The U.S. Army and Nation-Building Explaining Divergence in Effective Military Innovation

Home , Military Police (Russia), Nadia Schadlow, Water police

By Rebecca Damm Patterson

B.S., June 1996, United States Military Academy M.S., January 2001, University of Missouri-Rolla M.Phil, January 2007, The George Washington University

A Dissertation Submitted to

The Faculty of

Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

August 31, 2009

Dissertation directed by

Deborah D. Avant Professor of Political Science, University of California-Irvine; formerly Professor of Political Science, The George Washington University The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of the George Washington University certifies that Rebecca Damm Patterson has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of 31 July 2009. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.

The U.S. Army and Nation-Building Explaining Divergence in Effective Military Innovation

Rebecca Damm Patterson

Dissertation Research Committee

Deborah D. Avant, Professor of Political Science, University of California-Irvine; formerly Professor of Political Science, The George Washington University, Dissertation Director

James Lebovic, Professor of Political Science, Committee Member

Charles Cushman, Associate Professor of Political Management, Committee Member

iii

Acknowledgements

Researching and writing this dissertation has been a tremendously challenging and intellectual journey that would certainly not have been accomplished without the substantial assistance, support and encouragement of others. Many colleagues have read drafts, provided suggestions and lent me additional sources. At George Washington,

Amy Furches provided invaluable mentorship and support throughout the entire process.

I am also grateful to fellow students Roy Pettis, Charlotte Kirschner, Sarah Benatar, Kim

Furdell, Suzanne Beachey and Leah Curran. Thank you to Jessica Bunin, Kate Kohler and Lori Altadonna, who assured me constantly that I would eventually complete this project successfully. At West Point, Mike Wagner, Karen Underwood, Matt Zais, Mike

Shekleton, Isaiah Wilson and Suzanne Nielsen all provided great suggestions for additional sources as well as feedback on drafts. My bosses, Margaret Belknap, Jeffrey

Peterson, Cindy Jebb and Michael Meese have been extraordinarily generous in giving me time to work on this project. I would like to thank them for their unflagging support.

I am eternally grateful to my former professor and mentor Jay Parker for the countless letters of recommendation and notes of encouragement.

I would like to thank my advisors and readers of this dissertation. Jim Lebovic,

Ron Spector, and Chuck Cushman all provided invaluable feedback and advice. I would especially like to thank Deborah Avant, who was gracious enough to agree to serve as my advisor and spent countless hours whittling my scattered ideas into an attainable dissertation topic. Thank you for providing advice and feedback for the last three years.

My greatest thanks, however, goes to my family. Thanks to my mom for not only

telling me, but showing me by her actions, that you are truly never too old to learn.

Thanks to my father, for his steadfast support whether it be cooking another great meal or

taking Madeline out for another walk. In particular, thank you Paul for the perpetual encouragement—I could have never done it without your wholehearted support.

Abstract

The U.S. Army and Nation-Building: Explaining Divergence in Effective Military Innovation

Since the World War II era, the United States Army has been heavily involved in nation-building. Although these represent the majority of the missions that were executed in the last sixty years, the army still primarily focuses on planning, organizing and training to fight conventional high intensity ground wars. Despite the Army’s proclivity to avoid nation-building, the United States Army was able to innovate with respect to nation-building in Germany after World War II. Although several theoretical frameworks attempt to explain the presence of military innovation, none seemed able to account for this unique circumstance in which the army innovated in the Germany case.

This dissertation evaluates the effectiveness of the Army during nation-building.

The Army implemented several effective innovations in the case of Germany during

World War II. Conversely, the Army demonstrated a lack of effective innovation in their most recent case of nation-building—Iraq. Two additional cases of nation-building are also examined in lesser depth: the U.S. Army in Korea from 1945-1948 and the Vietnam

War.

This study makes three central arguments about effective innovation with respect to nation-building. First of all, reformist military leaders are necessary for innovation as well as military effectiveness. Second, civil-military relations have a tremendous impact on military effectiveness. Trust in particular, is essential to effective innovation. Finally, although threat shapes the options available to civilian and military decision makers, it does not explain the presence or absence of innovation.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ...... iv Abstract ...... vi List of Tables ...... ix CHAPTER 1: Introduction ...... 1 Dependent Variable ...... 5 Theoretical Framework ...... 15 Case Selection ...... 28 My Argument ...... 33 Chapter 2: Effective Innovations during the World War II Era ...... 37 School of Military Government ...... 38 Military Effectiveness ...... 41 Post War Planning...... 61 Military Effectiveness ...... 69 The U.S. Constabulary Force ...... 81 Military Effectiveness ...... 85 Conclusion ...... 94 Chapter 3: Ineffective Innovations in Operation Iraqi Freedom ...... 97 Training and Education ...... 100 Military Effectiveness ...... 107 The Postwar Plan ...... 112 Military Effectiveness ...... 122 Iraqi Security Forces ...... 139 Military Effectiveness ...... 152 Conclusion ...... 172 Chapter 4: Explaining Divergence in Military Effectiveness Outcomes ...... 176 Germany ...... 178 International Threat ...... 178 Reformist Military Leadership ...... 182 Civil-Military Relations ...... 189 Iraq ...... 198 International Threat ...... 199 Reformist Military Leaders ...... 203 Civil-Military Relations ...... 211 Conclusion ...... 228 Chapter 5: Explaining the Absence of Innovation in Korea and Vietnam ...... 231 Korea ...... 233 Military Effectiveness ...... 238 International Threat ...... 246 Reformist Military Leadership ...... 248 Civil-Military Relations ...... 249 Vietnam ...... 259

vii

Military Effectiveness ...... 262 International Threat ...... 265 Reformist Military Leadership ...... 270 Civil-Military Relations ...... 274 Conclusion ...... 281 Chapter 6: Conclusion and Policy Implications...... 283 Evaluating Effectiveness ...... 285 Causal Mechanisms ...... 290 International Threat ...... 291 Civil-Military Relations ...... 292 Reformist Military Leaders ...... 295 Policy Recommendations...... 296 Growing Innovative Leaders...... 297 Civil-Military Relations ...... 298 Reorganize for Nation-Building? ...... 301 Future Research ...... 302 Final Thoughts ...... 305 Bibliography ...... 308

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List of Tables

Table 1: Iraqi Security Forces Trained and Equipped ...... 165

Table 2: Iraqi Security Force Disposition as of 31 October 2008...... 166

Table 3: Training Standards for Iraqi Security Forces...... 167

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

“Modern wars are not internecine wars in which the killing of the enemy is the object. The destruction of the enemy in modern war, and, indeed in war itself, are means to obtain that of the belligerent which lies beyond the war.”

War Department, General Order No. 100, 24 April 1863

Since the World War II era, the United States Army has had several experiences with low intensity conflict, various types of military interventions and nation building. 1

Although these represent the majority of the missions executed in the last sixty years, the army still plans, organizes and trains to fight conventional high intensity ground wars. 2

In the last ten years there has been considerable criticism regarding the military’s inability to accomplish tasks other than traditional war. 3 Particularly after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has made failed states a national security priority. 4 Arguing that terrorist groups have exploited the vacuum of state authority, 5 many in the United States have claimed that as much as they would like to avoid involvement in nation building, failed states and the threat they present cannot be wished away, 6 and thus the military must innovate. The purpose of this study is to examine the conditions under which the United States Army has been able to effectively

1 For a complete list of military interventions during and since the Cold War, see Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 2 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace (New York: Basic Books, 2002), Lloyd J. Matthews, "Winning the War by Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and Post-Conflict in the 21st Century," in Fifteenth Annual Strategy Conference (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), Martin Van Crevald, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 3 Francis Fukuyama, "Nation-Building 101," The Atlantic Monthly 2004. 4George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002, accessed 2005). Center for Strategic and International Studies: The Commission of Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Play to Win: Final Report of the Bi-Partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Arlington: The Association of the United States Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003). 5 Kim Thachuk, "Transnational Threats: Falling through the Cracks?" Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 10, no. 1 (2003). 6 Robert C. Orr, ed., Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction , ed. Roberta L. Howard, Significant Issues Series, vol. 26 (Washington DC: CSIS Press, 2004). John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, "Toward Post conflict Reconstruction," The Washington Quarterly , Autumn 2002. 1 innovate with respect to these missions in the past and what tasks the military must accomplish to be successful in future nation building missions.

Nation building is defined as a type of military occupation where the goal is regime change or survival, a large number of U.S. ground troops are deployed, and both military and civilian personnel are used in the political administration of an occupied country. 7 The involvement of the United States Army in nation building dates to the late

19 th century. 8 Although the U.S. Marines have also been involved in nation-building, the majority of these missions have been executed by the Army. 9 U. S. Army involved in these missions has increased since the end of the Cold War. 10 Even as the United States

Army has continually been asked to do nation building in the last century, its focus remained on firepower and maneuver—two critical elements of large-scale ground war. 11

For example, Andrew Krepinevich argues that a key factor that inhibited change during the Vietnam War was the “Army Concept,” the belief that the objective of warfare is the destruction of an enemy’s forces. According to this concept, the U.S. Army should focus on mid-intensity conventional war and rely heavily on firepower to keep casualties

7 Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), Policy Brief. An alternate definition of nation building used by James Dobbins is “the use of armed force in the aftermath of a crisis to promote a transition to democracy.” James Dobbins, "Nation-Building: UN Surpasses U.S. On Learning Curve," in RAND Review (RAND, 2005). 8 James Dobbins and others, America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Arlington: RAND, 2003), Pei and Kasper. 9 The United States Army had conducted military government in Cuba, the Philippines, Mexico 1947-1848, in the Confederate States after the Civil War, and in the Rhineland after WWI. See Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941 (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1998), Jayne A. Carson, “Nation-Building, the American Way” (U.S. Army War College, 2003). 10 Andrew Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" International Affairs 81, no. 5 (2005). P. 1013. and Chapter 1 in Orr, ed. P. 3-7. 11 Anthony H. Cordesman, The War after the War: Strategic Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan , ed. Roberta L. Howard, Significant Issues Series, vol. 26 (Washington D.C.: CSIS Press, 2004), John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport: Praeger, 2002). Thomas G. Mahnken, "The American Way of War in the Twenty-First Century," in Democracies and Small Wars , ed. Efraim Inbar (London: Frank Cass, 2003). 2 down. 12 Similarly, Morton Halperin suggests that the organizational essence of the U.S.

Army is ground combat capability by organized regular divisional units. Therefore, military members will be considerably resistant to suggestions to develop capabilities for alternative missions like counterinsurgency or nation building. 13

Some authors have suggested that innovation is necessary and that the military should alter its organizational structure to better accomplish nation-building tasks. 14

Innovation is defined as replacing old organizational routines with new procedures, tactics, strategies or structures. 15 Organizational theory, however, predicts that the military will not innovate because organizations tend to function on routine, repetitive orderly action. 16 Organizations come into existence for the pursuit of specific purposes, which require coordination, planning and supervision. 17 The pursuit of purpose encourages behavior and structure aimed at reducing internal and external sources of uncertainty. 18

12 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 13 Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla Clapp, and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974). 14 The following sources take a critical view of what the US military has done in the past with respect to nation building or operations other than war: Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds., Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (Washington DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2003), Eric Robert Giordano, “The U.S. Army and Nontraditional Missions: Explaining Divergence in Doctrine and Practice in the Post-Cold War Era” (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2003), Donald Gregory Rose, "Peace Operations and Change in the US Military," Defense Analysis 17, no. 2 (2001). 15 Jeffrey A. Isaacson, Christopher Layne, and John Arquilla, Predicting Military Innovation (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), J.G. March and Herbert Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), Michael J. Meese, "Institutionalizing Maneuver Warfare: The Process of Organizational Change," in Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology , ed. Richard D. Hooker, Jr. (Novato: Presidio Press, 1993). 16 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, Inc., 1999), James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (Basic Books, Inc., 1989). P. 152. 17 March and Simon, Organizations . P. 162-165. 18 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). 3

The traits that constrain an organization’s ability to change--predictability, stability, and certainty--are the same factors that keep them efficient. To maintain this stability, organizational leaders have an interest in perpetuating the status quo. It is not in the interests of most members of an organization to promote or succumb to radical change. 19 Once large organizations become committed to a course of action, it is extraordinarily difficult to alter course. Instead, programs seem to have a momentum of their own. If and when obstacles are encountered, the natural tendency is to do more of the same rather than to rethink the problem and try to adjust response patterns. 20

Though theory suggests that the U.S. military is culturally and organizationally resistant to change, 21 there have been certain periods in which it has undergone drastic and significant changes. 22 There have even been cases in which the United States Army has effectively innovated in response to the requirements of nation building. 23 In 1942, for example, the U.S. Army established a school of military government to train forces for occupational duties. They also created military police and civil affairs branches to maintain control of military and civilian personnel in occupied territories. 24 The fact that

19 Ibid. 20 Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict , Westview Special Studies in National Security and Defense Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986). 21 Janowitz claims that military professionals have a long record of resistance to change, and have maintained outmoded organizational forms. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960). 22 The following sources discuss the likelihood of military change and examine what factors affect their propensity to change: Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds., The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology , ed. Michael Clarke, Making Sense of Global Security (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Suzanne C. Nielsen, “Preparing for War: The Dynamics of Peacetime Military Reform” (Dissertation, Harvard University, 2003), Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military , ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, vol. 275 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 23 James M. Snyder, The Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary: 3 October 1945-30 June 1947 (Engineer Reproduction Plant, 1947), Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946 , ed. Maurice Matloff, Army Historical Series (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975). 24 Ziemke. 4 such innovations occurred at this moment in history seems counterintuitive. One would expect the military to focus on its war-fighting tasks, especially when undertaking the biggest mobilization for war in the nation’s history. 25 The fact that innovation with respect to nation building did occur is puzzling. Studying specific cases where the US military made drastic internal changes to prepare for and execute a successful nation building effort is useful in generating ideas about how it can do so in the future.

Military innovation has not been studied in the context of nation building as a phenomenon separate from wartime or peacetime innovation. This research hopes to uncover the causal mechanisms behind specific cases of effective military innovation.

Finally, the results of this research may provide policy implications for those interested in fostering innovation within the military under similar conditions. If the US continues to consider nation building a national security priority, a more theoretically grounded study of past successful innovations may prove valuable to those contemplating undertaking similar missions in the future.

Dependent Variable

This study will examine the ability of the United States Army to effectively innovate in nation building. In particular, this study will focus on innovations that pertain to the provision of security during nation building since it is fundamental to the success

25 By the time Germany surrendered in 1945, detailed Allied planning for the post-conflict phase of operations in that nation had been ongoing for 2 years. Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003), Mark S. Watson, The War Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations , ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield, United States Army in World War II, vol. 6 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950). 5 or failure of the outcome. 26 Since security represents the most traditionally military task associated with nation building, the Army should be prepared to provide it. 27

In this study, military effectiveness will be used as the measurement of innovative success. An effective military is one that maximizes power from available resources— wealth, populations, technology and human capital. 28 Intrinsic political, strategic, operational and tactical considerations affect a state’s ability to generate military power. 29

To evaluate whether or not an innovation was successful, or that the military was effective, four criteria will be used: integration, responsiveness, skill and quality. 30 The most effective militaries will possess all four properties; however, it is more likely that different military organizations will capitalize on different elements of military effectiveness. For example, the U.S. Army typically focuses on skill and quality, whereas the British stress responsiveness and integration. 31 Each military accepts some risk in choosing certain elements to emphasize. The US may generate skills and doctrine

26 Many authors cite security as the primary concern with nation building. Here are those that were the most influential to me: Binnendijk and Johnson, eds., Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations , Dobbins and others, America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq , Albin F. Irzyk, "Mobility Vigilance Justice," Army , January 2003 2003, Snyder, Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam , Studies in International Security, vol. 10 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966). Police functions have been vital in the success or failure of peace operations particularly in the 1990s. This issue is discussed in the following report: Roxane D. V. Sismanidis, Police Functions in Peace Operations (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 14. A report that focuses solely on the provision of security is: Seth G. Jones and others, Establishing Law and Order after Conflict (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005). 27 Key tasks include rapidly deploying international military and police forces, vetting and deploying indigenous police and other security forces and establishing at least a temporary rule of law according to Jones and others, Establishing Law and Order after Conflict . 28 Risa Brooks, "The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness,” (2005). Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," International Security 11, no. 1 (1986). 29 Isaacson, Layne, and Arquilla, Predicting Military Innovation . 30 Brooks uses these four attributes. Brooks, "The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness." 31 Deborah D. Avant, "Political Institutions and Military Effectiveness," ed. Risa Brooks (2005). 6

that are inappropriate for some strategic goals, while the UK may risk having less skilled

personnel in other key areas. 32

It is also important to note that the dependent variable is designed to measure the

presence of effective innovation, not the outcome’s success. The outcome of a nation

building effort can still fail even if the Army is able to innovate. 33 Factors such as enemy

resources, political will, and resource commitments can all preclude success. 34 The

military’s contribution in the form of concrete, specified actions is only one facet of the

overall likelihood of success. If these four indicators are present, the likelihood of

success increases, but other factors may still derail the effort. Conversely, it is possible

that a nation building effort may succeed without the presence of innovation. There

could exist a variety of factors that ensure a successful outcome no matter what course of

action is undertaken by the occupying force.

Stephen Biddle develops criteria to explain military effectiveness as it relates to

mid-intensity warfare in his book, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in

Modern Battle .35 Although the tasks he identifies are useful for understanding why

militaries succeed or fail in conventional warfare, not all of the same tasks translate into

nation building effectiveness. This study, therefore, enumerates some of the tasks

required to execute nation building effectively through the specification of the dependent

variable.

32 Ibid. 33 Isaacson, Layne, and Arquilla, Predicting Military Innovation . 34 Brooks, "The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness." 35 Although on the whole Biddle’s tasks are very different from those required for nation building, force employment is one task that is important in both conventional war and nation building. See Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 7

Integration

The first and most crucial requirement for military effectiveness is the capacity for integration. There must be unity of effort among the diplomatic, military, economic, and informational aspects of national power. 36 Integration has two distinct facets. First of all, it refers to the degree to which military activities are consistent at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, 37 as well as in force development activities, like procurement, training and education. 38 Second, it refers to the integration between the military and the other agencies involved in the provision of security, particularly the integration between security needs and law enforcement requirements. 39 In nation building, this means that in addition to combating enemy actions, the military must ensure provision of security and safety of the civilian population. Combat operations, post-conflict reconstruction, and restoring security are so interconnected that strategies to achieve these goals must be fully integrated to be successful. 40 Two examples of

36 William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," Parameters (2003). 37 “Strategic military activity refers to the employment of national armed forces to secure by force national goals defined by political leadership which consists of plans specifying time, geography, missions, and objectives and the execution of those plans. Operational military activity refers to the analysis, selection and development of institutional concepts or doctrines for employing major forces to achieve strategic objectives within a theater of war, which involves the analysis, planning, preparation, and conduct of the various facets of a specific campaign. The tactical level refers to the specific techniques used by combat units to secure operational objectives. This involves movements of forces against the enemy, provision of fire upon enemy forces, and the arrangement of logical support.” Millett, Murray, and Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations." 38 Brooks, "The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness." 39 The integration between the military and other agencies involved in the provision of security would assign responsibilities for the following tasks: thorough implementation of martial law, provision of law enforcement capability down to local level, dispersion of security forces throughout occupied territory, control of borders through active patrolling, significant effort to thwart black marketing, arrest of law violators, disarmament of enemy combatants, displaced personnel (DPs), and civilian population, and safe delivery of food and medical aid . The importance of preventing civil disorder, border patrolling and similar activities is highlighted in the following report: Robert M. Perito, The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2005), 137. 40 Binnendijk and Johnson, eds., Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations , Anne Ellen Henderson, The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: 8 successful integration in nation building are the United States Army in the Philippines and the British Army in Malaya.

The US Army’s administration of nation building tasks in the Philippines from

1899-1902 demonstrates successful integration. 41 An enlightened military government, understanding and reform-oriented army officers and well-conceived counter-guerilla operations stressing political, economic, social, and traditional military activity led to the success of the campaign. 42 Although the Army organized municipal governments and implemented reform projects such as schools and roads, its primary mission was military.

In 1901, the Americans continually pressured the revolutionaries on military, social and economic fronts. The Army confiscated the property of prominent revolutionaries

(principalia) and harassed their relatives, a major blow at the elites furnishing the leadership. By arresting, deporting or imprisoning many of the principalia, the Army struck at their social and economic power, making both the revolutionaries and their supporters realize the consequences of continued warfare. U.S. military officers established and utilized organizations such as the municipal police, Native Scout units, and the Philippine Constabulary that enlisted many Filipinos, giving them a purpose, a

Lessons Learned (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2005), 138. Faleh A. Jabar, Postconflict Iraq: A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2004), 120. Henderson, The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: Lessons Learned . 41 By most accounts, the decentralization of authority and the integration of military officers with local communities made the overall campaign effective. However, there are also instances of atrocities at the hands of both General Leonard Wood and General Pershing. Punitive forays actually made the campaign more difficult in many cases. See Brian M. De Toy, ed., Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations after the Campaign (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004). 42 John Morgan Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 (Westport: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1973). 9

profession, and economic means. 43 This case illustrates the successful integration of

tactical, operational and strategic goals.

One of the most important attributes of the British campaign in Malaya, from

1952-1957, was its ability to integrate social, political, economic, police and military

actions. British district officers coordinated all administrative, police, and military effort

in a specific area. These men ensured the measures taken by the police and the military

were mutually consistent and internally supportive, sorting out any differences between

the two and reconciling them. The military created a framework in which economic

reform and governance could take effect. 44 This integration was vital in making the

counterinsurgency campaign effective.

Responsiveness

The second indication of military effectiveness is responsiveness--the

identification of explicit and implicit needs of a mission. This implies flexibility and a

quick reaction to events. 45 The army must be responsive in three key areas in order to be effective in nation building. First, and most importantly, there is a requirement for responsiveness to the military situation: the ability to react to the actions of the enemy. 46

A military must be able to adjust doctrine and tactics to the situation on the ground and

43 Brian McAllister Linn, The U.S. Army and the Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989). 44 Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife . 45 Flexibility is what made the US counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines successful. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 , William R. Kintner, Joseph I. Coffey, and Raymond J. Albright, Forging a New Sword: A Study of the Department of Defense , American Project Series (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958). 46 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam . Since the adversary must be stopped from reorganizing and from influencing the civilian population, the military must: defeat subversion first, secure important areas, and then defeat guerillas if necessary. Internal and external support to the enemy must be cut off, forcing any insurgents to go on the defensive 10

exploit its own strengths as well as the adversary’s weaknesses. 47 Then there is a requirement to be responsive to policing needs. 48 The law must be enforced and often the military is required to assume this responsibility until a separate law enforcement body is established. Finally, the military must also be responsive to the requirements of political and economic administration. 49 An illustration of effective responsiveness is the US

Army experience in the Philippines. Conversely, the Marines in Vietnam were responsive at the unit level, but their actions did not add up to overall effectiveness.

The US Army showed itself a competent counterinsurgency force able to adjust and adapt to the challenges it faced in the Philippines. A key to the success was the ability of U.S. officers to construct and implement pragmatic pacification policies designed to meet the realities of the guerrilla war in towns, provinces, and districts under their control. Officers had great discretion and were not closely supervised, although they had clear directives from higher headquarters providing guidelines. 50 The lack of adherence to rigid doctrines or theories and the willingness of its officers to experiment with novel pacification schemes led to the U.S. Army’s ultimate success. 51 The responsiveness of the individual army officers charged with maintaining law and order in their particular areas made the military particularly effective.

47 Brooks, "The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness." 48 Linn, Celeste J. Ward, The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq: Lessons Learned (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2005), 139. 49 Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict . Spreading governance and order throughout the occupied country is as important as securing the capital. John R. Ballard, Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti: 1994-1997 (Westport: Praeger, 1998), Ward, The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq: Lessons Learned . 50 Conrad C. Crane, "Phase Iv Operations: Where Wars Are Really Won," in Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations after the Campaign , ed. Brian M. De Toy (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004). 51 Linn. 11

F. J. West’s book, The Village , illustrates how U.S. Marines living in a Vietnam village were responsive to the enemy situation. Less than a platoon of marines waged a

successful counterinsurgency campaign by constantly interacting with the villagers and

continually adapting to the enemy as their tactics changed. By developing relationships

with the villagers, they were able to gather information about large troop movements in

their area that allowed them to call in heavy firepower when needed. Staying abreast of

the changing enemy situation made them effective at pacifying the area around them. 52

Despite the fact that the Marines were extremely effective at the village level,

because their actions were not integrated with a broader, national plan, the war was

ultimately unsuccessful. In order for the military to be effective at nation building, there

must be vertical and horizontal integration. Since there can be individually successful

examples that do not add up to overall effectiveness, several levels of analysis are

necessary. Tactical success is required (but not sufficient) for overall effectiveness. The

operational level of war is what ultimately determines success; it is where actions on the

ground are given meaning and purpose through the achievement of a strategic aim.

Therefore, the operational and strategic levels must be aggregated to determine whether

or not effectiveness was achieved.

Skill

Skill is the third attribute of military effectiveness. Skill reflects the ability of the

military to perform its wartime mission when called upon to do so, as well as the degree

to which military personnel are trained, and prepared to undertake difficult and complex

52 The following source describes the importance of combating enemy and ensuring the safety of the civilian population as primary ways to effectively counter an insurgency: Francis J. West, Jr., The Village (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972). This book is a great example of successful counterinsurgency techniques at the unit level. 12 tasks. 53 In nation building, since military officers are responsible in many cases for governance at the lowest levels of society in the transition from conflict to peace, having skilled personnel is an integral part of military effectiveness. 54 Additionally, the ability of military personnel to gather, analyze and disseminate intelligence is essential. 55

There are several skill sets that military members must possess if they are to be effective at nation building: tactical, intellectual and interpersonal. In terms of tactical skill, military members must be able to maintain order and security with the use of force when necessary. Intellectual skill is required in the form of a clear understanding of foreign policy goals and how tactical decisions impact the broader picture. 56 Dealing with civilian populations in occupied territories demands extraordinary intellectual and administrative skill. 57 Interpersonal skills like motivating subordinates, building relationships with occupied personnel, and differentiating between friendly and enemy

53 Brooks, "The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness." Michael J. Meese, “Defense Decision Making under Budget Stringency: Explaining Downsizing in the United States Army” (Doctoral, Princeton University, 2000). 54 James Fallows, "The Fifty-First State," The Atlantic Monthly 290, no. 4 (2002).The following sources discuss the myriad of responsibilities faced by US soldiers in Iraq: Todd S. Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing: America's War in Iraq (New York: The New York Times Company, 2004), Karl Zinsmeister, Dawn over Baghdad: How the U.S. Military Is Using Bullets and Ballots to Remake Iraq (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2004). The following resource discusses US soldier responsibilities in Germany Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors , ed. Stetson Conn, United States Army in World War II, vol. 6 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964). 55 Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife . 56 Lucius Clay was such a leader. The following books describe in detail how Clay implemented an ambiguous policy regarding German reconstruction. Edward Norman Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978), Hans A. Schmitt, ed., The U.S. Occupation in Europe after World War II (Lawrence: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1978). Douglas MacArthur took an entirely different approach, but again he understood the foreign policy goals and undertook the steps required to transform Japanese society to fit this mold. The following book discusses MacArthur’s techniques: Martin Kyre and Joan Kyre, Military Occupation and National Security (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968). 57 Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors . In Desert Storm, Army officers had to supervise camps containing Iraqi refugees and captured members of the Republican Guard. Obviously, creative interpersonal skills are required. Fallows, "The Fifty-First State." 13 forces are also vital. 58 Developing long term relationships and cultural awareness of the occupied personnel is essential to understanding who the enemy is and keeping or gaining the support of the people. 59 Identifying former regime members and supporters is the key to preventing a resistance from forming.

The occupation of Japan illustrates some of the skills required to be effective at nation building. 60 United States occupation officials, many of whom were military officers, supervised the daily workings of Japanese life down to what was taught in classrooms by working through the existing bureaucracy. Douglas MacArthur’s assistants rewrote labor laws as well as a constitution; years were spent developing and executing reform plans. 61 The Army was able to ensure the safety of the civilian population while at the same time positively influencing the political, economic, and social fabric of Japan. The highly skilled personnel assigned to this mission were an integral part of what made the military effective.

Quality

The final attribute of an effective military is quality—possessing highly capable weapons, equipment, personnel, and organizations. Although usually measured in terms of the military’s ability to supply itself with superior weapons and equipment, it can also

58 For a discussion of non-routine versus routine tasks and their influence on an organization’s ability to innovate see James Q. Wilson, "Innovation in Organizations: Notes toward a Theory," in Approaches to Organizational Design , ed. James D. Thompson (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963). 59 Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife . 60 Although this example demonstrates the presence of skilled personnel in the occupation of Japan itself, Ronald Spector argues that the occupation of most of the Japanese empire was not nearly the success Americans think it was. Instead, Allied occupiers found themselves in the middle of insurgencies or civil wars and by 1948 all the states of the former Japanese empire were involved in conflicts. Ronald H. Spector, "After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan's Empire, 1945-1947," The Journal of Military History 69 (2005). 61 Fallows, "The Fifty-First State." The following sources discuss the myriad of responsibilities faced by US soldiers in Iraq: Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing: America's War in Iraq , Zinsmeister, Dawn over Baghdad: How the U.S. Military Is Using Bullets and Ballots to Remake Iraq . The following resource discusses US soldier responsibilities in Germany Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors . 14 refer to the activities associated with internal organizational planning. 62 Having effective weapons can be just as useful in nation building as in traditional war. For example, nonlethal weapons provide a way to control crowds without causing fatalities. 63 Using new technologies may reduce the number of soldiers required to execute security tasks and can make a nation building operation more cost effective. Alternatively, organizational planning for the challenges of nation building also indicates a particular level of quality.

Recognizing that the organization’s structure may have to be altered to ensure adequate security can be just as important as possessing a new technology.

Theoretical Framework

There is substantial disagreement over what spurs military innovation. 64 One school of thought suggests that factors outside of the military spur innovation. For example, change could be motivated by both foreign and domestic developments external to the military organizations. Characteristics of the international environment that may be important include shifts in the balance of power, structural characteristics of the security environment, or the activities and postures of foreign militaries. Some literature on military innovation focuses on the question of whether armed services can innovate independently or whether civilian leadership must force innovation on an unwilling military. 65 Alternatively, other authors have suggested a more integrative model. 66

62 Brooks, "The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness." 63 Joseph Siniscalchi, Non-Lethal Technologies: Implications for Military Strategy (Center for Strategy and Technology, 1998, accessed 19 September 2005); available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/1998/03/occppr03.htm. 64 Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife . 65 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars, Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military . 66 Kimberly Marten Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organizational Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Isaacson, Layne, and Arquilla, Predicting Military Innovation , Murray and Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period . 15

Instead of attributing change to solely internal or external forces, institutional theory, for

example, suggests that civilian reformers and members of the military combine to create

changes. 67 This section will explain the prevailing theories by grouping them into the following three categories: threat-based accounts, accounts based on the qualities of military organizations, accounts based upon the quality of civil-military relations.

Threat-Based Accounts

Barry Posen argues that external forces are the underlying cause of military innovation. 68 Though he acknowledges that the nature of military organizations and

domestic political content can affect military innovation, he concludes that variables like

the nature of organizations are merely preconditions that potentially inhibit rather than

cause change. Instead, organizational variables are usually overridden by constraints and

incentives in the international political system. What matters most is the international

balance of power. Because states will seek to balance one another in the international

system, when the military is faced with a threat, civilian leadership will intervene to force

the military to update its doctrine to meet national security goals. This theory places the

impetus for change on the shoulders of civilians in the form of their intervention in

military affairs. 69

As a special organizational subset, Posen sees the military as particularly set in their ways, because of the danger inherent in their mission as well as the deadly consequences of operational failure. When the consequences of organizational defeat are

67 Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), Ricky Lynn Waddell, “The Army and Peacetime Low Intensity Conflict, 1961-1993: The Process of Peripheral and Fundamental Military Change” (Columbia University, 1994). Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies , ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). 68 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars . 69 Ibid. 16 extremely high, the organization’s concern for control, predictability, and reliability should work the strongest. Parochialism—the natural autonomy derived from the special and arcane nature of the military as well as the concern for predictability, according to

Posen, are the key factors that inhibit military innovation absent some threat that civilian leaders recognize as compelling change. 70

Several hypotheses emerge from Posen’s model. Civilian preferences imposed upon the military, reflecting national security interests, combined with the presence of military reformers leads to military innovation. The level of threat, according to Posen, also affects military effectiveness. For example, rising threats create incentives for the military to improve responsiveness. Therefore, without shifts in the balance of the international system and civilian intervention, the military will be unresponsive, poorly integrated and lack the skills required to be effective at nation building.

Barry Posen and Stephen Rosen fundamentally differ in their opinion of how threat affects military effectiveness. 71 Posen suggests that a low degree of threat leads to less political military coordination and poorer integration because parochial organizational agendas take over. 72 In peacetime then, organizational inertia sets in which prevents innovation. Rosen, however, argues that it is during peacetime that military organizations have the luxury to think about the future, thus making innovation more likely. 73 Both the Germany and Iraq case are marked by low threat environments

70 Waddell, “The Army and Peacetime Low Intensity Conflict, 1961-1993: The Process of Peripheral and Fundamental Military Change”. 71 Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military . 72 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars . 73 Emily O. Goldman, "International Competition and Military Effectiveness: Naval Air Power, 1919- 1945," in Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness , ed. Risa Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military . 17

prior to Pearl Harbor and 911. The similarities in the level of threat, therefore, don’t explain the variation in military effectiveness outcomes.

Another aspect of threat that may influence military effectiveness is diversity of threat. 74 This variable captures whether the state confront an overarching enemy that

make strategic priorities clear, or whether there are multiple enemies and challenges that

make strategic planning more difficult. A highly diverse threat environment often

produces conflicting or ambiguous political guidance. This complexity can serve as a

deterrent to both innovation and military effectiveness. The 1930s and 1940s saw

relatively dominant scenario that colored the national security priorities of the United

States. Policymakers saw Japanese aggression as the biggest threat and therefore funded

the navy over the army to prepare for this contingency. This doesn’t offer any

explanation, then, as to why the army was so effective in Germany. On the other hand,

the post-Cold War security environment was enormously complex further inhibiting

innovation in nation-building tasks as well as making military effectiveness problematic.

So, although diversity of threat may explain the army’s ineffectiveness in the Iraq case, it

doesn’t seem to offer an explanation of the effectiveness in the Germany case.

Qualities of Military Organizations

There are examples, however, of innovation in the absence of civilian

intervention. U.S. Army innovations with respect to nation building during World War II

were initiated without civilian pressure. 75 In fact, there is evidence that the civilian

leadership outside the War Department was skeptical of the priority the army was giving

occupation duties and put political pressure on the army to stop preparing for military

74 Goldman, "International Competition and Military Effectiveness: Naval Air Power, 1919-1945.", Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military . 75 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946 . 18

government functions. 76 Given these set of circumstances, Posen’s model does not

adequately explain the presence of military innovation in this particular case.

Contrary to Posen’s argument, some organizational theorists argue that innovation

is possible without civilian intervention. Instead, internal structures and the bureaucratic

processes of military organizations can explain innovation. For example, Huntington

argues in his book, The Soldier and the State that soldiers can be trusted to make wise

and appropriate decisions because they have the necessary professional expertise and are

loyal to the state. 77 Militaries can—and do—innovate of their own accord. This

“professionalist” approach posits that militaries are organizations driven by the goal of

maximizing their state security. 78 Under favorable conditions, organizations are capable

of learning and civilian intervention is not required to spur innovation. Instead, militaries

will take the initiative to innovate because they are professional organizations driven by

the goal of providing security for the state. 79

Stephen Rosen also uses organizational theory as the foundation for his argument

that neither defeat in wartime nor civilian intervention is a necessary prerequisite for

military innovation. 80 He suggests that key military leaders respond not so much to

civilian direction, but to structural characteristics of the security environment. Senior

military officers who create new military tasks and missions for their service, inspire a

generation of young officers to take up new career paths, and are assisted by senior

76 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947). 77 According to Huntington, military officers exhibit three characteristics that define a profession: expertise, responsibility and corporateness. This distinguishes the military from other professions. The self-regulating norms ensure the military remains obedient to civilian authorities. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military . 19 government civilians, can create major changes in military doctrine. This could be described as an internal model of military innovation.

Rosen goes on to suggest that organization failure and opportunities to expand or increase autonomy of the organization may also provide conditions that create innovation within an organization. 81 Using Rosen’s model, the following hypotheses emerge:

Senior military leaders who establish organizational measures of effectiveness with corresponding reward structures related to nation building, create opportunities for military innovation. If expertise in nation building is required for state security, then the military will innovate.

Organizational theory presents some possible alternative explanations concerning the presence of innovation with respect to nation building planning leading up to World

War II. 82 “Professionalist” military leadership realized there was a gap in its nation building capabilities after World War I when Britain and France were responsible for military government tasks by default. Perhaps the military saw preparation for occupation duties and developing nation building capabilities as a way to expand the prestige and power of its organization. 83 However, given US success in the case of

Germany, it fails to explain why the military would not continue to expand this capability as a way to maximize its autonomy in future nation-building involvement. Although

81 In addition to Rosen, Kimberly Marten Zisk is another author who uses organizational theory to explain the presence or absence of innovation. She hypothesizes that military organizations are likely to develop innovative doctrines on their own, in the absence of civilian intervention, when they interpret a foreign doctrinal shift as a threat to the success of their current war plans. Ibid, Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organizational Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991 . 82 Other theorists suggest that the organization culture of the U.S. Army prevents it from innovating in nontraditional missions. For further discussion of the U.S. Army’s unique culture see Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). John Nagl also argues that the U.S. Army’s organizational culture is against innovation in counterinsurgency operations. See Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife . 83 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946 . 20 organizational theory may explain a part of why innovation occurred in World War II, it fails to address the absence of innovation since then.

Several other authors cite reformist military leadership as the impetus for military innovation. 84 The process of innovation in complex organizations is fundamentally the result of a decision-making process, where the institutional structure and an actor meet. 85

Therefore, there must be an actor who sees the value in change. In order to have innovation in nation building, there must be a military reformer who envisions the need and opportunity for change. 86 A lone military reformer is not sufficient to force change just as enlightened senior leadership cannot impose its vision upon a recalcitrant bureaucracy. Instead, senior leaders set the conditions that foster change. 87 If leaders set the conditions for change to come from below, then innovation may occur.

COL Irwin Hunt, a civil affairs officer in the First World War is a great example of a military reformer that envisioned the need for innovation in nation building. He thought the American army that occupied Germany after World War I lacked both the training and organization to effectively guide the one million civilians whom were placed under its temporary control. 88 According to his “Hunt Report,” military government, the

84 Several authors cite the importance of leadership to military effectiveness. See Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness: The Second World War , vol. III (1988). Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala, National Security: Policymakers, Processes and Politics , Fourth ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008). 85 Joris Van Bledel, “The All-Volunteer Force in the Russian Mirror: Transformation without Change” (University of Groningen, 2004). 86 Reformist military leaders are a condition attributed to innovation by both Rosen and Posen. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars , Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military . It is also important to note that reformers work within the system. 87 Eliot A. Cohen, "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs," The Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 3 (2004). 88 Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, "Hunt Report Digest, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920," ed. Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone) Office of the Director, United States Forces European Theater, Reports and Information Branch (Historical Documents Section, Reports and Information Branch, Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone), 1946). 21

administration by military officers of civil government in occupied enemy territory, is a

virtually inevitable concomitant of modern warfare. 89 In instances prior to World War II,

neither the Army nor the government accepted it as a legitimate military function. 90

Consequently, its imposition invariably came as a somewhat disquieting experience for

both, and the means devised for accomplishing it ranged from inadequate to near

disastrous. 91 The Hunt Report looked on administration of an occupied territory as

something more than a minor incidental of war for the first time in the Army’s

experience. COL Hunt realized that to exercise governmental authority over a defeated

enemy required preparation. The Army should develop competence in civil

administration among its officers during peacetime instead of waiting until the

responsibility is thrust upon it. 92

COL Hunt and his report serve as an exemplar for reformist military leadership.

He clearly identified the need for new military functions and capabilities. However, it took other military reformers, as well as enlightened senior leadership, to develop the capability to address these new requirements and to institutionalize the relevant functions.

The heads of the American Army in 1941 were aware of the significant role which military government operations were bound to assume in conditions of total war, both for winning the war and securing the final peace. 93 More important than this realization, though, were the steps the military took to address its shortcomings in this area as well as the organizational traits that enabled them to do so.

89 Ibid. 90 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946 . 91 The following source discusses the problems of the occupation of Germany after the First World War. Robert S. Thomas, ed., American Occupation of Germany: United States Army in the World War, 1917- 1919 , vol. 11 (Washington D.C.: Historical Division, United States Department of the Army, 1948). 92 Harold Zink, American Military Government in Germany (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947). 93 Carl J. Freidrich, American Experiences in Military Government in World War II , American Government in Action (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1948). 22

Qualities of Civil-Military Relations

Deborah Avant uses institutional theory to suggest that civilians can influence the

military’s actions and its propensity to change by providing positive and negative

incentives to comply with their preferences. When civilian leadership is unified

regarding a specific national security goal, then change is more likely to occur.

Policymakers affect the Army’s bias through routine oversight, appointments, and policy

proclamations. 94

Using institutional theory, the following hypotheses emerge: Military

organizational integrity (professionalism) and institutional bias (preferences), along with

the degree of political unity/disunity in government, determines the ability of the military

to innovate. If the civilian government is divided and weak in terms of existing control

mechanisms over the military, innovation is likely to come from within the military itself.

If civilian government is unified or strong in terms of existing control mechanisms over

the military, innovation is likely to come from civilian leaders. The greater the degree of

political unity, the more responsive and integrated the military. Military organizations

will respond to civilian goals when military leaders expect to be rewarded for their

responsiveness.

According to institutional theory, the current bias of the military against nation

building could be attributed to lack of interest in this mission over time. 95 Furthermore,

civilians did not provide any incentives for the military to be responsive to the

requirements of nation-building, reinforcing their preference to avoid it. Although this

may explain the lack of innovation with respect to nation building tasks in the last half of

94 Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars . 95 In October 2000, George W. Bush stated that he didn’t think that our soldiers should be used for nation building. His quote is found in the following article: Fukuyama, "Nation-Building 101." 23

the 20 th century, it does not explain how or what caused the military to change without civilian consensus in the 1940s.

Other theorists suggest that the quality of civil-military relations, particularly the degree of trust has an impact on military effectiveness. Huntington’s work, in particular, attempts to use civil-military relations as an explanatory variable to explain military effectiveness. 96 Civil-military relations theories propose two different solutions to the structure and culture that will create effective military organizations. The Huntingtonian approach advocates for a clear divide between the civilian and military leadership allowing the military to develop its own skill set based on its view of the functional imperative. The Janowitzean approach instead argues that the contemporary context requires a politically attuned military and therefore advocates civil-military integration in order to create coordinated advice and to develop increased mutual understanding and trust between the actors of the civil-military interface. 97

Prominent civil-military scholars generally agree that conflict-laden relations

between political and military leaders will harm the country’s national security. 98

Relatively cooperative relationships between senior military and political leaders facilitate a number of desirable developments: integration of advanced technologies into military capabilities; 99 the capable employment of force; 100 the development of military

96 Suzanne Nielsen explores the issues associated with the impact of civil-military relationships on military effectiveness in the following book chapter:, Suzanne C. Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness," in Handbook of Military Administration , ed. Jeffrey A. Weber and Johan Eliasson (Boca Raton: Taylor and Francis Group, 2008). 97 See Robert Egnell, "Explaining US and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: The Civil-Military Dimension," The Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 6 (2006). P. 1048-1049. 98 Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness." 99 Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, "Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World," Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 2 (1996). 100 Risa Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), Adelphi Paper 324. 24 doctrine that supports political ends; 101 and the retention of flexibility in military organizations. 102 Just as enlightened senior military officials can set the conditions for change within the military, the civil-military environment can also affect the willingness of the military to attempt innovation. 103 If there is an environment of cooperative civil- military relations, then there may be greater opportunity for effective military innovation. 104 Another key variable in determining whether or not military organizations will innovate is the level of trust between civilian and military decision makers. 105 Trust is essential in creating conditions in which innovative ideas can be attempted. 106

The US has been able to overcome poor civil-military relations at times by applying overwhelming force. The nature of nation-building, however, requires close mutual civil-military understanding and trust in order to perform effectively. 107 The

President’s relationship to his military leaders certainly sets the stage for the level of trust

101 Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars . Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars . 102 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars , ed. Jack L. Snyder and Richard H. Ullman, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 103 Cohen, "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs." Egnell argues that the nature of civil-military relations affects operational effectiveness in the contemporary strategic context. He advocates for an integrated civil-military approach and a culture of mutual trust and understanding. See Robert Egnell, "Civil-Military Relations in Peace Operations: Political Leadership without Micromanagement," in Internal Studies Association Convention (Honolulu, Hawaii: 2005). 104 The more that civilian control reached into the domains of professional expertise, the more likely it was to damage the effectiveness of military organizations. See Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness: The Second World War . Civilians could exercise control of the armed forces through the budget process, legislation, investigations, personnel actions, and administrative control at the ministerial level. Murray and Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period . P. 359-367. 105 Several authors mention harmonious civil-military relations as important for military effectiveness. See Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, "Democracy and Military Effectiveness," Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 4 (2004). 106 There are three trust relationships that are important: the military profession’s relationship with the American people; their relationship with the public’s elected and appointed leaders in both Congress and in the Executive; the relationship with subordinate leaders within the military. See Don M. Snider, Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008).The civil- military relationship benefits when a national defense team is established that understands the military, treats the military with genuine respect and holds the military accountable. See Leonard Wong, "Civil- Military Relations in a Post-9/11 World," (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008). 107 Egnell, "Civil-Military Relations in Peace Operations: Political Leadership without Micromanagement." P. 26. 25 and cooperation between key civilian and military leaders. However, the most important interface of civil-military relations is that between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and subsequently is the most important indicator of trust between the military and its civilian masters. 108 Misunderstandings and distrust have been prevalent since the beginning of American civil-military relations, but has dramatically deteriorated since the end of the Cold War. 109 Part of the increase of distrust comes from the size of the organization; the larger the organization, the more difficult it is to generate trust. 110

As the number of organizations with political stakes has increased over time, the ability to prevent innovation has only grown.

Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War during World War II, was very supportive of military reformers. In his view, the duty of the Secretary of War was to support, protect, and defend his generals. 111 During his tenure, the Army reorganized itself several times and in many different ways to meet the requirements of the upcoming war as well as the conditions that would follow. 112

108 Johnson and Metz argue that the Secretary of Defense sets the tenor for all civil-military relations. See Douglas V. Johnson II and Steven Metz, American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995). P. 18. 109 Russell F. Weigley, "The American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present," in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security , ed. Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001). 110 Fukuyama also suggests that culture plays an important role in the degree of trust present in a society. See Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1995). 111 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War . 112 Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, "Digest American Military Government of Occupied Germany 1918- 1920," ed. Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone) Office of the Director, United States Forces European Theater, Reports and Information Branch (1946), Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops , The United States Army in World War II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), John David Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces , ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield, United States Army in World War II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War , John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades , ed. Jeffrey J. Clarke, Army Lineage Series (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1997). 26

The Iraq example, on the other hand, illustrates a contradictory organizational

dynamic. 113 Instead of allowing the Joint Chiefs of Staff unfettered access to the

President as mandated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Secretary of Defense Donald

Rumsfeld came to a different agreement with General Myers, the Joint Chiefs chairman.

General Myers agreed to serve the Secretary’s interests instead of providing independent

advice. 114 This set the tone for the military—disagreement with civilians in the

Department of Defense (DoD) would not be tolerated. Clearly this civil-military

environment provided a barrier to innovation—in order to innovate, open debate as well

as dissenting opinions must be encouraged. 115

The bureaucracy of the War Department in the 1940s was a fraction of its size

today. 116 Prior to World War II, the United States Government did not have the

bureaucratic infrastructure to intrusively monitor the decisions and actions made by the

military. 117 This inhibited civilian bureaucrats from intervening into most national

security issues and in turn may have created opportunities for military innovation. After

World War II, Congress was constantly occupied with major substantive issues of

military policy: selective service, universal military training, the size of the armed forces,

113 Jeffrey Record, Dark Victory: America's Second War against Iraq (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004). 114 Rowan Scarborough, Rumsfeld's War: The Untold Story of America's Anti-Terrorist Commander (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2004). 115 Murray and Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period . The following sources also cite organizational culture as critically important in innovating: James Corum, The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), Farrell and Terriff, eds., The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology , David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), Ian Roxborough, "Organizational Innovation: Lessons from Military Organizations," Sociological Forum 14, no. 2 (2000). 116 Ray S. Cline, The War Department: Washington Command Post: The Operations Division , U.S. Army in World War II, vol. 8 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), Watson, The War Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations . 117 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). 27 composition of reserve forces, the organization of the defense establishment and the conditions of service. 118 The Cold War enhanced the role of Congress with respect to both military policy and administration. Additionally, since the dramatic growth of the defense bureaucratic infrastructure over the past sixty years, the ability for civilians to prevent military change has only grown over time. Furthermore, the increase in the number of offices with political stakes in military policy makes it harder to generate trust and cooperation.

The increase of congressional power with respect to military affairs in the last sixty years has also allowed the Army to appeal to Congress when it was dissatisfied with a presidential direction, further complicating cooperation and trust between the military and civilians. 119 After emerging from World War II with high prestige and facing the development of the Cold War, the military found Congress especially responsive to its requests. 120 In fact, Congress was often more supportive of the budgetary and procurement views of the military than were secretaries of defense and presidents. 121

However, the end of the Cold War has presented the military with a different operating environment and therefore different mission priorities.

Case Selection

The goal of this study is to determine what conditions enabled U.S. innovation in some cases of nation building and what has prevented innovation in others in order to offer policy prescriptions. To narrow the universe of possible cases, three criteria will be

118 Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor Jr., and Michael Mazarr, American National Security , 5th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 119 Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars , Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 120 Jordan, Taylor Jr., and Mazarr, American National Security . 121 Ibid. 28

used. First, the case must be a nation building effort where the United States Army was

the primary force used. Although the Marines have also had an impact on several nation-

building efforts, the Army has been the primary military organization tasked to execute

nation-building missions. 122 Since service culture is an exogenous variable that can

account for some of the variation in both approaches to nation-building as well as

outcomes, I will only examine the Army. 123 Second, the cases must be comparable in all respects except for the independent variable. 124 Finally, the cases must result in different outcomes on the dependent variable.

Therefore, as a starting point to selecting cases, the term nation building must be defined in order to choose examples of the particular phenomenon. Nation building refers to a specific instance of comprehensive military occupation in which the United

States has distinct political and economic goals for the territory it is occupying. 125 In these cases, the United States uses a branch of the military to administer the governance of society until a political system can be established. I will examine cases where the

United States Army was tasked with governing a foreign country, where establishing a productive economy and a stable government that would ally with the United States in future contingencies were the primary goals. 126

122 The sheer size of the Army has by default led to it assuming the largest role in nation-building with the Army having over twice as many personnel (total end strength) as the Marine Corps. For example, during the “surge” in Iraq, the Marines deployed an additional two battalions (about 1000); while the Army deployed an addition five brigades (about 25,000). Furthermore, the Army has been the primary administrator of occupied territories since World War II. 123 Different branches of the armed forces have had different degrees of success in their innovation efforts. See Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis , Roxborough, "Organizational Innovation: Lessons from Military Organizations." 124 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences , BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004). 125 David M. Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," International Security 29, no. 1 (2004). 126 Ibid. 29

The object of this research is to determine what enabled the Army, specifically, to effectively innovate. Therefore, within the context of nation building cases, it is vital to choose important instances in which US military power has been used to underpin democratization. Although all other types of power, diplomatic, information, economics, are important, the focus of this study is on the arm of military power, specifically the army. 127 It is also important to choose cases where there is a divergence of predictions made by competing theories and to choose cases that resemble background conditions of current policy problems. 128 Clearly, a good starting place is a case where “success” was realized, especially if that case also demonstrates innovation. Furthermore, there should be variation with respect to the dependent variable--military effectiveness. In the twentieth century there have been several attempts at nation building: Germany, Japan,

Korea, Vietnam, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. 129 Germany represents the most successful case in terms of both outcome as well as effective innovation, while Iraq has been largely criticized for the lack of effectiveness. 130

The primary goal in the cases of Germany and Iraq was regime change-- comprehensive economic, political and social reconstruction. 131 The reconstruction effort

127 For a good discussion of the other elements of power and their influence in national security policy, see Chapter 11 in Amos A. Jordan and others, American National Security , 6th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2009). P. 233-246. 128 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). 129 Dobbins and others, America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq . 130 Although I will focus the majority of this dissertation on comparing Iraq and Germany, authors like Eva Bellin suggest that they are incomparable cases. She asserts that the five factors differentiate the two cases: level of economic development, ethnic homogeneity, strength of state institutions, prior experience with meaningful democracy, and elite leadership. Eva Bellin, "The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective," Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 4 (2004).These factors are important determinants of the outcome of the nation-building effort, but the focus of the dissertation is more concerned with the effectiveness of the innovation rather than the outcome of the effort. 131 Anni P. Baker, American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence , ed. Edward R. Beauchamp, Perspectives on the Twentieth Century (Westport: Praeger, 2004), Paul Cornish, ed., The Conflict in Iraq (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004). 30

in Iraq seeks to develop an unprecedented democratic political structure, create a new

security infrastructure, revive and reform a shattered economy, and bring many of the

former regime leaders to justice—the same requirements as that of Germany. 132 The stakes were particularly high in both cases since it was the second war with each in a relatively short period of time. 133 Germany and Iraq were both seen as strategic pieces of land, bordered by states hostile to the United States. 134 The Army had on its hands in both situations a twofold task--soldiers were required to serve military expediency on the one hand and politico-social directives on the other. 135

Next, the cases must be similar with respect to the international situation and the constraints placed upon the organization by domestic variables. In both instances, the

United States was moving into a new role in the international community, the military was parsing out its priorities, and there was a major war. Prior to the surprise attacks of

Pearl Harbor and 911, the United States had perceived the international threat to be relatively low. The armed forces between the world wars primarily focused on Japanese aggression and oriented their resources towards that eventuality. Conversely, the United

States after the end of the Cold War faced an incredible diversity of threat. The rise of violent non-state actors, concerns about transnational crime networks and terrorism were just a few asymmetric threats faced by the United States in addition to preparing to fight

132 Orr, ed., Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction . Henderson, The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: Lessons Learned . 133 This reference discusses the way the US Army was used in a variety of cases after the Cold War. The first Iraq war was vastly different in terms of the strategic goal. Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution, 1999), Thomas, ed., American Occupation of Germany: United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919 . 134 Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing: America's War in Iraq . 135 The intricacies of the Germany case are explained in the following source: Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors . 31 conventionally against North Korea or Iraq. Although the perception of threat was low prior to the direct attacks on the United States, the diversity of threat differed in the two cases.

On the domestic front, the Army was in both cases focused on reorganizing, transforming and mobilizing concurrently. 136 Civilians did not make nation building a priority nor did they intervene in either case. 137 Civilian leadership, especially within the administration, thought that occupation duties should be left to civilian authorities, not the military. 138 In both cases the military was placed in control of post-conflict planning and execution.

Although the international situation and domestic situation were similar, there were important differences in the two cases. Reformist military leadership played a role in both wars, but the level of trust between the military and civilian leadership was significantly different. There were also several organizational differences: a larger bureaucratic infrastructure, greater Congressional power in military affairs, and the institutionalization of high intensity warfare as the military’s primary mission.

Finally, the cases must vary with respect to the presence or absence of effective innovation. During World War II, there were a number of innovations that specifically relate to nation building. This study will focus on three instances in particular; one that occurred pre-war, one that was developed during the war, and one that was implemented

136 Max Boot, "The Struggle to Transform the Military," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (2005), Wilson. 137 James Lebovic suggests that military organizations learn only when change is imposed from the outside. The fact that civilians did not intervene in either case is an important antecedent condition. See James H. Lebovic, Foregone Conclusions: U.S. Weapons Acquisition in the Post-Cold War Transition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996). P. 79. 138 This similar condition should have resulted in similar efforts on the part of the military. Theory suggests that without civilian intervention the military would not effectively innovate. Joshua Hammer, "Tikrit Dispatch: Uncivil Military," The New Republic 230, no. 7 (2004), Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946 . 32 post-war. During the pre-war phase, a school of military government was established to provide expertise in the governing of occupied territories. Amidst American involvement in the war fighting, military planners developed thorough post war plans for Europe. The comprehensive planning process, resulting in the Eclipse Plan, is another instance of successful innovation pertaining to nation building. Finally, immediately following the

German surrender, the US Army created an entirely new unit, the US Constabulary, specifically to execute the task of postwar security. Each of these cases illustrates different strengths and weaknesses in terms of the four aspects of military effectiveness.

In contrast, the Iraq case will be used to determine what factors may have prevented effective innovation. Vietnam and Korea were two other important cases of nation- building that illustrate a lack of military effectiveness. These cases will also be addressed.

My Argument

This section has touched on two key issues that are central to understanding effective military innovation. The first of these is the debate over whether civilian political leaders or military officers are the central figures in the process of military reform. My assertion is that organizational innovations are primarily shaped by military officers. Political leaders may set the conditions whereby military leaders have the ability to innovate, but rarely determine the content or effectiveness of the innovation.

The second issue is what spurs military organizations to innovate? Possible motivators include: changes in the level or diversity of international threat, the presence of military reformers and the type of relationship between key military and civilian leaders. Although various scholars have prioritized one or another of these factors, none

of these conditions alone is enough to spur innovation. As will be seen in the case of the

U.S. Army in Germany, as well as the other cases, the weight of these factors varies

across cases. Military leaders respond to all of the following: the degree of trust present

with their civilian counterparts, changes in the potential threat, and developments within

their own organizations. Civilian policy decisions provide the parameters within which

militaries operate. The manner, in which military leaders respond to these constraints, as

well as to other factors such as threat, is usually a product of analyses within the military

organization itself.

Overview of Chapters Two through Six

In addition to this chapter, this dissertation will include four empirical chapters

and a conclusion. The first two chapters will explain three innovations attempted in two discrete cases and evaluate them using four criteria of military effectiveness: responsiveness, integration, skill and quality. The fourth chapter will explain the divergence in the two cases. Two additional cases will be examined and finally, the conclusion will offer policy prescriptions for future cases of nation-building.

Chapter Two

During the World War II era, the United States Army established a school of military government, spent several years preparing a plan for the occupation of Germany, and created a constabulary force to provide security after the end of hostilities. These three innovations are evaluated using the four criteria of military effectiveness. It concludes that the innovations were all effective and contributed greatly to the overall success of the nation-building effort in Germany.

Chapter Three

In the Iraq War, the United States Army innovated in similar ways to that in the

Germany case. The Army reoriented its training programs and established new organizations to address the complexities of nation-building. The post-war planning process and the establishment of the Iraqi Security Forces are also evaluated using the four traits of military effectiveness.

