December 2019 The “Proxy War” Prism on Yemen

View from the City of Taiz

Adam Baron & Raiman Al-Hamdani

Last edited on December 09, 2019 at 1:23 p.m. EST Acknowledgments

This paper would not be possible without the support of our colleagues at New America and Arizona State University and the funding of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The authors would like to thank Gabrielle Hamilton Stowe for her research and editing of this paper, Mohamed al-Qadhi for providing useful feedback and our field researchers, who we unfortunately cannot name for security reasons, for providing us with data otherwise unobtainable.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 2 About the Author(s)

Adam Baron is a fellow in New America's International Security program. He is a writer and political analyst focusing on the Middle East with an emphasis on Yemen and the wider Arabian Peninsula.

Raiman Al-Hamdani is a researcher and consultant focusing on issues of security and development in the Middle East and North Africa, specializing in Yemen. Born in Sana’a, Al-Hamdani spent his formative years in Yemen. He has an MA in International Security and Conflict Management from the American University in Cairo and an MSc in Development Studies from SOAS, University of London.

About New America

We are dedicated to renewing America by continuing the quest to realize our nation’s highest ideals, honestly confronting the challenges caused by rapid technological and social change, and seizing the opportunities those changes create.

About International Security

The International Security program aims to provide evidence-based analysis of some of the thorniest questions facing American policymakers and the public. We are focused on South Asia and the Middle East, extremist groups such as ISIS, al Qaeda and allied groups, the proliferation of drones, homeland security, and the activities of U.S. Special Forces and the CIA.

About Future of Proxy Warfare

The Future of Proxy Warfare Initiative is a joint project of New America’s International Security program and Arizona State University’s Center on the Future of War.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 3 Contents

Executive Summary 5

Introduction 7

War Comes to Taiz 11

The Houthi Incursion into Taiz 14

The Saudi Coalition and the Proxy War Narrative 17

Political Groups in Taiz 20

Islah: The Dominant Political Power in Taiz 21

Taizi Politics Beyond Islah 23

Interaction Between Local Political and Military Competition and Foreign Sponsorship 25

Local Military Forces in Taiz 2015-Present 29

Formal Governance Structures 32

Conclusion 35

Appendix 1: Detailed Summary of Armed Groups in Taiz 37

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 4 Executive Summary

Taiz, Yemen’s third most populous city and the capital of its largest governorate (province) of the same name, is engulfed by war. Long seen as the cultural heart of the country, Taiz emerged in early 2015 as the center of what many observers describe as a proxy war between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis, an armed Zaidi Shia revivalist movement with ties to Iran.

The current military situation in Taiz is a stalemate between the Houthis and a diverse, loosely formed coalition of anti-Houthi groups. Having surrounded and besieged the city of Taiz, the Houthis remain in control of most of its entrances and exits, controlling the passage of goods and people along with a strategically critical north-south gateway. The confict in Taiz is emblematic of the way regional rivalries between Gulf States and Iran and hyperlocal competition for power and infuence have played out and intersected across Yemen.

Foreign powers play an important role in the confict by seeking to impose their own goals through sponsorship of armed factions and political groups. As a strategic location abutting Saudi Arabia’s southern border and the shipping lanes of the Red Sea, Yemen holds importance for several foreign powers’ regional agendas. This has led many commentators to analyze the confict through the lens of proxy warfare.

Yet this lens can easily misrepresent the war as one in which Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and Iran move their proxies like chess pieces seeking comparative advantage, while also reducing the war as a whole to these movements. It is not only a matter of misdiagnosing the dynamics involved; framing the confict as primarily a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia complicates eforts to resolve the confict. The framing provides strategic advantages for many of the belligerent parties who use it to fuel their war eforts. The narrative itself further internationalizes the confict, obscuring the essential nature of the war in Yemen, which is at heart an internal Yemeni political confict.

The internationalization of what was originally a domestic political struggle has made the confict more complex, in turn making it more difcult to resolve, but it has not fundamentally altered the goals of the original domestic combatants. If the war is ever to end, the goals of Yemenis must be recognized for what they are, and elevated in importance above those of the international parties to the confict.

Key Findings:

• Various military forces in Yemen use the proxy war frame as a propaganda tool to recruit and raise funds, but the day-to-day experience of the confict is highly local. In many cases, rather than a

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 5 top-down proxy relationship of control, local forces exercise substantial agency despite receiving sponsorship, pursuing their own interests and using foreign sponsorship opportunities for their own purposes.

• The complex web of forces and sponsorship opportunities has empowered individuals—in addition to groups—to act as major players in Yemen’s war. Abu al-Abbas, the leader of the Abu al-Abbas Brigades, for example, skillfully drew on Saudi, Emirati, local, and potentially al-Qaida support to drive his rise in infuence.

• Though the Houthis have increasingly aligned with Iran, they continue to enmesh themselves in Yemen’s wider body politic. Prior to the current war, the Houthis waged six wars against the Yemeni government in the twenty-frst century, during which there is little evidence of frm Iranian command and control. Iran’s reported provision of missiles and drones shapes the confict, but its roots are local and would not disappear were Iran to fully abandon the Houthis.

• Foreign powers’ development of proxy relationships in the form of external sponsorship has made the confict more complex and difcult to resolve via negotiations. Such foreign relationships have resulted in an interplay between an expanded and shifting set of local forces, national political factions, and international parties, each of which have their own interests and aims. This expanded set of armed and political groups fuels tensions and complicates eforts to end the violence through a negotiated settlement.

• Uncritical adoption of the proxy war narrative poses challenges for peacemakers and policymakers, increasing the risks of escalation and frustrating eforts at confict resolution. The narrative obscures the true localized nature of the confict and ignores the goals and ambitions of key domestic stakeholders.

• These wider divisions have dragged out the battle against the Houthis while providing growth opportunities to extremist groups like al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Al-Qaida’s strength has diminished recently and its power should not be exaggerated, but the group stands to beneft from persistent confict.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 6 Introduction

On September 21, 2014 the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia military group, seized the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, sparking the latest round of internationalized confict in Yemen. While the Houthis waged six battles against the Yemeni central government in the frst decade of the twenty-frst century, the efective takeover of Sanaa by the Houthis and their allies spawned a political and military crisis unparalleled since the 1960s. This crisis included the Houthi kidnapping of Yemeni President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s chief of staf, Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak; the mass resignation of the Yemeni cabinet; the extended house arrest of Hadi himself; and Hadi’s subsequent declaration of war on the Houthis following his escape from Sanaa to Aden, which he then declared Yemen’s temporary capital.1

On March 26, 2015, the Saudi-led coalition began bombing sites in Yemen on the basis of an invitation from the internationally-recognized Yemeni government to aid the state in its fght against the Houthis.2 The invitation for intervention was warmly received, as it appealed to widespread Saudi- and Gulf-state anxiety regarding the Houthis’ relationship with Iran and their perceived role as Iranian proxies. The Saudi-led military coalition, therefore, quickly decided to intervene in Yemen under the framing of restoring the internationally recognized Yemeni government to power.

The warring parties and media coverage have largely cast the ensuing internationalized confict as a proxy war, a “Saudi war on Yemen” or “Iranian … aggression” using the Houthis as “tools.”3 In this framework, the primary narrative of the confict is a story of war between Arab states (mostly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and Iran, tied to broader regional tensions but fought by those states’ respective proxies.

Over the summer of 2019, the war in Yemen and its internationalization escalated. The separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) took hold of Aden and southwestern Yemen.4 The Houthis took credit for a series of increasingly brazen drone attacks within the Saudi interior, most notably claiming credit for the September 14 strikes on the Saudi Aramco oil facilities in Abaqiq and Khurais that reportedly disrupted up to half of Saudi oil production.5 Given the widely- reported Iranian provision of drones to the Houthis, the target’s relevance to the Iranian-Saudi rivalry, and the Houthis’ claim of the attack, many initially described the strike as a Houthi attack on behalf of Iran. Yet, later reporting suggested the strike may not have come from Yemen at all but rather from militias in Iraq or from within Iran itself, illustrating the ways in which the proxy narrative of the Yemen war can separate from the facts of the confict itself, all the while underlining Yemen’s increasing integration into regional battle fronts, if on a symbolic basis.6 France, Germany, and the United Kingdom joined the

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 7 United States in ascribing responsibility to Iran, but left conclusions regarding the strikes’ specifc origins vague.7 All the while, the peace process, led by UN Special Envoy Martin Grifths, has continued to stall, with initial momentum from the December 2018 Stockholm Agreement all but dissipating.8

The narrative of a grand proxy war continues to hold sway, particularly in the wake of the attack on the Saudi Aramco oil facilities. Playing into the narrative can generate funds, recruits, and international public support for both the Saudi- led coalition and the Houthis. Yet, the character of the war in Taiz challenges representations of the Yemen war as primarily a clash between external states conducted via proxy agents. Yemen’s third largest city, Taiz, has been under efective siege by the Houthis since the confict started. One of the most signifcant battlefelds in the country, owing to its strategic importance as the gate between North and South Yemen, Taiz remains the scene of some of the war’s strongest and most devastating battles.

The battles and struggles within Taiz are not only between the Houthis and the rival Saudi- and Gulf-led coalition, but also within and across the coalition itself. Instead of a confict between external states waged through well-controlled proxies, Taiz is the center of a militarized scrum between an amalgam of military and political factions, some of whom have proxy relationships with external powers.

Where they exist, proxy relationships are often weak and unstable, subject to the complex political dynamics of life in Taiz and in Yemen more broadly. The political party Islah, despite working with Saudi Arabia, retains substantial local roots in terms of fnancial and political support. Islah’s dominance over political and military life in Taiz and its ties to the Muslim Brotherhood has led the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to seek to counter its infuence at the same time—often relying on other locally rooted political factions. The various military groups that make up the Saudi-led coalition are products of local, popular uprisings against the Houthis and, despite eforts to regularize them, they continue to operate with great de facto autonomy. In some cases, individuals like Abu Abbas have fueled their rise as independent power centers by playing diferent sponsors of of each other. The variety of sponsorship opportunities and local resources makes this a viable strategy even as it has opened space for proxy relationships outside of formal lines of command.

Nor is this a matter only for the coalition. The Houthis retain an identity deeply rooted in multiple rounds of warfare that predate the expanded relationship with Iran that has emerged over the course of the current war. The power of local politics to interrupt eforts at alliance formation involving both the Houthis and the coalition was demonstrated by the decision of General People’s Congress party leaders in Taiz to reject their now-deceased national leader’s decision to align with the Houthis, instead viewing the Houthis as an invading force.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 8 The sponsorship that underlies these relationships takes many forms. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE alike have provided fnancial support to their allies, in some cases going as far as to pay fghters salaries and provide homes in their capitals for the leaders of allied military groups. The coalition has provided military and air support, coordination, and equipment, while Iran and its regional allies have provided the Houthis with access to a regional network and the resultant training and technological depth. It is difcult to assess what the war would look like without this support; regardless, the support has undeniably deepened various groups’ capacity and bolstered their ability to continue fghting.

These proxy relationships can beneft sponsors, particularly those whose strategies do not require substantial control over proxy agents’ more routine activity. The ambiguity—at least publicly—generated by Iran’s ties with the Houthis may even serve Iranian strategic purposes, regardless of the existence or level of control, when it comes to strikes alleged to have come from more tightly controlled Iranian forces like those on the Saudi Aramco facilities. The existence of such proxy relationships and strategies must be distinguished from narratives that view those relationships and strategies as defning either the identity and interests of the local parties to the confict or the confict as a whole.9

Yemen is strategically located, and the international and regional components of the confict are important and worthy of analysis. However, true understanding of the confict in Yemen can only be achieved through knowledge of the Yemeni forces on the ground, their reasons for fghting, and how their fght is reshaping the wider dynamics in the country.

Reading the Yemen war primarily through the lens of proxy warfare can fuel the confict itself by playing into the strategic uses of the frame by various warring parties and by helping to internationalize the confict. Ending the Yemen war will require recognizing and responding to the local interests at the root of the war, an efort made more difcult by the proxy war framework.

This report utilizes feld research conducted in the Yemeni city of Taiz to illustrate the limitations of reducing the Yemen war to proxy competition between external powers. Research was conducted from April through July of 2019 using multiple feld researchers. The researchers and their interviewees remain anonymous in this report out of concern for their safety in an ongoing confict. Researchers were tasked with assessing the present situation in Taiz, gathering information through multiple interviews with fghters, political leaders, and local residents of Taiz (known as Taizis). Where not otherwise footnoted or common knowledge, all information herein is derived from these interviews.

The report is divided into six sections, including this one. The next section examines how the war came to Taiz, the development of both local and proxy competition in the war, and how multiple belligerents use the proxy narrative to support their war eforts despite maintaining local interests. Sections three

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 9 through fve examine the various forces active in Taiz and their tensions in more detail at the political, military, and governance levels, respectively. The sixth and concluding section draws lessons from the Yemen war’s manifestation in Taiz for Yemen more broadly and for the Greater Middle East and its periphery, which is wracked by proxy and civil wars characterized by similar dynamics. In addition, an appendix provides a detailed examination of the military groups involved in the Yemen war in Taiz.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 10 War Comes to Taiz

The city of Taiz has historically played a key role in Yemen’s political life. Long considered the cultural capital of Yemen, Taiz has occupied this space for roughly a millennium.10 Historically, Taiz was described as the “Damascus of Yemen” for its impressive agricultural and academic production. A cosmopolitan urban center in the 1960s, Taiz provided refuge for southerners agitating against British colonial rule and Republican revolutionaries fghting to oust the Zaidi isolationist Imamate, rendering it a strategic urban space for leftist movements to exchange ideas.11 Home to much of Yemen’s educated class, Taiz often functioned as the urban fulcrum of opposition to the political elite based in Sanaa, Yemen’s capital. In the 1980s, Taiz played a key role in the advancement of negotiations between the north and south in the lead up to national unifcation.12 Taiz was also a focal point of Yemen’s 2011 Arab Spring, which resulted in the ouster of longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh. During the Arab Spring (between 2011 and 2012), Taiz was described as the “heart of the revolution.”13

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 11 Given its historical importance, foreign powers competed for infuence in Taiz prior to the Houthi seizure of Yemen’s capital, with Gulf States in particular funding political parties within the city. Qatar, a major international player in the lead up to the current confict, provided signifcant fnancial backing of Islah (particularly during the 2011 Arab Spring) and continued to back the party after the revolution.14 Iran, for its part, launched an infuence campaign—albeit largely

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 12 on the political front—early on, building ties with some Taizis both directly and through Lebanese networks—particularly disafected leftists—and even (according to interviews conducted for this report) in some cases literally sponsoring trips to Iran.15 All the while, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have maintained decades-old ties with Taiz, including through key political fgures, business families, and social and political networks.

→ SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS IN TAIZ:

The governorate of Taiz is in southwest Yemen, about 160 miles south of the national capital, Sanaa. Technically located in Yemen’s geographic south, the governorate and its main city were both part of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), also known as North Yemen. Taiz remains the third largest city in the country in terms of population size, although its population is estimated to have declined from 600,000 to 200,000 due to displacement.16 The population of Taiz city is majority Shafe’i Sunni, with a handful of Taizi families belonging to the Zaidi sect.17

Already the poorest country in the Arab world before the current war, today Yemen is in a state of economic crisis. Yemen’s GDP contracted by 39 percent since the end of 2014; 80 percent of the country currently relies on some form of aid to survive. 18 Historically a bastion of the middle class, Taiz is not an exception to this dire situation. The conflict has harmed a staggering 95 percent of Taizi businesses.19 Agriculture dominates the area’s economy, with a focus on the growth of crops such as grains, vegetables, and fruits, as well as livestock cultivation and fishing along the Red Sea coast.20 Taiz is also rich in minerals, including copper, nickel, cobalt, and platinum,21 and endowed with many important historic sites. 22 Despite these resources, Taiz’s economic outlook today is dismal.

Taiz is the native home of many of Yemen’s most important business dynasties, most notably the Hayel Saeed Anam family. Hayel Saeed began operating in Taiz in 1938; the business today, which focuses on manufacturing and imports and exports, is a global conglomerate generating $8 billion dollars in annual revenue.23 The Hayel Saeed family remains the largest employer in Taiz, and it continues to be active in philanthropy and social welfare projects throughout the city. Despite being forced to lay off 40 percent of its workforce and reduce the salaries of remaining employees, the company maintains its day-to-day operations, and has even persisted in paying the salaries of employees at its semi-operational factories.24 Still, the ongoing siege of the city and internal fighting has devastated the city’s industrial sector. Many factories are shuttered and many more are damaged

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 13 or destroyed from the fighting. For many Taizis, armed groups present some of the only available jobs.

The humanitarian situation in Taiz is also dire, with locals struggling to access basic services such as healthcare and education—even access to clean drinking water is limited. The Houthi siege of Taiz and the ongoing shelling and sniping from outside of the city has hindered access to basic supplies, and complicated the activities and responses of civil society and relief organizations. This has also made the rebuilding and stabilization process in Taiz difficult. Many homes and shops remain abandoned out of fear of leftover explosive munitions or mines. Despite the ongoing destruction and danger, desperate civilians who fled Taiz are returning home from rural areas of temporary refuge. Today, what used to be a 15-minute trip to the east of the city takes about five hours due to the partial blockage of roads by the Houthis. Freight truck drivers attempting to transport their cargo to residents of the southern neighborhoods in Taiz are forced to use a long stretch of dry riverbed—a path inaccessible during the monsoon seasons while all other roads into the city traverse daunting, unpaved rigid hills.

Finally, the governorate has absorbed the lion’s share of the violence in Yemen. According to a June 2019 report by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), Taiz has experienced the most conflict-related violence of any governorate in Yemen since the war began in 2015.25 From 2015-2019, more than 18,400 people have died in Taiz, including 2,300 civilians killed in violence that targeted them specifically as civilians.26 Significantly, these figures do not include the conflict-related deaths from cholera and other preventable diseases, which proliferated throughout the four and a half years of siege-related hardship. The death toll for the current war in Yemen stands at a staggering 100,000 deaths;27 Taiz makes up a fifth of the national death toll.28

The Houthi Incursion into Taiz

The Houthi rebel movement, whose political branch is called Ansarullah, seized the Yemeni capital on September 21, 2014. The capture of Sanaa was the culmination of decades of Houthi resentment toward the Yemeni government. Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh fought six wars with the Houthis throughout the 2000s.29 The collective result of these wars was the almost wholesale destruction of Saada, the historic capital of the Houthis’ native region, and the lingering resentment of the Houthis toward the government in Sanaa, which they accuse of withholding resources and targeting them unfairly.30 The Houthis largely draw their support from elements of Yemen’s Zaidi community. A branch

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 14 of Shia Islam, the Zaidi community predominates in north Yemen, representing about one-third of the Yemeni population.

The collective result of these wars was the almost wholesale destruction of Saada and the lingering resentment of the Houthis toward the government in Sanaa.

Upon capturing Sanaa, the Houthis spread outward attempting to conquer the rest of the north, including Taiz.31 They also went south, fghting their way almost into Aden before fnally being repelled by the Popular Resistance, a series of militias that organized to resist the Houthi advances. At that time, this resistance was an amorphous collection of armed groups that emerged organically to push back against armed militants fooding into their towns, although the Saudi- and Emirati-backed coalition moved quickly to organize and support groups resistant to the Houthis as they formally intervened in Yemen.32

The Houthi presence in Taiz, however, predated their takeover of Sanaa. The Houthis frst moved to establish an open presence in Taiz during the 2011 Arab Spring-inspired protests, in which men and women across the Middle East took to the streets in mass demonstrations against decades of authoritarian governance.33 The protests, which began in Tunisia and soon embroiled the region, quickly reached Yemen, where demonstrators targeted longtime Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh.34 Calling for expanded rights and services from the government, poverty reduction, and an end to state corruption, protestors also called for Saleh to cede power, which he did, fnally, in February 2012.35

The Houthis were active in the Yemeni Arab Spring, initially making themselves known largely through the Steadfast Youth (Shabab Al-sumud), a Houthi-afliated youth group prominent in protest encampments across the country. During this period, tensions between Houthi-afliated fgures and other political groups occasionally turned violent, mainly in the form of scufes with those youths who supported Islah and those who supported the Houthis in protest squares across the country.36

There were deeply local aspects to the Houthis early political eforts in Taiz. According to interviews conducted by the authors, several prominent Taizis rose through the ranks of the Houthis’ power structure, most notably, Mahmoud Al-

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 15 Guneid, a Taizi poet and political activist who eventually served as a Houthi leader. Al-Guneid was appointed as Director of the Presidential Ofce during the tenure of Saleh al-Samad37 from 2015 through 2018.38 Other fgures who aligned with the Houthis include Sultan al-Samei, a socialist member of parliament, Salah al-Dakak, a prominent leftist activist and journalist, Talal Aqlan, who served as the Houthi-afliated government’s acting prime minister, and Salim Mughalis, a member of the Houthis governing Supreme Political Council in Sanaa and delegate to UN-sponsored peace talks. Many of these fgures, who hailed from leftist political streams, framed their alignment with the Houthis as an outgrowth of their frustration with Islah and other traditional power centers. Islah’s dominance over the transitional process that emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring was one reported factor in uniting the Houthis with some on the left, but some Yemeni political activists also suggested that leftist support might have been fnancially motivated.39

The Houthis took control of parts of the Al-Mokha district in the Taiz governorate as early as March 2015.40 In their campaign, the Houthis often joined forces with groups loyal to ousted former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, owing to their mutual aims of pushing back against various fgures aligned with the transitional government. On March 22, 2015, a joint Houthi-Saleh army swept into the Taiz governorate capturing military bases and strategic spaces around the city of Taiz, including the town of Al-Turbah, 50 miles southwest of Taiz city and 70 miles east of the port of Mokha on the Red Sea coast. Initially, the Houthis faced little organized military resistance from local Taizis, and the joint Houthi- Saleh forces moved quickly through the governorate, capturing the airport and the local Central Security Forces (CSF) base in the capital city.

Local demonstrations against the Houthi incursion began almost immediately, with protests in Taiz and across Al-Turbah. Anti-Houthi demonstrators were met with violence, and were quickly suppressed where they occurred. On March 24, two days after the Houthis entered the Taiz governorate, six protesters were killed and dozens of others were wounded in Taiz and Al-Turbah.41 In reaction to the deaths, Taizi Governor Shawqi Hayel Saeed, grandson of Hayel Saeed Anam, Taiz’s wealthiest and most successful modern businessman, announced his intention to resign from ofce in protest against the security forces’ failure to implement his mandate and directives.42 Saeed was originally selected for this position because of his reputation as a capable technocrat and his family’s long history and infuence in Taiz. However, his resignation announcement paved the way for a violent confrontation in the increasingly fractured city, spurring the wider confagration that continues to embroil Taiz.

In response to Saeed’s resignation announcement, ofcers and members of the Thirty-Fifth Armored Brigade in Taiz, one of the most powerful military units in the city, declared their support for President Hadi. This announcement was prompted by then-Thirty-Fifth brigade head Major General Mansour Mohsen Mu’ajer’s alliance with the Houthis. General Mu’ajer handed over the Al-Arous

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 16 air defense base on top of Jabal (mountain) Saber, and sent two battalions from the brigade to reinforce the joint Houthi-Saleh forces in their southern campaigns.43 The brigade camp is located to the west of the city of Taiz; the territory mandated under the control of the brigade radiates outward from the western entrance of Taiz to the port city of Al-Mokha near the Bab Al-Mandab Strait. Demonstrations denouncing the brigade’s anti-Houthi stance occurred at the city’s old airport, which was under the control of the Thirty-Fifth Brigade.

On April 2, 2015, President Hadi appointed General Adnan Al-Hammadi commander of the Thirty-Fifth Brigade.44 Al-Hammadi was later killed in Taiz on December 2, 2019, more than four years after his appointment. On April 9, 2019 President Hadi issued a decree appointing Brig. Gen. Sadiq Ali Sarhan commander of the Twenty-Second Armored Brigade, a move that was rejected by the brigade’s former commander, Hamoud Dahmash, who remained loyal to Saleh.45 On April 11, pro-Houthi and pro-Hadi soldiers dispersed throughout Taiz. 46 On April 22, after 20 days of intense fghting, the Houthis captured the Thirty- Fifth Brigade headquarters at the old airport.47

In November 2015, seven months after he announced his intent to do so, Shawqi Hayel stepped down as governor of Taiz.48 This marked a watershed moment for Taiz; the end of technocratic governance and the disintegration of local authority.

The Saudi Coalition and the Proxy War Narrative

Shawqi Hayel’s resignation came only a few months after the ofcial start of the Saudi-led coalition’s Operation Decisive Storm, which began on March 26, 2015. 49 The war in Yemen became increasingly internationalized when the Saudi-led coalition ofcially began Operation Decisive Storm. The Saudi-led military operation aimed at ousting the Houthis and restoring Yemen’s internationally- recognized government to power. Decisive Storm was also framed by its proponents as pushing back against what they portrayed as an Iranian-backed threat to their national security. The UAE played a key role in the coalition from the beginning.

In the wake of the Saudi-led coalition’s military intervention in Yemen, the war has often been described as a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This narrative takes diferent forms. Some cast the Houthis as proxies for Iran, while others frame the Yemenis fghting against the Houthis as mercenaries for Saudi Arabia or UAE.

Both narratives are oversimplifcations. The Houthis are ultimately a locally- rooted group whose leadership’s decisions largely appear to be driven by Yemen- related concerns.50 Despite their local roots, the Houthis’ ties to Iran are undeniable. The group derives ideological infuence from both the Iranians and Hezbollah, frmly placing itself in the so-called Resistance Axis, a transnational

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 17 grouping allied with Iran and opposed to the hegemony of U.S. allies in the region.51 While the extent of Iran’s role in the war remains largely opaque, Western ofcials continue to highlight Iran’s deployment of ground advisors to Yemen, while UN expert reports point to Iranian technology transfers to the Houthis, particularly with regards to drone and missile technology.52 The Houthis receive logistical support from Iran, but this does not mean that they are a proxy over which Iran exercises substantial control. Despite shared ideological afnities, there is little evidence of frm Iranian command and control over the Houthis during the earlier rounds of warfare throughout the 2000s, though the relationship between Iran and the Houthis has clearly strengthened since the start of the war.53

Saudi Arabia has encouraged the grand proxy war narrative to garner both political and material support for its war eforts. By describing Iran’s involvement in Yemen as an existential threat to Saudi and regional security, Saudi Arabia has successfully persuaded Western governments of the necessity of its Yemen campaign, even in the face of declining international public support for the confict.54 While the United States has scaled back its indirect involvement in the Saudi campaign—most visibly in November 2018, when it halted its mid-air refueling of Saudi military planes—the United States continues to provide weapons and logistical support to both the Saudis and their Emirati partners.55 The prevailing framing of the coalition is similarly reductionist. Houthi-aligned media often frames Yemeni soldiers fghting on the coalition’s side as mercenaries or extremists, often going so far as to portray them as traitors to Yemen.56

Saudi Arabia has encouraged the grand proxy war narrative to garner both political and material support for its war eforts.

For the Houthis, framing their battle as one against a foreign enemy has allowed the group to mobilize fghters, even as the battles are largely directed against fellow Yemenis. This messaging of the wider confict as a “Saudi war in Yemen,” particularly in a signifcant portion of Western discourse, has also served to beneft the Houthis and their sympathizers, who have aimed to capitalize on some Western politicians’ and publics’ antipathy to Saudi Arabia—particularly after the death of Jamal Khashoggi—to generate international sympathy for their cause and opposition to Saudi Arabia’s military eforts.57

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 18 However, in the eyes of many Yemenis, not just in Taiz but also in areas like Marib and the formerly independent south, the Houthi incursion constituted a virtual invasion, leading them to frame their decision to take up arms in a locally rooted, defensive manner—regardless of whether they eventually linked up with powers outside of the country for fnancial and military support.58

Al-Qaida in turn benefts from both versions of the grand proxy warfare narrative. The group uses its propaganda to portray the war as defned by foreign intrusions, casting the Houthis as Shia tools of Iran and a refection of a region- wide sectarian threat, while simultaneously mounting criticism of the UAE presence as a foreign tool of the United States.59 At the same time, al-Qaida seeks to burnish its ties to local tribes proclaiming its local rootedness, and when it has had success in Yemen, that success has largely come from its deft manipulation of local dynamics amidst the larger war.60

While a variety of local, national, and international actors invested in Taiz share an interest in battling the Houthis, there are diferences at each level over how it should be done and who should be the force behind it.61 As the confict and humanitarian crisis intensifed, tensions over tactics and strategy broke out in the open, which in many ways refected long-standing friction between political factions in Taiz.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 19 Political Groups in Taiz

In order to understand the confict in Taiz, it is necessary to understand the political groups active in the city. The mainstream political groups in Taiz mirror those elsewhere in Yemen. Due in part to its educated middle class and history of opposition activity, Taiz’s political life has historically been more active than that of most other areas in Yemen.

