Bombing Iran or Living with Iran’s Bomb?

Kassem Ja’afar

© Transatlantic Institute and Kassem Ja’afar, July 2008 Bombing Iran or Living With Iran’s Bomb?

The Price of Military Action and the Consequences of Inaction

Kassem Ja’afar

FOREWORD

Dear Reader,

Since its nuclear programme was exposed in 2002, Iran has defied the international community and doggedly pursued its nuclear goals, turning down tantalizing diplomatic incentives, bearing the brunt of increasing diplomatic isolation and incurring a steep price in economic sanctions. Over the past six years, Iran has ramped up its nuclear programme and fought all attempts to make its rulers desist from its quest. As of July 2008, nothing seems to stand in the way of Iran’s successfully completing a nuclear cycle – nothing, except time and technological hurdles its scientists will eventually overcome.

What options does the international community have?

The answer depends on whether Iran can be convinced to change course. If so, the right mixtures of pressures and incentives will, at some point, tip the balance and persuade Iranian decision makers to change course. Regardless, the international community has failed so far to find that perfect point of equilibrium. Iran’s nuclear programme, meanwhile, is proceeding apace and time is running out. Before long, the international community might be faced with the unthinkable – the terrible dilemma between launching an attack against Iran before it acquires nuclear weapons (or at least the capability to build them) and coming to terms and living with Iran’s nuclear bomb. These are two terrible scenarios – but they may soon become very real.

It is with these considerations in mind that the Transatlantic Institute and Contact J Magazine offer you this report – a study of the unthinkable. What will be the consequences of an attack on Iran? And what is the price of inaction? Our goal is to advocate neither – but to offer our readers a glimpse into the world as it would emerge from either scenario. Hopefully, the cost they both entail will encourage the international community to renew its efforts to avoid them both – and choose a third way between pre-emptive strikes and deterring a revolutionary nuclear Iran.

Brussels, July 2008

Emanuele Ottolenghi, Claude Candiyoti Director, the Transatlantic Institute Publishing Editor, Contact J Magazine ABSTRACT

Speaking to France’s ambassadorial corps on August 27, 2007 newly elected French President Nicholas Sarkozy endorsed the current international approach to Iran’s nuclear programme, based on a mixture of incentives and disincentives. The two-pronged approach, Sarkozy said, “is the only one that can enable us to avoid being faced with an alternative that I call catastrophic: an Iranian bomb or the bombing of Iran”. Almost a year later, the problem of Iran’s nuclear programme remains unresolved, and with time running out, the prospect of confronting Sarkozy’s catastrophic alternative is becoming a distinctly realistic possibility. This report will offer a glimpse into what concretely constitutes this alternative in order to help policy makers contemplate the choices still available to avoid such a dangerous course.

Introduction The History The international community Iran is a signatory to the NPT. As such continues to seek a political settlement it has an obligation to reveal all the which could satisfy both Tehran’s details of its nuclear activities to the quest to develop a nuclear status and IAEA and to make them subject to the regional and international whatever inspection and verification requirements of preventing the Iranian measures are deemed necessary by the regime from obtaining a military Agency. This, Tehran has consistently nuclear capability. Regardless, this failed to do. While information about balancing act remains elusive. the emergence of Iran’s efforts in the nuclear domain remains sketchy at Meanwhile, Iran spares no best, it is well established that they opportunity to reiterate its intention to pre-date the Islamic revolution and the continue its nuclear efforts. In early establishment of the Islamic Republic June 2008, Iran went so far as declaring by the late Ayatollah Khomeini in that uranium enrichment was its red 1979. In fact, Iran’s first nuclear line and it was not prepared to facility, the Bushehr project, was suspend it, even as the international begun under the late Shah in the community offered Iran new enhanced 1970’s. incentives that included Western assistance in building state-of-the-art nuclear light water reactors. By reaffirming its desire to become a nuclear power, while rejecting international offers, Iran remains in violation of its Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations. For its part, the international community has never denied Iran’s right to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Picture 1: The Bushehr Nuclear Complex Indeed this is a prerogative enjoyed by any willing nation in the world as long Iran’s nuclear programme must be as their programmes are subject to understood in the context of the international rules and regulations, traumatic experience of the Iran-Iraq including total transparency and war. During this time, Iran was unable verification. This is the job of the to respond effectively to the missile International Atomic Energy Agency attacks launched by Iraq against its (IAEA) and it constitutes part of the cities and denied access to arms obligations expected of all signatories supplies by the arms embargo to the NPT. The latter has, since 1968, imposed on Iran by the United States remained the most comprehensive and and other Western nations. It is most binding international framework likely against this background that designed to regulate and limit the Iran initially decided to reverse its proliferation of nuclear weapons in the 1979 decision to suspend its nuclear world. programme; the pursuit of non- conventional weapons, including

1 nuclear weapons, was meant to give dollars with large quantities of new Iran the kind of deterrence it lacked generation weapons procured from during the years 1980-1988. Russia, other former Soviet Republics such as Ukraine and Belarus as well as Initially, Iran’s quest to develop its China and North Korea. own WMD deterrence capability was characterised by the following main In all these endeavours Iran was features: particularly interested in avoiding the effects of another potential arms • Domestic development and embargo or any other form of production of copies of the sanctions similar to what it had SCUD missile usually in suffered during the war with Iraq. A cooperation with countries such great deal of emphasis was thus as China and North Korea, both placed on building a domestic of which quickly became the development and production base two most important suppliers which would provide the regime with of Tehran’s re-armament a certain degree of self sufficiency both programme during and after in peace and when at war. the war with Iraq; • Development and production of Through its military expansion, Iran a chemical and biological also took the decision to regain its weapons capability regarded as strategic position as a regional a direct response to Iraq’s use of superpower capable of defending its such weapons against Iranian interests and projecting its power and forces during the war; influence wherever and whenever it • A clear ambition to develop a deemed necessary. nuclear capability with potential of ‘weaponisation’ of It is from this angle that Iran’s nuclear such a capability if or when the programme should be viewed. need arises. The Crisis At the same time, Iran’s military build- The Islamic government officially put up after its war with Iraq was not an end to the nuclear efforts pursued confined to WMD’s. Tehran’s top under the Shah as soon as it came to priority during the 1990’s was (and power in February 1979. The still is) to rebuild and develop its suspension in nuclear activities was military capabilities in all fields. brief – Iran’s nuclear activities Equally drawing on the experiences of resumed as early as 1985, followed by the war, Iran embarked on a clandestine procurement from the continuous programme aimed at network run by Pakistani nuclear improving all aspects of the scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan in 1987 performance of its military forces on and the signature, in July 1989, of a the ground, in the air and at sea. It is cooperation pact between Iran and estimated that during the period 1990- Russia, by then President Hashemi 2000 total military expenditure Rafsanjani. The pact covered the amounted to no less than 50 billion US utilisation of nuclear materials and

