Proxy War” Prism on Yemen

December 2019 The “Proxy War” Prism on Yemen View from the City of Taiz Adam Baron & Raiman Al-Hamdani Last edited on December 09, 2019 at 1:23 p.m. EST Acknowledgments This paper would not be possible without the support of our colleagues at New America and Arizona State University and the funding of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The authors would like to thank Gabrielle Hamilton Stowe for her research and editing of this paper, Mohamed al-Qadhi for providing useful feedback and our field researchers, who we unfortunately cannot name for security reasons, for providing us with data otherwise unobtainable. newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 2 About the Author(s) Adam Baron is a fellow in New America's International Security program. He is a writer and political analyst focusing on the Middle East with an emphasis on Yemen and the wider Arabian Peninsula. Raiman Al-Hamdani is a researcher and consultant focusing on issues of security and development in the Middle East and North Africa, specializing in Yemen. Born in Sana’a, Al-Hamdani spent his formative years in Yemen. He has an MA in International Security and Conflict Management from the American University in Cairo and an MSc in Development Studies from SOAS, University of London. About New America We are dedicated to renewing America by continuing the quest to realize our nation’s highest ideals, honestly confronting the challenges caused by rapid technological and social change, and seizing the opportunities those changes create. About International Security The International Security program aims to provide evidence-based analysis of some of the thorniest questions facing American policymakers and the public. We are focused on South Asia and the Middle East, extremist groups such as ISIS, al Qaeda and allied groups, the proliferation of drones, homeland security, and the activities of U.S. Special Forces and the CIA. About Future of Proxy Warfare The Future of Proxy Warfare Initiative is a joint project of New America’s International Security program and Arizona State University’s Center on the Future of War. newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 3 Contents Executive Summary 5 Introduction 7 War Comes to Taiz 11 The Houthi Incursion into Taiz 14 The Saudi Coalition and the Proxy War Narrative 17 Political Groups in Taiz 20 Islah: The Dominant Political Power in Taiz 21 Taizi Politics Beyond Islah 23 Interaction Between Local Political and Military Competition and Foreign Sponsorship 25 Local Military Forces in Taiz 2015-Present 29 Formal Governance Structures 32 Conclusion 35 Appendix 1: Detailed Summary of Armed Groups in Taiz 37 newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 4 Executive Summary Taiz, Yemen’s third most populous city and the capital of its largest governorate (province) of the same name, is engulfed by war. Long seen as the cultural heart of the country, Taiz emerged in early 2015 as the center of what many observers describe as a proxy war between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis, an armed Zaidi Shia revivalist movement with ties to Iran. The current military situation in Taiz is a stalemate between the Houthis and a diverse, loosely formed coalition of anti-Houthi groups. Having surrounded and besieged the city of Taiz, the Houthis remain in control of most of its entrances and exits, controlling the passage of goods and people along with a strategically critical north-south gateway. The conflict in Taiz is emblematic of the way regional rivalries between Gulf States and Iran and hyperlocal competition for power and influence have played out and intersected across Yemen. Foreign powers play an important role in the conflict by seeking to impose their own goals through sponsorship of armed factions and political groups. As a strategic location abutting Saudi Arabia’s southern border and the shipping lanes of the Red Sea, Yemen holds importance for several foreign powers’ regional agendas. This has led many commentators to analyze the conflict through the lens of proxy warfare. Yet this lens can easily misrepresent the war as one in which Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and Iran move their proxies like chess pieces seeking comparative advantage, while also reducing the war as a whole to these movements. It is not only a matter of misdiagnosing the dynamics involved; framing the conflict as primarily a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia complicates efforts to resolve the conflict. The framing provides strategic advantages for many of the belligerent parties who use it to fuel their war efforts. The narrative itself further internationalizes the conflict, obscuring the essential nature of the war in Yemen, which is at heart an internal Yemeni political conflict. The internationalization of what was originally a domestic political struggle has made the conflict more complex, in turn making it more difficult to resolve, but it has not fundamentally altered the goals of the original domestic combatants. If the war is ever to end, the goals of Yemenis must be recognized for what they are, and elevated in importance above those