IRAN’S SPACE PROGRAM: THE NEXT GENIE IN A BOTTLE? Lee Kass*

External support continues to help advance Iran’s space effort. Tehran is advancing its space program to satisfy numerous civil and military objectives, including manufacturing satellites to accurately guide its Shahab ballistic missiles. The United States and Israel remain gravely concerned of Iranian efforts to gain more military power. The Iranian space endeavor mimics a disturbing pattern other countries use clandestinely to advance their long-range missile programs. Iran might reengineer the Shahab to carry future satellites and try to obtain significant political rewards from future satellite launches. Exploiting this event would unite Iran politically, complicating Washington’s regional objective, and further destabilizing the region.

Iranian efforts to advance its space program throughout the region precisely. Statements follow an unsettling pattern seen elsewhere. from Iran’s president, Mahmoud In slightly different ways and to varying Ahmadinejad, who declared his intention to degrees of success, China, North Korea, and “wipe Israel off the map” and dismissed the Pakistan use a civil space pr ogram United States as a “hollow superpower,” clandestinely to manufacture longer -range heighten the level of tension. missiles to further safeguard national Iran might seek to develop a space security. Iran seeks to become a space program to improve national pride. power for similar reasons. This is a concern Successfully testing a launch vehicle would to the United States and its allies. Unlike allow Iran to boast that it is a space power. other Islamic countries with satellites, the The propaganda Tehran espouses following Iranian defense ministry plays a prominent this event might unite the country. This role in shaping the space effort with would further legitimize Ahmadinejad’s possible contributions from the Islamic policies and rhetoric, and generate greater Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC). This regional and international fear regarding the military component manages the Shahab regime’s intentions. ballistic missile program, which Iran might modify into a space launch vehicle (SLV) EFFORTS TO DEVELOP SPACE with foreign support. TECHNOLOGIES The United States and its allies find the Iranian space endeavor threatening. Tehran Iranian efforts to exploit space began seeks to build satellites to improve the under the Shah who tried to improve his military’s ability to target potential enemies country’s scientific standing. In 1959, and to closely monitor the region. Tehran became a founding member of the Enhancing the Shahab to become satellite- United Nations’ Committee on the Peaceful guided would allow Iran to strike Israel and Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). The United States military forces stationed United Nations ’ General Assembly

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2006) 15 Lee Kass requested that UNCOPUOS review 1. Commercializing space programs international collaborative programs to for Earth observation, and exploit space for civil purposes, serve as a predicting environmental changes; forum for information exchanges, and encourage the development and facilitate 2. Promoting international cooperation the advancement of national programs to based on concepts of joint benefits; study outer space.(1) Iranian efforts to exploit space started 3. Encouraging space efforts in the over thirty years ago, which demonstrates private sector to increase awareness that the country put a premium on further within the public of space and understanding this arena. Iran built a facility incorporate related initiatives into to obtain photographs soon after the United daily lives ; States launched the first system designed to capture imagery of the Earth. The Iranian 4. Developing a mastery of space Remote Sensing Center (IRSC) is science and technology directed to responsible for gathering, processing, and assist in the development of space distributing relevant material to users programs and commercial projects; throughout the country for re source planning and management. The IRSC helps 5. Increasing interest in space officials determine suitable areas to programs among the youth, who develop, and its personnel maintained will play a notable role in the operations while the country experienced a country’s future. (3) revolution and a devastating conflict with neighboring Iraq. (2) Iran seeks to accomplish the se and other Partly as a response to Iran’s eight-year broad objectives in order to become more war of attrition against Iraq, Iranians technologically advanced. Possessing wanted to improve their political, social, imagery and other types of material from and economic standing. As such, the people space will assist Tehran to identify areas elected the pragmatist Ali Akbar Hashemi suitable for development and those to be Rafsanjani, and later , the reformist avoided because of their susceptibility to Muhammad Khatami as president. These earthquakes and floods. (4) Iran attempted leaders wanted to further modernize the partially to do that by manufacturing country partly with more Western financial satellites. On January 5, 2003, Rear assistance. To encourage greater Western Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the country’s support , both presidents diminished the former defense minister, stated that within fundamentalists’ influence. Khatami issued eighteen months, “Iran will be the first various reforms to modernize the country to Islamic country to penetrate the stratosphere include reinvigorating efforts for the nation with its own satellite and with its own to become more active in space. He helped launch system.” According to Shamkhani, the country to view becoming a space the satellite launch would be in response to power as a vehicle for modernity. Some of American actio ns: “The Persian Gulf was the goals Tehran enumerated at a 2002 once a place from which constant threats UNCOPUOS meeting reinforces this against the Islamic Republic emanated. But perception: now, with the resources that we are gaining, this region cannot be used against us by any