Chapter Four

Why is there a difference in effectiveness outcomes in the cases of Iraq and

Germany? Level and diversity of threat, military reformers and civil-military relations are examined to attempt to account for the dramatic difference. Ultimately, the level of cooperation and trust between civilian and military leaders are the fundamental difference in the two cases.

Chapter Five

Korea and Vietnam are evaluated using the four criteria of military effectiveness.

Then the independent variables tested in chapter four are used to attempt to explain the relative ineffectiveness in both Korea and Vietnam. Ultimately, the lack of trust, in particular in the Vietnam case, served to prevent innovation and was a key factor in the army’s ineffectiveness.

Chapter Six

Four cases of nation-building were examined throughout the course of this dissertation. Examining them through the lens of responsiveness, integration, skill and quality was useful in determining military effectiveness. Cooperation and trust between

35 civilian and military leaders seemed to offer the most explanatory power in terms of the effectiveness outcomes in the cases. Policy prescriptions for future nation-building efforts are offered.

Chapter 2: Effective Innovations during the World War II Era

This chapter will explain three instances of successful military innovation that occurred during the World War II era. The first instance was the School of Military

Government (SOMG) that trained officers for postwar duties in particular transitioning cities and regions from war to peace. The second instance was the elaborate post war planning process to effectively manage the mayhem the military would face in the postwar world. Finally, the U.S. Constabulary Force was established to ensure security of the civilian population and to prevent crime. The chapter will discuss each instance of innovation individually, followed by an analysis of each innovation’s effectiveness.

The success of these innovations will be evaluated according to how they affected four criteria of military effectiveness: integration, responsiveness, skill and quality.

Integration refers to unity of effort among all aspects of national power and the degree to which military activities are consistent at all levels. Responsiveness refers to the ability to react to the actions of the enemy as well as the requirements of political and economic administration. Skill reflects the ability of the military to perform its given missions as well as possessing tactical, intellectual and interpersonal skills. Finally, quality means possessing highly capable weapons, equipment, personnel, and organizations.

This chapter will summarize and evaluate each innovation with respect to integration, skill, quality and responsiveness. The United States Army demonstrated extraordinary effectiveness at nation-building tasks in Germany. The overall success of their efforts was the result of many individual and collective actions; however, the impact of the three innovations mentioned in this chapter had a significant impact on the outcome. These innovations occurred in large part due to military leaders who saw the

requirement to plan and train for the challenges inherent in nation-building. Generals

Eisenhower and Marshall were particularly integral to the implementation of the School

of Military Government as well as the post-war planning process. Finally, the trust that

the civilian leadership had in General Marshall as the Chief of Staff enabled the military

to effectively innovate in these three instances in particular.

School of Military Government

By the 1940s, the American Army had been acquiring experience in military

government for a century. Since 1846, when the Army introduced a democratic

government in New Mexico, it had frequently administered control of civilian

populations. 139 Occasionally, as in 1848 in Mexico, the treatment of civilian problems contributed materially to the achievement of military aims of the campaign. 140 More

often, though, American military government followed in the wake of military operations

and had a political rather than military mission. This happened after the Civil and

Spanish-American Wars as well as World War I. In 1918, American troops were

exercising control over parts of Siberia, Dalmatia, and the Rhineland. But these earlier

experiences were dwarfed by the enormously complex tasks posed by WWII. 141

Having been involved with military government themselves (George Marshall in

particular), the heads of the American Army in 1941 were aware of the significant role

which military government operations were bound to assume in conditions of total war,

both for winning battles and the final peace. 142 Understanding this requirement, they saw

139 Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941 . 140 Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army 1898-1941 (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004). 141 Hajo Holborn, American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies (Washington D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947). 142 Larry I. Bland, Joellen K. Bland, and Sharon Ritenour Stevens, eds., George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue , vol. (Lexington: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991). 38

that a special personnel procurement and training program was needed. The number of

required personnel could not be obtained merely by commissioning American civilians

who were experts in foreign administrations; there were too few of them. 143

Consequently the Secretary of War approved a plan to train officers for civil affairs and

liaison in December 1941 and in May 1942 the School of Military Government (SOMG)

began operating. 144

The mission of the SOMG was to train officers for future detail in connection

with military government and civil affairs activities. 145 It was located in Charlottesville,

Virginia and generally instructed 100 officers at a time. 146 Qualifications of candidates included experience in a former Military Government, or in Federal, State, Country or

City government. 147 Lawyers, physicians, civil engineers and others acquainted with certain foreign countries by former residence or travel were also considered. The first students were men of some accomplishment in such public service as local and state government, judicial work, law enforcement, public health, transportation or education. 148

The SOMG aimed at training these men in military organization and methods, and in the political and social institutions of foreign countries equipping them to use their skills effectively as members of a military team in foreign countries. The commandant was BG

C.W. Wickersham. 149

143 Holborn, American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies . 144 The term “Military Government” will be used exclusively within enemy territories while “Civil Affairs” will continue to indicate G5/Civil Affairs activities in liberated territories. 145 Administrative Circular No. 1, 1942, Published April 17, 1942 SOMG, Charlottesville, Virginia, p. 1. 146 Administrative Circular No. 1, 1942, Published April 17, 1942 SOMG, Charlottesville, Virginia, p. 1. 147 Memorandum for the Secretary of War from Allen W. Guillion, MG, Provost Marshall, 1942. NARA Record Group Number 389, Entry A1 442, Box 738. 148 NARA Record Group Number 389, Entry A1 442, Box 740. 149 Holborn, American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies . 39

As time progressed and the military realized how many officers would be required to execute occupational duties, it became evident that the school at Charlottesville was not large enough to train the required personnel. Therefore, in addition to the school at

Charlottesville, other colleges and universities around the United States established programs to train officers for civil affairs and military government. Yale, Harvard

University, University of Michigan, Stanford, University of Chicago, Boston University,

Princeton, University of Wisconsin, Western Reserve University and University of

Pittsburgh all developed programs that were attended by hundreds of civil affairs officers. 150 The expansion of the program over time demonstrates several things. First of

all, it shows the speed at which the military realized the value of the SOMG trained

officers. As early as September 1942, during the North African campaign, Lieutenant

General Eisenhower cabled the War Department to ask for a civil administrator and key

“military and civilian” assistants. 151 A number of officers who had just graduated from the School of Military Government were sent as military assistants. Secondly, it demonstrates how responsive the military was to the situation on the ground in occupied territories. For example, once the administration of North Africa was turned over to the

State Department, all trained Civil Affairs officers would be organized into a planning cell for the next tactical operation and the subsequent administration of Military

Government. 152 Finally, it shows that those trained at the school were effective enough to warrant training more people in military government tasks. By 1943, the Charlottesville

150 Records of these schools can be found at NARA, Entry A1 442, Record Group No. 389, Stack 290, Row 33, Compartment 34, Shelf 05-, Box 738. Box 739 holds the lecture material from the first course. Box 740 lists the biographies of civil affairs trainers. Boxes 741-752 list all the information on students and course materials for the first seven classes of trainees. 151 Memorandum from General George C. Marshall for President Roosevelt, 3 September 1942, OPD files, 381, Torch, Section I. 152 Memorandum, COL Charles W. Rooth, Assistant Civilian Administration, Armed Forces Headquarters for Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs, AFHQ, 29 November 1942, CAD files, Husky plan. 40

school had enough legitimacy in the eyes of the military and civilian leadership that the

curriculum was being exported to civilian colleges as the need for more civilian affairs

trained officers grew. 153

In Sicily, for the first time American civil affairs officers went ashore with assault

troops. 154 Similarly, in the invasion of the Italian mainland, civil affairs officers, were placed under the commanding generals of the 5 th and 8 th Armies. Public safety, health, supply, agricultural, and other experts in the various phases of civil affairs accompanied the invasion forces. 155 General Eisenhower, in particular, insisted on their involvement.

The integration of nation-building tasks into the tactical and operational levels of war was in large part due to the success of the School of Military Government and the training officers received there.

Military Effectiveness

The effectiveness of SOMG should be illustrated in the execution of military government carried out by the officers trained at the school. In part, proof of the success of the training program was the fact that commanders of combat troops in the war zones quickly utilized the assistance which civil affairs officers were able to provide in the attainment of their military objectives. 156 The contribution of the SOMG towards victory in World War II, “may be expressed in the ingenuity, common sense, intuitiveness, and courage applied by the school’s graduates to the handling of military government and

153 Memorandum MG Guillion, PMG, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, 6 February 1943, PMGO Files, History of Military Government Training, Tab 19. in Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors . P. 80. 154 Ibid. P. 188-189. 155 General Marshall’s report on the Occupation. 156 Robert McCloy, "Background Statement in Connection with Press Conference Held by the Assistant Secretary of War and the Director, Civil Affairs Division," (Washington D.C.: Bureau of Public Relations, 1944). p. 5. 41

civil affairs activities in theaters of operations abroad.” 157 To evaluate the effectiveness of

the school and its training program, those trained there should demonstrate

responsiveness, integration, skill and quality by their actions.

Responsiveness is demonstrated in two fundamental ways: either through

adjusting policies, procedures, or organizations in response to the situation on the ground

or to the requirements of political and economic administration. The School of Military

Government itself demonstrated responsiveness through the evolutionary nature of the

curriculum and through the expansion of the program in response to the military

situation. The graduates of the school also illustrated this trait in the actions they took in

post war Germany. Early experiences with military government warranted organizational

changes and sharing information among military government officers also aided in their

ability to be responsive.

The School of Military Government established a comprehensive curriculum from

the beginning. 158 The following subjects were taught in depth: geographic and social

background, government and administration, legal affairs, government finance, money

and banking, natural resources, agriculture, industry and commerce, labor, public works

and utilities, transportation systems, communications, public health and sanitation, public

safety, education and public welfare. 159 The breadth of the courses offered indicates the

complexity of the tasks associated with nation-building. It also demonstrates the

military’s realization of this complexity and that they were attempted to plan and train for

issues in each of these areas.

157 “History of the School of Military Government” Charlottesville, VA, 16 February 1946, p. 16. 158 NARA Record Group 389, Entry A1 442, Box 739 contains the lecture material from Course 1. 159 NARA Record Group 389, Entry 443, Box 841, Topical Outline of Military Government Handbook, Prepared for the Military Government Division, Provost Marshall’s Office by The School of Military Government, Charlottesville, VA 42

Given the expanding role of civil affairs and military governance in the

prosecution of the war, the curriculum evolved to fulfill the requirements of the changing

situation. For example, in the 3 rd class, language instruction was introduced with a third

of the class studying Italian, Malay and German. In the fourth class, four functional

sections were established. These sections were set up to specialize in civilian supply and

the broader problems of economics, public safety, public health and fiscal problems.

French and Japanese language instruction was also added to the fourth class. Over time,

more emphasis was given to the practical application portion of the school instead of the

classroom portion. 160 Each of these alterations reflects the responsiveness the school had

to lessons from the field army.

In addition to merely changing the curriculum, the Office of Provost Marshall,

which oversaw the school, prepared a number of manuals for reference. Handbooks that

explained in depth all aspects of a particular country were developed for every country

involved in the war. 161 These references provided a common body of knowledge for both

those trained in military governance tasks as well as combat soldiers. Furthermore, the

success of the program led to expansion to various civilian universities to train more

officers than initially planned as the war itself expanded.

Although the curriculum and what occurred at the school itself is informative,

how those trained at the school performed is even more important in evaluating its

effectiveness. Military government officers were incredibly responsive to events on the

ground. The situation facing military government officers in Germany was indescribable

160 NARA Record Group 389, Stack 290/33/35/1-4, Entry A1 442, Box 753. 161 NARA Record Group 389, Stack 290, Row 34, Compartment 2, Shelf 4-6, Entry A1 443, Boxes 867- 884. 43 chaos. 162 The armed forces and government had disappeared leaving anarchy behind.

Despite all of this, military government officers were remarkably effective at keeping the peace. They did this by taking actions quickly to correct small problems before they became large issues. For example, when restitution of property became a contentious issue among victims of Nazi racial legislation or political enemies of the former regime, military government officers at the detachment level recognized this as a problem and elevated the issue to their headquarters so that appropriate legislation could be passed to deal with this issue. 163

Although Washington provided broad policy directives, military officials made many important decisions regarding how to govern Germany. For example, military government officers created Lander Governments in 1945 without requesting instructions from Washington. 164 The governments of Wuerttemberg-Baden and Greater Hesse were created by verbal orders of the Deputy Military Governor. 165 Military officers established a council of the minister presidents of Bavaria, Wuerttemberg-Baden and

Greater Hesse in November 1945 called the Laenderrat. Elections were held in the U.S.

162 Military Government in Germany began in earnest in November 1944. Systemic reporting began in late 1944 and ran through 1948. According to a Military Government Summary in the III Corps area, dated March 1945, many towns and villages were completely destroyed. Dead civilians were uncovered in the ruins of their homes and public buildings. Financial institutions, public utilities and factories were found destroyed by bombing and shell fire, with virtually nothing of value remaining. “Military Government Summary, HQ III Corps, Historian, G5 Section” NARA Stack 390, Row 40, Compartment 17, Shelf 4-, Entry A1 2. Box 28. 163 Weekly Military Government Report to the Commanding General Seventh Army, Headquarters US Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden, Detachment E1, Stuttgart, 2 September 1945, Report #18. P. 1. 164 U.S. Army, Occupation Forces in Europe Series , The United States Constabulary, vol. 22 (Frankfurt- am-Main: Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 1947). P. 84-85. 165 Weekly Consolidated Report for Land Wuerttemberg-Baden, 1945-1946 and Weekly Military Summary, Office of Military Government for Greater Hesse. 1945-1946. NARA Records Stack 390, Row 49, Compartment 35, Shelf 6, Entry A1 1510, Box 219 contains historical reports from 1944-1947 for Office of MG, Wuerttemberg-Baden. NARA Records Stack 390, Row 49, Compartment 6, Shelf 1-2, Entry A1 1399, Boxes 62-69 contain records of Office of Military Government, Greater Hesse. 44

Zone in January 1946. 166 When it became evident in March 1946 that Germany was not to be treated as an economic unit, the Deputy Military Governor stopped reparations.

MG officers established a Military Government Court on 11 June 1946 for civil actions. 167

To enable military commanders to be responsive to the current situation, reports were submitted by each area within Germany and showed trends in troops incidents, violations of Military Government and German law, denazification statistics, as well as provided narratives of all basic areas of military government (civil administration, political intelligence, public safety, public health, public welfare, education, youth and sport activities, etc.) 168 This information was vital in keeping the commander informed so that he could make more effective decisions about how to best proceed with the administration of military government. This further encouraged responsiveness based upon the results of the information collected about each area of military government.

One of the first things that military government officers did was to begin training a German police force and border police in order to provide greater public safety.169

Candidates were screened for allegiance to Nazi ideals prior to selection as a possible police officer. After a rigorous schooling and orientation program, Germans began acting as borders guards as early as November 1945. 170 Recognizing the need to employ young men, a “junior police” was also formed composed of 14-16 year old boys to act as traffic

166 NARA Record Group 389, Entry 443, Box 842, “Monthly Reports of Military Governor, U.S. Zone, 1946. Reports #36-40, January 1946. 167 Statement of Information Requested by U.S. Senate National Defense Committee. Paragraph 6, Section I. OMGUS records. 168 Office of Military Government for Greater Hesse, “Weekly Military Government Summary, No. 53.” 15 October 1946. 169 Weekly Military Government Report to the Commanding General, 7 th Army, Reports #10-14, June- August 1945. 170 Weekly Military Government Report to the Commanding General 7 th Army, Report #31. 2 December 1945, p.4. 45

patrols near schools and to guard children against traffic incidents. 171 This success of

these measures is illustrated in the crime rate statistics. In the American zone, there were

some 18 million inhabitants and in merely six months, the crime rate was lower than in

the United States. 172

To be successful, the military government had to do more than be flexible to the

military situation--they had to respond to the requirements of political and economic

administration. A clear instance of responsiveness to the political and economic

requirements of civil affairs occurred under General Eisenhower’s watch. In November

1942, when American and British troops landed in French North Africa, the plan was that

the French would handle the civil administration. 173 Even with the French running the internal affairs of North Africa, General Eisenhower was faced with a host of civilian problems. The North African territories were suddenly cut off from all supplies and they needed Allied assistance the Army by itself was not equipped to administer. The military commander who was preparing the Tunisian and Sicilian campaigns was forced to turn much of his energy toward unifying the aims of the civilian agencies and harmonizing them with the interests of the Allied Expeditionary Force. 174 This proved a heavy burden on General Eisenhower. 175 The difficult North African experiences demanded a better organization within the government at home and in the theater.

171 Weekly Military Government Report to the Commanding General 7 th Army, Report #31. 2 December 1945, p.4. 172 Byron Price, "Relations between the American Forces of the Occupation and the German People," The Department of State Bulletin XIII, no. 336 (1945). P. 887. 173 Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors . P. 52-54. 174 Ibid. P. 56-59. 175 Zink, American Military Government in Germany . 46

The first step towards addressing this problem was the establishment of the Civil

Affairs Division (CAD) of the War Department. 176 CAD was established in March 1943

to formulate and coordinate United States military policy concerning the administration

and government of captured or liberated countries, to advise and assist the commanders

engaged in such occupation or civil affairs activities, to train and supply personnel for

such activities, and to study, assess, and report on the extent to which United States

occupation plans were being carried out. 177 Up to that time the only military agency

concerned exclusively with civil affairs had been the Military Government Division of

the Office of the Provost Marshal General (who was administering the training and

procurement of civil affairs personnel). 178 Given General Eisenhower’s experiences, he became a firm supported of civil affairs and established a G-5 (Civil Affairs/Military

Government) Section as part of his staff. 179

Military Government organization, operations and administration underwent a

constant evolution of growth and adjustment in accommodating itself to the development

of U.S. objectives in Europe. Until the end of VE Day, these objectives were essentially

military in character and Military Government was subordinate to Military Command.

The United States Army, European Theater (ETOUSA) activated the civil affairs section

of the First U.S. Army Group on 7 February 1944 and directed that G-5 Division,

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) be established. 180 This

176 Holborn, American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies . 177 Guide to Civil Affairs and Military Government Records in the Adjutant General’s Records Centers, Department Records Branch, Administrative Services Division, The Adjutant General’s Office, Washington: November 1952. 178 Holborn, American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies . P. 8. 179 Report of Meeting of Officers of Field Grade and Above of the US Group CC and the Austrian Planning Group with Major General John Hilldring at the Officer’s Lounge in Princes Gardens 21 October 1944. BG Wickersham presiding. Notes by Historian, US Group CC. P. 2. 180 SHAEF Staff Memorandum No.2, 15 February 1944 47 staff section became the policymaking and coordinating body for all Civil Affairs (CA) matters. There were several countries sections within the SHAEF special staff: France,

Norway, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Germany. Germany’s country unit’s duties included: planning for governmental operations in Germany, assisting in training during the preparatory phase, and supervising and augmenting the German civil administration upon entry of Allied troops into Germany until an Allied High Command should resume responsibility. 181 The evolution of the organization demonstrates responsiveness to both the military situation as well as the political and economic requirements.

Military government officers showed their responsiveness by recognizing the need to share best practices and lessons learned. A conference of Military Government officers in Wuerttenberg-Baden was held 2 June 1945 in order to share lessons learned and to develop better methods of dealing with military government problems. 182 Among the issues discussed in weekly reports was the social problem associated with the nihilist nature of the German youth and the importance of opening schools as soon as possible in order to provide an outlet for discussion as well as political re-education. 183 Clearly these types of issues were important to address. However, the meeting itself had great meaning. The fact that military government officers realized that gathering to swap information and best practices would make them more effective is important to note. The forum these officers had, enabled them to be more responsive. In August of 1945, a similar military government forum was established in Berlin, whose purpose would be to

181 OMGUS Records. “Relationship between US Forces, European Theater, and Office of Military Government for Germany (US). P. 2. 182 Lieutenant Colonel Alan Hart, Military Government Detachment—Germany Headquarters Detachment E1C3, Report No. 5, “Consolidated Report for Land Wuertemmberg, Covering Week of 26 May to 2 June 1945.” Pg. 1-6. 183 Lieutenant Colonel Alan Hart, Military Government Detachment E1C3, Weekly Government Report to Commanding General, 7 th Army. Report #14. 5 August 1945. p.1. 48 answer questions on difficult problems, to give lectures on Military Government, and to achieve uniform interpretation of directives. 184

In addition to establishing a forum among American military government officers,

US military government representatives met with British military government officials to discuss their current situation and how civil administration could be better executed.185

These meeting notes were sent to the Commanding General of the Office of Military

Government of the United States. Meetings were also held with German officials to improve political and economic administration. For example, on 2 December 1947, a meeting was held with the German Laenderrat. Laenderrat officials wanted a complete revision of tax legislation to aid in the economic reconstruction of Germany. General

Hays (representing General Clay) agreed to consider such a change once a written proposal was made that could be submitted to the French, British, and Russians for consideration. 186

Integrated efforts across several issue areas demonstrate the military’s effectiveness: civilian displacement, denazification, safety of the civilian population, and education. Military government officers demonstrated integration through their unity of effort as well as the policies and programs for displaced persons (DPs), denazification, public safety, and education. The first military government detachment arrived on the continent D-day plus 23 days. Recognizing that security was paramount, three hours after Cologne was cleared, military government detachments were on the ground ready to

184 LT H.G. Williams and 1LT J.S. Bottomly, Minutes of Staff Meeting US Group CC, held at 1130 hours on Saturday 4 August 1945 in Berlin. P.1. 185 Headquarters, Office of Military for Bremen, 25 April 1946, Weekly Military Government Summary No. 53. 186 “ Questions Addressed to General Hays by the Laenderrat at its 27 th Meeting on 2 December 1947” Villa Reitzenstein, Stuttgart, Germany. P.1-2. 49 assist tactical units. They established courts, handled displaced persons, and established a food office to ensure civilians received adequate nourishment. 187 SOMG trained officers planned and executed policies and programs to deal with displaced persons and denazification of the government.

Displaced personnel represented a significant challenge to combat troops as they entered their respective areas of operation. As early as 1943, Supreme Headquarters

Allied Expeditionary Forces was planning for the care of people after the liberation.

Before the cessation of hostilities, the assembly, care, and maintenance of displaced persons became the mission of whole tactical units. It required substantial organization and planning to provide shelter, food and clothing for millions of liberated people. The consideration of the complexity of the task as well as planning for these provisions demonstrates integration, responsiveness and skill.

The US Army’s direct contact with DPs began with D-Day in June 1944. 188 As the Allied forces overran the enemy, increasing numbers of DPs were uncovered until a total of approximately 8,000,000 people had passed from Nazi custody into Allied hands in Western Europe. About 6,000, 000 were returned in the latter part of 1944 and the first seven months of 1945. Approximately 688,000 went home from July 13, 1945 to

December 1, 1947 in response to intensive repatriation efforts. 189 The remainder consisted of Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Ukrainian, Jewish, Yugoslav, and

187 Joel O'Brien, "Interview with Captain James Denison, Military Government," (Paris: 1945).p.2. CPT James Denison had been a military government officer since the early part of 1944 and landed on the continent on D-day plus 23 days. He was with the first G-5 Detachment in Germany. 188 European Command U.S. Army, Historical Division, "Planning for the Occupation of Germany," ed. European Command Office of the Chief Historian (The Provost Marshall General's School, Military Government Department, 1947). 189 Displaced Persons reports were made at the military government detachment level on a weekly basis and aggregated for those within the United States Army’s area of operation. Reports detailing this information can be found in the National Archives. See OMGUS Records . 50

stateless people who did not respond to voluntary repatriation. 190 They could not or

would not return to their homelands for fear of persecution due to race, religion,

nationality or political opinion. 191 These stateless people were a constant concern to military government officials.

Because of its humanitarian character, political background, and international implications, the displaced persons problem was given one of the highest priorities in the operation of military government. Generally, directives were scrupulously executed in both letter and spirit. Suggestions for improvements were incorporated and carried out. 192 Each country and even each province represented a unique situation to the military. The military’s effectiveness at dealing with the challenges presented by displaced persons was in large part due to their responsiveness.

In addition to concern for the displaced personnel issue, American forces had to turn their efforts to denazification. Removing the Nazis from positions of power was paramount to the rebuilding of German society in addition to being vital for the maintenance of security. Military Government officials developed and executed programs for denazification, destruction of German militarism, war crimes prosecution, security arrests, control measures, and fiscal controls. Each of these issues were closely related and had to be considered in concert with one another in order to attain the objectives of the US occupation. 193

In 1945 and 1946 the denazification process consisted almost exclusively of removing Nazis from positions in business and government, arresting some of them and

190 Department of State Information Bulletin, “Displaced Persons” 23 March 1948, P.2-3.. 191 Department of State Information Bulletin, “Displaced Persons” 23 March 1948, P.3-4. 192 Weekly Military Government Report to the Commanding General, 7 th Army, Report #28, 11 November 1945, p.1. 193 OMGUS records, Evaluation of Present Program, 1946. 51

confiscating their property. This was designed to be an interim policy during the initial

phase of the occupation. Over time, American Military Government officials established

German review boards in local communities to provide for more German involvement in

the denazification process. This enabled the Germans to take a larger part in stripping

former Nazis of their power and influence. It also prevented a one-size-fits-all policy.

Relying solely on the categories of offices, positions, and members in organizations

would have mislabeled many who were not really active supporters of the Nazi regime.

By giving German citizens at the local level the power, a fairer process was ensured.

Simultaneously, at the national level, the Nazi party leadership was prosecuted, which

was an essential part of the program. About 117,000 Nazis were arrested and interned in

the U.S. Zone by the end of 1946. 194

Another important way of evaluating the effectiveness of the SOMG program was

to examine the priority given to public safety. Public safety is an essential part of a

successful transition from war to peace. 195 Public safety was recognized as one of the

most important problems of the CA/MG detachments in the early stages of the

occupation. Realizing the importance of these problems, Corps and Divisions selected

and trained special MG police troops to carry out police functions in their areas.

There are several ways of examining the provision of public safety: public safety

statistics, access to medical care, and provision of other public goods are three indicators

of the American military’s effectiveness regarding public safety.

194 OMGUS records, Denazification Program, 1946. 195 Planning for the post-war occupation of Germany enumerates public safety as a key concern. See U.S. Army, "Planning for the Occupation of Germany."This is also reiterated in the Iraq case in most of the planning documents. 52

The Civil-Military Operations section (G5) of the Army Groups submitted weekly civil affairs/military government summary reports. The report first gave an overall summary of the situation on the ground in their particular area of operations. The following subjects were covered in greater detail: civil administration, press and radio, public safety, legal, property control, public health, education, monuments, fine arts and archives, displaced persons, civilian supply, food and agriculture, trade and industry, and labor. 196 The fact that these subjects were reported on a weekly basis demonstrates that these were the areas the military government officials thought were the most important.

The broad categories of information demonstrate integration of the tactical level with the broader strategic objectives. Even more noteworthy is that the data within these categories are primarily narrative in nature as opposed to quantitative. Often, the military errs on the side of quantifying progress in order to determine effectiveness. The qualitative nature of much of the report demonstrates to some extent the understanding that the big picture of CA/MG can’t be quantified necessarily to demonstrate success or progress.

Arrest reports were also kept at the Military Government detachment level. 197

The following offenses were reported on a weekly basis by nationality (German, Russian,

French, Polish, Other): murder, assault, attempted rape, robbery and larceny, disorderly

conduct, threats, misuse of government property, weapons, curfew, mental, sabotage,

196 Colonel Henry Parkman, Jr. Weekly Civil Affairs/Military Government Summary, No. 34, 31 May 1945. Headquarters 5 th Army Group, G5 Section. 197 Military government detachments reported arrests on a weekly basis to the Commanding General of their respective Army (1 st , 3 rd , 5 th , 7 th , 12 th or 15 th ). For example, “Consolidated Weekly Report for Land Wurttemberg, Covering 7 June-14 June 1945 inclusive.” To The Commanding General, Seventh Army, Report #6, written by Military Government Detachment E1C3, Company C, 3 rd ECA Regt. Lists arrests statistics by offense, by each nationality for the week ending 14 June 1945. These reports are available through NARA. See Records Group 389, Stack 390, Row, 49, Compartment 35, Shelf 6, Entry A1 1510, Box 219. 53

obtaining ration books illegally, blackmail, entering restricted area, illegal slaughtering,

suicide, political, tearing down posters, and saying U.S. posters were untrue. 198 Such thorough reporting demonstrates several things. It illustrates that those responsible for public safety had a very holistic idea of what offenses were detrimental to good order and discipline: political, economic and security issues were all important. The change in what was reported over time shows the degree to which the military government detachments were responsive to the situation on the ground.

Another way of determining whether or not the military was effective at ensuring public safety is to examine the crime statistics. Beginning in 1946, a monthly report of public safety statistics was compiled at the office of Military Government for Germany

(US) for the entire US sector. Between August 1946 and August 1947 crime rates and trends varied by region (Laender). In Bavaria, offenses decreased from 30,602 to 29,807; in Wuerttemberg-Baden they increased from 9,960 to 11,967; and in Hesse they increased from 10,545 to 12,945. 199 Although crime rates varied by region and seemed to be increasing, when compared with the per capita crime rates in the United States, it was considerably lower. The rate for homicides in the US zone was .16 per 100,000 people, as compared to 1.01 per 100,000 in the United States. 200

To provide public safety, the population needed to have adequate medical care.

In addition to assigning military government officers to deal with the security tasks, there were also medical department personnel assigned to military government detachments.

For example, one military government detachment had fourteen military doctors and nine

198 Ibid. 199 Public Safety Branch Internal Affairs and Communication Division, Statistics Section, "Monthly Report of Public Safety Statistics," ed. Office of Military Government for Germany (US) (U.S. Government, 1947). p. 1. 200 Ibid. P. 1. 54

civilian doctors of various nationalities (US, French, Belgian, and Luxembourg), eleven

military nurses and eleven civilian nurses, two sanitary engineers, three administrative

personnel and sixteen enlisted medical personnel. 201 The provision of public health

demonstrates the integration of nation-building tasks as well as the responsiveness of the

military to the needs of the population.

Intelligence reports warned of the existence of typhus fever in Cologne, so

Military Government Detachments ensured an appropriate number of medical personnel

were available to handle health issues. After public security was established and health

and food supplies were delivered; the detachments tackled the problem of utilities. Water

and electricity were vital to both the Army and the civilian population. For example,

hospitals required a great deal of electricity for x-rays. Next, telephone service was

restored using former employees of the telephone company. Electricity also enabled the

military government detachments to restore the newspaper plant. 202 Ensuring public access to medical care, water and electricity, all demonstrate the military’s responsiveness to the needs of the population.

Not only did being attentive to medical issues reinforce public safety, opening schools also kept children off the streets and employed teachers. Elementary schools were reopened in the entire American Zone of Occupation by September 1945. At the end of October 1945, a score of newspapers and magazine were being published, radio broadcasting had been restored and a considerable number of theaters and concert halls were licensed to operate. A comprehensive public health program had been inaugurated;

201 Lieutenant Colonel Alan Hart, Military Government Detachment E1C3, Weekly Government Report to Commanding General, 7 th Army. Report #14. 5 August 1945. Appendix IV. 202 O'Brien, "Interview with Captain James Denison, Military Government." p. 3. 55 newly organized political parties and labor unions were giving Germans experience in the ways of democracy. 203 All these factors helped to keep the US zone peaceful.

Those trained at the military government school demonstrated tactical, intellectual and interpersonal skills in their execution of occupational tasks. For example, in the postwar period, military government officers were responsible for the physical protection of civilian supplies, military supplies from civilian sources, archives, works of art, and for general public safety and security functions. In the early phases of occupation planning, these tasks were planned for as well as the tactical troop support that would be needed to protect such goods. In October 1942, General Guillion asked for authority to initially activate 100 battalions of occupational military police; these units to be specially trained to handle the problems of military government in all phases affecting public safety and military security. Although initially approved, General McNair (CG Ground

Forces) subsequently assured the Provost Marshall that tactical units would be made available to assist military government officers when needed. 204

The U.S. Army also commissioned men who had very specialized skills to be prepared for the variety of contingencies they were bound to face in the occupation of

Germany. For example, the Army commissioned museum curators as civil affairs officers. Upon completion of training, they were to have duties related to the protection of cultural institutions and of monuments of art, history and science in theaters of war.

203 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence, and Force Transformation , ed. Roberta L. Howard, Significant Issues Series (Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2002). P. 887. 204 LTC Wm. T. Babcock, Public Safety Section, GSC, Memorandum to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, USFET, 6 July 1945. p. 1. 56

They were a part of the military organization charged with controlling all human affairs behind the fighting front and in other occupied areas. 205

A requirement for an effective occupation is quality equipment, personnel and organizations. Military government officers had quality leadership that recognized the importance of occupational tasks. General Omar Bradley declared publicly that in order to win the war, the United States must do more than defeat a hostile army. The war would not be won until the peace was won. 206

The selection of quality personnel for military government as well as the training dedicated to these specific tasks helped to make the US effective. In the first eight weeks on the ground in Germany, military government officers used all subjects taught at the

SOMG except the opening of schools and Fine Arts and Monuments (which they would use later). 207 Military Government officers trained at the SOMG were assigned as head of sections that corresponded to Ministries of the Land Government, Interior, Finance,

Economics, Education and Religion.

Although military government officers were prepared to advise and influence the rebuilding of Germany, they were surprised when tasked to actually perform the majority of administrative tasks at the local, state and national levels. However, as the situation evolved and the United States Army’s zone expanded, important changes in the organization and function of Military Government Detachments occurred. By July of

1945, Land Governments were established, relieving the MG Detachments of a number

205 The Museum News, published by the American Association of Museums, June 15, 1943. Volume XXI, No. 4, pg. 6. 206 Report of Meeting of Officers of Field Grade and Above of the US Group CC and the Austrian Planning Group with Major General John Hilldring at the Officer’s Lounge in Princes Gardens 21 October 1944. BG Wickersham presiding. Notes by Historian, US Group CC. P. 2. 207 OMGUS records. “Accomplishments of Military Government in VIII Corps Area.” 16 November 1944. P. 5. 57

of administrative duties that were previously compelled to shoulder. This enabled MG

officers to complete their primary function of indirect government by supervision. 208

Regardless of their actual role, the SOMG trained officers demonstrated their effectiveness through the quality of their advice and by the responsiveness of their actions to the rapidly changing situation in their particular area of operation.

Although possessing quality personnel is vital, an effective organizational structure is essential to ensuring their influence. The G-5 (Civil Affairs/Military

Government Section) was established to do just that. Although not an organization designed for combat, thousands of its members served on the front line with the fighting forces, so that the Army’s progress would be unimpeded by confusion and disorder among local populations. Then, once the majority of the fighting had stopped, they were charged with imposing a system of law and order. Having officers who were able to address both the challenges presented by combat as well as versed in how to develop an effective country after the combat was over made the military more effective.

An example of the importance of the G-5 section became apparent during the

Battle of the Bulge. 209 To cope with the problem of controlling several hundred thousand civilians, division-level Military Government staffs and Civil Affairs/Military

Government detachments became the Corps Commander’s agents. According to reports,

CA/MG detachments were the most important tool deployed. Seventeen detachments

208 European Command Historical Division, "U.S. Military Government in Germany: Operations from Late March to Mid-July 1945," ed. Military Government Department for ORC Units The Provost Marshall General's School (United States Army, 1950). 209 The Battle of the Bulge was a major German offense launched towards the end of World War II (Dec 1944-January 1945) through the Ardennes Mountains of Belgium, France and Luxembourg on the Western Front. Although Allied forces were almost completely surprised, German objectives were unrealized. It was the bloodiest battle that U.S. forces experienced during the war. See “The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge” by Hugh M. Cole, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. 58

were deployed comprising a total of 119 officers and 187 enlisted men. 210 These

detachments evacuated civilians in order to prevent the endangerment of their lives. In

addition to marshalling personnel, they also marshaled food, supplies, clothing, and

billeting space. When security was of first priority, G5 guards kept the main supply

roads (MSRs) free of frantic civilians. They moved evacuees, in advance to prevent any

slow moving traffic from impeding the military advance. 211 The Civil Affairs section had

enough breadth of knowledge to provide sound advice to the division and corps level

commanders. Additionally, their ability to foresee the complex issues and their

interrelations were extraordinarily useful in implementing an integrative approach to

rebuilding Germany.

The First Army used Civil Affairs and Military Government detachments since

the landings at Normandy. 212 Military Government in Germany may be said to have begun on 18 November 1944, when, according to the report of COL W.I. Russell,

Infantry, MG Officer, with the 90 th Infantry Division operated in three German towns. 213

They had 41 Military Government Detachments, of which 32 were used in the field; three

refugee detachments went with the Army into Germany, one supply detachment, and 12

Civil Affairs detachments were in Belgium and Luxembourg. 214

Another demonstration of the quality of military government was the effectiveness of the government structures established throughout the US zone. Each state government (Bavaria, Bremen, Hesse, and Wuerttemberg-Baden) developed

210 “Historical Report, G5 Section, First US Army,” Dec 1944 and January 1944. NARA Record Group 389, Stack 290, Row 7, Compartment 27, Shelf 1, Entry 54, Box 282. 211 OMGUS records. 212 The Normandy Landings happened on 6 June 1944 (commonly known as D-Day). 213 OMGUS records. 214 OMGUS records. 59

constitutions that provided for parliamentary type governments elected by proportional

representation. At the head of each state was a minister-president, elected by and subject

to the confidence of the legislature. These constitutions also provided for independent

judiciaries and a supreme court with power to render final decisions on constitutionality.

The cabinets formed under the constitutions showed a great deal of stability. A military government directive of September 30, 1946, recognized the effectiveness of the initial

German governments by slightly limiting its previous powers. 215

Summary

Using responsiveness, integration, skill and quality as measures of effectiveness,

it is possible to evaluate whether or not the establishment of the School of Military

Government was a successful innovation. Military Government in Germany as of April

1946 did not attain the administrative machinery of General MacArthur in Japan. In

Japan, the central government was utilized and controlled was exercised over the

population using existing agencies. The challenge in Germany was coordinating with

three other governments among other things. Despite these challenges, order was

restored, Nazism was uprooted from government service and private industry,

demilitarization was almost complete, many war criminals were tried, war plants were

destroyed and property was confiscated. Germans voted in their first free election, two

million students were back to school; 349 movie theaters were reopened; 132 book and

magazine publishers were licensed; 26 newspapers and 5 radio stations were operating;

three million displaced persons were cared for; trade unions were organized; 4700

German plants were operating; and some transportation and communications facilities

215 Department of State Informational Bulletin. “Decentralization of Government.” 23 March 1948. p. 9. 60 were restored. 216 On balance, the School of Military Government demonstrates all aspects of an effective innovation. The priority that military commanders gave civil affairs had a significant impact on the outcome. General Eisenhower’s early experiences in North Africa and Sicily with civil affairs and its challenges gave further legitimacy to the School of Military Government.

Post War Planning 217

The first step the United States Army took to prepare itself for nation building was to train officers in the tasks associated with military governance. However, without an actual plan that addressed all the complexities of such an undertaking, having the right people would be irrelevant. Therefore, the post war planning process and outcome were essential to the overall success of the American efforts in Germany post-World War II.

In no war of American history were preparations for civil affairs as energetic as in World

War II. 218 This section will examine the evolution of the post-war plan and then will evaluate its effectiveness using integration, responsiveness, skill and quality as indicators.

Although the war did not end until 1945, steps were taken as early as June 1942 to organize and plan for the post-war. In June 1942, the Administration of Territories

Europe (ATE) committee was formed at the British War Office, under the chairmanship of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War, Sir Frederick Bovenschen. The U.S. was not formally represented, but civil affairs officers attended as unofficial observers.

At this time, all CA/MG planning for northwest Europe was handled through this

216 C.P. Echols, Major General, "Address by Major General Echols to Writer's Board," ed. Writer's Board (New York: War Department, 1946). P. 2. 217 A distinction needs to be made between post hostilities planning and planning for the occupation of Germany. The former included the later. Post hostilities planning also dealt with many matters not related at all to Germany. For example, civil affairs responsibilities in liberated countries were also addressed. Matters not relating exclusively to the occupation of Germany, such as the organization of the US Army in Europe were also delineated. 218 Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors . P. 114. 61

committee, but the General Staff, in conjunction with the War Office Department, were

responsible for CA/MG matters outside of Europe, as they had been since December

1940. Special branches of both the General Staff and the Finance Department were

created to deal with CA/MG, known then as “occupied enemy administration” early in

1941.

The ATE Committee decided that the time was ripe for the formation of a branch

of the War Office which would draw up plans for CA/MG in future operations in

Northwest Europe and on 10 November 1942, a Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer

(DCCAO) was assigned to that branch. All recommendations were put by DCCAO to

the ATE committee. In July 1943, for the first time, a CA/MG directorate was formed,

absorbing the WO (War Office) responsibility of DCCAO and of the Special General

Staff Branch which had been formed early in 1941.

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the US and Britain committed to

conducting a cross-channel attack against German-occupied Europe during the coming

year and agreed to accept only unconditional surrender from the Axis powers. A

combined headquarters, the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC)

was established in London, under British Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan to

begin planning operations. 219 The Combined Chief of Staff charged COSSAC with three

tasks: plan deception operations to reduce pressure on the Soviet Union, plan the invasion

of Europe, and plan the occupation of Germany .220 To many British officers, including

Morgan, the memory of Allied unpreparedness for the sudden German collapse in 1918 made such post conflict planning essential.

219 Affairs, "Hunt Report Digest, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920.", U.S. Army, "Planning for the Occupation of Germany."SHAEF, War Diary 220 U.S. Army, "Planning for the Occupation of Germany." 62

Morgan initiated post conflict planning of 22 May 1943 under the code name of

Rankin. Under the Rankin plan, the primary task assigned occupation forces was disarmament of German troops; the plan also foresaw the need to establish military government in the occupied areas to preserve law and order, and to ensure that security requirements like disarmament were carried out. The original plan for the occupation of

Germany assumed that the enemy had already capitulated. 221 Dozens of political, social and economic questions were opened up, which lay outside the training and experience of the vast majority of staff officers, in particular, how to control a large, and possibly hostile, civil population. 222

Over time, the plan evolved several times. Originally, the Rankin plan, then the

Talisman Plan, finally Eclipse. The plan changed in response to the events as the unfolded from 1943 to 1945. Certainly experiences in North Africa, Sicily and Italy all demonstrated what worked and what didn’t to those planning for the post-war occupation of Germany. The US Army was able to allocate the personnel to plan for the post-war occupation because the civilian leadership at the time had great trust and confidence in the decision-making abilities of General Marshall, the chief of staff. 223 Since he viewed planned for the occupation as vital to the ultimate success of the Allied forces, the civilian leadership trusted his decision to commit time and effort to the task.

221 Ibid. 222 Ibid. 223 Thomas Parrish, "Roosevelt and Marshall: Partners in Politics and War," (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989). 63

The Rankin Plan 224

With respect to the planning of the occupation of Germany, the staff of COSSAC started with a clean slate. Nothing resembling a plan for the occupation, or any statement of policy was handed to the Rankin planners. When the planning began, there was no

European Advisory Commission, the British post hostilities planning committee had not been created and there was no civil affairs staff of COSSAC. The plan was started in

July and by 13 August 1943 it was completed. They planned for three eventualities:

1. German weakening of strength and morale that would permit successful assault with the Anglo-American forces available prior to the target date of Overlord. 225

2. German withdrawal of occupied countries.

3. German unconditional surrender and cessation of organized resistance in NW Europe.

The Rankin plan was essentially a plan for moving forces into strategic positions.

Aside from implying that the Allied forces would proceed to disarm the German forces, the Rankin plan did not explain what Allied forces would do when they had taken their positions. It contained nothing about the disposal of the German forces after they were disarmed, the reformation of the German police forces, the recovery and repatriation of prisoners of war, the care and reparation of displaced persons, the disposal of captured enemy material, and numerous other matters which were later recognized as falling within the scope of responsibility of the Supreme Commander. It also contained no procedure or policy in the fields of civil affairs and military government. 226

224 The Rankin Period was the first of three plans to address the occupation of Germany. The majority of the planning occurred in 1943. 225 Operation Overlord was the code name for the Allied invasion of northwest Europe during World War II. It began with the Normandy Landings on June 6, 1944 (known as D-Day). 226 U.S. Army, "Planning for the Occupation of Germany." 64

Planning for the occupation of Germany cannot be said to have begun until

attention was given to problems that went beyond the mere occupation of the enemy’s

territory as the final stage in administering defeat to his forces. Over time, the planning

for the occupation of Germany expanded and took two main directions: first, the

consideration of problems that were strictly or primarily military and second, and

problems of a political, social and economic nature. 227 The expected political, social and economic conditions were the most important for the military to discuss since they were generally outside the purview of existing training and doctrine (with the exception of the

SOMG).

In the basic Rankin plan, COSSAC recommended the establishment of a Civil

Affairs Staff to plan for the military government of Germany. 228 Before Allied authorities could takeover, there would be a transition period in which the Supreme

Commander would be responsible for extinguishing any remaining resistance, restoring law and order, and affecting the initial disarmament of the German forces. During this period, the staff study held the Supreme Commander would impose military government upon Germany:

This initial plan foresaw the following as the major problems the US would face in Germany: sanctions would be required to insure compliance with surrender; the

German high command would be needed to impose the will of the United Nations; the initial phase of disarmament would be followed by problems of disposing of captured arms and material of destroying enemy fortifications. 229 Still unclear to planers was how to effectively disband the German armed forces; how to dispose of German police forces

227 Ibid. 228 Ibid. 229 Ibid. 65 like the Gestapo and remove Nazi influence; how to repatriate liberated prisoners of war; how to care and repatriate DPs; how to dispose of surrendered war material. Movement and transportation of persons, equipment and supplies was also a concern. Given that the

United States Army was undertaking the largest mobilization in its history, with great uncertainty that the Allies would even be victorious, it is noteworthy that they were able to come up with such a comprehensive list of issues two years prior to the end of the war, when clearly they had other significant issues to address.

The Talisman Plan 230

Recognizing the incompleteness of the Rankin plan, a new plan, Talisman, was developed. Following the surrender of the German armed forces and the cessation of organized resistance, the mission of the United States would be to disarm the German forces in the West and thereby to prevent a renewal of hostilities; to occupy strategic areas on the Continent, from which the terms of the surrender imposed by the Allied governments on Germany, and from which UN agencies can assist in the relief and rehabilitation of liberated countries. 231 According to Talisman, the Supreme Commander would be responsible for: disarmament of German forces, short-term disposal of surrendered war materials, control of the German forces through subordinate headquarters, control of Nazi organizational and other counter-intelligence measures, care of Allied prisoners of war, Civil Affairs and Military Government, and imposition of military sanctions. 232

230 Talisman was the second of three plans developed by the United States Army to address occupational duties in post-war Germany. The majority of the planning for Talisman occurred in 1944. 231 U.S. Army, "Planning for the Occupation of Germany." 232 Ibid. 66

The Eclipse Plan

All previous plans were mere sketches in comparison with the Eclipse plan. It

was defined as the military continuation of Operation Overlord. It reflected a much more

realistic view of what the surrender was likely to be like and of the probable conditions in

Germany than had been expressed in any previous plan. Initiated as the victorious armies

crossed the Siegfield Line 233 , it provided for the occupation of Nazi Germany and

addressed every aspect of civil government and administration. Eclipse was the bridge

linking war and peace. Overlord was the terminal combat operation of the war; Eclipse

was the initial operation of the peace. 234

The Eclipse plan recognized that each military district would need specially

trained control staffs for military government operations and disarmament. Joint Chief of

Staff Directive 1067 (JCS 1067) 235 gave the Military Government staffs their long- awaited basic statement of policy for the post hostilities period. 236 Beginning in March

1945, a series of regular biweekly meetings took place at Supreme HQ for the

coordination of post-hostilities planning.

Reflecting the bias of its authors, Eclipse emphasized combat operations

supported by civilian military operations rather than the reverse. The combat operations

central to the plan—seizure of key strategic areas—occurred largely as part of Overlord

233 The Siegfield Line commonly refers to the line of defense forts and tank defenses built by Germany spanning 390 miles. It went from the border with the Netherlands in the north to the border of Switzerland in the south. 234 Kenneth O. McCreedy, "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany," The Journal of Military History 65, no. 3 (2001). 235 “Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany.” Originally issued in April 1945, it was intended to guide General Eisenhower in the military government of that portion of Germany occupied by the United States forces. 236 JCS 1067 was issued April 1945. It was intended to guide General Eisenhower in the military government of that portion of Germany occupied by United States forces and at the same time GEN Eisenhower was to urge the control council to adopt these policies for enforcement throughout Germany. 67

and were mostly irrelevant to Eclipse. Instead, the supporting civil-military provisions of

the plan became preeminent in the operations that ensued. 237 Eclipse built upon the work that had already been done in Rankin and Talisman, but was much more comprehensive.

The plan itself demonstrates integration and responsiveness. The Eclipse plan enumerated specific goals for many aspects of the US Occupation of Germany. First of all, disarmament, denazification, arresting war criminals and bringing them to justice were paramount. The intelligence goals were to seize documents, installations, and wanted persons and to discover secret processes. The economic goals were to control transportation, control the German economy, destroy and prohibit cartels, disperse ownership and control of industry, and decentralize the economy. As far as reparations and restitution, German resources would be made available for relief of stricken countries. The United States would exact reparations and enforce restitution. The security goals included disarming, disbanding and imprisoning the Gestapo, abolishing political police, purging criminal and ordinary police of Nazi influence in order to use them to enforce rule of law under control of MG. Courts also had to be purged of Nazi influence. The civil government would establish law and order and institute Military

Government, while taking care not to oppress the German people. The Allies would establish a democratic government on a decentralized basis. Military government officers would preserve records, archives, monuments, and objects of art. The US would also control public information, postal services and telecommunications. With respect to education, all military academies and Nazi schools would be dissolved and elementary and secondary schools would be reopened as soon as possible. Finally, all prisoners held for reasons of race, religion or political opinions would be freed. Freedom of religion,

237 McCreedy, "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany." 68

press, and speech would all be reestablished. 238 This was an exhaustive list of tasks--

clearly demonstrating the integrative nature of the plan.

Military Effectiveness

In order for a post war plan to be effective, it must take into account the military aspects of the occupation as well as account for the other agencies involved in the provision of safety. Combat operations, post-conflict reconstruction, and restoring security to the population must be fully integrated to be successful. Finally, the military activities must be consistent at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. The post-war plan will be examined using the four criteria of military effectiveness: integration, responsiveness, skill and quality.

There was a remarkable breadth of vision displayed in 1943-1944. While planning Operation Overlord, the most complex military undertaking in history, the

Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Eisenhower demonstrated extraordinary foresight by devoting valuable, overburdened staff resources to planning for peace. Despite inefficiencies resulting from unclear political guidance, the exigencies of planning peace during war, and a reluctance to involve the army in such a long-term commitment, SHAEF formulated timely contingency plans for occupation, created organizations to plan and conduct post conflict operations, and thought about the peace and the military’s role in it. 239

In the shadow of Overlord, thousands of officers and soldiers sought to lay the foundation for winning the peace by ensuring a smooth transition from war. The Eclipse plan established the framework that the Western Allies would use in occupying Nazi

238 U.S. Army, "Planning for the Occupation of Germany." 239 McCreedy, "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany." 69

Germany. It set forth procedures and objectives for disarming and demobilizing German military forces. It provided for a system of military government to administer the occupied territory until Nazism could be abolished and a civil administration established.

Eclipse included plans for rapidly returning allied prisoners of war to their homes, as well as repatriating liberated forced laborers and concentration camp survivors. 240 The sheer comprehensiveness of the plan demonstrates how integrated the political, economic, and security concerns were to the American military.

Integrating the efforts of military police and military government detachments to restore order also increased effectiveness. Although the military police and military government officers were tasked with many of the occupational specific tasks, tactical units also were assigned missions related to them. Occupation duties, for the troops as distinct from the MG force, consisted in the main of manning border control posts, check points at strategically placed road blocks and security guard posts, and aiding in the administration and the maintenance of security of displaced persons centers. The pattern of wide dispersal of troops was in accord with what has been called an army-type occupation. It was based on the principle that the best method of maintaining control over the civil population was to post at least a few Occupation troops almost

240 Enumerated tasks of the occupying forces according to ECLIPSE are as follows: Enforce terms of surrender. Issue orders to the German military authorities to supplement the instrument of surrender. Apply sanctions in the event of failure on the part of the German authorities to execute the terms of surrender. To disarm and disband the German armed forces. To disarm and control all paramilitary organizations. To safeguard captured enemy material and to take steps to dispose of it. To arrest and bring to justice war criminals. To control transportation. To disarm and control the police. To establish law and order. To control governmental and military organizations. To institute MG. To execute intelligence functions, including the seizure of documents, secret processes, installations, and wanted person. To control public information mediums. To control postal services and telecommunications. Insure POWs of Allied nationality are liberated, cared for, and repatriated. Insure that DP of UN nationality were cared for and repatriated. 70

everywhere. 241 This principle was later to end, but the immediate effect was to make

more military personnel available for security purposes and the direct support of Military

Government operations.

The post-war planning incorporated all branches of service, further demonstrating the integration of effort. Not only did the US Army develop their own post war plans, but for months, the US Army, Navy and Air Forces had been perfecting mutually supporting plans for the occupation of Germany and had been working with their British, Russian and French Allies in putting together a coordinated program to impose a stern military government over all of Germany. 242 The Combined Civil Affairs Committee was one organization designed to coordinate the actions of the Allies in the post war era. The committee consisted of: One representative each of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the

U.S. State Department, the British Foreign Office, two representatives of the British Joint

Staff Mission, and two additional civilian members, one each from the US and the UK.

The mission was to recommend policies that should be adopted for civil affairs, coordinate the British and American military efforts, and to anticipate the problems presented by local populations. By integrating their efforts across both branches of service and allied nations, the plan itself became more effective.

Not only was Eclipse an integrated plan between all branches of the United States

Armed Forces as well as the Allies, military planners demonstrated responsiveness to the situation on the ground through thorough contingency planning. Military planners predicted that during the military occupation of Germany internal conditions would be

241 Historical Division, "U.S. Military Government in Germany: Operations from Late March to Mid-July 1945." 242 OMGUS Records. Press Release, Noon, 11 May 1945, War Department Bureau of Public Relations, Press Branch. “American Organizational Plans for Military Government of Germany.” P.1. 71

chaotic. They thought that destitution, unemployment, and general misery would be the

common lot with the possibility of famine and pestilence. 243 The problems facing governing Germany would present military government officials with the some of the most difficult set of problems ever faced by the US Army. War criminals would have to be brought to justice. If guerilla fighting developed, strong measures would be required to put it down. Public opinion also had to be considered. 244 Their plan took all of this into account, which enabled those who had to execute it, to be responsive to the situations they faced.

Evidence of the quality of the plan would be in the accuracy of which actual requirements were anticipated. The greatest achievement of Eclipse may have been the accuracy with which planners anticipated requirements. Few tasks came as a surprise to the units that occupied Germany, although the scale of the population movement dwarfed all estimates. Within three months, Allied armed forces had taken significant steps to stabilize the situation in Germany. They disarmed and demobilized the once formidable

German armed forces. Over four million displaced persons and Allied prisoners of war were repatriated to their homelands. Counterintelligence personnel quashed a feeble

German attempt to establish a resistance (also anticipated in the post-war plan).

Occupation forces provided vital assistance to restore basic services to many cities.

Military government detachments, augmented by combat troops, created working local governments and police forces, while administering military courts. 245 Almost every

243 17 October 1944, Memorandum for the Secretary of War: Military Occupation in Germany. (Author, Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War) 244 17 October 1944, Memorandum for the Secretary of War: Military Occupation in Germany. (Author, Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War) 245 Holborn, American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies , McCreedy, "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany." 72 eventuality was foreseen in the planning process, demonstrating the plan’s effectiveness in terms of its quality, responsiveness and integration.

Further proof of the effectiveness of the post-war plan can be found in evaluations of civil affairs and military government operations. As early as December 1944, Civil

Affairs and Military Government Operations were evaluated in historical reports. 246

Their most important task was to maintain order in their respective areas. Their primary missions were: prevent hysteria among civilians, prevent civilian circulation, establish rigid curfew, keep military routes clear of civilian traffic and have critical utilities and bridges guarded. 247 These tasks supported broader US objectives and by keeping the civilian population secure, tactical units were more able to concentrate on defeating the

German army. By most reports, those tasked with these missions were doing exactly as planned. The majority of the population was secure immediately upon the cessation of combat and hysteria among civilians was prevented.

To enable responsiveness of both combat troops and military government officers, population security was essential. The civil population was controlled by a variety of means, including the arrest of violators of MG regulations. Travel control was maintained by the establishment of check points at border control ports, bridges, main road junctions, and on main roads leading into villages and towns. Roving patrols during curfew hours picked up civilians who did not have the required MG passes. Stationary guards were posted at a wide variety of security targets, including railroad bridges and stations, US Army installations, jails, telephone exchanges, factories, financial

246 Historical Division, "U.S. Military Government in Germany: Operations from Late March to Mid-July 1945." 247 First U. S. Army G-5 Section, Civil Affairs/Military Government Operations (1944), Historical Report. P. 7. 73

institutions, and displaced persons camps. 248 All of these measures laid the groundwork for the basic security conditions required for economic and political rebuilding.

Having an experienced and skilled military commander who appreciated the unique problems of occupational tasks also aided in responsiveness. The Under

Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, advocated for General Eisenhower to be the only voice in Germany so that the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war would be mutually reinforcing and that unity of effort could be achieved. Instead of establishing other agencies of the US government overseas, General Eisenhower drew on the talent already in the Army of those were qualified (and trained at the SOMG) to deal with the difficulties to be encountered in governing the occupied area in Germany. 249

Eisenhower’s experience in North Africa and Italy with military government made him a perfect fit with the skills required in the post-war occupation of Germany.

Skill reflects the ability of the military to perform its given missions. In order for the postwar plan to be effective, the military needed skilled personnel who were prepared for the unique missions they would be expected to execute. A broad understanding of foreign policy goals and how tactical decisions would impact policy was required. The

One way to evaluate this is to examine the military doctrine concerned with postwar tasks. 250

248 “Major J.H. Vincent, SMGO, 5 th Infantry Division, March 1944, Historical Report.” NARA Records Group 389, Row 41, Compartment 7, Shelf 2-3, Entry A1 103, Box 311. 249 17 October 1944, Memorandum for the Secretary of War: Military Occupation in Germany. (Author, Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War). 250 Many civil affairs guides were published including: telecommunications and postal services of Germany, German Merchant Marine, Adaptation of the Administrative Machinery on the Local (Regional) Level in Germany, War Dept, Pam 31-171, (31-114), German public property 31-125, Territorial Units to be Used by Military Government in Germany, 31-115, German Elementary Schools, 31-118, Policy towards the Revival of Old Parties and Establishment of New Parties, 31-116, General Principles of Administration and Civil Service in Germany, 31-113, The Protestant and Catholic Churches in Germany, 31-120, German Labor Relations and Military Government, 31-159, Police and Public Safety, 31-107, 74

Military doctrine is meant to formalize an organization’s standard operating procedures and norms. It tells soldiers what to do and how to prepare themselves for the tasks they are expected to accomplish. By capturing principles in writing, the individual as well as the organization should be able to practice and improve the performance of assigned tasks. These principles are the central influence on a military’s organizational structure, operations, equipment, education and training. 251 Good doctrine aids greatly in having a skilled soldier as well as a skilled organization.

