policy brief An inflection point for Pakistan’s democracy Madiha Afzal

Pakistan’s democracy has long been mired with institutional shortcomings, but the election of Imran Khan as prime minister may have opened the door for greater democratic consolidation.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY turn eastward can be seen in the vein of a leftist brand of sovereign nationalism. ●● Pakistan’s new prime minister, Imran Khan, rose to power on a classic populist platform, ●● Khan’s election did not come without taint. His presenting himself and his party as the non- close ties with the military, long speculated, corrupt alternative to the country’s two main have become apparent in the months since parties (the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, the election, and the creation—via judicial known as the PML-N, and the Pakistan and political meddling, as well as muzzling People’s Party, known as the PPP), and of the media—of a pre-poll environment that their long, checkered history of corruption systematically weakened the incumbent scandals and misgovernance. PML-N ultimately proved helpful to him.

●● While Khan has earned an anti-West, pro- ●● Yet Khan was voted in by a diverse coalition Taliban reputation that translates quite that lends him broad legitimacy amid a neatly as right-wing, his populism is as changing set of demographics in Pakistan—64 left-wing as right. His domestic policy percent of the country’s population is now platform—including the provision of social under 30, and at least 37 percent live in services to the population and safety nets urban areas. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf to Pakistan’s poorest, along with his focus (PTI) formed provincial governments in two on austerity—draws squarely from the left. of Pakistan’s four provinces, Punjab and Even on foreign policy, his desire to reduce Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and a coalition Pakistan’s dependence on the West and to government in Baluchistan, a rarity.

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●● The irregularities seen in the 2018 election— ●● On matters of religion in Pakistan, Khan has horse-trading, media threats, judicial shown an inclination to wrest the narrative meddling—are institutional elements of from hardliners; he has commanded it better Pakistan’s politics that make its democracy than previous governments. vulnerable to instability and manipulation. In Pakistan’s environment of incumbency INTRODUCTION disadvantage, politicians have an incentive On July 25, 2018, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf to switch parties (horse trade) to move with (Movement for Justice) party, led by Imran Khan, a voters’ changing political preferences. charismatic former cricket star and philanthropist ●● Historically, Pakistan’s democratic turned fiery anti-corruption campaigner and populist environment of political instability and politician, won the country’s general election. In incumbency disadvantage has incentivized doing so, it upended a decades-long pattern of power politicians and governments to engage in alternating between Pakistan’s two major parties, extractive behavior, thus setting up a negative the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and cycle and their own eventual dissolution. the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), that had in turn Short time horizons in power also tend to been punctuated by long stints of military rule. Khan encourage the kind of political behavior that founded the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in 1996, dominates the Pakistani context—easily visible and it broke through to become the country’s third- investments in infrastructure (the PML-N’s largest party just five years prior, in the 2013 election. focus) and narrow patronage to constituents. Khan rose to power on a classic populist platform, ●● Khan’s politics of both left and right, his appeal presenting himself and his party as the non-corrupt to Pakistan’s next generation, and his alliance alternative to the PML-N and the PPP, and their with the military offer a real alternative for long, checkered history of corruption scandals and Pakistan’s democracy going forward—hinging, misgovernance. Over recent years, he earned an of course, on his success. The “job security” anti-West, pro-Taliban reputation that translates quite that the military can provide him may enable neatly as right-wing—due to his religiosity, sometime- Khan to finally undertake longer-term, deep support for peace talks with the Pakistan Taliban, institutional reforms that Pakistan desperately denunciation of U.S. drone strikes, and pandering to needs, including widening its tax base and fundamentalists. It is thus tempting for many in the reforming the energy sector. Ironically, it is West to frame his rise to power as part of a wave of the stability the military provides that may right-wing populists globally. enable Pakistan’s democratic strengthening, But Khan’s populism is as left-wing as right. His through implementation of political and policy domestic policy platform—the provision of social reforms. Whether Khan’s government can services, including health care and education, to the develop the competence to deliver on such population, his vision to create jobs, to provide social reforms, however, is still in question. safety nets to Pakistan’s poorest, and his focus ●● Khan aims to reduce Pakistan’s economic on austerity—draws squarely from the left. Even dependence on Washington and to seek a on foreign policy, his desire to reduce Pakistan’s more “balanced” relationship with the United dependence on the West and to turn eastward can States. With President Trump, he has fired be seen in the vein of a leftist brand of sovereign- back when slighted, and reciprocated when nationalism last seen in Pakistan in the 1970s with reached out to. then-Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.