16 Middle East Review of International Affairs , Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2006) Iran’s Space P rogram: T he Next Genie in a Bottle? outside force.” When he made this the defense minister and four “space announcement, Tehran figured it was the experts.”( 9 ) This arrangement raises next target after coalition forces met their national security implications, because one objectives in Iraq. That has yet to occur, but of the unspecified space specialists might Iran still seeks a space capability partly include the IRGC’s commander. Military because of America’s growing regional reforms in 1989 slightly curtailed this presence.(5) Developing these programs in group’s independence from the defense response to the increased United States ministry. While the IRGC retains an presence indicates that Iran feels threatened independent command, it administratively and partly seeks to exploit space to functions within the regular armed forces at safeguard its own national security. the General Staff.(10) The Iranian delegate Iran apparently attempted to meet some neglected to disclose the IRGC or the of the above-noted goals starting in April council’s efforts to safeguard security at the 2003. The legislature approved a bill to 2002 UNCOPUOS meeting, possibly to create the Iranian Space Agency (ISA) to minimize accusations that it wanted to serve as a policy-formulating organization exploit space for military purposes. for space initiatives. T he ISA performs research on technology, remote sensing DEVELOPING BALLISTIC MISSILES projects, develops national space AS SPACE PROGRAMS equipment, and participates in the development of national and international Reorganizing the Iranian aerospace space endeavors. It also coordinates various sector can help the country more effectively space-related activities within the country’s consolidate resources to advance various research institutes, administrative agencies, space efforts, such as launching satellites and universities. These efforts also help the onboard indigenously-developed SLVs. ISA to execute decisions from the Supreme Nasser Maleki, former deputy director of Aerospace Council. (6) the Iranian aerospace organization, Iran’s legislature created this body in acknowledged that the same technology December 2003( 7 ) to approve various used to manufacture missiles could also be space-related programs and to promote used to manufacture SLVs.(11) Building an partnerships among other organizations . (8) SLV based on ballistic missile technology The council functions with input from has distinct advantages: lower cost, less senior government officials. The IS A’s time needed for training, and less likelihood director serves as the council’s secretary, of international scrutiny because the same and the country’s president functions as technology can apply to manufacturing the chairman. Appointment of the president and SLV. These benefits might explain why not the minister of science or another more Iran seeks to deploy its satellites onboard knowledgeable stakeholder might impede indigenously-manufactured SLVs. (12 ) the advancement of current and future space Tehran will likely do that by modifying its projects, because the president has road-mobile, single-stage, liquid propellant numerous other matters to oversee and less Shahab ballistic missile . This and other expertise. Nonetheless, his presence raises liquid propellant systems have many the ISA’s profile. Other members include moving parts, which increase the chances of

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Lee Kass failure and the launch preparation period. In 1991, through the North Korea n delivery of contrast, solid propellant rockets have a Scud-Cs to Iran in exchange for hard shorter launch preparation period, because currency. The United States responded by the fuel is stored in the system prior to imposing sanctions on the participant launch. Iran has systems powered by both entities and opened talks with North Korea types of propellants , which it could use for to limit this country’s nuclear program to different stages of a SLV. ensure it solely served peaceful purposes. On February 7, 1999, Shamkhani, These factors apparently motivated Iran to acknowledged his country’s plans to advance the Shahab endeavor indigenously ; construct an SLV, the Shahab-4, based on No-dong design. (17) indigenously . His statement marked the first Initially, Iran tried to build its newest time an Iranian government official publicly Shahab ballistic missile without North admitted that the country considered Korean support. However, Tehran developing an SLV for civil purposes. (13) experienced difficulties constructing the In September 2000, an Iranian government engine. Iran requested and eventually spokesperson stated that the nation obtained Pyongyang’s help. North Korea n developed a modified missile, the Shahab- willingness to proliferate missile 3D, to launch communication satellites.