In order to properly administer military government, the Germany Country Unit of the G-5 section prepared a handbook for Military Government in Germany in June

1944. According to the manual, the principles of occupation would be: indirect rule, military administration, prohibition of political activity, suspension of courts and political police, only distribute food to prevent disease and unrest. Despite the tasks enumerated in the Eclipse plan, in the absence of policy direction by the civilian leadership, it was unclear to the military, which approach to take. At this point there was a lack of policy statements about disarmament, demilitarization, denazification in the economic sphere, cartels, decentralization, of ownership and control in business, reparations, restitution,

DPs, the establishment of democratic government, education and travel by Germans.

Over time, many publications would fill this void.

The doctrine published in the 1940s demonstrates several aspects of military effectiveness. The United States Army and Navy published, Military Government and

Civil Affairs, FM 27-5, in December 1943, super ceding the previous War Department

Electric Power Systems of Germany, 31-150, German Higher Education and Adult Education under Military Government, 31-119, The Administration of German Railroads, 31-144, Money and Banking, 356- 5. Records of these manuals can be found at NARA, Record Group 389, Entry 443, Box 842. 251 Donald Gregory Rose, “Peace Operations and Counterinsurgency: The U.S. Military and Change” (Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2000). 75

Manual 27-5, of July 1940. This manual was meant to explicitly separate what the

Army’s role would be in CA/MG versus the Navy’s role.

In addition to publishing doctrine in concert with the Navy, the Army worked to

inform its own internal organizations, the field army especially, about civil affairs and

military government. To prepare tactical units, the G-1 Division of Supreme

Headquarters prepared a Military Government Handbook specifically for Unit

Commanders that was published in September 1944. 252 Before the full-scale occupation

began a plethora of military government functional manuals, intelligence guides, pocket

books for the ordinary soldier on his relations with the Germans were published in

addition to the Eclipse memorandums and many SOPs. In December 1944, the Handbook

Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation in Germany assembled in a

single publication all that ordinary field commanders needed to know about his duties in

the occupation. It covered the military phases of the occupation as distinct from the MG

phases. It dealt with disarmament and disbandment of the armed forces, captured enemy

material, reformation of the police, Allied prisoners of war, DP, transportation, problems,

control of communication services, information control, and intelligence activities. There

was some overlapping in subject matter with the Handbook for MG in Germany also

published in December, especially with respect to public safety and displaced persons.

They marked out quite distinctly what was within the province of the field forces and

what was more properly regarded as pertaining to military government. Capturing this

distinction in print was especially important to assuring an integrated and responsive

effort. Units needed to know what tasks fell within their responsibility. It also provided

252 For statements of the objectives of the military occupation of Germany see: “SHAEF, Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of Germany,” Dec 44, par 9; “Directive for the Military Government of Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender,” 9 Nov 1944, par 4a. 76 context for all units in Germany—political, economic and security concerns were issues all forces would have to deal with.

Finally, Pamphlet 10, Military Government, laid out the major issues in undertaking this task. It laid out in great deal the following considerations: nature and functions of military government, German civil administration and the plan for its control, military government policy, eradication of Nazism and treatment of war criminals, public safety and control of movement, administration of justice, and how to deal with displaced persons and refugees. This publication further demonstrates the integration of effort among all aspects of nation-building: security concerns, economic development, and improving governance capacity were all addressed.

In order to successfully establish military government, skilled personnel were needed. To assure the accomplishment of military government policies, General

Eisenhower had almost 10,000 specially selected and trained US officers and enlisted men available. The majority of personnel assigned to General Eisenhower was trained at the School of Military Government and had prior experience in some aspect of governing. The G-5 section at Supreme Headquarters concerned itself exclusively with civil affairs and military government. 253

The final attribute of an effective postwar plan is quality—possessing highly capable personnel and organizations. The character of the occupation would ultimately rest upon the character of the organization and the personnel, which would administer it. 254 Establishing an organization with the ability to both plan and execute the post war plan was vital to its success.

253 (Memorandum for the Secretary of War from George Marshall, 20 April 1945) 254 OMGUS, “Organization for the Occupation” 26 October 1946. p. 1. 77

The Joint Post-War Committee was created in June 1944 to study and make recommendations concerning post-war military plans. They were also charged with cooperating and assisting agencies of the State and other Departments in matters concerning post-war military problems of interest to the JCS. By November 1944, there was a draft directive that laid out the plan for German disarmament and disbandment of the German Armed Forces. 255 The directive saw military government operations fall into three main phases: the rough and tumble period prior to German surrender, the period immediately following surrender during which the central organization of the German ministries is being reconstituted, and the final period when a central organization has been set up in Berlin and is functioning either under the Supreme Commander’s control or as a separate entity under the Allied governments. 256 Each of these phases would require skilled personnel and organizations.

In order to be responsive to the constantly changing situation in Germany, the

United States army established a comprehensive organizational structure. Skilled personnel were assigned to each of twelve major divisions to plan and implement control of Germany. The US planning group’s organization roughly corresponded to the ministries of the former German central government. Three military divisions would deal with the demobilization of the German armed forces, and the disarmament of Germany.

The Transport division regulated traffic. The Economics division dealt with food, agriculture and forestry, fuel and mining, price control and rationing, public works and utilities, internal and foreign trade, industry. The Finance division controlled public finance, financial institutions, foreign exchange and currency. The Reparation,

255 “Outline Plan for the Disbandment of the German Armed Forces” File 5604/147, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. 256 Memorandum to SHAEF/G5/Ops/803 of 16 November 1944. 78

Deliveries and Restitution Division supervised the execution of policies as well as handle

the supervision of monuments, fine arts and archives. The Internal Affairs and

Communications Division supervised public safety, including control of civil police

forces, public health and welfare, post, telephone, telegraph, military communications,

civil service, local government, education and religious affairs. The Legal Division gave

legal advice to the commander and other divisions as well as prosecuted war criminals and exercise proper controls over courts and prisons. The Prisoners of War and

Displaced Persons Division cared for and repatriated these people. The Manpower

Division dealt with labor relations, wage and labor policies, and housing. The

Intelligence Section supervised the denazification program and maintained surveillance over all German agencies. Public information and public relations sections reported directly to General Clay. 257 The organizational structure promoted an integrated and

responsive approach to the problems facing Germany. Furthermore, this extremely

detailed plan reflects the skill of both the personnel and organizations involved.

Not only was the planning organization essential for effective post war operations,

but also establishing a force to deal with public safety and security issues would prove

vital to the success of the occupation. A highly trained military policy force was of

tremendous value to military operations. Up to that time, military police were used

simply to enforce discipline and the regulations to which troops were subject. A careful

study of World War I operations brought the concept of using military police for helpful

control of military traffic moving to and during battle. When the German resistance

collapsed, the military police regulated the dense, chaotic traffic on the roads, burdened

257 OMGUS Records. Press Release, Noon, 11 May 1945, War Department Bureau of Public Relations, Press Branch. “American Organizational Plans for Military Government of Germany.” P. 2. 79

with combat troops and their supplies surging forward and millions of prisoners or

displaced persons straggling in the opposite direction. 258

Summary

The Eclipse plan and its implementation were not flawless. Vague and shifting

political objectives made it extremely difficult to plan and execute the post-war

occupation of Germany. Civil affairs and military government officials were limited by

the higher priorities attached to combat operations and the real security concerns of

combatant commanders. Furthermore, no one could have foreseen the kind of

devastation faced by military government or civil affairs officers who had to implement

the plan.

Despite these difficulties, the occupation was the product of careful calculations

and extensive preparation. Trained personnel were assigned throughout Germany,

ensuring continuation of police and basic civil administrative functions. Millions of

displaced civilians, prisoners of war, and German soldiers and sailors were returned

home. Counterintelligence agents identified Nazis and helped prevent a resistance from

forming. Medical personnel labored to prevent a public health catastrophe. The Eclipse

plan prepared the occupiers for the shattered economy, devastated infrastructure, and

desperate, starving population that awaited them. 259

The plan demonstrates responsiveness and integration just by the sheer breadth

and depth of topics considered. Furthermore, its evolution over time further shows the

military’s responsiveness to changing conditions. Finally, the execution of the plan itself

258 Larry I. Bland, Sharon R. Ritenour, and Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr., eds., The Papers of George Catlett Marshall , vol. 2 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).General Marshall’s report on the Occupation. P. 93. 259 McCreedy, "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany." 80

was successful. Given the four criteria of military effectiveness, the post-war plan was an

effective innovation.

The U.S. Constabulary Force

As early as July 1944, while still fighting in Normandy, the Third Army had

recommended the eventual establishment of a small, mobile force to be used to maintain

order and to patrol the countryside during the occupation. 260 In November 1944 the

Fifteenth Army began a study for a “Frontier Command” which would occupy fixed

police posts, maintain roadblocks, and conduct patrols; this force became operational in

1945. 261 Several cases in the American military experience suggested that a constabulary

force might be useful in the occupation of Germany.

After the unconditional surrender of Germany, normal government and economic

life disappeared, the courts did not function, the police were not at work, and stores were

closed. Europeans faced a winter without adequate food or fuel. 262 Despite these

concerns, the sheer magnitude of the U.S. Army implied that they would be able to

handle Germany’s problems. For example, the 6 th and 12 th Army Groups controlled five

field armies, sixty-one divisions containing 1.6 million men; the total U.S. troop strength

in Europe was over three million. 263 It didn’t seem that the American army would have

any great difficulty handling postwar tasks.

The occupation planners, however, did not consider the American propensity to

clamor for demobilization after war. 264 The nine-division permanent occupation force

260 Army, Occupation Forces in Europe Series . P. 4. 261 Ibid. P. 3. 262 Brian Arthur Libby, “Policing Germany: The United States Constabulary, 1946-1952” (Dissertation, Purdue University, 1977). p. 2. 263 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946 . P. 320. 264 Libby, “Policing Germany: The United States Constabulary, 1946-1952”. P. 5. 81

planned for Germany was infeasible after Japan surrendered. The Army expected to be

down to 2 million men by 30 June 1946. 265 In October, Marshall asked Eisenhower to consider using a police-type occupation force similar to one being devised in Japan, in which a native German police force under American supervision and backed by U.S. tactical units would take over practically the entire responsibility for security and order in the country. 266 He also suggested considering whether foreign manpower—German,

Polish, Norwegian, Danish, or Dutch—could be substituted for American manpower in the police force and in tactical units to reduce the requirements for US manpower and expense. 267

Eisenhower accepted the idea of a police-type occupation but objected to using

Germans on the ground of adverse public reaction anticipated in Europe and the United

States. 268 The War Department thereafter raised the possibility of recruiting other

Europeans several times during the succeeding months before finally dropping the whole idea because of various difficulties, among them expense, language problems, and danger of increasing the pressure for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces. 269 In the meantime,

USFET undertook to devise a police-type occupation of its own.

In September 1945, the Theater G2 (Intelligence Section), USFET, recommended creating security forces for each military district to be composed of MPs,

Counterintelligence Corps detachments (CIC), and district constabularies.270 The district constabularies would be mechanized cavalry groups taken from the tactical units, given

265 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946 . p. 321-322. 266 Army, Occupation Forces in Europe Series . P. 15, 28. 267 Ibid. P. 29-30. 268 Ibid. P. 32. 269 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946 . p. 323. 270 Libby, “Policing Germany: The United States Constabulary, 1946-1952”. P. 9. 82

special instruction in military government laws and ordinances, trained in conducting

raids and searches, and employed as quick, mobile security reserves. From the idea of the

district constabularies, evolved the concept of the United States constabulary into a self-

sufficient security force for the whole zone.

What made using a constabulary force so attractive was the army’s ability to

reduce the number of troops, by seemingly not losing any control over the population.

The constabulary’s missions would be to control the population by maintaining general

security in the U.S. occupied zone of Germany. 271 Calculating on the basis of one

constable (plus signals, supply and air reconnaissance) for 450 Germans, Eisenhower

informed the War Department that a constabulary of 38,000 men would be enough to

establish police-type control by 1 July 1946, assuming that by then the surplus property,

DP, and prisoner of war burdens would have been substantially eliminated. The

estimated reduction in required soldiers would amount to 81,000 since the supporting

tactical troops could be reduced to three divisions and one army headquarters. 272 The

constabulary was envisioned as an elite force, composed of the highest quality personnel

that could be obtained. They would be equipped with an efficient communications

network and enough vehicles and airplanes to make it highly mobile. 273

The organizational plans, completed at the turn of the year, provided for a

Headquarters, U.S. Constabulary, comparable to a corps headquarters; three brigade

headquarters, one for each Land capital; nine regimental headquarters, and twenty-seven

squadrons, located so as to cover one or more Kreise. As late as mid-February 1946,

271 Irzyk, "Mobility Vigilance Justice." P. 44. 272 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946 . p. 340. 273 Kendall D Gott, Mobility, Vigilance and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005). P. 10. 83

however, the US Constabulary consisted only of a plan and a headquarters. When MG

Ernest N. Harmon was appointed commanding general on 10 January, he was the sole

member of the constabulary. By mid-February, he had selected a headquarters staff; on

the 16 th , a constabulary school opened in the former Adolf Hitler Schule at Sonthofen to train members of a cavalry reconnaissance squadron as teachers for the main body of the constabulary that had yet to be assigned. 274

The first armored division and the fourth armored division formed the nucleus of the new organization. 275 The Constabulary’s mission was: to maintain general military and civil security throughout the US Occupied Zone of Germany by being prepared to take prompt and effective action to suppress rights, rebellions and other acts prejudicial to the security of the U.S. Occupational Forces; to support Military Government; to maintain authorized border crossing points; to enforce traffic regulations. 276 This was quite an extensive mission for soldiers who were merely being reassigned to fill the constabulary billets.

Given the complexity of the post war situation, MG Harmon thought that a school would provide a more systematic way to train the troops to be assigned. A Constabulary

School was established in Sonthofen in early 1946. The school offered a four-week course consisting of 136 hours of instruction in seven areas: tactics and weapons, police subjects, communications, motors, leadership, geopolitics, and general subjects. The

School was designed to handle 650 students per class. A Constabulary Trooper’s

Handbook was also written to reinforce the lessons learned at the school. The major

274 Major General E.N. Harmon, Milton MacKaye, and William Ross MaKaye, Combat Commander: Autobiography of a Soldier (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970). p. 283. 275 Ibid. P. 281. 276 Memorandum to all U.S. Commanding Generals and Commander, US Naval Forces, Germany, “Directive Governing the Operation of the US Constabulary.” 30 September 1947. pg. 2. 84

topics covered in the handbook were: instructions of duties, the German police, patrols,

prisoner search, traffic control, passes, riot duty, scene of a crime, evidence, searches,

confessions, and courtroom procedures. 277

For over two years, the US Constabulary was the only large organized law

enforcement agency in the U.S. Zone. 278 They dealt primarily with the day-to-day

problems of the average German. Its mission was to maintain general military and civil

security, assist in the accomplishment of the United States Government in the occupied

U.S. Zone of Germany by means of an active patrol system prepared to take prompt and

effective action to forestall and suppress riots, rebellion, and acts prejudicial to the

security of the U.S. occupation policies, and forces, and maintain effective military

control of the borders encompassing the U.S. Zone. 279

Military Effectiveness

The first and most crucial requirement for military effectiveness is the capacity for integration. Military activities must be consistent at the tactical, operational and strategic levels as well as integrate military and public security needs with law enforcement requirements. Finally, the military must ensure the provision of security and safety of the civilian population.

The constabulary force illustrates integration through their two most effective tasks—patrolling and border control. Patrolling irregularly, they found, was the best way to detect or prevent crime. There were four types of patrols used: vehicular, dismounted, horse, and air patrols. The border patrol task was particularly large with 1280 miles of international borders. In order to be effective, the Constabulary established fixed

277 United States Zone Constabulary Trooper’s Handbook, 15 February 1946. 278 Libby, “Policing Germany: The United States Constabulary, 1946-1952”. P. 19 279 Constabulary Operational Directive No. 1, p. 1. 85 checkpoints along the entire frontier and patrolled the border to prevent unauthorized crossing. 280 Constabulary troops also patrolled cities on foot and roamed the countryside in Jeeps stopping at German police stations checking for suspicious incidents. 281

Shows of force were also used to impress and awe the German urban population by demonstrating the power of the Constabulary. Typically, several troops would drive through a city without warning the population. Each major city had a show of force once a month. These activities demonstrated the presence of well-armed units that were able to crush any uprisings should the idea arise among the Germans. 282

Search and seizure operations were performed to stop criminals and to deter further crime. Constabulary troops did not bother with search warrants or probable cause. Instead, they would raid houses, search Displaced Persons camps, or entire regions looking for stolen goods, caches of weapons or other contraband. 283 The threat of search and seizure helped to keep crime low.

Constabulary units also were assigned the task of preventing subversive activity.

This portion of their duties was meant to curb any activities that could interfere with the

Occupation, demean American prestige and authority, or which was Nazi in character.

Some of these activities were trivial, but others had a more alarming connotation. For example, an ex-SS MAJ Sturmbannfuhrer Siegried Kabus recruited a gang of young men, which in October 1946 bombed three denazification courts and an American jail. 284 On the whole there were few fanatics in the American zone, but the Constabulary forces

280 Constabulary Operational Directive No. 1, p. 7-8. 281 David Colley, "Circle C Cowboys: Cold War Constabulary," Veterans of Foreign Wars Magazine , June 1996. 282 Libby, “Policing Germany: The United States Constabulary, 1946-1952”. P. 34. 283 Ibid. 284 The New York Times , 21 November 1946. 86 stayed alert to subversive activity. The fact that there are so few documented cases of subversion demonstrates the effectiveness of the unit.

Major General Harmon, commander of the Constabulary, was also responsible for building a new German police force organized in the manner of an American state police organization. The activation of German police, in his own words, permitted the

Constabulary to relinquish their routing policing of civilians and concentrate its efforts on border control and law enforcement among displaced persons and American servicemen. 285 Laying the foundation for effective local law enforcement was one of the most important tasks of the Constabulary force. The sooner the Germany police force became effective, the fewer American troops would be required to maintain security.

The Constabulary was not the only police force in the U.S. Zone. There were several other law-enforcement agencies: the German police (totaling 26,000 by 1946), the Border police (totaling 2700 in 1946), Railway Police, Forest Police and Water Police

(although they were each very small units). The German police did not play a significant role initially because they were not permitted to arrest or interfere with Allied personnel.

The Military Police retained primary jurisdiction over U.S. troops, traffic control and convoys; but after the dramatic drop in troop strength from 1945 to 1946 (3 Million to

340,000 troops), there weren’t many MPs available. Despite these other agencies, the

Constabulary was the mainstay of law and order in the U.S. Zone. 286

Another critical task was to employ military aged men. During the height of the

Third Reich, the youth in particular had been highly susceptible to joining the Nazi party.

In order to ensure the safety of the civilian population and to prevent crime, something

285 Harmon, MacKaye, and MaKaye, Combat Commander: Autobiography of a Soldier . P. 289. 286 Libby, “Policing Germany: The United States Constabulary, 1946-1952”. P. 36. 87

had to be done about the German youth. When World War II ended, occupation

authorities were very concerned about what to do with young people. The Hitler Youth

had a particularly influential role in the European theater and US occupation officials

needed a plan to combat any subversive activities. In the chaotic, impoverished

conditions of postwar Germany juvenile delinquency and more serious crimes had the

potential to reach epidemic proportions if healthy alternatives for young people were not

developed. The other concern was that the youth had been inculcated with Fascist ideals after twelve years of Socialist rule.

To combat these issues, the German Youth Assistance (GYA) Program was established to accomplish this goal. The purpose of this program was to provide opportunities for U.S. troops to interact with German young people. This could be done directly—a baseball tournament for example, or indirectly—giving Boy Scouts the use of barracks to meet.

In April 1946, the military government issued directives establishing a chain of command and a formal organization for the GYA program. In August 1946, General

Harmon issued the orders establishing the Constabulary’s GYA program in the U.S.

Zone. All brigades, regiments, and squadrons organized athletics for German children; each brigade assigned one field-grade officer and two NCOs to work full-time on GYA; each squadron and troop had one full-time NCO. Troopers who participated in GYA activities were excused from up to four hours a week of training duties. 287

The GYA program was extended to a very large number of youths. Since the

Constabulary was the largest unit of the occupation forces, its participation led to the

success of the program. One quarter of the children in the U.S. Zone were in one or

287 Constabulary Lightning Bolt , 20 June 1947. 88

another program by June 1947 and this number only increased over time. 288 It is unclear

if these activities actually taught the young people anything about democracy; however,

the simple fact that they had a positive outlet to expend their energy probably prevented

many from turning to delinquency and crime.

In order to be effective, the Constabulary had to be responsive to the military

situation, policing needs and political and economic administration. Although subversive

activities and violent crime remained very low during the period in which the

Constabulary existed, black marketing was the most pervasive criminal activity in

postwar Germany. There was illegal activity by individual Germans as well as U.S.

soldiers, but the Constabulary forces focused their efforts on stamping out the big

operators. 289 The Constabulary demonstrated their responsiveness to the military

situation by being alert to the attitudes toward the American occupation in general. The

squadrons were under orders to collect whatever rumors were circulating and to forward

them to higher headquarters. 290 Rumors about where and when the next constabulary raids would take place help keep crime low.

The U.S. Constabulary was tasked with filling the void where there weren’t enough Military Police or German Police. General crime was an issue across the US zone, giving the constabulary plenty to do. DP camps were rife with unrest and contraband. Rogues and gangs plundered at will and many former Nazis remained at large. The constabulary attempted to fill the law enforcement vacuum to provide order where there was chaos. Many of the German police had been dismissed because of past

288 OFES, 1945-1946, No. 24, “German Youth Activities,” p. 26. 289 Stars and Stripes, 5 January 1947. 290 Snyder, The Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary: 3 October 1945-30 June 1947 . P. 193-194. 89

Nazi connections. 291 Until the German police could be established throughout the US

Zone, the Constabulary was responsible for enforcing law and order. This mission was vital to the overall occupation.

Keeping the borders controlled was another critical task assigned to the

Constabulary. The plan for border patrol was straightforward: single lines of order posts were set up along the frontier. There were two types of posts—Authorized Crossing

Points, which allowed people with a legitimate need to cross access and Fixed Border

Posts that, blocked all other roads. There were 126 posts in all. Greater strength was used in the east because more illegal crossing was expected there. 292 This fixed line of border positions and the foot patrols between them were insufficient to secure the frontier because so many people were trying to enter illegally and there were so few soldiers available. For example, on 25 August 1947, the daily intelligence summary called it a

“slow day” when 135 people were arrested for illegal crossing. 293 A further 583 people were turned back at the border.

The responsiveness of the constabulary is illustrated through their approach to the border patrol mission. After a few months it became obvious that the single line of border posts was not capable of stopping illegal crossers. The Constabulary responded with a new system. In July 1946 the Constabulary discontinued both fixed border posts and foot patrols. 294 Instead, they established roving check points at a depth of up to 1000 yards behind the frontier; they functioned at random times and places. This new system was backed up by intensifying the Constabulary’s vehicular patrols in areas up to ten

291 Colley, "Circle C Cowboys: Cold War Constabulary." P. 23. 292 Harmon, MacKaye, and MaKaye, Combat Commander: Autobiography of a Soldier . P. 291. 293 Biddle and Long, "Democracy and Military Effectiveness." 294 Libby, “Policing Germany: The United States Constabulary, 1946-1952”. P. 68. 90 miles behind the frontier. The change eliminated the possibility that the Germans could overcome the system by mapping the fixed posts and foot patrols in order to avoid them.

Ultimately, the Constabulary was relieved of border patrol duty once the German border police were restored in 1947-1948. The responsiveness of the constabulary is evident in the evolutionary approach they took to their border patrolling tasks. Over time, as they realized the original plan wasn’t working, they adapted and altered their routines to be more effective.

Skill reflects the degree to which military personnel are trained and prepared to undertake the difficult and complex tasks associated with nation-building. The duties of a constabulary trooper and those of a combat soldier were substantially different.

General Harmon recognized this and made provisions to train those assigned to the

Constabulary unit. Initially, soldiers were trained at the unit level in police type tasks.

The Constabulary force school he established reflects his understanding of the importance of the unit’s mission. Providing his unit with the education to be effective demonstrates his skill and enabled the unit itself to be more responsive.

The final attribute of an effective military is quality—possessing highly capable weapons, equipment, personnel, and organizations. In order to have a successful occupation, the United States required a different military force. It had to be lighter, faster and more mobile in order to control the population of a defeated and occupied territory by maintaining general security in the U.S. occupied zone of Germany. 295

Possessing quality weapons and equipment was vital to the effectiveness of the

U.S. Constabulary. Each Constabulary squadron had three mechanized and two motorized troops equipped with M5 armored cars mounted with 37-mm cannons, quarter

295 Irzyk, "Mobility Vigilance Justice." p. 44. 91 and half-ton trucks, light machine guns, Thompson submachine guns, rifles, pistols, and code and voice radios. Other Constabulary units were outfitted with light tanks, M8 armored cars, and a large numbers of jeeps and horses. 296

The M8 Armored Car was one of the vehicles whose presence added to the “show of force” that kept Germany peaceful. Arguably, this also maintained US presence along the borders of Germany, particularly in the Soviet sector where Russian tanks were posted. Light observational aircraft also provided unique information to the constabulary troopers. Radios, telephones, and switchboards enabled communication up and down the chain of command. Radios were mounted in jeeps, trucks and armored cars. 297

The Constabulary employed horse cavalry units with 10 platoons of 30 horse soldiers. These platoons patrolled the borders of Germany, Austria, and Berlin. Horses were able to gain access into rather difficult places while on border patrol and were ideal for riot control in refugee camps and on border patrol, particularly in heavily forested frontier areas. Horse patrols were also used to hunt down former Nazis, displaced persons and contraband destined for the German black market. 298

While units were being transformed with new equipment, soldiers also had to undergo a psychological change. In defeated Germany, soldiers were the victors, the conquerors. Constabulary troopers, however, were meant to build a peaceful Germany the therefore had to demonstrate compassion, sensitivity and care toward the defeated, demobilized Germany. 299

296 William M. Tevington, ed., The United States Constabulary: A History (Paducah: Turner Publishing Company, 1998). P. 41. 297 Ibid. P. 41. 298 Colley, "Circle C Cowboys: Cold War Constabulary." p. 22. 299 Irzyk, "Mobility Vigilance Justice."p.47. 92

The Constabulary trooper was supposed to be an elite soldier skilled in maintaining public safety. To set them apart, they wore a distinctive uniform to be distinguished from traditional soldiers. Physically, he had to be at least 5’7” tall and weigh over 140 lbs, have good vision without glasses and be “strong, erect, well- proportioned, hard, tough, enduring, quick reaction.” 300 Mentally, he was to have scored in classes I or II of the Army General Classification Test (AGCT). Furthermore, he should be “honest, loyal, cooperative, conscientious, and adaptable.” 301

Although the plan called for soldiers among the first or second class of the

AGCT, the reality was that there was basically a standard distribution of ability. Only about 31% of the Constabulary troopers in 1946 scored Class I or Class II. Some 38% were Category III (the mean) and 31% scored below Category III. 302 This issue was not unique to the Constabulary, but instead reflected the general problem of the U.S. Army in

Europe after the War was over. There was enormous pressure to demobilize, leaving most units with many unqualified and untrained soldiers.

General Harmon, the Constabulary commander, thought quality soldiers were so important that he set up a Theater Placement Board, as well as lesser boards, to remove criminal-prone soldiers from the Constabulary. This enabled him to transfer or discharge undesirable enlisted soldiers. To eliminate undesirable officers, the War Department authorized discharging reservist company grade officers with efficiency ratings of 35 or less and field grade officers with ratings below 40. Washington gave even broader

300 Snyder, The Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary: 3 October 1945-30 June 1947 . p. 48. 301 Ibid. p. 48-49. 302 Ibid. p. 47-48. 93

guidance regarding who could be removed which enabled the separation of nearly a

hundred officers. 303

Although there was a shortage of company grade officers, the Constabulary was

able to get good squadron, regiment and brigade commanders because the rapid

demobilization left so many without positions. This reality made motivating regimental

commanders fairly easy. The threat of replacement was always lurking since so many

senior officers were looking to fill any available vacancy.

Summary

The idea of establishing a U.S. Constabulary force was innovative. Even more

impressive was their effectiveness at every task they were given. Despite the lack of

serious neo-Nazi activity, guerilla warfare, or widespread resistance to democratic

institutions, the evidence illustrates the effectiveness of the unit using the criteria of

integration, responsiveness, skill and quality. For several years, the Constabulary

provided the primary police authority in a disrupted and devastated country. Its presence prevented crime, dispelled riots and dampened the black marketing, which not only led to a secure environment but also fostered an easier transition to democracy.

Conclusion

The American military developed three effective innovations during the World

War II era that illustrated the four traits of military effectiveness: responsiveness, integration, skill and quality. First of all, the School of Military Government trained civil affairs officers to deal with the challenges inherent in the post-conflict environment.

Civil affairs and military government officials did a particularly good job of anticipating the requirements of the occupation and then implemented programs in the absence of

303 Ibid. p. 103. 94 clear policy guidance from Washington. The School of Military Government demonstrated effectiveness by the actions of those trained there. General Eisenhower’s early experience with civil affairs officers who had been trained at the SOMG further legitimized its mission. The SOMG curriculum evolved over time in order to accommodate the changing conditions on the ground. The graduates also demonstrated their responsiveness by sharing best practices and lessons learned across the entire area of operation. The integration of security, governance and economic tasks also contributed to the military’s effectiveness. Those trained at the military government school showed their tactical, intellectual and interpersonal skills in their execution of occupational tasks.

Finally, quality personnel were essential to the effective implementation of occupation policies. Organizing sections of civil affairs officers to the division level as well as establishing military government detachments all contributed to the successful nation- building effort.

The post-war plan itself demonstrates enormous integration and responsiveness.

Those who were responsible for developing the comprehensive plan did a phenomenal job of predicting what U.S. troops would face on the ground in Germany as the war progressed. The comprehensive post-war plan further was particularly innovative and demonstrates the significant thought that went into the administration of occupied territories, particularly Germany. The evolution of the plan from the Rankin to Talisman to Eclipse shows that the planners were responsive to the changing situation on the ground and that they were capable of learning from the experiences of North Africa and

Italy. At the strategic level, all branches of services were integrated into the planning process. The plan also integrated efforts of military police and military government

95 detachments in order to restore order. General Eisenhower was also instrumental in forming and implementing the plan. With the support of General Marshall, quality and skilled personnel were allocated to develop the plan. Over 10,000 specially selected and trained military personnel were trained to implement military government policies. The post-war plan was responsive, integrated and executed by skilled and quality personnel and organizations.

Finally, the U.S. Constabulary was established in 1945 to maintain control of the population in the zone of occupation. This organization was an innovative approach to address the requirement of security in the vacuum that normally occurs in the aftermath of conflict. The activities of the constabulary force illustrated integration of military and public security needs with law enforcement requirements. The constabulary was also responsive to the changing military situation, policing needs, political and economic administration. The personnel assigned to the constabulary force were trained and prepared to undertake their difficult and complex tasks. Furthermore, they possessed quality weapons, equipment and personnel. An innovative approach to dealing with population security, the U.S. Constabulary Force illustrated all four traits of military effectiveness.

The three innovations in the Germany case: the School of Military Government, the post-war plan, and the U.S. Constabulary all demonstrate responsiveness, integration, skill and quality. The evidence in this chapter suggests that all three innovations were effective. In the following chapter, these three effective innovations will be contrasted with three ineffective innovations in the Iraq War case.

Chapter 3: Ineffective Innovations in Operation Iraqi Freedom

During the World War II era, the Army had a creditable record under trying

circumstances, providing basic governmental services to over 200 million people

worldwide. 304 Much to the Army’s chagrin, the end of hostilities did not bring an end to the service’s civil affairs and military government responsibilities. 305 Yet civilian criticism reaffirmed for soldiers the old lesson that military government and nation building were arduous and institutionally unrewarding. 306 Thus, while the Army could

not completely ignore the military government function, strong traditions in American

political thought continued to retard the development of military capabilities for nation-

building. The difficulties facing the Army as an organization after 1945 were matched by

equally daunting foreign policy problems. America initially focused on Western Europe

due to its vulnerability to communism. To counter this threat, the United States

developed a dual strategy of economic development and military assistance that served as

its fundamental recipe for containing communism for the next fifty years.307

Although the Army continuously modified its doctrine and organization during

the course of the 20 th century to suit civilian policy directives, it steadfastly insisted on

keeping an eye on what it regarded as its most important mission, the conduct of major

conventional operations. The Army was reluctant to recast itself into a low-intensity or

nation-building force; it had a heavy burden defending Western Europe and Korea.

Furthermore, the Vietnam War experience left both the nation and the Army

304 Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944-1946 , Army Historical Series, vol. Pub 30-6 (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975). P. 15-16. 305 Kyre and Kyre, Military Occupation and National Security . P. 19-24. 306 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976 (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2006). P. 19. 307 Ibid. P. 22. 97

disenchanted with overseas entanglements, also contributing to the declining attention

paid to counterinsurgency and nation-building skills.

After the Vietnam War, the Army shifted its focus back to NATO and the defense

of West Germany with conventional combat operations. 308 The overwhelming victory

during Desert Storm reinforced the Army’s propensity to train and equip for large-scale

conventional war. The 1990s, however, presented many new security challenges to the

nation and the armed forces. US involvement in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, the Balkans,

Central and South America, the Philippines, and East Timor impacted how the Army

viewed itself: its role, its missions, and required capabilities. The domestic political

landscape reflected the typical American postwar reaction—the nation expected a lasting

peace and anticipated a “peace dividend.” The absence of a clear threat encouraged the

reduction of military forces. Budget constraints and an ambiguous political-military

environment discouraged military innovation in non-conventional missions. 309

This chapter will explain three instances in which the U.S. Army attempted to innovate during the Iraq war as well as evaluate each innovation with respect to military effectiveness. The three “non-innovations” that are examined parallel the instances of innovation in the Germany case. During World War II, the army established a School of

Military Government in order to prepare officers for civil affairs and military government in conquered territories. Similarly, several new training programs were initiated during the lead up to the Iraq War as well as after the end of the conventional war there; however, there was an overall failure to educate and train the force systematically for the myriad tasks associated with the transition from war to peace. In the Germany case, the

308 Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004). P. 3. 309 Ibid. P. 5. 98

military spent nearly three years planning for the post-war occupation, which set the

conditions for an integrated and responsive implementation of nation-building.

Conversely, in Iraq, there was a lack of a coherent and coordinated postwar plan. Finally, the U.S. Constabulary Force was established in the wake of World War II to address the security gap immediately following the cessation of hostilities. In the Iraq case, to address the security requirements, the United States trained and equipped the Iraqi security forces to fill the gap left after the overthrown of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party.

Each of these instances in the Iraq case are summarized and then evaluated according to four criteria of military effectiveness: integration, responsiveness, skill and quality. Integration refers to the unity of effort among all the different players involved in nation-building as well as the degree to which military activities are consistent at all levels. This includes mutually reinforcing economic, political and security considerations. Responsiveness refers to the ability to adapt to the unique political, economic and security conditions of a particular country as well as being able to react to the actions of the enemy. Skill reflects tactical, intellectual, and interpersonal capability, as well as the ability to execute the mission given by their civilian leadership. Finally, quality means possessing highly capable weapons, equipment, personnel, and organizations. Training and education, the post-war plan, and the Iraqi security forces all demonstrate a lack of several of the qualities of effectiveness.

Training and Education

The requirements of nation building are increasingly shaping military doctrine, training, and structures. 310 Training and education in the unique skills required of nation- building makes a military more likely to be effective. 311 To be effective in postwar tasks, adequate training and education are required. 312 For example, mission performance in a military occupation demands significant interaction with indigenous populations.

Engagement with the population has become so critical that mission success almost depends on the relationships that soldiers are able to build with local individuals and communities. 313 However, learning to interact with the local population presents a major challenge for soldiers. 314 With an increase in multinational cooperative military efforts, adaptive leaders who can work with individuals from widely divergent cultural background remain a requirement. 315

The prevailing thought of the U.S. Army is that if a soldier is trained as a war fighter, he or she can adapt to most other tasks. 316 However, many would argue the skills

310 Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" p. 1015. 311 According to Martin Rodriguez, "Constructive Engagement: A Proven Method for Conducting Stability and Support Operations," Military Review , no. May-June 2008 (2008). The commander must be prepared to conduct diplomatic and nonlethal military operations that go beyond conventional training. A growing number of military planners and strategists have also expressed concern that success increasingly will depend on the U.S. military’s ability to acquire and use socio-cultural expertise. For further discussion see: Pauline Kusiak, "Sociocultural Expertise and the Military: Beyond the Controversy," Military Review , no. November-December 2008 (2008). 312 DoD Directive 3000.05 calls on DoD to ensure that military schools and training centers incorporate stability operations curricula in joint and individual service education and training programs at all levels. It particularly calls for developing and incorporating instruction for foreign language capabilities and regional are expertise. See Nina M. Serafino, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006). P. 8-9 for more information. 313 A commander’s skill as a soldier and diplomat often are the most efficient means of reducing the insurgent base. See Rodriguez, "Constructive Engagement: A Proven Method for Conducting Stability and Support Operations." P.1. 314 Maxie McFarland, "Military Cultural Education," Military Review , no. March-April 2005 (2005). P. 62. 315 Ibid. P. 64. 316 Thomas E. Ricks, "Lessons Learned in Iraq Show up in Army Classes," The Washington Post , 21 January 2006. 100

required to be successful in a post-conflict setting are vastly different than traditional war

fighting tasks. 317 The institutional response to the challenges of counterinsurgency has

largely been to develop material and technological solutions, which is reinforced by the

military-industrial-congressional complex. The Army has undertaken several training

and educational initiatives in response to the global war on terror: the Joint Improvised

Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), the Asymmetric Warfare Group

(AWG), changes at the National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint Readiness Training

Center (JRTC), the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), the

Counterinsurgency Academy (COIN), and the Center for Army Lessons Learned

(CALL). Each of these organizations has a role in educating the U.S. Army in

occupational tasks.

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)

An Army task force was established in the fall of 2003 and made joint in 2004. 318

The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization is mandated to attack the improvised explosive device (IED) network, defeat the actual device, and train the force to deal with IEDs. 319 The task force publishes its intelligence on the Army’s Secret

Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR), which only special computers can reach. The intelligence is gathered from all four military services and a hundred and thirty-three different government and private agencies, ranging from the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to

317 For background and issues concerning military reorganization to address full spectrum operations, see: Andrew Feickert, Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force of Specialized Units? Background and Issues for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008). 318 Rey Guzman, "Joint IED Task Force Helping Defuse Insurgency's Threat," Army News Service , July 18, 2005. 319 http:// www.jieddo.dod.mil 101

Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR). 320 It uses FBI-style forensics on bombs and fragments to trace their makes and financiers.

The organization also works with the Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) offering unclassified training to address predeployment training gaps identified by service leadership. An Advanced Training Advisory Team (TAT) member provides assistance to units during pre-deployment training. This individual is typically assigned at the brigade level. Although technology to defeat the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) was an initial concern of the organization, it became apparent that technology alone would not solve the problem. Since the inception of the task force, casualty rates for IED specific events have dropped. 321

Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG)

The Army began organizing the Asymmetric Warfare Group in June 2004 in order to serve as the global conventional U.S. Army expert in asymmetric warfare. 322

They are charged with analyzing asymmetric threats and disseminating tactics, techniques and procedures to the rest of the U.S. Army. 323 Since the Army did not have a single organization to train or manage its response to asymmetric threats, this group was established with those goals in mind. The organization has focused much of its resources in developing technologies to defeat emerging threats. 324 The AWG offers training on four levels, like the IED task force. They train soldiers in tactics, techniques, and procedures for recognizing IEDs, advise battalion and brigade battle staffs, give brigade

320 Dan Baum, "Battle Lessons: What the Generals Don't Know.," The New Yorker , 17 January 2005. 321 Guzman, "Joint IED Task Force Helping Defuse Insurgency's Threat." 322 The decision to form the group was made in 2003. See K. P. Rowe, "Army Stands up Asymmetric Warfare Group," Army News Service , March 14, 2006. 323 Jr. Lovelace, James J. and Joseph L. Votel, "The Asymmetric Warfare Group: Closing the Capability Gaps," Army , March 2005. 324 Elaine Grossman, "Army to Create 'Asymmetric Warfare Group' to Prepare for New Threats," Inside the Pentagon , July 8, 2004. 102

level staff training, and brief division and corps level commanders on how to influence

training with the IED threat in mind. 325

There was criticism of the establishment of this organization even from the

beginning. 326 The danger with organizing around the current problems of the Army is

that no one is focused on preparing for a range of contingencies or assessing future

asymmetric threats and potential responses. Although responding to IED threats is

important, the lack of an overarching strategy to prevent their employment is still

missing. Furthermore, merely attacking the IED problem doesn’t get at changing the

conditions that enable or cause individuals or groups to decide to build, emplace or

detonate the actual devices.

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

Since mid-2003, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the National

Training Center (NTC) 327 have offered an Iraq or Afghanistan-based training rotation that includes negotiation training, media training, and cultural awareness training to the key leadership of its rotating units. 328 The Command and General Staff College also teaches courses specifically designed for field grade officers deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan. 329

Despite these changes, there is a lack of standardization across the Noncommissioned

Officer Education and Officer Education systems. Prior to 2005, few officers had received training in IEDs and none had received any but the most rudimentary instruction

325 Ibid. 326 Ibid. 327 The National Training Center rotations (either JRTC in Louisiana, NTC in California or CMTC in Germany) are usually required of units preparing to deploy. The majority of the scenarios trained at these centers deal with large maneuver warfare against a conventional army. 328 William D. Wunderle, Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006). P. 62. 329 Ibid. P. 63. 103

in the Arabic language or in Iraqi culture. 330 In April 2005, the Commanding General of

Training and Doctrine Command outlined requirements for cultural awareness to be

taught at all professional military education courses. 331 The actual implementation of this

requirement is still in development.

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)

The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute was established in

2003 to meet the future needs of the U.S. Army across a broad range of peacekeeping and

stability operations. A part of Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 332 called for a

stability operations center to coordinate operations research, education and training, and

lessons learned. 333 From 1993-2003, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute was the

former repository of knowledge relating to these topics. 334 PKSOI assists with the

development of Army doctrine at the strategic and operational levels and helps the

Army’s senior leadership develop operational concepts. It also works with the United

Nations, U.S. government interagency groups, inter-service groups, and foreign

militaries. 335 Despite DoD 3000.05’s mandate to improve coordination of stability

operations, PKSOI does not serve a coordinating function. 336 According to PKSOI, for

example, there is no single agency that currently has the resources to coordinate all facets

of Peacekeeping, Stability and Reconstruction Operations education.

330 Baum, "Battle Lessons: What the Generals Don't Know." 331 Wunderle, Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries . P. 63 332 Gordon England, "Directive 3000.05," ed. Department of Defense (Department of Defense, 2005). www.dtic.mil/mhs/directives/corres/pdf/30005p.pdf 333 Serafino, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement . 334 http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/divisions/pksoi/index.aspx 335 http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/divisions/pksoi/index.aspx 336 Serafino, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement . P. 9. 104

Counterinsurgency (COIN) Academy

In late 2005, General Casey established the Counterinsurgency Center for

Excellence in Iraq to help leaders adapt to and train for the war in Iraq. The purpose of the school north of Baghdad is to train leaders on the unique nature of COIN. 337 Leaders of American and Coalition units to include brigade commanders, battalion commanders, company commanders and senior staff attend the counterinsurgency instruction. 338 The major criticism by students is that it would be better placed prior to deployment. 339 The response from instructors at the school was that the Army failed to create a school in the

United States for three years, so General Casey decided to create it in Iraq. 340

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

The Center for Army Lessons Learned, based at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, collects and analyzes data from current as well as historical sources. It produces lessons for military commanders, staff, and students. CALL disseminates these lessons through print and electronic media. 341 The structures in place to collect lessons learned are dependent on submissions by individual soldiers. At Fort Leavenworth, thirty analysts, all of them military retirees, digest the after action reviews, identify trends, and reconcile the lessons with established Army doctrine. 342 CALL then makes the lessons available to units or soldiers in the field, by offering them in binders and in booklets, designed to fit in the cargo pocket of a soldier’s uniform. The centerpiece of CALL is really their

337 Thomas E. Ricks, "U.S. Counterinsurgency Academy Giving Officers a New Mind-Set," Washington Post , February 21, 2006. 338 Jim Garamone, "Taji Center Stresses Counterinsurgency Mission," American Forces Press Services 2006. 339 Mike Shuster, Baghdad School Trains Troops to Combat Insurgents , Morning(National Public Radio, 2007, accessed January 14, 2009). 340 Ricks, "U.S. Counterinsurgency Academy Giving Officers a New Mind-Set." 341 http://call.army.mil/ 342 Baum, "Battle Lessons: What the Generals Don't Know." 105

website. There is no institutional distribution method for the lessons or an evaluation tool

to measure the center’s effectiveness.

CALL representatives are assigned down to the division level in Iraq. The focus of their collection is two-fold: the center itself develops a collection plan for each individual deploying and their assigned unit can task them to collect specific information.

Ultimately, it is up to individual military units whether or not the information collected will used in future planning or operations. 343

Other Initiatives

Prior to deployment, individuals are directed to the “Theater-Specific Individual

Requirement Training Course (TSIRT).” This on-line, self-paced instruction is

completed before arriving at the replacement center (just prior to deploying). There are

several power point presentations meant to address the unique challenges presented by

each area of operation. For example, one such presentation gives a country overview of

either Iraq or Afghanistan and discusses tribalism. 344 Despite this admirable effort, by

lumping courses like Sexual Harassment, the Code of Conduct, Media Awareness, and

Tribalism into the same “training,” something is lost in translation. It is unclear to the

individual soldier if one module is more important than another, or how (or if for that

matter) they somehow fit together. Furthermore, boiling all the information into flashy

PowerPoint slides that most students see as one more task to complete before they can go

home for the day, is ineffective at really teaching anything beyond a checklist.

343 Interview with MND-N CALL Representative, July 2008. 344 Theater-Specific Individual Requirement Training Course can be found at the following website: https://www.atsc.army.mil/crc 106

Another organization recently established in order to address shortcomings in

cultural knowledge and capabilities is the Human Terrain System. 345 This system is

meant to give brigade commanders an organic capability to understand and deal with the

social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political elements of a population. 346 It is

also an opportunity for military commanders to benefit from gaining an academic

perspective. 347 A five person Human Terrain Team (HTT) will be embedded in each

forward deployed brigade or regimental staff. In the fall of 2006, five HTTs deployed to

Afghanistan and Iraq. 348 If successful, the program will be expanded. 349

Military Effectiveness

Most of the new organizations established to address the military’s shortcomings were established due to the suggestions of military leaders. 350 In the case of JIEDDO, there has been significant civilian support for the organizational initiative. The other programs have been largely divorced from the purview of civilian leaders outside of the

Department of Defense.

In looking at the aforementioned initiatives, it is important to note how they have contributed to military effectiveness. One facet to consider is the degree to which the programs are integrated. The Army has many programs designed around culture, including multinational and partnership training exercise programs; liaison officers,

345 The idea of establishing Human Terrain Teams was Montgomery McFate, a cultural anthropologist. For more information, see: Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson, "An Organizational Solution for DoD’s Cultural Knowledge Needs," Military Review , no. July-August 2005 (2005). 346 Jacob Kipp and others, "The Human Terrain System: A Cords for the 21st Century," Military Review , no. September-October 2006 (2006). P. 9. 347 Kusiak, "Sociocultural Expertise and the Military: Beyond the Controversy." P. 4. 348 Kipp and others, "The Human Terrain System: A Cords for the 21st Century." 349 Reports are still conflicting in terms of the actual effectiveness of the team. A report that discusses some of their challenges is the following: Cindy R. Jebb, Laurel J. Hummel, and Tania M. Chacho, "Human Terrain Team Trip Report: A "Team of Teams" Prepared by USMA's Interdisciplinary Team in Iraq," (United States Military Academy, 2008). 350 The Human Terrain team initiative, however, was initiated due to the efforts of civilians, most notably Montgomery McFate and Maxie McFarland. 107 foreign students integrated into education and training programs; and officer exchange programs are just a few of these efforts. Although useful, most are designed to educate foreign students about U.S. culture rather than the other way around. 351 The lack of any formal integrative mechanisms for these programs also reduces their potential effectiveness. So, although there are many military exchanges, the failure to leverage the relationships or to learn from these individual ambassadors demonstrates the lack of integration with respect to these programs.

With no centralized office for cultural knowledge, no natural home exists for programs such as the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force program or the Iraq Predeployment Training Program. The overall lack of integration between organizations and programs inherently limits its impact as well as their effectiveness. For example, House Armed Services Committee findings as of November 2008 concluded that despite spending more than $4 billion annually, it is not clear how well JIEDDO is accomplishing its mission. 352 Furthermore, while a vast store of knowledge is available, there is no systematic way to access or coordinate information from these sources. 353

The lack of coordination also makes it extraordinarily difficult to be responsive.

Within the military community, a number of institutions design and run programs with a cultural knowledge component. These programs, however, are dispersed and not easily accessible to military commanders or policymakers. This results in widespread confusion about how to gain access to needed information and resources and a subsequent reliance

351 McFarland, "Military Cultural Education." P. 64. 352 Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: DoD’s Fight against IEDs Today and Tomorrow (Washington D.C.: House Armed Services Committee, 2008). 353 McFate and Jackson, "An Organizational Solution for DoD’s Cultural Knowledge Needs." P. 18. 108 on gaining information through informal means. 354 The institutional structures themselves rely on individual soldiers submissions of their personal thoughts and reflections.355

Individual soldier experiences can be aggregated to inform how to change current doctrine. The Army’s doctrinal community is actively engaged in integrating the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan into doctrine. 356 However, these doctrinal changes will only be significant if a corresponding change in education and training take place. If tasks such as civil security, border control, provision of civil law and order, and host nation security force development aren’t institutionalized, the Army may remain ill- prepared to perform future stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. 357

Skill reflects the degree to which the military is trained and prepared to undertake difficult and complex tasks such as nation-building. Quality is possessing highly capable personnel and organizations. Since 2001, the military has created several new organizations (JIEDDO, AWG) and new training methods (TSIRT, COIN academy) to prepare for the complexity they face in Iraq and Afghanistan. This indicates that previous organizations and methods were not effective at preparing the force for the nation-building related tasks they faced in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation

Enduring Freedom (OEF). To date, it is also unclear as to whether or not the new structures will increase the military’s effectiveness. For example, insurgents have

354 Ibid. P. 18. 355 David H. Petraeus, "Learning from Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq," Military Review Jan-Feb (2006). 356 Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, and Amy Richardson, Preparing the Army for Stability Operations: Doctrinal and Interagency Issues (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007). P. 110. 357 Ibid. P. 110. 109

adapted to U.S. countermeasures against improvised explosive devices, thus requiring

JIEDOO to continue to evaluate and analyze efforts to defeat them. According to a GAO

report, dated March 2008, there have been concerned regarding the organization’s rapid

growth in structure, scope, and funding, as well as the extent to which the Department of

Defense manages its resources to effectively defeat IEDs. 358

Finally, though, the greatest success has been the actions taken by junior leaders.

In the absence of adequate preparation, platoon and company commanders have

exercised initiative to the point of occasional genius. 359 The Iraq war has produced

creative and flexible officers, where the Army’s training could not. In fact in many cases,

tasks that used to be reserved for colonels were being handed to captains.

Although the military has responded to the current challenges in Iraq with new

organizations, new training requirements and greater information sharing, there is an

overall lack of coherence. 360 Furthermore, the problem with both CALL and JIEDDO is

that information is unidirectional. The Army identifies a need, prepares a response and

hands it down from the top. This methodology lacks responsiveness. Things change on

the ground in Iraq so quickly, that by the time the information is codified in a manual, it

is no longer applicable.

The biggest successes have been the quality junior leaders who have performed

exceptionally well, in large part, despite having little to no preparation for the situations

they faced on the ground in Iraq. Although individually, these new training methods and

organizations may improve some unit outcomes, their general lack of integration makes

358 United States Government Accountability Office, More Transparency Needed over the Financial and Human Capital Operations of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (Washington D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, 2008), Report to Congressional Committees. 359 Baum, "Battle Lessons: What the Generals Don't Know." 360 Sheila Miyoshi Jager, On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007). 110 them ineffective. To date, the innovations are ad hoc at best and do not substantially change the way the military views occupational tasks or trains for them. 361 The perpetual evolution of the enemy’s tactics requires both responsiveness and integration at the tactical, operational and strategic level. The current methodology for creating and implementing new organizations and training is not able to keep pace the enemy, thereby negatively affecting the military’s effectiveness.

Summary

The Army has undertaken several new initiatives in an attempt to address the gaps in their capabilities with respect to nation-building. This section explained several of the

Army’s new programs and organizations. Finally, they were evaluated using the four traits of military effectiveness. Despite the attempts at innovation in the area of training and education, there is generally a lack of skill, integration and responsiveness to the complexities of nation-building in Iraq. For example, counterinsurgency expert Kalev

Sepp evaluated how well U.S. commanders in Iraq had absorbed COIN theory after the establishment of the COIN academy. “His conclusion was that 20 percent of them got it,

60 percent were struggling, and 20 percent were trying to fight a conventional war.362 ”

The one hugely positive aspect, however, has been the extraordinary initiative and innovation by junior leaders. The following section will discuss and evaluate the postwar plan.

361 Authors such as Pauline Kusiak suggest that officers pursue advanced degrees in social, cultural, and area studies at civilian universities to augment curricula at military universities. For further discussion see: Kusiak P. 8. 362 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009). P. 25. 111

The Postwar Plan

War planning for what eventually became Operation Iraqi Freedom started on

November 27, 2001. 363 General Franks, in consultation with Donald Rumsfeld, spent the next fifteen months revamping the old operations plan (OPLAN) 1003 so that the fewest forces could be used to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime in the shortest amount of time possible. The prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) [the war in

Afghanistan] also affected this planning and calculations of available resources. 364

Cobra II, the ground component of the classified U.S. war plan stated: “The purpose of this operation is to force the collapse of the Iraqi regime and deny it the use of

WMD to threaten its neighbors. The end state is regime change.” 365 This succinct

statement sums up the narrowly planned operation—a short, decisive war that would

topple the regime. There was a significant disconnect between the stated strategic goal of

transforming Iraq into a democratic state and the military’s focus on removing Saddam

Hussein’s regime from power. 366 The campaign planning illustrates that the majority of

the planning efforts, as well as force planning and re-sourcing, went toward the war-

fighting phases, with little to no effort placed on the stabilization phase. 367

While Franks, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith and other officials spent eighteen months planning the invasion of Iraq, the key question was left unaddressed: What

363 Nora Bensahel, "Mission Not Accomplished," in War in Iraq: Planning and Execution , ed. Thomas G. Mahnken and Thomas A. Keaney, Strategy and History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007). 364 Ibid, Isaiah Wilson, "America's Anabasis," in War in Iraq: Planning and Execution , ed. Thomas G. Mahnken and Thomas A. Keaney, Strategy and History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007). P. 13. 365 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006). P. 116. 366 Isaiah Wilson, "Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Operational Planning in Northern Iraq," in Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Washington D.C.: American Political Science Association, 2004). 367 Isaiah Wilson, Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Relations and Why America Fails to Win the Peace (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). P. 63. 112 would the U.S. do after getting to Baghdad? The postwar plan, dubbed Eclipse II, was founded on three basic assumptions: first, the plan assumed that there would be large numbers of Iraqi security forces willing and able to support the occupation; second, the plan assumed that the international community would perform the tasks the United States military wished to avoid (policing for example); finally, the plan assumed that an Iraqi government would quickly be established. So although humanitarian relief plans were extensive, reconstruction plans were not nearly as complete. These assumptions suggested that reconstruction would not be a difficult task. Unfortunately, no planning occurred for scenarios where these assumptions might not hold. 368

Central Command (CENTCOM) was the organization that would plan and execute any military action in Iraq due to its geographical location. General Franks, the

CENTCOM commander, briefed President Bush his concept in December 2001 and identified the four phases required of the Iraq campaign. 369 The first phase would create the conditions necessary to transport forces to the theater of operations. The second phase would shape the battlefield before ground operations would begin. The third phase was to defeat regime forces and their leadership. Phases one through three were expected to take up to 135 days. 370 Finally, phase four would be complete upon the installation of

368 Bensahel, "Mission Not Accomplished." P. 131. Rick Brennan and Nora Bensahel, "Shifting Phase Lines: Planning for the Transition from Combat to Post-Combat Operations in Iraq," in Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (Honolulu, HI: RAND, 2005). P. 8-9. 369 Brennan and Bensahel, "Shifting Phase Lines: Planning for the Transition from Combat to Post-Combat Operations in Iraq." P. 2. Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales Jr., The Iraq War (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2003). Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004). 370 Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: Regan Books, 2004). P. 366. 113

a representative form of government and when Iraq was capable of defending itself. 371

This phase was estimated to take several years. 372

As Central Command was planning, 5 th Corps, who would lead the Army forces

in the allied invasion of Iraq, began planning in November 2001, when they were given

the direction to start looking at the possibility of operations in Iraq. This planning went

on for over a year. According to Lieutenant General William Scott Wallace, the

commander of 5 th Corps, although General Franks was happy with the troop levels, “I

wasn’t real comfortable with the troop levels.” 373

From the beginning, there was tension between the uniformed military and the

office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) over two related issues: whether to attack Iraq

and the necessary troop levels. 374 For example, General Jack Keane, the Army Vice

Chief of Staff, thought the US should remain focused on Afghanistan and recommended

keeping two Army divisions on the Afghan-Pakistani border until bin Laden was

captured and his organization destroyed. 375 In March of 2002, U.S. troops were still engaged in war fighting operations in Afghanistan, but inside the government

Afghanistan seemed like yesterday’s problem as the Pentagon began shifting its focus on planning for Iraq. 376 The experiences in Afghanistan demonstrated to some that war could be executed without a significant ground presence. 377 This lesson affected the

options available to military planners of the Iraq campaign from the beginning. This was

371 Ibid. P. 392-393. 372 Meese, p. 8. 373 Richard Sanders, "Interview Lt. Gen. William Scott Wallace," in The Invasion of Iraq , ed. Richard Sanders (2003). 374 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq . P. 68 375 Ibid. P. 33. 376 James Fallows, "Bush's Lost Year," Atlantic Monthly , October 2004. p. 13. 377 Rumsfeld thought that the Iraq war plan should be more along the lines of Afghanistan—a light, mobile attack featuring special forces soldiers. See James Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad," The Atlantic Monthly 293, no. 1 (2004). P. 64. 114

merely one example of the friction between Rumsfeld and the uniformed Army (with

perhaps the exception of General Franks) that remained largely unresolved throughout

the war planning process.