2 related equipment for peaceful Despite these growing activities, Iran’s purposes. nuclear programme did not come into international focus until 2002, when an This effort was followed in 1993 by an opposition group, the National agreement signed with China to Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), supply Iran with two 300 megawatt revealed the existence of an uranium reactors under project Istiqlal enrichment facility at , and a (Independence), located in the heavy water plant at Arak. Darkhovin facility , south of the city of Ahwaz and by China’s agreement to For its part, Iran still insists that its supply Tehran with an HT-6B fusion efforts are entirely peaceful and reactor which was installed at the intended to provide the country with Plasma Research Centre of its future requirements for energy. Azad University. However this argument was not found particularly convincing, for the following reasons:

• Iran is an oil rich country which can provide for its energy supply much more economically and easily from its oil and natural gas reserves rather than through a switch to nuclear power. • Iran’s nuclear programme centres on uranium enrichment, although Iran is not building, Picture 2: Location of the Darkhovin facility. nor does it haven, any uranium fuelled reactor anywhere in the By then Iran’s nuclear efforts were country, with the exception of going full steam ahead. Bushehr was Bushehr; originally constructed by the German • The Bushehr reactor, however, company Siemens during the Shah’s is meant to be fuelled by rule and had been shut down Russian-supplied uranium, following Iraqi bombardment during something that makes Iran’s the Iran-Iraq war. enrichment efforts wholly unnecessary and therefore After Germany turned down Iranian suspicious. requests to complete the nuclear facility, Tehran sought help from Added to this is the secrecy in which Moscow. The Kremlin agreed and by Tehran managed to shroud its nuclear March 1994 Russian experts were plans. For nearly two decades Iran did scheduled to start working on not inform the IAEA of the true nature installing the first unit of a new Iranian of its activities, in total contradiction to 1000 megawatt plant at Bushehr. its obligations under the NPT regime.

3 In a report released as early as June continuing its enrichment programme 2003, the IAEA said that Iran ‘has and insisting repeatedly that it would failed to comply with the terms of the not relinquish its right to conduct such Nuclear Non Proliferation treaty’. activity domestically. Meanwhile, the international community was showing Iran eventually signed – but did not increasing signs of anxiety mixed with ratify – the Additional Protocols growing frustration at Tehran’s agreement with the IAEA in December posture. In June 2006, the UN Security 2003 and agreed to a temporary Council Permanent Five powers and suspension of its enrichment activities. Germany (P5+1) offered a list of Iran and the signed incentives for Iran to suspend the Paris Accord in October 2004. enrichment activities. When Iran However, Tehran rescinded these turned the offer down, Iran was agreements in January 2006 by referred to the Security Council. Four removing the UN seals at its Natanz UN Security Council Resolutions have enrichment plant and resumed its been passed since July 2006 and the research on nuclear fuel. By April IAEA has tried hard to maintain an 2006, Iran publicly announced its ostensibly balanced and cautious enrichment activities. Regardless of approach. Unfortunately, U.S. sources whether it was a publicity tool to introduced a measure of ambiguity to present a threat, or simply a statement the crisis. of fact affirming his country’s true intentions, Iran’s President, Mahmoud The key findings of a U.S. National Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had Intelligence Estimate made public in to 3.6 percent.1 December 2007 threw doubt on the possible military objectives of Iran’s nuclear programme.2 The report stated that analysts had concluded that Iran’s technical efforts on weaponisation had been ‘frozen’ in 2003. This was widely interpreted throughout the world, and indeed by Iran itself, as a reversal of the hitherto consistent claim by the Bush administration of Iran’s military nuclear intentions. It took several months and numerous explanatory

Picture 3: President Ahmadinejad on a visit efforts by President Bush and senior to Natanz enrichment facility members of his administration to retract the perceived conclusion of that Despite international warnings that report, emphasize that other essential this would endanger efforts to reach a aspects of a military nuclear program – compromise on the issue, Iran uranium enrichment and missile persisted in its enrichment activities. development - were ongoing, and to go back to the standard U.S. policy line The situation slowly deteriorated of insisting that Iran’s objectives were throughout 2006-2007, with Iran after all military first and foremost.

4 There was yet another round of This IAEA report also presented, for revived diplomatic efforts during the the first time, intricate details of Iran’s spring of 2008. Iran was presented military programme, including with an updated version of the P5+1 evidence of Iranian experiments with incentives package aimed primarily at detonators specifically designed for finding a mutually acceptable formula nuclear weapons, efforts to install for enrichment which would satisfy nuclear warheads on an operational both Tehran’s stand on the subject and ballistic missile, the Shahab 35 (which the international requirements for Iran recently tested during military transparency and verification.3 exercises in the Gulf), studies of the Another proposal, articulated in a effects of nuclear blasts, and the March 2008 article in the New York central role of military institutes and Review of Books by three prominent industries in the nuclear programme. former U.S. diplomats, even went as far as proposing a compromise The evidence referred to puts to rest whereby Tehran could continue its the confusion triggered by the NIE: domestic uranium enrichment Iran’s military programme appears to programme under international be developing rapidly without much supervision. difficulty, aside from tepid sanctions and technological hurdles, which Iran Despite a flurry of diplomatic efforts, will eventually overcome. time is running out for a mutually acceptable solution. The most recent Sanctions IAEA report, presented in late May While sanctions have yielded 2008, went further than ever before in important results, it may soon become criticizing Tehran’s record. The agency manifest that they fall short of is still deeply concerned with Iran’s persuading Iran to desist from its nuclear programme. The report nuclear ambitions. Even the mild highlighted Iran’s progress in sanctions so far agreed by the UN enrichment activities and revealed Security Council have been reached improved operation of a larger with great difficulty and any number of centrifuges at the Natanz4 expansion looks difficult. There is little uranium enrichment plant. likelihood that Russia would be prepared to join such a scheme and an even lesser chance in the case of China, which depends heavily on its commercial ties with Tehran with regard to oil and gas supplies vital for its economy. In return for the supply of crude, vital Chinese military assistance is awarded to Iran. Even positions within the Western alliance itself are far from united in their approach towards dealing with this crisis. The US and to a lesser extent