Over the course of the war, the Islah party has arguably dominated politics in Taiz. Yet other political parties remain active in the governorate. These parties have at various times cooperated with Islah while at other times challenging it.

The key political groups in Taiz—namely, Islah, the General People’s Congress (GPC) party, the Nasserists, and the Socialists—have maintained their importance and locally rooted identities throughout the upheaval of the past fve years. Far from political factions becoming mere pawns of foreign powers, political contestation rooted in local history is alive in the city and shapes the confict. However, the confict and its internationalization has also at times reshaped the roles of Taizi political parties with many gaining de facto military wings, becoming infuenced by foreign powers, or some mix of the two.

→ KEY POLITICAL FACTIONS IN TAIZ AND THEIR LEADERS

Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah)

President of the party in Taiz: Abdul Hafedh Al-Faqih

Military commander: Abdo Farhan Salem - known as Salem

The Nasserist Unionist People’s Organization or NUPO

Head of the party branch in Taiz: Adel Al-Aqibi

The General People’s Congress Party (GPC)

Head of Taiz branch (Pro Hadi): Sheikh Aref Gamel

The Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP)

Multiple leaders in Taiz: Mohamed Abudlaziz Al-Sinwi, Mohammed Abdulrahman Al-Samei, Abdulhakim Sharaf

Al-Rashad Union

Party representative in Taiz: Abdulhakim Aoun62

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 20 Islah: The Dominant Political Power in Taiz

Islah is one of the most important local political forces in Yemen in general and, currently, in Taiz in particular. A political party with a religious dimension, it is known for its association with the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Islah aligned with the ruling GPC party both in the run-up to and in the aftermath of the 1994 civil war, in part as a hedge against the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP).63

After his government’s victory in 1994, Saleh distributed some ministries to Islah members, such as the Ministry of Education, and supported their opening of scientifc institutes, which became centers of religious studies. Islah utilized the post-unifcation era of democratization, unifcation, and the creation of a multiparty system to become a formal and legal opposition party, and develop charitable organizations throughout the country while maintaining a close relationship with funders in the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia.64 In 2003, fearful of Islah’s growing strength and infuence, Saleh attempted to crack down on religious political parties, further prompting Islah to formally move to the opposition and join the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), a coalition of Yemen’s establishment opposition parties.65

By 2011, Islah had expanded to become the largest opposition party in Taiz and the rest of the country.66 Islah possessed the ability and resources to quickly mobilize against the ruling forces, which proved essential during the Arab Spring. Islah had signifcant sway over Freedom Square, the center of the protests.67 When it was attacked, Islah and its allies held their own in violent confrontations against pro-Saleh forces.68

Islah had expanded to become the largest opposition party in Taiz and the rest of the country.

Up until 2015, Islah was able to benefit from its political organization and hierarchical military, as well as experience accrued from its participation in 69 battles throughout various cycles of conflict. The power of Islah-aligned networks continues to grow politically and militarily in Taiz. Since 2015 Islah’s allies have had substantial influence on liberated areas of Taiz’s government, security services, and military brigades and units.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 21 The Islah party is financed mainly through their financial capital, local economic 70 projects, and funding from their international allies. The charitable trusts and other civil society organizations established during and after Islah’s alliance with 71 Saleh generate income and goodwill for the party. Islah has retained its local political identity despite its interactions with foreign sponsors, thanks in part due to its rootedness in the Yemeni political fabric and access to diverse sources of funding beyond foreign sponsorship.

Yet Islah also maintains relationships with foreign powers. Despite Saudi Arabia’s antipathy to the Muslim Brotherhood (and many Islah members’ close relationship with Qatar),72 Riyadh has long maintained close relations with numerous fgures in Islah and those afliated with the party. Saudi Arabia took advantage of these relationships to bolster its fght against the Houthis in the lead up to Operation Decisive Storm. Many fgures within Islah have beneftted from Saudi patronage, and many members of the party’s leadership currently reside in Riyadh, such as Islah’s Chairman Mohammed Abdullah al-Yadoumi.73

The ofcial leader of Islah in Taiz today is Abdel-Hafedh Al-Faqih, although he is seen as possessing little decision-making power with regards to military fles. The bulk of the key military fgures within the network maintain lower profles. Chief among them is the network’s top military commander, Salem, who is often cast as the de facto leader of Taiz by more vociferous critics of the Islah party. The general public frst became aware of Salem’s true identity within Islah in February 2018, when the media publicized his appointment as an advisor to the Commander of the Taiz Military Axis.74

Currently, the city of Taiz is under the military control of pro-Islah security brigades and the political control of the Islah party. The Islah network has full control over government departments across sectors, and has generally succeeded in politically and militarily dominating the city. Many of Hadi’s associates connected to Islah leadership, such as General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, have a large say in top-down decision-making in collaborating with Islah- afliated groups. After four years of war, Islah has managed to build signifcant sway over key state functions within Taiz. Salem and other Islah-aligned fgures and businessmen have also made large fnancial investments in universities, schools, factories, and small companies throughout the city in order to shore up the position of the party and its allies.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 22 Taizi Politics Beyond Islah

Islah is but one of many political parties operating in Taiz. Other parties, including the Nasserist NUPO, the formerly ruling GPC, the socialist YSP, and the Salafst Al Rashad Union, are active in Taiz and continue to alternatively compete and cooperate with Islah, in some cases developing close relationships with foreign sponsors, particularly the UAE given its wariness towards Islah.

The NUPO is an Arab nationalist and socialist Yemeni political party founded on December 25, 1965. It has been a part of the JMP75 since the JMP’s formation in 2002.76 The NUPO won one seat in the 1993 parliamentary elections and two seats in 1997.77

An opposition party in Taiz, NUPO is often cast as the second most powerful political party in the city after Islah. Among Yemeni political factions, the Nasserists were one of the most unequivocal in their opposition to the Houthi takeover of Sanaa.78 The Nasserist party is one of several leftist forces and parties that many residents of Taiz associated with in previous generations. But with time, and changing internal dynamics, more conservative factions such as the Islah Party have eclipsed the historically prominent leftist parties.

Today in Taiz, NUPO marginally shares power with Islah networks, with some important government positions being held by notable Nasserist fgures. Figures from the NUPO in the government of Taiz include Rashid Al-Akhali, the deputy governor of Taiz, and Hussein Al-Maqtari, former head of the Cleaning and Improvement Fund. Although the party has no afliated military groups or armed organizations, individuals afliated with NUPO have joined and ascended the ranks of the army in Taiz.

The Nasserists remain poorly funded and dependent on internal sources of revenue. At the beginning of the war, they appeared to receive support from some of the coalition countries, particularly the UAE, but this support has been uneven. Today, NUPO is likely supported by businessmen afliated directly with the party, although contacts in the city say it continues to engage in outreach to the UAE.

The General People's Congress party (GPC), founded in 1982 under Ali Abdullah Saleh, has historically been the ruling party in Yemen and the strongest political force in the country, though its power declined from 2011 through 2015. The GPC has rebounded recently due to the breakdown of the Houthi-Saleh relationship.

At the beginning of the war, much of the upper-level leadership of the GPC sided with President Ali Abdullah Saleh and accepted his formation of a strategic alliance with the Houthis.79 However, this difered across the country, including in Taiz, where many of the GPC’s local leadership viewed expelling the Houthis from the city as their immediate priority, leading to splits within the party.80 The split between many of the national GPC leaders and Taiz’s local GPC leadership

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 23 over the question of allying with the Houthis illustrates the local roots of Yemeni politics and the ability of local interests to reshape political factions and interrupt eforts at alliance formation.

Sheikh Aref Gamel, the head of the GPC’s Taiz branch, is one of the leaders of the Popular Resistance who fought the Houthis in Taiz. Gamel led his forces to completely liberate the south of the city, including Jabal Saber, the frst liberated district in Taiz. The ascent of the GPC in Taiz would have not been possible without their alliance and coordination with fgures and factions loyal to Islah party networks. The split in the party posed challenges for many of its members. Some members of the GPC now reside in Cairo and do not want to be associated with any of the parties to the confict.81 However, Gamel’s supporters praise him for his pragmatism and fghting prowess alike.

The ascent of the GPC in Taiz would have not been possible without their alliance and coordination with fgures and factions loyal to Islah party networks.

Taiz natives have also been politically prominent in the GPC outside of the city. The current head of parliament, Sheikh Sultan al-Barakani, is an MP from Taiz and the longstanding head of the GPC’s bloc in parliament. Former Minister of Interior Rashad al-Alimi and former Taiz Governor Hamoud al-Suf both continue to play key roles in decision-making in the governorate from afar, taking advantage of their long-standing relations with key stakeholders inside and outside of Yemen. While quiet for some time, the GPC has held public demonstrations in Taiz, underlining their aim of maintaining relevance in the city.

The YSP was once one of the major political parties in Yemen, although its infuence has declined since its heyday in the 1970s. One of Yemen’s original socialist parties, the YSP originally formed as the Unifed Political National Front Organization, which was a merger between three political movements that fought for independence from the British: Yemen's National Liberation Front of occupied South Yemen (NLF), the Democratic Union Party (Marxist), and the Popular Vanguard Party (Baathist).82 In 1978, it ofcially became the YSP.83 The party maintains an outsized presence abroad, where many of its various leaders

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 24 have resided since 1994, after the North-South civil war, and (more recently) post-Arab Spring.84

After the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), an ambitious summit that was meant to be the cornerstone of Yemen’s post-Arab Spring transitional process, the YSP was delegated some positions within the local authority of Taiz. For example, Mohammed Abdulrahman Al-Samei was appointed director of fnance and Najib Qahtan was appointed as the director of the Information Ofce. According to local sources, Qahtan has close ties with Islah networks, which has afected his infuence within YSP leadership circles.85

As previously mentioned, the Houthis’ entry into Taiz was partly facilitated through the support of YSP fgure Sultan al-Samei, whose relationship with the Houthis has grown increasingly complicated.86 A number of prominent Taizis who have aligned with the Houthis have socialist backgrounds, which stem in part from their antipathy to the Islah party.

Finally, Al-Rashad Union is a Yemeni political organization oriented towards Salafsm and Islamism. The party issued its establishment announcement on March 14, 2012, and soon after received ofcial permission to engage in political activity in Taiz.87 The party is currently headed by Mohammed Musa Al-Amiri; the secretary general is Abdul Wahab Al-Humayqani.

While Al-Rashad wields very little political power on the ground in Taiz, the party has successfully poached members from Islah groups who are attracted to the party’s religious dimension.

A deputy of the governorate, Dr. Abdul Hakim Aoun, was appointed as the Salafs' slot in the local government in Taiz, however, Abdulhakim Aoun is reportedly also afliated with the Islah Party.88 The relationship between Aoun, Islah, and Al-Rashad Union underlines Islah’s coordination with—and continuing infuence over—other political groups in the city.

Interaction Between Local Political and Military Competition and Foreign Sponsorship

Islah has maintained political and military dominance in Taiz over the course of the Yemen war. As noted above, this has resulted in many prior rivals having to accommodate the party. However, it has also led to blowback from rivals able to beneft from foreign sponsors wary of Islah’s Muslim Brotherhood ties. At the same time, political and military entrepreneurs taking advantage of hyperlocal facets of the war economy increasingly shape and challenge Islah’s power.

Apart from the Houthis themselves—and with the GPC party’s split into pro- Saleh and pro-coalition factions at the time—Islah’s afliates and allies constituted the most organized and experienced fghting forces in the city. With

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 25 Saleh’s eventual death at the hands of the Houthis, the GPC in Taiz was able to fully align itself with Islah and the coalition.

Military leaders who had broken with Saleh and backed key military leader Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar89 during the 2011 fghting—most notably, Sadiq Sarhan, Saleh Al-Thaneen, and Hameed Al-Qushaibi—aligned against the Houthis, in numerous cases cooperating with Islah paramilitary forces. Local social fgures who led militias during that same period, most notably Hamoud al-Mekhlaf, were largely drawn from Islah as well.

Islah used organizational structures that it developed for its charitable, educational, and political outreach programs as the bedrock for organizing local resistance against the Houthis. The presence of many connected Taizi Islah supporters and allies in circles close to the internationally recognized government eased the process of obtaining military and fnancial support from the Yemeni government, while the disproportionate representation of Taizis amongst the Yemeni press corps granted a steady stream of media attention.

The 2016 exodus from Taiz of Hamoud Al-Mekhlaf, the frst leader of the Popular Resistance there, deprived the city of a key fgurehead and potentially unifying fgure and exposed the realities of the divisions amongst coalition forces in Taiz. The reasons for his departure are described later in this report. It did little, however, to diminish the continuing infuence of Islah’s networks in Taiz, which only solidifed in the coming period, although power has shifted to less well-known fgures on the ground.

Even so, Islah and its allies’ perceived dominance resulted in blowback from anti- Houthi forces in Taiz. Local powers, like the Nasserists and individuals such as Abu Al-Abbas and his eponymous brigade, who distrusted Islah or resented what they saw as Islah’s undue infuence sought to shore up their own standing.90 Foreign powers—most notably, the UAE—which were anxious about the potential resurgence of Muslim Brotherhood ideologies in Yemen, eagerly built relationships with and bolstered these local forces within the wider framework of battling the Houthis.91 Local groups and individuals took advantage of the overarching regional narrative of a Gulf (particularly Emirati) confict with the Muslim Brotherhood to fuel their own political ends.92 In turn, the UAE’s support for Islah opponents has generated greater anti-UAE feeling among some Islah- afliated factions.