(14) technology undermine d the government’s The Shahab-3D is a two-stage projectile claim that it stopped participating in the that underwent a flight test in September Iranian missile effort. North Korean support 2000 using a combination of solid and helped Iran manufacture the Shahab-3. This liquid propellants. Three years later, Tehran missile has a range of about 1,300 declared that it ended the Shahab-4 kilometers (810 miles), and its first test program. (15 ) The effort might have flight occurred in July 1998. The IRGC restarted in early 2006. Some Western soon obtained operational control of the intelligence service sources confirmed to a missile, and it continues to manage this prominent German news agency that Iran program. (18) successfully fired the Shahab-4 on January Perhaps the IRGC encouraged senior 17, 2006 to measure different electronic and Iranian government officials to broadcast aerodynamic tests in flight. Major General publicly the ballistic missile launches. Yahya Rahim Safavi, the IRGC Openly showcasing the missiles is a notable commander, informed the public about the development, particularly because Iran did event on Iranian television on January 28, that earlier with different Shahab variants. 2006.(16) Perhaps he did that to remind the On August 11, 2004, Iran tested the world that his country could manufacture Shahab-A. This missile has a range between long-range ballistic missiles. Iran again 1,500 to 1,800 kilometers (approximately flexed its military’s muscles with another 930 to 1,120 miles). On September 17, Shahab-3 test while Israeli Prime Minister 2004, Iran tested a longer-ranged system, Ehud Olmert met with United States the Shahab-B. This event marked the first President George Bush in Washington in time Iranian engineers publicly tested a May 2006. missile with a reported range of between The Shahab system resembles North 2,000 to 2,500 kilometers (about 1,240 to Korea’s liquid propellant No-dong, which 1,550 miles).(19) The 2004 tests were less both countries agreed to develop jointly. of a surprise to Uzi Rubin, the former Their collaborative efforts expanded in founding director of Israel’s Missile

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Defense Organization, than the issuance of ballistic missile efforts undercut Beijing’s photography and video Tehran released claims that it continues to support afterwards. According to Rubin, the event international nonproliferation efforts. was a message of confidence from Tehran The Iranian SLV initiative advance d in the Shahab-3 and a warning: The missile further with North Korean assistance. On is becoming more advanced not only as a August 31, 1998, North Korea attempted to system, but also as a comprehensive launch a satellite by reengineering a weapons package. (20 ) Enhancing this ballistic missile. The Taepo-dong 1 failed to missile into an integrated system indicates place its satellite into orbit due to a that Iran seeks to capitalize on existing mechanical failure. Nonetheless, the event technology to become a greater regional marked an important advancement in North threat. Tehran seeks an SLV based on Korea’s missile program. The country ballistic missiles, a disturbing pattern seen showcased some key requisites for elsewhere to varying degrees of success. developing longer -ranged missiles—multi- China developed SLVs partly based on stage separation, and advanced guidance its ballistic missile inventory. Its first two mechanisms. Moreover, Pyongyang now Long March rockets were derived from owned a multi-stage rocket capable of modified intercontinental ballistic missiles hitting targets much further than its more (ICBMs). Beijing continues primarily to use publicized cousin, the shorter-range and various Long March SLVs to place single -stage No-dong. Iran and Pakistan satellites into orbit. At least two prominent sent delegations to witness the 1998 launch. Chinese aerospace firms played a key role Their presence indicates that both nations in this effort and have a history of could use Taepo-dong 1 technologies for proliferating military-related technologies their indigenous SLV efforts. (23) Perhaps to Iran. In response, the U.S. State this event motivated Iran to conduct the Department sanctioned the China North September 2000 Shahab test using solid and Industries Corporation five times since May liquid stages. (24) 2003 and the China Precision Machinery The level of support between North Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) or Korea and Iran reportedly improved in late its managing group four times since 2005. According to senior U.S. and Asian 1991.(21) More recently, the U.S. Treasury officials, a North Korean freighter delivered Departme nt froze CPMIEC and three other some Soviet-era SS-N-6 submarine- Chinese aerospace corporations’ U.S.-held launched ballistic missiles. Iran could equip assets for providing or trying to proliferate the missile on its three Russian-supplied missile-related material to notable Iranian submarines, or incorporate some of the aerospace corporations. According to the components into an SLV. Proliferating Treasury Department’s statement , the complete systems to Iran represents a Chinese companies tried or succeeded in renewed level of cooperation between both providing support to Iran’s Shahid Henmat rogue states. Moreover, U.S. officials state Industrial Group (SHIG). SHIG manages that the delivery is a technological liquid-fueled ballistic missile efforts , to advancement from earlier transfers, because include the Shahab-III.( 22 ) Attempts by the SS-N-6 has components that can launch Chinese entities to help advance Iranian heavier loads over greater distances.( 25 )