Picture 4: Iran’s Shahab 3 missile Great Britain have often indicated pressure on Tehran, and they their total opposition to Iran’s nuclear eventually lead to a virtual paralysis, activities. France has expressed her wouldn’t this inaction be seen by the resolute solidarity with the Anglo- Iranian authorities as essentially a American policy stance. But with other ‘green light’? If that is the case, would EU countries favouring continued that encourage, even by default, the dialogue over direct confrontation, emergence of a possible ‘worst case and powerful economic interests scenario’ whereby the military option acting as a deterrent to the push for becomes the only effective way of tougher sanctions, the carrot-and-stick tackling this problem? If so, then policy may fail to achieve the desired perhaps it is wise to consider what goals, unless it is greatly enhanced. choices are available, including While it may still be premature to talk military intervention. about a schism within the Western alliance on this issue, the prospects for Is there an effective military option to a compact transatlantic front able to solve this crisis? In discussing the apply and sustain heightened pressure possibility and prospects of any on Iran may be dim. military action against Iran’s nuclear programme, a variety of points seem Equally problematic will be any efforts to be unanimously agreed upon by to reach a unified political or economic both diplomats and defence analysts. sanctions regime against Tehran by its regional neighbours. While the Options members of the Gulf Cooperation There is no doubt whatsoever that the Council (GCC) may be extremely Iranian nuclear programme constitutes apprehensive of Iran’s nuclear a dilemma of major proportions both ambitions, they also feel deeply to countries in the Middle East and to reluctant to be seen as openly the international community as a antagonistic to Tehran. The same whole. would probably apply to other pro- Western governments in the region Regardless of the specific details of such as Egypt and Turkey. this programme and its multi-faceted potential intentions and objectives, the The timing of the Iranian efforts and of simple fact is no one can be absolutely any measure aimed at countering certain of the ultimate goals that them is also proving to be particularly Tehran is trying to achieve through its significant. With the United States in nuclear ambitions. One thing is the midst of a Presidential election certain, and that is, as put by the campaign, and with the present Bush Iranian President himself, Iran is administration nearing the end of its determined to acquire ‘a nuclear term, it becomes evidently difficult to posture’. predict US policy beyond January 2009. While this might not necessarily mean a traditional path to develop or even If these problematic features surround explode a bomb, as done by countries any possibility of viable international such as and , Tehran’s

6 objectives could be perfectly satisfied deal with it are manifold. They can be with a rather more ambiguous status summarised as follows: whereby uncertainty about its nuclear potential becomes the key word. This There is very little certainty surrounding view has been repeatedly articulated the exact number of Iranian nuclear by Iranian official and semi-official facilities, the precise nature of activities literature referring to the idea of a going on in those facilities, their location ‘bomb in the basement’ preferred by and actual functions and objectives. Israel and to a lesser extent South Africa under its former apartheid While it is commonly accepted that regime. there are no fewer than twenty major nuclear sites spread practically all over As such, Iran might believe that it can the country, it remains quite possible quite plausibly follow a path of and even probable that there are as nuclear development shrouded in many ‘shadow’ facilities whose enough secrecy to render all possible functions are to duplicate the activities verification efforts by the international of the publicy known plants. community of its true intentions and/or capabilities essentially The ‘known’ Iranian facilities engaged redundant, if not outright useless. in nuclear efforts at the moment Thus, through that approach Tehran include: would not even need to publicly announce that it had reached • Anarak weapons-grade uranium or • Arak (an important heavy in its enrichment activities and it water 40MW reactor with certainly would not require to test a another smaller facility thought ‘device’ as a way to prove its nuclear- to be capable of producing up military capability. All it needs to do, to 9kg of weapons grade and perhaps that it precisely what is plutonium per year according intended by the whole current process, to Western Intelligence sources is to keep everyone else guessing. -- enough to produce one bomb) • Ardakan Can the region and the world tolerate, • Bonab accommodate and ultimately accept • Bushehr (a major site which such a scenario? And if that is the case, includes two reactors and is what could be the consequences scheduled to be completed with politically, militarily and strategically? Russian help by the end of 2008) If not, what options are available to • Chalus pre-empt Iran’s quest for its long • Darkhovin sought ‘nuclear posture’? • Isfahan (various facilities mostly engaged in research and The problems facing any accurate uranium conversion) assessment of the present situation • Karaj and the various options required to • Lashkar Abad

7 • Lavizan (military installation An invasion is regarded out of the under Ministry of Defence question for numerous reasons, above control, referred to as The all the formidable challenge of Physics Research Centre) performing and maintaining such a • Natanz (another important site task. Iran is a huge county with an with several facilities under area of more than 1.6 million square both military and civilian kilometres and a population close to control engaged in uranium 70 million people. Iran’s regular armed conversion) forces (including the regular units of • Parchin (military installation the IRCG) are estimated at some under Ministry of Defence 500,000 in total. These would be control specialising in high augmented by no fewer than two explosive research) million ‘volunteers’ (Baseej) and local • Saghand militia members (Kommittas). • Tehran (various sites in and around the city mainly engaged in research and development) • Yazd

The list of confirmed and suspected locations above illustrates the formidable obstacles faced by the international community in its efforts to verify in any credible way what is happening in Iran’s programme at any particular time. Picture 5: a Revolutionary Guards’ Poster