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Matching his politics, Khan’s coalition of voters After the election, the European Union’s election draws from both the left and the right; key to his observation mission also noted a marred playing base is Pakistan’s conservative, urban youth—a field, given terrorist violence in the campaign huge and fast growing demographic that will have and the uneven media and legal environment to be engaged in any winning political coalition preceding the election. It did note positive changes moving forward. But Khan’s victory, impressive as to the electoral set-up in the 2017 Elections Act, it was, did not come without a fair share of taint. which it said had “significantly improved the legal His close ties with the military, long speculated, framework particularly by increasing powers for the have become apparent in the months since the ECP [Election Commission of Pakistan], introducing election; and the creation—via judicial and political greater transparency requirements and measures meddling, as well as muzzling of the media—of a aimed at enhancing women’s participation.”2 This pre-poll environment that systematically weakened was a reference to a new election law that mandated the incumbent PML-N (which had fallen out with a minimum women’s voter turnout of 10 percent in Pakistan’s military) ultimately proved helpful to order for the constituency’s election to be valid. him. The election also saw an unprecedented set of hardline That electoral environment, detailed below, candidates; chief among these were candidates came after a promising 10 years for Pakistan’s fielded by the Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), a new, democracy, with two successive governments fundamentalist political party whose main platform that had completed their full five-year terms for centers on the strict implementation of Pakistan’s the first time in Pakistan’s 70-year history, and harsh blasphemy law (under which blasphemy is relatively free and fair elections in 2008 and then punishable by death). It was a failure on the part of in 2013. Does this portend a democratic backslide the Election Commission that it allowed this party to for the country? What does it mean for Khan’s contest; while the TLP won no seats in the national legitimacy, and his ability to deliver on his policy parliament, its candidates ran vigorous campaigns, promises? What are the implications for the future especially in Karachi, allowing its political rhetoric to of democracy in Pakistan? be mainstreamed. It ended up with about 2 million votes out of 50 million in the general election, and THE 2018 ELECTION won a couple of provincial seats, including in Karachi. Multiple independent observers judged Pakistan’s Legal meddling 2018 electoral playing field as uneven. First, the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development In 2016, Pakistan’s Supreme Court began hearing and Transparency (PILDAT) deemed the pre- a case against then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on poll environment to be “unfair” in its May 2018 charges of corruption, after information about the report. It noted the lack of “neutrality of [the] Sharif family’s undisclosed assets was revealed in military towards competing political parties and the leaked Panama Papers that year. The case came candidates,” and lack of “freedom of private media in the wake of Sharif’s showdown with the military from the influence of state institutions and vested over a leaked report in the Dawn newspaper of a interests.” PILDAT also judged the “neutrality of meeting with intelligence chiefs in which his brother, the accountability process led by NAB [National the chief minister of Punjab, had asked them to end Accountability Bureau]” and the “independence their support of militant groups. The army reacted and neutrality of [the] judiciary” as unfair.1 strongly against the report, and the “Dawn leaks,” as the issue came to be known, significantly damaged Sharif.

