Resolving Displacement Essential for Long- Term Peace and Stability

18 September 2014 Yemen Resolving displacement essential for long- term peace and stability Intermittent armed conflict and violence have mainly taken place on three fronts in Yemen in recent years. The Shia al-Houthi movement has led a violent insurgency in the north, there has been civil unrest in central and southern regions, and government forces have clashed in the south with militants associated with the Southern Separatist Movement and Ansar al-Sharia, an offshoot of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The fighting has caused ongoing and often repeated internal displacement, which has taken place in the context of Internally displaced boys living in Al Madab settlement, Hajja, Yemen, fetch water a growing socio-economic and humanitarian from a well while using a donkey to transport the water to their home 100km away. crisis. Political instability has left the govern- Photo: NRC/Nashon Tado, June 2013 ment struggling to provide basic services, con- tributing to increased needs among vulnerable groups. As of July 2014, there were 334,626 internally displaced people (IDPs) registered by the government’s Executive Unit and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), most of whom had fled conflict and violence. Disasters including flash floods and drought have also caused displacement, but there are few reliable estimates of its scale. IDPs and their host communities face many protection risks, including threats to their physical security and a lack of access to adequate shelter and basic services. Food insecurity and malnutrition rates are also particularly high among displaced communities, and IDPs face a heightened risk of serious human rights abuses. Local traditions such as early marriage for girls increase the risk of gender-based violence. Many IDPs from minority clans also suffer pervasive discrimination. Insecurity is fuelled by weak rule of law and the prevalence of small arms, particularly outside urban areas. It also hampers humanitarian access, data collection and protection monitoring. The government has made significant efforts to address displacement and promote political transition. From March 2013 to January 2014, it held an inclusive national dialogue consultation, which set out a detailed roadmap for democratic reform and the establishment of a new federal state. In June 2013, it www.internal-displacement.org The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply ofﬁcial endorsement or acceptance by IDMC. Sources: Flood-affected governorates: OCHA, 11 October 2013 Armed clashes from August 2013 - August 2014: OCHA, 2013 and 2014; Yemen Times, 2014; UNHCR, 2014 Returnees per governorate (as of 31 July 2014): OCHA, 2014 IDPs per governorate (as of 31 July 2014): OCHA, 2014 SAUDI ARABIA 76,977 returnees 103,014 IDPs SA’ADA Sa’ada 24,700 IDPs OMAN 71,548 IDPs AL-JAWF AL-MAHARAH HADRAMAUT 89,136 IDPs AMRAN HAJJAH Al Hazm Al Ghaydah Amran Hajjah AL-MAHWIT 46,228 IDPs MARIB Al-Mahwit Sanaa Marib AL-HUDAYDAH 8,155 returnees Al- SHABWAH Hudaydah RAYMAH DHAMAR Al Mukalla Dhamar Atah Displacement in Yemen AL-BAYDA as of 31 July 2014 IBB AD Al-Bayda 150,671 returnees DALI Capital Ibb Total number of Ad Dali Governorate capital ABYAN registered IDPs Taizz International boundary TAIZZ as of 31 July 2014 (OCHA) Governorate boundary LAHIJ E Zinjibar 334,626 Governorates affected by R Lahij armed clashes between I T Aden R E A ADEN Aug 2013 - Aug 2014 Total number of Governorates affected by registered returnees ﬂooding in Aug/Sept 2013 DJIBOUTI as of 31 July 2014 (OCHA) IDPs per governorate 226,803 Returnees per governorate 0 200 km SOMALIA Map by: IDMC More maps are available at www.internal-displacement.org/search?Type=Map Yemen: resolving displacement essential for long-term peace and stability adopted a national policy on internal displace- Political instability and a scarcity of livelihood ment, which addresses all causes and provides a assets are significant drivers of violence. Land and comprehensive framework for response. The suc- water disputes cause an estimated 75 to 80 per cess of these initiatives will depend on implemen- cent of tribal clashes, and there is an underlying tation, improvements on the political and security threat of sectarian violence increasing. Parts of the fronts and continued donor support. Weak state country are under the control of non-state armed capacity and scarcity of resources pose significant groups, which have taken advantage of the weak obstacles. rule of law and overstretched security forces. Rising levels of drug smuggling and substance In the long-term, the achievement of durable abuse in a country flooded with small arms add solutions for Yemen’s IDPs is vital to ensure peace further to the insecurity (IISS, last accessed on and stability, but in the absence of broader solu- 31 July 2014; IRIN, 30 June 2014; UNICEF, 17 June tions to the country’s political, humanitarian and 2014; the Guardian, 9 