The evolution of the planning process was ultimately placed in the centralized

control of the Department of Defense (DoD) and in the summer of 2002, stabilization

planning began. The planning staff at Central Command was initially put in charge. The

overworked and overwhelmed staff that had been working Afghanistan policy for nearly a year focused on humanitarian issues such as famine, refugee crises and oil fires.

Although the DoD knew that Phase IV would occur, they were uncertain who would have long-term control. Franks created the Coalition Forces Land Component Command

(CFLCC) separate from and subordinate to the overall command, which was a change from previous conflicts. Initially CLFCC was to plan Phase IV, since it was primarily a ground forces mission, with no follow-on organization named. 378

LTG David McKiernan, the commander of the U.S. Third Army, was designated

the CFLCC and was given the task of planning Phase IV in January 2002. 379 He then

selected Colonel Kevin Benson to be the chief planner, who spent the next several

months contacting officials who would be involved in the issues associated with postwar

Iraq. 380 COL Benson was the lowest ranking member of the CLFCC staff with access to

the working war plan due to its high security classification, which made his task

378 Kate Phillips, Shane Lauth, and Erin Schenck, U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006). P. 12. 379 Brennan and Bensahel, "Shifting Phase Lines: Planning for the Transition from Combat to Post-Combat Operations in Iraq." P. 6. 380 COL Benson had served at Third Army before and knew the CENTCOM region very well. See Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom . P. 44-45. 115

particularly difficult. 381 Once the classification was downgraded to Secret, a larger

number of the CLFCC staff became eligible to participate in the planning. 382

Since CFLCC was concerned primarily with phases I through III of the war plan, an ad hoc, Phase IV planning cell was attached to their staff. 383 The Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) established Joint Task Force IV (TFIV), led by Brigadier

General Steve Hawkins, which assembled in Tampa in early 2003. 384 Staffing for this task force was done on an impromptu basis. Although General Hawkins was given the job, he was nowhere in the chain of command of CENTCOM and therefore not taken very seriously. 385 By March 2003, it became clear that this organization would not become the center of postwar military planning, so it was disbanded. Some of its personnel were reassigned to other offices in CFLCC and others were sent to Office of

Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). As a result, most of the work they had done was lost. 386

The State Department began working on issues related to Iraq in October 2001.

Beginning as early as March 2002, State Department officials held planning meetings with Iraqi exiles. 387 They established fifteen “Future of Iraq Project” working groups to prepare for the transition to post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. 388 The body of their work explains many of the issue areas in detail, as well as identifies personnel who would be willing to assist in the planning for occupational issues. The Future of Iraq project did

381 Brennan and Bensahel, "Shifting Phase Lines: Planning for the Transition from Combat to Post-Combat Operations in Iraq." 382 Meese, p. 11. 383 Wilson, "Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Operational Planning in Northern Iraq." P. 15. 384 Meese, unpublished paper, page xv. 385 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq . P. 79-80. 386 Meese, unpublished paper, p. xvi. 387 Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad." P. 56-57. 388 State Department Cable, Future of Iraq Expert Working Groups, July 8, 2002. 116

not provide a plan for how to conduct post conflict reconstruction, but it did identify

areas of concern and expertise across the government to assist with these areas. 389

Despite this considerable amount of effort, the majority of the information was ignored by the Defense Department. 390

OSD also created a new office to handle the increased workload associated with potential military operations in Iraq. The new office was ambiguously named the Office of Special Plans (OSP) in order to divert attention from the fact it was focusing specifically on Iraq. 391 Its responsibilities included recommending policies on coalition building, troop deployments, government reorganization, de-Ba’athification, training the police force and many other issue areas. 392 In late September 2002, Rumsfeld met with

General Franks and Douglas Feith, the Pentagon’s undersecretary for policy and the head

of OSP. 393 Rumsfeld thought that the DoD was better organized to run postwar Iraq than

the State Department, and that the Department of Defense should and would be put in

charge. Feith wanted his office to lead the postwar effort, which would enable Franks to

focus solely on security. 394

Douglas Feith’s office was supposed to be a civilian parallel to the Central

Command and was to oversee the policies guiding the war and post-conflict conditions.

Feith’s interest in planning Phase IV relieved General Franks who was only too happy to

389 Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad." P. 57-58. 390 According to Rieff, Garner was instructed by Rumsfeld to ignore the Future of Iraq Project. David Rieff, "Blueprint for a Mess," New York Times Magazine , 2 November 2003. p. 32. 391 Meese, p. 29. 392 Meese, p. 29. 393 Bob Woodward, State of Denial (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006). P. 90-91. 394 Ibid. P. 90-91. 117

avoid non-combat related tasks. 395 The focus of the military therefore remained on the

traditional tasks of combat and the Phase IV (postwar stability and support operations)

received considerably less attention. Phase IV went beyond the comfort zone of the

military and since Feith’s office was tasked to oversee postwar policy; the military

avoided any in-depth post-conflict planning. 396 Feith’s office conducted its postwar

planning with the utmost secrecy. They did little coordinating with the State Department,

the CIA, or even with post-conflict reconstruction experts within the Pentagon. 397

Furthermore, there was an aversion to dwelling on worst-case scenarios that might diminish support for the invasion. Feith’s team saw the mission as a war of liberation that would require only modest post war assistance.

Eight weeks before the invasion, the lead in postwar planning was moved again.

Retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, who had led the relief effort in northern

Iraq in 1991, was asked to lead postwar operations in Iraq. On January 20, 2003, the

White House issued a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-24) that put the

Defense Department in charge of all Iraqi activities and established the Pentagon postwar planning office, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). 398

This was a departure from the previous administration’s coordination mechanisms and

395 For Franks, anything other than war-fighting was an unglamorous and thankless burden according to Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006). P. 486. 396 The overarching cause of this failure could be the military’s bias towards warfighting in general that permeates education, training and doctrine. See Brennan and Bensahel, "Shifting Phase Lines: Planning for the Transition from Combat to Post-Combat Operations in Iraq." 397 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City (New York: Random House, Inc., 2007). P. 34. 398 Woodward, State of Denial . P. 112. 118 further confused matters. 399 Some felt this signaled that previous planning should be ignored. 400

The directive (NSPD-24) stated that the immediate responsibility for the challenges facing Iraq in the aftermath of combat would fall on U.S. Central Command.

Success, however, would depend on a national effort. Garner’s office would be this

“national effort” responsible for planning a response to the myriad post-conflict issues.

This was a surprise to Garner, who thought he was recruited to play the role of a glorified chief of staff, but suddenly he was responsible for all the tasks normally run by national, state, and local government in postwar Iraq. 401

In late February 2003, Jay Garner convened experts from across the U.S. government to discuss postwar Iraq. 402 This was the sole meeting before the invasion when all factions within the U.S. government met. Among those present were representatives from: Feith’s policy office, the NSC, the Vice President’s office, Central

Command, CIA, DIA, Treasury, Justice, British and Australian governments, the State

Department and the Pentagon. The meeting concluded that security was the greatest challenge and the biggest shortfall. Despite this meeting, there still was not a clear way ahead with respect to the actual plan, or the division of responsibility.

Garner met with the President on February 28, 2003, for the first time to brief him on his team’s planning. 403 He addressed the nine basic assignments that were enumerated in NSPD-24 and said that four of them (including dismantling weapons of mass

399 Johanna Mendelson Forman, "Striking out in Baghdad: How Postconflict Reconstruction Went Awry," in Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq , ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). P. 200. 400 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq . P. 80. 401 Woodward, State of Denial . P. 112. 402 Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad." P. 72. 403 Woodward, State of Denial . P. 131. 119

destruction, defeating terrorists, reshaping the Iraqi military and reshaping the other

internal Iraqi security institutions) were beyond the capabilities of his team. 404 No one

asked who would be in charge of these problem areas. 405 Finally, he explained that the

Iraqi Regular Army was necessary to maintain stability. 406

It was expected that coalition forces would hand over control of Iraq to its

functioning ministries by June 2003. Garner assumed that when ORHA arrived in

Baghdad they would find the city roughly intact. They organized ministry teams,

comprised of a small number of Americans that were supposed to go in and take over the

executive suite of the ministry and then help the Iraqi technocrats run their ministries. 407

The Army’s original plan was to conduct a force withdrawal beginning in midsummer

2003, reducing the total number of U.S. troops in Iraq to 30,000. Until April 2003, it was

thought that the mostly non-Ba’ath party makeup of the police force would allow it to

maintain law and order, so that coalition forces would not be required to participate in

any policing activities. 408 The coalition would merely play a bystander role, advising the

new ministries. By late summer the situation in Iraq had rapidly deteriorated and the

chaos and violence was spreading. Although in theory, the war was over, things were

getting significantly more violent for a great deal of the 130,000 American soldiers in

country. 409

On March 15, 2003, Garner went to the Pentagon to brief Rumsfeld on his plans

for postwar Iraq. Garner saw two options for de-Ba’athification—either the locals would

404 Ibid. P. 131-132. 405 Ibid. P. 132. 406 Ibid. P. 133. 407 PBS, "Frontline, Interview, Robert M. Perito," in The Invasion of Iraq , ed. Richard Sanders (PBS, 2003). 408 Andrew Rathmell and others, Developing Iraq's Security Sector (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005). P. 11. 409 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq . P. 221. 120

kill the most offensive of them or over time, the locals would point them out. Garner’s

plan was to remove just two people from each ministry and major government office— the top Ba’athist and the chief personnel officer. He also reviewed for the president his plans for dealing with other issues like famines and oil fires. 410

Garner spoke with Lieutenant General George Casey, director of the Joint Staff,

to request people for his postwar operations. Casey didn’t see ORHA’s mission as a

continuous operation that would require such a substantial amount of personnel. 411 In spite of Casey’s initial refusal to assist in supplying personnel, eventually, Garner was able to put together a team of 200 former military, Foreign Service, academic and corporate personnel. The team also was comprised of civil engineers, administrative and infrastructure experts and a governance team.

Despite requirements to reestablish a political system, provide aid and economic assistance, create a sound banking system, and myriad other important tasks that drew upon skills outside of the Department of Defense, Rumsfeld refused to allow the effort to extend past the Pentagon. As a result, work done by other Departments would not be integrated into the overall plan. ORHA did put together a robust plan for humanitarian assistance, but did not do so for civil administration and reconstruction. 412

When U.S. troops entered Iraq, there were no clear criteria for ORHA or any civilian body to take over the administration of Iraq. As the Hussein regime was toppled and ORHA began to establish itself in Baghdad, President Bush appointed L. Paul

410 Ibid. P. 105. 411 Woodward, State of Denial . P. 123. 412 Kenneth O. McCreedy, "Waging Peace: Eclipse in Postwar Germany and Iraq," in A Nation at War in an Era of Strategic Change , ed. Williamson Murray (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004). P. 139. 121

Bremer III as his permanent envoy to Iraq, undermining Garner’s efforts. 413 Although

Garner never planned to be a permanent fixture in the US effort, this early transition

seemed to indicate a lack of confidence in his ability and the administration’s

unhappiness at how the events were unfolding in the aftermath of combat. U.S. officials

officially announced Bremer’s appointment on May 6 and he arrived on May 12 with a

mandate to create a new Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Unlike ORHA, CPA

would possess all the powers of an occupation authority, being responsible for all

political, economic and security activities in Iraq. 414

Military Effectiveness

The postwar plan will be evaluated using the four criteria of military

effectiveness: responsiveness, integration, skill and quality. First of all, the postwar plan

lacked responsiveness to the enormously complex situation facing the troops once the regime was overthrown. Despite winning the war in Afghanistan, the transition to stability operations and support operations revealed the Army still had a great deal to learn in this area. Winning combat alone was necessary but not sufficient to meet the nation’s strategic goals. 415 The Army did not learn from its experience in Afghanistan

with respect to the postwar planning of Iraq, illustrating its lack of responsiveness.

The stated strategic end was to remove the Hussein regime. 416 Since the mission

was solely security related, this inherently dissuaded integration of security, governance

and economic considerations. There was a complete absence of integration among the

413 The appointment of L. Paul Bremer happened in late April 2003. 414 Forman, "Striking out in Baghdad: How Postconflict Reconstruction Went Awry." P. 202. 415 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom . P. 25. 416 Ibid. P. 46. 122

elements of national power: the State Department was, for the most part, ignored.

Furthermore, the plan did not address the political and economic administration.

Both the military leadership and the civilian leadership tasked with undertaking

the post-war transition did not possess the requisite skills. A lack of personnel with

expertise in the Middle East as well as a lack of Arabic speakers made planning and

executing a post-war plan in Iraq extraordinarily difficult even had conditions been

optimal. Finally, the lack of quality is demonstrated in the constantly changing

organizational structure as well as the lack of a clear organization mandated to do the

planning.

The Bush administration planned to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime. In

order to do this, they identified the ways and means to gain a military victory. However,

by trying minimizing the forces committed to the operation, the plan failed to provide

adequate resources to wage a successful peace and led to the army’s inability to be

responsive. Political considerations limited the scope of postwar planning, shaped the

resources that would be committed, and failed to establish unity of command or effort demonstrating the lack of integration. The failure to link operational success with the broader political and economic goals led to overarching military ineffectiveness.

In the fall of 2002, seventy national security experts and Mideast scholars met for

two days at the National Defense University to discuss “Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam’s

Role.” They concluded that occupying Iraq would be “the most daunting and complex

task the U.S. and the international community will have undertaken since the end of

World War II.” 417 It also recommended against a swift, uncoordinated dissolution of the

417 This point is also reiterated in the following source: Crane and Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario . 123

Iraqi military. 418 The overriding problem, even after this conference, was that there was

not a singular plan enumerating the objectives, assigning responsibilities for tasks, or

explaining how coordination would take place. 419 Although there was a substantial

amount of discussion and analysis of the problems that the U.S. would face in Iraq, the

failure to incorporate these suggestions into the postwar plan demonstrates the lack of

integration between agencies involved in the planning.

This group advised against two major initiatives that L. Paul Bremer III pursued

in 2003—dissolving the Iraqi army and top down “de-Ba’athification.” 420 They instead

recommended a bottom up approach like the one implemented in post-World War II

Germany, where each town individually determined, through questionnaires, which

would have their political and economic activities curtailed. 421 The decision to ignore the advice of both the experts and the lessons of historical experience further shows the unresponsiveness of the leadership involved in the postwar planning.

According to Isaiah Wilson, a historian and combat observer/interviewer for U.S.

Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki’s Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group

(OIFSG), the campaign plan lacked purpose, political aim and was incomplete with regards to timing and allocation of resources. 422 The key to military effectiveness in a

postwar setting is burden sharing among international organizations and other

governments, in addition to U.S. governmental organizations. Involving others would

418 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq . P. 72. 419 Woodward, State of Denial . P. 129. 420 L. Paul Bremer III and Malcolm McConnell, My Year in Iraq (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). P. 39-40. Bremer claims that the specifics of the plan came from Douglas Feith’s office and was sanctioned by Don Rumsfeld. 421 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq . P. 73. 422 Wilson, "America's Anabasis." P. 11-12. 124 lighten the load placed on the U.S. military. 423 Unfortunately, as of late February 2003, plans for the organization and management of an overall post-conflict effort were still being developed. 424

The war portion of the operation ended on April 9, 2003 when the Saddam

Hussein regime collapsed. Anything beyond this collapse was deemed postwar and so, some other entity rather than the U.S. military would assume responsibility. This view was reinforced to Isaiah Wilson during the formation of the Iraqi Freedom Study Group.

The group’s mission was to interview, research and keep records regarding the ground war—Phases I, II and III while Phase IV remained beyond their mandate. 425 In the absence of a clear plan to handover the responsibility to a particular organization, the military remained unresponsive as the situation quickly deteriorated in the absence of security and complete disarray of the political and economic bureaucracies of the former regime.

The widely expected mass capitulation of the Iraqi army never materialized.

Instead of surrendering or defending Iraq, they melted away. Paramilitary forces proved more of a threat than anyone had expected. 426 Although the intelligence community was aware of their existence, military planners did not anticipate how ferocious, tenacious and fanatical they would be. Attacking in a way that avoided traditional American strengths, this offered the first inkling of what an insurgency in Iraq would look like.

423 Thomas R. Pickering and James R. Schlesinger, Iraq: The Day After (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003). P. 3. 424 Ibid. P. 15. 425 Isaiah Wilson, "Rediscovering the Way of Lawrence," in War in Iraq: Planning and Execution , ed. Thomas G. Mahnken and Thomas A. Keaney, Strategy and History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007). P. 227- 228. 426 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom . P. 102. 125

For the first year of the war, there was no overall plan that addressed the reconstruction of Iraq or how to deal with the growing insurgency. 427 The lack of an overarching strategy and the resources to implement an effective counterinsurgency strategy caused operational and tactical missteps for several years. Units individually developed their own plans and their efforts were not coordinated by any officially sanctioned campaign plan. Each division’s area of operations looked like a different war with different units attempting different methods of dealing with the same challenges.

This hands-off approach was logical because of the vast disparity of conditions across

Iraq. On the other hand, this variety led to an incoherent overall effort in which tactics often were used that undercut the broad strategic goals. 428 This furthered the lack of integration between tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. Without an overarching strategy, it was unclear what the goals individual units should works towards attaining. The result was extreme disparity across the country as the variation of approaches, combined with very different cultural and socio-economic situations led to complete collapse of society in some places, while in others, relative success was realized.

Although allowing individual units the freedom to take initiative is important, especially in a country as diverse as Iraq, if there isn’t an overarching strategy, individual units are bound to attempt tactics that are counterproductive. 429 The lack of a coherent, complete, and comprehensive plan left the country and the U.S. intervention policy in

427 Andrew Rathmell argues that there were plans and planning processes, but their efficacy and appropriateness are what is open to challenge. See Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" p. 1017. 428 Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND National Security Research Division, 2004), Occasional Paper, OP-127-IPC/CMEPP. P. 9. 429 Ibid. P. 9. 126

strategic ambiguity and each unit in Iraq without clear marching orders by May-June

2003. Each separate division was left to its own devices to develop its own plans for

conducting stability and reconstruction operations in its individually assigned area of

operations. The result was a completely uncoordinated, un-synchronized, non-integrated

and out-of-balance stability and reconstruction situation throughout Iraq, with each of the eighteen provinces or governorates that comprise the country falling under the control of at least five separate Multi-National Division (MND) controlling agencies. The result was the unintended creation of at least five separate and all-too-often dysfunctional distinct approaches to security, stability and reconstruction operations. 430 Moreover, as units rotated in and out of theater, even the geographical approaches changed. Finally, by organizing units by geographical area without a comprehensive countrywide strategy, initiatives that crossed geographical boundaries were overlooked, furthering both the responsiveness and integration of effort problem.

There were at least three groups inside the military and one at the State

Department working on postwar issues. Despite the number of groups working on the issues, the real problem was that the planning was poor, there was no unity of command, and correspondingly there was a lack of coordination between all parties involved.

General Franks seemed to truly believe that military activities were his only concern and that the civilians in DoD would handle the aftermath. So, while there was a great deal of discussion, there wasn’t a plan that could be implemented for postwar Iraq. 431 The military organization charged with planning itself led to a lack of integration. The

Pentagon assembled two discrete headquarters—CFLCC and ORHA until it would

430 Wilson,"Rediscovering the Way of Lawrence." P. 228. 431 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq . P. 78-79. 127 transition to a Combined Joint Task Force, which was planned for June 2003.

Unfortunately, there was virtually no contact between military planners and ORHA, despite the fact that ORHA was supposed to be subordinate to Central Command.

The situation between the two organizations became worse once Garner and his staff deployed to Kuwait. Instead of working alongside the CFLCC, ORHA headquarters was housed in the Kuwait Hilton, which was forty-five minutes away from Camp Doha and lacked rudimentary communications and infrastructure. Given the strict travel restrictions, the two organizations might have well been in different countries. 432 This physical separation did nothing to contribute to the rocky relationship between the two organizations. The distance between the two groups also worked against their integration and led to a situation where ORHA couldn’t be responsive to the situation in Iraq.

As ORHA arrived in Kuwait three days before the war began, many in CFLCC saw their contributions as coming too late to be effective and felt that ORHA was too isolated from the reality of combat operations. On the other hand, ORHA felt marginalized by the military and lacked the resources to be effective. 433 The organizational structure itself lacked unity of effort or unity of command, so implementing a postwar strategy would lack the same unity. Unlike Eisenhower’s extensive participation in the postwar strategy and planning, General Franks decided to remain uninvolved in any postwar occupation planning. 434

Even in the planning phase for the postwar, the evidence of non-responsiveness pervades. For example, Rumsfeld thought that Iraqi civil servants could wait weeks or

432 McCreedy, "Waging Peace: Eclipse in Postwar Germany and Iraq." P. 142. 433 Corelli Barnett, Post-Conquest Civil Affairs: Comparing War's End in Iraq and in Germany (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2005). P. 9. 434 Ibid. P. 11-12. 128 months to be paid. He thought it was more important that American taxpayers not have to foot the bill to pay them. 435 In April, Rumsfeld’s spokesman Larry DiRita flew to

Kuwait to be briefed by ORHA. During the briefing he alluded to State Department failures in Bosnia and Kosovo and that the Pentagon was not going to let that happen to

Iraq. He also announced that all but twenty-five thousand soldiers would be out of Iraq by September. 436

Waging peace requires overwhelming force on the ground, especially in the early stage. 437 Having enough soldiers to maintain peace and be responsive is vital in a postwar situation. The presence of forces, human intelligence, civil affairs and information operations are essential to military effectiveness. 438 The sheer number of personnel is important because it takes soldiers patrolling neighborhoods and responding to unrest to achieve security and stability. 439 In post conflict reconstruction, timing is everything. In Iraq, security was the most important need, since other basic necessities— water, electricity and jobs were all tied to it. 440 Although initial responsibility for the postwar occupation would fall to the military, the troops allotted to the war simply did not provide reserves that could be diverted to these non-combat tasks. 441 Stability and support operations did not happen immediately because there wasn’t enough military power to do so. Once combat operations were over, the military began to focus on

435 George Packer, The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005). P. 126. 436 Ibid. P. 133. 437 Pei and Kasper, Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building . Crane and Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario . 438 Department of the Army, "Counterinsurgency," ed. Department of the Army Headquarters (Department of the Army, 2006). pg. 2-5 For more about information operations in Iraq and Afghanistan see Norman E. Emery, "Irregular Warfare Information Operations: Understanding the Role of People, Capabilities and Effects," Military Review , no. November-December 2008 (2008). 439 Military preponderance is generally likely to ensure security from large-scale violence. See Dobbins and others, America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq . P. 170 440 Forman, "Striking out in Baghdad: How Postconflict Reconstruction Went Awry." P. 203. 441 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq . P. 462. 129 postwar tasks. 442 Unfortunately, in many cases this was too late to avert mass destruction, looting and chaos.

The military couldn’t be responsive to the postwar needs of Iraq because there simply were not enough troops to do both combat and reconstruction tasks. 443 None of the anticipated challenges came to pass and instead, widespread civil unrest and looting was the biggest problem facing the coalition. 444 Unfortunately, U.S. forces were ill prepared to cope with the civil violence. 445 They started out short-handed because two divisions were still not in position when the major fighting ended, nor were they the right type of forces. 446 Most of the forces in country were mechanized or armor forces, not well suited to restoring civil order. Due to this unpreparedness and the mismatch between tasks and units, it took a considerable amount of time before they reacted to the deteriorating security situation. Buildings were not only stripped of their furniture and equipment, but doors, window, light fixtures, plugs, wiring and more were carried away and anything left behind was burned. Military units in some cases stood by and watched as the looting occurred. The rules of engagement simply did not include any provision for prevention of property destruction, further damaging U.S. legitimacy in the eyes of

442 McCreedy, "Waging Peace: Eclipse in Postwar Germany and Iraq." P. 140-141. 443 The lack of adequate personnel in the military’s plan was pointed out by both senior members of the uniformed military and by seasoned peacekeeping officials. See Rieff, "Blueprint for a Mess." P. 44. 444 What made this worse was that US troops only guarded the Iraqi Oil Ministry ,Ibid. which sent a message to the Iraqis that all the U.S. cared about was their oil resources. See Rieff, "Blueprint for a Mess." P. 44. 445 The 3 rd Infantry Division had 20,000 troops available to safeguard Baghdad, a city of over five million people. Hammer, "Tikrit Dispatch: Uncivil Military." P. 17. 446 Meese unpublished paper, p. xix. Part of this was because the change in which troops would deploy was decided directly by Secretary Rumsfeld. Instead of sending additional troops to impose order after the fall of Baghdad, Mr. Rumsfeld and General Franks canceled the deployment of the First Cavalry Division. See Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, "Dash to Baghdad Left Top U.S. Generals Divided," New York Times , March 13, 2006. 130 the Iraqis. This security vacuum caused by the U.S. Army’s inability to be responsive directly led to the rise of the insurgency. 447

ORHA was not responsive to the immediate postwar tasks because it took Garner and his team weeks after coalition forces occupied Baghdad to actually arrive in country.

This delay was partially due to Central Command’s desire to establish security prior to calling ORHA forward. 448 Once ORHA arrived in Baghdad, it still took them a great deal of time to get organized. Although this was understandable given the conditions in

Iraq at the time and the lack of resources ORHA possessed it sent a powerful message to both the U.S. military as well as Iraqi citizens that no agency had a firm grip on the situation on the ground in Iraq. During the aftermath of the war in Germany during

World War II, military government detachments followed combat troops to immediately start the transition to occupation tasks. In Iraq, there were very few civil affairs teams and those on the ground lacked the same level of training and preparation that their predecessors possessed during the occupation of Germany. 449

When ORHA entered Baghdad on 21 April 2003, the conditions were much different than those expected. The expected humanitarian crisis never materialized; instead the biggest concern became the damaged infrastructure. Continuing combat operations made operating a challenge on a daily basis. The personnel assigned to

ORHA generally lacked experience in nation-building. 450 Only a handful had previously worked in a war zone. 451

447 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). P. 189. 448 Bensahel, "Mission Not Accomplished."P. 133. 449 McCreedy, "Waging Peace: Eclipse in Postwar Germany and Iraq." P. 142. 450 Several ORHA representatives were tasked to positions of which they had no experience. For example, the Ministry of Education was assigned to a midlevel bureaucrat from the Treasury Department. Another 131

The U.S. Army’s unresponsiveness to the civil unrest, looting, blackouts, and insurgent activity led to a loss of momentum. The Iraqi people couldn’t understand how a military could take over their country in a mere three weeks, but fail to restore electricity in three months. 452 Saddam Hussein rebuilt Iraq after the war with Kuwait in only four months. This disparity led to a growing sense of disappointment in the

American occupation.

In an ambiguous and challenging environment, quality leadership becomes essential to military effectiveness. Unfortunately, during the chaos in April and May of

2003, there were a series of retirements and replacements among the top commanders.

General Franks, in particular, was prepared to retire and General Abizaid had not yet been confirmed as the CENTCOM commander. 453 General Shinseki, the Chief of Staff of the Army, retired about the same time while General Jack Keane, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, declined to take Shinseki’s job. In an unusual move, Rumsfeld passed over all the Army’s active duty three and four star generals and chose a retired Special

Operations general named Peter Schoomaker. Then, instead of having General

McKiernan and the CFLCC run the situation in Iraq, the staff of V Corps, a smaller, less experienced group was put in charge. To further complicate matters, Major General

Ricardo Sanchez was to take over V Corps at the same time it assumed the mission in

Iraq. 454 All of these personnel changes served to undermine the quality of the

former ambassador, with no prior trade experience, was told to run the Trade Ministry. See Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City . P. 36. 451 Hammer, "Tikrit Dispatch: Uncivil Military." P. 17. 452 Henderson, The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: Lessons Learned . P. 7. 453 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq . 454 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq . P. 156-158. 132

organization. Additionally, the newly assigned leadership had a steep learning curve,

further complicating the situation.

Quality personnel and organizational structures are important attributes of

military effectiveness. The choice of Jay Garner as the person to lead a complete

political and economic reconstruction effort in Iraq was questionable at best. If postwar

Iraq was to be a limited humanitarian effort, he was the right person for the job. He was not a sophisticated thinker and knew little about the region other than his limited experience with the Kurds. Since the early 1990s, he had worked in the private sector.455

His army expertise was in air defense and his private sector employment was in the

missile communications and targeting systems. Neither of these fields was of

tremendous use in the chaos that characterized Baghdad in April 2003. Furthermore,

Garner’s staff never had the expertise required for the mission: neither the Defense or

State officials assigned to ORHA had hands-on experience in nation-building. Of 200

key officials, only a dozen specialists had worked in war zones. 456 Additionally, ORHA

lacked Arabists and Arab speakers. 457

The transition from ORHA to CPA did not improve the general staffing issues.

Although a number of CPA staff were experts in their fields, and many performed above

and beyond the call of duty in difficult circumstances, the CPA was badly weakened by

its human resource management. The staffing was at half the planned strength; there

were too few personnel with experience in the region or in post-conflict environments;

455 Packer, The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq . P. 121. 456 Joshua Hammer and others, "Who's in Charge Here?" Newsweek , 5/26/2003 2003. 457 Rieff, "Blueprint for a Mess." p. 33. 133

and there was far too rapid a turnover of staff. 458 The lack of quality personnel further

contributed to the ineffectiveness of the organization.

Much more significant than Garner’s lack of skill or qualifications was the fact

that he had a mere seven weeks to prepare for post war mission. Although his office was

in the Pentagon one floor below the Office of Special Plans, there was hardly any

communication between the two organizations; the lack of integration between the

military officers and civilians in the Pentagon continued to progress. Army Colonel Paul

Hughes was named as his chief of planning and he suggested that ORHA develop a

political-military plan. The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Doug Feith stopped

any this idea immediately—there would be no detailed documents and everything

important should remain unwritten. 459

ORHA lacked the most qualified planners because they belonged to the State

Department. Tom Warrick, who oversaw the department’s “Future of Iraq Study” and

Meghan O’Sullivan, who was working in the department’s Office of Policy Planning,

were the most knowledgeable about the challenges the U.S. would ultimately face in Iraq.

Although Garner wanted both to work for him, Rumsfeld insisted they be let go. 460

Meghan O’Sullivan was rehired after Garner’s continued appeal to the National Security

Council, the State Department and Rumsfeld. Tom Warrick, however, was a casualty of

the interagency war and didn’t get to Baghdad for a year. 461 The Pentagon also insisted

on approving all appointments of State Department officials. This allowed them to delay

their appointments or simply fail to clear them at all. Wolfowitz replaced even the State

458 Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" p. 1028. 459 Packer, The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq . P. 122. 460 Rieff, "Blueprint for a Mess." p. 32. 461 Packer, The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq . P. 124. 134

Department’s team of Iraqi exiles with those he chose. 462 This bureaucratic infighting contributed to the lack of integration.

A key factor in military effectiveness is having quality leadership. In mid-May,

Major General Ricardo Sanchez was promoted and given command of the U.S. ground effort in Iraq. Almost overnight the commander of the last arriving division in Iraq would become the senior military commander for the most sensitive part of the operation. 463 In previous occupations, commanders were four-star generals—Douglas

MacArthur and Lucius Clay for example. Sanchez went from commanding 20,000 troops to leading a combined U.S. and allied force of over 180,000. Although the Pentagon estimated he needed a staff of 1400, he was given approximately 500. 464 Even the most qualified, experienced, and educated leader would have been challenged to complete his mission given less than half the required personnel.

With respect to leadership on the civilian side, L. Paul Bremer was appointed as the presidential envoy. Bremer was a former ambassador to the Netherlands and worked as an aide in government to Henry A. Kissinger. Unfortunately, he had no background in

Middle Eastern Affairs. 465 He arrived in Iraq in early May and proceeded to assert his authority immediately. He made three moves that radically altered the American approach to Iraq and which helped create the conditions for an anti-American insurgency.

First, he purged the Ba’athist leadership by removing any party member from employment in the public sector despite receiving advice from Garner and several Army

462 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq . P. 159. 463 Ibid. P. 487. 464 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq . P. 173. 465 Robert Younes and Janet McMahon, "Post-Saddam Leader Garner, Bremer and Chalabi All Have Neocon Ties," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs , June 2003. 135

generals not to do so. 466 Anyone in the top three management layers of any government ministry would be fired if they had any Ba’ath affiliation. This drove approximately

30,000 Ba’athists underground. 467 This also left Iraq without teachers, professors, doctors and town administrators, all of which could have aided the reconstruction efforts. 468

Second, Bremer dissolved the Iraqi security forces—both the police and the army.

This may have been the biggest error of the American occupation and led to the ongoing destabilization. 469 Garner’s original plan called for these forces to be used for reconstruction tasks. This left 385,000 former Iraqi armed forces, 285,000 police and domestic security forces, and 50,000 presidential security forces without a livelihood.

Taking into account the Iraqi army and their families, this act resulted in an economic crisis for approximately 10 percent of the population. 470 Furthermore, anyone with a rank of Colonel or above was no longer eligible for pension payments. 471 This loss of income further exacerbated the economic problems and in turn inspired many Iraqis to join the insurgency.

Finally, Bremer announced despite Garner’s plan, there would be a significant delay in establishing a new Iraqi government. He then pursued a program pushing Iraq

466 Lt. General Sanchez and Mr. Bremer allegedly sparred over many aspects of the occupation, especially the decision to disband the Iraqi military. See Hammer, "Tikrit Dispatch: Uncivil Military." P. 16. 467 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq . P. 158-159.Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong and Right in Iraq," in Nation-Building , ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 2006). P. 182-183. 468 Forman, "Striking out in Baghdad: How Postconflict Reconstruction Went Awry." P. 205. 469 Ibid. P. 204. Woodward, Plan of Attack . 470 Michael Slackman and John Daniszewski, "U.S. Policies Lead to Dire Straits for Some in Iraq," Los Angeles Times , June 10, 2003. P. 1. 471 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq . P. 164. 136

towards a free market economy by shutting down unprofitable state run industries. 472

This further alienated the middle class and created more unemployment. 473 The CPA

based economic decisions on security considerations, but did not see economic

consequences as major considerations when making security decisions, therefore

negatively affecting economic reconstruction. 474 Economic distress continues to be an

issue as well as a factor in the continuation of violence. Iraqi reconstruction has

primarily consisted of US financed and managed programs focused on rebuilding

damaged infrastructure. 475 There was also a general lack of financial incentives to

encourage political and economic development. 476 Bremer’s failure to be responsive to

the unique situation facing Iraq and failure to integrate the CPAs efforts with the

military’s resulted in complicating an already precarious situation.

The oil ministry in Baghdad was the only ministry protected by military forces.

This was the only institution to survive. According to Robert Perito, “I think the lesson

that the Iraqis drew from that is what was the United States’ real goal here? Was it to get

our oil? It wasn’t to protect the National Museum, which was destroyed and looted. It

wasn’t to protect the National Library, where priceless manuscripts were lost. It wasn’t

to protect the hospitals, which were looted, etc. It was to protect the petroleum

ministry.” 477 Several lessons can be inferred from the success of the marines in

protecting the oil ministry. First of all, if the U.S. military made protecting the

472 For further critique of the initial economic policies, see Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace . P. 123-127. 473 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq . P. 165. 474 Henderson, The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: Lessons Learned . P. 8. 475 Paul Brinkley, "A Cause for Hope: Economic Revitalization in Iraq," Military Review , no. July-August 2007 (2007). P. 3. 476 Ibid. P. 3. 477 Perito interview. 137

infrastructure of Iraq a priority, post-war governance structures could have been

established much more quickly. The U.S. knew that the infrastructure was fragile and so

the bombing campaign avoided destroying civilian ministries. Not preparing to defend them against looting and lawlessness had a catastrophic effect on the entire postwar effort. 478

Summary

The end state for the Iraq war according to the military was regime change. This mission was accomplished in record time. Unfortunately, toppling a regime does not guarantee anything close to peace. Eclipse II, the post war plan for Iraq, did not resemble the original Eclipse plan in any way. Military planners assumed there would be a large number of Iraq security forces willing to support the occupation and that the international

community would take the lead in non-combat related tasks. The failure of either of

these conditions to come to fruition left the military uncertain as to how to proceed.

The postwar plan for Iraq clearly lacked most of the aspects required to be

effective. Planning only for the best-case scenario prevented manpower and resources

from being allocated to undertake the massive reconstruction effort that would be

required. A general lack of integration between the government agencies involved a

questionable command structure and uncertainty about who was responsible for what task

set up Iraq for the chaos and confusion that marked much of the postwar atmosphere.

The ever-changing organizational structures to deal with the planning as well as the post

war occupation implementation further worked to the detriment of military effectiveness.

Finally, the absence of skilled and experienced leaders made a tenuous situation even

worse.

478 Perito interview 138

The innovations attempted in the Iraq case closely parallel those attempted in the

World War II Germany case. New training and education methods were initiated in both

and the military conducted post war planning. Finally, the United States created

organizations to deal with the lack of security in the postwar occupation in Germany—

the U.S. Constabulary. In the Iraq case, the United States decided reestablishing the Iraqi

Security Forces was the best way to address the security vacuum left by the overthrow of

the Saddam Hussein regime. The following section will summarize the establishment of

the post-Saddam Iraqi Security Forces and evaluate its effectiveness.

Iraqi Security Forces

Since security is a precondition of sustainable development, security sector

reform is essential in the transition from war to peace. 479 Security sector reform

encompasses the transformation of a nation’s system consistent with democratic

norms. 480 There are several tenets of security reform that are particularly relevant to the

Iraq case. First, security policy must be concerned with the well being of its

population. 481 Second, security is inextricably linked with political and economic

development. 482 Finally, security problems are often a result of how the security systems

themselves are organized and resourced. 483 The provision of security in Iraq is absolutely

479 Sean McFate, Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2008), Special Report, 209. 480 Nicole Bell, Promoting Security Sector Reform in Fragile States (Washington D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 2005). 481 Walter B. Slocombe, "Iraq's Special Challenge: Security Sector Reform 'under Fire'," in Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector , ed. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi (Geneva: LIT Verlag Berlin- Hamburg-Munchen, 2004). 482 Heiner Hanggi, "Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction," in Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector , ed. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi (Geneva: LIT Verlag Berlin- Hamburg-Munster, 2004). 483 Rathmell and others, Developing Iraq's Security Sector . P. 6-7. 139

essential for military success. 484 Without security, economic and governance reforms can’t take place. 485 In order to be successful, effective Iraqi military, security and police forces capable of bringing security to the entire country must be created.486

In the aftermath of the ground invasion, massive looting destroyed nearly all of

the governance and security structures. 487 It was not until May 2003, almost two months

after Baghdad fell, that a 4000 soldier U.S. military police unit was authorized to deploy

to Baghdad. It took over a year for the Coalition to realize that the police and security

forces were critical to stability and to any form of effective governance and

reconstruction. 488 Security remained the primary concern of most Iraqis for several years

following the invasion. 489 The failure of the Coalition to provide security against car-

jackings, kidnappings, armed robbery, rape and other crimes was their chief complaint.

Unfortunately, most Iraqis held the United States responsible for this insecurity. 490

The pre-war planning for security expected the Iraqi military and police force

would take over the majority of post-war security tasks following the ground invasion.

Unfortunately this did not occur. The lawlessness that erupted in Baghdad badly

damaged the police infrastructure in particular, later contributed to impede the rebuilding

of the police forces. Although some Iraqi police officials did return to work after the

484 Colin Powell reiterated to President Bush that reconstruction and the political process as well as economic development could not happen without security. P. 261. Woodward, State of Denial . 485 Samer Shehata, "Losing Hearts and Minds: Understanding America's Failure in Iraq," Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 6, no. Winter/Spring 2005 (2005). P. 73. 486 The key to progress in Iraq is the quality of the Iraqi security forces. See Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Post- Saddam Governance and Security (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008), RL31339. P. 40 487 Bing West, The Strongest Tribe (New York: Random House, 2008). P. 5. 488 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraqi Security Forces (Westport: Praeger, 2005). P. 19. 489 Shehata, "Losing Hearts and Minds: Understanding America's Failure in Iraq." 490 Ibid. P. 73. 140

invasion, they rarely left their offices. 491 The police were not properly trained in routing

police activities, such as arrest, criminal investigation or patrol. 492 Besides having to be

trained in technical matters of effective police techniques, the new Iraqi police had to be

familiarized with procedures of democratic policing. 493

One of the CPA’s first tasks was to rebuild both a military and police force. CPA

Order Number 2, issued on May 23, 2003, formally dissolved Iraq’s armed forces and its

Defense Ministry. 494 The dissolution of the Iraqi security apparatus led to the largest, and

perhaps most intricate, job of advising foreign military forces in U.S. history. 495 When L.

Paul Bremer III disbanded the Iraqi security forces, there was no immediate plan to

replace them. Army Major General Paul Eaton, who led the initial effort to create the

Iraqi Army stated, “History will have to sort out the pros and cons of disbanding the Iraqi

army, but even proponents of the idea understood that you would have to immediately

devote a lot of resources and manpower to replaced it, and the fact that never happened is

a damning indictment of Secretary Rumsfeld’s leadership. Instead, I fell in on a staff of

five guys…and we were supposed to build an army for a country of 27 million

people.” 496 It was not until August 2003 that the CPA issued an order for the creation of

a new Army. 497 The following month, the CPA issued an order creating the Iraqi Civil

491 Mathieu Deflem and Suzanne Sutphin, "Policing Post-War Iraq: Insurgency, Civilian Police, and the Reconstruction of Society," Sociological Focus 39, no. 4 (2006). 492 PBS, "Frontline, Interview, Robert M. Perito." 493 Swiss Foundation for World Affairs, "Security in a World of Conflict: Needs and Strategies in International Policing," in For the Record (2005). 494 Joseph A. Christoff, "Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police," ed. United States Government Accountability Office (United States Government Accountability Office, 2005). p. 1. 495 Frederick Kienle, "Creating an Iraqi Army from Scratch: Lessons for the Future," (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2007). 496 James Kitfiel, "The Generals' Case," National Journal , 6 May 2006. 497 CPA Order 22, August 18, 2003. 141

Defense Corps whose mission would be unclear for several years. 498 The original plan was for an Office of Security Transition, led by a military officer that would reside in the

U.S. embassy that would oversee the development of the new security forces. 499

In April 2003, with looters on the streets and fires burning in government in

Baghdad, the U.S. military issued a call for Iraqi police officers to return to duty. The

Iraqi police survived, but their senior leadership and mid-level management were dismissed during de-Ba’athification. The Ministry of Interior was reorganized and assigned new responsibilities. Massive recruitment began to fill policing positions; the

CPA, however, was unable to provide the hundreds of advisors that the State and Justice

Departments believed were required to facilitate this expansion and to adequately train

Iraqi personnel. 500

The U.S. pressured the Ministry of Interior to recruit, train, equip, and deploy tens of thousands of new Iraqi police. Goals such as hiring 30,000 new policemen in 30 days were announced and implemented with little regard for the quality or vetting of recruits. 501 Training was limited to three weeks for former police officers with most classes taught by U.S. military police. As the insurgency took hold and security deteriorated, recruitment plummeted. In March 2004, President Bush transferred responsibility for reforming the Ministry of Interior as well as the training and equipping of the Iraqi police from the State Department to the Department of Defense and the U.S.

498 CPA Order 28, September 3, 2003. 499 William C. Thomas, "Creating the Iraqi Security Forces," in Hope Is Not a Plan: The War in Iraq from inside the Green Zone , ed. Thomas S. Mowle (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007). P. 71. 500 Robert M. Perito, Iraq's Interior Ministry: Frustrating Reform (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2008). 501 Ibid. 142

military. 502 This action was unprecedented, as State and Justice Departments had trained local police in all previous peace operations.

The existing Iraqi militias presented another challenge. A number of militia

groups that fought against Saddam had to be either disbanded or brought under the

control of the new Iraqi government. Nine parties maintained armed forces and/or

militias – the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

(PUK), the Badr Organization, Da’wa, Iraqi Hezbollah, the Iraqi Communist Party, the

Iraqi Islamic Party, the Iraqi National Accord, and the Iraqi National Congress. 503

Although this issue was discussed at length, nothing was actually done about it until

2004. In June 2004, the adoption of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) made all

armed forces and militias, not under federal control, illegal in the new Iraq.504

Within the CPA, Walter Slocombe 505 was assigned as the senior advisor for

National Security and Bernard Kerik 506 was appointed as the advisor for the Ministry of

the Interior (MoI). They were to concentrate on the defense and intelligence sectors and

police and law enforcement respectively. Once Bremer decided to abolish the security

forces that served Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi Armed Forces had to be built from scratch.

The new Iraqi army rapidly became a key component of the U.S. plan to restore security

502 See NSPD-24. 503 For further information on the intricacies of disbanding these groups, see Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace . P. 317-319. 504 The Transitional Administrative Law provided a roadmap for political transition including elections, and a constitution. For information see Katzman, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security . P. 11. 505 Walter Slocombe served as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy during the Clinton Administration from 1994-2001. 506 Bernie Kerik had been the New York City’s police commissioner when terrorists attacked the World Trade Center on September 11 th , 2001. Kerik had worked in the Middle East before, as the security director for a government hospital in Saudi Arabia. For more about Kerik and his role in post-Saddam Iraq see Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City . P. 95-103. 143 in Iraq and avoid an open-ended commitment. 507 The armed forces under Saddam

Hussein were particularly top-heavy and inefficient, with over 10,000 generals as opposed to the U.S. Army, which has 300 generals. Coalition planners intended to create a three division corps with 12,000 men per division. 508 The purpose of these forces initially was to defend the country from Iraq’s neighbors without becoming so strong as to be a threat in the region. The new corps would reflect the ethnic, regional, and religious makeup instead of the previous model. 509

Those who planned the concept of the new Iraqi armed forces had the Afghan

National Army in mind after just building that force. The U.S. led Multinational Force

(MNF) in Iraq made contributions to the effort to train and equip Iraqi security and police forces under the auspices of the Multinational Security Transition Command (MNSTC).

The MNSTC has two sections: the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) which trains the police, border, and non-military security services and the Coalition

Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT), which has primary responsibility for training members of Iraq’s military. 510 While the CPA trained the Ministry of Defense officials, CMATT would recruit and train the military. This organization grew to two hundred personnel and was comprised of a variety of coalition countries. 511

The early training efforts primarily focused on the formation of a conventional

Iraqi army, which by all accounts should have been the lowest priority, since there were already 160,000 coalition forces in country but no national police. The trainers were

507 Kienle, "Creating an Iraqi Army from Scratch: Lessons for the Future." 508 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq . P. 483. 509 Rathmell and others, Developing Iraq's Security Sector . P. 33. 510 "Building Iraqi Security Forces," in Government Reform , House of Representatives (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005). P. 79. 511 Rathmell and others, Developing Iraq's Security Sector . P. 34. 144

from the Vinnell Company, a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman, who was hired under a

$48 million contract. 512 Vinnell, in turn, subcontracted to MPRI for training and SAIC for recruitment. 513 CPA Order 22 514 created the New Iraqi Army on August 7, 2003 and soon after, Vinnell was training 1000 new recruits.

The training of the Iraqi Army changed often throughout the occupation. In fact, even its name changed—originally the New Iraqi Army it became the Iraqi Armed Forces over time. The contractors were supposed to train the initial twenty-two battalions of the

Iraqi army. 515 In August 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld pushed for an accelerated training plan that would establish twenty-seven battalions of the New Iraqi Army in one year instead of the originally planned two. 516 Most American troops in Iraq would finish their year in the February-April 2004 time frame and Washington was convinced that the

Iraqis would take over a significant number of security tasks from the U.S. military during that time period. 517

In addition to putting pressure on the CPA to accelerate the training for the Iraqi

Army, officials in Washington pressed for quicker training of the police. Bernie Kerik, the former New York City police commissioner, was placed in charge of the police training in Iraq in 2003. Although he had some experience working in the Middle East, he lacked policing experience in post-conflict situations. 518 The Hungarians were

512 Ibid. P. 34. 513 Nathan Hodge, “Pentagon Agency May Train Iraqi War-Crimes Prosecutors,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, September 15, 2003; Nathan Hodge, “Norththrop Grumman to Train New Iraqi Army,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 7, 2003. 514 This order also explicitly dissolved the previous security apparatus of the state as well as several of the militia groups. www.cap- iraq.org/regulations/20030818_CPAORD_22_Creation_of_a_New_Iraqi_Army.pdf 515 Packer, The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq . P. 306. 516 Bremer III and McConnell, My Year in Iraq . P. 150 517 Ibid. P. 151. 518 Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City . P. 96. 145

supposed to take over for him in late 2004, but balked at the last minute. In looking for

another option, the CPA investigated training the police in Jordan. The fundamental

difficulty with accelerating and expanding the training program was a lack of facilities—

classrooms and ranges were in short supply. Kerik had run the largest training program

in America, which trained six thousand cadets a year. Rumsfeld wanted 35,000-40,000

trained in less than two years. 519

In September 2003, Rumsfeld visited Iraq to determine the options for reducing

American forces. There was constant pressure from Washington to reduce the U.S.

military presence and turn over more responsibility to the Iraqis, even if they weren’t

trained and resourced. Agreement was reached with the Jordanians to train up to 1500

Iraqi police a month, though the program wouldn’t start until November 2003.

Allegations of theft and corruption dogged the program. 520 General Abizaid offered to

take over police training from the CPA. 521 This would mean U.S. forces training police while at the same time fighting insurgents. Bremer doubted the military’s motives, knowing that the key to troop draw downs rested in trained Iraqi security forces.522

This debate continued between Rumsfeld, Bremer, Wolfowitz and Abizaid. 523 In the fall of 2003, there were supposedly 40,000 police on duty. The plans to train the

519 Bremer III and McConnell, My Year in Iraq . P. 152-153. 520 Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace . P. 189. 521 An officer on Abizaid’s staff came to inspect Vinnell’s work and was furious at how bad the training was and how bad the equipment was that Vinnell was giving the Iraqi soldiers. See Packer, The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq . P. 306. 522 Bremer III and McConnell, My Year in Iraq . P. 168. 523 There were chain of command issues consistently. Abizaid and Bremer in particular had powerful and strong-willed personalities. Bremer reported to Rumsfeld, and as the president’s personal envoy, kept the White House informed. Abizaid reported to Rumsfeld. The priorities and information sources were vastly different. See Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (New York: Bantam Books, 2005). P. 23. 146

police in Jordan would take fifteen months to prepare 25,000 for duty. This program

would train an unprecedented four times as many police in one year. 524

During a congressional delegation briefing, Lieutenant General Sanchez

announced that the Coalition military were training and recruiting police across the

country and had almost 54,000 on duty. At the end of August, Bernie Kerik said that

many of the 35,000 police then on the rolls would have to be dropped for incompetence,

corruption, or previous human rights abuses. The 54,000 police officers on duty were

actually recruits that were run through a three-week training course, armed and then put

on duty. 525

Late in 2003, the leadership in Washington began to distrust the reports coming

from Bremer. For example, Bremer would tell congressional delegations that there were

one hundred thousand Iraqi security forces trained, when in fact the numbers were closer

to 10,000. 526 Rumsfeld sent a survey team to Iraq, headed by Major General Karl

Eikenberry to review the training of Iraqi police and military units. General Eikenberry

concluded that the training was not going well and the program needed to be consolidated

under the U.S. military. 527 The effort to train and deploy the Iraqi security forces was plagued with inefficiency, poor planning and sheer incompetence and they ended up becoming soft targets for the terrorists. 528

524 Bremer III and McConnell, My Year in Iraq . P. 169. 525 Ibid. P. 183. 526 In 2003, Bremer and Rumsfeld through around numbers in the range of 150,000, but in June 2004, the small print of a CPA report revealed that fewer than 6000 out of almost ninety thousand had received serious academy training last more than two or three weeks. See Packer, The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq . P. 306. 527 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. P. 267-268. 528 Diamond, "What Went Wrong and Right in Iraq." P. 177. 147

The Security Sector Synchronization Exercise, in October 2003, was the first

attempt to evaluate whether or not the plan for training the Iraqis was implemented. 529

This evaluation concluded that the coalition plans to date had been poorly coordinated.

To address the problems discovered during the exercise, the CPA’s policy planning office

produced a paper, published on December 4, 2003, entitled Iraq: Integrated Security

Sector Development that laid out its vision and purpose. 530

By December 2003, it was becoming obvious that the contractor-trained Iraqi

army would satisfy neither operational nor political requirements, particularly in the

context of the growing insurgency. 531 The civilian contractors had the technological

expertise, but not enough military rigor. 532 The trainers were not able to embed with

Iraqi forces, forcing Iraqi leaders to struggle in the field. Before the first battalion

completed its training, it suffered nearly a 50 percent attrition rate. After graduating from

the contractor run boot camp, the new soldiers were assigned U.S. army advisors. When

those officers asked the Iraqis to fight, there was no bond of trust forged through

training. 533 In other nations, American Special Forces had trained units and then

deployed with them, a system that seemed to work. In Iraq, there weren’t enough

American soldiers to do that. 534

In February 2004, the outfitting and training of Iraqi soldiers and police was still

stalled. After ten months, there was not a single properly trained and equipped Iraqi

security officer in the entire al Anbar province. Although there were some 10,000 police

529 Rathmell and others, Developing Iraq's Security Sector . P. 19. 530 Ibid. P. 20. 531 Kienle, "Creating an Iraqi Army from Scratch: Lessons for the Future." 532 Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). P. 124-125. 533 Their general lack of discipline was evident immediately. See West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah . P. 68-73. 534 Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City . P. 309. 148

and civil defense officers on the rolls, they lacked training and equipment. 535 According to Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the U.S. did not take the training and resourcing of the Iraqi security forces seriously until April

2004. 536

Another significant issue was that the new Iraqi security forces felt that they were being asked to fight for the United States, not Iraq. The coalition military forces thought that Iraqi armed forces would help the coalition. However, many Iraqi units refused to fight domestically. 537 By the spring of 2004, it was agreed that the army’s primary mission would be external defense, but due to the ongoing insurgency could be used internally to support civil authorities. 538 This enabled the US to justify training the armed forces for internal security and counterinsurgency operations.

The spring of 2004 also saw a new organizational structure being created to take over the training. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) took over the functions of the Office of Security Transition and became subordinate to Multi-

National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), which oversaw all coalition forces in Iraq. LTG David

Petraeus took command of MNSTC-I in May 2004 and organized his new command to address the expanding needs of the Iraqi military and police. 539 In late 2004, General

Petraeus developed a new model for advisory teams was developed that included Military

535 According to LTG Sanchez, major contracts for materials had not been signed and national requirements had not been defined by the CPA. The timeline to meet all the paperwork requirements, exacerbated the delays. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq , Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle (New York: Harper Collins, 2008). P. 317. 536 Packer, The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq . P. 307. 537 Meese, p.xxvi. 538 Rathmell and others, Developing Iraq's Security Sector . P. 36. 539 General Petraeus was credited with implementing a more realistic assessment of Iraqi troop readiness, embedding U.S. advisors with Iraqi units, and shifting more of the military’s resources towards training. See Jeremy M. Sharp, Iraq's New Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006), CRS Report for Congress, Thomas, "Creating the Iraqi Security Forces." P. 72. 149

Assistance Teams, Police Assistance Teams, Special Police Assistance Teams, and

Border Assistance Teams that would be embedded with ISF units.

MNF-I published a campaign plan in 2004, which provided strategic guidance. It

outlined broadly the desired end state for Iraq. Unfortunately, MNSTC-I did not have a

plan for accomplishing the tasks assigned by its higher headquarters. What MNSTC-I

did have was a desired end state based upon numbers without any explanation of the

capabilities that the Iraqi security forces should possess. Having a command structure in

place with a particular number of units manned by a particular number of Iraqis became

the goal towards which MNSTC-I operated. It was unclear though of what the forces

should be capable. 540

In 2005, the Government Accountability Office found that assessing Iraqi security

forces was particularly difficult because the data regarding training and equipping of Iraqi

security forces was unreliable. Furthermore, the intensity of the insurgency continually

grew from 2003 until 2005. At the same time, there were four key challenges in

increasing Iraqi force capability: training, equipping and sustaining a consistently

changing force structure; developing a system for measuring the readiness and capability

of Iraqi forces; building loyalty and leadership throughout the Iraqi chain of command;

and developing a police force that upholds the rule of law in a hostile environment. 541

The next revision, the joint MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Baghdad Campaign Plan, was

published in April 2006. That Joint Campaign Plan includes the following four phases:

“Partnership,” which occurred from 2005 to 2006, and expanded the use of military,

police and other transition teams to train Iraqi units. “Iraqi army lead,” currently

540 Thomas, "Creating the Iraqi Security Forces." P. 76. 541 Christoff, "Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police." p. 2. 150 ongoing, the MNF is attempting to organize and develop Iraqi units so they can assume the lead in counterinsurgency operations. “Provincial Iraqi control” will occur sometime in the future. In this phase, MNF-I and the Iraqi government determine when the Iraqi provinces can assume responsibility for security based on the threat level, Iraqi capabilities, and MNF-I’s ability to respond to major threats if needed. The final phase,

“Iraqi security self-reliance,” will occur when the government of Iraq is capable of planning, conducting, and sustaining security operations and forces through its security ministries. 542 The MNSTC-I commander, General Dubik and the Iraqi Defense Minister both separately stated in January 2008 that the Iraqi Security Forces would not be ready to secure Iraq from internal threats until 2012, and from external threats until 2018-2020, despite the expanding size of the ISF. 543

The New Way Forward, published in January 2007, was developed to address the escalating violence in 2006 and articulates goals and objectives for the phase that ends in

July 2008. Establishing a basic level of security was a key component of The New Way

Forward, as was developing capable Iraqi security forces and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi government. 544 Since 2003, the United States has spent over

$20 billion to develop Iraqi security forces. Despite increases in trained Iraqi forces, from 323,000 in January 2007 to 478,500 as of May 2008, the number of units at the highest readiness level accounts for less than ten percent of total units. 545 There has not

542 Joseph A. Christoff, "Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces," ed. United States Government Accountability Office (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007). P. 3-4. 543 Katzman, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security . P. 41. 544 Gene L. Dodaro, "Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed," in Armed Services, House of Representatives , House of Representatives (Washington D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, 2008). p. 6 545 Ibid. P. 6. 151

been an updated strategic plan since 2007. The goals and objectives and the phase that

follows it are contained in disparate documents rather than a single strategic plan. 546

All Iraq provinces were originally scheduled to transfer to Provincial Iraqi

Control (PIC) by the end of 2008. 547 However, this was impractical and many of the

provinces transferred to PIC were still not ready. The southern provinces became

protectorates of various Shiite militias or criminal gangs. 548 The ISF still had inadequate

capabilities and any effective security action depended heavily on continued US or

Coalition support. In many areas, there was no ISF or central government presence.

These problems continued into 2008. The US transferred responsibility to the Iraqi

government for 11 of 18 provinces by September 2008, and had withdrawn US troops

from 13 of 18 provinces. All formal transfers are now supposed to be complete by some

point in 2009.