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In July 2017, the Court disqualified a weakened declare themselves as independent candidates. Sharif from office on the basis of the constitutional Before the election, at least 21 of PML-N’s clause that by failing to report a previous incumbent legislators from Punjab (out of 126) employment, he had violated the requirement that switched over to the PTI, and others declared members of parliament be “sadiq” and “amin”— themselves independent.4 But the military denied honest and trustworthy. Sharif was subsequently any pressure on politicians, and given the extent indicted and handed a 10-year sentence on charges of “horse-trading”—switching parties—that occurs of corruption by the Accountability Court just weeks on a regular basis in Pakistan’s electoral cycles, it prior to the election. Sharif’s supporters saw the maintained plausible deniability. decision as unfair, and as selective justice in a country with a largely corrupt political class. There are structural incentives for horse-trading in the Pakistani context. Analysis of election data While it was the judiciary that removed Sharif from from the 1990s shows that Pakistan’s politics are office and sentenced him, his supporters also characterized by an incumbency disadvantage at suspected the military’s influence. Some members the constituency level, and this is driven by those of the military played a relatively direct role through politicians who belong to the majority party—that their representation on the joint investigation team is, incumbent legislators belonging to the party in set up by the Supreme Court to look into Sharif’s power are less likely to win the next time around assets. There is historical context to the assumptions than non-incumbents, all things equal.5 This may be of military influence. In Pakistan’s enduring tug of due to the unfulfilled expectations and perceptions war for power between its democratically elected of corruption associated with those in power, as governments and its military—which has culminated was especially true during the 1990s. In turn, it in three military coups and numerous assertions of is likely that this constituency-level incumbency control known as “soft coups”—the judiciary has disadvantage, along with Pakistan’s macro-level often functioned as a non-neutral arbiter, rubber incumbency disadvantage (incumbent federal stamping coups via the “doctrine of necessity,”3 governments are voted out every time), has partly and selectively administering justice to politicians. It driven politicians—especially those who have some most notably sentenced Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto popularity independent of their party—to switch to death in 1979, under the influence of General parties; they do this to move with the changing Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who had ousted Bhutto political “hawa” (wind) as they see it. in a coup in 1977. In 2012, the Supreme Court ousted the PPP Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani While the numbers on how many politicians were under contempt of court charges when he refused pressured into switching parties versus those who to comply with a judicial order to reopen dormant did so of their own free will in 2018 may not be fully corruption cases against President Asif Ali Zardari. clear, the incumbency disadvantage inherent in Pakistan’s political system, along with the practice Khan’s supporters, on the other hand, saw Sharif’s of horse-trading, sets this up to be something that indictment as justice finally beginning to be served can be manipulated, furthering political instability. in Pakistan. Such manipulation was part of the military’s modus operandi during the politically unstable 1990s, and Political maneuvering in the 2002 election during Pervez Musharraf’s Also in the run-up to the election, various PML-N military regime, when much of the PML-N defected, politicians alleged that the military was coercing due to Sharif’s disqualification at the time, to found them—through intimidation, maneuvering, or the PML-Q (Quaid), or King’s Party. Post-Musharraf, blackmail—to switch ranks to Khan’s party or to many returned to the PML-N fold.

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The military has also “engineered,” or helped 10 percent in order for the constituency’s election formulate, multi-party alliances to bolster the to be valid. But the hours after polls closed were prospects of parties it has backed. It was said in marred by irregularities reported in vote counting 2002 to have set up an alliance of Islamist parties, protocols at polling stations amid a heavy military the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, that was reprised in presence—leading to allegations of rigging by 2018. Such alliances typically improve the electoral multiple parties—and delayed election results, which performance of Islamist parties. It also engineered caused confusion and further speculation of rigging. an opposition alliance to the PPP, the Islami The delay, it turned out, was due to a breakdown Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), comprising the PML-N, the in a new result transmissions system deployed by Jamaat-e-Islami, and others, in 1988; the IJI won the Election Commission, which led to weeks of the 1990 election. withholding results and recounts after the election. Overall, the EU observation mission’s report gave Media muzzling the polls themselves a green(ish) light, saying they The media faced threats in the run-up to the 2018 “positively assessed the vote count process in 2/3 8 election, especially those television channels and of [their] observations.” newspapers seen as pro-Sharif. A particular target Vote rigging allegations are not new in Pakistan. was Dawn, Pakistan’s most prestigious English Imran Khan led charges of vote rigging against daily. Security agencies allegedly disrupted the Sharif’s party in 2013, staging an aggressive, distribution of such outlets, but this occurred months-long sit-in (“dharna”) in Islamabad in behind the scenes, and the disruptions were not 2014, which functioned to destabilize the Sharif complete, giving the military a veneer of plausible government and undermine its credibility. A sizable deniability. In addition, the credibility of those media minority of Pakistanis in 2014—37 percent of houses began being questioned openly. The tactics respondents polled by PILDAT—believed the 2013 are analogous to U.S. President Donald Trump’s election had been rigged.9 As the protest faded from labeling of The New York Times, The Washington public consciousness, the number went down to Post, and CNN as “fake news.” Just a week before 30 percent in 2015, meaning that allegations and the July 2018 election, Imran Khan wrote on Twitter protests do serve to tarnish faith in democracy.10 that “the blatant bias of Dawn against PTI has now come out in the open. So much for Dawn’s neutral Rigging allegations by opposition parties continued and liberal credentials! Complete farce!”6 His party for a few weeks following the 2018 election, and supporters echoed that rhetoric. A senior military were briefly bolstered by the PTI’s unremarkable official, the director general of the Inter Services performance during by-elections, but they have Public Relations (the public relations arm of the largely died down in recent months. Early on, in a military and its intelligence agencies), also joined in positive gesture, Khan promised to cooperate in any the fray earlier in 2018 by publicly identifying various investigation of rigging. journalists as “enemies of national security.”7 As The Economist put it, “the democratic show A complicated polling day rolls on.”11 Yet the muzzling that characterized the pre-poll season has continued after the election, On election day, turnout stood at 53 percent despite at least in part. Dawn again faced disruptions in a terrorist attack at a polling station in Quetta that distribution, albeit limited, as its reporting on the killed more than 30 people. The country also saw Election Commission and polling day irregularities higher women’s turnout in many constituencies was questioned. In the fall of 2018, a number of thanks in part to the new election law that prominent broadcast journalists were laid off by mandated a minimum women’s voter turnout of