The IAEA has publicly criticised Iran Iran’s military capabilities have grown for denying it access to several of the exponentially over the last few years. above mentioned sites, particularly Tehran has acquired advanced combat those under military control. And the aircraft such as the MiG-29 multi-role agency also made it clear that fighter, MiG-31 long range interceptor, documentation related to activities in Sukhoi Su-27 air superiority fighter those sites has not been made available and the Sukhoi Su-24 long-range to its inspectors. It also constitutes an tactical and maritime strike bomber. It operational nightmare for intelligence has also developed new types of air gatherers, not to mention military defence systems, including the long planners if or when the need might range SA-5 Gammon (S-200) and the arise to resort to the ‘military option’. SA-10 (S-300) and the multi-layered Pantsir S-1 SAM systems.6 No military option effectively or hypothetically being discussed, at present Tehran was also particularly keen to or in the foreseeable future, would include obtain a ‘blue-water’ capability for its a physical invasion of Iran as such. naval forces with particular emphasis on controlling and blocking - if need be - the vital maritime routes in the

8 Persian Gulf. This included the eventually turn a successful initial acquisition of, amongst others, Russian conquest into an ongoing quagmire. (kilo-class) submarines, missile-armed Fast Patrol Boats’s and long-range There is very little doubt that an surface launched and air launched Iranian scenario would be far more anti-ship missiles from China. difficult and costly than the Iraqi one. With the US Armed Forces currently Even if - in terms of conventional stretched to their near limits as a result warfare - those armed forces are still of their engagement in both Iraq and not a match to a modern Afghanistan (and the same applying to technologically-advanced war- varying degrees to the British forces machine such as the US Army or other and other European armies), the Western armies, they would resources crucially required for any nevertheless constitute a huge invasion in Iran are simply not challenge if they were to be deployed available and probably will not be any and operated by Tehran in a Low- time soon. Intensity Warfare campaign against a potential occupation force by foreign The Military Scenario powers, rendering the whole exercise An outright land invasion of Iranian essentially unviable. territory can then be ruled out. Assuming a failure of ongoing political and economic Even if the military odds were more punitive measures to yield a change of favourable, an invasion would almost behaviour on the part of Iran’s regime, the certainly require an amount of only plausible military option available to operational, human and equipment destroy or at least severely downgrade resources which are simply not Iran’s nuclear programme is a surgical available at the moment. For a strike aimed at vital Iranian installations successful land invasion of a country both directly and indirectly related to it. the size of Iran, historical experience indicates that no fewer than half a There is a general consensus that such million troops would be required, with a military option is both available and the corresponding complement of possible. Military analysts agree that armour, artillery and other support in the face of a concerted operation equipment. This has been proven time involving air force, naval and missile and time again in major confrontations assets, coupled with the probable since the 2nd World War with deployment of teams of Special Forces ‘Operation Desert Storm’ in Iraq capable of operating on search and during 1990-91 being a prime example. destroy missions for short periods deep inside Iranian territory, Tehran More than 500,000 Coalition troops might have very limited capabilities of were deployed at the time in what was engaging or countering such an not even a full scale invasion. The operation effectively. example of ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ in 2003 remains to this day a case However, what constitutes a ‘surgical’ study of how the lack of adequate military strike remains itself open to resources on the ground would debate. It is unclear for military planners and analysts alike whether

9 such an attack can be defined as a SAM systems which would pose a single overwhelming operation using threat to any attacking force. the maximum level of firepower quantitatively and qualitatively, and whether such an operation on its own would be capable of achieving its objectives.

If the answer to the above were negative, then another possible scenario would emerge, still within the domain of air operations, but no longer restricted to one strike. This would require a strategic offensive campaign, which could take days, Picture 6: The Russian-made Pantsir S-1 SAM system perhaps even weeks, aimed at destroying Iranian targets which are These assets cannot be regarded, deemed of relevance to the objective of however, as a fully integrated halting Tehran’s nuclear activities. A defensive shield capable enough to strategic offensive air campaign would obstruct or prevent a concerted effort be reminiscent of the one to which Iraq from taking place. As such it would be was subjected during the opening safe to assume that an attacking force stages of ‘Operation Desert Storm’, comprising modern strike aircraft, when some 1,500 Coalition combat strategic bombers and stand-off long and support aircraft were engaged in a range cruise missiles, both air sustained series of air attacks against launched and sea launched, would Iraqi targets over a period of several almost certainly be able to reach and weeks in preparation for the land destroy its designated targets inside invasion that led eventually to the Iran. liberation of Kuwait.

If the United States, with or without its The Iranian Air Force and the air Western allies, were to attack, it would elements of the ICRG have been almost certainly resort to using a rebuilt and modernised considerably combination of all the above since the end of the Iran-Iraq war. mentioned assets including land-based Iran’s estimated order of battle F-15 E Strike Eagles, carrier-borne F-18 currently comprises around 500 E Super Hornets, B-2 Spirit Stealth combat aircraft, half of which are bombers and other land-based long- considered of high quality. These range strategic bombers such as the B- include such recent Russian-made 1 Lancer and the B-52 Stratofortress. aircraft as the MiG-29, as well as some This attacking force would also be of the remaining US-made F-14 augmented and defended by multi- Tomcat fighters supplied under the role and air superiority fighters such Shah. Iranian air defences have equally as the F-15 Eagle, F-16 Falcon and even been updated with Russian-made the new F-22 Raptor Stealth fighter.

10 related targets per se, a more elaborate offensive would hypothetically extend to include the following: targets of general military significance, such as air bases, air defence sites, naval bases, military production facilities, troop concentrations, military command and control centres, intelligence headquarters etc.

Picture 7: The B-52 Stratofortress Rather than being merely aimed at While the numbers required to launch halting Iran’s nuclear plans, this an attack of this magnitude remain would be directed at paralysing its debatable, it would be likely that the armed forces and preventing any figures involved would reach several meaningful conventional retaliation by hundred aircraft. Undoubtedly, the US Tehran. would also deploy large numbers of long-range air-launched and sea- launched (both ship and submarine) cruise missiles such as the Tomahawk with ranges up to 2,500 kilometres. Also of note would be the almost certain use of various air-launched special munitions such as the JDAM and similar weapons designed specifically for precision-guided deep penetration attacks against fortified targets.