Military Effectiveness

Building a military from the ground up takes a significant effort—time, money,

and equipment are all required. 549 Establishing a new Iraqi security force requires more

than just building up their military skill set, it is also about passing on values and a sense

of professionalism. The effort to deploy Iraqi security forces quickly since 2003 has

meant that getting heavily armed police and soldiers into the field has increasingly taken

546 Ibid. P. 4. 547 Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," ed. Report to Congress (Department of Defense, 2008). P. 91-93. 548 Anthony H. Cordesman, How Soon Is Safe? Iraqi Force Development and "Conditions Based" US Withdrawals (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008). p. 46. 549 Although all of these elements are required, merely providing equipment, conducting training or technical courses is not enough. See Andrew Rathmell, Fixing Iraq's Internal Security Forces (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007). P. 5 152

priority over efforts to inculcate democratic values and respect for human rights. 550 From the beginning, putting the measure of effectiveness or progress on the number of Iraqis trained incentivized pushing as many through as possible, without regard for their actual aptitude. Furthermore, the extensive use of contractors in the early stages, as well as the current return to outsourcing the training and advising, sends a powerful message: the values of civil-military relations and professionalism are supplanted by the evident commoditization of military skills. 551

The magnitude of the effort required to establish the Iraqi Security Forces is truly

unprecedented. Iraq’s police and military had no previous experience with democratic

norms, therefore even using former police or military personnel was problematic—re-

training was necessary to reorient officers to their new missions. The sheer number of

personnel required to impact the deteriorating security situation was staggering. If the

largest police force in the United States could only train 6000 police officers a year with

the expectation that the newly trained officers would be paired with a much more

experienced partner, it was completely unreasonable to expect the Iraqi police to be

effective with less training in a more violent and complicated environment. Finally,

expecting the Department of Defense to take the lead in training and equipping the

police, the Armed Forces and the Border Patrol with positive results while fighting an

insurgency in Iraq and supporting operations in Afghanistan was unrealistic. Despite

550 Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" p. 1020. See also Peter Beaumont, “Revealed: grim world of new Iraqi torture camps,” Observer , 3 July 2005. 551 Peter W. Singer, "Lessons Not Learned: Contracting out Iraqi Army Advising," (The Brookings Institution, 2008). 153 these horrible odds, recent reports suggest that the total number of Iraqi Security Forces, as of May 2009, is nearly 600,000. 552

As of 2008, Iraq’s Ministry of Interior oversees four civilian security services: the Iraqi Police Service, which numbers 275,300 and is controlled at the provincial level; the Iraqi National Police, a 32,390 member gendarmerie that assists the U.S. and Iraqi military forces in counterinsurgency operations; the Iraqi Border Enforcement Service is a 38,200 force charged with preventing infiltration, smuggling and illicit trafficking; the

Facilities Protection Service is a 150,000 member force of largely autonomous units responsible for protecting government ministries. 553 The combined total of these forces is nearly 500,000 members, which is nearly three times as large as the new Iraqi army, navy and air force combined. It is also responsible for civil functions such as nationality, passports, immigration control and regulation of private security companies. Especially troubling are reports that the Ministry of Interior is a ministry in name only—highly dysfunctional, sectarian and suffering from ineffective leadership. 554 In July 2007, the

Los Angeles Times reported that it had become a “federation of oligarchs” where various

552 It is important to note that these numbers are what the Iraqi ministries are reporting. They also do not reflect the effectiveness of the forces. These numbers include police, national guard, armed forces and border patrol. See Michael E. O'Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell, "Iraq Index," (Brookings, 2009). 553 Under the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Facilities Protection Service (FPS) was formed in 2003 to provide guards for public buildings and essential infrastructure. Each of the 26 ministries and eight independent directorates, such as the Central Bank, was allowed to recruit its own guard force. There are 150,000 FPS officers and another 8,700 personal security guards for Iraqi leaders. FPS officers were issued police-style uniforms, badges and weapons, but they did not receive police training nor were they given police authority. The ministerial guard forces became the private armies and a source of patronage jobs and funding. Radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr controls the health, education and transportation ministries. The FPS provides money and jobs for the Mahdi Army. The same is true for ministries controlled by Kurdish politicians and other political parties that have militias. Interior Minister Bolani has publicly blamed the FPS for sectarian violence. See Robert M. Perito, Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police, and Facility Protection Service (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 2007). And Stuart W. Bowen, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience (Baghdad: Special Inspector General Iraqi Reconstruction, 2009). P. 127. 554 Perito, Iraq's Interior Ministry: Frustrating Reform . 154 floors of its building were controlled by rival militia groups and organized criminal gangs. 555

While some U.S. defense officials give the Iraqi Security Forces credit for toughness and growing counterinsurgency skills, many analysts have serious doubts about the forces’ effectiveness. 556 By the Pentagon’s own estimates, only 65 percent of trained forces are available at any given time; others say the ratio is closer to 50 percent. 557 The weak Iraqi management of their forces has also contributed to the accountability issues. 558 A House subcommittee concluded in June 2007, despite three months of study, it could not determine the “operational capability” of Iraqi forces. 559

Furthermore, the consistent need to address short-term security threats has only further served to distort the long-term nation-building effort. 560 This section will evaluate the

Iraqi Security Forces using skill, quality, integration and responsiveness to determine their effectiveness.

Integration refers to the consistency between the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war as well as the degree to which military efforts are mutually supporting of

555 Ned Parker, "The Conflict in Iraq: A Ministry of Fiefdoms," Los Angeles Times , July 30, 2007. 556 For further critique of the ISF see Christoff, "Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces.", Cordesman, Iraqi Security Forces , Olga Oliker, Iraqi Security Forces: Defining Challenges and Assessing Progress (Washington D.C.: RAND, 2007), Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations United States House of Representatives, Olga Oliker and others, U.S. Policy Options for Iraq: A Reassessment (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), William M. Solis, "Operation Iraqi Freedom: DoD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces' Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed," ed. United States Government Accountability Office (United States Government Accountability Office, 2007). 557 Greg Bruno, The Preparedness of the Iraqi Security Forces (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2008). p. 2. 558 Joseph A. Christoff, "Stabilizing Iraq: DoD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces," ed. United States Government Accountability Office (United States Government Accountability Office, 2007). 559 House Armed Services Committee O&I Staff, "Stand up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces," ed. Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (2007). 560 Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" p. 1020. 155

the broader political and economic goals of a country. Security sector reform requires

development of indigenous security forces in addition to developing a legal framework,

consistent with international law. 561 The focus of the United States’ effort in Iraq has been primarily on establishing effective security forces, capable of defending Iraq’s borders. There has been generally a lack of integration in the training processes of the

Iraqi security forces as well as more broadly security sector reform. Finally, the United

States has concentrated primarily on building an effective Army instead of focusing on the police force.

Initially, the United States plan had been to recall Iraqi units, train them, and put them into the field to assist coalition forces. 562 After Ambassador Bremer disbanded the former Iraqi Army a new plan had to be developed. There were a number of organizations involved in planning and executing security sector reform in Iraq, which made integration of the United States effort challenging. CENTCOM, CJTF-7, various contractors, the CPA and the CIA all played a role. 563 The CPA and CJTF-7 each had a part of the plan—the CPA focused on the policy oversight as well as the institutional development, while the CJTF-7 was responsible for the Iraqi army training and eventually the police training as well (in the spring of 2004). 564 Often the two had

conflicting guidance. Another problem was that the focus of CJTF-7 was on defeating

insurgents and terrorists. Training Iraqi security forces took a backseat to those pressing

issues. The shifting responsibilities contributed to the lack of integration.

561 Nicole Ball, Promoting Security Sector Reform in Fragile States (Washington D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 2005). p. 8. 562 Sanchez, Wiser in Battle . P. 190. 563 According the LTG Sanchez, Ambassador Bremer told CJTF-7 that they were not going to have anything to do with rebuilding the Iraqi military. See Ibid. P. 190. In 2004, this was reversed with Rumsfeld ordered CJTF-7 to have responsibility for rebuilding the Iraqi Security Forces. P. 316. 564 Rathmell and others, Developing Iraq's Security Sector . P. 15. 156

Recognizing this as a problem, there was a shift of control from CMATT to

CJTF-7 in March 2004; this shift created confusion about both policy direction as well as

chain of command. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense was supposedly to ultimately control

the Iraqi forces, but the CPA was still in the process of establishing it. Also, the CPA no

longer had a relationship with the CMATT. 565 The confusion as to what the Iraqi

government’s role would be combined with the dysfunctional relationship between the

United States’ civilian and military organizations further prevented effective integration

of effort in the establishment of the Iraqi Security Forces.

The effort to make the Iraqi army a representative force of all ethnic, religious and

sects was another priority of the CPA and CJTF-7. While recruiters actively sought

representation of all such groups, the effort to actually integrate them effectively was at

the trainer’s discretion. 566 This decentralized approach led to disparity between units.

Local U.S. and coalition military commanders were given the responsibility to train these

units, leading to a lack of standardization in their training and vetting across the

country. 567 Pressure to get Iraqi participation led to many local police simply being

reconstituted. 568 The representation issue was extraordinarily complex. On the one hand,

having ethnic and religious representation is important in the creation of cohesive state;

on the other hand, expediency was understandably given greater priority due to security

concerns. Over time, overrepresentation by certain groups undermined effective rule of

law and even local security.

565 Ibid. P. 37. 566 Ibid. P. 36. 567 Testimony by Kalev Sepp, Assistant Professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School states that vetting is varies widely throughout Iraq. "Building Iraqi Security Forces." P. 141. 568 Ibid. P. 161. 157

The Iraqi Army training mission wasn’t a high priority for the CPA or the U.S.

military. 569 The only policy direction came from a 24-page PowerPoint presentation from CENTCOM. According to Major General Paul Eaton, the first commander of the

Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT), there was hardly any

participation with the exception of an ad hoc team from his personal request. 570 Without a strategic plan, limited resources and five staff members, CMATT set out to man, train, and equip the Iraqi Armed Forces in a vacuum.

The general lack of an integrated plan for the Iraqi Security Forces caused an emphasis on the military forces at the expense of the police forces. For example, of the fourteen staff officers within the planning section of MNSTC-I, only one worked on police issues, while twelve worked on military matters. The physical separation of

CPATT from the MNSTC-I headquarters also made it more challenging to coordinate and cooperate. 571

Developing the Iraqi police forces should have been just as important since so many of the issues the coalition faced were law enforcement in nature. 572 In 2004, the

Iraqi police service, which had historically been powerless and corrupt, was expected to provide internal security in a worsening security environment. CPA’s Ministry of

Interior (MoI), with responsibility for police, were short staffed and constantly torn between the effort to build effective structures and the need to have police on the street patrolling. 573 This tension was exacerbated by a failure of the coalition to recognize the

569 Bowen, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience . P. 128. 570 Ibid. P. 128. 571 Thomas, "Creating the Iraqi Security Forces." P. 80. 572 "Building Iraqi Security Forces." 573 Since April 2003, the human capacity of the ministry has been seriously degraded. Many of the experienced managers left in 2003 and steady attrition has occurred since then. See Rathmell, Fixing Iraq's Internal Security Forces . p. 3. 158

crucial nature of the police mission and to allocate it sufficient resources. MoI and its

advisors lacked civilian police trainers, funds, and staff. Far more people were hired than

could be trained, and training was haphazard at best. This lack of resources and training

led to a police force that was ineffective and unresponsive during times of crisis. MoI

was also charged with created a facilities protection capability and a border patrol force,

which were no less important and just as problematic to implement. 574 Today the MoI is

expected to manage and support what could grow to upwards of 500,000 employees,

which could account for almost 10% of the entire Iraq male labor force. 575

Robert Perito, a former official in the U.S. Department of State who has extensive

experience in implementing civilian police programs abroad, argues in societies that have

experienced brutal oppression, large scale breakdowns in public order should be

anticipated. 576 Under those circumstances, police reform will always be difficult. He

argues that such training in post-war situations can take at least five years and requires

the help of international police experts with foreign experience. 577 Initial estimates that

the reconstruction of Iraq’s police institutions would take several months, or one year,

were wildly inaccurate. 578

Decentralization of the command and control of the IPS had the unintended

consequence of creating fiefdoms subject to political machinations. In certain provinces,

competing chiefs of police respond to the provincial governor, while others may respond

to the Ministry of the Interior. Pay problems were also created by the decentralization.

574 Meese, p. xxv. 575 Rathmell, Fixing Iraq's Internal Security Forces . P. 3. 576 Perito, The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified . 577 Robert M. Perito, Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004). 578 PBS, "The New Iraq: Transcript of News hour with Jim Lehrer," (2003). 159

Each provincial chief of police controls his share of sub-allotted funds. Mismanagement and corruption of pay has been on ongoing problem. 579

Although the Iraqis now carry out most basic training, coalition forces serve a vital role as mentors and monitors of Iraqi units. Ideally, the advisory teams eat, drink, sleep and patrol with Iraqis. This presence also improves head counts of forces and makes it easier to evaluate unit readiness and capability. Most of these mentors are military personnel since there aren’t enough international police advisors to work with the Iraqi units. Local police are the most crucial element of success in a counterinsurgency. 580 Police actions connote the illegality of the insurgency whereas military operations perpetuate the perception of armed conflict. 581 Police also protect the local population, which is critical in winning popular support for the government. 582

Military personnel are seen as fighters, not protectors. 583 While the military needs to be involved in case of extreme violence, they should be working alongside the police to give them greater legitimacy. 584

In order to be effective at building the Iraqi Security Forces, the United States had to be responsive to local conditions. Measuring progress is important so that the relevant organizations could respond to problem areas that were identified by changing conditions over time. Most of the CPA and CJTF-7’s internal measures of effectiveness related to

Iraqi security forces were money spent, equipment provided, recruited and trained

579 Howard J. Krongard and Joseph E. Schmitz, "Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training," ed. Department of State and Department of Defense (U.S. Government, 2005). P. 12. 580 Eliot A. Cohen, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 2009). 581 Oliker, Iraqi Security Forces: Defining Challenges and Assessing Progress . P. 5. 582 Ibid. P. 5. 583 Ibid. P. 5. 584 The United States military tried to avoid taking on police-like functions as much as possible according to Kimberly Zisk Marten, Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 160

personnel, and units formed, instead of their achievement of a provision of security for

Iraq. 585 The most important evaluation criteria should be creating the conditions required

for political transition and economic development. Looking at political violence, crime,

corruption and perceptions of public safety are all valuable measures of the success of the

Iraqi security forces. 586 Developing war fighting capabilities, counter terrorism

capabilities and counterinsurgency capabilities are the measures of success, not

examining the number of personnel. 587

These measures all indicated a negative trend. There was an increase in attacks

against all categories of people from 2003 to 2007 (coalition forces, civil administrators,

contractors, Iraqi civilians and officials). 588 The crime rates had also increased. Polling

numbers illustrate public concern had grown with each year of the occupation. 589

Although these numbers illustrate a worsening security situation, it does not demonstrate

causality between that and the performance of the Iraqi security forces. Deficient

leadership, lack of disciplinary standards, and logistics shortfalls are some additional

causes of operational ineffectiveness. 590

The lack of a professional Iraq security force created a vacuum that was filled by

Kurd and Shia Arab militias. These militias survived because there was no real plan to address them. With Iraq controlled by the militia’s masters, the Interim Iraqi

Government’s successors abandoned transition and reintegration and allowed members of

585 Rathmell and others, Developing Iraq's Security Sector . P. 73. 586 Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq . P. 14. 587 "Building Iraqi Security Forces." P. 104. 588 See Iraq Index, www.brookings.edu/iraqindex . The aggregate violence peaked in 2007 and has gone down since then. 589 Rathmell and others, Developing Iraq's Security Sector . P. 74-75. These statistics come from Brookings Institution and Iraqi Central Statistical Organization. 590 James L. Jones, The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007). P. 9. 161

the Shia Arab Badr Organization and al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army to join the Iraqi police. 591

The Sunni Arabs soon found themselves at odds with their own state. 592 As a minority and knowing they would not win democratically, civil war seemed like the best option. 593

Iraqi officials involved in creating Iraqi security forces saw the lack of

effectiveness of Iraqi forces until late 2004 as a result of the failure to anticipate the threat

of a major insurgency. By overlooking this threat, training and equipping the military,

security and police forces were focused on avoiding past abuses instead of preparing to

counteract an insurgency. Iraqi forces were created on a “helter-skelter” basis with little

equipment, training and facilities. 594 Manpower quality was paid little attention. There

was little if any coordination between police, security and military forces, further

inhibiting their responsiveness. The MNC and US constantly changed focus and had

different priorities in each of the five major operational areas under MNC control. 595

Skill reflects the degree to which the military is trained and prepared to undertake

difficult and complex tasks. The U.S. Army was largely unprepared to fulfill the

requirement to train and advise the Iraqi Army. They were even more unprepared to take

the lead in assisting the establishment of the national police.

In order to effectively train another country’s military, there needs to be a base

cultural understanding of the people who are being trained. Advisors also need to be able

591 Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace . Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005). 592 There is still distrust among Sunni tribal elements towards coalition and Iraqi forces. See Sharp, Iraq's New Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences . P. 4. 593 Thomas S. Mowle, "Introduction: The Green Zone in 2004-2005," in Hope Is Not a Plan: The War in Iraq from inside the Green Zone , ed. Thomas S. Mowle (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2005). P. 9-10. 594 There are also fears that some of their weapons are falling into the hands of insurgents, militias or terrorist groups. In August 2007, the GAO reported that the Defense Department couldn’t fully account for the total of $19.2 billion worth of equipment provided to the ISF by the United States. Katzman, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security . P. 42. 595 "Building Iraqi Security Forces." P. 112. 162

to plan counterinsurgency operations, conduct civil military activities, while

simultaneously serving as governors in towns, villages, and provinces. 596 The United

States Special Operations Command is the only combatant command with a legislatively mandated foreign internal defense (FID) mission. Instead of using Special Forces units that specialize in training foreign militaries, defense contractors were used as well as some regular soldiers, including National Guard and Reservists. The view was that

Special Forces units were too important to be wasting their time training Iraqis.

Regardless, the demands in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and in order areas, are far too great for the Special Forces to undertake alone. This later came back to haunt Bremer and the U.S. effort when after a year of training, the Iraqi forces lacked leaders they were willing to follow into battle. 597

Difficulties in Iraqi police reform were compounded by the reliance on private contractors without requisite overseas experience. 598 DynCorp International administered the U.S. Civilian Police Program for the State Department in Iraq. In Iraq, some 1000

DynCorp-subcontracted police act as “International Police Officers” to aid the reorganization of Iraq’s police systems on the basis of a $750 million contract. 599 Since

the spring of 2006, DynCorp has been under investigation by U.S. officials following

reports of criminal fraud. Other private security companies, such as Blackwater, have

been performing various police functions because of the void left by the absence of Iraqi

police. Employees of private security companies have allegedly been involved in several

dozen shootings against Iraqi civilians.

596 Kienle, "Creating an Iraqi Army from Scratch: Lessons for the Future." 597 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq . P. 328-329. 598 Deflem and Sutphin, "Policing Post-War Iraq: Insurgency, Civilian Police, and the Reconstruction of Society." P. 278. 599 Renae Merle, "DynCorp Took Part in Chalabi Raid," The Washington Post 2004. p. A17. 163

In general, the training itself was very ad hoc. The Iraqi regular army was trained

by a U.S. Army division assigned to MNSTC-I, Iraqi National Guard forces were trained

by coalition forces assigned to MNC-I, and police forces were trained by contractors at a

variety of locations including the Jordanian police academy. 600 The wide variety of

experiences and lack of clear guidance made it difficult for the Iraqi forces to have any

sort of coherence.

Evidence of the skill level of the Iraqi Security Forces can be seen in several

ways: through the number trained and equipped as well as through their performance in

battle. In December 2003, U.S. trainers so distrusted their students that they carried

loaded pistols to a graduation ceremony in case of a mutiny. 601 Although the contractors

were supposed to train some twenty-seven battalions, they actually only trained six

battalions, of which half deserted.602 Furthermore, the training method, syllabus, and

methods of training changed virtually monthly since June 2004. 603 Desertion rates were

so high because of low salaries as well as a lack of a clear mission.

600 Thomas, "Creating the Iraqi Security Forces." P. 77. The police training significantly improved once the Caribinarri took over the training. 601 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq . P. 329. 602 Singer, "Lessons Not Learned: Contracting out Iraqi Army Advising." 603 "Building Iraqi Security Forces." P. 104. 164

Table 1 illustrates the status of Iraqi Security Forces as reported by the

Department of State as of March 2, 2005: 604

Ministry Component Required Operational/Trained Percentage of and Equipped Required Defense Iraq Army 605 94,656 58,992 62 Interior Iraqi Police 135,000 55,274 39 Service Highway Patrol 6,300 Other Forces 606 34,050 26,798 79 Table 1: Iraqi Security Forces Trained and Equipped The Government Accounting Office investigated the report’s methodology and found several problems with the data. First, these numbers are misleading because of inconsistent and inaccurate reporting. The other problem with these figures is the inconsistent measurement of “operational” or “trained and equipped.” Iraqi security forces are not reporting whether or not they possess the required weapons, vehicles, communication equipment and body armor. 607 Finally, there is no means to measure the

success of the Iraqi security forces. This presents a considerable problem when

evaluating the numbers reported to Congress. 608

604 Ibid. P. 24. 605 This figure includes regular army, national guard, intervention force, and special operations. 606 Other forces include civil intervention, special police, emergency response, border enforcement and dignitary protection. 607 Most observers say that the ISF are severely underequipped, dependent primarily on donations of surplus equipment by coalition members. See Katzman, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security . P. 42. 608 "Building Iraqi Security Forces." P. 67. 165

Table 2 below lists the Iraqi Security Forces as of October 31, 2008. 609

Ministry Component Authorized Assigned Trained Defense Iraq Army 610 174,280 196,236 235,606 611 Interior Iraqi Police Service 612 334,739 300,156 209,100 Table 2: Iraqi Security Force Disposition as of 31 October 2008. A significant number of Iraqis have been trained in the past six years. These numbers illustrate the importance given to the Army’s training versus the lack of emphasis on the police. What is not evident, however, is how effective the training has actually been in terms of the performance of Iraqi soldiers individually or the leadership capacity of either the police or army units.

To date, it is still unclear how many Iraqi security personnel are actually serving.

The Pentagon keeps records on the numbers of “trained and equipped” personnel, which overstates the actual number on duty. Iraqi officials are also uncertain of the actual number of forces. The Ministry of Interior counts police who are absent without leave in its totals. The number of those absent is in the tens of thousands. 613 They know how many people they are paying, but they are paying people who are not truly working. The

Ministry of the Interior pays local officials a lump sum based on payroll numbers. Local officials then dole out this money; however, the Ministry of Finance doesn’t know how many people are being paid. 614 Another problem with this lack of accountability is that it presents the opportunity for corruption at the local level.

609 Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," ed. Report to Congress (Department of Defense, 2008). 610 This figure includes regular army only. 611 This number reflects total Iraqi forces personnel trained to date, some of whom are no longer assigned due to casualties, absent without leave, normal separations, etc. 612 The Iraqi Police Service includes all provincial police forces (station, patrol and traffic, and special units) assigned to all 18 Iraqi provinces. 613 "Building Iraqi Security Forces." P. 23-24. 614 Oliker, Iraqi Security Forces: Defining Challenges and Assessing Progress . P. 1-2. 166

Each type of force has a different length of training. The missions and training of

the Iraqi Security Forces are as follows in Table 3:615

Ministry Unit Mission Training Defense Regular Defense Iraq against internal Eight weeks of basic training. Army threats and when directed, assist in providing defense against internal threats. National Stability operations to support Three-week basic training. Guard internal security. Constabulary duties. Intervention Defeat anti-Iraqi forces with focus Four weeks of cadre training Force on urban areas. for officers and noncommissioned officers. Thirteen weeks basic and urban operations training Interior Police Provide law enforcement, public New officers—eight week safety and internal security academy training. Serving officers—three-week course. Table 3: Training Standards for Iraqi Security Forces The training approaches from 2003 until 2007 varied consistently. For example,

half of the Iraqi National Army’s ten divisions were originally built as Army forces and

received Coalition developed training. The other half is made up of Iraqi National

Guardsmen, which grew out of Iraqi Civilian Defense Corps. The Iraqi Civilian Defense

Corps was established to support the mission of the coalition. Those personnel had

minimal initial training, most of which was on-the-job. Most of the IPS training

programs were designed and executed by the coalition (up until 2005) with minimal input from Iraqi leaders. 616 According to an Inspector General report, there is little consensus

on how to best train the Iraqi police and the training program to date (2005) has not

created an effective IPS. 617 Now, all Iraqi armed forces are recruited centrally and Iraqi

615 "Building Iraqi Security Forces." P. 26. 616 Krongard and Schmitz, "Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training." P. 3. 617 Ibid. P. 11. 167

trainers are now responsible for the majority of basic training, which has been a dramatic

improvement.

Quality is possessing highly capable personnel and organizations. The quality of

the Iraqi Security Forces is evident in their performance in battle. On April 5, 2004, the

new Iraqi army was put to the test. As Sunni and Shiite revolts merged, commanders ordered an Iraqi battalion to assist the Marines. It was the first time the U.S. Military sought to involve the newly formed postwar Iraqi army in its major combat operations,

and it led to major disappointment. The 620-man 2 nd Battalion of the Iraqi Armed Forces

refused to join the battle. 618

Part of the issue with the Iraqi Army was not performance or training related. The

Iraqi units did not agree to serve in an organization where they would be forced to fight

their fellow Iraqis. Iraqis were never informed about the actual role the U.S. expected

them to play. Another problem was that their previous advisers were rotated out of Iraq

and the new advisers had not yet gained their trust. When training a foreign force, the

advisers accompanying it into battle must be trusted. This trust takes a considerable

amount of time to be built. 619

The demonstrated unreliability of Iraqi security forces was a strategic failure for

the entire approach in Iraq. If the Iraqis, who had been trained by the U.S., would not

stand next to them and fight, what did it say about the entire occupation? This refusal

also illustrated the flaws in the U.S. training plan. The Iraqi police and soldiers also

lacked body armor, uniforms, vehicles, radios, rifles, ammunition and night vision

618 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq . P. 339. 619 Ibid. P. 340. 168

gear. 620 The Iraqis saw this lack of resources as a further signal of the low importance the

U.S. placed on their effectiveness. The combination of these reasons led 3000 police officers and 12,000 troops to leave the rolls the week of April 17, 2004. Although these failures were a significant hurdle to overcome, the ISF quality has improved over time.

As of February 2007, DoD reported that it had trained and equipped 327,000 Iraqi security forces. The increased visibility of these newly trained forces is one of the successes of the program. 621 However, while the Iraqi security forces had grown in size and are increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations, they and MNF-I had been largely unable to reduce the levels of violence in Iraq. Several factors have complicated the development of effective Iraqi security forces. First of all, they are not a single unified force whose mission is counterinsurgency. Only the Iraq army has counterinsurgency (currently) as its primary mission. This represents about 40 percent of the total Iraqi security personnel. Second, high rates of absenteeism and poor reporting procedures result in an overstatement of the Iraq security forces present for duty. Third, sectarian and militia influences have divided their loyalties. Finally, they remain dependent upon coalition forces for logistical, command and control and intelligence capabilities. Better information from the actual Iraqi units needs to be published in order to make good assessments as to individual readiness. This information, kept by MNF-I in its Transition Readiness Assessments, has not been published. 622

620 In testimony to Congress on June 23, 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld states that the vast majority of security forces have radios, vehicles and body armor. "Progress of the Iraqi Security Forces," in Armed Services House of Representatives , U.S. House of Representatives (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005). P. 6. 621 Krongard and Schmitz, "Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training." P. 3. 622 Christoff, "Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces." P. 2- 3. 169

Equipment also varies in terms of both quantity and quality. Most of the Ministry

of Defense’s equipment was purchased without support packages. Both mechanics and

spare parts are in short supply and fuel shortages are typical, all of which makes readiness

a consistent problem. 623 Iraqi forces have limited armored vehicles and most have only an AK-47 and a pistol. Often foreign forces and the enemy are both better equipped.

The uncertainty of Iraqi loyalties prevents coalition forces from providing more and better equipment (both weapons and vehicles) to them. 624

The Iraqi Army and the Special Forces have made significant progress in their capabilities over the last four year; some successful examples of mostly independent operations include those in Karbala in August 2007, Basra in April 2008 and Sadr City in

May 2008. However, the Iraqi Police Service, National Police and border security forces are still largely ineffective. 625 Without the continued support and assistance from the

Coalition Military Transition Teams, the ISF will be unable to provide security for

Iraq. 626 Additionally, the Iraqi Security Forces will continue to rely on the Coalition to provide key resources such as aviation, communication, intelligence, logistics, maintenance, and training. In the near term, the forces will be unable to secure their borders against threats. 627 Sectarian violence and military control of local security is still an issue and continue to impede development of the Iraqi Security Forces capabilities. 628

623 Oliker, Iraqi Security Forces: Defining Challenges and Assessing Progress . P. 3. 624 Ibid. P. 4 625 Jones, The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq . P.39. 626 Ibid. P. 35. and Benchmark Assessment Report (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2007). P. 24. 627 David M. Walker, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks (Washington D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2007). P. 65. Jones, The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq . P. 46. 628 Solis, "Operation Iraqi Freedom: DoD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces' Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed." p.8. 170

Many neighborhoods have become divided along religious affiliations. 629 Finally, Iraqi

Security forces are still not providing even-handed enforcement of the law. 630

As of October 2008, on any given day in Iraq, 140,000 Iraqi soldiers are on duty.

That includes some 1000 that are in jail, 2000 in the hospital or recuperating from injuries, and around 1000 are absent without leave. Nobody, in fact, really knows exactly how many Iraqis are actually on duty. 631 The Iraqi Army’s 7 th Division reported 11,478 personnel on the payroll in August 2008. Of those, only 7556 were on duty, with 20-25% on leave. The rest were in training, dead, absent without leave or injured. 632 Part of this

problem has been the U.S. effort to contract out the counting of soldiers. More than two

years ago, the U.S. hired a private contractor to keep count of how many Iraqis showed

up to work as policemen and soldiers. Military officials continued paying the contractor

despite complaints that the system didn’t work. 633

Summary

The entire security situation in Iraq depends on the successful training, equipping

and manning of the Iraqi Security Forces. 634 To date, the U.S. plan seems to have been

ineffective at creating such an organization. The pressure to consider security forces

“trained” and ready for duty after only weeks of training further complicates the process.

A successful outcome is still possible, but the way in which the security sector reforms

629 Walker, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks . p. 57. 630 Walker, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks . P. 54-56. 631 T. Christian Miller, "Iraqi Army Headcount Still Unclear Despite Millions Paid to Private Contractor," (Pro Publica, 2008). 632 Ibid. 633 Ibid. 634 Patrick T. Colloton and Tommy E. Stoner, "Transition Teams and Operational Integration in Iraq," Infantry , November-December 2006. 171

were developed and implemented, illustrate the lack of integration, responsiveness, skill

and quality.

Conclusion

In the decade following Desert Storm, the Army suffered a swirling mix of

initiatives, lessons, bureaucratic dynamics, as well as policy and fiscal challenges as it

approached the end of the 1990s. 635 In order to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War

world, General Eric Shinseki drove the Army to transform into a more easily deployable

force. In the midst of this transformation, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001

served to speed its importance. The challenges specific to Iraq spurred further

organizational changes in the military.

The unpleasant lessons of Vietnam combined with peacekeeping operations

during the 1990s and the Revolution in Military Affairs penchant for high-technology

reinforced the Army’s preference for large-scale conventional war. Despite engaging in

numerous stability operations throughout the 1990s, the armed forces did little to bolster

their capabilities for civil reconstruction and security force development. 636 The

military’s promotion system heavily weighted assignments and schools that demonstrated

skill at conventional warfare tasks. The trend in the executive branch was to seek out

mild-mannered team players to serve as senior generals which reinforced the

maintenance of the status quo. 637 The Bush administration, in particular, publicly

denounced nation-building. All of these factors dissuaded military leaders from

preparing to undertake nation-building missions.

635 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom . P. 15. 636 Paul Yingling, "A Failure of Generalship," Armed Forces Journal , no. May 2007 (2007). 637 Ibid. 172

The training and education system within the Army is still primarily oriented to

conventional warfighting tasks, although there have been some significant changes since

2001. Training and education initiatives such as the establishment of JIEDDO, AWG

and PKSOI illustrate that the Army recognized its weakness in dealing with asymmetric

threats. The Center for Armed Lessons Learned is a great system for collecting and then

applying lessons at the tactical level. However, broader more strategic lessons are much

more difficult to apply. It was at the operational and strategic level that the military

experienced its greatest failures. Despite the organizational innovations, the four criteria of military effectiveness were not met. Operations in Iraq raised the bar for integration

and responsiveness. Evaluation of the military’s performance demonstrates that further

cultural, doctrinal, organizational and training changes are required. 638

Unlike the postwar planning process during World War II, the postwar plan for

Iraq did not integrate political, economic and security concerns. The end state for the

operations in Iraq was regime change—there was never a discussion of what would

happen once the Hussein regime was removed from power. Although the military was

responsible for implementing the civilian policy goal of regime change, previous wars

should have demonstrated that the military would be the default administrator of the

occupied territory. 639 Although Army planners discussed considerations such as urban

combat and protection of the oil fields, while broader concerns such as population

security, civil government and administration went unaddressed. 640 The failure of the

post-war plan to integrate economic, political and security concerns prevented military

responsiveness as the situation evolved from a conventional war to massive looting while

638 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom . P. 404. 639 Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941 . 640 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom . 173

the military stood by as merely an onlooker to the dismantling of the government. No

one had planned for catastrophic success.

Advising foreign militaries until the Iraq experience has largely been a mission of

the Special Forces. Completely rebuilding the entire Iraqi security apparatus is a mission

of unprecedented magnitude. The United States military did not possess adequate

personnel or training to effectively implement such a plan. Regardless of these

shortcomings, the Iraqi Security Forces number nearly 600,000 today. Despite the

numbers, the Iraqi Army has limited operational effectiveness, caused primarily by

deficiencies in leadership, lack of disciplinary standards, and logistics shortfalls. 641 The

Iraqi Police Service remains under equipped and compromised by militia and insurgent

infiltration. These operational realities indicate that the training of the Iraqi Security

Forces has generally been ineffective. Although a great deal of the problem remains at

the ministerial level, missteps in the implementation of the actual training of the forces

(using a mix of military police, U.S. conventional forces and contractors that were ill-

prepared for training a foreign military) certainly contributed to their inability to protect

Iraqi citizens. Criminal gangs still operate with impunity, cooperate with insurgents for

profit, and engage in smuggling of oil and antiquities. 642

The U.S. Army was responsible for planning for the postwar occupation of Iraq,

training and educating its personnel to undertake this task and providing security in Iraq

so that political and economic reconstruction could take place. Unfortunately, all three of

these instances illustrate a lack of integration, responsiveness, skill and quality.

Challenges still exist in each of these areas. Although there are myriad other factors that

641 Jones, The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq . P. 9. 642 Perito, Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police, and Facility Protection Service . 174 have prevented overall success in Iraq, the ineffectiveness in these three areas have significantly impacted the outcome to date.

175

Chapter 4: Explaining Divergence in Military Effectiveness Outcomes

Current military innovation theory can be organized into three main categories;

those that focus on threat based accounts, the qualities of military organizations or civil-

military relations. The literature on threat focuses on changes in the international

political system and its effect on civilian leaders’ intervention in military affairs. 643

Threat as an explanatory variable is ambiguous on its impact on military effectiveness;

Posen suggests that a low degree of threat inhibits effectiveness, while Rosen suggests that peacetime enables effectiveness. 644 This chapter explores the level and diversity of

threat to determine whether or not it can explain the divergence in military effectiveness

outcomes. The level and diversity of threat are not sufficient or necessary for effective

innovation to occur.

On the other hand, qualities of military organizations and civil-military relations

do hold some explanatory power in terms of effective innovation. Military reformers are

necessary, yet not sufficient for innovation to occur. The quality of civil-military

relations, particularly the degree of trust has an impact on military effectiveness. 645

Conflict laden-relations between political and military leaders are harmful to national

security; while, cooperative relationships facilitate integration, responsiveness, skill and

quality of military forces. 646 What enabled effective innovation in Germany was the

presence of military reformers, cooperative civil-military relations and trust between

civilian and military leadership. Unfortunately none of these factors alone seem

643 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars . 644 Ibid. and Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military . 645 Egnell, "Explaining US and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: The Civil- Military Dimension." Snider, Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions . 646 Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness." 176 sufficient to spur military innovation. What prevented innovation in the Iraq case is that despite the presence of several military reformers, the civil-military nexus was particularly adversarial with almost a complete lack of trust at the highest levels.

Most work in U.S. civil-military relations focuses on the interactions between senior members of the executive branch and military leaders. 647 Congress, the industrial base, and society also interact with the military; however, this study argues that the most important relationship is between key executive branch officials (the President and

Secretary of Defense in particular) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the relevant combatant commanders. Public statements by the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the high-ranking military officers indicate the level of trust present between the military as an institution and its civilian masters. Since public statements are usually vetted as well as present best-case scenarios, they will typically overstate the trust between the two.

In each case, I will examine the level and diversity of international threat, the presence or absence military reformers and the level of cooperation and trust between the civilian and military leadership in order to explain the divergence in military effectiveness. Facets such as competency and honesty influence the amount of trust present between military and civilian leaders. 648 Trust will be judged by examining public statements by executive branch and high-ranking military officers about each other, especially perceptions of their competency and honesty. Ultimately, military

647 Ibid. 648 Leland suggests that competency and honesty are two useful proxies for trust. See Jonathon Leland, Daniel Houser, and Jason Shachat, "Measuring Trust and Trustworthiness," (National Science Foundation, 2004). 177

reformers as well cooperation and trust between civilian and key military leaders are all

necessary for effective innovation.

Germany

In the immediate postwar period, the United States, along with its allies, pursued

the nation-building of Germany. 649 Initially the United States Army established a military government to administer the conquered territory. Soldiers trained at the School of Military Government were assigned through the European Theater of operations to provide support to combat units in the transition from war to peace. The post-war plan,

Eclipse, gave units explicit guidelines and tasks to accomplish in the aftermath of combat. Finally, the U.S. constabulary force filled the law-and-order gap until a professional German police force could be established. This section will examine the variables that enabled these effective innovations to be implemented.

International Threat 650

Threats in the international system have been credited with spurring military

innovation. 651 In particular, threats to state survival create incentives for states to adjust their military activities to compete effectively. 652 When national survival depends on battlefield success, states should be highly responsive to threats; therefore, the external threat environment should be causally linked to military effectiveness. 653 In periods of

rising international tensions, we should see better political-military coordination, which

649 Dobbins and others, America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq . p. 7. 650 Other international factors that influence military effectiveness include global norms, competition, and international organizations according to the following source: Risa A. Brooks, "Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness," in Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness , ed. Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). P. 17. 651 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars . 652 Goldman, "International Competition and Military Effectiveness: Naval Air Power, 1919-1945." P. 158. 653 Ibid. P. 158. 178

increases integration. Posen hypothesizes that this is because civilians will intervene to

ensure that the military is prepared to address external threats. 654 Military organizations

implicitly have an incentive to innovate in response to new threats and vulnerabilities.

However, a threatening environment can be detrimental to quality if there is insufficient

time or resources to make significant changes. 655

On the other hand, Posen suggests that when threats are low, we should expect less political-military coordination and poorer integration because parochial interests take priority. 656 Civilian priorities can also undermine military capabilities or their efforts to innovate, particularly in times of budget constraints. 657 In times of low external threats, defense budgets fall and interservice rivalry increases as each service tries to protect their interests.

Stephen Rosen, however, argues that during peacetime, the military has the time to reassess its organization and performance, thus creating an environment in which innovation can flourish. 658 This contradicts Posen’s assertion that in peacetime, organizations fall back on their bureaucratic processes and inertia sets in, preventing innovation. 659 This disagreement makes it unclear as to whether low threat or high threat is more likely to foster innovation or military effectiveness. How the military itself responds to the threat environment is what really drives whether or not innovation will occur during periods of low threat.

654 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars . 655 Ibid. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military . 656 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars . 657 Meese, “Defense Decision Making under Budget Stringency: Explaining Downsizing in the United States Army”. 658 Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military . 659 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars . 179

In the World War II case, the United States faced a low threat prior to the attack

on Pearl Harbor. Geographically isolated, especially from the economic devastation

caused by World War I, the United States seemed invulnerable to events in Europe or in

the Pacific. During the interwar period, declining defense budgets imply that the U.S.

Army would have been of lower quality and less responsive due to high bureaucratic

rivalry among the other services. This should have been to the detriment of the army’s capabilities, especially since the navy was given the majority of resources in the interwar period; the overarching belief was that the Navy was the only necessary line of defense. 660 Furthermore, the parochial organizational agendas should have led to less

integration.

Despite these predictions, the United States Army was surprisingly responsive to

both the requirements of the conventional war in both theaters of operation as well as the

occupational duties required after the war. Chapter three discussed the successful

integration of political, economic and military concerns in the preparation for post-war

tasks as well as the planning for the occupation of Germany. The Army also

demonstrated skill and quality in its execution of nation building. The low threat

environment in the interwar period predicts less integration, responsiveness and quality,

which seem to contradict the performance of the U.S. Army in Germany.

Although the level of threat does not seem to offer any explanatory power in

terms of the effectiveness of the U.S. Army during the World War II era, diversity of

threat may offer some explanation of why the military was effective. Emily Goldman

suggests that diversity of threat may explain divergence in integration, responsiveness

660 Watson, The War Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations . P. 15. 180

and quality of equipment. 661 Diversity of threat captures whether the state confronts an overarching enemy or dominant scenario that makes strategic priorities clear, or whether the state faces multiple enemies and competing strategic requirements.662 A diverse threat environment makes it more difficult to assess the most likely threat, therefore, producing ambiguous political guidance leading to less integration, responsiveness and quality.

The U.S. Army between the two World Wars had few duties in peacetime. The main strategic concern of policymakers was the Pacific and the possibility of Japanese aggression. 663 The low diversity of threat permitted civil-military consensus that the U.S. strategic priority was in the Pacific, with even army planners giving this significant attention. This may explain the successful integration, responsiveness and quality of the navy, but doesn’t explain why the army was so prepared and effective in the European theater, since this was not the priority threat identified through national security policy.

The United States in the interwar period pursued foreign policies most responsive to economic and domestic social issues, not security concerns. 664 Peacetime military policy provided for small military constabulary forces capable of wartime expansion. 665

Low levels of spending on defense, approximately two percent of GNP, also reflect the perception of the low level of threat in the interwar period. 666 The budget-constrained environment combined with the American desired to remain isolated should have resulted in a corresponding decline in military effectiveness. Furthermore, the priority given to

661 Goldman, "International Competition and Military Effectiveness: Naval Air Power, 1919-1945." P. 165. 662 Ibid. P. 165. 663 Maurice Matloff, "The American Approach to War," in The Theory and Practice of War , ed. Michael Howard (London: Cassell, 1965). P. 228 664 Murray and Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period . P. 333. 665 Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness: The Second World War . p. 45. 666 Ibid. p. 48. 181

the Pacific as the most likely threat to U.S. national security should have prevented

innovation with respect to nation-building tasks, especially those focused on Europe.

Therefore, military effectiveness in nation-building does not seem to be explained by

variation in the level or diversity of threat. Threat may matter when discussing the

reasons for effective innovation in conventional military tasks in expectation of an

interstate conflict. However, threat alone does not seem to be the impetus for innovation

nor does it predict military effectiveness in nontraditional military tasks. If anything, the

threat of conflict between states provides incentives to focus solely on the immediacy of

war at the expense of nation building preparation.

Reformist Military Leadership

Military leadership influences all aspects of effectiveness. 667 Reformist military leaders with an understanding of the situation ensure responsiveness by communicating priorities to their subordinates and coordinating with political leaders. 668 Innovative leaders also can improve integration by ensuring that the military responds quickly to developments in the field and that those responses remain consistent with strategic goals and operational plans. 669 Without military leadership commitment, effective innovation simply won’t happen. During the World War II era, there were several illustrations of

667 Ground combat forces continue to stress leadership and command as the keys to success for the institution. See Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Conner, The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century , Second ed., Cass Military Studies (London: Routledge, 2006). p. 73. Brooks also suggests that poor leadership harms integration and responsiveness. Competent leadership is essential to military effectiveness. See Risa Brooks, "Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness: Egypt in the 1967 and 1973 Wars," in Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness , ed. Risa Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). P. 114. 668 Millett and Murray find that insight: understanding the situation is required for effectiveness. Intellect alone does not guarantee insight, nor do soldierly values such as integrity, courage, loyalty and steadfastness. Leadership of the right kind is required for effective military forces at all levels. See Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness: The Second World War . p. 334-335. 669 Yates refers to integration of civil and military planning as a significant indication of military effectiveness. Lawrence A. Yates, The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005 , Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006). 182

reformist military thought. First of all there was the Hunt Report, which was very

influential. General Marshall’s support for nation building tasks, as well as key members

of the general staff also made a significant difference. The insight and efforts of these

military reformers led to the effective implementation of several key innovations.

Prior to World War II, American armed forces participated in a surprisingly large

number of military or quasi-military governments. 670 Unfortunately, the military was ill

prepared in nearly every case. 671 This was even true of the American occupation of the

Rhineland, the perhaps best-conducted job of military government. 672 This occupation

spurred COL I.L. Hunt, the Civil Affairs Officer in charge of the American military

government to write an extensive report on the subject.

“The history of the United States,” said COL Hunt “offers an uninterrupted series

of wars which demanded their aftermath the exercise by its officers of civil governmental

functions. Despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the

Southern States, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines, and elsewhere, the

lesson has seemingly not been learned. In none of the service schools devoted to the

higher training of officers has a single course on the nature and course on the nature and

scope of military government been established.” 673

In addition to advocating the training of personnel for occupational tasks, the

Hunt Report explained what principles should govern military government. According to

his report, the following criteria should be used in future military government operations:

670 For a list of occupations and their success or failure see Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail." P. 90. 671 Yates, The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005 . P. 36-42. 672 Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors . P. 6-7. 673 Affairs, "Hunt Report Digest, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920." (Volume I, pg. 56-7) 183

undivided and centralized control, creation of separate staff departments for civil

administration, civil administrators of lower political subdivisions should serve on staffs

of corresponding military commanders, civil administrators should be selected possessing

special qualifications and there should be sufficient personnel for the work required.

Finally, civil administration should correspond to political subdivisions of territory. 674

These ideas gave the military leadership of the 1940s a framework to begin planning the

structure of military government and civil affairs.

Major General Allen W. Guillion, the Judge Advocate General of the Army, used

many of the principles enumerated in the Hunt Report in the development and publishing

of FM 27-5, Military Government, a statement of purposes, policies and procedures to

govern occupied territories. 675 Under General Guillion’s recommendation, an order of

the Secretary of War, on 2 April 1942, established the school known as the School of

Military Government at the University of Virginia. 676 This school had been conceived to remedy a potential deficiency by providing the Army with a nucleus of trained military government officers. 677 However, the country was then plunged into a global war and long before the first class assembled at Charlottesville, the Army’s eventual engagement in military government was inevitable. 678 What had been a contingency was soon to

become a reality and a vital one.

674 Ibid. 675 FM 27-5, Military Government, was first published 30 July 1940 and then revised twice, 22 December 1942 and 22 December 1943. This manual also assigned responsibility for military government personnel, training, and planning to the G1. 676 On 15 September 1940, the G1 proposed beginning to train officers for military government and reconstruction. In the fall of 1941, General Guillion briefly acquired an additional assignment; besides being Judge Advocate General, he became Provost Marshal General. See Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946. 677 Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors . P. 10-11. 678 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946 . 184

Furthermore, General Guillion established on 25 July 1942 in the Provost Marshal

General’s Office a Division of Military Government, the function of which was to engage

in broad planning for military government. 679 He envisioned that the task of the Army

would be largely administrative. Most of the larger policies of any occupation would be

determined by agencies other than the War Department or the Army. Political policy

would be formulated by the State Department, fiscal policy by the Treasury Department,

economic policy by the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare, or both, and

so forth. It would be the duty of the Army to administer these policies during the initial

period of military necessity and therefore, it would be necessary to train personnel to

execute these duties. MG Guillion thought that the obligation implicit in the Army’s

mission of military government was, perhaps, of as great importance as any connected

with the war. The termination of hostilities would probably leave the American army as

the sole agency capable of initiating the reconstruction process in wide areas scattered all

over the world. 680

Joint efforts by the Army and other agencies of the government would be needed.

The American occupation of the Rhineland took 250,000 American troops. The number

of military Civil Affairs personnel required there was 213, or 1% of the armed forces. 681

In the 1918 occupation, local German officials were extensively used in the functioning

of local institutions. Under the WWII conditions in Germany, it would be unwise to keep

Nazi officials in office or in key positions. Due to these factors, more Army personnel

would be required than in the previous occupation. In sharp contrast to the Allied forces,

679 Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors . P. 9. 680 Memorandum from BG Wickersham (SOMG) to The Provost Marshal General. (17 June 1942) 681 Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors . P.12. 185

the Germans and Japanese had long anticipated such needs and trained for many years on

military government tasks.

General John Henry Hilldring, appointed the first Director of the Civil Affairs

Division, thought that political, economic, fiscal, relief and social considerations that did

not enter into military determination would compound the civil affairs mission of the

army. 682 General Hilldring took his new responsibility as the head of the Civil Affairs

Division to mean that he would handle all planning, policy making, issuing of basic directives, coordination and supervision of all army responsibilities with respect to military government. Having already served as a division commander, he understood the importance of integrating the efforts of civil affairs with combat forces. Furthermore, he made cooperating and coordinating with the navy a priority, ensuring the success of the

Joint Civil Affairs Committee. 683

General George Marshall was the Chief of Staff of the Army during the

establishment of the School of Military Government as well as the Civil Affairs Division;

he was an avid supporter of these programs. His opinion was that during a military

occupation, civil affairs are the responsibility of the commander concerned. The Civil

Affairs Division had the mission of assisting theater commanders with local problems,

but fundamentally, preparation of plans for civil affairs is an integral part of planning for

any specific operation. 684 This point of view was essential in the effective integration of

political, military and economic considerations in the governing of occupied territories.

682 Letter from General Hilldring to COL Karl R. Bendestsen, DAC of Staff, 8 December 1943, COASSAC. Reference found in Ibid. P. 110. 683 Ibid. P. 72-73. 684 Ibid. P. 73-74. 186

Part of why General Marshall was so supportive of innovation in nation-building

tasks was due to his own unconventional career. 685 He gained invaluable experience outside the army when he was dispatched to set up and supervise some 19 camps for young men in the Civilian Conservation Corps.686 Having also served in the Philippines he had a great appreciation of the difficulty in executing nation building as an Army officer. Although he had the responsibility of a governor of a large territory (half an island), he had received no instruction prior to his assignment. He thought proper training was important if the United States was going to continue to undertake nation- building. An indication of his support for this initiative was that he forced division commanders to stop sending sub-optimal officers to attend the training.

Marshall sent military government officers to Africa with the intent that they would go into Sicily and take charge of the villages so there would be a form of governance immediately. The villages were assigned specific officers and the officers were educated in connection with that village. Even from the initial class of students at the SOMG, there was a plan to integrate them directly into occupation plans. Once the officers made it to their final destination, they accomplished great things. 687 The vision of military reformers like General Guillion and General Marshall directly impacted the effectiveness of the innovations attempted during World War II.

During the Torch operation, General Eisenhower had a Civil Administrative

Section to coordinate civil and political matters. However, he requested that the State

685 Bland, Bland, and Stevens, eds., George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue . 686 Charles A. Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress (London: Routledge, 2006). P. 97. 687 Bland, Bland, and Stevens, eds., George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue . P. 453-454. A Bell for Adano by John Hersey, 1944 was written about this. 187

Department send personnel to assist with civil administration. Although the President

charged the War Department with all phases of the operation, the military leadership

recognized that the political and civil phases could be facilitated by the aid of the State

Department. 688 By including other experts in both the planning and execution of military

occupation, the military was more effective. Eisenhower’s firsthand experience with the

complexity of nation-building convinced him that planning and training for this mission

was vital to US success. He commented, “Sometimes I think I live ten years each week,

of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters.” 689

The U.S. armed forces in WWII consisted mostly of citizen soldiers: conscripts,

reservists, and after the Japanese attack, patriotic volunteers. Military leadership

consisted of dedicated and competent professionals who had carefully reflected on war

for many years. The best among them had taken advantage of the service schools, as

much to be with fellow professionals as to absorb the curriculum. 690 In the small army it was possible for an officer to know his entire year group, all officers of his branch, and many others, particularly those with whom he attended professional schools. George S.

Patton, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Omar N. Bradley, for example, had known each other for years before WWII. Army officers were keenly aware of the profound political and technological changes that would make a return to a frontier army mentality impossible.

Denied troops and hardware, the best among the officers carefully studied the art of war at all levels. 691 This small army mentality forced officers to take on innovative

688 Memorandum, George C. Marshall for President Roosevelt, 3 September 1942, OPD files, 381, Torch, Section 1. 689 Quote by General Eisenhower can be found in Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors . P. 3. 690 Henry G. Gole, The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934-1940 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003). P. 7. 691 Ibid. P. 8. 188

approaches to problems. The military leadership that developed in this environment

valued flexibility and responsiveness, further enabled effective innovation in nation-

building tasks.

The School of Military Government, the post-war plan and the U.S. Constabulary

Force were all effective innovations in large part because of the military reformers

present at the time. COL Hunt’s influential report set the conditions for change within

the Department of War. General Guillion’s implementation of the School of Military

Government established a body of knowledge amongst the officer corps to advise

commanders about military occupation and nation-building concerns. General

Eisenhower, as the commander of the North African campaign saw the importance of

civil affairs firsthand during the early years of the war. Finally, General Marshall’s

support of the innovations all set the conditions necessary for their ultimate effectiveness.

The fact that these influential leaders saw nation building as an important strategic goal

helped to insure that appropriate steps were taken to plan for it. Each of these leaders had valuable insight into the value that preparation for nation-building would provide the military. Their vision was essential in ensuring military effectiveness in post-war

Germany.

Civil-Military Relations

The nature of civil-military relations is an important variable for explaining

military effectiveness in complex operations. 692 Cooperative civil-military relations

enable military effectiveness both directly and indirectly. 693 The nexus of civil-military

692 Egnell, "Explaining US and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: The Civil- Military Dimension." P. 1042. 693 Ibid. P. 1042. and Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness." P. 248. 189

relations occurs at the level in the chain of command where strategic aims are created and

operationalized into effective plans .694

Trust is one of the most fundamental elements of an effective civil-military relationship. 695 How does one evaluate whether or not relationships are trusting when trust is not easily defined and to confuse matters is has a constellation of synonyms? 696

Furthermore, trust involves the continual accumulation and updating of experience. 697

The first trait that is relevant to this study is the expectation regarding others’ competence. 698 For example, the fact that one trusts a surgeon to perform surgery but not one’s mother results because there is a belief that the surgeon is competent to perform such a task, while one’s mother is not. Military leaders expect their civilian masters to possess a modicum of competence when crafting policy that the military will be forced to execute. Similarly, civilian leaders expect that the military will carry out their orders effectively and efficiently. Trust also concerns the expectation that another person will behave in an honest and benevolent manner. This study will use public statements of military and civilian leaders about each other to decipher the perceptions of competence

694 Christopher P. Gibson, Securing the State Reforming the National Security Decision-making Process at the Civil-Military Nexus , ed. Howard M. Hensel, Military Strategy and Operational Art (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008). And Snider, Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions . 695 In order for the military to be considered professional and to maintain the client’s trust (civilian leaders and the American public), they must serve the client effectively as a moral obligation. There are three important trust relationships: trust between the military and the American people, trust between the military and the public’s elected and appointed leaders, and trust with subordinate leaders within the military. See Snider, Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions . 696 Kenneth Newton, "Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy," International Political Science Review 22, no. 2 (2001). P. 202 697 For example, social trust in Germany increased steadily from 9 percent in 1948 to 45 percent in 1993. See Ibid. P. 204 698 Leland, Houser, and Shachat, "Measuring Trust and Trustworthiness." 190

and honesty. 699 Dissent by the military particularly diminishes the level of trust between

civilians and the military. 700

In order for operational effectiveness, the civil-military interface must operate in a

functional and integrated manner. 701 Therefore, if civilians support military efforts to

undertake significant change, it is much more likely to occur. 702 However, if the military

sees their civilian supervisors advocating for the status quo, they are unlikely to think or

act in innovative ways. 703 Effective innovation requires civil-military integration in the

form of mutual understanding and trust between the actors at the civil-military

interface. 704 The most important interface in American civil-military relations is that

between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 705 During the World War

II era, the military enjoyed a harmonious relationship with the president, the Secretary of

War and the Congress, marked by mutual respect, trust and honesty. This is not to imply

that there were not disagreements, or times when the President didn’t override his

generals; instead, when there were disagreements or military advice was not heeded, both

sides felt that they had been honest, respectful and heard.

Prior to World War II, the constitutional balance of power was clear. Military

officers worked for the president. The military was very apolitical with many officers

699 Most social science research has used primarily responses from simple survey questions. The empirical literature on trust has focused on National Opinion Research Center’s General Social Survey as a primary source for U.S. evidence on trust. See Edward L. Glaeser and others, "Measuring Trust," The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2000). There is great variation depending on education level, race and age. 700 Snider, Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions . 701 Janowitz argues that the military should be integrated with the political leadership in order to develop increased political understanding and sensitivity. See Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait . P. 420. 702 Stephen Peter Rosen, "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation," International Security 13, no. 1 (1988). 703 Military innovators need allied in the civilian political establishment according to: Murray and Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period . P. 359. 704 Egnell, "Explaining US and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: The Civil- Military Dimension." 705 Johnson II and Metz, American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems . P. 18. 191 even refusing to vote. Furthermore, senior military officers did not believe they had the right to appeal to Congress for more funds than the president had approved. 706 World

War II began a new era of civil-military relations. 707 The military ran the war with respect to policy and strategy. 708 The power of the military leadership reached unprecedented levels as they helped fill the void left by the various other departments within the U.S. government.