5 DEMOCRACY & DISORDER AN INFLECTION POINT FOR PAKISTAN’S DEMOCRACY their respective television channels. The official it benefits from maintaining an aura of remove from reason was cost-cutting in the wake of financial the day-to-day governing of the country, so that it is difficulties, but the implication is that lowered not held accountable for failures on that front. Public advertising revenues have left the news outlets with opinion seems to have shifted decisively in favor of no other choice.12 The laid off journalists tend to be democracy as well, transforming a population that ones seen as unsympathetic to the military or the openly wondered about Pakistan’s compatibility current government. with democracy to having consistent majorities of Pakistanis declaring their faith in democracy year Thus, while there were irregularities in the 2018 after year (in a Gallup poll conducted in Pakistan in election—horse-trading, media threats, judicial June 2016, for example, 84 percent of respondents meddling—many of these are institutional elements said they preferred democracy to dictatorship).13 of Pakistan’s politics that make its democracy vulnerable to instability and manipulation. Tackling But Pakistanis do seem divided on their satisfaction them will require shifts in power structures, and in with their country’s particular democracy: 54 percent the country’s political setup, as I discuss toward the of Gallup respondents in February 2018 indicated end of this paper. they were satisfied with the way democracy was working in Pakistan, while 45 percent said they were PAKISTAN’S DEMOCRATIC HISTORY dissatisfied.14 Alternating military-civilian cycles: delivery, This is because Pakistan’s democratic governments misgovernance, and public opinion to this point have been deeply linked with misgovernance, corruption, and poor delivery—in the Until 2008, Pakistan had been characterized by 1990s, but also beyond. In the 11 democratic years cycles of civilian and military rule that followed a bookended by military coups between 1988 and pattern: civilian regimes started out with a period 1999, four elections were held with the PML-N and of high expectations that was met with a cycle of the PPP alternating power. Each electoral term was poor delivery and misgovernance. This in turn led cut short by an escalating drumbeat of corruption people to switch their faith over to the military, and misgovernance allegations. Each time, the which portrayed itself as the savior for the country, president (allegedly under some military pressure) the readily available better option. But military dissolved the assemblies and the government regimes were not immune to political pressure, and through a clause of the constitution that had—no the public’s hopes were inevitably dashed when surprise—been put in place by a military dictator, the military governments—by definition—engaged in Zia-ul-Haq. This clause, number 58-2B of the repression and failed to improve outcomes for the constitution, gave powers to the president to dissolve country, leading to a switch back to democracy. Key the elected assemblies to call for fresh elections. The to these alternating civilian-military cycles was the exact wording—“a situation has arisen in which the manipulation of public opinion. Government of the Federation cannot be carried on After decades of repeating this pattern, 2008 in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution seems to have been a turning point. Since then, and an appeal to the electorate is necessary”—left the military—though it certainly remains Pakistan’s open room for the abuse that occurred in the 1990s most powerful institution—seems content to not be (the clause was repealed in 1997). ostensibly in control of the government, so far as it The environment of political instability and the can still control the two things that matter most to it: incumbency disadvantage that I noted earlier did security and foreign policy. It seems to have realized not set up incentives for good political behavior. In that it is better off not controlling the economy and