With these assets, the US and its allies Picture 8: The strategically located Bandar could inflict serious damage on the Abbas Port is a likely target in a broader known targets related to Iran’s nuclear campaign aimed at neutralising Iran’s programme. They could also inflict military capabilities and minimising Iran’s serious and perhaps debilitating retaliatory actions. damage on other Iranian vital installations. A particular emphasis in this scenario would naturally be placed on Depending on the exact objectives of attacking the assets of the IRCG. Over any military operation, the list of the years, Tehran heavily invested in potential targets would extend from re-organising and re-equipping as well those immediately and directly related as training and expanding the regular to the nuclear programme, such as units of the IRCG. Sustained efforts those listed above, to a much wider were made to improve the battlefield range of centres and institutions. coordination and operational While a ‘limited’ strike would be integration of these units, and between expected to concentrate on nuclear- the IRCG and the regular armed forces, characterised also by the

11 formation of several ‘Special exclusively focused on its nuclear Operations’ (S-Ops) units dedicated to facilities. This eventuality would commando, sabotage and behind- certainly change the ‘rules of enemy-lines operations. In case of an engagement’ and turn the offensive attack, the elite units including Al into an all-out conflict directed at Quds Corps, ballistic missile destabilising and ultimately unseating launchers, anti-ship and coastal missile the regime founded by the Islamic launchers, air elements and naval Revolution in 1979. Consequently, bases used to launch its notorious fleet such a broadened objective would of speed boats armed with anti-ship have profound political and strategic weapons, would be targeted. The latter implications both within and beyond fleet is reportedly composed of several Iran’s borders with no guaranteed hundred vessels ranging from rubber outcome. dinghies carrying squads of suicide commandos and armed with portable How could an attack be done? rocket launchers to fully fledged FPBs (Fast Patrol Boats) armed with long- On a numerical level, the US can range anti-ship SSMs. theoretically deploy up to 1700-1800 combat and support aircraft on An even wider ranging campaign missions ranging from air superiority, would include targets of economic and escort, area and point air defence, political significance, such as strategic and tactical strikes, deep industrial complexes, energy penetration interdiction, air defence generating facilities, oil refineries, sea suppression to close air support. ports and airports, communication Moreover, it is widely believed that networks and transport installations. the US Air Force and the US Navy Obviously this would be aimed at would almost certainly be capable of inflicting as much economic damage eliminating any viable threat posed by on Iran’s infrastructure as possible and the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force paralysing its economic output, hence (IRIAF), the air elements of the IRCG creating a general sense of anarchy and the Iranian Navy within hours. It which the regime might find difficulty is also believed that American C4-I to contain and control. (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence), as well If the campaign were to include as AEW (Air-Borne Early Warning), ‘regime change’ as one of its objectives ECM/ECCM (Electronic Counter/ then its targets would include the Counter-Counter Measures), Aerial institutions of the regime itself. This Refuelling and other forms of Force- would entail attacking central and Multiplication assets would be able to provisional governmental offices, support the main combat elements and leadership headquarters, achieve total air supremacy over administrative networks and official Iranian airspace and the surrounding media outlets. Of course, if the US and areas within a very short time. its allies chose to incorporate these targets into their strategy, a military If other Western allies decide to take strike against Iran would no longer be part in the operation, those coalition

12 assets could be increased by some 10- mistakes still occur, particularly when 15% and would also provide targets under attack happen to be considerable political and logistical mixed with civilian populations and backing. infrastructures, and when many of them are intended for dual purpose in One thing would remain profoundly the first place. Collateral damage in problematic, however. this case has always been and will always be inevitable, generating While there is no disputing the fact potentially unacceptable political that such an air campaign would have ramifications. a devastating impact on Iran and its nuclear programme as well as its How accurately can Iran’s likely responses political and military command and be anticipated and effectively contained? control structures and capabilities, there remains no guarantee that it It is generally agreed that while Iran would be totally successful. On the might not be able to confront an attack other hand, an expansion of targets with overwhelming superior forces beyond nuclear installations could against it conventionally, it would prevent some, but not all, of the worst almost certainly resort from the outset fallout expected from an attack. to ‘unconventional’ methods in responding to what it would naturally This poses the question of whether the consider as an aggression. outcome of such an attack must be by definition a ‘total success’, or whether How severe will the political fallout be? it would suffice to achieve any degree of ‘partial success’. The pitfalls here Ideally any military strike would are numerous: hypothetically include the US and at least some West European allies such How would anyone be absolutely certain as Great Britain and France. This that the known targets attacked are the would add valuable assets to the only targets that Iran depends on in its Allied air effort and would nuclear endeavours? demonstrate wider political support. However, the converse is also true: If the other unknown shadow targets Absent of minimal international remain intact, what impact if any participation would have severe would such an attack have in political repercussions, beside which obstructing or stopping the Iranian the 2003 crisis over the Iraq war would nuclear programme in the long run? pale by comparison.

How ‘surgical’ can such an attack actually What if Israel does it alone? be, not-withstanding all the latest advances in precision guidance and pin An added complication, of course, is point accuracy? the ‘Israeli Dimension’. Iran’s President, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad It has become commonly accepted that has repeatedly called for the Jewish even in the most careful planning and State to be ‘wiped off the map’. And intelligence-gathering operations

13 regardless of whether such reiterations are made purely for propaganda purposes as some would claim, or whether they constitute an integral part of Iran’s foreign policy, it would be impossible to ignore the potential threat that Israel would feel if or when Tehran acquires nuclear weapons. This situation adds another source of Picture 9: An Israeli Phantom 2000 Kurnas strategic tension and poses the inevitable question: could Israel ever But the operational challenges are not tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran as a insignificant. Firstly, Israel’s distance threat, and if the world does not act and lack of geographic contiguity with would it then feel obliged to act on its Iran requires Israel to fly over a own? number of regional players, complicating the mission at the The absence of other participants and political and operational level. the possible non-US involvement as a Secondly, distance requires additional result of a potential change of policy in resources for refuelling purposes – Washington leaves the prospect of something which would stretch ‘Israel going it alone’. Here the Israel’s capabilities to the limits. necessary question becomes whether Thirdly, an Israeli attack would the Israelis are indeed capable of such necessarily be much more limited in a task on their own. While scope and may aspire only to hypothetically this might be the case, downgrade Iran’s nuclear programme, operationally speaking it would be an while leaving its military might – and extremely difficult and complicated consequently its ability to retaliate – operation even for the Israeli Air practically intact. Force. The regional fallout of a solitary Israeli If Israel were to launch an attack action would resemble the one against Iran on its own, its reported expected from a US-led strike – only military assets would include up to more amplified. Politically, one can 300 high quality combat aircraft, expect little difference, because in including F-15 E Strike Eagles, F-16 terms of public and government Falcons and F-16 I Super Falcons as perception in the region, Israel and the well as Phantom-2000 Kurnas Air- US are so closely associated as to make Superiority and Strike aircraft. They few people doubt that an Israeli attack, would also be supported by a large even if launched alone, would enjoy network of Force Multipliers including US support. Furthermore, the Electronic Warfare and Aerial geographical challenges of such a Refuelling tankers. mission would make it unlikely that Israel would attack without some degree of advance warning to and coordination with the US.

