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Daesh in Pakistan's Militant Landscape and the Allure for Urban

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Daesh in Pakistan's Militant Landscape and the Allure for Urban Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) Daesh in Pakistan’s Militant Landscape and the Allure for Urban Extremists* Zoha Waseem In* January 2016, Afghan Ambassador to individuals and cells claiming affiliation with Pakistan declared that a militants from northern Daesh have emerged across Pakistan, including Pakistan were fleeing military operations and the urban areas of Sindh and Punjab – the two joining the Islamic State (hereafter, ‘Daesh’) in most populated provinces. Investigators and Afghanistan.1 Hours after this statement, a analysts have called Daesh ‘a new brand of suicide attack on the Pakistani consulate in militancy’6, ‘global trend-setters’7, or Jalalabad was claimed by Daesh.23 Jalalabad is a downplayed it as an old threat with a new city in Nangarhar, an eastern province of name. Others, like the counterterrorism Afghanistan that is believed have a strong departments of Sindh and Punjab police, have presence of Daesh’s Khorasan province (or been cracking down on suspects affiliated with Wilayat Khorasan which includes Afghanistan Daesh, but uncertainty prevails over the extent and Pakistan)4, under the command of of its threat in the country and how to prevent defectors from the Afghan and Pakistani local militants from defecting or self-radicalised Taliban (the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan or individuals from joining it. TTP). Last year, Daesh circulated an online video of ‘Sheikh Jalaluddin training camp’, near The militant landscape of Pakistan is evolving the Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor.5 Since 2014, due to global trends and ongoing military operations in northern Pakistan8, a paramilitary- 9 * led operation in Karachi , and a supposed The author would like to thank Abdul Basit, associate realisation within the civil-military apparatus research fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, that counterterrorism operations must be taken 10 Zia ur Rehman, journalist at The News, and officers of the to ‘logical conclusions’ in order for foreign Counter Terrorism Departments of Sindh and Punjab investments and projects (like the China Police for their relentless guidance. Pakistan Economic Corridor)11 to continue 1 Kamran Yousuf, ‘Majority of Militants Fleeing Pakistan uninterrupted. To complement these Joined Islamic State in Afghanistan’, The Express Tribune, 13 January 2016, online at operations, Pakistan devised a counterterrorism http://tribune.com.pk/story/1026774/majority-of- militants-fleeing-pakistan-joined-islamic-state-in- afghanistan-afghan-envoy (all online sources last accessed 6 Z. Rehman, ‘2015 Brought the Educated Terrorist to on 15 January 2016, unless stated otherwise). Karachi’, The News, p. 13. 2 ‘A Selection of Military Operations Conducted by the 7 K. Shahid, ‘ISIS in Punjab?’, The Friday Times, 01 January Islamic State’, Dabiq, No. 13, online at 2016, online at http://www.clarionproject.org/factsheets-files/Issue-13- http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/isis-in-punjab/ the-rafidah.pdf (last accessed on 31 May 2016). 8 ‘Nearly 350 Military Men Killed in Zarb-e-Azb: ISPR’, 3 This is the second suicide attack claimed by Daesh in Dawn, 13 June 2015, online at Nangarhar after the one in April 2015 that killed 30 http://www.dawn.com/news/1187994. people. 9 ‘Karachi Operation to Continue Till Logical 4 ‘Islamic State Expands Afghan Footprint With Terror Conclusion: COAS’, The News, 9 April 2015, available at Campaign’, Daily Times, 20 December 2015, online at http://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/3877-karachi- http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/foreign/20-Dec- operation-to-continue-till-logical-conclusion-coas. 2015/islamic-state-expands-afghan-footprint-with-terror- 10 ‘Operation Zarb-e-Azb to Continue Till Its Logical campaign. Conclusion: Army Chief’, The Express Tribune (13 July 5 B. Roggio & C. Weiss, ‘Islamic State Highlights “Sheikh 2015), online at Jalaluddin training camp” in Afghanistan’, The Long War http://tribune.com.pk/story/920259/operation-zarb-e- Journal, 19 November 2015, online at azb-to-continue-till-its-logical-conclusion-army-chief. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/11/islam 11 S. Safdar, ‘The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: An ic-state-highlights-sheikh-jalaluddin-training-camp-in- Assessment of Potential Threats and Constraints’, Conflict afghanistan.php. and Peace Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (July-Dec 2014), pp. 11-40. 