6 DEMOCRACY & DISORDER AN INFLECTION POINT FOR PAKISTAN’S DEMOCRACY fact, they incentivized politicians and governments support, at least for now. Khan is not challenging to engage in extractive behavior, thus setting up a the military’s power or explicitly asserting civilian negative cycle and their own eventual dissolution. supremacy, though he is vocal and communicative Short time horizons in power also tend to encourage with the public, and clearly the face in charge of the kind of political behavior that dominates the the nation. It also seems the civilian-military divide Pakistani context—easily visible investments in question is not one the Pakistani public cares much infrastructure (the PML-N’s focus) and narrow about anymore (at least for now)—that is, there is patronage to constituents, both of which win votes— an acceptance of the military’s outsized role in in contrast to longer-term policy investments in Pakistan. education, health, and institutional reform. Yet it is significant that Khan, as much as he was The 2008 to 2018 time period brought with it helped by the political environment leading up to greater political stability, and with five-year terms, the election, was voted in by a diverse coalition the PML-N and PPP were both able to implement that lends him broad legitimacy amid a changing some reforms at the federal level. The PPP set of demographics in Pakistan—64 percent of government enacted the 18th amendment in the country’s population is now under 30, and at 2010, which devolved power to the provinces— least 37 percent live in urban areas.15 His party won widely lauded as a good move. The PML-N installed across provinces and urban areas. The PTI formed massive infrastructure projects and signed a deal provincial governments in two of Pakistan’s four with China for more infrastructure development provinces, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. But and a coalition government in Baluchistan—a rarity. by early 2018, after Sharif’s disqualification, the It also did well in Pakistan’s largest city of Karachi in governments of both the PPP and PML-N had been Sindh, hitherto the territory of the ethnic Muttahida associated with corruption and misgovernance in Qaumi Movement party. Khan secured his victory each of their three respective terms in power since with the help of technological innovations, including 1988; the months leading up to the 2018 election a database of supporters and a phone app, to help seem to have been ones of disillusionment with the voters locate polling stations and increase turnout. options offered by Pakistan’s democracy. Pakistanis questioned whether a lack of accountability for It is Khan’s politics of both left and right, his appeal their political leaders was the cost they needed to to Pakistan’s next generation, and his alliance pay for democratic stability in the country. with the military that offer a real alternative for Pakistan’s democracy going forward—hinging, of KHAN’S ELECTION AS AN INFLECTION POINT course, on his success. The “job security” that the military can provide him may enable Khan to IN PAKISTAN’S DEMOCRACY finally undertake longer-term, deep institutional In his months in power, Khan’s alliance with reforms that Pakistan desperately needs, including the military has become apparent—there is a widening its tax base and reforming the energy partnership and division of responsibilities at sector. Such moves are unpopular in the short play, with the civilian government responsible for term; other democratically elected governments domestic matters and the economy, and the military have been too weak to take them. The same at the helm of foreign policy and national security. job security may also enable Khan to provide Khan is the face of the government abroad, but the social services that are fundamental to his the military is either literally by his side, or invoked platform, building on some successes that his party by him as being on the same page. The two back oversaw in the KPK province. He has indicated he each other up with (apparently) total mutual would like to deepen Pakistan’s local government