The president’s leadership style significantly affected civil-military relations. 709

Unlike his predecessors, Franklin Roosevelt relied more on personal relationships than on highly structured organizations in order to govern. 710 He favored blurring the lines of authority encouraging competition between subordinates while emphasizing flexibility and ambiguity. 711 Roosevelt made clear from the beginning that he was the commander in chief and was prepared to step in and countermand the military when required. Despite this, he exerted his influence in such a manner that friction was minimized. 712

706 Time and time again, senior military leaders reminded congressional committees that they were not allowed to ask for more than the president and his Budget Bureau had approved. Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress . P. 97. 707 The rise of the Soviet Union to superpower status and the onset of the Cold War forced a change. The US could not base its security on a small military, nor could it revert to its previous isolationist posture. One consequence was the emergency of a more visible and prominent National Security Establishment and military system as integral parts of the American political scene. Sarkesian and Conner, The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century . p. 60. 708 Huntington, The Soldier and the State . P. 315. 709 The reorganization of the War Department in 1942 changed the relationship between the president and the Chief of Staff. It made strategy, tactics, and military operations of special concern to the President and provided for his direct supervision of the Chief of Staff in these matters. See Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). P. 123. 710 Despite laboring under Roosevelt’s unsystematic practices, Stimson still commented that the President had been the most superb war president in history. Roosevelt played the primary decision maker about strategy even against strong opposition. Ibid. P. 107. Desch also lists twenty-eight decisions in which Roosevelt overrode the JCS recommendation. See Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment . P. 135-136. 711 Dale R. Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005). P. 24. 712 Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress . P. 113. 192

When Roosevelt became president, the concept of a Joint Chiefs of Staff had not

yet been established. 713 The precursor to the Joint Staff was the Joint Army-Navy Board, which consisted of six members, three army officers and three navy officers. The board played only an advisory role. Army members included the chief of staff of the Army, the chief of the War Plans Division, and the chief of the Operations Division. 714

By the summer of 1939, with war imminent in Europe, the army in the midst of limited mobilization and the Navy undergoing even larger increases, President Roosevelt issued an executive order that required the Joint Army and Navy Board to operate under his direction. In the months that followed, the Joint Board did not increase its responsibilities, but the chief of staff did. He dealt directly with the president without going through the service secretary. 715 This reorganization would set the stage for tensions between the civilian Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in future administrations. 716

President Roosevelt’s choice of General Marshall to serve as his Army Chief of

Staff set the stage for a cooperative civil-military relationship built on mutual trust and respect. When Marshall was still a brigadier general Marshall stood up to the president and disagreed openly with his decision to build planes at the expense of modernizing other military forces. 717 Five months later the president chose him above thirty-four other higher-ranking army officers to serve as his chief of staff. When the president told

Marshall he had been chosen for the position, Marshall informed the president that he

713 Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush . 714 Jr. Edgar F. Raines and David R. MAJ Campbell, The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command, Control and Coordination of the US Armed Forces, 1942-1945 (Washington D.C.: Center for Military History, 1985). 715 Ibid. p. 5. 716 Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century . 717 Nicolaus Mills, Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and America's Coming of Age as a Superpower (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008). 193

wanted the right to say what he thought even if it was unpleasant. 718 Roosevelt had no inhibitions about having his generals argue with him. In turn, the generals respected him for his willingness to hear their points of view, even if he moved in a different direction. 719 Marshall’s frankness coupled with his unquestioning acceptance of civilian authority gained him the full confidence of Roosevelt. 720 Roosevelt repeatedly offered

Marshall command roles during the course of the war, which were never realized because both understood that his contribution as expert advisor and honest broker in Washington was irreplaceable. 721

In addition to relying on his chiefs for the conduct of the war itself, Roosevelt used their expertise in the world of diplomacy. While basic directives spelling out policy during World War II originated in Washington, the manner in which the policy was applied was determined largely by top ranking officers overseas. Complimentary civilian organizations were never developed. Instead, the chiefs filled the vacuum providing military, diplomatic, political, and intelligence advice. 722 Senior military leaders did not feel inhibited about raising problems and concerns or disagreeing with the president in private. This cooperative relationship continued into the Truman administration.

Truman also relied heavily on the military for advice in all areas and felt such confidence

718 Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush . P. 29. Marshall also insisted the President call him General Marshall, not George. Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When American Helped Save Europe (New York: Free Press, 2007). P. 11. 719 Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress . P. 113. 720 Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, "Infusing Normative Civil-Military Relations Principles in the Officer Corps," in Future of the Army Profession , ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2005). p. 661. 721 Forrrest C. Pogue, "Marshall on Civil-Military Relationships," in The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989 , ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York: New York University Press, 1991). p. 205-206. 722 Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush . P. 32. 194

in their abilities that he frequently named senior military officers to what would normally

be considered civilian positions. 723

Another indication of the civil-military environment was the relationship that

General Marshall had with Congress. As a newly appointed Chief of Staff he was called

to testify before Congress about war preparedness. In 1940, Marshall told Congress that

he was opposed to massive, sudden expansions; but he also opposed waiting until the last

minute and then attempting the impossible. 724 He was extraordinarily consistent in repeatedly articulating what appeared to be a calm, deliberate, well-thought approach.

Although the President sometimes did not heed his advice, Marshall refused to plead his case directly to the public although he was encouraged to do so by several senators. He thought that kind of conduct would permanently undermine his reputation and reduce his credibility on Capitol Hill. Marshall wisely decided that in the long run the interests of the country and the Army would be best served by working as a team player with the

President at the head. 725

When the President finally agreed with Marshall’s assessment of needing a dramatic increase in appropriations, he let Marshall appeal to Congress. The appropriations bill would go through if President Roosevelt left it in Marshall’s hands for three reasons. First of all, Congress was certain General Marshall had no ulterior motives. Second, because of his consistency they had begun to trust Marshall. Finally,

Republicans could assure their constituency that they were doing it on Marshall's suggestion and not FDR's so they could back the bill without political loss. Sam Rayburn

723 Ibid. P. 35. 724 John T. Nelsen, General George C. Marshall: Strategic Leadership and the Challenges of Reconstituting the Army, 1939-1941 , Professional Readings in Military Strategy, vol. 7 (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993). P. 24. 725 Ibid. P. 24-25. 195

told the Speaker of the House, "Of all the men whoever testified before any committee on

which I have served, none has had the influence with a committee that General Marshall

has. When he takes the witness stand, we forget whether we are Republicans or

Democrats, we just remember that we are in the presence of a man who is telling the truth

about the problems he is discussing." 726 Marshall would tell the truth even if it hurt his cause; Congress respected him so much they were willing to give him things they would give no one else. 727

George Marshall was the standard-bearer with respect to effective civil-military relations for a generation of officers. 728 Marshall understood the strength of isolationist sentiment in the nation and the constraints it imposed on the military. He was deferential toward the legislative branch, but was such an honest and straightforward witness that he built a friendly and trusting relationship with Congress. 729 His stature on Capitol Hill not only enabled to succeed in gaining support for extra funds, but also allowed him to overcome patronage pressure to retain superannuated officers. When he became Chief of

Staff, he revitalized the army by seeking legislative authority to remove older officers.

He was admired on both Capitol Hill and in the White House for his willingness to speak truth to power. 730

During World War II, the Congress continued to cooperate almost instinctively and unquestioningly with the proposals of General Marshall. He fully believed in military subordination to civilian authority and displayed enormous respect and deference to Congress. He also impressed congressional committees by habitually speaking

726 Parrish, "Roosevelt and Marshall: Partners in Politics and War." P. 137. 727 Mills, Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and America's Coming of Age as a Superpower . P. 9. 728 Ulrich, "Infusing Normative Civil-Military Relations Principles in the Officer Corps." P. 660. 729 Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress . P. 97. 730 Ibid. P. 98. 196

without notes. 731 When testifying he was always frank and respectful. Finally, by

refusing to be drawn into political infighting and downplaying his personal role in

building up the Army, Congress saw him as extremely trustworthy. 732

Finally, the extraordinarily cooperation and trust between Secretary of War

Stimson and the Army Chief of Staff Marshall had a positive effect on civil-military

relations. How the two interacted had a direct impact on the overall effectiveness of the

military. Secretary of War Elihu Root was largely responsible for the relationship

between the chief of staff and the secretary of war. In 1903, he secured legislation

creating a War Department General Staff headed by a chief of staff. This was to prove

extremely important in conditioning Army views towards the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 733

The chief of staff commanded only the general staff; he lacked authority over the technical bureaus and the troops in the field. Over the years, an informal political alliance developed between the secretary and the chief of staff. The secretary supported the chief of staff when the bureau chiefs resisted his attempts to coordinate their activities; the chief of staff supported the secretary of war during appearances before

Congress. 734 Working together, they established much firmer control over the Army and in the process largely excluded congressional influence over the appointment and assignment of officers, one of the distinctive characteristics of American civil-military relations during the preceding century. 735

731 Parrish, "Roosevelt and Marshall: Partners in Politics and War." 732 Nelsen, General George C. Marshall: Strategic Leadership and the Challenges of Reconstituting the Army, 1939-1941 . p. 49-54. 733 Raines and Campbell, The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command, Control and Coordination of the US Armed Forces, 1942-1945 . P. 1 734 Ibid. p. 1. 735 Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century . P. 10-31. 197

Secretary of War Henry Stimson initially resisted the diminished role of his

office, but the pressures of mobilization and his personal respect for George Marshall led

him to accept the arrangement. 736 Stimson’s point of view was highly influenced by his youthful experience as a protégé of Elihu Root and his service as secretary of war in the

Taft administration. To him, command was vested in the president. When the chief of staff spoke, he spoke with the authority of the president, not in his own right. 737

Cooperation and trust marked the relationship between General Marshall,

Secretary Stimson, President Roosevelt and Congress. These relationships enabled

Marshall to suggest and implement changes that he thought were necessary to succeed in the aftermath of combat operations. The trust civilians had for the military leadership at the time led to a more responsive and integrated approach to the occupation of Germany because military leaders were able to truly plan and resource this enormous task prior to its execution. Supporting the SOMG and the establishment of the U.S. Constabulary

Force led to a more skilled and prepared force to undertake nation building tasks.

Without this trust and cooperation at the nexus of the civil-military relationship, military reformers would not have been effective.

Iraq

The U.S. Army developed several new training programs in order to prepare itself for the Iraq War; however, the initiatives largely lacked integration and responsiveness to the complicated post-war situation facing U.S. soldiers in Iraq. The focus of the armed forces remained primarily on conventional warfare tasks at the expense of their effectiveness in the establishment of a functioning state. The lack of a coherent and

736 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War . p. 330-331. 737 Raines and Campbell, The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command, Control and Coordination of the US Armed Forces, 1942-1945 . p. 6. 198 coordinated postwar plan that addressed basic governance and economic issues also contributed to Iraq’s devolution. Finally, reliance on the Iraqi Security Forces to provide security remains problematic. What led to the dramatic difference in military effectiveness in the Iraq case and the Germany case? This section will examine the variables of international threat, reformist military leaders, and civil-military relations to explain the difference in effectiveness outcomes.

International Threat

The level and diversity of threat may have important consequences for military effectiveness. 738 In the period after the Cold War, the likelihood of a major war or a nuclear exchange between major powers had diminished. Defense declined as an issue of general public concern, making such it a lower priority to elected officials.739 Given this decrease in the level of threat, we should expect to see a corresponding decline in military effectiveness. Declining defense budgets and organizational inertia lead to less integration, responsiveness and lower quality forces. 740 The drastic change in the international system, however, caused in increase in the diversity of threat. This also adds to challenges with military effectiveness. When there is a higher degree of threat diversity, we should also expect to see diminished integration, responsiveness and quality. As chapter three pointed out, the Iraq War illustrated a general lack of military effectiveness with respect to nation-building tasks. A decline in threat and a diversity of threats may explain part of this lack of effectiveness.

738 Goldman, "International Competition and Military Effectiveness: Naval Air Power, 1919-1945." P. 179. 739 Richard Lacquement, Shaping American Capabilities after the Cold War (Westport: Praeger, 2003). p. 144. 740 Goldman, "International Competition and Military Effectiveness: Naval Air Power, 1919-1945." p. 164. 199

A crucial guidepost for national security policy considerations is threat.741 After the Cold War ended, there was a general feeling that the overwhelming threat had receded. 742 Decision makers within the United States Government reformulated national security policy with little certainty as to what challenges might lay ahead. Soft power was given a greater role in the new world order with the rise of interdependence. Long- term economic strength, as the basis for both soft and hard forms of power also became more important. 743 The end of the Cold War began a series of military drawdowns and budget cuts. 744 The new military strategy contained four central concepts: strategic nuclear deterrence, forward-presence, response to regional crises and reconstitution.

Smaller threats could be countered with fewer standing forces because longer warning time would allow for a reconstitution of more military capabilities if needed.

Furthermore, the Army’s was fixated with the Revolutionary in Military Affairs

(RMA)—the idea that technology was the answer to every problem, to the point that they forgot that warfare is ultimately a human endeavor.

The forward presence of forces in particular was seen as a means to deter war.

This line of thinking gave rise to an increase in operations other than war. Instead of a major conventional war, peace operations dominated the activities of the U.S. military since the end of the Cold War. President Clinton’s national security strategy noted its importance as a critical military contribution to shaping the international security

741 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Anarchic Structure of World Politics," in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues , ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, Inc., 2003). 742 Jordan, Taylor Jr., and Mazarr, American National Security . p. 544. 743 Joseph S. Nye Jr., "American Power and a Post-Cold War World," in Facing the Future: American Strategy in the 1990s (Aspen: Aspen Institute, 1991). 744 The FY1998 budget request was 40 percent less than it was in 1985, at the Cold War peak. As a share of GDP, outlays fell to 3 percent, the lowest relative level since before World War II. See William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997). P. 244. 200

environment. 745 Despite this proclamation, the American military considered these types

of operations a diversion from their primary mission: war-fighting tasks. 746

The aftermath of the Cold War left the U.S. without a peer competitor, increasing

the diversity of threat, making it difficult to know how to optimize the armed forces.747

At the same time, new states were expanding and developing their nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities (China, North Korea and Iran in particular). 748 New threats ranging from revolution and terrorism to conflicts associated with coalitions of drug cartels made national security planning and prioritizing increasingly difficult. 749 The clear separation between law enforcement responsibilities and military missions also became blurred because of the rising threat of non-state and transnational actors. 750 The diversity of threat presented a significant challenge to military effectiveness. Not knowing what threat to plan for led to less integration. Competing priorities led to less responsiveness.

A more diverse, but lower threat atmosphere was the key traits of the security environment from the end of the Cold War until 9/11. The attacks of September 11 th

changed the assessment of the threats against the United States. Suddenly national

security concerns became of the utmost importance. All levels of society and

government assessed and readjusted their security measures. 751 The change in threat

745 President William Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2000). 746 Deborah D. Avant and James H. Lebovic, "U.S. Military Attitudes toward Post-Cold War Missions," Armed Forces and Society 27, no. 1 (2000). 747 Lacquement, Shaping American Capabilities after the Cold War . p. 160. 748 Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, National Security: Policymakers, Processes and Politics . P. 31. 749 Jonathan M. Winer, "International Crime in the New Geopolitics: A Core Threat to Democracy," in Crime and Law Enforcement in the Global Village , ed. William F. McDonald (Highland Heights: Anderson Publishing Co., 1995). 750 Thachuk, "Transnational Threats: Falling through the Cracks?" 751 Lacquement, Shaping American Capabilities after the Cold War . p. 162-163. 201

should have given the military opportunity to innovate and to increase their

responsiveness with new doctrine. 752 The threat should have also improved political-

military coordination and thus integration. Effective nation building requires a capability

to integrate and plan for both combat and occupation tasks at the tactical, operational, and

strategic levels. 753 In cases where only coordination, not integration, occurred between

the combat and postconflict planners, combat operations have overridden nation building

concerns. The Iraq War case (see chapter three) illustrates this dynamic.

Despite the U.S. Army’s long history of involvement in nation building, the

military did little to develop its capabilities for this type of mission. 754 The increasingly

complex threat environment made it difficult to ascertain the most likely threat. 755 The

United States Army demonstrated a lack of integration and responsiveness to the

complexities involved in nation-building during the Iraq War. Through evaluation of the

training and education system, the post-war planning and examining the performance of

the Iraqi Security Forces, it is evident that threat did not lead to military effectiveness in

the Iraq case. In both Germany and Iraq, the previous decade had been marked with a

low threat environment; therefore, the degree of threat cannot explain the difference in

military effectiveness outcomes. The key difference with respect to threat is the diversity

aspect: the Germany case illustrated a low diversity of threat, whereas Iraq demonstrates

752 Several new doctrinal manuals have been published since September 11, 2001 to address the challenges of stability operations and counterinsurgencies. See FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency or FM 3-07 Stability Operations. 753 Yates, The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005 . p. 35. 754 The same criticism exists for lack of preparation for protracted counterinsurgency. See Steven Metz, Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007). 755 Accompanying this uncertainty were policy proclamations against nation-building by senior administration officials. Additionally, American military culture views nation-building as a distraction from the Army’s primary mission: fighting and winning the nation’s wars. 202

a greater diversity of threat. This variable alone, however, does not account for the

dramatic difference in the two cases.

Reformist Military Leaders 756

Military leaders are essential to effective innovation. 757 In particular, leadership

is vital to the integration and responsiveness of a military’s effort. 758 Effective innovation was especially difficult after World War II because of the institutionalization of two things: Congress’ role as an active participant in the formation of military policy, and a grand strategy for most of the 20 th century that enabled the army to focus on planning for a conventional war in Europe. 759 Civilian leaders reinforced the army’s preference for conventional warfare by funding expensive weapon systems and by their policy proclamations against nation-building. Force structure and doctrine since the Cold

War fundamentally represent the preferences of military leaders. Military leaders have insisted that the missions of the armed forces remain essentially unaltered and that the specific threats have changed mainly in degree rather than in kind. 760

Historically, the dominant voice within the senior military leadership on issues of force planning, defense budgeting, and weapons development is that of the service chiefs. 761 They have a statutory obligation to organize, train and equip their respective services. On the other hand, the unified commanders, who are responsible for a specific

756 This section will evaluate the effectiveness of military reformers until 2006. General Petraeus had a significant impact on the effectiveness of the US Army in Iraq from 2007-present. Since he was not directly involved in the three ineffective innovations discussed in chapter 3, his influence will be excluded. 757 Military historians stress the importance of leadership traits to effectiveness. For further discussion, see Brooks, "Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness." P. 7. and Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness: The Second World War . p. 335- 336. 758 Brooks, "Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness: Egypt in the 1967 and 1973 Wars." p. 175. 759 Avant, "Political Institutions and Military Effectiveness." P. 88-89. 760 Lacquement, Shaping American Capabilities after the Cold War . P.142. 761 Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr, "Military Professionalism and Policymaking: Is There a Civil- Military Gap at the Top? If So, Does It Matter?" in Soldiers and Civilians , ed. Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2001). 203 geographic region, provide divergent professional perspectives based upon their particular responsibilities. 762 Cleavages between unified commanders and the service chiefs have developed over time as their views on use of force issues differ. Quite naturally, unified commanders have very specific concerns and priorities based on their area of the world; conversely, the service chiefs must grapple with political factors that unified commanders do not.

During the run up to the Iraq War, General Eric Shinseki was the acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Appointed as the Army Chief of Staff in June of 1999, he called for a transformation of the U.S. Army into a more lightweight, mobile, quickly deployment force. Having seen the rise of peacekeeping operations as well as the challenges presented in Desert Storm, General Shinseki advocated a more flexible force.

He foresaw the challenges of planning for only a conventional war and instead thought that versatility was vital to the changing situation that the Army would be confronted with in the future. 763 Although he recognized the innate tension between the military’s involvement in operations other than war and being prepared to fight a major theater war, the Army did not institutionally change under his tenure.

The majority of the uniformed Army leadership was shut out of the planning for the Iraq war with the exception of General Tommy Franks, the commander of Central

Command. General Franks was a product of the Army and his faults reflected those of the institution. The Army went into Iraq with a considerable amount of pride, knowing mainly victories. His war plan combined aspects of the post-Vietnam operations: the tank heavy thrust into Kuwait, the speed of the overnight takedown in Panama, the

762 Ibid. 763 Frontline interview: The Future of War Interview with Eric K. Shinseki. 204

precision bombing campaign in Afghanistan. The invasion plan focused on the fall of

Baghdad and excluded the tasks required to secure victory after its fall. 764

General Franks considered himself an innovator. 765 For example, as a brigadier general, he was the director of the Louisiana Manuevers Task Force, which was supposed to replicate the Louisiana Manuevers that propelled the Army forward into World War

II’s technology and doctrine. In reality, there was nothing innovative about the Task

Force, which spent a lot of money on digitization; but, it reinforced the idea that technological solutions could overcome personnel shortages. 766 Like Rumsfeld, he thought that the war in Afghanistan had demonstrated some of the principals of transformation—the utility of a small number of forces and the ability of technology and surprise to substitute for mass. Like many of his generation, he had no fondness for the

Clinton-style nation building. Franks had been to Vietnam and Korea, but never served in Bosnia or Kosovo, where Army officers had firsthand experiences on what it took to prevent ethnic fighting and build new governing institutions. CENTCOM had not been involved with nation building since the failed 1993 mission in Somalia. 767

Franks had told his commanders in early August 2002 that the State Department

would take the lead in planning for the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s removal. The

Army had done some planning for governing post-war Iraq during the Clinton years.

General Tony Zinni, the former commander of Central Command, had rehearsed both the

war plan and war-gamed the aftermath as well. His invasion plan had called for 380,000

764 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq . P. 130. 765 For a personal account of his involvement as well as his disdain for the JCS, see Franks, American Soldier . 766 The Louisiana Manuevers Task Force existed from 1992-1995. For more information see “Louisiana Manuevers: The First Year.” 767 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq . P. 24-25. 205

troops to control the country, although Franks asked for only 125,000 soldiers in his war

plan. Franks did little to pick up where this preliminary plan left off. Part of this may

have been influenced by his lack of nation building experience. Since Franks did not

serve in Kosovo or Bosnia, he was willing to leave the bulk of the phase IV planning to

other government agencies. 768

Following major combat operations, the majority of the occupation tasks fell to

the Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander. Originally this position was held by

Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez. Following the Abu Ghraib scandal, 769 the position

was made a four star billet, with General George W. Casey, Jr. taking over as the top

commander in Iraq in June 2004. In many ways, he was considered to be an accidental

choice for one of the most complex and challenging jobs in the military. 770 Regardless,

his reputation was as a forceful but low-key officer highly respected by Secretary

Rumsfeld.

General Casey’s plan for Iraq called for turning over responsibility for security to

the Iraqis, shrinking the number of American bases and beginning the gradual withdrawal

of U.S. troops. General Casey was rebuked by the Bush administration for openly

discussing troop reduction levels in 2005. 771 President Bush personally intervened to

play down as “speculation” all talk of troop pull-outs as it implied weakening resolve,

which concerned U.S. allies in the region. 772 Casey’s plan was aimed at illustrating to the

768 Ibid. P. 139-140. 769 Sanchez himself suggests that he took the fall for the Abu Ghraib scandal. After leaving MNC-I, his career was basically over. See Sanchez, Wiser in Battle . 770 Eric Schmitt, "The Reach of War: Man in the News--George William Casey Jr.; a Low Key Commander with 4 Starts to Tame the Iraqi Furies," The New York Times , July 5, 2004. 771 Casey had briefed that troop levels (then 138,000) could be reduced by 30,000 in early 2005 as Iraqi Security Forces would take on a greater role. 772 Philip Sherwell, "Bush Slaps Down Top General after He Calls for Troops to Be Pulled out of Iraq," The Telegraph , August 14, 2005. 206

Iraqis that the United States did not want to perpetuate its role as an occupier

indefinitely. 773 The plan, however, collided with the unraveling of the situation in Iraq,

which took most of the administration by surprise (to include General Casey). 774

Stephen Hadley, the president’s national security adviser, acknowledged in 2006

that the American strategy had crumbled. 775 Iraqi forces were unable to hold

neighborhoods and the sectarian violence continued to mount. As optimism collided with

reality, President Bush increasingly found himself uneasy with General Casey’s strategy,

finally accelerating his departure from Iraq. 776 General Casey argued that his plan offered the best prospect for reducing the perception that the United States remained an occupier—and it was a path he thought matched the president’s wishes. As Baghdad spun out of control, the president became concerned that General Casey was more fixated on withdrawal than victory.

In September 2006, the president signed off on a complete review of Iraq strategy, after becoming disappointed with the results in Iraq. General Casey insisted that a surge was unnecessary and might be counterproductive. Despite General Casey’s views,

American field commanders in Iraq, and officers in Baghdad, said they were surprised by

General Casey’s continued advocacy of withdrawals and consolidating bases. They

773 David E. Sanger, Michael R. Gordon, and John F. Burns, "Chaos Overran Iraq Plan in '06, Bush Team Says," The New York Times , January 2, 2007. 774 Ibid. 775 Casey kept reporting progress, but violence was up. Buildings would be cleared but various extremist or violent elements moved right back in. The Iraqi forces that were supposed to “hold” never arrived at full strength. U.S. forces did not stay behind to “hold.” Despite all of this, Casey held firmly to his leave to win strategy and reported that within 12 to 18 months, Iraqi security forces could take over security responsibilities. See Bob Woodward, The War Within (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008). P. 100-109. 776 Sanger, Gordon, and Burns, "Chaos Overran Iraq Plan in '06, Bush Team Says." 207 thought that American forces should focus on a greater counterinsurgency effort, which would require a substantial number of troops to protect the population. 777

In the end, General Casey’s performance as the Multi-National Force-Iraq commander has received mixed reviews. For example, John McCain threatened to vote against General Casey’s nomination as Army chief of staff because of concerns about the strategy he pursued in Iraq since 2004. 778 Woodward also comments that Casey’s promotion to Army chief of staff was considered a “soft landing,” the same position given to General Westmoreland when he left Vietnam. 779 Regardless, under General

Casey’s time as the MNF-I Commander, United States forces were largely ineffective.

Part of the lack of effectiveness may have resulted from a flawed strategy (and a lack of a post-war plan), 780 but certainly some of it stemmed from the lack of effective training and education and reliance on Iraqi Security Forces that weren’t prepared to provide security in contested areas.

Although no senior level military officer 781 emerged as a reformer during the lead up to the Iraq War, there were a series of mid-level military reformers such as Lieutenant

Colonel (LTC) John Nagl who wrote “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife” which exposed

777 Casey complained in 2007 to Congress that the Army spends nearly all of its time training for counterinsurgency operations, “to the detriment of preparedness” for other missions. Bryan Bender, "Army Is Warn Too Thin, Says General; Calls Force Not Ready to Meet New Threats," The Boston Globe , September 27, 2007. 778 Donna Smith, “McCain casts doubt on Gen. Casey as U.S. Army head,” Reuters, Washington D.C., January 21, 2007. 779 Woodward, The War Within . p. 295 780 LTG (Ret.) Sanchez for example argues that the Bush administration failed to craft a detailed strategy for success in Iraq that went beyond the use of military force. See David S. Cloud, "Former Top General in Iraq Faults Bush Administration," New York Times , October 12, 2007. 781 Lt. General David Petraeus is touted as the most flexible leaders in the military today. The division he commanded during the invasion, the 101 st Airborne Division, was arguably the most successful at reconstructing and governing a province in Iraq. Next, he was tasked with building up the Iraqi Security Forces. Finally, in 2007 he was appointment as the Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNFI). Most of the change in strategy from 2007-present has been credited to his vision. Unfortunately the outcome is still unclear to date and the army as an organization has not fundamentally changed. See Julian E. Barnes, "An Open Mind for a New Army," U.S. News and World Report , October 31, 2005. 208

the US army’s propensity to learn the wrong lesson. 782 For example, after Vietnam,

instead of learning from defeat, the US army concentrated its efforts on how to win a

high-end conventional war. Nagl suggests establishing a permanent Army Advisor Corps

because historically the Army has rarely given priority to those who train host nation

forces. 783 Many critics of the current advisory teams in Iraq suggest that those selected to serve have been chosen on a very ad hoc basis and their pre-deployment training varied widely. Nagl argues that professionalizing and institutionalizing the advisor capability is vital to winning in both our current wars and in future campaigns in the Long War. 784

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling’s scathing article “A failure in generalship”

pins the blame of the recent quagmire in Iraq on the generals who failed to prepare the

military adequately for the next war. 785 Yingling claims that there are three common

characteristics in great generals: courage, creative intelligence and physical fitness. 786

Only one quarter of three or four star generals have received advanced degrees in social

sciences or humanities or speak another language, both traits crucial to fighting a

counterinsurgency according to Yingling. Nagl and Yingling’s writings demonstrate that

some military officers within the command structure saw the lack of innovation as a

problem. Unfortunately for the military, LTC Nagl has chosen to retire and LTC

Yingling’s future remains uncertain.

Finally, COL H.R. McMaster, who wrote Dereliction of Duty , concluded the Joint

Chiefs of Staff in the 1960s betrayed their professional obligations by failing to provide

782 Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife . 783 John A. Nagl, "Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps," (Washington D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2007). P. 4. 784 Ibid. P. 5. 785 Yingling, "A Failure of Generalship." 786 Ibid. 209

unvarnished military advice to the civilian leadership. 787 When the book was published in 1997, General Hugh Shelton, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ordered all commanders to read it. McMaster, who has been singled out at particularly successful, especially in the Tal Afar campaign was selected from promotion to brigadier general and was made the general in charge of futures in TRADOC. The promotion list communicates to the organizational broadly what traits are revered and which are not.

This, in combination with a host of other personnel changes within the Army may indicate a change in thinking. 788

In the fall of 2006, General Pace convened a special internal review of the Iraq strategy with some of the rising stars from every branch of the military. Nicknamed the

Council of Colonels, they reported directly to the Joint Chiefs. They were shocked to find the Chiefs in the middle of wartime, more of less adrift, disconnected from policymaking, without a plan or a unified voice. 789 Although their advice and conclusions to the Joint Chiefs were sound, unfortunately none were taken to the administration and used.

Military reformers are necessary for innovation. 790 Although their presence alone

is not sufficient to force the military to change, without great ideas and advocates for

them, innovation simply will not occur. Several institutional factors foster innovation,

such as pathways for promotion for those who develop and implement new ideas. 791

Unfortunately, the current personnel system promotes those who have followed a very

787 H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997). 788 After the FM 3-24 was published, General David Petraeus was idolized and those who could not get with the program of innovation were fired. Many of these changes coincide with an improved civil- military relationship under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. 789 Woodward, The War Within . P. 169. 790 Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military . 791 Rosen also argues that the strength of intervention alone is incapable of changing the Army’s preferences except at the margin. 210

structured, traditional pathway. Reformers have not been revered since the World War II

era, which has been a consistent impediment to change.

Civil-Military Relations “The Constitution calls for civilian control of this department. And I’m a civilian.” Don Rumsfeld 792

“JCS had a lot less of a voice in this administration. The Pentagon in previous administrations had two voices. Not in this administration. It was just Rumsfeld.” Richard Haas, State Department, 2001-2003 793

“There are tensions still at the Pentagon. What strikes me is the degree to which they’ve been suppressed, and which officers have been told, “You will not voice dissent”—to the point that they don’t even need to be told that anymore. They just know, “You don’t voice dissent around here.” Thomas E. Ricks, The Washington Post, Pentagon correspondent 794

Military operations in the post-911 strategic context require close coordination

between civil and military components in order to achieve the desired political aims. 795

The civil-military interface is particularly important in creating and implementing

comprehensive and effective campaign plans that include all elements of national

power. 796 Cooperation and trust among civilian and military leadership are important

factors that influence military effectiveness. 797 This study will use public statements of

military and civilian leaders about each other to decipher the perceptions of competence

792 Scarborough, Rumsfeld's War: The Untold Story of America's Anti-Terrorist Commander . P. 136. 793 David J. Rothkopf, Running the World: The inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2005). P. 407. 794 Richard Sanders, "Interview: Thomas E. Ricks," in The Invasion of Iraq , ed. Richard Sanders (United States: 2004). 795 Civil-military cooperation is especially important in the increasingly complex national security environment according to : Egnell, "Civil-Military Relations in Peace Operations: Political Leadership without Micromanagement.", Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, National Security: Policymakers, Processes and Politics . P. 1. 796 Since the end of the Cold War, many important decisions fall in the overlapping area, between the spheres of civilian and military leaders, of joint responsibility. See Christopher P. Gibson and Don M. Snider, "Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National Security Decision- Making Process," Armed Forces & Society 1999. p. 195. 797 Furthermore, civil-military trust and collaboration leads to better policies. Ulrich, "Infusing Normative Civil-Military Relations Principles in the Officer Corps." P. 660. 211

and honesty. 798 For example, in 2006, a Military Times poll reported that 60 percent of

servicemen and service women did not believe that civilians in the Pentagon had their

“best interests at heart.” 799 This survey clearly indicates a decline in the trust between the

military and its civilian masters. Two important relationships indicate the level of

cooperation and trust between civilian and military leaders: that between the President

and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. 800

Political leaders use the selection process to identify those officers who are most

capable of working within the constraints set by political leaders. 801 It is increasingly

unlikely that officers reach senior military positions without having developed a least

some level of political acumen. Morris Janowitz suggests that, “Admirals and generals

who have achieved personal success within the system are not very likely to challenge or

tamper with the basic rules of the game.” 802 Ole Holsti similarly finds that senior officers express commitment not only to the “system” but to the civilian leaders who appointed them to the high ranks, possibly diminishing the potential for conflicts within the civil- military nexus. 803 Instead, it is more likely that the rising generation of military leaders

will suggest and press for innovation. In the Iraq War case, senior military leaders were

selected based upon their propensity to agree or go along with the administration’s

798 Most social science research has used primarily responses from simple survey questions. The empirical literature on trust has focused on National Opinion Research Center’s General Social Survey as a primary source for U.S. evidence on trust. See Glaeser and others, "Measuring Trust." There is great variation depending on education level, race and age. 799 Michael C. Desch, "Bush and the Generals," Foreign Affairs , May/June 2007. 800 Johnson II and Metz, American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems . p. 18. 801 Roman and Tarr, "Military Professionalism and Policymaking: Is There a Civil-Military Gap at the Top? If So, Does It Matter?" 802 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait . p. 368. 803 Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-1996," International Security 23, no. Winter (1998). P 37. 212

viewpoints and if they did not go along with the prevailing viewpoint of the Secretary of

Defense they were ignored or replaced. 804

During his presidential campaign, President Bush pledged to transform the

military into a leaner, more agile force. 805 After September 11, 2001, George W. Bush

was transformed, from a president, who was elected with fewer popular votes than his

opponent, to a popular commander-in-chief, rallying the nation and ordering troops into

combat against the terrorists and their allies. 806 His overall management style was to give guidance and to delegate operational responsibilities. His other overwhelming trait is

“instinct,” considering himself an instinctive thinker. 807

One of the most surprising developments of President Bush’s administration was the deterioration in the relationship between civilians and senior military leadership. 808

Campaigning for military votes in 2000, he promised that his administration would be dramatically different than the “anti-military” Clinton White House. Furthermore, his choices for top officials included two former Secretaries of Defense—Vice President

Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Yet, somehow, civil-military relations under the Bush administration have been as bad, if not worse than they were under Clinton. 809 The breach between Bush and the generals became so wide that the bipartisan Iraq Study Group explicitly recommended “the new Secretary of Defense should make every effort to build healthy civil-military relations, by creating an environment in which the senior military feel free to offer independent advice not only to

804 Woodward, The War Within . Scarborough, Rumsfeld's War: The Untold Story of America's Anti- Terrorist Commander , Woodward, State of Denial . 805 Lacquement, Shaping American Capabilities after the Cold War . p. 152. 806 Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress . P. 182. 807 Richard Brookhiser, "Close Up: The Mind of George W. Bush," The Atlantic Monthly , April 2003. 808 Desch, "Bush and the Generals." 809 Ibid. 213

the civilian leadership in the Pentagon but also to the President and the National Security

Council.” 810

Several other events indicate the president’s leadership style. For example,

President Bush rejected any blame for the chaos that ensued after the March 2003

invasion, instead pointing the finger at General Tommy Franks. 811 In 2006, when most military leaders, including the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, opposed the surge, he removed the top two commanders responsible for Iraq, instead taking counsel from General

(Retired) Jack Keane. 812

Neither the president nor Secretary Rumsfeld had much interest in the idea of nation-building. Bush had criticized the Clinton Administration for the practice during the 2000 campaign. Rumsfeld commented to the press on October 9, 2001, that defeating the Taliban doesn’t leave the United States the responsibility to determine what type of government Afghanistan ought to have. The president reinforced this sentiment in a NSC meeting when he said, “There’s been too much discussion of post-conflict

Afghanistan.” 813 The low priority given to nation-building tasks was repeated again in

Iraq.

Despite these proclamations from US civilian leadership, the prevailing strategic landscape in the 21 st century has been driven by operations other than traditional high intensity conventional warfare. 814 Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan require US armed forces to act primarily as policeman rather than soldiers; and in combat situations, post-

810 James A. Baker and others, The Iraq Study Group Report (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006). 811 Dan Frocking, "How Bush Uses His Generals," The Washington Post , July 16, 2007. 812 Woodward, The War Within . It is important to note that although most military leaders opposed the surge, LTG Odierno, the MNC-I Commander, supported a surge in forces. 813 Brookhiser, "Close Up: The Mind of George W. Bush." 814 Sarkesian and Conner, The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century . P. 143. 214

conflict operations must be considered. 815 Until stable security, governance, and basic services are established in post-conflict areas, the war is incomplete and the achievement of durable political objectives is unlikely. 816 Given these operational realities, reformist military leadership, cooperation and trust between civilian and military leaders are required to ensure effectiveness in an increasingly complex strategic environment.

In sharp contrast to the relationship General Marshall had with Secretary Stimson,

Donald Rumsfeld set a very different tone when he assumed his role as Secretary of

Defense in 2001, for the second time. He had been in the Navy, a NATO ambassador, a

Congressman, earned a small fortune as the CEO of a pharmaceutical company, run two government commissions, and served as the youngest defense secretary under President

Ford. 817 His concern over relations with allies was secondary to his extreme focus on the daily operations in the Pentagon and was uneasy leaving others in charge for even a day. 818

From the outset, Rumsfeld had established himself as an indomitable bureaucratic presence. The Bush team came into office believing that the military needed stronger civilian oversight and Rumsfeld exercised control with iron determination. 819

Reasserting civilian control of the military was his first order of business. 820 Upon arriving at the Pentagon, he made it clear that his aim was nothing less than remaking the

U. S. military into a leaner, more lethal force and that he had no problem micromanaging

815 Ibid. P. 144. 816 Nadia Schadlow, Charles Barry, and Richard Lacquement, "A Return to the Army's Roots: Governance, Stabilization, and Reconstruction," in The Future of the Army Profession , ed. Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2005). P. 251. 817 Scarborough, Rumsfeld's War: The Untold Story of America's Anti-Terrorist Commander . 818 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq . P. 6. 819 Ibid. P. 3. 820 Record, Dark Victory: America's Second War against Iraq . 215 the process down to the tactical level if necessary. 821 Furthermore, no war would stand in the way of this transformation.

In Rumsfeld’s eyes, the biggest obstacles to his authority and vision were institutional. All of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were holdovers from the Clinton administration and he was concerned that the JCS and its large staff were a rival source of power. 822 Rumsfeld’s goal was to replace the previous generals who he saw as vestiges of the old administration and in their place, a new generation of senior officers would be installed that he personally interviewed and approved. 823 He even interviewed several dozen officers in order to fill each of the most important positions of JCS members and combatant commanders. Rumsfeld began a “silent purge” of other officers and civilians and seized control of senior appointments from the services. 824

On September 10, 2001, Rumsfeld held a town hall meeting at the Pentagon to let officials know that he felt the main threat to a more efficient and innovative defensive structure was internal. 825 Rumsfeld also believed that he and his civilian advisors understood military strategy, doctrine, structure, and weapon systems better than the generals and admirals he encountered. He distrusted the uniformed military and instead relied primarily on civilian advisors, excluding the Chiefs and the Joint Staff from the more than 50 studies he launched when he took office. 826 These civilian advisors also

821 Boot, "The Struggle to Transform the Military." 822 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq . P.7-8. 823 Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress . P. 180. 824 Scarborough, Rumsfeld's War: The Untold Story of America's Anti-Terrorist Commander . P. 113 and 127. 825 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq . P. 9. 826 Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress . P. 181. 216

shared his lack of respect for the uniformed military furthering the “us” versus “them”

divide. 827

Several things indicate the sort of relationship Secretary Rumsfeld had with his

military subordinates. After September 11 th , Rumsfeld stood at the Pentagon podium day

after day with General Myers standing behind him, saying little if anything. This was a

substantial reversal from the days of the first Gulf War with General Powell at the

podium with then-Secretary of Defense Cheney behind him. Rumsfeld also spoke daily

with General Franks, the CENTCOM commander in charge of the campaign. This was

also a break from the past—General Clark had no direct contact with William Cohen

during the Kosovo campaign. 828 Several things can be inferred from these changes.

Rumsfeld either didn’t trust his military leaders, didn’t think they were competent or was

afraid they would reveal differences in opinion to the public.

The secretary of defense was determined to assert tight civilian control over any

military operation. Repeatedly he would answer questions directed at General Myers or

General Franks. After one such exchange, President Bush asked General Franks directly,

“Tommy, what do you think? The general responded, “Sir, I think exactly what my

secretary thinks, what he’s ever thought, what he will ever think, or whatever he thought

he might think.” 829 The elimination of the military’s voice from policy debates illustrates

the dysfunctional state of civil-military relations.

827 Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush . P. 381. 828 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (New York: Penguin Group, 2004). P. 307. 829 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002). P. 251. 217

Throughout the planning process to the Iraq War, Secretary Rumsfeld was, “like a

dentist’s drill that never ceased,” according to General Franks. 830 The CENTCOM staff

faced a “daily barrage of tasks and questions beginning to border on harassment.” The

Joint Chiefs, conversely, were kept at an arm’s length from the planning process. They

were not formally briefed until September 2002; nearly nine months after Franks had

begun to revise the Iraq War plan. 831 The deliberate exclusion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

from the planning process suggests that the Secretary of Defense either didn’t think they

were competent or didn’t trust that they would agree with his assessment of the plan.

Rumsfeld refused to give subordinates negotiating authority for interagency

meetings, thus clogging the process and forcing even minor issues to the senior leaders’

meetings. This became especially evident during National Security Council (NSC)

meetings. The NSC is a system that assumes cooperation among senior officials and

shared information with their counterparts. The organization itself is left to individual

administrations to decide its structure and functions. 832 Rumsfeld was able to exploit this

weakness in the system. In briefing his war plans at the White House, Rumsfeld would

routinely retrieve the slides and take them back to the Defense Department. He went as

far as to tell senior defense aides not to takes notes so he could better control the

information. 833 Rumsfeld didn’t trust anyone outside of the Department of Defense and

trusted only a few select civilians within his own department.

Frank Miller, the director of the NSC staff for defense faced an interesting

conundrum when dealing with war preparations. Beginning in August 2002, he headed a

830 Franks, American Soldier . 831 Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress . P. 185. 832 Jordan, Taylor Jr., and Mazarr, American National Security . P. 220. 833 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq . P. 148. 218

group called the Executive Steering Group, which was to oversee interagency

coordination for Iraq on behalf of National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice. He was a former naval officer and a 19-year veteran of the government’s Senior Executive Service.

One of his chief tasks was to coordinate among the various parts of the Rumsfeld

Defense Department. The Pentagon’s budget office, Feith’s office, General Myers’ Joint

Staff and Franks’ CENTCOM staff all operated as independent fiefdoms. 834 Many senior

and mid-level personnel in the Defense Department were big-idea people with a great

love of concepts, but did not care to manage the implementation process. 835

Miller had to call representatives of the Pentagon’s comptroller, policy office, and the Joint Staff to his office to try to work things out among them. They were so adversarial that eventually he held meetings three times a week, forcing the participants to produce charts indicating their progress on central issues. 836 Miller reported these results to the deputies committee and elevated policy decisions up to the principles or the president as necessary. There was such chaos that a weekly off-line meeting with Andy

Card, White House Chief of Staff, Condi Rice, National Security Advisor, Steven

Hadley, Deputy National Security Advisor and Scooter Libby, Chief of Staff to the Vice

President, was required to nudge Rumsfeld or others. In the Department of Defense, communication between civilian and military officials was catastrophically broken. The

Joint Staff was afraid of Rumsfeld and Feith and didn’t want to be seen as meddling with

Franks’ war plan. 837

834 Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City . P. 32. 835 Woodward, Plan of Attack . P. 321. 836 Ibid. P. 321-322. 837 Ibid. P. 322 219

In late 2001, Rumsfeld called a meeting of the senior military leadership to discuss the global war on terror. Greg Newbold, the three-star general who served as chief operations deputy for the JCS had the main assignment for the session. He was to outline Central Command’s OPLAN 1003-98, the Iraq war plan. 838 Newbold outlined the plan, which called for as many as 500,000 troops. Rumsfeld didn’t trust his opinion; he thought this was for too many troops and supplies and took much too long to execute.

This type of plan was everything that Rumsfeld thought was wrong with the military.

The defense secretary declared that he didn’t see why more than 125,000 troops would be required and even that was too many. 839 This war plan had been regularly exercised in war games and reflected long standing military principles about force levels needed to control a population of more than 24 million. Rumsfeld’s numbers seemed to be pulled out of thin air. He had dismissed the military’s plan and suggested his own force level without any objection by the generals present. 840

General Franks, the CENTCOM commander was tasked to develop a new Iraq war plan, but Rumsfeld would poke, prod and question it continuously. For the better part of two years, General Franks met independently with the president and Secretary

Rumsfeld as Rumsfeld continually pressured Franks to decrease the number of troops required for the operation. 841 Defense Department civilians moved into Franks’ planning cells to monitor his work, while the JCS staff was completely excluded. Since Franks reported directly to the secretary of defense, the chairman of the JCS was not his boss,

838 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq . 839 Others argue that Rumsfeld interpreted the Army’s calls for a larger invasion force was an example of what he perceived as foot dragging. See Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Rumsfeld, the Generals, and the State of U.S. Civil-Military Relations," Naval War College Review , Autumn 2006. 840 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq . P. 4-5. 841 According to CENTCOM planners, the final force ratio was 1:6 (friendly to enemy) instead of the 3:1 purported in Army offensive doctrine. 220 though he technically outranked him. This exclusion caused a great deal of tension between Franks and the chiefs. When Cheney was defense secretary he had interacted with Powell and left the JCS to deal with General Schwarzkopf, the Desert Storm commander. 842 General Zinni (the former CENTCOM commander) had briefed his

Desert Fox plan in the late 1990s to bomb Iraq’s suspected WMD sites to the JCS and the chiefs had even voted on it. These relationships imply that the Secretary of Defense didn’t trust his military leaders nor did he believe they were competent enough to develop an appropriate war plan without civilian supervision.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been kept at arm length for the entire planning process of the Iraq war. In October 2002, they were finally brought into the White House and given a briefing. Rumsfeld wanted them to meet only with the president, without

General Franks, Wolfowitz, Hadley and Libby. 843 The president asked for their opinion.

The Air Force Chief of staff said that the air plan was supportable. The Chief of Naval

Operations was concerned about weapons system production and opening a second front, but it was doable. Army Chief of Staff Eric K. Shinseki was the first to say that he worried the size of the force was too small. The rapid advance to Baghdad would severely tax the supply system, as the army would be strung out over several hundred kilometers. Still, Shinseki supported the plan. 844

The military-civilian difference was also divided over which would be more difficult: winning the war or maintaining the peace. 845 The civilian leadership of the

842 According to the following source, General Powell was the most influential decision-maker with respect to the Gulf War. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The General's War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995). 843 Woodward, Plan of Attack . 844 Ibid. P. 208. 845 Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad." 221

executive branch thought that the war would pose the real challenge, not what would

follow. For example, Vice President Cheney was explicitly optimistic, “I really do

believe that we will be greeted as liberators.” This expectation permitted planners to

scale down the planned occupation force to 50,000. 846

Military organizations are cautious when it comes to carrying out secondary tasks

lest they drain the organization of valuable resources and detract from the organization’s

ability to carry out preferred competencies. 847 Since the focus of the civilian leadership

was on winning the war, there was little incentive for military personnel to make

suggestions on how to plan or organize for the challenges of nation building. 848 There were several other indicators prior to September 11 th that demonstrated to military members that the administration was not interested in nation building: the reduction of forces in the Balkans, the closure of the United States Army Peacekeeping Institute and statements by key administration personnel that nation building was not the responsibility of military members. 849 These indicators would also serve as a barrier to innovation.

The civilian side of the Department of Defense and the uniformed services held differing views on many aspects of the war planning. Rumsfeld envisioned an entirely different type of war than had been fought in the past. The war he saw relied on a few divisions, backed by precision bombing from an arsenal of warplanes and missiles, steered by a constellation of sensors in the sky that could give commanders a round-the- clock look at the battlefield below them. 850 The lighter, more mobile approach fit

846 Ibid. P. 65. 847 Giordano, “The U.S. Army and Nontraditional Missions: Explaining Divergence in Doctrine and Practice in the Post-Cold War Era”. 848 Zinni in particular attempted to inform the civilian leadership about the challenges inherent in nation- building, but he was completely ignored. See Kitfiel, "The Generals' Case." 849 Rieff, "Blueprint for a Mess." 850 Scarborough, Rumsfeld's War: The Untold Story of America's Anti-Terrorist Commander . 222

perfectly with Rumsfeld’s larger goal of transforming the military from a lumbering

behemoth trained to fight a fixed enemy like the Soviet Union to a nimble, information-

age force able to move quickly to engage a range of potential threats around the world. 851

His concern with making “transformation” happen in the manner he thought important

took priority in war planning and gave the military further reason to ignore nation

building concerns. The Pentagon’s top generals had deep misgivings about these ideas,

but were reassured by Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz that the Iraqi army would fold

quickly in combat and that Iraq would welcome the advancing Americans with cheers

and flowers. 852 Since there would be only celebrations after the end of hostilities,

postwar planning (and therefore innovation) was not required.

In November 2005, the Department of Defense issues DoD directive 3000.05 that

declared stability operations 853 a core military mission. 854 Although issued by DoD,

Secretary Rumsfeld did not sign the document, but instead his deputy, Gordon England did. Furthermore, budget choices reveal the true priorities of the Defense Department and in investigating where money is being allocated, hugely expensive weapons programs are still a top priority instead of building more divisions. 855

The Iraq War, however, illustrates the absence of trust between civilian and

military leadership, especially between the Secretary of Defense and the top military

leadership. General Shinseki and Secretary of the Army, Thomas White, were both

concerned that Iraq about the troop levels. Iraq is as large as the state of California with a

851 Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing: America's War in Iraq . 852 Ibid. 853 According to DoD 3000.05, Stability operations are defined as the “Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions.” 854 Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05, November 28, 2005 855 George Packer, "The Lesson of Tal Afar," The New Yorker , April 10, 2006. 223

population of over 25 million people and they were concerned that there wouldn’t be

enough troops after the operation to provide security and to begin stabilization

activities. 856 Rumsfeld’s public and private response was that Shinseki and White didn’t

know what they were talking about. 857 Rumsfeld announced Chief of Staff, General

Shinseki’s replacement 15 months before his term ended. When it was time to pick a

new Chief, Rumsfeld rejected all the army’s serving generals and recalled General Peter

Schoomaker from retirement. 858

Another example of the distrust between the Secretary of Defense and the military

leadership was Secretary Rumsfeld’s personal determination of which units would deploy

to Iraq and which would not. The military had a computerized system for deploying

forces, the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL). The TPFDL

automatically determined not only which logistical and auxiliary units should be sent to

support the combat forces earmarked for the war plan, but also the order in which they

should be sent. It wasn’t perfect, but it was the only system the military had.859

Rumsfeld regarded the TPFDL as a wasteful anachronism that took the decision making out of his hands. Rumsfeld did not trust the generals to send the minimum force necessary and subsequently decided to be the arbiter of which units were to be sent. His basic philosophy was that the services are sloppy with their manpower and if left to their own designs, would bring too many people, too early. 860 He continually pored over

deployment requests and insisted CENTCOM explain why it needed each particular unit.

This was the first time a defense secretary managed the deployment process with such

856 Richard Sanders, "Interview: Thomas White," in The Invasion of Iraq , ed. Richard Sanders (2004). 857 Ibid. 858 Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress . P. 191. 859 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq . P. 96. 860 Sanders, "Interview: Thomas White." 224 scrutiny. Rumsfeld was not only deciding which units should ultimately be sent to

Kuwait, but also when the units should be altered for possible deployment, typically an

Army prerogative. 861

When postwar operations ran into trouble, recently retired generals and civilian leaders brought the fault lines into the public eye. 862 Lieutenant General Gregory

Newbold, former JCS director of operations, General Anthony Zinni, former head of

CENTCOM, Major General Paul Eaton, former head of the Iraqi training mission, Major

General John Riggs, Former head of the army’s transformation task force, and Major

Generals Charles Swannack and John Batiste, former division commanders in Iraq, all publicly called for Secretary Rumsfeld’s resignation. The controversy of the generals versus Rumsfeld may represent the worst break in civil-military relations since Harry

Truman dismissed General Douglas MacArthur. 863

According to General Zinni, “My primary issue with Secretary Rumsfeld’s leadership is accountability…Rumsfeld committed acts of gross negligence and incompetence.” 864 The perception that Rumsfeld was not competent illustrates the distrust between military leaders and civilian leaders. Many of the problems facing U.S. troops in the aftermath of combat operations were foreseen by previous war plans for

Iraq. The general continues, “Our warnings were brushed aside and we were personally attacked. Rumsfeld said our planning was ‘old and stale.’ That this was going to be a

‘cakewalk’ with ‘shock and awe’ and flowers in the streets, and Iraqi oil paying for

861 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq . P. 96-99. 862 Richard J. Whalen, "Revolt of the Generals," The Nation 2006. Martin L. Cook, "Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in Professional Ethics," Parameters 2008, Kaplan, "Challenging the Generals." 863 Kitfiel, "The Generals' Case." 864 Ibid. 225

reconstruction. Those were wild-eyed and patently ridiculous ideas.” 865 The issues

Zinni raises go to the fundamental judgment and competence of those entrusted with the nation’s most lethal levers of power. Major General John Batiste stated that his decision to speak out was a result of witnessing the arrogance of Rumsfeld and then having to live with the impact of his strategic blunders as division commander in Iraq, “as Rumsfeld ignored the advice of military experts during preparations for war.” 866 Lieutenant

General Greg Newbold goes on to list the successive policy failures directly attributed to

Secretary Rumsfeld: “Some of the missteps include: the distortion of intelligence in the buildup to the war, McNamara-like micromanagement that kept our forces from having enough resources to do the job, the failure to retain and reconstitute the Iraqi military in time to help quell civil disorder, initial denial that insurgency was at the heart of the opposition to occupation, alienation of allies who could have helped to rebuild Iraq….” 867

George W. Bush tapped Robert Gates to replace Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of

Defense in 2006, explicitly recommending that, “The new secretary of defense should make every effort to build healthy civil-military relations, by creating an environment in which the senior military feel free to offer independent advice.” 868 This statement is a clear indictment of the quality of civil-military relations during the tenure of Secretary

Rumsfeld. Statutorily there are two voices in the policy debate for a reason, in addition to civilian leaders, the military is supposed to have input into the decision-making process. Although civilians have the right to ignore or to disagree with military advice, military officers should at least be given the opportunity to voice their advice.

865 Ibid. 866 Ibid. 867 Ibid. 868 Desch, "Bush and the Generals." 226

The increased use of technology has also enabled decisions to be made at a much

higher level, reducing the opportunity to build trust. Satellite communications have

allowed decisions on the battlefield in Iraq or Afghanistan to be made at the headquarters

of Central Command or at the offices of the defense secretary or the president. 869 For the

invasion of Iraq to take place, General Franks, the CENTCOM commander had to put in

a request with the Joint Staff in Washington, who then had to work with the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, the Army Staff, the U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Army Forces

Command, the Army Reserve Command, and the National Guard Bureau to provide the

needed units. In the field, the chain of command ran from Bush to Rumsfeld to Franks to

the Third Army, to the Army’s V Corps or the 1 st Marine Expeditionary Force, then to

various divisions, brigades, battalions, companies, platoon and squads. This implies there

are at least eight layers of bureaucracy separating senior decision-makers from soldiers

with weapons. At command posts throughout Iraq, senior leaders were able to see

tactical level scenarios unfold before their eyes on their plasma screen television. The

general, who was commanding over 20,000 American soldiers, was able to implement

decisions down to the individual soldier level, such as ‘Follow the fourth truck.’ 870 In

such a system, trust becomes infinitely harder to build.

869 Boot, "The Struggle to Transform the Military." P. 5. 870 Thomas S. Sowers, “Nanomanagement: Technology, Monitoring and the Death of Professions” (Dissertation, London School of Economics, 2008). P. 1. 227

Summary

Cooperation and trust between civilian and military leaders alone are not

871 responsible for effective military innovation . However, it is a necessary condition for

innovation to occur. The only way that innovation is possible is if the military leadership

expects to be supported by their civilian masters. A cooperative relationship in which

trust is present enables military effectiveness by allowing greater opportunity for

integration and responsiveness in doctrine, training, education and planning. In an

environment of distrust, there are few, if any, opportunities for innovation. In particular

the secretary of defense plays a pivotal role in creating an atmosphere where the military

has the freedom to innovate. Likewise, the relationship between the president and the

advice he welcomes as commander in chief also plays an enormous role in influencing

the likelihood of effective military innovation.

Conclusion

This chapter offered explains as to why innovation was effective in Germany and

not in Iraq. First, the level and diversity of threat was investigated through both cases. In

both Germany and Iraq, the level of threat was relatively low until the surprise attack on

Pearl Harbor and 911 respectively. There was, however, a difference in the diversity of

threat. In the Germany case, national security policy was oriented to the Pacific region

with the concern of Japanese aggression foremost in the minds of policymakers. This

orientation does not explain how and why the U.S. Army effectively innovated in the

case of post-World War II Germany. On the other hand, the diversity of threat in the

period leading up to the Iraq War may have furthered deterred military effectiveness.

871 Authors like Brooks suggest that competition at the political-military apex are problematic for military effectiveness. See Brooks, "Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness: Egypt in the 1967 and 1973 Wars." P. 120. 228

Although threat may have been influential in the Iraq case, it still does not explain the

effectiveness outcomes in Germany.

The presence of military reformers is a necessary condition for effective

innovation. Civilian leaders did not play a role in either Germany or Iraq in terms of

encouraging innovation, particularly with respect to nation-building tasks. Without

military leaders who saw the value in training, planning and organizing for occupational

duties, the army would have been ineffective in the case of Germany. In the case of Iraq,

although there were military reformers at lower levels, the adversarial civil-military

relations environment worked to the detriment of military effectiveness and prevented

effective innovation.

Cooperative civil-military relations and trust between civilian and military

leadership all set the stage for military effectiveness in the nation-building of Germany.

Despite the presence of a few military reformers in the Iraq case, the civil-military nexus

was particularly adversarial with almost a complete lack of trust at the highest levels.

The most significant difference in the two cases was the cooperation and trust between

military and civilian leaders. General Marshall had the most cooperative relationship

with civilian leaders in the 20 th century. Not only was Marshall greatly respected by

President Roosevelt, but also his relationship with Congress was one of great trust and admiration; they never doubted his advice. These relationships stand in stark contrast to those between military and civilian leaders during the Iraq War. The exclusion of military advice from policy decisions, due to a lack of trust, affected the quality of the planning, training and organizing for the Iraq War. The difference in trust was more than just a personality issue between President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld and key military

229 leaders. Since World War II, trust has also generally been harder to generate because of the increased number of offices with political stakes in the national defense policymaking process.

230

Chapter 5: Explaining the Absence of Innovation in Korea and Vietnam

The previous chapter explained why innovation was effective in Germany and not

in Iraq. Both cases exhibited a low threat level, which did not explain the divergence of

military effectiveness outcomes. Diversity of threat in the Germany case was low, yet in

the Iraq case was high. Although threat may have been influential in the Iraq case, it

didn’t explain the military’s effectiveness in the Germany case. We would expect then,

that the high level of threat of nuclear war with the Soviet Union throughout most of the

20 th century would not cause innovation with respect to nation building in either the case of Korea or Vietnam. In the case of Korea, the military was torn in several directions; the army was governing both Germany and Japan while simultaneously preparing to face the rise in Soviet power. Similarly, in the case of Vietnam, wars in peripheral areas presented strategic challenges to the army, as did maintaining a focus on the threat of war with the Soviet Union. The high level and diversity of threat in both cases should work to the detriment of effective innovation in nation-building tasks.