of the international parties to the conflict. Key Findings: • Various military forces in Yemen use the proxy war frame as a propaganda tool to recruit and raise funds, but the day-to-day experience of the conflict is highly local. In many cases, rather than a newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 5 top-down proxy relationship of control, local forces exercise substantial agency despite receiving sponsorship, pursuing their own interests and using foreign sponsorship opportunities for their own purposes. • The complex web of forces and sponsorship opportunities has empowered individuals—in addition to groups—to act as major players in Yemen’s war. Abu al-Abbas, the leader of the Abu al-Abbas Brigades, for example, skillfully drew on Saudi, Emirati, local, and potentially al-Qaida support to drive his rise in influence. • Though the Houthis have increasingly aligned with Iran, they continue to enmesh themselves in Yemen’s wider body politic. Prior to the current war, the Houthis waged six wars against the Yemeni government in the twenty-first century, during which there is little evidence of firm Iranian command and control. Iran’s reported provision of missiles and drones shapes the conflict, but its roots are local and would not disappear were Iran to fully abandon the Houthis. • Foreign powers’ development of proxy relationships in the form of external sponsorship has made the conflict more complex and difficult to resolve via negotiations. Such foreign relationships have resulted in an interplay between an expanded and shifting set of local forces, national political factions, and international parties, each of which have their own interests and aims. This expanded set of armed and political groups fuels tensions and complicates efforts to end the violence through a negotiated settlement. • Uncritical adoption of the proxy war narrative poses challenges for peacemakers and policymakers, increasing the risks of escalation and frustrating efforts at conflict resolution. The narrative obscures the true localized nature of the conflict and ignores the goals and ambitions of key domestic stakeholders. • These wider divisions have dragged out the battle against the Houthis while providing growth opportunities to extremist groups like al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Al-Qaida’s strength has diminished recently and its power should not be exaggerated, but the group stands to benefit from persistent conflict. newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 6 Introduction On September 21, 2014 the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia military group, seized the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, sparking the latest round of internationalized conflict in Yemen. While the Houthis waged six battles against the Yemeni central government in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the effective takeover of Sanaa by the Houthis and their allies spawned a political and military crisis unparalleled since the 1960s. This crisis included the Houthi kidnapping of Yemeni President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s chief of staff, Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak; the mass resignation of the Yemeni cabinet; the extended house arrest of Hadi himself; and Hadi’s subsequent declaration of war on the Houthis following his escape from Sanaa to Aden, which he then declared Yemen’s temporary capital.1 On March 26, 2015, the Saudi-led coalition began bombing sites in Yemen on the basis of an invitation from the internationally-recognized Yemeni government to aid the state in its fight against the Houthis.2 The invitation for intervention was warmly received, as it appealed to widespread Saudi- and Gulf-state anxiety regarding the Houthis’ relationship with Iran and their perceived role as Iranian proxies. The Saudi-led military coalition, therefore, quickly decided to intervene in Yemen under the framing of restoring the internationally recognized Yemeni government to power. The warring parties and media coverage have largely cast the ensuing internationalized conflict as a proxy war, a “Saudi war on Yemen” or “Iranian … aggression” using the Houthis as “tools.”3 In this framework, the primary narrative of the conflict is a story of war between Arab states (mostly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and Iran, tied to broader regional tensions but fought by those states’ respective proxies. Over the summer of 2019, the war in Yemen and its internationalization escalated. The separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) took hold of Aden and southwestern Yemen.4 The Houthis took credit for a series of increasingly brazen drone attacks within the Saudi interior, most notably claiming credit for the September 14 strikes on the Saudi Aramco oil facilities in Abaqiq and Khurais that reportedly disrupted up to half of Saudi oil production.5 Given the widely- reported Iranian provision of drones to the Houthis, the target’s relevance to the Iranian-Saudi rivalry, and the Houthis’ claim of the attack, many initially described the strike as a Houthi attack on behalf of Iran.

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