14 The Fall-Out that Iran currently has around Perhaps the main downside of any 100 of these missiles in stock. military option against Iran lies in the • The Shehab 4, currently being eventual outcome which may result developed and supposed to be a from such a development, not on the copy of the North Korean No battlefield or even within Iranian Dong-1, with a range of 2,500 territory, but on a broader regional km and a warhead of 1,000 kg. and strategic level. Some estimates but the number of missiles produces of this type The first and perhaps spontaneous at 30-40, with production Iranian reaction to any attack on its continuing. territory would be expected to rely on • The Shehab 5, a missile with a retaliation through its arsenal of reported range of 5,000 km ballistic missiles. which Iranian sources claim is being developed as a space There are various estimates of Iran’s delivery vehicle for Iran’s capabilities in this domain. The most planned satellite launch within reliable information available indicates the next 2-3 years, but with that Tehran currently possesses more obvious military applications as than 1,000 surface-to-surface ballistic an IRBM. missiles with ranges between 300 and 2,500 kilometres. Other Iranian missiles believed to be operational include the X-55 long- They include: range (2,500 km) cruise missiles, 12 of which were reportedly obtained by • The Shehab 1, believed to be a Tehran from Ukraine after the locally produced copy of the downfall of the Soviet Union. Also, Soviet-era SCUD-B missile with Iranian sources speak of the Fajr-3 a range of 300km. Some sources missile with a range of 2,500 km. This indicate that the Iranians with was reportedly tested by the Iranians a North Korean help have few years ago, but it is not entirely managed to increase this range clear whether it is a new type or just to 500km with a 500kg another name for one of the already warhead. existing Shehab missile family. • The Shehab 2, believed to be a locally produced copy of the There is very little doubt among North Korean developed officiasl and analysts alike that if Iran SCUD-C with a reported range were to be attacked its first priority of 1,000 km and a warhead of would be to retaliate by launching its 750kg. missiles against a network of what • The Shehab 3, locally produced Tehran perceives as ‘legitimate’ targets with North Korean help and in the region. These would evidently Chinese technology with a include Israel as well as US and other reported range of 1,500 km and allied bases in the Middle East and the a 750kg warhead. It is believed neighbouring Gulf States.

15 If Iran where to resort to non- multinational corporations and conventional means to respond to an commercial aircraft activities. attack on its nuclear facilities and other targets, it would have multiple 3. Tehran is expected to retaliate options. Operations by Iranian forces against a US attack through its and Iranian proxies could reach across allies and proxies in Iraq, where the whole Gulf area, as well as to other Iranian influence has become a parts of the Middle East. Indeed such prominent factor amongst Iraq’s operations might cover the whole Shiite community. This would world and take the form of terrorist obviously mean additional activities against US, Israeli and other burdens for US forces in Iraq, Western interests both military and and further complicate efforts non-military. Possible scenarios could to stabilise the country. include the following: 4. Iran could choose to unleash its 1. Attempts by Iranian forces to pro-Iranian Hezbollah (Party of interrupt or even cut off oil God) militia in Lebanon. Tehran supplies in the vital maritime has gained considerable routes in the Gulf and the Strait influence in Lebanon in recent of Hormuz, using dispersed, years, mainly through the highly mobile and lightly political and military presence equipped elements of the IRCG, of Hezbollah, and its strategic in suicide attacks against alliance with neighbouring shipping activities in that Syria. Hezbollah is now region. That was a tactic which considered the major military proved reasonably efficient and power in Lebanon and its cost effective for Iran during the armed element is regarded as Iran-Iraq war. Tehran could an operational extension of the well resort again to using it in IRCG, enjoying common the face of overwhelming odds training, equipment, which it would face in a direct operational doctrine and naval confrontation. strategic objectives. The leadership of Hezbollah itself 2. Suicide and other forms of takes pride in describing the attack against US and Western party as a ‘regional player and targets in the neighbouring Gulf inseparable part of Iranian States, aimed at spreading a strategy in the area’. It would general sense of instability and be inconceivable, therefore, for crisis in the whole region. Hezbollah to remain inactive in Again such tactics might not be a situation in which Iran is confined to direct military subjected to an attack by the US targets but could include other or any of its allies. The expected symbols of Western presence course of action for the such as embassies, educational organization would most likely facilities, banks and other take the form of an attack commercial institutions, against Israel in order to

16 reignite their conflict – in a scepticism, and for some to consider much more vehement and that option an exercise in futility. In widespread fashion and light of the anticipated range of without ruling out the reponses and their consequences, possibility of direct Syrian military planners would endeavour to involvement. mitigate at least some of the worst expected effects of an attack. 5. Tehran could also embark on, or at least encourage and Regardless, some argue that whatever sponsor, acts of violence by the political, economic or military cost various terrorist organisations of such an option, it would still be less and cells directed against dire than the consequences of Iran targets in many parts of the acquiring a nuclear posture, let alone world. While such acts might be deliver a . This view predominantly aimed against has been repeatedly advocated by US and Israeli targets, terrorist Senator John McCain, the presumptive attacks might also target other Republican nominee for the US cities and nations, particularly Presidency. And more recently it had those supporting any attack on been articulated by his Democratic Iran, hence creating a general rival, Senator Barack Obama, who has feeling of insecurity on a global pledged to prevent Tehran from level. obtaining nuclear weapons, whatever the cost. 6. The uncertainties and instability triggered by an attack on Iran Is it at all possible for the region and and Iran’s retaliatory actions the world to envisage the emergence would no doubt have economic of a nuclear-armed Iran? And will it be repercussions both regionally an acceptable option to tolerate such and worldwide. Some analysts an eventuality? Perhaps the most go so far as to describe such an pressing question of all is how a impact as potentially nuclear Iran would change and affect catastrophic, particularly if it the strategic correlation of power were to a have a long-term regionally and globally. effect oil supplies from the Gulf. They believe that it would lead Tehran’s nuclear shadow to further steep increases in oil Iran’s objectives have become quite prices which are already at clear and it would be no exaggeration record levels, pushing the to say that, first and foremost, they are world into a deeper economic focused on establishing its position as crisis. a major regional superpower with the ability to project, defend and The Price of Non-Action consolidate its influence and strategic Needless to say the grim fallout would interest throughout the area. In order be sufficient for many to view any to achieve that paramount objective, military option against Iran and its Iran recognises the need to reinforce nuclear programme with deep its military and strategic position with