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Obtaining this missile will help advance the In March 1995, Pakistan renewed Iranian missile or space effort and enhance interest in the space program. President North Korea’s ability to proliferate Pervez Musharraf formally tasked the weapons. This event further undermines the nation’s space agency, the Spa ce and Upper difficulty of preventing the spread of Atmospheric Research Commission dangerous weapons to rogue states. (SUPARCO), to explore and oversee the Equally troubling was the possible building of an SLV and satellite. presence of Iranian representatives in North SUPARCO’s former director, Salim Korea during its July 4, 2006 ballistic Mehmud, acknowledged that this missile tests. Assistant Secretary of State organization sponsored studies that Chris Hill, the chief United States explored SLV development. SUPARCO’s negotiator with Pyongyang, retracted technicians also built Pakistan’s two Badr statements he made at a Congressional spacecrafts. According to the infamous hearing that an Iranian delegation witnessed nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the seven launches. Nonetheless, Kim Tae- Pakistan needs to develop SLVs and woo, a South Korean analyst with the satellites in response to similar governmental Korea Institute for Defense advancements in neighboring India. (28) Analyses in Seoul, said, “There is a high North Korean and Iranian support to probability of Iranian involvement in these enhance Pakistan’s space and ballistic missile tests, but we don't have hard missile initiatives is a significant source of evidence.”( 26 ) The likelihood that Iran worry in India and the United States. witnessed the event further deepens Washington imposed various “red lines” to Washington’s concerns that both rogue prevent the transfer of sensitive states seek to destabilize security by technologies to India. The United States collaborating on different ballistic missile attempted to maintain a technological efforts. balance between India and Pakistan. It is less clear whether Pakistan sent a However, under the United States-Indian delegation to witness the July 2006 tests. Next-Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) Nonetheless, Islamabad appears to be program, that balance might soon tilt to following North Korea’s example. Pakistan India’s advantage. Both democracies seek might produce an SLV by modifying its to improve bilateral relations, partly available Hatf 5 (Ghauri) ballistic missile. through the establishment of more joint The system can carry a nuclear warhead and civil space projects. However, the NSSP has similar design features to Iran’s neglects to address India’s sophisticated and Shahab-3 and North Korea’s No-dong maturing missile program and its ballistic missile, which indicates possible willingness to export missile technologies cooperation. In addition, North Korea sent abroad, to include Iran. Tehran would either complete No-dongs or their engines benefit from Indian ballistic missile to Pakistan and oil-rich Iran. Islamabad also assistance, especially the Agni 2. The Agni obtained intermediate-range ballistic 2 intermediate -range, mobile, and solid missiles from North Korea, apparently in propellant system has a range of about exchange for sending Pyongyang highly 2,000 kilometers (1,245 miles) and a enriched uranium for use in the nuclear modified first stage that is likely similar to program.(27) the country’s polar SLV. The Agni 2 will also serve as part of India’s undeveloped

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ICBM, the Surya. This system will have propellant medium-range ballistic missile sufficient range to hit China—India’s other (MRBM).(32) Moscow powered one stage main external rival. The agreement of its SL-7 (R -12/Cosmos ) SLV with a RD- Washington reached with New Delhi has 214 engine. Some Western military experts significant arms control implications . India were more worried about this component’s remains unwilling to follow weapon transfer than the North Korea n delivery of nonproliferation and nuclear test-ban its No-dong ballistic missiles to Iran, agreements, which it views as biased because the SS-4 has a larger warhead and toward more powerful countries. (29 ) longer-range, about 2,000 kilometers (1,250 India’s experience in developing accurate miles).(33) This range will allow Tehran to missiles and satellites could greatly benefit hit military and civilian targets throughout Iran. Asia and Europe. Indian support will complement the Moscow views Tehran as a key vehicle knowledge Tehran obtained elsewhere, for maintaining stability in the Near and especially from Russia. According to some Middle East. Russia seeks to exploit Iran’s U.S. officials, since late 1996, Russia has regional influence to maintain security in been a main supplier of Iranian ballistic the sensitive trans-Caucuses and Persian missile technology and training.(30) S ixteen Gulf in order to undermine efforts by Ira nian undergraduate students studied Muslim terrorists to establish a greater engineering and rocketry at the Moscow foothold there.