June 2014; HPN, May 2014; socio-economic crises, the prospects of this hap- OCHA, 4 April 2014). pening are likely to remain low. Despite these many obstacles, Yemen has em- barked on a process of a political transition (World Background and causes of Bank, last accessed on 3 July 2014; HPN, May displacement 2014). From March 2013 to January 2014, the government held an inclusive national dialogue Internal displacement in Yemen has taken place consultation, which set out a detailed roadmap in the context and as a result of a growing socio- for democratic reform and the establishment economic and humanitarian crisis. The country of a new federal state, including the drafting of is the poorest in the Arab world, with 54 per cent a constitution followed by parliamentary and of the population of 24.4 million living below the presidential elections in 2015. The success of poverty line and 10.6 million suffering food inse- these initiatives will depend on implementation, curity (World Bank, last accessed on 3 July 2014; improvements on the political and security fronts UNICEF, 17 June 2014; UNFPA, 30 October 2013). and continued donor support (World Bank, last Nearly 15 million people require humanitarian as- accessed on 3 July 2014; ICG, 10 June 2014). sistance (OCHA, 10 August 2014). Displacement caused by conflict This situation is made worse by high levels of un- Displacement in Yemen is mainly a result of three employment, particularly among young people, crises. The Shia al-Houthi movement has led a rapidly declining water resources, poor basic ser- violent insurgency in the north, there has been vices, fuel shortages and volatile food and com- civil unrest in central and southern regions, and modity prices that often spike because of insecu- government forces have clashed in the south with rity along transport routes (OCHA, 20 June 2014; militants associated with the Southern Separatist UNICEF, 17 June 2014; World Bank, January 2014). Movement and Ansar al-Sharia, an offshoot of al- An influx of vulnerable people from the Horn Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). of Africa and the expulsion of around 685,000 Yemenis from Saudi Arabia between January 2013 Fighting between the al-Houthi movement and and July 2014 have made the dire humanitarian the Yemeni army and government-backed tribes situation even worse (OCHA, 3 September 2014; in Sa’ada governorate has forced hundreds of UNICEF, 17 June 2014). thousands of people to flee their homes in the north of the country. The conflict began in 2004 18 September 2014 www.internal-displacement.org 3 Yemen: resolving displacement essential for long-term peace and stability with isolated clashes in Sa’ada, but over the the violence are thought to have returned to their years it spread to other northern governorates homes (UNHCR, email exchange, 17 August 2014; and reached the south-western Saudi border World Bank, last accessed on 3 July 2014; HPN, province of Jizan in 2010 (USAID, 30 June 2014; May 2014). Weak rule in Sana’a, Taiz, Aden and The Economist, 10 June 2014; the Guardian, 9 other cities, however, means that insecurity has June 2014; Rand Corporation, 3 May 2010; HRW, persisted (USDOS, 27 February 2014). 7 April 2010). By April 2011, the movement had taken over Sa’ada city and large parts of al-Jawf, In the south, fighting between the security forces Amran and Hajjah governorates (ACAPS, 11 and Ansar al-Sharia displaced more than 200,000 October 2011). With the backing of local tribes, people between May 2011 and June 2012, as the it has continued to fight government, tribal and group took advantage of the secessionist turmoil Islamist forces, despite a number of ceasefires and following the country’s popular uprising. Security its participation in peace talks. On 8 July 2014, improved when the conflict wound down, and it seized control of Amran city (OCHA, 12 May, 4 the majority of those displaced returned to their April and 6 February 2014; USAID, 30 June 2014; areas of origin (IISS, last accessed on 31 July 2014; The Economist, 10 June 2014). USAID, 30 June 2014). That said, clashes between government forces and a variety of militant and The al-Houthi movement has expanded its tribal groups, including Ansar al-Sharia and the support network and its control over northern Southern Separatist Movement have continued territory, filling the void left by the state’s weak- to displace people, particularly in Abyan and ness. It has won public backing by advocating Shabwah governorates (USAID, 30 June 2014; the on behalf of the poor and delivering justice for Guardian, 9 June 2014; UNHCR, 1 January 2014; abuses committed by some tribal leaders. In some Yemen Times, 31 December 2013). areas the movement has become “a virtual state within a state”, controlling local government, Some areas of the south are still under Ansar running checkpoints and collecting taxes (ICG, 10 al-Sharia’s control, and others are controlled by June 2014).

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