7 DEMOCRACY & DISORDER AN INFLECTION POINT FOR PAKISTAN’S DEMOCRACY reforms, following on the PTI’s implementation Foreign policy of the new local government system in KPK. His policy successes, if achieved, may in turn lead to On foreign policy, the military appears to have given democratic stability and a new kind of political Khan some space to maneuver—as long as he environment for Pakistan—and he could restore does not interfere with certain issues that are not faith in democracy by possibly delivering one that is up for debate, such as the question of prosecuting both accountable and stable. The irony, of course, non-state militant groups that target India and is that this outcome would be achieved with the Afghanistan, including the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) military’s role in the run-up to the election and in and the Haqqani network. In this vein, Khan has guaranteeing Khan’s potentially stable tenure. reached out to India, largely to be rebuffed by the Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) There are significant risks at play. The military is government, which is intent on winning in India’s known to sour on those it has backed, and were 2019 election by relying on an increasingly strident Khan to step on its toes on security or foreign stance toward Pakistan. Khan pushed forward and, policy, pushback would be all but guaranteed. That in a win for him, inaugurated a visa-free corridor curtails the power he can exercise. between India and Pakistan for India’s Sikh minority to be able to make a pilgrimage to Sikh holy sites There are also real doubts that Khan has the in Pakistan. The army stood by him for this step; competence to deliver on social services and both know that unless action is taken against the jobs for the average, young Pakistani. He has no LeT, the relationship with India will not improve experience running a government, and neither significantly, so the “costs” of Pakistan’s outreach do some of his most prominent ministers. He is a are small (“costs” to the military, which benefits master campaigner, but has spent too much time from the persistence of the war). in the past few months focusing on optics and talking to the public, still essentially in campaign Pakistan’s relationship with the United States has mode. In doing so without a script, as is his wont, seen ups and downs in recent months, largely he has repeatedly made gaffes, setting himself up following President Trump’s outbursts. Khan has for criticism. argued for a relationship with the United States based on “trust” and “mutual respect”—saying How Khan navigates his political opposition will be in his victory speech that the relationship should tricky as well. He has no friends in the two main be “mutually beneficial” and “balanced,” and opposition parties, given his own opportunistic not one of dependence. But his quick response rise to power at their expense, starting with his to Trump’s intemperate tweets and statements sit-in protests that proved debilitating for Sharif’s berating Pakistan for taking U.S. aid without doing government. Those parties are thus raring for anything in return shows that he will not hesitate blood—and quick to jump on each of his gaffes, to respond in kind: On Twitter, Khan fired back with missteps, and inconsistencies. What’s more, any the losses Pakistan has suffered in the wake of the accountability measures taken during his term U.S. war in Afghanistan. Khan will also reciprocate that target those opposition parties are perceived when reached out to—as he did during Secretary by the latter’s supporters as politically motivated. of State Mike Pompeo’s visit (which notably was a Khan’s supporters, on the other hand, see them as joint civilian-military visit from the U.S. side) and just, and as delivering on his promise of a clean in response to Trump’s letter asking for Pakistan’s government. support in the Afghan peace process—but will still aim to reduce Pakistan’s economic dependence on Washington. On this front, Khan has turned to Saudi

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Arabia, China, and the United Arab Emirates looking been in its 71-year history, given that it is holding for bailouts, with success in the Persian Gulf. In elections with governments completing their full the United States, the relationship continues to be terms in office—but this took a hit with the pre-poll seen through a military lens, and through the prism meddling of 2018. Substantively, there have been of the Afghan conflict and its resolution—which some improvements, especially with the powers of means that Pakistan’s military will largely remain in the executive curtailed, and new local governments, the driving seat vis-à-vis the United States, as it has though implementation has been slow and marginal in recent decades. on that front in most provinces.