The presence of military reformers was a necessary condition for innovation in the Germany case. Although there were also reformers in the Iraq case, the level of trust and cooperation was dramatically different in the two cases. Lieutenant General John

Hodge, who was responsible for the nation-building effort in Korea, was ill-equipped to deal with the complicated situation he faced in 1945. Having neither the training and experience, nor the personnel necessary to establish a democracy in South Korea, the nation-building effort there ultimately failed. In Vietnam, General William

Westmoreland was the most influential officer with respect to the policies undertaken by the United States Army in Vietnam. For the most part, General Westmoreland

231 concentrated on conventional military tactics, which ultimately were unsuccessful at building a democratic South Vietnam. In both the Korea and Vietnam case, there was a lack of military reformers who were able to positively contribute to the effective innovation of the nation-building efforts there.

Cooperation and trust between military and civilian leaders set the stage for military effectiveness in the Germany case. Conversely, distrust among the Secretary of

Defense and key military leaders worked to the detriment of military effectiveness. Since cooperative civil-military relations and the presence of military reformers were both important determinants of military effectiveness, this chapter will examine the same variables in the cases of Korea and Vietnam.

During the nation-building effort in Korea, civil-military relations became extraordinarily adversarial. The infamous firing of McArthur who had overstepped his bounds as a military officer led to a dramatic decline in the level of trust between the civilian and military leadership. At the same time, the distrust between the Secretary of

Defense and military officers contributed to the poor civil-military relationship. During

Vietnam, President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara were notorious micro-managers who seemed to completely distrust the military and their opinion. The poor quality of civil-military relations, in particular the lack of trust, should prevent effective innovation in both cases.

The purpose of this chapter is to determine if the level and diversity of threat, military reformers and civil-military relations explain the absence of effective innovation with respect to the nation-building efforts in Korea from 1945-1950 and Vietnam until

1969. The chapter will first discuss the Korean case and then examine the independent

232 variables to determine if they explain the lack of effective innovation. Next, the Vietnam case will be discussed, looking at the same variables to determine if they explain the absence of effective innovation.

Korea For decades prior to 1945, the Japanese colonized and subjugated the Koreans. 872

After the conclusion of World War II, the Korean people expected that they would be liberated by the Allied Forces and thus be an independent country. 873 Unfortunately for the Korean people, instead of being granted immediate independence, allied leaders agreed on implementing an international trusteeship over Korea. 874 As early as the Cairo

Conference in 1943, the post-war settlement for Japanese held territories stipulated that

Korea would “in due course” become free and independent. 875 The decision to postpone independence implied a transitional stage, which ultimately led to the failure of unification. 876

When World War II ended, American soldiers were thrust into the roles of occupiers and peacekeepers. 877 Although the focus of the Army in the Pacific was on

Japan, the Army also sent troops to the Korean peninsula to deal with the surrender of

872 In 1905 Japan established a protectorate over Korea and in 1910 annexed it. See Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1946 (New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1997). P. 99. 873 The long suppressed Korean desire for independence was emphatically proclaimed. See p. 23 in Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic (Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1966). Korea is a peculiar case in U.S. post-World War II occupation policy because they were treated more like an occupied enemy country than an ally. See Charles K. Armstrong, "The Cultural Cold War in Korea, 1945-1950," The Journal of Asian Studies 62, no. 1 (2003).p. 73. 874 It was widely held that the Korean s would not be ready for independence. Secretary of State Cordell Hull felt that trusteeship offered the most satisfactory solution. See Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War , ed. Harry Hearder, Origins of Modern War (London: Longman, 1986). P. 9. 875 Jongsoo James Lee, The Partition of Korea after World War II (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006). P. 5-6. 876 Choi Sang-Yong, "Trusteeship Debate and the Korean Cold War," in Korea under the American Military Government, 1945-1948 , ed. Bonnie B.C. Oh (Westport: Praeger, 2002). 877 Leonard Wong and Douglas V. Johnson II, "Serving the American People: A Historical View of the Army Profession," in The Future of the Army Profession , ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2005). 233

Japanese forces. 878 Initially, the focus was on repatriating Japanese units while

establishing law and order in southern Korea. 879 When 25,000 American soldiers occupied southern Korea in early September 1945, they found themselves up against a strong Korean impulse for independence. 880 The American military viewed this resistance as radical and pro-Soviet. 881 In 1946, when tensions developed between the

Soviet and American governments over plans for Korea, the United States formed a military government that attempted to create a stable environment so the two occupation zones could be reunified. 882 During the two years that the United States controlled the

southern zone, many American officers within the military government became involved

in reinvigorating the rural economy, reestablishing the judicial system and rebuilding the

education system. 883

A small number of American advisors also became involved in the training and

equipping of the Korean constabulary as early as 1946. 884 Concerns about the communist

threats of invasion led American leaders to expand the effort in 1947. In the two years

before the Korean War, the primary mission of the US Army in South Korea was to train

the Korean constabulary force to be able to defend the south from communist guerillas. 885

878 The U.S. had definite territorial aims in the Pacific: Japan, the islands occupied by Japan during the war, and to maintain China as a unified state under a government dependent on the U.S. were the priorities. See Kathryn Weathersby, Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1993). P. 9-10. 879 Edward Grant Meade, American Military Government in Korea (New York: King's Crown Press, 1951). P. 59. 880 Ibid. 881 Bruce Cumings, The Two Koreas , vol. 269 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1984). P. 27. 882 Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War . p. x. 883 Yates, The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005 . p. 78 884 Bryan Robert Gibby, “Fighting in a Korean War: The American Advisory Missions from 1946-1953” (Dissertation, Ohio State University, 2004). 885 Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1945-1950 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005). 234

On the eve of war, the Republic of Korea army consisted of 95,000 soldiers organized

into eight divisions and equipped with American weapons and vehicles. 886

The American occupation aimed to remove the Japanese colonial government and

to establish a democratic, capitalist regime capable of controlling the entire peninsula

with minimal American economic and military assistance. 887 Repatriating the Japanese

happened quickly, but growing tensions with the Soviet Union thwarted the establishment

of a unified Korea. The United States Army again found itself serving as an occupation

force with the mission to rebuild a nation’s economic and political system.

Although the Russians did not object to the division of the Korean peninsula at

the 38 th parallel, there was never any formal wartime agreement between the U.S. and the

Soviet Union to divide Korea into two zones of occupation. 888 Despite the lack of a

formal agreement, two Koreas developed split by the 38 th parallel. On one side, U.S.

forces controlled by General MacArthur occupied the southern half of the peninsula. 889

The original purpose of this control was to enforce Japan’s surrender and to protect the

Koreans. 890

In the years following this informal agreement, the Russian authorities north of

the 38 th parallel, made feverish attempts to sovietize the people. 891 From 1945-1950, the

886 Yates, The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005 . p. 78 887 Richard W. Stewart, ed., American Military History , ed. John W. Elsberg, United States Army Historical Series, vol. II (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2005). P. 206. 888 Center of Military History U.S. Army, "Korea: 1950," ed. Department of the Army (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997). p. 4. 889 Walter B. Jung, Nation-Building (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1998). P. 229. 890 U.S. Army, "Korea: 1950." P. 4-5. 891 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II, the Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). P. 336-337. 235

North Korean Army received a course in battle indoctrination from the Soviets. 892

Conversely, U.S. forces were swiftly demobilizing and South Korean troops were merely a lightly armed constabulary force. 893 Russian policy in North Korea was aimed at creating an indigenous government which would be a replica of the Russian political system and subservient to the Soviet Union. 894 While the presence of the Red Army guaranteed a Soviet veto over Korean decisions, the Russians chose to exercise indirect rather than direct control. 895 They installed Kim Il Sung, who had served in the Russian army in Manchuria, as the head of the Korean Communist party in late October 1945. 896

Other Russian-trained Koreans took over key posts in the North Korean regime. 897

Throughout 1946 and 1947 rumors of a North Korean incursion were rampant. 898

Reports that the Russians were training hundreds of thousands of young North Korean and forming a native army spread throughout South Korea. Despite these ruminations, in

July 1947, President Truman transferred control for civil administration in Korea from military to civilian control. 899 This was a clear signal to the military that administration of Korea was not a priority. Since U.S. civilian leadership did not see Korean nation building as important, the military had no incentive to innovate.

892 Andrei Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 1945-1960 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002). P. ii-v. 893 U.S. Army, "Korea: 1950." P. 8. 894 James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year , ed. Maurice Matloff, 5 vols., U.S. Army in the Korean War, vol. 3 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992). P. 24. 895 This was in contrast to direct United States military government in South Korea from 1945-1948. See Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic . P. 29. 896 Balazs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era , ed. James G. Hershberg, Cold War International History Project Series (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005). 897 James F. Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945-1947 , vol. 1 (Washington DC: Office of Joint History, 1996). 898 Robert Leckie, Conflict: The History of the Korean War 1950-1953 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962). P. 3-5. 899 Paul M. Edwards, Korean War Almanac , Almanacs of American Wars (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2006). 236

The JCS and the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee

(SANACC) thought that withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces would most likely lead to communist domination of the entire peninsula. 900 Since they nevertheless intended to evacuate American troops, eventual Russian control of Korea would have to be accepted.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted that no military security guarantee should be extended to the Republic of Korea because such action would risk a major war in an area where

Russia would have nearly all the natural advantages. 901 As a result, the President approved a policy stating that the U.S. would not get involved in a conflict there; 902 thus demonstrating that Korea was of secondary importance. For example, General

MacArthur was informed that he no longer had to be concerned with defending Korea. 903

Secretary of State Dean Acheson reinforced these ideas in his speech to the

National Press Club in Washington on 12 January 1950. 904 In outlining the U.S. security strategy in the Far East, he excluded Korea and Formosa from the American defensive perimeter. 905 To some, this seemed like an explicit invitation to Communist China, North

Korea and Russia that they could invade with impunity. 906 The low priority given to

Korea further impeded the military from innovating with respect to nation-building tasks. 907

900 Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945- 1950 (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1981). 901 According to Markel, this may have been the JCS’ biggest mistake with respect to the Korean War. See Wade Markel, "The Limits of American Generalship: The JCS's Strategic Advice in Early Cold War Crises," Parameters , Spring 2008. p. 19. 902 The president approved this policy on 4 April 1948. 903 Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year . P. 49-50. 904 There was nothing in his speech that wasn’t approved by the president as NSC 7-1 in 1947. Francis H. Heller, The Korea War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977).P. 11-14. 905 The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended in September 1947 that the U.S. had little strategic interest in maintaining troops and bases in Korea. See Ibid. P. 13. 906 Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year . P. 51-52. 907 In order of precedence, the JCS ranked East Asian countries hierarchically according to their importance to national security. Japan was #13, China #14, and Korea #15. See Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of 237

Further evidence of the lack of interest in Korea was the general apathy towards

National Security Council Paper Number 68 (NSC-68). 908 The report purported that the

Soviet Union was developing the military capacity for world domination and that

Communists worldwide were united. This paper implied that the U.S. should take up a stronger perimeter system to contain the Communist bloc. Despite these concerns, the political will did not exist to undertake the massive military rebuilding and considerable tax increases required of such an effort. 909 The threat of conflict did not spur the U.S. to make the Korean peninsula a priority with respect to military resources. 910

In less than three years, the Republic of Korea was formed and on that day the

U.S. military government below the 38 th parallel came to an end. 911 The 50,000

American occupation troops were gradually withdrawn. Only the Korea Military

Advisory Group (KMAG) numbering about 500 Americans remained to continue training

Korean security forces. 912

Military Effectiveness

Four criteria of military effectiveness: integration, responsiveness, skill and quality, will be used to evaluate whether or not the army’s efforts were successful in the

Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1945 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983). P. 19. 908 NSC-68 was written by Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze of the State Department’s policy planning staff in April 1950. To see the actual stipulations contained in the report, see http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm 909 Gary A. Donaldson, America at War since 1945 (Westport: Praeger, 1996). P. 11-12. 910 In 1947, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did point out that Korea was the one country in which the U.S. had carried out ideological warfare. To abandon the struggle would mean that the U.S. was not really determined to accept the responsibilities and obligations of world leadership. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, “U.S. Assistance to Other Countries from the Standpoint of National Security.” April 29, 1948 in Containment , ed. Etzold and Gaddis, pp. 71-83. 911 The government of South Korea was formed on 17 July 1948. 912 U.S. Army, "Korea: 1950." P. 6. Several sources discuss at great length the role of advisors in Korea. Here are a few: Robert D. Ramsey III, Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006). Gibby, “Fighting in a Korean War: The American Advisory Missions from 1946-1953”. 238

case of Korea. In September 1945, American forces arrived to assume occupation duties in the southern half of Korea with US military personnel working all of the central government bureaus in Seoul as well as in provincial and local governments. 913 US

forces were tasked to defend South Korea while at the same time establishing the nation’s

basic governing system. 914 The largely combat oriented occupation force, however, did

not possess the requisite skills for complicated occupation duties. 915 Although initially

American soldiers were well received, the atmosphere soon changed as the Korean

people expected that the Americans would provide quick and constructive guidelines for

a new era of nation building. 916 The Koreans became increasingly frustrated as the lack

of an integrated and coherent plan became evident.

The American occupation force was unprepared, lacking the skills to carry out the

Korean nation-building mission effectively. 917 The years between 1945 and 1948 were

violent and disorderly and the army was not responsive to the disintegrating security

situation. 918 American military leaders held the Korean people in low esteem further

preventing their responsiveness, criticizing them openly as headstrong and unruly, which

was contradictory to the regard shown the Japanese. 919 Furthermore, American support

of Korea’s most right political faction enabled the conservatives to achieve political

913 James P. Finley, The U.S. Military Experience in Korea, 1871-1982: In the Vanguard of ROK-US Relations (San Francisco: Command Historian's Office, Secretary Joint Staff, HQS, USFK/EUSA, 1983). P. 7. 914 Although originally planned to be democratic, it became more important not to be communist as opposed to true democracy. Individual rights and freedoms were not as important as stifling the communist movement in the South to the occupation force. 915 Jung, Nation-Building . P. 230. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge was the commander of U.S. forces in Korea during the occupation. 916 Ibid. P. 232. 917 Russell D. Buhite, Soviet-American Relations in Asia, 1945-1954 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981). P. 144. 918 Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1945 . P. xi. 919 Racism against Koreans was exhibited at the highest levels of the American command. In fact, the Russian-Korea relations seemed to be more cordial than those of American-Korean relations in the 1940s. See Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War . P. 390. 239

dominance. A variety of measures were undertaken concurrently to suppress the popular leftist movements. 920 Economic and political development was largely ignored in lieu of ensuring that the leftist movements would be excluded from the political process.

Guerilla tactics and terrorist acts also occupied the U.S. military within the

Korean peninsula. Between 1945 and 1948 unconventional guerilla and terrorist formations emerged within South Korea as an important concern for ROK military defenses and later for U.S. forces on the ground. The North Korean People’s Army initiated sporadic, idiosyncratic attacks against civilians and military personnel alike, forcing ROK forces to deploy three entire divisions from what would soon become the front lines of the Korean War. As NPKA and ROK forces engaged, the NKPA's guerilla forces were well situated for harassing civilian populations, interdicting military supply lines, and collecting valuable intelligence for North Korea commanders. While the UN command located in the South was forced to dedicate much needed resources to countering the guerilla and terrorist threat, U.S. and ROK Troops conducted ad hoc operations with conventional patrols. However, conventional forces lacked the requisite mobility, flexibility, and interoperability to be effective. 921

While the Americans lacked an integrated and responsive plan, as well as the skill

and quality required to rebuild the nation of Korea, conversely, from 1945 to 1948,

Soviet military authorities developed an integrated and responsive plan for creating the

North Korean state. 922 From the first days of the Soviet occupation, Russian military

920 Jung, Nation-Building . P. 233. 921 Matthew R. McNabb, "Application of the Military for Countering Nonstate Terrorist and Guerilla Networks," in Handbook of Military Administration , ed. Jeffrey A. Weber and Johan Eliasson (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2008). 922 Weathersby, Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives . P. 14-16. 240 officers played a significant role in the decision-making processes. Most decisions were made on the spot with little influence from Moscow. 923 The Russian officers that found themselves in North Korea were surprised to be ruling the country without being experts on international relations, foreign affairs or Korea. Prior to 1945, the Russian Army had considered future action in Korea as a purely military operation while ignoring the political aspects. When the 25th Army entered North Korea, there weren't any interpreters; the army had been preparing to fight the Japanese. 924 Lacking language skills and cultural knowledge of the Korea people, the army was hard-pressed to be responsive to their needs. Little was known about the country they were expected to govern.

In contrast to the lack of integration by the United States, the Soviets undertook significant steps to address the political, economic and security needs of the North

Koreans. In the economic field, the Soviet military authorities had to sustain the North

Korean economy, satisfy the needs of the population in food and basic supplies, organize essential service repairs and maintain public order. 925 Despite their lack of preparation, the Soviets were able to adapt quickly to the situation on the ground in North Korea, eventually reorganizing as local institutions were created. 926 Soviet military government personnel were dispatched to all major Korean counties and cities. 927

The majority of the Soviet personnel serving in the military government apparatus were career military officers, who lacked the qualifications and experience necessary to

923 Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 1945-1960 . P. 4. 924 Ibid. p. 15. 925 Initially, economic extraction was the goal of the Soviet Union. By 1946, however, Soviet policy shifted from pillage to rehabilitation. See Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution: 1945-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). P. 45. 926 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War . P. 383-391. 927 Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 1945-1960 . p. 15. 241

deal with complicated political and economic problems. Since the occupation was going to take a substantial amount of time, the Soviets deemed professional administration a necessity. Hence, the Soviet Civil Administration (SCA), a military institution, was founded to take care of the social and economic life of North Korea. 928 The level of

organization of the Soviet Civil Administration in North Korea demonstrates an

extremely high level of sophistication and indicates the level of involvement the Soviet

Union planned to have in the development of North Korea. 929 Economic and political

departments were formed to address a variety of issues. 930 The SCA centralized the provincial and county administration in Pyongyang supervising political and economic life in North Korea. 931 Reports from American delegations that visited the north in 1946 reported that the Russians were not taking capital from Korea; instead, they seemed to be devoting considerable effort in repairing and restoring economic activity. 932 In fact, the

Soviets sent specialists, educated the North Koreans, delivered machinery, reconstructed plants and provided raw materials and fuel. 933

In addition to providing economic and political guidance, the Soviets made building the North Korean security capacity a priority. 934 The Russians trained the North

Koreans as a military-gendarme force, building the force around the Korean officers and

928 Ibid. p. 15 929 Erik Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford: Berg, 1989). P. 103. 930 Economic departments formed include: communications, finance, transport, agriculture, and industry were formed. Political departments formed include: education, culture, justice and the press. 931 Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 . p. 104-105. 932 Ibid. p. 177. 933 Dozens of ethnic Koreans were brought from the USSR in order to train North Korean Teachers. Hundreds of North Korean students were also sent to the USSR for their programs of study . See Armstrong, "The Cultural Cold War in Korea, 1945-1950.", Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 . p. 178. 934 The Communists sent young men to the Soviet Union for military and technical training. Others went to Communist-held areas of Manchuria where they joined Communist armies fighting against the Nationalist Chinese forces, gaining their military training in the field. See p. 102-103 in Shannon McCune, Korea: Land of Broken Calm (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966). 242

men who served in the Soviet and Chinese armies. 935 Contrasting the Russian and US level of effort: the US maintained 50,000 soldiers to govern 20 million people in South

Korea, while Russia had an army of 220,000-250,000 to rule about ten million people. 936

The actions of the Soviet Union stand in stark contrast to those of the United

States; the Russian government thought that Korea was very important. 937 Conversely, the American government was focused on the European theater of operations and public support for maintaining a large standing army with a focus in Asia simply was untenable. 938 The Soviets’, on the other hand, viewed Korea as a strategically vital area. 939 The major American objective was to promote the concept of a free, independent and democratic Korea, which flowed from the recognition that Korea was not vital to the

United States. 940 The American military was never given the personnel or resources to undertake similar programs. Strategically, Korea was seen as unimportant, thereby encouraging focus elsewhere. Given these constraints, it is not surprising that the nation- building effort was unsuccessful and the army was largely ineffective.

The United States Army was given the mission to rebuild South Korea’s economic and political system. Lieutenant General Hodge never developed an integrated plan to do so; instead he treated the Koreans with disdain and backed the anti-communist

935 Henry Chung, The Russians Came to Korea (Washington D.C.: The Korean Pacific Press, 1947). P. 61- 63. 936 Ibid. P. 156-157. Despite these numbers, by the end of 1948, the Soviets withdrew their occupation troops from North Korea. They did, however, keep advisers in the Korean government and military. See Bruce Cumings, Divided Korea: United Future? vol. 306 (Ithaca: Foreign Policy Association, 1995). 937 Buhite, Soviet-American Relations in Asia, 1945-1954 . p. 140. 938 The U.S. could have warned the North Koreans away by: promising direct military support to the ROK, maintaining their existing commitment but increase indirect military and diplomatic support, or reducing the limited commitment and prepare for the costs of failure in Korea. However, the Truman administration didn’t do any of these things. See Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II, the Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950. p. 408-410. 939 Japanese control of Korea contributed significantly to Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 and was still fresh in the mind of the Soviets. See Buhite, Soviet-American Relations in Asia, 1945-1954 . P. 139. 940 Ibid. p. 141. 243

forces in order to maintain order. The highest quality U.S. Army personnel were in other

theaters of operations. Soldiers trained to conduct military government operations were

being used in Germany and Japan; those assigned to Korea did not have the skill to

develop integrated and responsive nation-building plans. Even if those assigned had the

requisite skills, policy proclamations and force requirements elsewhere demanded that

the army effort in Korea take a low priority. This economy of force effort also prevented

responsiveness to the changing situation from 1945-1948. Despite the threat of North

Korean incursion and the need for a strong South Korea, the United States had publicly

declared South Korea was outside the American defensive perimeter.

Summary

Korea illustrates the challenges of nation building after imperialism. Just as

arbitrary national borders in post-independence Africa gave rise to wars and political

instability, the foundation of the two Koreas as a result of the arbitrary partition flared

into an all out war and years of tense confrontation afterward. 941 Although South Korea's

nation-building efforts since the 1950s have generated successes in economic

development and recently democratization that have eluded nation-building efforts in

other parts of the world, North Korea stands as a stark failure. 942 The test of South

Korea's success in nation building may still lie ahead; as its’ dramatic gains might still be

derailed by a failure to overcome the even greater challenge of Korean reunification.

Furthermore the success of South Korea’s transition from a dictatorship to a

democratic form of government happened in spite of the United States not because of the

U.S. Army’s involvement. Instead of encouraging democratization, the United States

941 Lee, The Partition of Korea after World War II . P. 6-7. 942 Korean Overseas Culture and Information Services, A Tumultuous Half Century (Seoul: Korean Overseas Culture and Information Services, 1998). 244 chose to support one party rule for over forty years to prevent the rise of communism.

From 1948 until the 1990s, the South Korean government outlawed and brutally suppressed all leftist political activities. 943 The United States sponsored a military dictatorship in Korea, delaying achievement of democracy, though South Korea enjoyed political stability and economic development. Conversely, communist rulers in North

Korea came to power in 1945 with widespread popular support. For more than forty years, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung remained in power. Even after his death, his son

Kim Jong-Il maintains the same hold over North Korea.

The United States Army did not create any new organizations or attempt any new methods of dealing with occupation duties. From the vantage point of the Korean War, the U.S. military looked back on the occupation of South Korea with considerable self- criticism. 944 The forces charged with nation building didn’t receive any specialized training, nor was there any grand plan for how the military would go about transforming

South Korea. 945 The primary objective of the U.S. Army, the Korean Military Advisory

Group (KMAG), was to create an indigenous military force in South Korea. 946 Their efforts were not wholly unsuccessful; however, there were simply not enough advisors or resources to establish a capable armed force in only three years. Overall, the Army used minimal effort in the nation building of South Korea and was ineffective at creating a state before they withdrew.

943 James I. Matray, "Korea's Quest for Disarmament and Reunification," in Korea and the Cold War: Division, Destruction and Disarmament , ed. Kim Chull and James I. Matray Baum (Claremont: Regina Books, 1993). P. 240-243. 944 Armstrong, "The Cultural Cold War in Korea, 1945-1950." P. 75. 945 For example, during the first year, one province had four military governors with extremely disparate leadership styles, priorities and skills. See Meade, American Military Government in Korea . P. 82-90. 946 The KMAG was engaged in everything from suppressing guerillas to training soldiers to administering budget matters to restraining hotheaded Korean generals. See Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II, the Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 . p. 473, 245

International Threat

Threats in the international system have been credited with spurring military

innovation. 947 In particular, threats to state survival create incentives for states to adjust their military activities to compete effectively. 948 When national survival depends on battlefield success, states should be highly responsive to threats; therefore, the external threat environment should be causally linked to military effectiveness. 949 A high threat

environment can lead to improved political-military coordination increased military

budgets, thereby improving integration and responsiveness. In the case of Korea, there

was political-military coordination and agreement about its lack of strategic importance

in the years following World War II. 950 Furthermore, the immediate aftermath of World

War II saw a decrease in military budgets. These two factors alone should have led to less military effectiveness.

The diversity of threat is another important factor to consider. The military was torn in several directions—the administration of Japan and Germany as well as concerns over the rising power of the Soviet Union. Viewing international events in the context of the American-Soviet confrontation forced Washington officials to give top priority to

European affairs. 951 Korea seemed like merely a diversion from other greater strategic priorities. The highly diverse threat environment could have contributed to the military’s lack of integration and responsiveness regarding the requirements of Korea.

947 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars . 948 Goldman, "International Competition and Military Effectiveness: Naval Air Power, 1919-1945." P. 158. 949 Ibid. P. 158. 950 Korean policy after 1946 was determined almost exclusively by Acheson and the State Department since the military was vehement about Korea’s military insignificance. See Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II, the Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 . p. 409. 951 In addition to European concerns, the Middle East was another strategic concern. See p. 35-36 in LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1946 . 246

The political-military perception of Europe as the strategic focus on the military in addition to a decrease in military budgets provided further disincentives to focus on nation building. Strong civilian aversion to be involved on the Korean peninsula served as a powerful deterrent to military innovation. Given these constraints, the military’s ineffectiveness at nation-building in Korea is not surprising.

The change in the world order after World War II profoundly affected the U.S.

Army. No longer merely a small constabulary-type force, the Army found itself governing Germany and Japan while operating in dozens of smaller countries. 952

Demobilizing most of the Army made these tasks all the more challenging. Although soldiers acted in all types of civil capacities other than warriors for the first years after the war, they returned to the combat role with the rise of the “Iron Curtain.” 953 With the advent of a nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union, the United States faced a major direct threat, and it reacted by creating, for the first time in its history, permanently standing forces. A new jurisdiction of forward presence developed, defending America through the strategy of containment. The focus on a singular and clear threat—the Soviet Union, caused the army to shift its focus to a clear combat capability to win the “First Battle.” 954

Korea was relatively low in terms of the U.S.’ strategic priorities after World War

II. Given that the U.S. did not see Korea as a high threat, coupled with the high diversity of threat predicts less integration and less responsiveness. In this case, the diversity and level of threat worked in concert to focus the military’s efforts in places other than Korea.

952 According to Gaddis, Not until Americans had suffered the Czechoslovak Coup, Berlin blockage, the Soviet atomic bomb, the fall of China, and the Korean War would they bring themselves to accept a large peacetime military establishment as a normal state of affairs. See John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). P. 341-342. 953 Wong and Johnson II, "Serving the American People: A Historical View of the Army Profession." P. 100 954 Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, America's First Battles, 1776-1965 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986). 247

The army oriented the majority of its effort toward Europe and then Japan. Korea was a

mere diversion from what both military and civilian leaders agreed was most important.

Therefore, threat does explain the military’s unpreparedness for nation-building in Korea

as well as their relative ineffectiveness.

Reformist Military Leadership

Military leadership is essential to effective innovation. 955 Unfortunately, during

the Korean War, military officers did not demonstrate reformist tendencies with respect

to nation-building tasks. Although MacArthur was infamous for his successful

administration of Japan, he was not involved in the nation building of Korea after World

War II. Instead he appointed Lieutenant General John Hodge to administer South Korea

on behalf of the United States. Unfortunately, Hodge did not turn out to be a good

choice. 956 Described as pugnacious and tactless, having little knowledge of Korean

conditions, he appointed former Japanese colonial authorities and their Korean

collaborators as local administrators. 957 He told the press that he intended to treat the

Koreans as conquered enemies. 958 The policies he implemented were often contradictory

in nature and generally condescending towards the Koreans. Eventually, Washington

ordered Hodge to replace the Japanese administrators and to stop insulting the

Koreans. 959

955 Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness: The Second World War . P. 334-335. Brooks, "Civil- Military Relations and Military Effectiveness: Egypt in the 1967 and 1973 Wars." 956 His selection as the occupation commander may have been the most important early decision leading to the Korean War according to James I. Matray, "Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in Korea, 1945-1948," Korean Studies 1995. 957 Bonnie B.C. Oh, ed., Korea under the American Military Government, 1945-1948 (Westport: Praeger, 2002). P. 4-5 958 Armstrong, "The Cultural Cold War in Korea, 1945-1950." 959 Dennis D. Wainstock, Truman, Macarthur, and the Korean War , Contributions in Military Studies, vol. 176 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999). P. 3-4. 248

Hodge had no experience in the administration of civil affairs and had little

understanding of Asian culture and politics. 960 Further complicating the situation was the

lack of guidance on political questions from Washington. In order to build a pro-

American government, Hodge backed the extreme right, effectively establishing a police

state. 961 To maintain security, he built a Korean constabulary force under the control of a

group of right-wing military officers. 962 Though Hodge was assigned a political advisor from the State Department, Washington had not yet prepared the formulation of the administrative process for the occupied areas, which continued to prevent successful integration of effort. 963

Hodge’s attempts to reform the economic and political system of South Korea were largely unsuccessful. 964 Given his performance from 1945-1948, Hodge was clearly not the right choice for the complexities and sensitivities inherent in the nation-building of Korea. The absence of a military reformer in the case of Korea at least partially explains the lack of innovation.

Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations are an important determinant in the propensity for the

military to innovate. 965 How the military leadership interacts with the civilians in key governmental positions creates an atmosphere that either encourages or discourages

960 The only reason he was chose to the lead the occupation was his proximity to the peninsula. See Buhite, Soviet-American Relations in Asia, 1945-1954 . p. 144. 961 Gye-Dong Kim, Foreign Intervention in Korea (Brookfield: Dartmouth, 1993). P. 42. 962 Donaldson, America at War since 1945 . P. 9. 963 Arthur Bunce served as Hodge’s economic and cultural advisor. For a discussion about the influence of Bunce and Joseph E. Jacobs see James I. Matray, "Bunce and Jacobs: U.S. Occupation Advisers in Korea," in Korea under the American Military Government, 1945-1948 , ed. Bonnie B.C. Oh (Westport: Praeger, 2002). 964 In the fall of 1946 for example, rioting erupted over his decision to continue the hated Japanese rice collection and taxation system. See Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976 . P. 86. 965 Egnell, "Explaining US and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: The Civil- Military Dimension." 249

innovation. Military effectiveness is largely determined by the relationship between the

president, the secretary of defense and the top military commanders. 966 Trust is an

important determinant of the quality of civil-military relations. 967 In the Korean War

example, an insecure president, a self-serving Secretary of Defense and an egotistical

general made for an extremely adversarial civil-military relationship. Furthermore, the

institutional changes that occurred between World War II and the Korean War, the

National Security Act of 1947 in particular, also significantly shaped the relationship

between the Secretary of Defense and the military.

Almost immediately after World War II, civil-military relations in the post-war

period degenerated into a contentious competition over missions and allocation of

budgets. 968 The five years between the Korean War and World War II displayed the lack

of trust and candor evident in the relationships between civilian leaders and the military.

The Truman-MacArthur controversy in particular, marked the lowest point in American

civil-military relations of the 20 th century.

The National Security Act of 1947 formalized coordination and policy planning functions of the presidency in national security matters. 969 It was explicitly designed to

ensure military-civil coordination and balance. 970 The act reorganized the armed forces, foreign policy and intelligence community. 971 The position of the Secretary of Defense

966 Johnson II and Metz, American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems . Egnell, "Civil-Military Relations in Peace Operations: Political Leadership without Micromanagement." 967 Snider, Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions . 968 Weigley, "The American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present." P. 237. 969 Jordan, Taylor Jr., and Mazarr, American National Security . P. 100. 970 Ibid. P. 173. 971 National Security Act of 1947, United States Statutes at Large (80 th Congress, Session I, Chapter343, p. 495-510). 250 was created and this person would oversee all the armed forces. 972 Secretary of Defense

James Forrestal, the first secretary under the new act, still felt unable to exercise effective control over the feuding services; hence, the act was again amended in 1949 to assure their subordination to the Secretary of Defense. 973 The National Security Council, which would serve as a coordinating body for national security policy, was also established as a part of the act.

The importance of the act resides in the reassertion of civilian supremacy in foreign policy matters. During World War II, the military had taken the lead in political and economic planning. State Department leadership in postwar European recovery shifted the initiative of policymaking away from the military establishment. The military’s advantage in organizational terms shrank, as did its resources. Both military appropriations and personnel strength contracted enormously. The unified approach to defense budgeting gave the newly designated secretary of defense responsibility for supervising the budgeting process, which resulted in interservice competition for slices of the same budgetary pie. 974 The restructuring of the American military establishment dramatically changed the power relationships between and among the services, Congress, and other executive branch departments. 975

Finally, the reorganization and unification of the national security apparatus in

1947 had a significant effect on civil-military relations. One of the key points in the

972 The act also created a separate air force from the existing army air forces. Initially, the three service secretaries maintained a quasi-cabinet status. 973 Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg, "Organization," in The Department of Defense 1947-1997: Organization and Leaders , ed. Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997). P. 14. 974 Paul Y. Hammond, "Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy," in American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies , ed. Harold Stein (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1963). P. 232-235. 975 Jordan, Taylor Jr., and Mazarr, American National Security . P. 174. 251

decision to unify the armed forces under the Department of Defense was to provide a

means for civilian control of the military. Civilian control of the military establishment, a

fundamental concept of democracy, would be strengthened if one Cabinet member had

primary responsibility for exercising control. 976 These institutional changes constrained

to some extent the level of cooperation possible. It also took some of the military

decision-making power away, affording the military leadership less opportunity to earn

civilian trust.

Besides these institutional changes, President Truman’s experience, education and

leadership style was dramatically different than President Roosevelt’s. 977 He disarmingly

admitted his lack of preparation for the huge range of problems with which he had to

grapple. 978 In large part, the president sets the stage for the relationship between the

military and the civilian leadership. President Truman had a very unique perspective

about international affairs having never been to college. His one fatal weakness was that

he had little or no grasp of grand strategy or military power. To make matters worse, he

thought that he knew more about the military and grand strategy than all his generals and

admirals. 979 Truman was motivated by an overwhelming desire to balance the budget and

a visceral cynicism towards the military, holding most military officers in contempt. 980

976 Historical Section Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Department of Defense, 1944-1978 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979). P. 13. 977 Truman was blunt and straightforward where Roosevelt had been subtle and evasive. See Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War . p. 11. Unlike Roosevelt’s practice of demoralizing his staff and heightening conflict among his staff, Truman sought a consensus-based approach. See Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision (New York: The Free Press, 1968). P. 24. 978 His knowledge of foreign issues was limited and Roosevelt had not consulted him in the brief period that Truman held the vice-presidency. Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War . p. 11. 979 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War (New York: Random House, Inc., 1987). P. 4. 980 Keith D. McFarland and David L. Roll, Louis Johnson and the Arming of America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress. P. 114-134. 252

In his first three years as commander in chief, Truman imposed budget ceilings based not on strategic considerations, but on what he decided that the country could afford. 981 He was determined to maintain a balanced federal budget and reduce the $250 billion national debt without increasing taxes. In order to stay on his arbitrary fiscal course, he cut the Pentagon budget by a third. 982

Budget ceilings led to the drastic postwar reduction of troops as well as the decline in quality and quantity of arms. At the end of World War II, the U.S. Army numbered six million men and nearly 100 equipped and trained divisions. Truman allowed a frenzied demobilization to occur and in only a few months, the majority of the army consisted of unhappy draftees who were assigned to occupational duties in

Germany or Japan. 983 By March 1948, the Army had dwindled to 530,000 men. Only one division--the 82 nd Airborne Division was combat-ready. 984

To make matters even more challenging for those in uniform, Louis A. Johnson took over as Secretary of Defense in 1949. 985 His goal in taking the position was to use it as a launching mechanism for the White House in 1952. 986 Johnson clashed with every member of the Cabinet and never missed an opportunity to say derogatory things about

Truman’s staff. 987 The fiscal year 1951 budget was a large cut from previous years. 988

Johnson boasted to Congress that his austere program provided more powerful forces

981 McFarland and Roll, Louis Johnson and the Arming of America . P. 190. 982 Blair, The Forgotten War . p. 6-7. 983 Ibid. p. 7. 984 Ibid. p. 8. 985 When he came to office in 1949, he was charged with strengthening the office of the Secretary of Defense and to hold defense pending below $15 billion. See Paige, The Korean Decision . P. 31. 986 Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam (Houndmills: The MacMillan Press LTD, 1986). P. 20 987 The secretary of defense was famous for his boorishness. See Blair, The Forgotten War , Buhite, Soviet- American Relations in Asia, 1945-1954 . p. 17. 988 By the time of his appointment, the defense budget had already been established below the $14 billion threshold. See Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century . P. 244. 253 with less money. 989 This put the military chiefs in a tough position. They did not agree with Truman’s budget or Johnson’s statements, but they owed their obedience and loyalty to civilian authority. 990

Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed rearming the military to meet the

Soviet threat. 991 Conversely, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson was vehemently opposed to these ideas because they would pose a threat to his budget cutting policies. 992

They would also counter his public statements that the current state of national security was adequate to meet the threats to the United States. The chiefs of staff saw the Soviet threat in Europe as a reason for military expansion, not demobilization, as suggested by

Johnson’s policies. This created a unique case where the military chiefs were more aligned with the Secretary of State than the Secretary of Defense. 993

Given the President’s distrust of the military and the erratic behavior of the

Secretary of Defense, civil-military relations were problematic. To make matters worse,

General Douglas MacArthur’s dominating and outspoken personality played into

President Truman’s insecurities. In addition to the personality clash, MacArthur thought

989 Although the majority of the literature about the Korean War claims that Johnson was somewhat to blame for the surprise attack due to the austere budget cuts, McFarland claims that Johnson merely implemented the policies that Truman wanted and was largely supported by Congress and the public. See McFarland and Roll, Louis Johnson and the Arming of America . P. 188-190. 990 Blair, The Forgotten War . p. 28. At the same time, the famous “revolt of the admirals” occurred, precipitated by Johnson’s cancellation of the Navy’s super carrier which led to a number of Navy officers criticizing Truman’s defense reorganization plans in Congress. See Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973). P. 377-379. 991 Acheson approached the cold war in military terms. In their view, peace was a technical term. In real terms, the US was already at war with Soviet communism. MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam . P. 24. 992 LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1946 . p. 97. and MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam . P. 24. 993 Blair, The Forgotten War . p. 25. 254

that he was infallible. 994 On a few occasions, he made very public statements that contradicted White House policy. 995

The idea of fighting a limited war was contrary to General MacArthur’s thinking.

Once the nation committed its troops to battle, he believed the goal should be total victory using an offensive approach. 996 MacArthur was extremely critical of any caveats on how and when to use his forces. 997 Knowing MacArthur’s position (and his outspoken nature), Truman issued notices not to make public statements regarding foreign policy and ordered military commanders to clear all statements before making them. 998

In March 1951, Truman became convinced that the US was in a good position to negotiate and the Allied nations with troops in Korea favored a peace settlement.999 The

Joint Chiefs informed MacArthur that Truman would soon announce a political proposal

to end the war. MacArthur was fundamentally opposed to accepting a stalemate and thus

publicly released a statement threatening direct military action against China. 1000 This

was a direct affront to the limited war policy and challenged civilian supremacy over the

994 Roy K. Flint, "The Truman-Macarthur Conflict: The Crisis of Civil-Military Relations in the Nuclear Age," in The United States Military under the Constitution, 1789-1989 , ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York: New York University Press, 1991). P223-267. 995 Ibid. 996 Michael Schaller, "Douglas Macarthur: The China Issue, Policy Conflict, and the Korean War," in Korea and the Cold War: Division, Destruction and Disarmament , ed. Kim Chull and James I. Matray Baum (Claremont: Regina Books, 1993). P. 170. 997 One of his least admirable traits may have been his hypersensitivity to criticism. Michael D. Pearlman, Truman and Macarthur (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008). P. 3 998 Wainstock, Truman, Macarthur, and the Korean War . p. 101. 999 Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1997). P. 97. 1000 D. Clayton James, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: The Free Press, 1992). 255

military. 1001 Truman did not bring up the question of dismissal with his cabinet, instead

merely reprimanding MacArthur. 1002

The final straw came a few weeks later, when MacArthur’s letter that stated,

“There is no substitute for victory” with respect to the Chinese was read on the House floor. To those in Washington, MacArthur’s letter was in direct conflict with U.S. Korean

War policy. 1003 The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated MacArthur’s subsequent dismissal with President Truman signing the orders for his recall and replacement. 1004

Truman’s leadership style enabled senior officers to freely and openly criticize the president’s actions. 1005 MacArthur’s insubordination illustrates Truman’s indecisiveness when dealing with the military. When confronted with the problem of MacArthur, he relied primarily on the JCS. His failure to dismiss MacArthur earlier furthered the impression that he was weak. 1006

Another factor that illustrated the lack of trust between civilian and military leaders was the degree to which decisions were centralized. One of the unique aspects of the Korean War was the close control that Washington maintained at all times over operations in the field. For example, MacArthur’s first reaction to the North Korean invasion was to send supplies—this was all he had the authority to do. After consultation between State, Defense, all the service chiefs and the President, a decision would be

1001 David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War (New York: Hyperion Press, 2007). P. 594. 1002 Wainstock, Truman, Macarthur, and the Korean War . p. 121-122. 1003 Edwards, Korean War Almanac . P.460. 1004 Wainstock, Truman, Macarthur, and the Korean War . p. 123-125. Markel claims that despite the actions of MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs of Staff functioned most effectively during the Korea War, always keeping that war in its proper global context. See Markel, "The Limits of American Generalship: The JCS's Strategic Advice in Early Cold War Crises." p. 18-19. 1005 Although Truman believed in strong executive leadership, he was too nice to be the man he dreamed of being. See Michael D. Pearlman, Truman and Macarthur: The Winding Road to Dismissal (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2003). 1006 Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush . 256 made. Finally, the Secretary of the Army would call General MacArthur to inform him of the approved course of action. 1007 This stands in sharp contrast to the latitude allowed military commanders during the Second World War. Routine transactions and problems that would have been handled by a theater commander in World War II became matters of great concern to the nation’s highest officials in Washington during the Korean

War. 1008 The vast distance between Washington and the Far East served to hinder effective, timely communication, further complicating the problems of directing the war. 1009

Another example of the lack of trust was who held the power to make decision about committing more troops to battle. MacArthur believed that in order to halt the

NKPA advance, more American troops were needed. On June 30, 1950, he cabled the

Pentagon that American combat forces must be committed to hold the Han River line.

He sought permission to move a U.S. regimental combat team (RCT) into the combat area immediately. The Army Chief of Staff, LTG Collins, let him know that only

President Truman had the authority to order a RCT to move into the battle zone or a two- division buildup. Collins agreed to get Secretary of the Army to ask Truman for an immediate decision. MacArthur was outraged that he had to wait for the President to decide. 1010

The adversarial relationship between the President and the Secretary of Defense on the one hand and the military on the other, adversely affected military effectiveness with respect to nation building. The trust between civilians and military leaders

1007 Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year . P. 70. 1008 Millett, The War for Korea, 1945-1950 . P. 60. 1009 Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year. 1010 Wainstock, Truman, Macarthur, and the Korean War . p. 28-29. 257

diminished in the period following World War II and given the actions of MacArthur

further deteriorated during the Korean conflict. Furthermore, the centralization of

decision-making consolidated power in Washington to the detriment of theater

commanders. This also contributed to the growing lack of trust between civilians and

military leaders.

Summary

The Korean War marked a drastic change in the employment and strategy of

United States forces. The threat of nuclear war and communist ideology ushered in a

new era. Total mobilization of the nation to fight a confrontational war with the Soviet

Union was not a policy option. In some ways, this should have provided a reason for the military to innovate with respect to nation building. If conventional warfare was no longer going to be the focus of the military, the army could have used the evidence of their success in Japan and Germany as reason to expand their capability to nation build.

However, the threat from the Soviet Union, a lack of reformist military leaders and adversarial civil-military relations all conspired to deter innovation and led to military ineffectiveness in the nation-building of Korea. Furthermore, the maintenance of a large peacetime army focused on Europe institutionalized the army’s bias towards offensive doctrine. After the initial defeat on the Korean peninsula, the American military shifted its focus from preparing for a World War II type mobilization to maintaining forces ready for the immediacy of future wars. 1011

The combination of the Army’s focus on Europe, a lack of resources in the

Korean area of operations, as well as civilian statements that reflected Korea’s low priority as a security consideration all deterred the military from innovating with respect

1011 Stewart, ed., American Military History . P. 248. 258

to nation-building in Korea. At the same time, the majority of military reformers were

concentrating on the European theater to the detriment of the efforts in Korea. Finally,

the lack of trust and cooperation between civilians and military leaders further prevented

innovation.

Vietnam

Unlike the nation building of Korea, the US military did attempt to address the unique aspects of the nation-building of Vietnam by creating new organizations.

Executive branch support for improving U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities certainly provided the Army the opportunity to innovate with respect to nation building. The experiences of the Special Forces in organizing Civilian Irregular Defense Groups

(CIDG), the Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development study-based expansion of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) pacification effort, airmobile divisions, 1012 and strategic hamlets were a few such

programs. Combined Action Platoons, composed of twelve U.S. Marines and twenty-

four Vietnamese Popular Force militiamen made significant contributions at the village

level. 1013 Unfortunately, their efforts were not replicated on a large-scale and largely

ignored by the Army.

Until the Kennedy administration, the South Vietnamese government and the U.S.

Mission in Saigon had placed primary emphasis on developing the regular military forces

to deal with the insurgency. Under the sponsorship of the U.S. Mission in Saigon,

however, several programs were initiated in late 1961 to broaden the counterinsurgency

1012 For further information about the specifics of air mobility development and doctrine during Vietnam, see John J. Tolson, Airmobility 1961-1971 , Vietnam Studies, vol. CMH Pub 90-4 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989). 1013 For information about a CAP that had enormous tactical success, see West, The Village . 259

effort by developing Vietnam’s paramilitary potential. 1014 Special Forces detachments

were assigned to the U.S. Mission in Saigon to provide training and advisory assistance

in the conduct of these programs, which eventually came to be known collectively as the

Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program. 1015 The Special Forces helped to train

local forces to fight guerillas. Developing paramilitary forces became their primary

mission in Vietnam. The approximately 2500 soldiers assigned to the 5 th Special Forces

Group raised and led an army of 50,000 tribal fighters to operate in some of the most

difficult and dangerous terrain in Vietnam. 1016 CIDG patrolling of border infiltration

areas provided reliable tactical intelligence and the units secured populations that

otherwise may have conceded to the enemy. 1017

Army Special Forces advisers were oriented toward a specific geographic area and received language training to facilitate their operations in the field.1018 Over time, the

Army changed the focus of Special Forces units from pacification efforts to offensive operations making them less effective at nation building. Once the Special Forces fell under Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) the Army reoriented their tasks to unconventional, but not counterinsurgency missions. 1019 With this reorganization,

their effectiveness at affecting the population was dramatically diminished.

The hybrid civil-military CORDS organization, which imposed unified

management of all the diffuse U.S. pacification support programs, was relatively

1014 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971 , Vietnam Studies, vol. CMH Pub 90-23 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989). P. 6. 1015 Ibid. p. 6. 1016 Robert M. Cassidy, "Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars," Parameters 2004. 1017 Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years (Washington D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 1988). P. 196-207. 1018 Stewart, ed., American Military History . P. 278-279. 1019 Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars . P. 63. 260 effective. 1020 The CORDS program was placed under military command; this paradoxically resulted in greater U.S. civilian influence over pacification than ever before. 1021 Ambassador Robert Komer, President’s Johnson’s emissary for pacification efforts, was the first ambassador in U.S. history to serve directly under a military command and also have command responsibility for military personnel and resources.1022

This was especially interesting because U.S. civilian agencies were opposed to being under military control and the military was not enthusiastic about accepting this major, new responsibility. Regardless of their wishes, CORDS forced the military and civilians to integrate their efforts.1023 Although the program itself was valuable, the lack of coordination and direction in the pacification effort in South Vietnam led to its overall ineffectiveness. 1024

The Strategic Hamlet program, fortifying villages to separate the peasants from the insurgents, emulated the British successes in Malaya. 1025 In addition to impairing the

Viet Cong’s control of the countryside, Ngo Dinh Diem, the prime minister, saw the hamlets as a way to solicit more American aid and to control his own population. The lack of adequate security of the individual hamlets, failure to provide basic social needs,

1020 Dale Andrade and James H. Willbanks, "Cords/Phoenix Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future," Military Review , March-April 2006. p. 17. 1021 Thomas W. Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1982). P. 64. 1022 Ibid. P. 66. 1023 William P. Schoux, "The Vietnam Cords Experience: A Model of Successful Civil-Military Partnership," (USAID, 2006). P. 4. 1024 Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict . p. 118-119. 1025 Mackay claims that transferring the lessons of Malaya to Vietnam was ineffective, especially the strategy hamlet program. SeeDonald Mackay, The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960: The Domino That Stood (London: Brassey's, 1997). For a discussion of how the British experience influenced Vietnam see Peter Busch, "Killing the 'Vietcong': The British Advisory Mission and the Strategic Hamlet Program," The Journal of Strategic Studies , March 2002. Antonio Varsori, "Britain and US Involvement in the Vietnam War During the Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963," Cold War History 3, no. 2 (2003). 261

and the overextension of resources led to its ultimately failure. 1026 When the South

Vietnamese government abandoned it in 1964, only a small percentage of the hamlets

remained in friendly hands. 1027 Diem’s overambitious program created too many such

hamlets, widely scattered and often indefensible, thus dooming the initiative to failure. 1028

Air mobility was another significant innovation; however, it fit the war the army

wanted to fight instead of the war the army was actually faced with in Vietnam. 1029

Greater battlefield mobility enabled massing of forces and firepower at a decisive point,

which had great appeal. Bombing and shelling communities not only killed scores of

innocent people, but also alienated the population. Yet, the United States military was

determined to use its greatest asset, firepower, to fight the war of its own choice in

Vietnam, regardless of the implication for the Vietnamese people. 1030 Air mobility could

also be used in the European theater--the focus of Army leadership as well as

Congressional budgetary outlays. 1031 Furthermore, the US Army favored technological solutions to enhance battlefield performance and air mobility doctrine seemed to fit this preference very well. 1032

Military Effectiveness

Despite these various innovations, the combined effort of the United States did

not ultimately lead to a strategic victory. The Army was largely unsuccessful at

1026 Milton E. Osborne, Strategic Hamlets in South Vietnam: A Survey and a Comparison , vol. 55 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965). P. 22-24. 1027 The Vietcong were able to consolidate their holdings in the countryside after the fall of the Diem government in November 1966. See William J. Webb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1969-1970 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002). P. 257. 1028 Stewart, ed., American Military History . P. 299. 1029 Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars . P. 68 1030 Max Hastings, Warriors: Portraits from the Battlefield (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005). P. 287. 1031 The major threat was viewed as a sophisticated enemy attacking with masses of armor on the plains of Europe. Counter-guerilla warfare was viewed as a secondary mission. See Tolson, Airmobility 1961-1971 . p. 11 1032 Christopher Ives, US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam (London: Routledge, 2007). p. 69. 262 accomplishing the destruction of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. 1033 Part of the reason for U.S. failure was the lack of an overarching, integrated and responsive strategy for the Vietnam War. 1034 Key aspects such as population protection and linking Saigon to its people were overlooked. 1035 Furthermore, an Allied strategy that went beyond the borders of South Vietnam was not supported. U.S. congressional, executive, and public support for South Vietnam depended solely on a short victory. 1036 Conversely, the

Vietnamese Communist party had a very effective strategic view of revolution as a stage- by-stage social process aimed at preempting the government’s contact with the people. 1037 They made contact with the people a significantly larger priority and dedicated five to ten times more manpower at the local level through indoctrination, social control and redistribution of wealth, power, and status. 1038 By integrating social, political, economic and military associations around the people, they were much more effective than the United States. 1039

1033 Charles R. Miller, "Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation," in Handbook of Military Administration , ed. Jeffrey A. Weber and Johan Eliasson (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2008). P. 205. 1034 U.S. forces allocated to cope with a limited contingency have historically lacked a coherent strategy, a capable organization, and the strategic mobility required to accomplish the assigned mission. See Robert P. Haffa, Jr., The Half War: Planning U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces to Meet a Limited Contingency, 1960-1983 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). Donald W. Hamilton, The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia (Westport: Praeger, 1998). 1035 Lawrence E. Grinter, "Vietnam: The Cost of Ignoring Political Requirements," in The American War in Vietnam: Lessons, Legacies and Implications for Future Conflicts , ed. Lawrence E. Grinter and Peter M. Dunn (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987). P. 27-29. 1036 Ibid. P. 29. 1037 Osborne, Strategic Hamlets in South Vietnam: A Survey and a Comparison . P. 4-6. 1038 Michael Charles Conley, The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy (Washington D.C.: The American University, 1967). 1039 For a discussion of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s integrated strategy see Douglas Pike, War, Peace, and the Viet Cong (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1969). P. 32-36. and Douglas Pike, Viet Cong (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1966). Thompson asserts that in order for a plan to be effective it must integrate security, political, economic and police efforts. See Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam . 263

Even when the US Army learned something significant, there wasn’t a process for

incorporating lessons or comparing doctrinal intent with the effects of its execution. 1040

This lack of a process for learning and institutionalizing lessons prevented U.S. responsiveness to the changing enemy situation. Knowledge did not float up into the institutional army from either successful initiatives or the indicators of failure. 1041

CORDS, Special Forces, and Airmobile divisions all impacted military effectiveness in a positive way; however, the failure to integrate these efforts into a broader strategy negated their operational successes. Furthermore, these individual programs did not address the broad social, economic and political requirements of nation building.

The U.S. Army displayed their lack of responsiveness to the actual nature of threat by pulling their Special Forces troops away from counterinsurgency activities, in lieu of increasing offensive actions. Search and destroy missions subjected the South

Vietnamese population to significant danger, reducing the probability of their support for the government of South Vietnam. The army’s strategy was in direct conflict with the

U.S. goal of achieving a stable, non Communist South Vietnam, demonstrating the military’s failure to integrate their strategy with broader U.S. aims. 1042

The challenge of integrating political, economic and security concerns were paramount. The PROVN study in particular highlighted the need for greater coordination. 1043 Civilian bureaucracies were a significant source of opposition to further integration. 1044 Given the vehement resistance to suggestions for greater integration of

1040 Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife . 1041 Ives, US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam . p. 130. 1042 Avant, p. 95 (Brooks book) 1043 Lewis Sorley, "To Change a War: General Harold K. Johnson and the PROVN Study," Parameters , Spring 1998. 1044 Andrew J. Birtle, "PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historian: A Reappraisal," The Journal of Military History 72, no. October 2008 (2008). P. 1240. 264

effort, Westmoreland proceeded cautiously knowing that getting civilian bureaucracies to

abandon their parochial interests would be extremely unpopular. 1045 Bureaucratic politics was a barrier to integrating political, economy and military plans and adversely affected military effectiveness.

Finally, the trend during the Vietnam War was centralization of decision-making to an unprecedented extent, inhibiting responsiveness. 1046 Regardless of the trend, the need for flexibility in the field still remained, which contributed to the military’s ineffectiveness. 1047 The U.S. military in Vietnam was unable to capitalize on innovations because of their inflexibility and lack of responsiveness. In addition, the Army’s proclivity for high intensity warfare led to a lack of integration in the political, economic and security efforts. All of these factors led to the overall ineffectiveness of the U.S.

Army in Vietnam.

International Threat

The level and diversity of threat affects military effectiveness. 1048 A high threat environment may lead to more integration and responsiveness because of improved political-military coordination and increased military budgets. 1049 On the other hand, diversity of threat refers to the type of threats confronted by the state. When the state confronts an overarching enemy, such as the Soviet Union during the Cold War, strategic

1045 Ibid. 1046 W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, eds., The Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1977). P. 277. 1047 Directing movement from the air also demoralized leaders and troops on the ground, stifled initiative, and inhibited a sense of responsibility. See Bruce Palmer Jr., The 25 Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984). P. 62. 1048 Goldman, "International Competition and Military Effectiveness: Naval Air Power, 1919-1945." P. 164-165. 1049 Ibid. P. 164-165 265

priorities should be clearer. 1050 A highly diverse threat, on the other hand, complicates planning and resourcing, leading to less integration and responsiveness.

The principal role of the U.S. Army during the 1950s became deterring Soviet aggression and avoiding war. Bitter administrative and bureaucratic struggles between the services became the norm over roles, missions, budgets and manning levels. 1051

Although the Soviet Union posed the largest threat to American national security, peripheral wars in countries like Vietnam were fought as proxies for the underlying tension between capitalism and communism. The military viewed proxy wars as a diversion from their main priority. For example, General Matthew Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, was completely against the US getting involved in Vietnam. 1052 On the other hand, possession of nuclear weapons made direct confrontation with the Soviet Union unacceptable to the American public, constraining the spectrum of options available to military leaders.

The U.S. containment strategy in East Asia rested on two principles: the assumption of world revolution driven by a monolithic enemy and the cascading effects of social and political revolution across regions and continents. 1053 Through the

Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations the United States made increasingly large political and financial commitments to the survival of South Vietnam, which reinforced containment ideology. 1054 The Vietnam era represents both a high level and

1050 Ibid. P. 165. 1051 Ives, US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam . p. 55. 1052 A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The US Army between Korea and Vietnam (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986). P. 40-45. 1053 Orrin Schwab, A Clash of Cultures: Civil-Military Relations During the Vietnam War , ed. David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, In War and in Peace: U.S. Civil-Military Relations (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006). P. 7. 1054 Ibid. p. 8. 266

diversity threat environment. Although the Soviet Union was primary threat, wars in

peripheral areas presented strategic challenges to the U.S. Army.