( 34 ) Expanding this Aviation Institute (MAI), a leading facility partnership will likely become a more vital involved in various Soviet ICBM component of both countries’ national initiatives. Iran likely picked this facility security as they increase cooperation into because its professors taught some Chinese other sectors. Lucrative oil contrasts will students during the late 1950s, when their further improve bilateral relations, country had a fledgling missile program. hindering Washington’s ability to isolate Iranian students at MAI cultivated Iran diplomatically and economically. relationships with their professors and The U.S. intelligence community invited them to speak in Tehran. Iran hosted remains worried about Tehran’s desire to dozens of Russian experts knowledgeable in manufacture SLVs, because they have most guidance systems, metallurgy, and of the key components needed to build an aerodynamics. (31) Greater understanding ICBM. (35 ) Recent initiatives to enhance of these fields can help Iranian technicians the Shahab-3 reinforce the concern. further improve various missile endeavors, Shamkhani stated that his country possesses partly by duplicating Chinese efforts. the technology to mass-produce Shahab-3s Training students at prominent institutes (36 ). Iran’s ability to do that might have was less of a concern to militar y experts contributed to U.S. Director of National than the proliferation of Russian missile Intelligence John D. Negroponte’s technologies to Iran. From the Russian firm acknowledgement that Tehran has the Energomash Science and Production largest inventor y of ballistic missiles in the Association, Iran obtained components region.( 37 ) Iran’s ability to build and related to the RD-214 engine, used on the deploy this missile quickly, complicates Soviet-era SS-4 single stage and liquid efforts to assess accurately the numbers and

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Lee Kass develop countermeasures. Moreover, making grandiose statements about Tehran publicly acknowledged that it possessing a certain technological feat long increased this missile’s range to about 2,000 before it is operational.(41) For instance, in kilometers (1,245 miles). Many European July 1999, Iran’s government-run radio politicians and military officials fear that announced that the country would launch Iran seeks to target areas beyond the Middle three satellites within two years.(42) That East. One Western diplomat questioned the has yet to happen, which reinforces the reasoning for Tehran to develop longer- perception that an operational Iranian space range missiles, “Why design a Rolls-Royce capability is mere rhetoric. Clawson if it is needed to deliver a pizza?”(38) Iran surmises that the world also believes is already capable of hitting Israel and most Tehran lacks the requisite infrastructure to regional U.S. military facilities with the develop an independent satellite production Shahab-3. Improvements to this program program.(43) Perhaps that explains why the demonstrate that Iran seeks a sophisticated press departments in the White House and and long-range missile program, possibly to U.S. State and Defense departments did not target countries beyond the Middle East. Ali issue official statements or comments the Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, former Iranian week after Russia launched Iran’s first president and current leader of the satellite. Ahmadinejad’s speech the Expediency Council, a body that mediates previous day about his plan to “wipe Israel between the regime’s institutions, off the map” overshadowed the event.(44) reinforced such concerns by stating that Political rhetoric aside, the Iranian space countries possessing missiles similar to the endeavor is a growing threat. Shahab-3 could modify their systems to reach all other stages—presumably to COLLABORTIVE SPACE EFFORTS include intercontinental ranges. He also said WITH CHINA AND REGIONAL that the country could consider developing FORUMS a satellite program from advancements in the missile field and the defense ministry’s The danger that Iran’s space program involvement. (39 ) The statement not only poses to regional security will likely reemphasized that the country’s space increase with greater cooperation with program would have a military component, China . According to Ahmad Motamedi, but it would also exploit missile technology Iran’s Minister of Communications and to produce an SLV. Information Technology, China is an Iran’s space program and its efforts to attractive partner partly because of its develop long-range missiles have yet to ability to launch 40 rockets successfully generate sufficient global concern. Richard since 1996.( 45 ) Beijing not only has a Speier, an arms control expert at the mature space effort, but key programs that National Defense University, surmises that have military applications. Two examples the international community remains are the Brazilian-Chinese joint project to unconcerned, because the space program launch a remote-sensing satellite remains relatively low-profile.( 40 ) In constellation and Beijing’s active addition to concurring with this assessment, involvement in the European Galileo global Patrick Clawson, an Iranian expert at the positioning system (GPS) project. Critics Washington Institute for Near East Policy, argue that China can replicate the points out that Tehran has a history of technologies from this project to