17 a credible deterrence capability which neighbours. It might even be argued would pre-empt, in Tehran’s view, any that Tehran would actually envisage aggression against it, or any attempt to such a development as a guarantee of destabilise the regime, as well as any impunity against any threats – military threat to its vital interests in the Gulf or otherwise - in the future. or in the Middle East as a whole. In a highly volatile and inherently It is obvious that Iran’s nuclear unstable region like the Middle East programme constitutes only one major and its immediate surroundings, such element in Tehran’s quest to achieve a situation can only lead to further these goals. There are also other instability. It will also enhance the elements which might not have feeling that trying to avoid a enjoyed the same amount of attention confrontation at a particular stage of a but are nevertheless still vital in that crisis only serves to pave the way for a equation. further and far worse conflict at a later date. Tehran already possesses a considerable arsenal of chemical and Iranian influence in the Gulf and the biological munitions and has been wider Middle East would be enhanced engaged for many years in developing to unprecedented levels. Tehran and deploying a credible offensive already enjoys a strategic alliance with capability based on ballistic missiles Syria. It also sponsors local groups which are destined to reach ranges of with significant political and military up to 5,000 km in the next few years. If assets in countries stretching from Iraq current assessments of this to Lebanon and the Palestinian programme prove accurate, this would Territories as well as several of the coincide with a similar dateline for neighbouring Gulf States. Iran’s success in acquiring a weapons- grade nuclear capability.

Such a combination would undoubtedly give Iran the credible nuclear deterrence that it seeks, regardless of whether Tehran declares such a capability or not. Needless to say, this would be a fundamental turning point in the strategic map of the Middle East, and would have Picture 10: Iran’s President, Mahmoud crucial ramifications for the world as a Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah whole.

Iranian authorities do not hide the Iran would have achieved parity with importance they attach to these groups all its regional present or potential and their potential impact on their foes, and consequently enjoy respective societies. This applies to unprecedented leverage in its organisations such as Hezbollah in relationship with its immediate Lebanon, the Palestinian Hamas

18 movement, a large section of the Shiite immediately following the death of the community in Iraq and significant Prophet Mohammad in the 7th century. Shiite constituencies in both Kuwait However, they are now taking a far and Bahrain and the eastern parts of more political and socio-economic Saudi Arabia. If Tehran could be dimension than simply matters expected to use its influence with these relating to faith. The Islamic Republic groups as part of its retaliation against presents itself as the ‘guardian’ of the a military attack, it is equally plausible Shi’a and a representative of its that such influence would be interests – similar in many ways to correspondingly enhanced by Iran’s what Saudi Arabia regards itself as newly acquired nuclear posture. vis-à-vis the Sunni world. The potential for conflict between these For some in the Gulf and the Middle two countries along sectarian lines can East, the prospect of a nuclear Iran only increase, particularly if Iran would lead to ‘unthinkable’ succeeds in establishing itself as a consequences. While such sentiments regional super-power extending Shi’ite are usually kept private, they are influence in the neighbourhood. widely shared in the region, not only in official government circles, but also The destabilising effects of Iran’s amongst the general public. In what influence and power projection was later retracted as a ‘slip of the capabilities in the region cannot be tongue’, King Abdullah II of Jordan overestimated when it comes to the warned in 2004 of ‘a Shi’ite Crescent’7 Arab-Israeli conflict. Hezbollah in extending from Iran on the Persian Lebanon has recently been granted Gulf to the Mediterranean shores of veto power over Government Syria and Lebanon and its decisions after a long stalemate which consequences on the situation in the had previously prevented the election Middle East. With sectarian tensions of a new President. The May 2008 growing, fears that a nuclear Iran ‘Doha Agreement’ managed to resolve could escalate the Shi’a-Sunni divide that crisis, bringing about the election run deep among regional rulers and of former Army Commander, Gen the public alike. Michel Suleiman, as President.

Iran’s ascendency indeed coincides However, this came at the price of with rising tensions in the Muslim Hezbollah and its allies becoming the world amongst Shi’ites and Sunnis. single most influential force in the Although these tensions were country. Hezbollah’s influence is not exacerbated by the conflict in Iraq in merely political. It also constitutes the the wake of the downfall of the regime most powerful military force in of Saddam Hussein, they are not Lebanon – even more so than the confined to the Arab world. Similar army. Thanks to direct Iranian and conflicts are currently simmering in Syrian support, Hezbollah’s leadership Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh is able to boast an arsenal comprising and even predominantly-Muslim areas more than 20,000 rockets and missiles in Africa. These rivalries have always which it describes as ‘a strategic been endemic to Islam since the days deterrent’ against Israel. For its part,

