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Pakistan Missile Chronology

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Pakistan Missile Chronology Pakistan Missile Chronology 2011-2003 | 2002 | 2001-2000 | 1999-1998 | 1997-1996 | 1995-1994 | 1993-1992 | 1991-1988 | 1987-1947 Last update: May 2011 This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here. Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation. 2011-2003 29 April 2011 Pakistan successfully tests the Ra'ad (Hatf-VIII) nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missile. The missile has a range of 350 km. —"Pakistan successfully conducts flight test of Hatf-8 missile," The Express Tribune, 30 April 2011, http://tribune.com.pk. 20 April 2011 Pakistan successfully tests a new short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile called Nasr (Hatf-IX). The missile has a range of 37 miles. According to analysts, the missile is meant to act as a deterrent against an Indian conventional military attack, especially through its Cold Start military doctrine. —"Pakistan Launches Nuke-Ready Missile in Trial," Global Security Newswire, 19 April 2011; Anita Joshua, "Pakistan Tests Short-Range Ballistic Missile," The Hindu, 20 April 2011, www.hinduonnet.com. 12 March 2011 Pakistan successfully tests the surface-to-surface nuclear-capable ballistic missile Abdali (Hatf-II). The missile has a range of 180 km. —"Pakistan test-fires ballistic missile," The Daily Times, 12 March 2011, www.dailytimes.com.pk. 3 March 2011 Pakistan and China sign an agreement for joint construction of two fast-attack boats equipped with missiles for eventual induction into the Pakistan Navy. —"Pakistan and China to manufacture missile boats," Dawn, 3 March 2011, www.dawn.com. Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org. This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright © 2011 by MIIS. 17 February 2011 Pakistan successfully tests the Babur (Hatf-VII) nuclear-capable cruise missile. The missile has a range of 470 miles. —"Pakistan test fires Babur cruise missile," 17 February, 2011, www.upi.com. 21 December 2010 The Strategic Missile Group of the Army Strategic Forces Command successfully tests the Ghauri (Hatf-V)) nuclear- capable ballistic missile. The missile has a range of 800 miles. Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani, who witnesses the test, says, "The test amply demonstrates the credibility of our minimum deterrence strategy, which is the cornerstone of our security policy and ensures peace in the region." —"Pakistan Launches Nuke-Ready Missile," Global Security Newswire, 21 December, 2010; "Pakistan carries out training launch of ballistic missile," Dawn, 22 December, 2010, www.dawn.com. 6 December 2010 Pakistan successfully tests an unspecified anti-tank missile at the Tilla firing range. The missile is said to be indigenously made. —"Pak Army successfully conducts anti-tank missile test," The Daily Times, 6 December, 2010, www.dailytimes.com.pk. 9 May 2010 Pakistan has successfully tested two nuclear-capable ballistic missiles - the 290 km-range Ghaznavi (Hatf III) and the 650 km-range Shaheen I (Hatf IV). —Anita Joshua, "Pakistan Tests Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missile," The Hindu, May 9, 2010, www.thehindu.com. 17 March 2010 The Pakistan Navy has carried out a series of tests of various missiles including the C-802 anti-ship missile, Excocet 39, and the Harpoon. —"Pakistan Displayes Naval Offensive Capabilities," Jane's Defence Weekly, March 17, 2010, Lexis-Nexis. 16 March 2010 The Pakistan Navy has tested an unnamed surface-to-air missile. The test was carried out from a guided missile destroyer. —"Pakistan Navy Test-Fires Surface-to-Air Missile," Associated Press of Pakistan, March 16, 2010, BBC Monitoring South Asia - Political, Lexis-Nexis. 27 February 2010 According to a Pakistani news report, in recent days Islamabad has tested several missile systems. Although these tests have not been publicized, as per their agreement, the Indian government was notified prior to the tests. According to the report, one the missiles being tested is the Hatf VII (Babur) cruise missile. —"Pakistan Reportedly Conducts Unannounced Missile Tests," Nawa-i-Waqt, February 27, 2010, BBC Monitoring South Asia - Political, Lexis-Nexis. Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org. This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright © 2011 by MIIS. 10 September 2009 In a television interview, disgraced former Pakistani nuclear scientist, Dr. A.Q. Khan revealed that Islamabad had bought 200 missiles from North Korea in 1999. He said that Islamabad needed surface-to-air missiles at that time. The then Pakistan army chief, Gen. Pervez Musharraf sent him and a senior air officer to purchase the missiles. —"Pakistan Allegedly Bought 200 Missiles from North Korea in 1999," Choson Ilbo (South Korean newspaper), September 10, 2009, BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific — Political, Lexis-Nexis. 30 August 2009 The Pakistan government has refuted reports that it illegally modified United States-supplied Harpoon missiles to allow them to attack land targets. —"No Modification Made to Harpoon Missile: Pakistan," The Times of India, August 30, 2009, timesofindia.indiatimes.com. 30 August 2009 The United States has charged Pakistan with modifying the Harpoon anti-ship missile for a land-attack role, in violation of the Arms Control Act. Islamabad has denied these allegations. The missile was reportedly tested unannounced on April 23, 2009. —Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, "U.S. Accuses Pakistan of Altering Missiles," The New York Times, August 30, 2009, www.nytimes.com. 28 December 2008 In the wake of recent Pakistan-India rift, the Pakistan Air Force shifts six jet fighters equipped with most up-to-date cruise missiles to Karachi Airport. The PAF is also surveying with full care what types of Indian planes are in operation and in which sector. — "Missile-fitted planes shifted to Karachi", The Nation, 28 December 2008; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 28 December 2008, lexis-nexis.com. 8 December 2008 Pakistan is emerging as the launch export customer for Brazil's MAR-1 anti-radiation missile (ARM). It remains undetermined on which aircraft the missile will be integrated. Brazilian press reports quote Defense Minister Nelson Jobim as confirming that agreement had provisionally been reached in April for a deal worth $108 million. The sale of 100 missiles appears to have been approved by the Brazilian government at the start of December. — "Pakistan acquires Brazilian ARM", Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, 8 December 2008; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 December 2008, lexis-nexis.com. 8 May 2008 Pakistan conducts a successful flight test of the indigenously developed air-launched cruise missile, Hatf-8, known as Ra'ad. The Ra'ad cruise missile, with a range of 350 km, has special stealth capability. It is a low-altitude, terrain- following missile with high maneuverability and can deliver all types of warheads with great accuracy. The missile test is part of a continuing process of validating the design parameters of the weapon system. Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org. This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright © 2011 by MIIS. — "More on Pakistan test-firing cruise missile", BBC Monitoring South Asia, Dawn News TV, 8 May 2008; in Lexis- Nexis Academic Universe, 8 May 2008, lexis-nexis.com. 22 April 2008 Pakistan's army test fires a long-range ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear weapon. The launch marks the culmination of a field training exercise for the Hatf VI (Shaheen II) missile program, which included a test firing on 19 April 2008. — "Pakistan test-fires second missile in 3 days", The International Herald Tribune, 22 April 2008; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 22 April 2008, lexis-nexis.com. 19 April 2008 Pakistan successfully test fires its long range surface-to-surface ballistic missile Hatf VI (Shaheen II). This missile test is part of a process of validation and technical improvements to consolidate and verify various land based strategic missile systems. Hatf VI (Shaheen
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