Meanwhile various smaller groups—or even individuals—have sought to control local funding streams and develop their own political and economic bases of support. Issues ranging from the collection of taxation to the manning of checkpoints became key focuses of political and military tension. While the wider ideological diferences and geopolitical tensions apparent in foreign sponsor relations set out the kindling, it has consistently been these hyper-local issues that provide the match, spurring clashes between anti-Houthi armed

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 26 groups. For example, in July 2018, there were a total of 48 revenue-generating checkpoints on the road between Taiz and Hayjaht Al-Abd (connecting south Taiz to the south of Yemen) controlled by either Islah afliates or their opponents.93

Groups have also clashed and profted from the trade of qat, a mild narcotic leaf chewed across the country, and one of the few thriving industries in Yemen’s war-economy.94 In January 2019, fghters loyal to Ghazwan al-Mekhlaf, an unruly adolescent member of the Twenty-Second Brigade, fought with militias over control of qat taxation in the Qat market, in Al-Thawra neighborhood of Taiz.95 Ghazwan is related to Sadiq Sarhan, commander of the Twenty-Second Brigade, and hails from the same village as the famed Popular Resistance fgure Hamoud Al-Mekhlaf.96

Since 2017, the internationally recognized Yemeni government has organized security campaigns to clear elements they described as being “outside” the law, using the local police and authorities to clear government buildings and institutions occupied or held by groups challenging the government’s authority. Many of these campaigns have proven unsuccessful. For instance, coalition fghters from the Thirty-Fifth Brigade ignored government orders to relinquish control of vital revenue-generating checkpoints around the southern entrance of Taiz.97 Most of these campaigns failed to progress due to infghting, the willful ignorance of government orders by certain militias, and the ability of these factions to act independently with impunity. The last of these security campaigns was launched in March 2019 by Governor Nabil Shamsan and has shown little success, as the local authorities struggle to come together under Hadi’s umbrella, often choosing to halt the campaigns to avoid a clash of interests between difering armed groups responsible for helping to keep the peace.98

Bouts of infghting between anti-Houthi armed groups have often ended in ceasefre agreements. For example, a truce committee under the auspices of Taiz Governor Nabil Shamsan reached an agreement with the Abu Al-Abbas Brigades to hand over wanted individuals and evacuate Abu Al-Abbas fghters from the residential neighborhoods in the Old City.99 Yet the wider structural issues encouraging and allowing for such clashes remain. Absent greater consolidation of power—whether in the hands of one group, which appears unlikely, or in the form of a more coherent and cooperative coalition of factions (a tall order) —a lasting accord is unlikely. This is particularly true given the enduring weakness of civilian government, a trend which appears to have continued under the current governor, Nabil Shamsan, regardless of his best intentions.

It remains far from certain that the groups in Taiz will agree and implement a durable cease of hostilities in the medium-term future, as the war has also become an enterprise in and of itself, infecting nearly all aspects of daily life in Taiz. Fighters are overwhelmingly reliant on their salaries, which has brought increasing leverage for military leaders and their funders at all levels. Even those

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 27 not directly reliant on war-related monies cannot fully disentangle from the wider system.100 In this context, Taiz’s situation will likely continue to be shaped by local tensions and its war economy—which have seen power brokers clash over everything from weapons smuggling to checkpoint profteering—as much if not more than by the grander proxy conficts between external states or even by Yemen’s more traditional political divides.

Fighters are overwhelmingly reliant on their salaries, which has brought increasing leverage for military leaders and their funders at all levels.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 28 Local Military Forces in Taiz 2015-Present

The military forces battling the Houthis in Taiz illustrate the complexity of the Yemen war and the difculty of encapsulating its dynamics within a grand proxy war framework that views sponsors as exerting substantial control over their proxies and views the confict as defned by the aims of external sponsors.

Many of the armed groups active in Taiz initially emerged as irregular Popular Resistance forces operating outside of the government. External funding facilitated their activity, but often struggled to catch up with the actions of locally motivated groups.

Over the course of the war these forces have increasingly been brought, at least nominally, into the chain of command of the Yemeni government. The hierarchy of the military decision-making in the Yemeni government is as follows. Forces under the Yemeni army ostensibly fall under the leadership of Yemeni President Abdo Rabbu Hadi, then, Minister of Defense Mohamed al-Maqdashi, and fnally, Armed Forces Chief of Staf Taher al-Aqill. Those in Taiz fall under the de jure leadership of the Fourth Military Region (one of four military regions in Yemen designated since 2013), which includes both Aden and Taiz. According to interviews with military fgures, the process of absorbing these forces into the government military brigades began in July 2015.

However, the formalization of the Popular Resistance groups has not turned the Yemen war into a clash between unifed military forces under the sway of foreign sponsors that can be understood primarily through a framework of proxy warfare. Despite formalization, the confict remains locally rooted, and sponsors must contend with local loyalties and political competition.

Forces within the Yemeni army in Taiz have witnessed leadership changes as the central government, the Yemeni armed forces chain of command, various Yemeni political factions, and the coalition have sought to bolster their favored fgures within Yemen’s military structure. External backers, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have played a role in this dynamic. However, this has often seen a degree of back and forth, with partnerships evolving due to difering internal and external dynamics.

Though the Yemeni government is often reduced to a proxy for the Gulf States, it actually has discretion over how Gulf support is distributed on the ground. Hadi’s government provides the salaries for soldiers in the Axis. Hadi’s government in turn receives fnancial support from the coalition countries, which it distributes to its military and political leaders on the ground, demonstrating the multi-level nature of its alliance with its Saudi backers.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 29 While forces in Taiz have increasingly been brought nominally under the ofcial chain of command, military leaders in Taiz have substantial autonomy from both their military superiors and coalition sponsors, owing in equal parts to the dispersed status of the Yemeni armed forces and the besieged nature of the city of Taiz. Both media reports and Taizis themselves frequently refer to brigades by their pre-reorganization name, continuing to view Popular Resistance groups that were ostensibly subsumed into the national army as still-discrete entities.

This dynamic is compounded by the interaction of internal party politics with foreign power sponsorship, particularly in the case of divides between Islah and its rivals. There are two broad military groupings in Taiz. The frst, the Taiz Military Axis, is generally viewed by international observers as being aligned with Islah, and incorporates the bulk of the Popular Resistance groups. The second grouping, also aligned against the Houthis, consists of the Thirty-Fifth Brigade and the Abu al-Abbas Brigades.

The Thirty-Fifth Brigade and Abu al-Abbas have received UAE support in part to counter the strength of Islah, whose ties to the Muslim Brotherhood worry the Emiratis. In turn, this has pushed the traditional backers of Islah to increase support to their preferred agents. Both the Thirty-Fifth Brigade and the Abu Abbas Brigades—in contrast to the majority of the groups within the Taiz Military Axis—are seen by Taizis as primarily UAE-, rather than Saudi-, backed.

However, these alignments are often more ephemeral than they are represented as under the grand proxy war narrative. In reality, both groupings have beneftted from coalition funding, composed mostly of support from both the UAE and Saudi Arabia, at diferent points in time, underlining the dynamic nature of proxy-sponsor relationships in Yemen.

The military groupings are fuid in structure and the outlines of the groups are constantly mutable and evolving, with individuals and battalions merging with other battalions and brigades. On the ground, personal relationships, geography, and familial ties often have as much, if not more, to do with allegiance and alliance than ideology and geopolitics.

For example, on December 2, 2019, Adnan Al-Hammadi, the commander of Thirty-Fifth Brigade was killed in Taiz. As Afrah Nasser, a Human Rights Watch Yemen researcher, put it, the assassination "refects the deepening fragmentation of power in [Taiz]."101 Two years prior to his death, Al-Hammadi told the journalist Abu Bakr Al-Shamahi that fnancial and military support intended to strengthen the military was diverted to other pro-government factions. According to Al-Shamahi, "Of camera [Al-Hammadi] said that the UAE had agreed to supply him with heavy weapons for a military ofensive against the Houthis, but that [Islah] had prevented this from happening."102 In the wake of his assassination, attribution for which remains unclear, some have pointed the

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 30 fnger at Islah, illustrating the role of local political rivalries in the confict and the Taizi understanding of it.

In addition to the two major military groupings, al-Qaida also maintains a latent presence in Taiz. Although its presence has diminished due to counterterrorism operations, it has not disappeared and has in the past demonstrated an ability to use the chaos of the war and the propaganda framings of proxy war to its advantage.

A detailed examination of these three military groupings, their local roots, and the complex interaction between local interests and external sponsors can be found in Appendix One.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 31 Formal Governance Structures

Taiz has historically had a strong government, both on a governorate and local level. Though local governance has been challenged over the course of the confict by both the infuence of external sponsors and decentralization of power as a result of the war, local government retains much of its independent and locally rooted identity.

This legacy of strong governance has been used as an instrument by the government and its supporters in much of their rhetoric in the battle against the Houthis. Key allies and spokespeople for the government have framed their battle as one to restore the state in response to the Houthis’ takeover, focusing particularly on the restoration of the civilian governance.

This legacy of strong governance has been used as an instrument by the government and its supporters in much of their rhetoric...

On the ground, it has been more complicated, owing to the constellation of armed groups and foreign infuence. The three governors who have served since the start of the confict have all struggled to do their job amidst the insecurity and violence resulting from the ongoing war against the Houthis, but also from the competing armed groups, many of whom operate with relative autonomy de facto running the more lucrative governance roles themselves.

Since the resignation of Governor Shawqi Hayel Saeed in 2015, Taiz has seen three governors: Ali Al-Maamari, Amin Mahmoud, and currently, Governor Nabil Shamsan, all of whom hail from the GPC party.103 Nonetheless, owing to the city’s divided political afliations, the rise of party-aligned militias and the wider divides of the confict, Taiz’s governors ultimately have been forced to maintain consensus among the governorate’s various political and military factions.

Yemenis have tended to view Taiz’s governors within the prism of their ties to outside powers. Maamari, a native of Taiz, had previously distinguished himself as a member of parliament with his acerbic criticism of the Houthis and his resignation from the GPC in support of Yemen’s Arab Spring-inspired uprising in February 2011. Yet, he is often viewed in Yemeni political circles through his cooperation with Islah-afliated fgures in Taiz, and his critics often cast him as

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 32 an undeclared member of the party (this information is based on interviews with Yemeni MPs and political fgures who repeatedly highlighted this relationship). His successor, Amin Mahmoud, a former local government ofcial who had spent most of the past decade in Canada, is viewed by interviewees through the prism of his cordial relations with the UAE, something in contrast with his predecessor, which raised the ire of many local backers of the Islah party.

According to close sources, Amin Mahmoud comes from an afuent family from Saber, and is married to one of the daughters of former Yemeni Vice President Judge Abdulkarim Al-Arashi; this displays how the element of social status is often used in appointing political fgures.

Taizi governors found themselves deeply constrained and shaped by the local dynamics of the city. Maamari resigned in protest two years after taking ofce, complaining of the Central Bank in Aden’s refusal to pay salaries to his employees and claiming that he wasn’t given sufcient resources to carry out his job.104 Mahmoud, as local rumor has it, was sacked, not due to issues with his performance, but due to pressure from ofcials in the Islah party, who viewed him as a threat to their interests due to his perceived close relationship with the UAE. Under all governors, security concerns have meant limited accessibility, with many spending signifcant time abroad in Riyadh and Cairo or in the temporary capital of Aden.

As with Taiz’s larger political culture, Taiz’s governance structures have been challenged by increasingly hyper-local sources of authority empowered by the war economy and the government’s inability to project its power. Many state institutions across Taiz (including the police and security services, local courts, and public civil institutions) have been defunct since 2015, when Houthi shelling and coalition airstrikes battered the city. According to the Yemen Polling Center, an independent research organization, the role of tribal sheikhs and aqils, or neighborhood leaders,105 has increased in the absence of the state’s ability to provide security, as traditional governance fgures have stepped in to fll the vacuum.106

As the war went on and the political and security vacuum widened across Yemen, local governing authorities and informal local authority brokers began operating more independently. Local authorities have become more isolated over time from what is happening elsewhere in the country and are more inclined to serve their personal agendas rather than those of the government. Today, they are often assisted in the pursuit of individual, localized ambitions by the foreign backers who make up the coalition. Support from international powers has led to an increase in the number of non-governmental groups exerting infuence over local afairs, as well as growing groups of local players.

Four and a half years of intensifying confict and insecurity at the national level has led to a general collapse in security. Local police forces and entire branches of

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 33 the judiciary, which once helped to maintain a degree of order, can no longer guarantee a safe environment for local authorities to operate. At the same time, local councils across Yemen have lost much of their funding. In 2015, the internationally recognized government was forced to reduce funding to local councils due to confict-related declines in oil and gas revenues.107 Additionally, the January 2018 budget exclusively allocated funds to pay the salaries of local authorities at the expense of 50 percent of the operating costs for the areas under their control.108

In the eyes of many of its backers, the battle for Taiz was about restoring and/or preserving state institutions and preventing the Houthis from consolidating control. Nonetheless, in many regards, the battle to restore the rule of the internationally recognized government has served to weaken formal governance structures even as it has facilitated the government’s return, something that has been fueled, in part, by foreign sponsorship of armed groups in the city. However, foreign sponsorship has not eliminated the relevance and power of local governing parties. Tensions are likely to continue to shape stabilization eforts in the city despite armed groups’ formal integration into the Yemeni armed forces’ chain of command.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 34 Conclusion

The confict in Taiz is ultimately rooted in decades, if not centuries, of history. The city—the ancestral home of much of Yemen’s educated middle and upper- middle class—has come to epitomize the country’s wider unrealized dreams and lost potential owing to misgovernment, underdevelopment, and corruption. The uprising of 2011 represented an opportunity to push back against this; Taizis took the lead in protests not just in Taiz, but in Sanaa itself. The collapse of the transitional period and the Houthis’ subsequent takeover of Sanaa (and attempted takeover of Taiz) has plunged Yemen and the city into a state of continuous confict.

The battle between local tribal, social, religious, and military leaders and the Houthis for the city has left Taiz the most devastated front in Yemen’s ongoing war. Long-standing political and factional divides have been weaponized, in many cases transmuting partisan cleavages onto wider regional divides. As civilians are caught between belligerents, extremist groups thrive in the resulting insecurity.

The infuence of foreign powers in Yemen has led many to frame the confict as a proxy war between the Arab States (Saudi Arabia and the UAE) and Iran. It is certainly true that these foreign powers have cultivated proxy relationships with various military and political groups in Yemen. But on the ground, the complications are plainly obvious. Internal divides between political parties and branches of the military have spawned street wars and petty personal grievances fuel battles within the coalition. Above all, young men continue to fnd themselves in the line of fre, fghting to defend their city even as wider, more complicated agendas interfere.

The infuence of foreign powers in Yemen has led many to frame the confict as a proxy war between the Arab States and Iran.

Within this context, locally based individuals and networks have demonstrated their agency and ability to shape the confict, playing foreign powers of of each other, using the very framing of proxy war for their own ends. Though increasingly challenged both by the internationalization of the confict and the

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 35 de-centralization—and in some cases, collapse of traditional forms of governance—Yemeni political and military forces continue to express locally- rooted identities and compete on that basis rather than becoming pawns of foreign powers.

