YEMEN’S STOLEN ASSETS: PAST AND FUTURE CIFAR.EU Cover picture: Old Sana’a, Yemen by Rod Waddington under a Creative Commons Licence Published: 2020, CiFAR – Civil Forum for Asset Recovery e.V. CiFAR – Civil Forum for Asset Recovery e.V., Köpenicker Str. 147, Berlin, Germany, cifar.eu CiFAR - Civil Forum for Asset Recovery e.V. and the author are solely responsible for the contents of this publication. CIVIL FORUM FOR ASSET RECOVERY CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 BACKGROUND 2 ASSET RECOVERY IN YEMEN 7 POLITICAL SITUATION 8 LEGAL FRAMEWORK 9 ATTEMPTS AT ASSET RECOVERY 11 MAPPING THE NETWORK 12 NEXT STEPS FOR ASSET RECOVERY IN YEMEN 19 ASSET RECOVERY FRAMEWORK 20 OPTIONS FOR THE RECOVERY OF STOLEN ASSETS 21 RECOVERY INDEPENDENT OF YEMENI AUTHORITIES 23 PROSECUTION 23 RETURNS MECHANISMS 24 3. CONCLUSIONS 26 RECOMMENDATIONS 28 REFERENCES 29 CIFAR.EU [email protected] CIVIL FORUM FOR ASSET RECOVERY ACRONYMS AQAP al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GPC General People’s Congress JMP Joint Meeting Parties NDC National Dialogue Conference PDRY People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen STC Southern Transitional Council UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council YAR Yemen Arab Republic YSP Yemeni Socialist Party CIFAR.EU [email protected] PB 1 CIVIL FORUM FOR ASSET RECOVERY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In 2014, the former President of Yemen, Ali It also aims at advancing the prospect Abdallah Saleh, his son Ahmed and three of those assets being returned to Yemen other individuals were placed under UN through moving forward the investigation sanctions in the context of the ongoing civil into where and how the suspected proceeds war in Yemen. These sanctions included an of corruption have been hidden and making obligation on UN Member States to freeze assets recommendations as to how those assets located in their jurisdictions that were related could be recovered. Its purpose therefore is to to the listed persons in an effort to ensure that be a tool to assist Yemeni civil society and public any legally or ill-gotten gains acquired by officials in recovering those assets and using them could not be used to fuel the civil war. them for the benefit of the people of Yemen. Since then, a Panel of Experts created under the original UN Security Council resolution The report starts by considering the historical has been reporting on the implementation and political background to the theft of state of those sanctions, including the asset freeze. assets as an introduction to those unfamiliar with the context in Yemen. It is followed by a The sanctioning of Saleh came at the end description of the challenges Yemen currently of a long process of the Saleh family’s fall faces in recovering those assets. The report from power, following popular uprisings in then moves on to look at advancing the Yemen in 2011 and in the context of their recovery of those assets, with the following allying with their former enemies and section examining the assets identified under engaging as belligerents against the UN- the UN Security Council Panel of Experts recognised government in the Yemeni civil reports with the addition of information from war. While the war is ongoing, questions our own investigation. The final part then have been raised as to whether the alleged considers the possibilities for recovery of assets looted by Saleh and his associates the assets in Yemen, the legal and political during his over 30 years in power are changes that would need to take place, as being used to fund hostilities, whether UN well as other avenues that could be explored. Member States are effectively freezing assets belonging to the former President, Ultimately, the report concludes that the and whether the Yemeni people are ever challenges of asset recovery in Yemen going to see these assets returned to them. make any efforts to advance the case in the near future unlikely and extremely difficult. THIS REPORT ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN However, it also notes that considering asset BOTH SOME OF THE CHALLENGES THAT recovery as part of future peace talks will be LED TO THE SITUATION WHERE THE vital in ensuring that impunity is addressed. The FORMER REGIME WAS ABLE TO HIDE report therefore also highlights that exploring MONEY OVERSEAS AND SOME OF THE other, non-traditional methods for asset CHALLENGES YEMEN IS FACING AND WILL recovery and engaging with governments FACE IN RECOVERING THAT MONEY. holding the assets may be more useful options for Yemen and result in a greater possibility that any stolen money could be confiscated and returned to the Yemeni people. CIFAR.EU [email protected] PB BACKGROUND PB 3 CIVIL FORUM FOR ASSET RECOVERY In July 1978, Major Ali Abdallah Saleh These origins of the GPC are still reflected became President of the then Yemen Arab in the makeup of the party and account Republic (YAR) after the assassinations of two for its