The United States became involved in Vietnam, like Korea, in the aftermath of

the Second World War. 1055 Originally trying to avoid involvement in Southeast Asia, the

Americans offered aid and committed personnel and resources to training and equipping the South Vietnam armed forces. 1056 Building a Vietnamese army was largely unsuccessful, making the tenuous situation more difficult. On 30 December 1949,

President Truman signed NSC 48/2, which committed the United States to oppose any further extension of Communist influence in Asia. 1057 Despite this declaration, the

Department of State didn’t have any Southeast Asian expertise, further demonstrating the general lack of interest in this region. 1058

The Eisenhower administration’s, “New Look” strategy, emphasized massive retaliation, thus increasing the size of strategic bombing forces. The U.S. would rely primarily on nuclear weapons for deterrence, giving the Air Force and Navy priority over the Army. 1059 Over time, the Air Force’s share of the budget became so large it diminished the capacity of the United States to wage a conventional war. Given the overarching “New Look” strategy, there was little cause for developing nation-building capacity. 1060

As the spread of communism worldwide consumed the U.S. government, the fall of Vietnam became politically untenable. While the U.S. could not allow Vietnam to fall

1055 Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976 . 1056 Donaldson, America at War since 1945 . 1057 Office of Joint History, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the First Indochina War , History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004). p. 213. 1058 John F. Melby, "Vietnam--1950," in The United States and the Vietnam War , ed. Walter Hixson (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 2000). P. 98. 1059 Jordan and others, American National Security . P. 48-49. 1060 Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The US Army between Korea and Vietnam . P. 35-40. 267

to the communists, neither did a war seem in its best interest. When Dien Bien Phu fell,

the United States turned to building a collective defense organization for Southeast Asia.

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that communism’s spread to Vietnam would

undermine the US strategic position in Southeast Asia, they approached direct military

engagement with extreme caution. Korea and NATO buildup in Europe were a higher

priority. In their opinion, the defense of Indochina should be the responsibility of

America’s allies or indigenous forces. 1061

Though keeping Southeast Asia from becoming communist was in the U.S.’ interest, the Kennedy administration was against direct military force in order to avoid a second land war with China. Kennedy was committed to nation building, though his successor, Johnson was more willing to consider military escalation. With U.S. forces and assistance either on call or committed around the world, it appeared the United States was more likely to be involved in local wars than in a general conflagration. 1062 Despite this reality, the military budget emphasized deterrence of nuclear conflict over preparation for limited conventional wars.

During the Kennedy administration, the U.S. government’s civilian agencies had the lead with respect to the mission in Vietnam. The State Department, US Agency for

International Development, U.S. Information Agency, and the Department of Treasury had specific objectives mandated by the White House and the Congress to modernize

South Vietnam. The State Department, in particular, thought that Vietnam was a

1061 History, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the First Indochina War . p. 214. 1062 Stewart, ed., American Military History . P. 257. 268

manageable problem without military force. 1063 The military initially played only a

supporting role in the nation building process. This reflected the administration’s belief

that creating a prosperous and developed civil society was essential to the survival of

Vietnam. The State Department’s concept in Vietnam was to use diplomatic means to

influence change. They continued to encourage the growth of democratic institutions

based on an American model of government. 1064 Despite the extensive civilian agency participation, the military chose to minimize their involvement in Vietnam.

There was a policy debate in 1961 that signaled a shift toward treating Vietnam as a military problem. The president sided with the hawkish members of the executive branch signaling the administration’s intentions and determination. This trend was thereby reflected in the field as the U.S. military gained power, operating independently of the U.S. ambassador in Vietnam. 1065 President Johnson appointed Robert W. Komer as a special assistant to the president for national security affairs, giving him a mandate to supervise Washington support for pacification. 1066 Komer proposed turning over pacification responsibility to the military since they provided 90 percent of the resources.

The process by which the American government came to increase its support for pacification was disorderly and haphazard, like the strategy for the war in general. 1067

The army’s force structure, equipment and its style of warfare evolved after

World War II with the greatest threat in mind—the Soviet Union. 1068 Since this was the

1063 Gary R. Hess, "Commitment in the Age of Counterinsurgency: Kennedy's Vietnam Options and Decision, 1961-1963," in Shadow on the White House Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975 , ed. David L. Anderson (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993). P. 75. 1064 Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict . P. 62-63. 1065 Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support . 1066 Ibid. P. 24. 1067 "Re-Emphasis on Pacification, 1965-1967," in The Pentagon Papers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971). P. 515. 1068 Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict . P. 48. 269

priority, it is no surprise that the military did not develop the capability to address nation

building, especially for an eventuality in Vietnam. The largest threat the U.S. faced was

defeating another North Korean attack or forcing stalemate on the central European front.

Both of which did not require skill sets other than conventional warfare. The diversity of

threats facing the United States was high given the increase in peripheral wars, as well as

the threat of nuclear war with Russia. The high level of threat combined with the

diversity of threat predicted contradictory patterns of responsiveness and integration. In

this case, the threat of nuclear war with Russia provided the military an excuse to avoid

planning and training for nation building. Despite civilian views regarding the

importance on unconventional warfare, the military remained focused on its traditional

institutional response—preparation for conventional warfare with the Soviet Union at the expense of its effectiveness in Vietnam.

Reformist Military Leadership

Leadership is crucially important for the effective functioning of a military. 1069

Reformist military leadership is also vital to effective military innovation. 1070 Without military leaders who see the value in changing the organization, the military will fall back on its standard operating procedures. 1071 Unfortunately, during the Vietnam War, there was a lack of military reformers who impacted military effectiveness. The United States military never stopped hoping that direct conventional warfare would work against the

Vietnamese. This propensity to use the tools they had always used in the past and ignore the lessons of counterinsurgency provided a disincentive to innovate with respect to

1069 Guenter Lewy, "Some Political-Military Lessons of the Vietnam War," in Assessing the Vietnam War, ed. Lloyd J. Matthews (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1987). P. 142. 1070 Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness: The Second World War . 1071 Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military . 270

nation building. Key military leaders believed that if they increased the number of troops

in theater, killed more Viet Cong and dropped more bombs, that victory was right around

the corner. 1072 Unfortunately, few efforts focused on political or economic development.

The military saw their role as only war fighting and ignored the civil considerations.

President Kennedy urged Army leaders to develop a counterinsurgency program,

yet the Army responded with minimal effort. 1073 General Lemnitzer, the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960-1962, expressed his view that unconventional warfare

was an overrated means of operation. 1074 Similarly, General Decker, the Army Chief of

Staff from 1960-1962 and General Maxwell Taylor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff from 1962-1964, both scoffed at the idea that guerilla warfare would ever be important to the U.S. Army.

President Johnson appointed Maxwell Taylor to be the South Vietnam ambassador in July 1964. 1075 Taylor’s opinion of counterinsurgency served to further prevent innovation in this field. Although he seemed like an ideal fit—a strong military figure that would be able to force civilian and military agencies to work together--at the end of his tenure, the U.S. mission had larger, more fragmented bureaucratic fiefdoms than ever. 1076 Despite his broad powers, he was reluctant to interfere with the military chain of command. Although this doesn’t seem problematic, it was indicative of a larger issue. Taylor was clearly the figure of authority, but he didn’t provide the direction

1072 Large military engagements only took allied forces away from the pacification efforts and involved them in combat in conditions favorable to the enemy. See Lewy, "Some Political-Military Lessons of the Vietnam War." p. 146. 1073 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam . P. 33 and Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict . 1074 Schwab, A Clash of Cultures: Civil-Military Relations During the Vietnam War . p. 21. 1075 General Taylor was considered one of the few “soldier-scholars” in American history. Jaya Krishna Baral, The Pentagon and the Making of US Foreign Policy (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1978). P. 75. 1076 Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support . P. 8. 271 required to pull the mission together, which resulted in agencies continuing to go in their own directions.

General William Westmoreland commanded the American forces in Vietnam from 1964-1968, subsequently serving as the Army Chief of Staff until 1972. There were two different strategies used in Vietnam. During Westmoreland’s tenure as commander, his objective was to win militarily through the conduct of a war of attrition by killing as many of the enemy as possible. 1077 The theory was that this would eventually cause the enemy to stop fighting. 1078 Clearly, General Westmoreland did not see winning the people to the combined South Vietnamese/US side as a priority. 1079 His bias against nation building served as a deterrent to innovation in Vietnam. Upon

General Westmoreland’s promotion, General Creighton Adams took command of U.S. forces employing a strategy that addressed combat operations, pacification and indigenous force development as equally important. The generally accepted view today is that General Westmoreland’s strategy was counterproductive and that by the time his successor could adopt a more fruitful approach, it was too late. 1080

At the same time General Westmoreland was appointed the commander of

American forces in Vietnam, General Harold K. Johnson became Army Chief of Staff.

General Johnson was dissatisfied with how the Vietnam War was progressing; however, under President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of

1077 Owens, "Rumsfeld, the Generals, and the State of U.S. Civil-Military Relations." p. 72. 1078 Lewis Sorley, Remembering Vietnam (Washington D.C.: National Archives, 2002). 1079 Westmoreland’s strategy was to conduct one of three operations: search and destroy enemy forces, clearing operations to drive large enemy units out of populated areas or securing operations (which were usually conducted by regional, popular forces, or the police). See Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1977). P. 39. 1080 Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harvest Books, 2000). Andrew Birtle argues that Abrams’ methods were not significantly different from Westmoreland’s. See Birtle, "PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historian: A Reappraisal." 272

Staff had little influence on either strategy or policy concerning the war. 1081 Despite

these constraints, General Johnson set out to devise a new approach to the war in

Vietnam. 1082

Convinced Westmoreland’s approach wasn’t working, Johnson commissioned a

study entitled, “A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of

Vietnam,” known as PROVN for short. It conclusions were stark and disturbing, calling

into question Westmoreland’s approach to waging war. 1083 The heart of the entire study

was security for the people living in hamlets and villages in South Vietnam “Critical

actions are those that occur at the village, district and provincial levels.” 1084 Johnson subsequently observed that search and destroy operations in remote jungle regions produced no lasting effects and were irrelevant to security in the villages. Only 6 percent of artillery fire was observed. The very operations that were supposed to be protecting villagers were harming them. Despite the conclusions and recommendations of PROVN, the JCS were loath to interfere with Westmoreland’s conduct of the war. 1085

Even if there had been a decisive, innovative military thinker, access to the

President was extremely limited. 1086 This was critical since the President had taken over the majority of decisions regarding anything related to the war. The Chairman of the

1081 Markel, "The Limits of American Generalship: The JCS's Strategic Advice in Early Cold War Crises." According to McMaster, Johnson was also skeptical of the effectiveness of air power. Regardless of his reservations, Johnson failed to present his views to the Secretary of Defense. See McMaster, Dereliction of Duty . P. 149-150. 1082 Sorley, "To Change a War: General Harold K. Johnson and the PROVN Study." 1083 Although many studies have suggested that PROVN indicted the U.S. government for failing to create a unified and well-coordinated program for eliminating the insurgency in South Vietnam, Andrew Birtle contends that historians have exaggerated PROVN’s significance, glossed over its weaknesses, and distorted its relationship to Westmoreland. See Birtle, "PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historian: A Reappraisal." 1084 Sorley, "To Change a War: General Harold K. Johnson and the PROVN Study." 1085 Ibid. And McMaster, Dereliction of Duty . 1086 Markel argues that the JCS did not develop a workable plan because they couldn’t agree on the nature of the war or the strategy to win it. See Markel, "The Limits of American Generalship: The JCS's Strategic Advice in Early Cold War Crises." P. 25. 273

Joint Chiefs of Staff was the only military officer with routine access to President

Johnson and even he rarely saw the president. In the twelve-month period from June

1965 to June 1966, the Chief of Staff of the Army only saw the President privately twice. 1087

In the Vietnam case, there was a clear lack of military reformers, which prevented military innovation, particularly in non-conventional tasks. The JCS failed not only to speak up, but also had little of value to actually add to the deliberations. 1088 Furthermore, this also greatly contributed to the military ineffectiveness. In particular, the military lacked integration and responsiveness, which greatly contributed to the overall failure.

Civil-Military Relations

Complex military operations require close coordination between civil and military components in order to achieve the desired political aims. 1089 Cooperation and trust among civilians is an important determinant of effective innovation. 1090 The conventional neat division between civil and military affairs became increasingly blurred in the 1960s and 1970s and the complexities of civil-military relations were especially challenging in the era of limited war. 1091 Furthermore, military leaders must have the trust of their civilian masters, the American public, and those who serve under their command. 1092 The civil-military interface is particularly important in creating and

1087 Harry G Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato: Presidio Press, 1982). p. 48. 1088 Markel, "The Limits of American Generalship: The JCS's Strategic Advice in Early Cold War Crises." P. 25-26. 1089 Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, National Security: Policymakers, Processes and Politics . 1090 Egnell, "Explaining US and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: The Civil- Military Dimension." 1091 A military built of draftees that needed to be constantly ready also contributed to civil-military problems. See Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984). P. 555. 1092 Snider, Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions . 274

implementing comprehensive and effective campaign plans that include all elements of

national power. 1093 During the Vietnam War, the president and the secretary of defense

had adversarial relationships with the military leaders at the time, particularly during the

Johnson administration. Additionally, there was a lack of trust between civilians and the

military.

There was a significant amount of civilian-military disagreement about the

conduct of the war in Vietnam. 1094 The military was not enthusiastic to commit U.S. ground forces to Southeast Asia. 1095 Even once civilian leaders persuaded them that vital interests were at stake, the military had serious reservations about the civilian strategy for the war. There was a general absence of a consistent operational concept in the decades surrounding the Vietnam War. Each administration developed new ways of organizing the military to deal with the Soviet threat. The frequency of new directions led in many cases to disorientation and confusion rather than improvement. 1096

U.S. involvement with the situation in Vietnam began during the Truman administration, spanned Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford. 1097

The majority of the effort with respect to nation building without a significant ground war element occurred during the Kennedy administration. However, the Johnson administration marked the low-point in civil military relations during the Vietnam War.

1093 Since the end of the Cold War, many important decisions fall in the overlapping area, between the spheres of civilian and military leaders, of joint responsibility. See Gibson and Snider, "Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National Security Decision-Making Process." p. 195. 1094 Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment . P. 27. 1095 David H. Petraeus, "Korea, the Never-Again Club, and Indochina," Parameters 1987. 59-70. 1096 Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The US Army between Korea and Vietnam . P. 143-144. 1097 By 1950, both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department saw Southeast Asia as an area of strategic importance. The State Department took the position that Communism must be stopped at the southern border of China. The domino theory eventually grew out of these concerns. See Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 , ed. David F. Trask, United States Army in Vietnam, vol. 63 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983). p. 107. 275

Regardless, the entire Vietnam era was marked by adversarial U.S. military

operations. 1098 Disagreements about the control and conduct of the war developed into

confrontations between political leaders and military professionals. 1099

Efforts to reorganize the department of defense after 1947 were aimed at increasing civilian control over the military, while reducing the harmful tendencies to allocate resources and to develop policies on a bargaining for shares of the pie. In 1958, the National Security Act was again amended to give the secretary of defense greater authority, more influence in strategic planning, and greater control over the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The services were further downgraded administratively and their functions were revised to exclude control over major operational commands. 1100

The Army reforms of the 1950s were abandoned when John F. Kennedy took office. Instead, Kennedy stressed the importance of counterinsurgency, nation-building and Special Forces as a way to address the challenges of the Cold War. He thought that a victory for the communists in North Vietnam would lead to a series of brush fires that would threaten world peace. 1101 Nation building and small arms warfare was far more acceptable than conventional war in Southeast Asia. 1102 This was unacceptable, therefore requiring an increased commitment to the Saigon government. 1103 He increased the number of military advisors from 700 to 16,000, enhancing US political and military influence. 1104 However, Kennedy pushed a much more political solution—fostering a

1098 Palmer Jr., The 25 Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. P. 201. 1099 Sarkesian and Conner, The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century . P. 63. 1100 Jordan, Taylor Jr., and Mazarr, American National Security . P. 176. 1101 Stephen Pelz, "John F. Kennedy's 1961 Vietnam War Decisions," in The Roots of the Vietnam War , ed. Walter Hixson (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 2000). P. 361. 1102 Schwab, A Clash of Cultures: Civil-Military Relations During the Vietnam War . p. 105. 1103 Hess, "Commitment in the Age of Counterinsurgency: Kennedy's Vietnam Options and Decision, 1961- 1963." P. 67. 1104 Ibid. P. 69. 276

noncommunist nationalist movement rather than sending military forces. These ideas

were contrary to what the military leadership at the time believed. Though Kennedy had

a clear vision of the importance of counterinsurgency, the military largely ignored him,

choosing to focus on preparing for a conventional war in Europe.

President Johnson, who inherited the Vietnam problem, had a much different

leadership style. Johnson was secretive, did not like to hear opinions that differed from

his own and attempted to keep as much power in his hands as possible. He rarely used

the NSC, but when he did, it was to implement his policies, not formulate them. 1105

Johnson continually ignored the Chiefs, failed to provide them with clear policy

guidance, personally insulted and patronized them. 1106 President Johnson tried to compensate for the lack of policy by becoming intricately involved with tactical military decisions--all military action had to be approved by the White House. This was done at the expense of his primary civilian leadership responsibilities. 1107 Furthermore, the

Chiefs had extremely limited access to the president who preferred to deal only with his civilian advisors. This environment further prevented military innovation as well as effectiveness.

President Johnson’s secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, had a destructive, adversarial relationship with the chiefs. McNamara distrusted and at times demonstrated contempt for the advice of the uniformed military. 1108 Under his leadership, civil- military relations deteriorated sharply.1109 The type of relationship that the military has

1105 Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush . P. 151. 1106 Ibid. P. 150. 1107 Robert Previdi, Civilian Control Versus Military Rule (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1988). P. 88-89. 1108 Ibid. P. 118. 1109 David C. Hendrickson, Reforming Defense: The State of American Civil-Military Relations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988). P. 49. 277

with the Secretary of Defense sets the stage for civil-military relations. 1110 McNamara created an environment in which the uniformed military were undervalued and largely ignored.

Despite presidents urging the Army to adopt a counterinsurgency capability, congressional budgetary policy induced the Army to focus on Europe. 1111 As early as

1965, Congress was opposed to an expanded role in Vietnam with a majority of senators favoring a negotiated settlement. Although Congress was generally opposed to further involvement in Vietnam, they were just as uncertain as the executive branch as to what course of action to take in Southeast Asia. 1112

In January 1966, military actors reluctantly expressed before Congress their

differences with the civilian elements of the Pentagon on Vietnam. Regardless, the

military attempted to avoid face-to-face confrontations with the Defense Secretary over

Vietnam. The generals, whenever possible, avoided answering direct questions about

their differences of opinion when asked by Congress. Especially troubling were the

civilian leadership within the Pentagon who failed to provide accurate information about

Vietnam to Congress on several occasions, leaving the military in a particularly awkward

and compromising position. 1113

Civilian analysts dominated the strategy arena. 1114 There was an increased emphasis on technical, managerial, and bureaucratic concerns. 1115 This rationalistic

1110 Johnson II and Metz, American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems . 1111 Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars . P. 50. 1112 Gibbons, p. 394 1113 Baral, The Pentagon and the Making of US Foreign Policy . P. 261. 1114 “Civilian militarists” had no problem keeping the military out of the national security decision-making process. Especially since the military abdicated their military-political responsibility in favor of the technocratic aspect of war. See Paul M Kattenburg, "Reflections on Vietnam: Of Revisionism and Lessons yet to Be Learned," in Assessing the Vietnam War , ed. Lloyd J. Matthews (Washington: Pergamon- Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1987). P. 161. 278

approach attempted to bring more objectivity to defense decision making. However, the

idea that all things can be quantified and simplified is comforting, but unrealistic. By

using this methodology, military innovation and flexibility were discouraged.

Presidential intervention was not enough to force military innovation. Presidents

proposed innovative doctrine, but the Army maintained its adherence to older,

inappropriate doctrine. 1116 Congressional control over budgetary allocations became the focus of army leaders instead of the president’s preferences. This is not surprising given the especially adversarial relationship that civilian leaders within the executive branch had with the military leadership during the Vietnam War. The poor relationship between the president, the civilian leadership of the military and the uniformed military all led to an environment where risk was to be avoided. Developing new methods or organizations to address the challenges of nation building would certainly have been risky given the civil-military relations at the time.

An illustration in the lack of trust was the North Vietnam bombing campaign that was completely orchestrated in Washington. Bombing targets were selected at luncheons in the White House, at which no military officer was present. The one common theme of the McNamara era was his unwillingness or inability to delegate responsibility. 1117

Entire operations were directed from Washington with policymakers reserving the right to call off planned air strikes and did so several times. The weather in Vietnam, meanwhile, changed more quickly than people could inform Washington; this kept pilots in a constant state of alert as they waited for decisions to come from Washington.

1115 Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. P. 45. 1116 Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars . P. 74. 1117 Hendrickson, Reforming Defense: The State of American Civil-Military Relations . P. 48-49. 279

The distrust between McNamara and the senior military leaders coupled with

President Johnson’s desire to make decision about tactics in Washington worked to the

detriment of military effectiveness. The political environment in Washington promoted

conflict between civilians and military officers as procedure took precedence over

strategy. Finally, the focus on conventional warfare in Europe by Congressional budgets

as well as the military’s preference for such warfare also contributed to the lack of

effective innovation in the Vietnam case.

Summary

In the end, the military fell back upon its traditional, institutional repertoire. After

World War II, the United States sized, equipped, and trained the military to compete with

the Soviets on the plains of Central Europe. Instead of adapting to the unique situation

they were confronted with in Vietnam, the army fought the enemy the way they were trained and organized. 1118 When things didn’t go as expected, the organization simply

did more of the same--whether it was to commit more troops or to go on more patrols.

The very political problem of Vietnam was dealt with using a militarized response.

Additionally, the lack of any clear strategy to deal with the complexities of nation

building contributed largely to the ineffectiveness of the military effort.

The high level and diversity of threat, the lack of reformist military leaders, and

poor civil-military relations marked by distrust all predict a lack of effective innovation.

In the Vietnam case, this is exactly what one sees. Furthermore, the military response of

preparing and organizing for the war they hoped to fight was reinforced by Congressional

budget allocations and promotion policies.

1118 Thompson and Frizzell, eds., The Lessons of Vietnam . P. 268. 280

Conclusion

Both the Korean and Vietnam Wars illustrate military ineffectiveness and a lack of innovation. In the case of Korea, military personnel lacked the requisite skill to undertake nation-building efforts. Although the military had trained a cadre of officers to administer occupied territories, the majority of them were assigned to Germany and

Japan. Military forces were not responsive to the changing situation on the ground, nor did they develop an integrated plan for the administration of South Korea.

During the Vietnam War, several new organizations were developed to attempt to address the unique situation the army faced. CORDS, the actions of Special Forces, the use air mobility and strategic hamlet programs were all innovative ways to approach the problems in Vietnam. Despite these attempts, the army’s focus remained on search and destroy missions, which were largely ineffective. The lack of an integrated plan at the strategic level prevented the tactical level successes from being aggregated in any meaningful way. As the situation evolved over time, the army simply did more of the same instead of being responsive.

This chapter examined three variables: international threat, reformist military leadership, and civil-military relations to explain the absence of effective innovation. In the Korean case, the United States was focused on the European theater of operations. In the Pacific theater, Japan was the primary concern of both policymakers and the military leadership. The level and diversity of threat can explain the lack of effective innovation with respect to nation-building in the Korea case. In addition, the lack of reformist military leaders and the adversarial relationship between civilians and military also

281 contributed to the lack of effective innovation with respect to the nation-building of

Korea.

Similarly, in the Vietnam War, there was a lack of reformist military leaders and trust between the military and civilian leaders. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had a particularly adversarial relationship with the uniformed military. Furthermore,

President Johnson made tactical level decisions from Washington about the conduct of the war illustrating his distrust of military leaders. The diversity of threat also conspired to complicate the U.S.’ strategic planning. These factors all contributed to the ineffectiveness of the U.S. military in Vietnam. Despite presidential proclamations of the importance of unconventional methods of fighting in Vietnam, the military chose to maintain their focus on high intensity conflict in Europe.

282

Chapter 6: Conclusion and Policy Implications “Good tactics can’t fix a bad strategy, but good strategy tends to fix bad tactics, because the inappropriateness of those individual actions becomes self-evident when seen against the larger scheme. 1119 ”

This dissertation has important implications for the policy debate about military

effectiveness. By systematically examining the sources of effective innovation in nation-

building this study sheds light on prioritizing reformist military leadership and civil-

military relations based on trust, honesty and respect. In today’s increasingly complex

world, the combat phase of warfare may be the easiest part. What follows the combat

phase is where most strategic objectives will be achieved or not achieved. Therefore,

nation-building deserves as much planning and attention as the combat phase.

The Army’s first experience with nation building was in securing and building the

United States itself. It played an active role in supporting settlement and rudimentary

governance. When the country expanded to the west, the Army helped ensure control to

foster the establishment of government. It was central in instituting and protecting

governance functions in often-hostile environments. 1120

Routine governance and other stabilization tasks carried over to the postwar governance in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Similarly, after World War II, the military was essential in the postwar period to the reestablishment of government and economic systems across Europe and in Japan. In fact, historically, the Army often sought control over governance operations to preserve unity of command. 1121 A historical assessment of the many case studies of US stability operations suggests that the

1119 Ricks, The Gamble . P. 160. 1120 Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement, "A Return to the Army's Roots: Governance, Stabilization, and Reconstruction." P. 255. 1121 Nadia Schadlow, "War and the Art of Governance," Parameters 33, no. 3 (2003). P. 256. 283

military will continue to be responsible for nation building. 1122 Since the end of the Cold

War, the United States has taken on roughly one new nation-building commitment every

other year. 1123 Given this pattern, effective innovation with respect to nation building

will continue to be an important facet of the United States’ national security posture.

This study examined military innovation with respect to nation building, as a

separate category from wartime or peacetime innovation. For the purpose of this work, I

used Pei and Kasper’s definition of nation-building: a military occupation where the goal

is regime change or survival, a large number of U.S. troops are deployed and both

military and civilian personnel are used in the administration of the occupied country. 1124

The U.S. Army has been involved in nation-building operations since its inception and

their increasing number since the end of the Cold War imply that understanding the

causal mechanisms behind effective military innovation is important.

Three criteria were used to narrow the universe of possible cases: cases where the

U.S. Army was the primary force used; cases where the U.S. Army had primary

responsibility for governing a foreign country, where establishing a productive economy

and a stable government that would ally with the United States were the primary

goals. 1125 In the twentieth century, the U.S. Army has had primary responsibility for

many nation-building efforts: Germany, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia,

Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. 1126 In the case of Germany, Korea, Vietnam and Iraq, the

U.S. Army was tasked with governing the country while undertaking comprehensive

1122 Yates, The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005 . 1123 Fukuyama, "Nation-Building 101." p. 1. 1124 Pei and Kasper, Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building . 1125 Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail." 1126 Dobbins and others, America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq . 284 economic, political and social reconstruction. 1127 Germany represents the most successful case in terms of both outcome as well as effective innovation, while Iraq has been largely criticized for the lack of effectiveness. 1128

Evaluating Effectiveness

New concepts or methods do not guarantee victory because factors exogenous to military innovation play an important role in determining outcomes. 1129 Therefore, military effectiveness, rather than victory is a more useful measure of innovative success.

A comprehensive framework for measuring military effectiveness is required, since military activity occurs at multiple levels. 1130 Although some authors use battlefield outcomes to measure effectiveness, this study examines the specific features of the army as indicators of effectiveness. 1131 The military’s organization, training, and planning for nation-building all provide evidence for its (in) effectiveness.1132

1127 Baker, American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence , Cornish, ed., The Conflict in Iraq . 1128 Although I will focus the majority of this dissertation on comparing Iraq and Germany, authors like Eva Bellin suggest that they are incomparable cases. She asserts that the five factors differentiate the two cases: level of economic development, ethnic homogeneity, strength of state institutions, prior experience with meaningful democracy, and elite leadership. Bellin, "The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective."These factors are important determinants of the outcome of the nation- building effort, but the focus of the dissertation is more concerned with the effectiveness of the innovation rather than the outcome of the effort. 1129 Isaacson, Layne, and Arquilla, Predicting Military Innovation , Millett, Murray, and Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations." 1130 Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," in Military Effectiveness , ed. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987). P.3. 1131 Authors who use outcomes to compare states’ effectiveness include: Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, "Democratic Effectiveness? Reassessing the Claim That Democracies Are More Effective in Battle," in American Political Science Association (Boston: 2002), Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III, "Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness," Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 3 (1998).Pollack also uses features of the military to indicate military effectiveness. See Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002). 1132 Brooks, "The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness." 285

Brooks’ four criteria of effectiveness: integration, responsiveness, skill and

quality were used to evaluate cases of nation-building. 1133 Integration refers to the degree to which military activities are consistent at the tactical, operational and strategic levels as well as integration between the military and other actors. 1134 Responsiveness implies flexibility and a quick reaction to requirements with respect to the military situation, policing needs as well as political and economic administration. 1135 Skill reflects the military’s ability to perform its assigned mission as well as the degree to which the military is prepared to undertake difficult and complex tasks. 1136 Quality means

possessing highly capable weapons, equipment, personnel and organizations. 1137

Although each of these factors is important, there are tradeoffs between them and

militaries will accept some level of risk in choosing to focus on one element versus

another. Different militaries will capitalize on different elements of military

effectiveness. Furthermore, the framework is meant to discount variables external to the

military. Despite effective innovation, a nation-building effort may still fail. Enemy

resources, political will, and resource commitments may derail success even in the

presence of all four criteria of military effectiveness.

The United States Army effectively innovated in the case of Germany during

World War II. The School of Military Government, the Eclipse Plan for the post-war

1133 Brooks, "Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness." 1134 Perito, The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified . 1135 Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict , Ward, The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq: Lessons Learned . 1136 Brooks, "Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness.", Meese, “Defense Decision Making under Budget Stringency: Explaining Downsizing in the United States Army”. 1137 Brooks, "Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness." 286

occupation of Germany, and the establishment of the U.S. constabulary force were all

instrumental in a successful war to peace transition. The army’s effectiveness at the

nation-building of Germany was demonstrated by the actions of individuals on the

ground, supported by policies, programs and organizations at the operational and

strategic level. Soldiers were prepared to undertake the complexities of post-war

occupation duties due to their training at the School of Military Government. The

comprehensive post-war planning process anticipated the myriad challenges that the

military would face in Germany, enabling responsiveness. Finally, the Constabulary

force provided much needed population security so that rebuilding the economy and

government institutions could happen. Beyond the effectiveness of the innovations, the

outcome itself was successful, making the case even more interesting. It is important to

note, however, all the other factors that the military had in its favor.

First of all, prior to the outbreak of World War II, Germany was a great power

that was highly industrialized with a developed economy. Although the war devastated

much of its physical capital, German retained the human, organizational, and social

capital that is the lynchpin of economic development. 1138 Secondly, Germany possessed

an effective police force, judiciary, and civil service with which to govern.1139 Finally,

there was historical precedence of meaningful democracy. 1140 All of these factors made the nation-building of Germany significantly easier than any other case since. 1141

Regardless of these dissimilarities, the United States army has not attempted the level or depth of innovations in any conflict since World War II. Korea and Vietnam are

1138 Bellin, "The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective." P. 596. 1139 Ibid. P. 597. 1140 Ibid. P. 597. 1141 The Japan case had very similar pre-conditions and similar successful outcomes. 287

important historical cases that both lacked effective innovation. In the Korea case, there

was never an integrated or responsive plan for the political or economic administration of

the country. Additionally, the military was not responsive to the deteriorating security

situation. Soldiers trained in military government operations were assigned to other,

higher priority, theaters of operation. The military in Korea was unprepared to undertake

the complex and difficult tasks required of nation-building, demonstrating their lack of

skill. This study found that the four criteria of effectiveness were lacking in the U.S.’

nation-building effort in Korea after World War II.

Unlike the Korea case, the U.S. Army did attempt to innovate to address the

challenges in Vietnam. During Vietnam War era, the United States Army developed a

large number of tactical and technological innovations, all designed to assist in bringing

conventional firepower to bear. 1142 The expansion of the Special Forces, establishment of

the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), airmobile

divisions, and strategic hamlets were all attempts to address the complexities of the

situation in Vietnam.

Special Forces advisers made a significant impact in the early years of the war.

However, the change in their task organization and reorientation to unconventional, not

counterinsurgency tasks diminished their nation-building effectiveness. 1143 CORDS was

also a valuable program, but the lack of an integrated pacification ultimately led to its

overall ineffectiveness. 1144 Ultimately, the tactical level innovations were unsuccessful because the military lacked an effective strategy. Key nation-building tasks such as

1142 Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife . P. 199. 1143 Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars . 1144 Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict . 288

population protection and linking locals to the national-government were overlooked in

lieu of search and destroy missions that alienated the very people the US and South

Vietnam were aiming to win over. 1145 Unrestrained and uncontrolled firepower was

substituted for patient work developing intelligence sources in the local population, who,

given real security and belief in the government, might have provided valuable

information about which locals were setting the ambushes, and where. 1146

A significant institutional legacy of Vietnam is the present structural segregation

of elements most likely to engage in nation building tasks. These elements were placed

outside the Army’s mainstream combat structure, exemplified most clearly by the

placement of civil affairs units within Special Operations forces as well as placing these

capabilities mostly in the reserves. 1147 The experience of Vietnam also offered the

military three lessons according to General David Petraeus: American public support of a

protracted conflict is finite; civilian officials are responsive to influences other than the

objective conditions on the battlefield; there are limits to military power in solving

certain types of problems in world affairs. 1148 These lessons all had an impact on future

nation-building efforts.

Finally, Iraq is the most comprehensive nation-building effort since Vietnam.

During the Iraq War, the military established several new training and education

initiatives. The Joint Improvised Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), the

1145 Haffa, The Half War: Planning U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces to Meet a Limited Contingency, 1960- 1983 , Hastings, Warriors: Portraits from the Battlefield , Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam . 1146 Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife . P. 200. 1147 Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement, "A Return to the Army's Roots: Governance, Stabilization, and Reconstruction." P. 256-257. 1148 David H. Petraeus, "Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam," in Assessing the Vietnam War , ed. Lloyd J. Matthews (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1987). P. 173-174. 289

Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADDOC),

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), Center for Army Lessons

Learned (CALL) and Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) are a few of these programs or

organizations meant to address the challenges faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. The post-

war plan and the establishment of the Iraqi Security Forces were the other two

innovations evaluated. For the most part, the U.S. Army’s innovation attempts were

unsuccessful. The military demonstrated great skill at the tactical level, but like the

Vietnam War experience, the lack of an overarching strategy led to a lack of overall

effectiveness. Another significant problem was the lack of responsiveness in the early

years of the war. As the security situation continually deteriorated from 2003-2006, the

institutional response was to do more of the same and hope things on the ground would

improve. Although how it ends it still a question mark, the military’s preparation and

planning was unarguably inadequate and demonstrated ineffective innovation.

Most theory predicts that the military will resist innovation—which was the case

in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq. The effective innovation in the Germany case, however, is an interesting aberration. Since military innovation is the exception, rather than the rule, identifying the causal mechanisms is important. Several authors have investigated the factors that affect their propensity to change. 1149

Causal Mechanisms

The purpose of this dissertation was to understand why the United States Army

was able to innovate with respect to nation-building in Germany after World War II, yet

1149 Nielsen, “Preparing for War: The Dynamics of Peacetime Military Reform”. Farrell and Terriff, eds., The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology . Rose, “Peace Operations and Counterinsurgency: The U.S. Military and Change”. Murray and Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period , Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military . 290

has been unable to replicate its successes in nation-building case since then. Although

several theoretical frameworks attempt to explain the presence of military innovation,

none seemed able to account for this unique circumstance in which the army innovated in

the Germany case. The major theoretical task has been to determine what conditions are

necessary for innovation.

This study contributed to the literature on military effectiveness by examining the

sources of variation between the cases as well as theorizing about why they differed.

Absent conclusive differences in the US’ underlying social, cultural and institutional

fabric, 1150 I speculated that variation in the level and diversity of threat, civil-military

relations, and the presence or absence of reformist military leaders must be crucial

variables for explaining the differences in outcomes across the cases. After looking at all

four cases and several variables, the two precursors necessary to foster innovation are

reformist military leadership and cooperative civil-military relations. Threat has also

been an important factor.

International Threat

Threat has been credited with influencing the military’s propensity to innovate as well as impacts effectiveness. 1151 Despite great agreement that threat influences effectiveness, there is disagreement in the literature about how threat impacts effectiveness. 1152 Posen suggests that a low threat security environment leads to less responsiveness and integration. 1153 Rosen, on the other hand, argues that during

1150 These are independent variables explored in other works. See Risa Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley, eds., Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 1151 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars . 1152 Brooks, "Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness: Egypt in the 1967 and 1973 Wars." 1153 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars . 291

peacetime, military organizations have the time to contemplate new methods and

concepts; therefore, low threat may enable effective innovation. 1154 However, the

similarities in the threat environment prior to World War II and the Iraq War didn’t

explain the variation in effectiveness outcomes. Theory predicted that a highly diverse

threat environment serves as a deterrent to both innovation and effectiveness. 1155 The

Vietnam and Korea cases support this assertion. Overall, threat is useful in

understanding the conditions that prevent innovation; however, threat is not sufficient or

necessary to force military innovation.

Civil-Military Relations

This dissertation attempted to link civil-military relations literature to the literature on military effectiveness. Suzanne Nielsen suggests that military effectiveness rivals civilian control as a legitimate concern in the study of civil-military relations. 1156

Huntington’s seminal work, The Soldier and the State , sought a pattern of civil-military relations that would promote military professionalism and thus military effectiveness. 1157

Posen emphasizes the point that military organizations need to change over time to remain relevant and effective. 1158 Janowitz argues for a constabulary concept; a constabulary force would understand the primacy of political objectives and the need for limited applications of force—both of which were vital to military effectiveness during the Cold War. 1159

1154 Rosen, "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation." 1155 Brooks, "Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness: Egypt in the 1967 and 1973 Wars." 1156 Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness." 1157 Huntington, The Soldier and the State . 1158 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars . P. 24-29. 1159 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait . 292

Civil-military relations have rarely been used as an explanatory variable for

military effectiveness, with the exception of Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle. They use

the conflictual nature of civil-military relations in Iraq to explain their inability to exploit

technology, while North Vietnam’s harmonious civil-military relations help explain its

successful use of technology. 1160 This study agrees with the assertions of Nielsen, Biddle

and Zirkle and postulates that civil-military relations, trust between civilians and military

officers in particular, is necessary for effective innovation.

Trust is a key component that can describe the relationship between the military

and its political leaders; trust is necessary for effective innovation. 1161 Scholars like

Samuel Huntington and Eliot Cohen suggest that the delicate balance was sometimes

upset in past wars when politicians did not have much knowledge of military affairs.1162

Sometimes, they bullied officers out of insecurity, or alternatively allowed the military

too much discretion in recognition of their own ignorance. 1163 Harmonious conditions

changed almost immediately once wartime pressure for harmony was removed. The

cases in this study illustrated extreme variation in civil-military relations, especially with

respect to trust.

During World War II, the constitutional system of civilian control of the military

functioned as well as it ever has in the history of the Republic. 1164 The relationship

between General Marshall, President Roosevelt, Secretary Stimson, and Congress were a

1160 Biddle and Zirkle, "Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World." 1161 Kurt Lang, "Military Organizations," in Handbook of Organizations , ed. J.G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965). Gibson, Securing the State Reforming the National Security Decision- making Process at the Civil-Military Nexus . 1162 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: The Free Press, 2002), Huntington, The Soldier and the State . 1163 Victor Davis Hanson, "Armies for Democracy--Past, Present and Future," The American Spectator , July/August 2007. 1164 Weigley, "The American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present." P. 237. 293

model of harmony. Although they did not agree on every matter of strategic

consequences, the trust they held for each other created an environment where innovation could flourish.

The five years between World War II and the Korean War was marked with contentious and open interservice squabbling over unification, missions, and allocation of limited budgets. These were all mild, however, in comparison to the Truman-MacArthur controversy. Things did not improve during the Vietnam War with Secretary of Defense

McNamara and President Johnson choosing which targets to bomb over lunch. Under the

Clinton administration, some suggest that the military exercised too much autonomy.

Conversely, during the Bush presidency the charge was just the opposite. In 2006, top

brass came out of retirement to complain that there had been “too much

micromanagement of the war, too many policy demands placed on a military that was stretched too thin to carry such burdens and too much utopian ideology guiding the conduct of the war at the expense of realistic judgments of what in fact was possible.” 1165

This revolt was similar to the public outrage by admirals in 1949-1950, which brought down Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and resignations of top military officers.

Conflictual civil-military relations not only interfere with battlefield effectiveness, as suggested by Biddle and Long, but also detract from nation-building efforts. 1166 This

study contributes to the civil-military relations literature by demonstrating that

cooperative relations between senior military and political leaders are necessary for

effective innovation. Ineffectiveness in the Korea, Vietnam and Iraq cases was caused by

a lack of integration between military considerations with nonmilitary concerns. Several

1165 Hanson, "Armies for Democracy--Past, Present and Future." 1166 Biddle and Long, "Democracy and Military Effectiveness." P. 532. 294

authors suggest that friction and distrust between civil leadership and senior officers can

impede the coordination required in such complex operations, resulting in poorly

formulated strategy and military; this in turn undermines effectiveness.1167 Indeed, this

study’s findings support these assertions.

Reformist Military Leaders

Military leadership has a significant impact on effectiveness. 1168 This study

argues that reformist military leaders are necessary for effective innovation and agrees

with Rosen and Huntington that military organizations are capable of generating

innovation internally. 1169 Civilian intervention is not required to force organizational change as argued by Posen nor is civilian intervention the key to military innovation and the integration of military doctrine with national security goals. 1170 Reformist military leaders were crucial to the effective innovations during the World War II era in particular.

This dissertation sides with Avant by demonstrating that civilian intervention is not essential to effective innovation. Despite previous theory attributing change to civilian leaders forcing their will upon an unwilling military, I have found that the military is adept at shirking when a civilian direction does not fit with their conception of their mission. The U.S. Army generals who commanded MAAG-V and MACV repeatedly rejected innovative suggestions for changes in American counterinsurgency

1167 Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations , Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, "Conclusion: The Gap and What It Means for American National Security," in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security , ed. Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), Paul Kennedy, "Britain in the First World War," in Military Effectiveness , ed. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988). 1168 Sarkesian and Conner, The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century . P. 73. 1169 Huntington, The Soldier and the State , Rosen, "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation." 1170 Deborah D. Avant, “The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: The United States in Vietnam and Britain in the Boer War and Malaya” (Dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1991). p. 327 295

doctrine in Vietnam. Civilian intervention before and during the war in Vietnam was not sufficient to force innovation on the unwilling military. 1171 On the other hand, military reformers were instrumental in all three innovations in the Germany case in the absence of civilian intervention.

Policy Recommendations

Several lessons can be gleaned from the successes in America’s past. Max Boot suggests that American success in the Philippine insurrection was due to a combination of carrots and sticks: aggressive patrolling combined with providing essential services such as schools, hospital, and sanitation, generated goodwill among the population. 1172

Sam Sarkesian also suggests that America learn from its own history and codify its involvement with nation-building into strategic and operational doctrine. 1173 Even the lessons of the 19 th century Indian Wars offer a loose body of principles that remain useful: ensure close civil-military coordination, provide firm but fair and paternalistic governance, reform economic and educational spheres, treat prisoners well, consider grievances of the population, and avoid killing women and children. 1174 Achieving these goals is extraordinarily difficult, but military leadership is essential to all of them.

Investment in people is critical to maximizing military effectiveness. Producing well-trained, educated, and experienced officers and enlisted personnel is vital to military effectiveness, as is retaining them.1175 This study agrees with Eliot Cohen that change tends to come from below, from the spontaneous interactions between the military,

1171 Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars . 1172 Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace . 1173 Sam C. Sarkesian, America's Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons for the Future , Contributions in Military History, vol. 40 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984). 1174 James L. Payne, "Deconstructing Nation Building," The American Conservative , October 24, 2005. P. 81-82. 1175 Risa Brooks, "Conclusion," in Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness , ed. Risa Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). P. 236. 296

technology, and tactical circumstances. 1176 Although the best innovations may come from the tactical level, senior military leaders must be willing to support new ideas and not punish failures that innovation sometimes brings about.

Growing Innovative Leaders

If military reformers are required for innovation, how do we create an

environment where innovators are free to offer opinions or advice? The military

personnel system has not fundamentally changed in the last fifty years. Institutionalizing

flexibility and adaptiveness is extraordinarily difficult. Retaining innovative leaders may

require some rethinking in the current assignment and promotion system. Although

leadership is essential, it is not enough. In the Vietnam case, highly qualified and

experienced leaders saw the need for change, but were frustrated in their attempts to force

it. Training and incentive systems need to place a premium on flexible thinkers that

promote innovation. 1177

Graduate level education and assignment as an instructor are two ways that the

Army can promote innovative thinking. The Corps commanders during World War II

developed common professional skills and abilities during the interwar period. 1178

Despite all serving during the First World War, only one half of the Corps Commanders were in battle during the war. The interwar period gave officers time to study and teach at professional military schools. Officers also made important contacts with contemporaries and superiors who would influence their careers. Of the thirty-four Corps

Commanders, only one did not attend the Command and General Staff School at

1176 Cohen, "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs." P. 400. 1177 Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict . P. 167-168. 1178 Robert H. Berlin, "U.S. Army World War II Corps Commanders," (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1989). 297

Leavenworth; twenty-nine graduated from the Army War College; every one of them

served as an instructor somewhere in the army educational system. World War II corps

commanders recognized the connection between teaching and military command. In fact,

twenty-five of them spent over ten years in the classroom as either students or

instructors. 1179

Furthermore, the leaders in today’s army that have had the greatest positive

impact in the Iraq War have had instructor assignments. General Petraeus is the best

example of an innovative leader who is adept at both military tasks, political, cultural and

economic considerations. 1180 Other commanders who have been lauded as tremendously

effective in the nation-building of Iraq include COL Pete Monsoor and COL (P) H.R.

McMaster, both of whom have advanced degrees and have served as instructors. Clearly,

not all officers or non-commissioned officers can serve as instructors or attend graduate

school. However, these assignments should be seen as career enhancing.

Civil-Military Relations

The relationship between civilian and military leaders has changed dramatically over the course of the past hundred years; at times there has been great unity, cooperation and trust amongst the two parties. Conversely, there have also been times of one-sided domination or questionable levels of over-influence by one side or the other. How should civil-military relations be approached to encourage more effective outcomes? And if certain criteria are developed, is such a prescription likely to be heeded? This study advocates for mutual respect and trust as an important determinant of military effectiveness.

1179 Ibid. 1180 Barnes, "An Open Mind for a New Army.", Joe Klein, "David Petraeus," Time , December 17, 2007. 298

Although the roles of the civilian and military components within the Department of Defense are set out in law, several other factors contribute to civil-military relations.

Historical experience and personality will have significant impact on the manner in which business is conducted, particularly as they influence the level of trust. 1181 Conflict between the president, his senior officials, and the Chiefs proved to be most intense in those administrations in which the presidential leadership style and service culture were most at odds. 1182 Those presidents with a high degree of conflict include Nixon and

Johnson, those with moderate conflict include Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and G. W.

Bush; there was minimal conflict with Roosevelt. 1183 While President Roosevelt took a keen and continued interest in the planning and managing of the war, he did not interfere in operational decisions.

The role of the president in both setting the right tone of civil-military relations and leading the team of national security professionals is vital to military effectiveness.

Though civilian control of the military is shared between the President and the Congress, the Commander in Chief needs to play the starring role in decisions that affect national security. He or she may delegate the authority for strategic decisions to combatant commanders, but ultimately they should hold the military responsible for their effectiveness or lack thereof.

The president needs to push his military advisors. Ricks suggests that, “Generals disagree, sometimes profoundly. Civilian leaders need to discover these disagreements,

1181 Baral, The Pentagon and the Making of US Foreign Policy . P. 30. 1182 Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush . P. 409. 1183 Ibid. 299

force them to the surface and address them. That is what Lincoln and Roosevelt did.” 1184

President Johnson’s biggest mistake was failing to force a serious strategic debate.

Though there may have been too much civilian involvement in the tactical details, there

was not enough civilian participation in terms of asking the big questions about what we

were really doing in Vietnam. 1185 This study joins Gibson in suggesting that the

President needs to get competing advice and fully developed options from those at the

nexus of the civil-military relationship. 1186

In addition to civilian officials providing guidance and authority, prospects for

innovation also increase when the military officers are held accountable. 1187 During

World War II, over a dozen generals were relieved. Yet, the Bush administration handled

its generals as if they were all equally successful during the Iraq War. The current

promotion system does not take into account actual effectiveness in counterinsurgency

(or nation-building). This study advocates promoting those leaders who are effective at a

faster rate or ahead of their peers as well as suggests those who were ineffective be

relieved of command. Promoting and assigning generals in wartime in the same manner

as peacetime is detrimental to military effectiveness.

With respect to the military side of the relationship, the Chiefs as well as the

combatant commanders should provide the president and the Secretary of Defense with

honest assessments of military capabilities. Candid assessments of progress (or lack

thereof) towards accomplishing declared aims, goals and objectives should also be

1184 Ricks, The Gamble . P. 99. 1185 Kinnard, The War Managers . 1186 Gibson, Securing the State Reforming the National Security Decision-making Process at the Civil- Military Nexus . p. 64. 1187 Nielsen, “Preparing for War: The Dynamics of Peacetime Military Reform”. P. 470. 300

offered. 1188 Beyond competence, capability and will, they should also be able to build

coalitions and forge consensus. 1189

Reorganize for Nation-Building?

In 2003, the Army began to restructure its division-based force into a brigade

combat team based force primarily to increase the force pool of combat units available

for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. 1190 There is general agreement among military analysts that the full-spectrum U.S. Army’s initial success in defeating the Taliban in

Afghanistan and the Iraqi Army during a three-week campaign demonstrated that the

Army is “good at destroying targets and bad at rebuilding states.” 1191 The Army’s varied performance at counterinsurgency warfare directly challenges the Army’s contention that it is a “full spectrum” capable force. 1192 On October 10, 2007, Secretary of Defense

Robert Gates suggested that the Army should expect to be tasked with reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting good governance until the government decides to increase the size of the civilian agencies like United States Agency for

International Development (USAID). 1193

There are a variety of proposals for the reorganization of the Army to address the needs of counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training and advisory missions—all key nation-building tasks. 1194 John Nagl has suggested the implementation of a permanent

1188 Gibson, Securing the State Reforming the National Security Decision-making Process at the Civil- Military Nexus . P. 121. 1189 Ibid. p. 66. 1190 Feickert, Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force of Specialized Units? Background and Issues for Congress . P. 2. 1191 Greg Gardner, "Brains, Not Bullets," The Economist , October 25, 2007. 1192 Robert M. Tomes, "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare," Parameters 2004. 1193 Fred Kaplan, "Secretary Gates Declares War on the Army Brass," Slate Magazine 2007. 1194 Feickert, Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force of Specialized Units? Background and Issues for Congress . 301

advisory corps. 1195 Other studies have advised dividing the army into three disciplines:

conventional warfighting, counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, and homeland

defense. 1196 Establishing stabilization and reconstruction divisions is also an option. I

agree with the Army’s current position that full spectrum units are the best course of

action; 1197 however, augmenting the current force structure with special staff that have the requisite skills for the particular operation the military is tasked to undertake is recommended. The Army needs officers with expertise in economic development, advising foreign militaries and law enforcement and governance.

Future Research

Although this study focused on threat, civil-military relations, and military reformers to explain effective innovation, two other viable explanations for future research are organizational culture and path dependency. As Carl Builder notes that though many people outside the military institutions may suggest military strategies and concepts, they can only be implemented if and when military institutions accept and pursue them. 1198 When the United States developed a national approach to the use of force in international politics, “the strategy of annihilation became characteristically the

American way in war.” 1199 Eliot Cohen suggests that there are two dominant

characteristics of American strategic culture: The preference for massing large numbers

1195 Nagl, "Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps." 1196 Feickert, Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force of Specialized Units? Background and Issues for Congress . P. 11. 1197 Peter W. Chiarelli, "Learning from Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future," Military Review , September-October 2007. 1198 Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis ., p. 3. quoted in Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife . P. 43. 1199 Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy . P. xxii. 302

of men and machines and the predilection for direct and violent assault. 1200 Other features that characterize the American approach are an overwhelming reliance on technology, a faith in the moral mission of the United States, and an aversion to the use of unconventional tactics and a distrust of large standing military forces. 1201

The experience of the United States Army throughout its history tended toward the absolute defeat of its enemies as a matter of national survival. 1202 The world wars in particular solidified the American conception of war as something that had to be won quickly and completely. This idea gained strength in the Korean War and overshadowed army interest in the “small wars” doctrine that the United States Marine Corps developed before World War II. Nation building was considered an aberration that need not be repeated. 1203 The focus on large wars, fought with technological advantages and unlimited firepower, but without appreciation for the political context in which war was fought, would only serve to prevent innovation in non-conventional tasks.

The culture that selected the leaders whose failure to prosecute the war in

Vietnam successfully was so strong that it has persisted ever since. Conditioned to see all wars as military problems, innovations that married political-economic and military concerns were rejected. Military cultural change is a precondition for innovative and adaptive approaches to meet the exigencies of a more complex security landscape. 1204

Instead of learning from the experiences of Vietnam, the Philippines, and the Indian

1200 Eliot A. Cohen, "The Strategy of Innocence? The United States, 1920-1945," in The Making of Modern Strategy: Rulers, States, and War , ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). P. 464. 1201 Jordan and others, American National Security . 1202 Ibid. 1203 Russell F. Weigley, "Makers of Modern Strategy," in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age , ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). P. 411. 1204 Cassidy, "Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars." 303

campaigns, the US Army for most of the last 100 years has viewed these experiences as

anomalies and aberrations—distractions from preparing to win big wars against other big

powers.

Another possible explanation for innovation during World War II is path

dependency. The initial conditions that caused the Army’s expansion—the United

States’ changing role as a world power, the decision to create a large standing Army, and

the need to organize for the biggest war fought to date may have enabled innovation at

the point of creation. 1205 After the Army expanded, however, conditions were created

that hindered innovation due to organizational inflexibility, offensive doctrinal

preferences, as well as the fight for power with the other branches of service.1206 One of two paths could have emerged: one where the war-fighting aspect was heralded or another where those who implemented the peace had the starring role. The war-fighters won out…therefore, this aspect was reinforced in the organization for future generations.

The preference for large-scale warfare was only reinforced and rewarded over time, by organizational design and the prevailing cultural ethos of the US Army, 1207 making innovation with respect to nation building more difficult. 1208

The institutionalization of high-intensity warfare as the military’s primary mission has further prevented innovations in other tasks. 1209 If the military does not view the

1205 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 1206 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars . Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy , Institute of War and Peace Studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). 1207 Wilson, "Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Operational Planning in Northern Iraq." 1208 Giordano, “The U.S. Army and Nontraditional Missions: Explaining Divergence in Doctrine and Practice in the Post-Cold War Era”, Waddell, “The Army and Peacetime Low Intensity Conflict, 1961- 1993: The Process of Peripheral and Fundamental Military Change”. 1209 Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," Military Review , November-December 2005. 304

post-offensive phases of war an important part of their mission, then they may not

prepare for them. The Iraq War demonstrates how the US Army has institutionalized its

conception of war and warfare, defining its professional identity on traditional

mechanized warfare and combative approaches to war planning. 1210 The reconstruction

phases of the War in Iraq went beyond the US Army’s idea of what constitutes war and

what does not. 1211 Therefore, its focus was solely on the offensive portion of the war.

This explanation warrants future consideration.

Final Thoughts

To call a nation building effort a success, the military occupation of the target

country should have resulted in the establishment of an enduring democracy. 1212 By this

definition, the American record is not good. The problem with nation-building is that

there is a lack of concrete, usable knowledge on how to do it. 1213 Those who have been

charged to do it are usually ordinary government employees who wind up on the scene of

a military occupation, or military officers with no background in politics, sociology, or

economics. As a result, the military (and other U.S. government agencies) has only the

vaguest concept of what actions and programs would lead a country towards

democracy. 1214 The military should focus on the following tasks to attain better outcomes

in nation-building:

• Provision of security and safety of civilian population 1215

1210 Wilson, "Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Operational Planning in Northern Iraq." 1211 Ibid. 1212 Payne, "Deconstructing Nation Building." 1213 Ibid. 1214 John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992). 1215 Many authors cite security as the primary concern with nation building. Here are those that were the most influential to me: Binnendijk and Johnson, eds., Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations , Dobbins and others, America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq , Irzyk, 305

Thorough implementation of martial law Provision of law enforcement capability down to local level Dispersion of security forces throughout occupied territory Control of borders through active patrolling Significant effort to thwart black marketing Arrest of law violators Disarmament of enemy combatants, displaced personnel (DPs), and civilian population Safe delivery of food and medical aid Development in social, economic, and political fields

• Combat enemy actions 1216 Combat operations and nation building must take place concurrently and are interdependent. 1217 Security and safety of civilian population is separate from task of combating remaining enemy Enemy must be stopped from reorganizing and from influencing the civilian population Defeat subversion first, secure important areas, then defeat guerillas if necessary 1218 Cut off internal and external support to enemy—force insurgents to go on the defensive 1219 Defeat of organized resistance is essential to successful outcome Intelligence sharing among law enforcement, military forces, intelligence agencies and government administrators Interallied conflict management if a multilateral operation 1220

• Governance structures must be established down to the lowest levels of society Develop comprehensive political-military strategic plans 1221 Military officers will be responsible for governance at lowest levels in the transition from conflict to peace Top down or bottom up techniques are both valid in the transition from military governance to civilian governance Only instituting a national government decreases the likelihood of successful outcome

"Mobility Vigilance Justice.", Snyder, The Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary: 3 October 1945-30 June 1947 , Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam . 1216 West, The Village . This book is a great example of successful counterinsurgency techniques at the unit level. 1217 Binnendijk and Johnson, eds., Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations . 1218 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam . 1219 Ibid. 1220 Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict . 1221 Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era , ed. Ian F. W. Beckett, War, Armed Forces and Society (New York: Manchester University Press, 1995), Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam . 306

Spreading governance and order throughout the occupied country is as important as securing the capital 1222

• Unified Management 1223 Unified civil, political and military structure necessary to assign responsibilities Requirement for balance and coordination between military operations and civil programs 1224 The military leader tasked with implementing martial law, military governance and civil affairs must have adequate decision making power This leader must personally understand the nature of America’s overall foreign policy goals

• Flexibility in planning and execution of post-war plan 1225 Both the implementers and planners have to be willing to take local conditions into account 1226 Integrated coordination between the US military, occupied country’s military, bureaucrats from each side, non-governmental organizations, must take place constantly, heterogeneity is preferred. Information sharing must occur between intelligence organizations and the military units implementing policies Integration of political, economic, information, security and military branches of government is essential. 1227

Even if the military does everything right, there is no guarantee that the outcome

will result in a lasting democracy. Altering the structure and composition of American’s

army to accommodate this mission should be approached with extreme caution.

Regardless of what mission the military is asked to perform, the presence of reformist

military leaders and civil-military relations based upon mutual respect, trust and honesty,

will make the military more effective.

1222 Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict . 1223 Ibid. 1224 Ibid. 1225 Flexibility is what made the US counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines successful. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 , Kintner, Coffey, and Albright, Forging a New Sword: A Study of the Department of Defense . 1226 Linn, The U.S. Army and the Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902 . 1227 Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict . 307

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