While its success has so far been limited, the ability of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula to use the mesh of competing military and political factions to strengthen itself, either through its own mobilization or by building connections with and inroads into other forces, is particularly concerning.

As tensions in southern Yemen—which have seen clashes between the UAE- backed, separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) and Yemeni government —unfold and phenomenon like the splintering of the Syrian opposition demonstrate, local politics can often upend the plans of ostensibly more powerful external forces with major consequences. Reporting from cities like Taiz underlines the multiplicity of dynamics driving what are often seen as binary conficts. As conficts in other arenas, including the Syrian city of Raqqa, demonstrate, these divisions are not mere minutiae—jihadist groups have managed to successfully exploit competition between local parties to undermine their adversaries and expand their reach on the ground in confict-wracked areas. 109

Understanding—let alone working to help resolve or deescalate— the Yemen war and similar conficts across the Greater Middle East requires embracing multiplicity, both within armed groups and with regards to the hierarchy of interests driving conficts. It is a mistake to ignore the role of external powers and their proxy relationships in Yemen, but it is also a mistake to ascribe to those relationships primary explanatory power. At the end of the day, there will be no peace in Yemen until local interests of Yemenis are recognized and addressed. The war has relevance for regional proxy conficts, but it is, indeed, a Yemeni war.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 36 Appendix 1: Detailed Summary of Armed Groups in Taiz

This appendix provides a detailed description of the various military groups involved in the Yemen war on the anti-Houthi side. The groups are broken down into the three main groupings: the Taiz Military Axis, armed groups outside the axis but part of the coalition, and al-Qaida. Within each large grouping, descriptions are provided of specifc brigades that fall under the grouping, as well as of smaller units and groups that make up the brigades.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 37 Taiz Military Axis

The leadership of the Taiz Military Axis, which is under the command of the Yemeni Army in Taiz, belongs to the Fourth Military Region. The frst commander of the Axis was Brig. Gen. Yusuf Al-Sharaji, a military leader seen as close to the Islah Party, who was replaced in 2014 by Major General Khaled Fadel, who helped integrate various elements of the Popular Resistance (the bulk of which were allied with Islah) within the formal military structure.110 In December 2018, Fadel, despite being a member of the Islah party, was removed as part of a series of presidential decrees that led to his replacement by Major General Samir Sabri. The decrees also removed the governor of Taiz, Dr. Amin Mahmoud, due to fears that Mahmoud would threaten Hadi’s position by advancing UAE policy. 111

Though understood to be one military grouping with ties to the Saudi-led coalition, the Taiz Military Alliance consists of a number of diferent brigades and groups that belie its representation as a stable force rather than a mutating set of individuals, networks, and brigades with their own local roots and identities. These constitutive parts are described below.

Twenty-Second Mechanized Infantry Brigade

The Twenty-Second Mechanized Infantry Brigade follows the Taiz Military Axis. Its commander, Major Sadiq Sarhan, is a veteran military fgure and was one of the leaders of the First Armored Brigade before the current war. During the 2011 battles in Taiz, he mobilized fghters to stand against Saleh’s forces. Since the

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 38 reorganization of the armed groups in Taiz and the incorporation of the popular resistance militia groups into the Yemeni armed forces, the Twenty-Second Brigade has incorporated four key groups, all of which are broadly seen by locals as belonging within Islah’s network.

Yahya Al-Raymi group:

Yahya Al-Raymi led fghters in the eastern front axis and the Republican Palace in May 2017.112 Al-Raymi is also a local Islah leader and former Quranic teacher. His fghters merged into the Twenty-Second Brigade in February 2017,113 and in 2018, the government replaced him with Ahmed Al-Baadani.114 Despite being sacked as leader of the brigade, Al-Raymi reportedly continues to lead battles in the eastern parts of the city under the ofcial title of “Moral Guidance Ofcer” in the Taiz Military Axis. There are whispers that Al-Raymi is one of the Yemenis who returned to Yemen from fghting alongside the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Although unsubstantiated, these rumors add to his mystique and credibility on the battlefeld.

Wahib Al-Hawri group:

Wahib Al-Hawri is a local Islah leader and former military ofcer in the First Armored Brigade of Ali Muhsin. His group, which he named Brigade of the Storm, was ofcially active on the eastern front and fought in the axis of Hassanat near Thaabat, as well as in the north and west of the city. The Al-Hawri group was integrated into the forces of the Twenty-Second Brigade within the second sector in February 2017, alongside Al-Raymi’s fghters.

Nabil Al-Adimi group:

Nabil Al-Adimi is a commander of groups on the northern front, also known as the Zunoj Front.115 He also carries out ofensive missions, including missions against the Houthis in diferent areas as a military commander, and is aligned with Islah.

Tawfq Abdulmalik group:

A local Islah leader and a teacher, Tawfq Abdulmalik led assaults on the eastern front axis near the school of Muhammad Ali Othman. In 2017, Abdulmalik was replaced by another commander, Mahfoudh Thabet often referred to as Sheikh Mahfoudh (also a local Islah leader). Their forces were jointly merged into the Twenty-Second Mechanized Infantry Brigade. Despite lacking an ofcial military rank, Mahfoudh continues to play a signifcant role in leading the eforts in the eastern front via the Twenty-Second Brigade.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 39 Seventeenth Infantry Brigade

The Seventeenth Infantry Brigade is another military brigade under the umbrella of the Taiz Military Axis. The commander of the brigade, Brig. Gen. Abdulrahman Thabet Al Shamsani, is a veteran army fgure who has often had tense relations with the Islah military network despite frequently coordinating with it on the battlefeld.116 Media reports alleged that Islah-allied elements attempted to assassinate Shamsani in November 2018.117 The brigade's operations are focused to the west of the city. Abdo Hamoud Al-Saghir, the commander of operations for the Seventeenth Brigade, is also the commander of the western battlefront.

The Seventeenth Brigade is ultimately a hybrid, pulling in both career military forces and irregular forces mobilized after the start of the Houthi siege in Taiz. The integration of these forces has helped Islah afliates increase their sway in this area of the city. As with the Twenty-Second Brigade, incorporation of irregular forces has often been more symbolic than material. Fighters and civilians in Taiz speak of tensions between veteran and newer military leadership, as well as the resentment of what are seen as political interests by military brass.

Abdo Hamoud Al-Saghir group:

Abdo Hamoud Al-Saghir was a teacher and director of a public school in Taiz and served two terms as an Islah member in the local council of Al-Qahira. Al-Saghir was the frst to lead the fghting west of the city of Taiz, and was considered the commander of the western front until his forces integrated into the Seventeenth Infantry Brigade. Following the integration, he was appointed commander of the brigade's operations and continues to command his followers.

The so-called Students’ Brigade, a group of university students who joined the popular resistance, also falls under the leadership of Abdo Hamoud Al-Saghir. The group continues to fght on the western front, and is also broadly viewed by Taizis as being composed largely of Islah sympathizers.

170th Air Defense Brigade

The 170th Air Defense Brigade is adjacent to the Tariq Air Base in Taiz as part of the Fourth Military Region Operations. President Hadi appointed Brig. Gen. Abdul Aziz Al-Majidi commander of the brigade in 2017.118 Al-Majidi is a veteran member of the YSP. During the confict, he became closer to political fgures from Islah, such as Thya Al-Haqq Al-Ahdal (a prominent Islah leader) and Salem. Abdul Aziz Al-Majidi’s ties to the YSP have often complicated his relations with Islah-afliated fgures, owing to the two party’s ideological diferences. The 170th Air Brigade’s relevance has diminished due to its lack of bases in the north, and

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 40 the fact that most of the command units are Islah afliated, according to interviews conducted for this report.

Al-Hamza Brigade:

The Al-Hamza Brigade is the descendant of groups initially formed by Sheikh Hamoud Al-Mekhlaf, the original founder—and, according to his backers, still current leader—of the Popular Resistance. Sources on the ground reported that the Al-Hamza group merged with the 170th Air Defense Brigade under the command of Brig. Gen. Abdul Aziz Al-Majidi. Post-merger, Hamoud Al- Mekhlaf’s son Hamza was appointed within the 170th Brigade’s General Staf of the War,119 where his operational mandate is to oversee the northeastern fronts in Kalabah, Zahraa, and Fortieth Street.

In 2015, expanding his presence at the Central Security Forces headquarters and the district of Usaifra, Hamoud Al-Mekhlaf began training his militants to fght against the Houthis from the east of the city to the north. Although his resistance was small, it was one of the frst to actively take to the streets against the Houthis. He is therefore hailed by many locals as the military leader and spiritual father of the anti-Houthi resistance in Taiz. In April 2016, Hamoud Al-Mekhlaf’s relations with both Hadi and the coalition frayed, owing in part to his personal frustration with what he perceived as their lackluster support for the battle in Taiz and their focus on fronts elsewhere.120 In 2016, Hamoud Al-Mekhlaf visited Marib, Shabwa, and Saudi Arabia to rally fghters and acquire weapons, ammunition, and money for the liberation campaign for Taiz.121 In retaliation for this and previous public criticism of its liberation eforts, the coalition pushed President Hadi to pressure Al-Mekhlaf to cease his political and military activities in Taiz and leave the city—all of which he did.

According to locals, Hamoud Al-Mekhalf’s departure created a vacuum in Taiz that was partially flled by his son, Hamza, who took over his political and military responsibilities and maintained his relationships through the eponymous Hamza Brigades.

The Hamza brigade contains the remnants of Hamoud Al-Mekhlaf’s forces after his forced ouster from Taiz by Hadi and the coalition. The brigade is based at the front of the district of Kalabah, adjacent to the Central Security Forces camp. Today, many Taizis consider the Al-Hamza brigade an inactive group, due to its lack of progress or retreat from the territory it gained at the beginning of the war. While they have mobilized groups as reinforcements on other fronts, according to feld observations, they remain near the battlefeld without directly engaging in combat. The brigade employs a strategy to appear more directly engaged in the fghting than they actually are. The brigade possesses a large arsenal of equipment and weapons, but ultimately lacks the manpower to launch battlefeld operations.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 41 Fourth Infantry Mountain Brigade

According to interviews conducted for this report, the Fourth Infantry Mountain Brigade is a relatively new brigade established in 2018 by the leadership of the Taiz Military Axis to counter the UAE-backed Thirty-Fifth Brigade in Al-Turbah, Al-Hujariyah and other rural areas in the southwestern suburbs of the city of Taiz. According to these interviews, Hadi appointed Abu Bakr Al-Jabouli, an Islah ally, as the brigade’s commander (he is also an in-law of the former Taiz Military Axis commander, Khaled Fadel). The Yemeni government reportedly directed the Fourth infantry to a training camp in the Al-Masabih area near the town of Al- Turbah, which also received more than 300 recruits from within Taiz, apparently to prepare for confrontations with the Thirty-Fifth armored brigade.

In 2019, a turf war unfolded due to the Taiz Military Axis’s transfer of 500 members of the Thirty-Fifth Brigade to the Fourth Brigade in order to have more soldiers under the government’s control. However, confrontations between the two brigades swiftly ensued due to their collective refusal to accept the executive decisions of Hadi. A number of local contacts tied this to tensions between the Taiz Military Axis and the UAE, connecting it to the UAE’s support of Brig. Gen. Adnan Al-Hammadi in supplying armored vehicles to the Thirty-Fifth Brigade.

145th Infantry Brigade

A fairly new unit, the 145th Brigade falls under the direct leadership of the Taiz Military Axis. Its leader is the same as the leader of the Taiz Military Axis: Samir Al-Sabri. The brigade integrated the former Al-Sa'alik Brigade and other reserve battalions with the intention of unifying the security forces. The 145th is yet another brigade essentially operating under the control of Islah. Sources on the ground indicated that the brigade was preparing to support Hadi’s forces in Aden against the STC, but failed to mobilize.

Al-Sa'alik Brigade:

The Al-Sa’alik Brigade includes groups under the leadership of Azzam Al-Farhan, the son of Abdo Farhan (Salem), who has emerged as one of the most powerful fgures in Taiz and an advisor to his father.122 The brigade’s name, which derives from local derogatory usage and means “mischievous outlaws,” was chosen by its young members and is meant to inspire fear on the battlefeld. The Al-Sa’alik Brigade is a tactical group of former Popular Resistance fghters tasked with launching ofensive attacks on various fronts. They continue to enjoy strong relations with Saudi Arabia, which has provided them with weaponry, including multiple armored vehicles—boldly emblazoned with the words “145th Brigade Command and Al-Sa’alik”—and modern equipment considered superior to that possessed by other groups. According to interviews, most of the members of this brigade are also the sons of Islah members who have previous combat

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 42 experience. After their integration into the army, they became part of the 145th Brigade of the Taiz Military Axis, though they retain a signifcant amount of autonomy.

Fifth Brigade (Presidential Guard)

The Fifth Brigade sits under the umbrella of the Taiz Military Axis. The Fifth Brigade was created to formalize the Hasm Brigades as well as strengthen Hadi’s infuence in Taiz. Adnan Ruzayq leads the collective brigade, whose work as part of the Presidential Guard directly involves it in confrontations with the Houthis. It maintains a number of sites in the western part of the city, including Al-Sayahi and Hadhran. Interviewees claimed that support for the Fifth Brigade comes directly from the ofce of the president, especially from Nasser Hadi, the president’s son, and the fgure responsible for the Presidential Protection Forces. Reports based on interviews with fghters on the ground indicate that prior to the creation of this force, the Hasm Brigades received substantial support from the UAE.

Hasm Brigades:

Led by Salafst Adnan Ruzayq, a native of the southern governorate of Shabwa who grew up in Taiz, the Hasm Brigades are an armed group that came to prominence through its participation in the battles of Aden. After the liberation of Aden, the Hasm Brigades coordinated with one of the prominent feld leaders in Taiz, Ammar Al-Jandabi. The transfer of Ruzayq’s weapons (used previously in Aden), made it possible for the brigade to quickly expand its activities in Taiz. The brigade has a strong record of participating in battles for the liberation of the city. Interviews confrm that Ruzayq merged his forces with those of the Taiz Military Axis, and in 2017, he was promoted to commander of the Fifth Presidential Guard, under the direct command of President Hadi. According to these interviews, Hadi chose Ruzayq mainly because of his good ties with Islah, which he maintains despite not personally being a member of the political party.