19 Israel considers Hezbollah’s military militia, the Mehdi Army. While wing as in fact a direct extension of the relations between these groups regular units of the IRCG. If these oscillate periodically between relative assumptions are correct, it would cooperation and outright mean that Iran has managed for the confrontation, it would be quite first time in the history of the conflict feasible for Tehran through its to become a direct player in the Arab- financial support and political Israeli arena with forces actually influence to control their future deployed along the Israeli border and behaviour. This would ultimately in their vicinity. And with its growing affect the policies and attitude of any links to Hamas and other Palestinian future Iraqi Government, particularly movements, Tehran will not be coy in view of the fact that any such about actively playing such a role. Government is expected to be Shi’ite dominated. Iran no doubt aspires to Indeed, its officials habitually declare consolidate its position as a major the ‘liberation of Jerusalem’ as a power-broker in post-Saddam Iraq. Its central priority for Iran’s policies. nuclear ambitions can only serve to Although this ideological commitment facilitate that objective. does not necessarily reflect an actual obligation by the Islamic Republic to A nuclear Iran is also poised to engage in an active pursuit of Israel’s become a major arbiter of energy destruction, it remains nevertheless a prices. Iran is currently the fourth powerful tool which Tehran can largest producer of oil in the world always resort to whenever it deems it and it holds the second largest known in its interest. And with the hard line reserves of natural gas. Despite elements within the regime led by predictions that Iranian oil reserves President Ahmedinejad repeating may be dwindling and might not last those sentiments, a nuclear Iran would for more than 50 years (in fact, an undoubtedly add to Tehran’s leverage argument used by Tehran to justify its on the conflict and its future nuclear programme), there would still developments – to the extent that, be still ample scope for Iran to play a under a nuclear umbrella, one cannot central role in influencing oil politics rule out the possibility of Iran claiming on a global scale for at least several a veto power on any possible peaceful more decades. With an enhanced settlement which it might deem political and strategic posture, a detrimental to its interests. nuclear Iran would be able to affect energy policies in the neighbouring Another source of potential Gulf States and the Caspian basin, in destabilisation would be the addition to asserting its control of the detrimental effect of a nuclear Iran on adjacent maritime routes vital to oil the situation in post-war Iraq. Tehran supplies worldwide. A confrontation already enjoys close ties with several which would be avoided over Iran’s Shi’ite Iraqi factions including SCIRI nuclear programme now might and its armed wing, the Brigades, become inevitable if or when oil and the opposition led by cleric supplies became subject to a dispute Moqtada al-Sadr and its affiliated

20 between the international community However, a nuclear Iran poses a and a nuclear Iran at a later date. completely different challenge to Arab powers – not to mention Israel, whose Over and above these considerations is policy of nuclear ambiguity might be the fact that a nuclear Iran will trigger forced to change to respond to Iranian a renewed and, probably far more advances. dangerous, arms race in the Middle East, this time centred on acquiring The threat of a nuclear Iran is of a nuclear capabilities, by other states in different magnitude because, unlike the region. Such a race, if nothing else, Israel, whose nuclear arsenal is widely would put the final nail in the coffin of perceived to be geared to exclusively the NPT regime. deterrent and defensive purposes, Iran is a revolutionary power and its It is no longer a secret that already the aspirations by definition are to change ongoing crisis has rejuvenated the the status quo in the region and shape long-dormant nuclear ambition of the area in its own image and several neighbouring countries. As a according to its revolutionary recent study by the International worldview. In light of its Institute for Strategic Studies indicates, revolutionary fervour, a nuclear status 13 regional powers are seeking nuclear may become an extraordinary tool to status as well – and Iran looms large in promote its revolutionary ambitions their calculus. Egypt is a prime across and beyond the region. example, with the regime expressing renewed interest in developing That Iran may use its nuclear status nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, only indirectly in order to project after it forfeited such plans for several power in the region does not rule out decades. Egypt may feel robbed of the possibility that it might choose to regional power status by Iran – and it lend nuclear weapons to its terrorist may not be the only one. Another case proxies or to proliferate nuclear in point is Saudi Arabia, which enjoys technology by helping allies in the a long-standing relationship with region and across the world to either nuclear Pakistan, and whose regional build their own indigenous status would be seriously challenged programmes or become equipped with by the rise of a nuclear Iran. A third Iranian supplied nuclear weapons. candidate is Turkey – a NATO Given Iran’s aspirations to supplant member whose decision to balance the now-defunct Soviet Union as the Iran’s nuclear status with its own beacon of anti-Western movements nuclear programme could have across the globe, a repetition of the negative repercussions for the future Cuban missile crisis – this time of the transatlantic alliance. involving countries such as Venezuela – is not inconceivable. An argument sometimes expressed in favour of allowing Tehran to pursue The time frame for such efforts is not its nuclear ambitions has made the long; though intelligence assessments point that Israel is already widely vary on the timeline of Iran’s nuclear believed to possess such weapons. progress, past experience suggests that

21 nasty surprises are in order. This concentrate on alternatives to prevent requires accelerating any non-military both. effort designed to delay Iranian progress, deny Iranian access to the Whether Iran can be persuaded to halt required technology, and increase the its enrichment activities, fully disclose sense of vulnerability and insecurity of its nuclear facilities to IAEA the Iranian regime vis-à-vis the inspections, abide by its NPT international community. commitments and assuage international concerns about its Conclusion nuclear activities is yet to be seen. There is no perfect solution to the nuclear standoff with Iran. The two The international community should scenarios hitherto described – not relent in its efforts to induce a bombing Iran or living with Iran’s change in calculus in Tehran. The hour bomb – are equally frightening and of a choice between two equally therefore require policymakers to frightening scenarios is fast approaching.

1 Financial Times. West May Bring Forward Date of Possible Iran N-Bomb, 19 May, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/12654090-e690-11da- a36e-0000779e2340.html

2 National Intelligence Estimate, Iran: Nuclear Capabilities and Intentions, November 2007

3 Iran to be Offered New Incentives, 2 May 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7380 804.stm

4 BBC News. Iran Withholds Nuclear Details, 26 May 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7420 737.stm

5 IAEA Report, 26 May 2008, http://www.isis- online.org/publications/iran/IAEA_Iran_Report_26 May2008.pdf

6 Military data in this report have been compiled from a variety of published sources including The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance and Jane’s Defence

7 Washington Post, Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election from Iran, 8 December 2004.

22 About the Author

Kassem Ja’afar currently works as a diplomatic consultant in Qatar. During the early 80’s he co-edited Strategic Review, a specialized newsletter on defense issues. He spent more than 10 years as a Middle East correspondent for the BBC. He also worked as Defense and Diplomatic Editor at Al-Hayat and Al-Wasat. He has authored and co-authored several books and articles on Middle Eastern and defense related affairs. He served for two years as a member for the Board of Governors of Al-Jazeera. He holds a BA from the American University of Beirut in Middle Eastern History and an MA and MPhil in War Studies from Kings College in London.