructure their intelligence, counterterrorism, counterextremism, and counterinsurgency forces to deal with different kinds of threats. This analysis focuses on these new security dynamics and on the role the U.S. and its European security partners must play in the MENA region. The U.S. is currently the leading outside power and source of military support for MENA states, except for the Russian presence in Syria. However, the roles of Russia and China are expanding. There are only three major outside powers – the U.S., Russia, and China – that can provide the full range of capabilities needed to help create the MENA forces that can operate at these levels and that are the ones the U.S.