While Ruzayq maintains a frm relationship with the Islah networks, he is also known for adopting a balanced approach to adversaries. Ruzayq acted as an intermediary to help calm the situation between Islah and the Abu Al-Abbas Brigades in the city of Taiz during the fghting between the two groups throughout 2017.123 He has also been accused of having ties to al-Qaida;124 a number of fghters from Hasm, including Ammar al-Jundubi,125 are alleged members of the group.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 43 Armed Groups Outside the Taiz Military Axis

While the bulk of armed groups in Taiz have been subsumed and incorporated into the Yemeni military via the Taiz Military Axis (and fall under the Fourth Military Region command of the Army), some have remained efectively outside of its chain of command. In other words, while they are ofcially and technically contained within the same structure, there is a de facto split between them. Chief among these armed groups operating outside of the Taiz Military Axis are the Thirty-Fifth Armored Brigade and the Abu Al-Abbas Brigades, which ostensibly have been integrated into the Thirty-Fifth Armored Brigade. Both of these forces are led by fgures who view themselves as rivals to the wider Islah-aligned network; they have each benefted from support from both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, though in the wider public sphere, they are seen as being aligned with the UAE.

Thirty-Fifth Armored Brigade:

The Thirty-Fifth Armored Brigade announced its support for the internationally recognized government under the leadership of Brig. Gen. Adnan Al-Hammadi, 126 alleged by Islah supporters in Taiz to be connected with Nasserist Party leader Abdullah Noman at the onset of the war. Locals mentioned that in response to the Thirty-Fifth Brigade’s declaration of support, the Houthis seized the brigade headquarters, displacing its soldiers, who fed to Al-Thabab district. There, the soldiers regrouped, and after several months returned to fght the Houthis across Taiz. The brigade opened new battlefronts against the Houthis and eventually regained control of several military sites. The Thirty-Fifth Brigade is now the most powerful military force in Al-Hujariyah, the western rural area of Taiz.

The brigade is ofcially under the Fourth Military Region, and the Hadi government pays the soldiers’ salaries. That being said, there are de facto divides that grant the brigade autonomy. There are sharp diferences between the Thirty- Fifth Brigade and the military leadership structures of Islah. Many locals have accused Islah-afliated ofcials of aiming to reduce the brigade’s power by redistributing members of the brigade to other military units more directly under Islah’s control within the Taiz Military Axis, something that, as of yet, has proven relatively unsuccessful.

The UAE, anxious about Islah’s dominance in Taiz, has sought to bolster the Thirty-Fifth Brigade, providing fnancial and military support to Brig. Gen. Adnan Al-Hammadi.127 The signifcant amount of armored vehicles and other military and fnancial resources provided by the UAE has allowed General Al Hammadi to expand his foothold in areas already under his control. Simultaneously, civilians in Taiz reported that the UAE has launched a surge of UAE Red Crescent Projects in these same brigade-controlled areas, aimed at winning the hearts and minds of locals.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 44 Tensions between the Taiz Military Axis and Adnan Al-Hammadi have frequently surfaced. Most of this tension has played out across spaces in close proximity to both the Axis’ established military brigades and areas controlled by the Thirty- Fifth Brigade. In Al Turbah, for example, the Axis established the Fourth Mountain Infantry Brigade (Islah-backed) adjacent to the Thirty-Fifth Brigade. Reports of further confrontations between the two sides continue, including over the Thirty-Fifth Brigade’s detention of arms shipments bound for the Fourth Brigade.

These tensions led to occasional skirmishes beginning in 2017. Multiple attempts by the local authorities to unify the factions and reduce tensions have failed.128 In late 2018, representatives of the GPC, YSP, Islah and NUPO held a meeting in China and called on the military factions to implement Al-Khayami agreement (signed by the leadership of both the Axis and Thirty-Fifth Brigade) to dismantle the new posts and return occupied areas to a joint security committee.129 However, local civilians are doubtful that the agreement will ever be implemented.

On December 2, 2019, Al-Hammadi was killed in Taiz.. His death, amidst some unconfrmed rumors of Islah involvement, illustrates the continued fragmentation of the war in Taiz and the role of local politics.

Abu Al-Abbas Brigades

The Abu Al-Abbas Brigades are armed groups collectively led by Adel Abdo Farea Al-Thabhani, who calls himself Abu Al-Abbas (the father of Abbas). The brigades have ostensibly been integrated into the Thirty-Fifth Brigade. A 48-year-old local from the old city district of Taiz, Al-Abbas describes himself and his followers as Salafis from Dammaj.130 However, local observers counter that as much as 90 percent of his armed forces are ordinary people. Moreover, they recall that he has also incorporated and aligned himself with a number of fgures who were originally members of the GPC and historically felt animus toward Islah. Abu Al- Abbas's fghters were included in the Thirty-Fifth Armored Brigade when Yemen’s Popular Resistance was merged into the chain of command of the Yemeni military, but despite integration into the payroll, full structural command and control did not follow.

The rise of Abu Al-Abbas is emblematic of the means by which various, once unknown individuals have managed to rise to prominence during the confict. Abu Al-Abbas began as a fnancial ofcer to a military leader named Abu Al- Sadouq.131 He used this position to build his own independent channels with funders, eventually forming an armed group and making the Old City his stronghold. Concentrating his forces on eastern areas of the city, Al-Abbas liberated much of city of Taiz from Houthi control. With the support of the coalition, Abu Al-Abbas seized many of the government institutions from the

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 45 Houthis and their allies, in addition to garnering signifcant sway on fnancial channels to anti-Houthi armed groups in Taiz.

According to local contacts, Abu Al-Abbas’s fghters have beneftted from UAE support since 2015. This has often resulted in a difcult balancing act. In one telling event in November 2015, after receiving four armored vehicles from the UAE, Abbas festooned them with Emirati and Yemeni fags and paraded them around the city of Taiz. Al-Abbas’s faunting of its relationship with the UAE angered Saudi leaders, who were also supporting Al-Abbas, and resented the absence of the Saudi fag. Attempting to difuse the situation and demonstrate his loyalty to both sides. Al-Abbas again paraded the vehicles, this time with Saudi fags waving alongside those of the UAE.

According to interviews, Abu Al-Abbas seized sensitive institutions such as the buildings of the Political Security Organization, responsible for gathering intelligence led by military ofcers, and the Military Police base, a longstanding law-enforcement institution. By 2017 Abu Al-Abbas controlled much of the Old City, as well as economic institutions such as Yemen’s Tobacco and Matches Company, a major source of income for the state.

As Abu Al-Abbas’s strength grew, his relations with Islah networks deteriorated. Islah groups engaged in proxy battles with Abu Al-Abbas via afliated parties, such as the 170th Brigade. Opponents of Abu Al-Abbas waged a media campaign against him; Islah continued to claim that he was a terrorist and spread rumors about underground prisons where he personally tortured and executed his opponents.132 Consistent negative media attention caused local and regional public opinion to turn against Al-Abbas.

In October 2017, the U.S. Treasury Department added a number of individuals and groups to the terrorist list, including Abu Al-Abbas or Adel Abdo Farea Al- Thabhani, who was accused of fnancing terrorist elements afliated with al- Qaida.133 Abu Al-Abbas categorically denied the accusation, and blamed the United States’s decision on malign infuence from Islah and Qatar. According to interviews, in the lead up to the terrorist listing, Saudi Arabia allegedly asked Abu Al-Abbas to leave Yemen and withdraw from the political and military scene (he refused).134

According to sources, in late 2017, rhetorical hostilities between Abu Al-Abbas and Islah simmered into armed confict. By 2018, the confict had intensifed, with sporadic fghting radiating outward from the city center. Despite a tentative ceasefre, clashes between the two sides continued intermittently until the beginning of April 2019. These violent confrontations killed tens of civilians and fghters, paralyzing Taiz and further demoralizing its long-sufering population (the siege of the Old City, Abu Al-Abbas's stronghold, was particularly brutal). Although the pretext for ongoing hostilities changed by the day, the Taiz Military Axis ultimately sought to kick Abu Al-Abbas and his forces out of Taiz. After

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 46 rounds of talks by meditative military committees and several orders from President Hadi, Abu Al-Abbas fnally agreed to leave the city.

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Ansar al-Sharia

While the anti-Houthi coalition mostly consists of the two major alignments described above, a third force is also active in Taiz. Portrayals of Taiz as an extremist haven are exaggerated, but the confict has—or at least had—proven a boon to AQAP’s presence in the city. The Yemen war marks the frst time that AQAP has maintained an open presence in Taiz, where it took advantage of the wider dynamics of the confict, positioning itself as an efective anti-Houthi fghting force.

Historically, while AQAP has recruited from disafected urban youth in cities like Sanaa, Hudayda, Aden, and Taiz, the balance of their activity has been elsewhere in the country, mostly in more sparsely populated and isolated areas in governorates, like Marib, Abyan, and Shabwa.135 The rise of the Houthis—and the accompanying collapse of the state—allowed AQAP and its front group, Ansar al- Sharia, to capitalize on power vacuums across the country. They simultaneously cast themselves as vanguards of Sunni Islam in an aim to capitalize on anti- Houthi feeling and the accompanying rise in sectarian sentiment.136

According to locals, al-Qaida established a military presence in Taiz at the outset of the war, operating in now-defunct jails and military bases. At frst, the al-Qaida presence on the battlefeld in Taiz was scattered across diferent fronts. Diverse AQAP members and groups eventually united into one force: the Ahl Al-Sunnah Brigades, now known as the Ansar Al-Sharia of Taiz. The group soon began documenting and photographing their battles in Taiz. In early November 2015, they began to release videos of the so-called Ansar Al-Sharia in Taiz, highlighting their role in the two-year long battle for the neighborhood of al-Jahmaliya, a fght that also pulled in members of the Abu Al-Abbas Brigades.137

In an efort to win support, Ansar Al-Sharia launched a savvy digital media campaign, flming their battles with modern equipment such as Go-Pro cameras, which appealed to young followers. Other flms they produced portrayed the Houthis as terrorists and Iranian stooges and contained distressing scenes of violence and brutality.138 Locals mentioned that they also launched a variety of recruitment operations, including distributing propaganda, a (short-lived) weekly newsletter, mobile recruitment centers and, in one case, a memorization competition.

However, under the governorship of Amin Mahmoud, security campaigns forced the militants to depart from Taiz and relinquish the areas under their control. Furthermore, AQAP’s activities in Taiz have appeared to decline following their loss of the Yemeni port city of Mukalla in April 2016; while Mukalla is distant

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 47 from Taiz, it robbed the group of a safe haven, one that provided both fnancial resources and operational space.139 As with elsewhere in Yemen, AQAP also appears to have been forced to reduce their activities in Taiz owing to their loss of critical revenues from Mukalla. While local contacts say that AQAP-aligned fghters can still be found in Taiz, since the middle of 2018, they appear to have largely withdrawn from the city. This withdrawal does not entirely remove the possibility of al-Qaida sleeper cells, but it did eliminate the open presence of al- Qaida in Taiz, which locals previously observed riding around in marked vehicles distributing propaganda pamphlets.

While hardened al-Qaida and ISIS fghters have mostly fed Taiz (largely to the governorates of al-Bayda, Hadramout, Shabwa and Lahj), local sources say that other AQAP fghters have moved to an area near Jabal Habashi, al-Kadaha, and Al-Shuraja in Taiz’s rural west, where they continue to clash with Abu Al-Abbas fghters. Most notably, veteran AQAP leader Bilal Al-Waf sought refuge in Al- Shuraja until his arrest on May 18, 2019 by the Seventeenth Brigade.140 Local Taizis who previously fought for extremist groups have largely either defected from these groups and gone into hiding or been arrested. This demonstrates the ephemeral nature of allegiances in the confict: Many joined up with AQAP- aligned groups more for practical, rather than ideological, reasons.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 48 Notes 8 “Briefing Security Council on Yemen, Special Envoy Warns Oil Facilities Attack Could Threaten 1 Helen Lackner, Yemen in Crisis: Autocracy, Neo- Regional Stability, Calls for Inclusive Process to End Liberalism and the Disintegration of a State (London: Fighting,” United Nations, September 16, 2019, Saqi Books, 2017), 42–57. https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13952.doc.htm

2 Joe Dyke, “Is the Saudi War on Yemen Legal?,” Th 9 See, for example, on the question of proxy e New Humanitarian, April 16, 2019, http:// relationships and different models of understanding www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2015/04/03/ proxy war and what constitutes a proxy: David saudi-war-yemen-legal Sterman, “How Do We Move Past Proxy Paralysis,” N ew America Weekly, March 7, 2019, https:// 3 For a characteristic framing on the first end, see: www.newamerica.org/weekly/edition-239/redfine- Juan Cole, “Trump-Saudi War on Yemen Collapsing proxy-warfare-strategy-identity/ as Southern Separatists Take Aden,” Informed Comment, August 12, 2019, https:// 10 Taiz’s rise began in 1173 AD, with the arrival of www.juancole.com/2019/08/collapsing-southern- Turan Shah, an emir of the Ayyubid dynasty. After the separatists.html. For a characteristic framing on the Ayubbids exited Yemen, the Rasulid Dynasty made second, see: Faith Salama, “Saudi Arabia Ups the the city its capital, from 1229 AD to 1454 AD. Taiz Ante on Iran-Backed Houthis,” The Arab Weekly, reached its civilizational height under the Rasulids, June 16, 2019, https://thearabweekly.com/saudi- who developed a sophisticated administrative arabia-ups-ante-iran-backed-houthis system, built fortresses and schools, and spread innovative agricultural techniques throughout the 4 Helen Lackner, “Yemen. A Misleading Withdrawal country, such as coffee production. In the 17th From the Emirates,” OrientXXI, August 26, 2019, century, a maritime dispute with the Portuguese led https://orientxxi.info/magazine/the-yemen-war- the Ottomans to begin trading via the port of Al- impact-of-recent-developments Mokha instead of Aden. In 1918, after the collapse of the Ottoman empire, the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of 5 Nada Altaher, Jennifer Hauser, and Ivana Yemen selected Taiz as their capital until its Kottasova, “Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Claim a ‘Large- overthrow in 1962. Historically characterized by its Scale’ Drone Attack on Saudi Oil Facilities,” CNN, diversity and religious tolerance, Taiz was a notable September 14, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/ center for Yemeni Jews for hundreds of years, 2019/09/14/middleeast/yemen-houthi-rebels-drone- beginning in 130 AD; the Shar’ab Assalam district attacks-saudi-aramco-intl/index.html boasted a vibrant and illustrious Jewish Quarter until 6 Geoff Brumfiel, “What We Know About The the 1940s. Faisal Saeed Farea, Taiz: Faradat Al- Attack On Saudi Oil Facilities,” NPR, September 19, Makan Wa ’adamat Al-Tarikh (Taiz: Al-Saeed 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/09/19/762065119/ Foundation for Sciences and Culture, 2012), 2. what-we-know-about-the-attack-on-saudi-oil- 11 Prior to 1990, Yemen was divided into two facilities countries, “North” Yemen with its capital in Sanaa, 7 John Irish and Kylie MacLellean, “European and “South” Yemen with its capital in Aden. The north Powers Back U.S. in Blaming Iran for Saudi Oil Attack, was under the rule of the Zaidi imamate until its Urge Broader Talks,” Reuters, September 23, 2019, overthrow in the September 26th republican https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-un/ revolution in 1962; the south was ruled by the Marxist european-powers-back-us-in-blaming-iran-for-saudi- People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) oil-attack-urge-broader-talks-idUSKBN1W81TK following the withdrawal of the British in 1967. See:

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 49 Noel Brehony, Yemen Divided: The Story of a Failed Winter-2019-English-12-Mar-19.pdf ; Patrick Wintour, State in South Arabia, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013). “More than Half of $2.6bn Aid to Yemen Pledged by Countries Involved in War,” Guardian, February 26, 12 Charles Dunbar, “The Unification of Yemen: 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/global- Process, Politics, and Prospects,” Middle East Journal development/2019/feb/26/more-than-half-of-26bn- 46, no. 3 (1992). aid-to-yemen-pledged-by-countries-involved-in-war

13 Sasha Gordon, “Taiz: The Heart of Yemen’s 19 “Caught in the Middle: A Conflict Mapping of Revolution,” Critical Threats Project, January 12, Taiz Governorate” (DeepRoot Consulting, 2018), 29, 2012, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/taiz- https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/ the-heart-of-yemens-revolution df2b40_e6cbadad37b248b495c4c3634996b8aa.pdf

14 Adam Baron, “Qatar’s Dispute with Neighbors 20 “The Republic of Yemen: Unlocking the Potential Reverberates in Yemen,” The Arab Gulf States for Economic Growth” (World Bank, October 2015), Institute in Washington, July 19, 2017, https:// 84, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ agsiw.org/qatars-dispute-with-neighbors- 673781467997642839/pdf/102151-REVISED- reverberates-in-yemen/ ; Peter Salisbury, “Yemen and box394829B-PUBLIC-Yemen-CEM-edited.pdf the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War’” (Chatham House, February 2015), 10, https://www.chathamhouse.org/ 21 “Al-Mawarid Wa Foras Al-Istithmar Fi Mohafadhat sites/default/files/field/field_document/ Taiz,” National Information Center Presidency of 20150218YemenIranSaudi.pdf Yemen, 2014, https://www.yemen-nic.info/gover/taiz/ menwal/ 15 In addition to evidence from our interviews in Taiz, this dynamic can be seen in Eric Schmitt and 22 These sites include Al-Janad Mosque, Al-Qahira Robert F. Worth, “With Arms for Yemen Rebels, Iran Citadel, and the Islamic schools such as Al- Seeks Wider Mideast Role,” The New York Times, Modhafariah, Al-Ashrafiah and Al-Mu’tabiah. March 15, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2012/03/15/world/middleeast/aiding-yemen-rebels- 23 “In Yemen, A Different Kind of Battle: Getting iran-seeks-wider-mideast-role.html People Trained and Finding Good Bureaucrats,” Know ledge@Wharton, September 18, 2012, https:// 16 Nasser Al-Sakkaf, “In Taiz, Some Yemenis Choose knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/in-yemen-a- War – and Home – over Displacement,” The New different-kind-of-battle-getting-people-trained-and- Humanitarian, July 16, 2019, https:// finding-good-bureaucrats/ www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/ 2019/07/16/taiz-yemen-war-displacement 24 “Caught in the Middle: A Conflict Mapping of Taiz Governorate,” 29. 17 Maysaa Shuja al Deen, “The Endless Battle in Taiz,” Atlantic Council, April 26, 2017, https:// 25 “ Yemen War Death Toll Exceeds 90,000 www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the- According to New ACLED Data for 2015” (ACLED, endless-battle-in-taiz/ June 18, 2019), https://www.acleddata.com/wp- content/uploads/2019/06/ACLED_Yemen-2015- 18 These were the last reliable figures and they are Data_6.2019-2.pdf considered to be “anecdotal.” “Yemen Economic Monitoring Brief” (World Bank Group, Winter 2019), 26 “Yemen War Death Toll Exceeds 90,000.” 1, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 161721552490437049/pdf/135266-YemEconDevBrief-

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 50 27 Sam Jones and Matthias Sulz, “Press Release: executive body of the Houthis, until his death by a Over 100,000 Reported Killed in Yemen War,” Saudi airstrike on April 19, 2018. Marwa Rashad and ACLED, October 31, 2019, https:// Sarah Dadouch, “Saudi-Led Air Strike Kills Top www.acleddata.com/2019/10/31/press-release- Houthi Official in Yemen,” Reuters, April 23, 2018, over-100000-reported-killed-in-yemen-war/ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security- official/saudi-led-air-strike-kills-top-houthi-official-in- 28 “Yemen War Death Toll Exceeds 90,000.” yemen-idUSKBN1HU28Z

29 Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine 38 “Al-Juneid Yo’akid Hirs Al-Dawlah Wa Ihtimamiha Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Bi Ri’ayet Osar Al-Shuhada,” Al-Thawra, February 28, Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 2016, http://althawrah.ye/archives/380024 1. 39 Author’s interviews held with Yemeni political 30 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, 114. activists in Beirut and Sanaa over 2012 and 2013.

31 Saeed Al-Batati and Kareem Fahim, “Rebels Seize 40 Al-Batati and Fahim, “Rebels Seize Key Parts” Key Parts of Yemen’s Third-Largest City, Taiz,” The New York Times, March 22, 2015, https:// 41 Ahmed Al-Haj, “Shia Rebels Kill Six in Clashes www.nytimes.com/2015/03/23/world/middleeast/ with Thousands of Protesters in Yemen,” AP, March houthi-rebels-taiz-yemen.html 24, 2015.

32 Omar Said, “The View from Aden: A Shadow 42 Ibid. State between the Coalition and Civil War” (Arab Reform Initiative, April 19, 2019), https://www.arab- 43 Saleh Al-Diwani, “27 Yom’an Min Tahajom Al- reform.net/publication/the-view-from-aden-a- Inqlabiyeen Wa Tahqiq Agradh Al-Tahalof,” Al-Watan shadow-state-between-the-coalition-and-civil-war/ Online, March 26, 2016, https:// - ايجولونكت /www.alwatan.com.sa/article/295558/27 اموي - مجحت -ال قن ل نييب - ققحتو - ضارغأ - فلاحتلا Helen Lackner, Yemen’s “Peaceful” Transition 33 from Autocracy: Could It Have Succeeded? (International IDEA, 2016), 14. 44 Amr Al-Sabagh, “Ra’ees Al-Yemen Yo’aiyn Qa’id Jadid Lil Liwa 35,” DotMsr, April 2, 2015, http:// - سيئر - نميلا /Lackner, 14. www.dotmsr.com/news/196/247700 34 نيعي - ادئاق - اديدج - ءاولل -35- عردم 35 Lackner, 23. 45 UNSCR, “7721st Meeting. Provisional Meeting, 36 For general clashes, see: Laura Kasinof, “Yemeni UN Doc S//PV.7721,” June 21, 2016, 5, https:// City Feeds Unrest’s Roots,” The New York Times, www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/ February 25, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/ %7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- 2011/02/26/world/middleeast/26yemen.html. For CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7721.pdf See also, “Annual clashes between Islah-Houthi supporters, see: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for “Ishtibakat ’Anifah Bayn Al-Islah Wa Al-Huthiyein Fi Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High Sahat Al-Hurryia,” Yemress, September 6, 2012, Commissioner and the Secretary-General. A/HRC/ https://www.yemeress.com/saadahpress/5996 39/43,” United Nations Human Rights Council, 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/YE/ 37 Saleh Al-Samad served as President of ‘Yemen’s A_HRC_39_43_EN.docx Supreme Political Council,’ which was the de facto

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 51 46 This was confirmed in field research interviews; in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/iran-s- also see: “The Conflict in Yemen: April 2015” fingerprints-in-yemen-real-or-imagined/ (Stratfor, April 30, 2015), https:// worldview.stratfor.com/article/conflict-yemen- 54 Hiltermann and Alley, “The Houthis Are Not april-2015; “Al-Yaman Thobadt Al-Liwa 35 Ya’linon Hezbollah.” Ta’yeedihim Lilraees Hadi,” Al-Arabiya, March 27, 2015, https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/ 55 Wesley Morgan, “Pentagon: No More Refueling ,of Saudi Aircraft Bombing Yemen,” Politico - نميلا - طابض - ءاوللا -35- نونلعي /yemen/2015/03/27 /November 9, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story مهدييأت - سيئرلل - يداه 2018/11/09/saudi-arabia-yemen-bombing-pentagon- 47 “Houthis Take Control of Army Brigade in refueling-982924 Yemen’s Taiz: Residents,” Reuters, April 22, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security- 56 This can be observed across Houthi media taiz-idUSKBN0ND0QO20150422 outlets see, for example: Honah AlMasirah, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6VhRE92bJP0. 48 “Shawqi Hayel’ Yastaqil Niha’iyan Min The narrative can also be seen in material from Mansibeh,” Al-Ameen Press, November 16, 2015, Houthi news agencies: “Update of Confrontations https://alameenpress.info/print/5257 with US-Saudi Forces in Border Fronts, September 18th, 2019,” Almasirah Media Network, September 9, 49 Dan Roberts and Kareem Shaheen, “Saudi Arabia 2019, http://english.almasirah.net/details.php? Launches Yemen Air Strikes as Alliance Builds es_id=8861 Against Houthi Rebels,” Guardian, March 26, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/26/ 57 Sarah Aziza, “Trump’s Veto on Yemen War Is a saudi-arabia-begins-airstrikes-against-houthi-in- Sign That the Strongmen in the U.S. and Saudi Arabia yemen Are Winning,” The Intercept, September 9, 2019, https://theintercept.com/2019/04/18/trump-veto- 50 Jodst Hiltermann and April Longley Alley, “The yemen-saudi-arabia-mbs Houthis Are Not Hezbollah,” Foreign Policy, February 27, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/27/the- 58 Nadwa Al-Dawsari, “Yemen: A View from Marib,” houthis-are-not-hezbollah/ Atlantic Council, May 1, 2015, https:// www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/yemen- 51 For more on the Houthi-Iranian relationship, see: a-view-from-marib/ Thomas Juneau, “Iran’s Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: A Limited Return on a Modest Investment,” 59 Adam Baron, “The Gulf Country That Will Shape International Affairs 92, no. 3 (May 2016): 647-63, the Future of Yemen,” The Atlantic, September 22, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12599 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2018/09/yemen-mukalla-uae-al-qaeda/ 52 Jon Gambrell, “AP Explains: How Yemen’s Rebels 570943 ; “Yemen’s Al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base” Increasingly Deploy Drones,” AP, May 14, 2019, (International Crisis Group, February 2, 2017), https:// https://www.apnews.com/ d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/174-yemen-s-al- 02c0c90050ee4b21a408db483906971b qaeda-expanding-the-base.pdf

53 Hiltermann and Alley, “The Houthis Are Not 60 Kendall, “Iran’s Fingerprints in Yemen: Real or Hezbollah”; Elisabeth Kendall, “Iran’s Fingerprints in Imagined?” Yemen: Real or Imagined?” (Atlantic Council, October 19, 2017), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 52 61 Mustafa Naji, “Y emen: Taiz, Martyred and 72 Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold Forgotten City,” OrientXXI, May 14, 2019, https:// War’”; Baron, “Qatar’s Dispute with Neighbors orientxxi.info/magazine/yemen-taiz-martyred-and- Reverberates in Yemen.” forgotten-city,3091 73 These personalities have lived in Saudi Arabia

62 Aoun is supposedly a Rashad representative evensince the onset of the military intervention. Other

though originally an Islah member, and serves as the members of Islah’s leadership reside in Turkey. Egypt

city’s deputy governor. Al-Rashad does not have a and Qatar. strong military or political role in Taiz. As of 2015, Essa Al-Shawafi was the party’s representative in 74 “Qa’id Al-Mujahideen Ila Al-Dhawo: Senario Aden Taiz, but he has been invisible from the political Yahoom Fawq Taiz!,” Al-Arabi, February 21, 2018, scene since then. https://www.al-arabi.com/Issues/20692

63 Lackner, Yemen in Crisis. 75 The Joint Meeting Parties are a coalition of opposition forces including the Nasserists, Yemeni

64 Amr Hamzawy, “Between Government and Socialist Party, and Islah and other blocs that was

Opposition: The Case of the Yemeni Congregation for formed to counter the ruling party at the time, the

Reform” (Carnegie Endowment for International GPC. Peace, November 2009), https:// carnegieendowment.org/files/ 76 Vincent Durac, “The Joint Meeting Parties and yemeni_congragation_reform.pdf the Politics of Opposition in Yemen,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 38, no. 3 (December 2011): 65 Ibid. 343-65.

66 Gordon, "Taiz: The Heart of Yemen’s Revolution.” 77 “The April 27, 2003 Parliamentary Elections in The Republic of Yemen” (National Democratic 67 Gordon. Institute, 2003), https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/ files/1701_yem_elect-rep.pdf 68 “Yemeni Forces in Deadly Clash with Tribesmen,” Al Jazeera, December 2, 2011, https:// 78 “Houthis Reject Doha Peace Talks,” ReliefWeb, www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/ March 26, 2015, https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/ 2011/12/2011121143513804349.html houthis-reject-doha-peace-talks 69 These con flicts include the 1994 war, the battles 79 “Yemen’s Saleh Declares Alliance with Houthis,” of 2011, the early confrontation in 2015 with the Al Jazeera, May 11, 2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/ Houthis in the city, and its military alliance with the news/2015/05/cloneofcloneofcloneofstrikes-yemen- 35th Armored Brigade. saada-breach--150510143647004.html 70 Laurent Bonnefoy and Marine Poirier, “The 80 April Longley Alley, “Collapse of the Houthi- Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Al-Islâh): The Saleh Alliance and the Future of Yemen’s War” Difficult Process of Building a Project for Change,” in (International Crisis Group, January 11, 2018), https:// Returning to Political Parties?, ed. Myriam Catusse www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf- and Karam Karam (Presses de l’Ifpo, 2010), 61-99. and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/collapse-houthi-saleh- alliance-and-future-yemens-war 71 Bonnefoy and P oirier.