20 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) strategy – the National Action Plan (NAP) – stability, particularly given the fact that this following the attack on the Army Public School brand of militancy is alluring for individuals in Peshawar in December 2014. and cells emerging from educated, middle- and upper-middle class backgrounds16. This is However, other factors have also altered the documented in the case of the Karachi cell, militant environment in Pakistan. These include members of which were behind multiple internal rifts within the TTP following recent attacks in Karachi in 2015, most notably on 13 crackdowns and the appointment of a new May when a bus carrying Ismaili Shias was leadership12; rifts within the Afghan Taliban attacked in the city, claiming 45 lives.17 While following the death of Mullah Omar13; territorial losses to Daesh-inspired cells are not discontentment within local militant groups due foreseeable, the threat of this ‘new generation to political reconciliations with the state; the of global jihadists’18 persists. inability of al Qaeda to theatrically display its strength in the region over the last few years; In the last section, I discuss the National and the lack of counter-narratives to religious Action Plan vis-à-vis its non-militaristic aspects extremism. It is in this environment that Daesh that are crucial for reclaiming the ideological has found support and the potential to space ceded to extremists in urban Pakistan. As indoctrinate young recruits. Hassan Abbas argues, military operations can enforce the state’s writ in ungoverned spaces of This article relies upon open source Pakistan but are unlikely to be sufficient in information and interviews with analysts and urban areas.19 Countering Daesh’s expansion investigators studying Daesh in Pakistan. It is entails countering existing radical religious sectioned into three parts. The first examines ideologies (particularly sectarianism), terrorist how Daesh’s ideology may be finding space in propaganda, as well as monitoring supporters Pakistan’s current militant landscape. Its extent and facilitators, including women20 and clerics is yet to be accurately deciphered but over the who are known to deliver sermons in favour of last two years fighters from local groups have radicalisation21. To implement these policies, reportedly left for Syria14, while others have the state needs independent law enforcement pledged allegiance to Daesh. However, the agencies working alongside counterterrorism existing militant landscape is too complex to specialists, not just the deployment of troops. easily become a fertile ground for Daesh to co- exist with other militant groups.15 The second Spatial Gains part focuses on the urban presence of Daesh- inspired extremists. It is argued that this is a The footprints of Daesh in Pakistan can be considerable threat to Pakistan’s internal traced back to mid-2014, shortly after Abu Bakr a-Baghdadi established the so-called caliphate 12 Saud Mehsud & Mehreen Zahra-Malik, ‘Pakistan in Syria and Iraq and chalked out a five-year Taliban Reject Islamic State Leader’s Claim to be plan of global expansion, identifying the Af- “Caliph”’, Reuters (19 December 2015), online at Pak region as Wilayat Khorasan. One of the http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-islamic- state-idUSKBN0U20IT20151219. 13 Bilal Sarwary, ‘Life in the Taliban After Mullah Omar: 16 Ahmed Rashid, ‘Pakistan: The Allure of ISIS’, The New Afghan Islamist Commanders Reveal How the York Review of Books, 06 October 2014, online at Organisation has Split and Lost its Roots’, The Independent, http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2014/10/06/allure-isis. 10 August 2015, online at 17 Farhan Zahid, ‘Tahir Saeen Group: Higher-Degree http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/life-in- Militants’, Conflict and Peace Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2015), the-taliban-after-mullah-omar-afghan-islamist- pp. 151 – 160. commanders-reveal-how-the-organisation-has- 18 Zahid Hussain, ‘ISIS is no Taliban’, Dawn, 09 July 10449093.html. 2014, online at http://www.dawn.com/news/1117938. 14 Z. Rehman, ‘Pakistani Fighters Joining the War in 19 H. Abbas, ‘ISIS Eyes Influence’, p. 14. Syria’, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 6, No. 9 (2013), pp. 9-11. 20 Naimat Khan, ‘Terrorist Moms’, The Friday Times, 25 15 Hassan Abbas, ‘ISIS Eyes Influence in Pakistan: Focus, December 2015, online at Fears and Future Prospects’, Jinnah Institute, 23 December http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/terrorist-moms. 2014, online at http://jinnah-institute.org/wp- 21 ‘Mobile Signals Suspended for Third Friday Now’, content/uploads/2014/12/ISIS-PB-by-Hassan- Dawn, 19 December 2015, online at Abbas.pdf. http://www.dawn.com/news/1227313. 21 Strife Journal, Issue 6 (May/ June 2016) first acknowledgements came from Jamaat-ul- In an interview in Dabiq magazine in January Ahrar (an offshoot of TTP) after Daesh 2016, Khan called on Muslim men and women supported the release of a Pakistani prisoner to migrate to Khorasan.30 imprisoned in the US on terrorism charges.22 Shortly after, pro-Daesh wall-chalking and The year 2015 saw a surge in Daesh-related pamphlets began appearing across Pakistan.23 In developments
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