22 Middle East Review of International Affairs , Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2006) Iran’s Space P rogram: T he Next Genie in a Bottle? manufacture an indigenous GPS navigation Technology in mid-2005 to learn about program or exploit current vulnerabilities. space-related topics. Some of the courses (46) One Chinese aerospace journal already explored satellite structure, orbit control, explored some of the system’s micro-satellite design, remote sensing, and susceptibilities, to include attacks from spacecraft engineering project space or ground-based lasers and anti- management.(50) Iran and other developing satellites. China’s involvement in the nations will benefit from these and other Galileo effort could help Beijing reaffirm or topics , because they can obtain a greater disprove the efficacy of these methods, understanding of how to establish, which could also benefit Iran in producing effectively manage, and complete various similar systems. ( 47) space initiatives. Chinese technicians assist their Iranian Lectures are a notable way for Iran to counterparts through regional endeavors. establish and cultivate relationships with The Small Multi-Mission Satellite (SMMS) experts. China’s Ma Wenpo taught the project is an effort to collaborate on various June-July 2005 class on remote sensing. He space projects, to include building a also wrote an article that not only explained satellite. China and Iran continue to lead the role that internal calibration sensors this initiative. The spacecraft will enter play in assisting remote sensing ground orbit onboard a Chinese SLV to perform stations to obtain accurate imagery from civilian remote sensing and satellites, but also assessed different communications experiments. Iranian systems.(51) This information would help technicians continue to build the remote Iran build facilities equipped with the sensing camera. Some of the technologies technology to effectively capture and used to develop the device can enhance distribute space imagery, greatly enhancing Iran’s long-term reconnaissance its early-warning capabilities. Tehran’s capabilities. (48) engagement in regional organizations and The SMMS effort is overseen by the interactions with experts in classrooms are Asia -Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in vehicles to establish and cultivate Space Technology and Applications (AP- relationships with foreign technicians in MCSTA) group. The AP-MCSTA attempts order to advance its military programs. to encourage information exchanges in space technology among countries in the IRANIAN CIVIL AND MILITARY Asia -Pacific region. (49) The AP-MCSTA SPACE GOALS helps Iran and technicians from other countries obtain more knowledge, often Tehran recognizes that it must swiftly through classes and conferences. advance the spa ce endeavor to avoid Participants in the AP-MCSTA and China’s Western sanctions. Iran fears that such National Space Administration jointly measures will occur once the West developed training opportunities to concludes that it seeks to manufacture establish relationships and exchange sophisticated reconnaissance satellites. As knowledge. Over 120 participants from Muhammad Reza Movaseghinia, an Iranian approximately 30 countries attended a two- space official, noted, “We have to move week course at China’s Academy of Space quickly and achieve our goals in space.

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Otherwise we will face political, economic to develop an ingenious space and security threats.”( 52 ) The space program.”( 58 ) Unless stopped, Iranian program is important to Iran, because it specialists could apply the knowledge views becoming a space power as a vehicle gained from the Sinah-1 project to construct for survival against perceived external more powerful satellites. dangers. Manufacturing an independent satellite On October 27, 2005, Iran met a key is likely to occur through development of aerospace objective by becoming the 43rd the 60-kilogram (130 pound) Mesbah nation to own a satellite. The Sinah-1 spacecraft. The system is initially intended spacecraft entered orbit onboard a Russian to obtain pictures for a variety of civilian rocket to monitor natural disasters and purposes, to include greater data collection observe agricultural trends . (53) According and distribution, assisting in efforts to find to Director General of Iran Electronic natural resources and to more accurately Industries Ebrahim Mahmoudzadeh, Russia predict the weather. Eventually, Iran will also built the $15 million spacecraft. Tehran modify the satellite for remote sensing. The initially planned to construct the satellite, military could benefit from this technology, but its manufacturer, the Iranian Institute of because it could obtain knowledge of where Applied Research, experienced technical to build suitable facilities. The Iran difficulties and requested Russian Telecommunications Research Center assistance.(54) Moscow provided Iran with (ITRC) and the Iran Science Organization support and planned to launch Sinah-1 in of Science and Technology (IROST) are September 2005. However, according to jointly building this micro-satellite with the Moscow’s chief of the press service of Italian company Carlo Gavazzi Space. Space Troops, Colonel Aleksei Kuznetsov, Construction of Mesbah began in 1997, just manufacturing delays in Sinah-1 postponed before the start of then-Iranian President the launch until October 2005.