Rethinking Peace in Yemen Middle East Report N°216 | 2 July 2020 Headquarters International Crisis Group Avenue Louise 235 • 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 • Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Preventing War. Shaping Peace. Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. “All We Want is Peace”: Parties’ Positions and Perspectives ........................................... 4 A. The Huthi-led Authorities in Sanaa ........................................................................... 5 1. Who are the Huthis? ............................................................................................ 6 2. Internal challenges ............................................................................................... 7 3. What do they want? .............................................................................................. 10 B. Anti-Huthi Factions ................................................................................................... 11 1. The Hadi government and its supporters ............................................................ 12 2. Internal challenges ............................................................................................... 14 3. What do they want? .............................................................................................. 15 4. Non-government-aligned anti-Huthi groups....................................................... 16 III. A Regional Standoff .......................................................................................................... 19 A. Saudi Arabia ............................................................................................................... 19 B. Iran ............................................................................................................................. 22 C. The UAE ..................................................................................................................... 24 IV. International Efforts to Break the Deadlock .................................................................... 27 V. An Imperfect Way Forward .............................................................................................. 31 A. Expanded Participation in Negotiations ................................................................... 31 B. Reaching an Agreement That Recognises Ground Realities ..................................... 33 C. Learning from the Past by Prioritising Bread-and-Butter Issues and Effective Local Oversight Mechanisms .............................................................. 34 D. Ensuring International Backing ................................................................................ 35 VI. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 37 APPENDICES A. Maps of Yemen National Divisions and Key Front Lines ................................................ 38 1. Yemen Political and Territorial Divisions as of June 2020 2. Yemen Key Front Lines as of June 2020 3. Front Line 1: Marib/al-Jawf/Sanaa Front Line (Huthis vs. Government-affiliated Forces) as of June 2020 4. Front Line 6: Yemen/Saudi Arabia Border Front Line (Huthis vs. Saudi-overseen Yemeni Forces) as of June 2020 5. Front Line 8: Abyan Front Line (Southern Transitional Council vs. Yemeni Government-affiliated Forces) as of June 2020 B. About the International Crisis Group .............................................................................. 43 C. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on the Middle East and North Africa since 2017 .... 44 D. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ........................................................................................ 47 Principal Findings What’s new? A COVID-19 outbreak has injected new energy into diplomatic defforts to end Yemen’s regionalised civil war, now in its sixth year. But the par- ties remain stubbornly opposed to compromise and the UN’s two-party mediation framework no longer provides a realistic pathway to peace given the country’s political and military fragmentation. Why does it matter? The war has killed more than 112,000 people and has left 24 million in need of some form of humanitarian assistance. The pandemic could further decimate a population lacking access to health care and particu- larly vulnerable due to malnutrition. The worst may be prevented if the war can be halted. What should be done? The Yemeni government and Huthis should right- size expectations regarding a political settlement and accept inclusion of other political and armed factions in UN-led negotiations. The UN Security Council should draft a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and inclusive settle- ment and table it if the parties stick to their positions. International Crisis Group Middle East Report N°216 2 July 2020 Executive Summary After five years of war, the parties to the Yemen conflict face a stark choice: accept a ceasefire and an imperfect political settlement, particularly in light of fears of a growing COVID-19 outbreak, or continue a war that will produce more human suf- fering but no clear nationwide military victory for any group. A political settlement between the internationally recognised government and the Huthis – the de facto authorities in Sanaa – might once have been able to end the war and return the country to a political transition. But subsequent shifts in the military balance, po- litical and territorial fragmentation, and heavy-handed regional intervention have changed peacemaking requirements. A more inclusive UN-brokered, multiparty set- tlement is needed, along with interim governance arrangements that avoid rapid recentralisation of power in Sanaa to the benefit of just one or two groups. One of the biggest barriers to a settlement is an outdated international approach to ending the war. The government of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi holds that any deal must build on the foundations of an April 2015 UN Security Council Resolution (2216) that it interprets as a form of legal summons for the Huthis to sur- render, hand over heavy weapons and allow the government to return to rule Yemen from Sanaa. UN-brokered talks in Kuwait in 2016 produced a draft agreement built around Resolution 2216 that has become the framework for subsequent negotiations. The agreement would have led to a power-sharing arrangement that included a minor- ity Huthi role in government and opened a pathway to national elections. Much has changed since 2016. The Huthis have consolidated their control over the north west and are threatening the government’s last stronghold in the north – in Marib. They have become increasingly confident of their hold on power in Sanaa and now want a deal that bypasses the Hadi government and recognises de facto realities on the ground, which they believe favour their rule. Aware of its territorial weakness, the government has clung to its legal status and become increasingly resistant to any agreement that might provide its rivals with legitimacy. Other shifts on the ground have further complicated matters. Yemen is now rough- ly divided into five cantons of political and military control: the Huthi-controlled northern highlands; government-aligned areas in Marib, al-Jawf, northern Hadra- mawt, al-Mahra, Shebwa, Abyan and Taiz city; the pro-separatist Southern Transi- tion Council-dominated territories in Aden and its hinterland; districts along the Red Sea coast where the Joint Resistance Forces are the chief power; and coastal Hadra- mawt, where local authorities prevail. The war rages along multiple fronts, each with its own political dynamics and lines of command and control. Local groups, some of which are loosely in the government camp but in practice function independently, reject the idea that they may have to cede newfound autonomy to a recentralised government, as the UN’s Kuwait framework suggests and both the Hadi government and Huthis would like to happen, albeit under different rule. Absent their buy-in, a peace settlement will not be sustainable. A successful political process will require two things. First, the parties will need to be persuaded that it is in their own interest to abandon maximalist demands. The military balance favours the Huthis, but not to the extent that the group might think. They appear to believe they can broker a deal to end the war directly with Riyadh, Rethinking Peace in Yemen Crisis Group Middle East Report N°216, 2 July 2020 Page ii but they are fighting an array of adversaries who are unlikely to accept a settlement that does not protect their core interests or to honour one simply because Riyadh demands it. An outright military victory for any party, including the Huthis, is highly unlikely. Moreover, the Hadi government, however weak, is still Yemen’s internationally rec- ognised authority. For these reasons, the Huthis should accept that a UN-brokered deal will not simply transfer authority to them and convert territorial realities into international recognition of their rule. In turn, the government should accept that its demands for a return to power in Sanaa through an effective Huthi surrender are wholly unrealistic. For its part, Saudi Arabia will not be able to declare victory in Yem- en as leaders