Domestic politics Where does Pakistan go from here? Pakistan’s civil- military relationship and the weakness of its political On issues where Khan has in the past pandered system remain key issues. Any real progress on the to the right in service to political opportunism— civilian-military balance will have to come from for instance drumming up the issue of Pakistan’s within, and through a strengthening of its political blasphemy laws during his campaign—he seems system. As noted above, ironically, it is the stability to be trying to move the needle toward a more the military provides that may enable Pakistan’s progressive approach now that he is in power, democratic strengthening, through implementation surprising even those most skeptical of him. But he of political and policy reforms. If Khan is able to has not been able to get very far, and has at times deliver on his policy promises, that will benefit retreated in the face of Islamist backlash, earning Pakistan’s democracy. him the moniker “Mr. U-turn.” When, in October 2018, Pakistan’s Supreme Court acquitted a poor Pakistan’s political ecosystem—especially the Christian woman on death row for blasphemy, he related issues of incumbency disadvantage and defended the verdict in strong, unequivocal terms. horse-trading—is easy to manipulate in a way that In his nationally televised speech that day, he took furthers political instability, therefore benefitting charge of the narrative on an issue where the the all-powerful military. Instituting rules that would state has often been fearful and silent and has let counter these features—making horse-trading fundamentalist rhetoric prevail. difficult, for example—would be beneficial for Pakistan’s democracy. Yet, when faced with protests, his government appeased the protesters with a peace deal, but Another avenue for improvement is Pakistan’s then began a crackdown against them, arresting parliamentary process. Being a legislator continues fundamentalists—how far that goes and how long to be a part-time activity in Pakistan, and voters are that lasts remains to be seen. Pakistan will not unclear about the responsibilities of legislators—they become progressive on religious issues on Khan’s tend to reward them for patronage rather than voting watch, but even controlling the narrative on such behavior in parliament. To deal with this, it would be matters in line with Pakistan’s current laws is no useful to take steps to make all parliamentary votes small feat. Pakistan’s history is one in which the and proceedings public (they currently are not) and state ceding control to hardliners and extremists to hold regular Q&A sessions in parliament for the has moved the population toward fundamentalism. prime minister (something Khan has promised) and other members. It was notable that Khan had LOOKING AHEAD one of the lowest attendance rates in parliament as a legislator; to see if he can focus on legislative How is Pakistan’s democracy and its direction to activity now will be key. Here, the United States and be characterized? Procedurally, in the past 10 Western democracies can offer logistical support. years, Pakistani democracy is the strongest it has

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Beyond that, what the United States can do for On other illiberal moves made in Pakistan in recent Pakistan’s civilian-military balance is limited. It is months—allowing fundamentalists to contest better for America to clearly work with the civilians elections—the Pakistani state is also moving away over the military, but it is hard to do that when the from responding to Western pressure, letting military is in charge of foreign policy and national extremist groups contest elections even after being security (i.e., where U.S. interests in Pakistan are gray-listed by the Financial Action Task Force. It concentrated). will have to be Pakistan’s civilian government that takes a stab at reversing these trends. Khan has The most fundamental threat to Pakistani begun a crackdown on such fundamentalists, but democracy currently lies in the threats to media how far he goes, or whether he succeeds in the freedom (and freedom of speech). Media outlets long term, remains to be seen. that write and speak against the military have seen their ad revenues dry up and have faced CONCLUSION intimidation (via intelligence agencies). Because a lot of this happens behind the scenes, the problem It is clear that Pakistan’s democracy is at an is hard to resolve. What complicates the situation is inflection point. Military meddling in its elections that the public (and the government) sees Pakistani and in the work of its civilian governments cannot media outlets as partisan (mostly warranted), and be denied, and neither can the war on the media considers their reporting to be biased, in one way and the curbs on press freedom around the 2018 or the other. election—all illiberal, authoritarian signals—but Pakistan continues to be more than a procedural On this, direct Western pressure can do little, democracy. The populism that has come to Pakistan especially given that the current U.S. administration with Khan has been a reaction against political is fighting its own battles with the press, and has elites perceived as corrupt, as in the West. The shown illiberal tendencies itself. The Pakistani new government now has a chance to restore faith media needs to hold itself up to nonpartisan, in civilian politicians and a chance to consolidate international standards; Western media, including the institutional improvements that Pakistan has in the United States and European countries, made to its democracy over the years. Hopes for can help demonstrate what such standards are. Khan are high, but unmet expectations have been Pakistan’s media regulatory authority can also help the downfall for all of Pakistan’s leaders. The new ensure that the media remains free of pressure, government’s next steps will need to be watched as but this is hard because the state can intimidate a gauge of the direction Pakistan’s democracy will the regulatory authority in turn. take next.

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REFERENCES 1 “General Election 2018 Score Card on Perception of Pre-Poll Fairness,” (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency, May 2018), https://pildat.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ PILDAT-Scorecard-on-Perceptions-of-Pre-Poll-Fairness-May-2018-010718.pdf.

2 “Positive changes to the legal framework were overshadowed by restrictions on freedom of expression and unequal campaign opportunities,” (Islamabad: European Union Election Observation Mission, July 27, 2018), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_eom_pakistan_2018_-_preliminary_statement_ on_25_july_elections.pdf.