current split into at least three different successive Presidents in the space of eight factions. At the time of GPC party rule in months. Like his predecessors, he rose through the YAR, the socialist People’s Democratic the ranks of the Yemeni army, which had Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the South was remained the main source of political power also governed under a one-party system, in in the country in the post-revolutionary years. this case under the Yemeni Socialist Party . Saleh’s family belongs to the Sanhan tribe, (YSP), which was ideologically aligned with which is part of the broader Hashid tribal other communist regimes around the world.4 confederation. Lacking any particular tribal credentials, Saleh was considered a “self-made The Yemeni unity agreement of 1990 came at man” by his supporters, a product of the new a time when the South Yemeni regime found republican social order that was established itself in a particularly weak position after the with the fall of the Imamate.1 Although his collapse of its external patrons across Eastern presidency was expected to be as short-lived Europe and as a result of the fratricidal civil as that of his predecessors, he safeguarded his war of 1986. Similarly, the economy of North position by relying from the very beginning Yemen had declined significantly in the latter on a small circle of trusted relatives and part of the 1980s. President Saleh was quick associates that were placed at the helm of to seize the opportunity to unify the country the state’s military and security institutions.2 under his control and mostly on his own terms. He credited himself with the achievement SALEH WAS QUICK TO ESTABLISH of Yemeni unification and would often be HIS DOMINANCE OVER THE YAR portrayed in speeches and in the press as AND INSTRUMENTAL IN GRADUALLY “the architect of modern Yemen”. Saleh’s rule EXPANDING THE GRIP OF THE STATE over the country extended, however, beyond BEYOND URBAN CENTRES TO THE REST political symbolism. The newly incorporated and resource-rich southern governorates OF THE COUNTRY. provided him with the opportunity to expand both his patronage network among In 1982, aiming to further his political control, southern elites and, allegedly, his wealth.5 he established an umbrella organisation in the General People’s Congress (GPC) Several months after unification, the Wadi that operated more like a loose gathering Masila oil field in the southern province of of his supporters than a political party.3 Hadhramaut was discovered, providing The GPC was in effect the institutional a major boost to the regime’s ability to embodiment of the various overlapping tribal, dispense patronage. However, land grabs military, security, and business patronage became the hallmark of what South networks that had Saleh at their apex. Yemenis perceived as the Northerners’ corrupt practices across the South.6 CIFAR.EU [email protected] PB CIVIL FORUM FOR ASSET RECOVERY The PDRY’s legacy of nationalising private Alongside this, 2006 also marked the assets, including land, proved beneficial to start of political challenges for Saleh. The Saleh as southern state property came under opposition, Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), a the control of Sanaa. Moreover, the failed coalition of six parties including the Islamist secession of South Yemen and ensuing civil al-Islah and the YSP, managed to mount a war of 1994 gave Saleh the opportunity to challenge to his position for the first time in solidify central government hold over the the 2006 election. Furthermore, there was former South.7 Appropriation of southern a destabilisation of Saleh’s own alliance with land and other assets by prominent northern General Ali Muhsin and the paramount military and business elites intensified in sheikh of the Hashid confederation, Shaykh the years following the war and people Abdallah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar, both of in former South Yemen complained whom are considered among the top of neglect and underdevelopment beneficiaries of Saleh’s favouritism and could in the years under Saleh’s rule.8 boast extensive portfolios of both legitimate and dubious business ventures.12 This was Members of the Zaydi community, who due to the death of Shaykh Abdallah in formed a majority in the northern part of 2007 and because Saleh started to explicitly the country, felt equally excluded from the promote his son Ahmed as his successor at state’s political settlement.9 The Ansar Allah the expense of Ali Muhsin, showing direct movement (Supporters of God), whose disregard for his al-Ahmar tribal allies.13 members were known as the Huthis due to the family name of its leader, quickly transformed YEMEN’S YOUTH UPRISING OF 2011, from a religious revivalist movement to INSPIRED BY AND COINCIDING WITH a political one that directly challenged THE ARAB SPRING REVOLUTIONS the authority of the state and demanded ACROSS THE MIDDLE EAST, DID NOT, autonomy for their region.