(55) Muhammad Khatami’s second term. On The Sinah-1’s primary mission is to August 4, 2005, the day after Ahmadinejad demonstrate that Iran can possess an succeeded Khatami, Tehran showcased operational satellite. The country’s deputy Mesbah in an unveiling ceremony. Once telecommunications minister and head of operational, personnel from ITRC/IROST the space program admitted that it could will control it from a ground station in tec hnically spy on Israel, but Ahmad Tehran throughout its three-year lifespan. Talebzadeh stated he could obtain more Mesbah will augment Iran’s understanding detailed imagery commercially. (56 ) of space technology and further increase its According to Jonathan McDowell, a scientific standing throughout the region Harvard astronomer who monitors the and developing world. (59) Iranian space effort, commercial Mesbah was scheduled to enter orbit in photography is frequently too old and early 2006 onboard a Russian rocket. inaccur ate for spying and determining Perhaps Iran decided against using Russia military targets.( 57 ) Perhaps Iran might to launch future satellites after it placed the soon build a sophisticated reconnaissance Arab Satellite Communications spacecraft. Muhammad Enterazi, a satellite Organization 4A spacecraft in an incorrect program manager, noted that, “We are at orbit. The February 28, 2006 setback the very beginning of a long, long road in marked the third in 36 launches for the space technology. But we have the potential Proton launch vehicle program since it

24 Middle East Review of International Affairs , Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2006) Iran’s Space P rogram: T he Next Genie in a Bottle? starting launching commercial systems.(60) Reshetnev Scientific-Production Russia’s inability to place the 4A in its Association of Applied Mechanics (NPO proper orbit might cause Iran to consider PM, Zheleznogorsk) to build the $132 exploring other options, to include using an million Zohreh satellite. Zohreh is designed indigenously -developed SLV, to launch to provide Iranians with numerous services Mesbah or other systems. to include television and radio broadcasts, Mesbah could serve as a springboard for internet, and e-mail access. Technicians Iran to manufacture more sophisticated from NPO PM will assist their Iranian reconnaissance satellites. Doing that would counterparts to control the system, which meet one of the country’s goals,( 61 ) will increase the system’s functionality, undermining Tehran’s claims that the space because it can avoid space debris and other program is solely intended for peaceful satellites. (64 ) Possessing advanced purposes. One Israeli defense source stated reconnaissance spacecrafts could greatly that Iran’s space program is a significant help Iran, particularly after a natural concern to the Jewish state. According to disaster, because emergency personnel this official, Israel fears that if the military could effectively coordinate relief efforts. launches a strike to disable the Iranian The military can also exploit this nuclear program, “[…] the last thing we technology by rapidly distributing orders to need is Iranian early warning received by forces to neutralize potential threats. satellite.”(62) Obtaining imagery that shows Sending and receiving data quickly increased activity at Israeli Air Force throughout the theater is a key characteristic facilities might cause Tehran to conclude of a sophisticated military, which Iran seeks that Jerusalem seeks to launch a preemptive to further modernize with space assets. aerial attack on Iran’s nuc lear sites. Sepehr and Zohreh will allow Tehran to Advanced knowledge of such an operation closely monitor developments in Israel and would undermine Israel’s efforts to achieve neighboring Iraq and respond accordingly total surprise because Iran would have more whenever a threat arises. time to prepare its defenses and to transfer Iran is partly considering building small personnel and nuclear material to more satellites because they have distinct secure locations. Technicians could then advantages. Besides their size, micro- continue the nuclear effort confident that satellites are lightweight and inexpensive. their country has an enhanced early- Tehran might exploit these advantages to warning capability to further safeguard develop an anti-satellite weapon, even national security. though that would undermine the spirit of To meet this objective possibly, Iranian the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which technicians are developing two similar prohibits Iran (and other treaty participants) reconnaissance systems. The Iranian from placing weapons on space Defense Ministry initiated an endeavor to systems.( 65 ) Moreover, Tehran would manufacture the Sepehr satellite. (63) The weaken its obligations under United ministry’s close involvement reinforces the Nations General Assembly Resolution argument that Iran will exploit space to 37/99. Parties to this document agree to a become more militarily powerful. Iran comprehensive disarmament of various contracted with the Russian company M.F. weapon systems, to include anti-satellite