3 The doctrine of necessity states that an extra-constitutional authority can take over a government for the good of the people; in Pakistan, it was used to justify military coups over democratic governments.

4 Saeed Shah and Waqar Gillani, “Pakistan’s military wields more influence ahead of national election,” The Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/pakistans-military-wields-more- influence-ahead-of-national-election-1532088001.

5 Madiha Afzal, “Democracy in Pakistan: Elections tell us why voters behave badly,” VoxDev, August 14, 2017, https://voxdev.org/topic/institutions-political-economy/democracy-pakistan-elections-tell-us-why- politicians-behave-badly.

6 Imran Khan (@ImranKhanPTI), Twitter, July 17, 2018, https://twitter.com/ImranKhanPTI/ status/1019230696601251841.

7 Hameed Haroon, “A dirty war on freedom of the press in Pakistan,” The Washington Post, July 11, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/07/11/a-dirty-war-on-freedom-of-the- press-in-pakistan/?utm_term=.e710ab88b8b6.

8 “Positive changes to the legal framework,” https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_eom_ pakistan_2018_-_preliminary_statement_on_25_july_elections.pdf.

9 “Public Opinion Overwhelmingly Supports Democracy: PILDAT Nationwide Poll,” Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, August 12, 2014, https://pildat.org/assessment-of- democracy1/public-opinion-overwhelmingly-supports-democracy-pildat-nationwide-poll.

10 “Approval Ratings on the Overall Quality of Democracy up to 66% at the end of the 2nd Year of the Current Government,” Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, October 19, 2015, https://pildat.org/assessment-of-democracy1/approval-ratings-on-the-overall-quality-of-democracy-up-to- 66-at-the-end-of-the-2nd-year-of-the-current-government.

11 “How will Imran Khan govern?” The Economist, August 2, 2018, https://www.economist.com/ asia/2018/08/02/how-will-imran-khan-govern.

12 “Financial Crunch: Dawn News lays off analyst Nusrat Javeed,” Journalism Pakistan, November 4, 2018, http://www.journalismpakistan.com/financial-crunch-dawnnews-lays-off-analyst-nusrat-javeed.

11 DEMOCRACY & DISORDER AN INFLECTION POINT FOR PAKISTAN’S DEMOCRACY

13 “PM’s performance satisfies 54pc; 68pc term PM resignation demand unfair: Gallup Pakistan Survey,” Geo News, June 20, 2016, https://www.geo.tv/latest/108123-68pc-term-prime-ministers-resignation- demand-unfair.

14 “Majority of urban Pakistanis (53%) say they are dissatisfied with how democracy works in Pakistan. Dissatisfaction is lower in rural areas where only a minority is dissatisfied,”Gallup Pakistan, February 22, 2018, http://gallup.com.pk/majority-of-urban-pakistanis-53-say-they-are-dissatisfied-with-how-democracy- works-in-pakistan-dissatisfaction-is-lower-in-rural-areas-where-only-a-minority-is-dissatisfied/.

15 Asma Kundi, “Pakistan currently has largest percentage of young people in its history: report,” Dawn, May 3, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1405197; Shahbaz Rana, “6th census findings: 207 million and counting,” The Express Tribune, August 27, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1490674/57- increase-pakistans-population-19-years-shows-new-census/.

12 ABOUT THE AUTHOR Madiha Afzal is a visiting fellow in the Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution, and was previously assistant professor of public policy at the University of Maryland, College Park. She is the author of the book Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society, and the State (Brookings Institution Press, 2018). Afzal has also published in Public Choice, and is the author of a USIP special report on education and attitudes in Pakistan, as well as several book chapters, journal articles, and policy reports. Afzal writes for Pakistani and international publications including Dawn, Foreign Affairs, The Cairo Review, Foreign Policy, and The Washington Post. Afzal is also a fellow with the Center for Economic Research (CERP) and the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives (IDEAS) in Pakistan. In addition, she consults for various organizations, including the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development, the U.K. Department for International Development, and the International Food Policy Research Institute. She has also taught at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to independent research and policy solutions. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars.

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