81 Ibid.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 53 82 Brehony, Yemen Divided. Washington, December 15, 2017), https://agsiw.org/ yemens-ali-mohsen-al-ahmar-last-sanhan-standing/ 83 Ibid. 90 Sudarsan Raghavan, “The U.S. Put a Yemeni 84 Stephen Day , “Yemen on the Brink: The Political Warlord on a Terrorist List. One of Its Close Allies Is Challenge of Yemen’s Southern Movement” Still Arming Him,” Washington Post, December 29, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 2010), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/ middle_east/the-us-put-a-yemeni-warlord-on-a- yemen_south_movement.pdf terrorist-list-one-of-its-close-allies-is-still-arming- him/2018/12/28/f3c4fb5b-f366-4570- 85 “Hizb Al-Islah Yokhatit Listikmal Ibtla’ Taiz,” Sahif b27b-75a3ed0f0f52_story.html -حزب/at Al-Arab, March 18, 2019, https://alarab.co.uk .Ibid 91 اﻹصﻼح-يخطط-ﻻستكمال-ابتﻼع-تعز

86 “Sulan Al-Samei Yuhajim Al-Houthiyeen,” 92 Eleonora Ardemagni, “The Yemen Element in the Almahr ah Post, May 23, 2019, https:// UAE’s Anti-Brotherhood Fight” (Carnegie Endowment almahrahpost.com/news/10969#.XYNm6VVKiUk for International Peace, July 2, 2019), https:// carnegieendowment.org/sada/79423 ; “Former 87 Judit Kuschnitzki, “Insight 116: Sala sm in Yemen Allies Furious as UAE Assassination Campaign Yemen and the 2011 Uprising: A Religious Movement Exposed,” Middle East Eye, January 29, 2019, https:// at the Crossroads of Continuous Quietism and www.middleeasteye.net/news/former-yemen-allies- Politicization,” National University of Singapore / furious-uae-assassination-campaign-exposed Middle East Institute Singapore, November 17, 2014, https://mei.nus.edu.sg/publication/insight-116- 93 “Tawjih Muhafedh Taiz Birafe Niqat Altaftish salafism-in-yemen-and-the-2011-uprising-a-religious- Bayn Taiz Wa Hayjat Alabd Khilal Asharat Ayam,” Ne movement-at-the-crossroads-of-continuous- ws Yemen, July 13, 2018, https:// quietism-and-politicization/ www.newsyemen.net/news32384.html

88 “Taiz: I’lan Tahalof Al-Qiwa Al-Siyaseh Li Isnad 94 “The Teen Warlord Who Runs Yemen’s Second Al-Shariya,” Al Islah Yemen, September 19, 2019, City with Fear,” Middle East Eye, November 26, 2018, http ://alislah-ye.com/news_details.php? https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/teen-warlord- lng=arabic&sid=636 who-runs-yemens-second-city-fear 89 Al-Ahmar is one of the most prom inent 95 Emad Al-Marshahi, “Clashes Erupt between military commanders in Yemen’s modern history. He Coalition’s Rival Militias in Taiz,” Uprising Today, is a leading member of Islah and the former General January 6, 2019, https://www.uprising.today/clashes- of the First Armoured Brigade pre-2014, which was a erupt-between-coalitions-rival-militias-in-taiz. military brigade as strong as the Republican

commanded by Saleh’s son, Ahmed. Al-Ahmar has 96 “Ghazwan Al-Mekhlafi: Qina’ Morahiq l‘Wajh’ Al-

close connections with Saudi Arabia and the tribes Islah,” News Yemen, December 2, 2018, http://

around northwestern Yemen, and is considered one newsyemen.news/news35967.html of the strongest leaders during the Arab Spring who fought directly with Saleh at the time. See: Peter 97 “Tawjih Muhafedh Taiz Birafe Niqat Altaftish Salisbury, “Yemen’s Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar: Last Bayn Taiz Wa Hayjat Alabd Khilal Asharat Ayam.” Sanhan Standing” (Arab Gulf States Institute in

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 54 98 “Taiz. Police Chief Survives an Assassination 105 Literally: judicious, a name used to describe Attempt, Security Campaigns to Capture Remaining wise men and elders of local communities. Defendants,” Debriefer, March 23, 2019, https:// debriefer.net/en/news-7498.html 106 Sultan, Transfeld, and Muqbil, “Formalizing the Informal: State and Non-State Security Providers in 99 “Crisis Group Yemen Update #8” (International Government Controlled Taiz City.” Crisis Group, April 5, 2019), https:// www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf- 107 Badr Basalmah, “Local Governance in Yemen: and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/crisis-group-yemen- Challenges and Opportunities” (Berghof Foundation, update-8 2018), 9, https://www.berghof-foundation.org/ fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Other_Resources/ 100 Maged Sultan, Mareike Transfeld, and Kamal Berghof_Foundation_Yemen_locgov_Paper02LocalG Muqbil, “Formalizing the Informal: State and Non- overnance_WEB.pdf State Security Providers in Government Controlled Taiz City” (Yemen Polling Center, July 22, 2019), 108 Basalmah, “Local Governance in Yemen: https://www.yemenpolling.org/ Challenges and Opportunities.” formalizing_the_informal/ 109 See on Raqqa: Nate Rosenblatt and David 101 @Afrahnasser, “Tonight’s Assassination of a Kilcullen, “How Raqqa Became the Capital of ISIS: A Senior Military Personnel in Taiz Reflects the Proxy Warfare Case Study” (New America, July 25, Deepening Fragmentation of Power in the City 2019), https://www.newamerica.org/international- /security/reports/how-raqqa-became-capital-isis # ناندع _ يدامحلا ”, Tweet, Twitter, December 2, 2019, https://twitter.com/Afrahnasser/status/ 1201619550493663232 110 “Wazir Al-Difa’ Yuqil Qaid Al-Liwa 35,” Mareb Press, October 27, 2014, https://marebpress.net/ 102 @abubakrabdullah, “This Was Our December news_details.php ; “Caught in the Middle: A Conflict 2017 Interview with General Adnan Al-Hammadi, Mapping of Taiz Governorate,” 20. Who Was Killed Yesterday. He Complains That pro- Government Militias in Taiz Got More Support than 111 “Caught in the Middle: A Conflict Mapping of His Forces, the Actual Yemeni Army.,” Tweet, Twitter, Taiz Governorate,” 21; “Hadi Sacks Taiz Governor December 3, 2019, https://twitter.com/ under Islah Pressure,” Aden Press, December 31, abubakrabdullah/status/1201940686192496645 2018, http://en.adenpress.news/news/2001

103 The timeline of governors in Taiz since 2015 is as 112 “Colonel Al-Raimi Confirms the Liberation of the follows: Shawqi Hayel Saeed: April 2012-November Republican Palace in Taiz,” SeptemberNet, June 13, 2015; Ali Al-Maamari: January 2016-January 2018; 2017, https://en.26sepnews.net/2017/06/13/colonel- Amin Mahmoud: January 2018-December 2018; Nabil al-raimi-confirms-the-liberation-of-the-republic- Shamsan: December 2018-present. palace-in-taiz

104 Emma Tveit, Miranda Morton, and Matthew 113 “Qa’id Al-Mujahideen Ila Al-Dhawo: Senario Cassidy, “Gulf of Aden Security Review - September Aden Yahoom Fawq Taiz!” 26, 2017,” Critical Threats Project, September 26, 114 Wi’am Al-Sufi, “Kaif Istaqbal Nashitoon Qarar 2017, https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/gulf-of- Hadi,” Al-Mawqea Post, January 1, 2018, https:// aden-security-review/gulf-of-aden-security-review- almawqeapost.net/news/37076 ; “Ta’arif Ala Jaysh september-26-2017 Al-Doha Fi Taiz Wa Abraz Qit’atih Al-Askriyah,” Anba

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 55 Yemeniah, September 18, 2018, http:// 124 Maggie Michael and Trish Wilson, “U.S.-backed yemeninews.net/show390379.html coalition cuts deal with al Qaeda in Yemen,” AP, August 7, 2018, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/ 115 Wi’am Al-Sufi, “Qayid Aljabhat Alshamaliat Fi Middle-East/2018/0806/US-backed-coalition-cut- Taezin Yuakid ’Iihraz Almuqawamat Taqadumaan deals-with-Al-Qaeda-in-Yemen Kabiraan Ealaa Almlyshyat,” Al-Mawqea Post, June 10, 2016, https://almawqeapost.net/news.php? 125 According to local sources, Amar Al-Jundubi id=8734 attended Al-Eman University, a Sunni religious school founded by Abdulmajid Al-Zindani, a ‘Specially 116 “17 Infantry Brigade Commander Survives Designated Terrorist’ and cofounder of Islah. For Assassination Attempt at South Taiz,” Al Masdar more, see: Laura Kasinof and Scott Shane, “Radical Online, November 18, 2018, https:// Cleric Demands Ouster of Yemen Leader,” The New almasdaronline.com/article/17-infantry-brigade- York Times, March 1, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/ commander-survives-assassination-attempt-at- 2011/03/02/world/middleeast/02yemen.html south-taiz 126 “War in Yemen: Taiz on the Frontline,” The New 117 “Second ‘Hadi’ Forces Commander Survives An Arab, April 20, 2015, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/ Assassination in Taiz Within 24 Hours,” Debriefer, english/politics/2015/4/20/war-in-yemen-taiz-on-the- November 18, 2018, https://debriefer.net/en/ frontline news-4774.html 127 Fernando Carvajal, “Anatomy of Chaos: Yemen’s 118 “Qarar Jamhowry Bitayeen ‘Almajidi’ Qayidaan Taiz,” Gulf State Analytics, April 9, 2019, https:// Lilwa’ 170,” AlHarf28, February 20, 2018, 28, http:// gulfstateanalytics.com/anatomy-of-chaos-yemens- www.alharf28.com/p-2592 taiz/

119 “Akad Tawafuq Aljamie Alaa Taeyin Najl,” Yemen 128 “Ahzab Yemeniyah Tado’o Tanfeeth Itifaq Al- Now, October 18, 2016, http://yemen-now.com/ Khayami,” AlHarf28, November 26, 2018, http:// news1296550.html www.alharf28.com/p-14658

120 Wi’am Abdulmalik, “Ma Wara’ Tahrokat Al- 129 “Ahzab Yemeniyah Tado’o Tanfeeth Itifaq Al- Sheikh Al-Mekhlafi Tijah Marib Wa Al-Mamlakah?,” A Khayami.” l-Mawqea Post, April 3, 2016, https:// almawqeapost.net/reports/6727 130 Dammaj is a city home to Dar Al-Hadith, a Salafi school, that was besieged by the Houthis in 2011 and 121 Ibid. 2014 until the Salafi population was forced to leave after multiple ceasefire attempts, resulting in a Salafi 122 Hanan Al-Hakry, “Yemen: Blood and Fire in Taiz,” exodus. Maysaa Shuja al Deen, “The Houthi-Tribal Ahram Online, March 28, 2019, http:// Conflict in Yemen,” Carnegie Endowment for english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/329013/ International Peace, April 23, 2019, https:// World/Region/Yemen-Blood-and-fire-in-Taiz.aspx carnegieendowment.org/sada/78969

123 “Lajnat Wasata Tukhmid Ishti’al Al-Mowajahat Fi 131 Abdulhakim Hilal, “Fi Awal Hiwar Lah.. Al- Taiz,” Asharq Al-Aswat, April 28, 2019, https:// Shaykh Al-Salafi ‘Abu Al-Sadouq’: ‘Abu Al-Abbas’ La ,Yomathilna,” Yemen Shabab Net, September 17, 2018 ةطاسو ةنجل - - /aawsat.com/home/article/1698596 https://yemenshabab.net/interviews/39259 ُ مخ ِد تاهجاوملا لاعتشا ت- - يف- زعت -

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/the-proxy-war-prism-on-yemen/ 56 132 “Maqabir Sirryah Tabi’ah Li’ Katayeb Abu Al- www.acleddata.com/2019/01/29/regional-overview- Abbas B’Taiz,” Al Jazeera, October 22, 2018, https:// middle-east-29-january-2019/ ; “Yemen’s Government ,Forces Arrest Key Al-Qaida Leader,” AP, May 19 قيقحت - /www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2018/10/22 /https://www.apnews.com ,2019 ةريزجلا رباقم - ةيرس ةعبات- بئاتكل - - سابعلا وبأ- - زعتب - ; “Tensions Heighten between Pro-Hadi Groups in 91fc48d39fed471a9ce0486482f54111 Yemen’s Taiz,” Middle East Eye, August 30, 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/tensions- heighten-between-pro-hadi-groups-yemens-taiz

133 “Counter Terrorism Designations,” Office of Foreign Assets Control U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 25, 2017, https:// www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC- Enforcement/Pages/20171025.aspx

134 Raghavan, “The U.S. Put a Yemeni Warlord on a Terrorist List”; “Abu Al-Abbas Battalion Leave Taiz, End Infighting,” Debriefer, April 27, 2019, https:// debriefer.net/en/news-8096.html

135 Michael Horton, “Fighting the Long War: The Evolution of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula,” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 1 (2017).

136 Ibid.

137 Walid Al-Amri, “Al-Qaeda Yabith Tasjilat Hiya Al- Oula To’wathiq Hodhooroh Al-Qitaly Fi Taiz,” Khabar News Agency, November 11, 2015, https:// www.khabaragency.net/news42182.html

138 “Al-Yemen: Al Qaeda Tunshir Videohat Lihajamat Ala Qiyadat Houthiyeen Wa Tohatheraho,” CNN Arabic, August 7, 2016, https://arabic.cnn.com/ middleeast/2014/09/15/yemen-qaeda-houthi

139 Yara Bayoumi, Noah Browning, and Mohammed Ghobari, “Special Report - Al Qaeda Emerges Stronger and Richer from Yemen War,” Reuters, April 8, 2016, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-yemen- aqap-specialreport/special-report-al-qaeda- emerges-stronger-and-richer-from-yemen-war- idUKKCN0X50SM

140 “Regional Overview - Middle East 29 January 2019,” ACLED, January 29, 2019, https://

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