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Lee Kass systems (Annex D). Tehran favored the national pride. Muhammad bin Ibrahim al- request that the United Nations’ Conference Souail, vice president for Research on Disarmament continue to deliberate on Institutes at the King Abdulaziz City for an effective and verifiable agreement to Science and Technology (KACST), prevent an arms race in outer space.( 66 ) explained that the engineers who built the The level of Iranian willingness in meeting Saudisat-1 and Saudisat-2 satellites these documents objectives will shed some obtained specialized knowledge, which will light on the country’s space program, serve as a springboard for other related including focus areas, deficiencies, and initiatives.(69) future international collaborative efforts. The spacecrafts that Russia hoisted were Knowledge of these fields will help the indigenously-constructed at the Space international community to more effectively Research Institute (SRI) in KAAST. SRI assess Iran’s projects and establish ways to also supports the spread and advancement prevent Tehran from exploiting space to of space technology. The country’s other further jeopardize international security. notable space facility is the Saudi Center for Remote Sensing (SCRS). Saudi Arabia SPACE AND NATIONAL PRIDE established the ce nter in 1986, because it recognized that remote sensing ha d Iran fervently believes that it has a numerous civil benefits. Enhancements to sovereign right to sophisticated SCRS allow it to obtain and distribute technologies, to include a space and nuclear imagery simultaneously from multiple program. Tehran views these endeavors as foreign remote sensing systems.(70) sources of national pride and a victory Saudi Arabia’s space effort is far more against some external forces, which mature than Iran’s, yet generates Shamkhani accused of stifling the country’s significantly less international concern. scientific advancements. (67) Iran’s return to According to Turki bin Sa'ud bin space with an indigenously-produced SLV Muhammad al-Sa'ud, head of KAAST, his would make the country the first in the facility completely financed the Saudisat-1 Islamic world with this capability. and Saudisat-2 satellites without assistance Therefore, a mature space effort would from the defense ministry or any other provide Iran with more national pride than government entity. The director called any the nuclear program , because Pakistan claims that the two systems had a military could boast that it is the first to own “an purpose “baseless.” The satellites are Islamic bomb.” However, all Islamic intended solely for telecommunications and countries lack the scientific infrastructure to research purposes. (71) KAAST’s ability to launch satellites independently. Iran wants completely fund this initiative demonstrates to change that. Saudi Arabia’s desire to exploit space Iran and Saudi Arabia use Russia to solely for civil purposes. launch their spacecrafts. Saudi Arabia’s six In contrast, the Iranian space effort is a satellites entered orbit onboard Russian growing source of international unease. The rockets. It has many SLVs that can carry defense ministry and possibly the IRGC small satellites , which is beneficial to Saudi play a more prominent role in the count ry’s Arabia because engineers have greater space program. Their involvement, Iranian flexibility in picking the launch date. (68) motivations for becoming a space power , The Kingdom views space as a source of behavior, and cooperation with countries

26 Middle East Review of International Affairs , Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2006) Iran’s Space P rogram: T he Next Genie in a Bottle? that cloak their long-range ballistic missile sophisticated camera significantly enhances efforts behind a civil space project, raises Israeli photo reconnaissance capabilities. disturbing questions about this nation’s One Israeli defense official stated that the intentions in space. satellites could find images as small as 27.5 The international community will likely inches. The system can also photograph react to a future Iranian SLV launch in a activities in ballistic launch sites to obtain similar manner to North Korea’s August advanced warning of potential strikes and 1998 failed attempt to place a satellite into study future missile tests. The same source orbit using a reengineered ballistic missile. remarked that “the most important thing in North Korea’s Taepo-dong 1 launch was a a satellite is its ability to photograph and its key factor that reinvigorated efforts within resolution.”( 73 ) Israel has an edge over the United States to develop a ballistic others in the region in satellite technology, missile defense shield. Iran’s SLV launch which Iran seeks to change quickly. will generate greater European support for the U.S. ballistic missile defense program. CONCLUSIONS The event will also increase pressure on the European Union states of United Kingdom, The Iranian space effort resembles a Germany, and France to resolve the Iranian disturbing pattern seen earlier to varying nuclear issue before the IRGC can threaten degrees of success. North Korea, China, and Europe with a miniaturized nuclear warhead Pakistan cloak their efforts to modify onboard a modified missile. ballistic missiles within a civil space Iran seeks to challe nge Israel’s regional program. Iran seeks to repeat history partly monopoly in outer space. Israel is the only by exchanging ballistic missile technologies regional actor who can deploy satellites with these and other parties. This onboard indigenously-manufactured SLVs. international assistance might eventually The Shavit SLV is a modified Jericho help Iran launch an indigenously-developed MRBM that placed numerous civilian and SLV. Such an event would generate global military systems in space. The space concern in a manner similar to North program is a tremendous source of pride for Korea’s 1998 failed satellite launch. Israel. Hayim Eshed, head of the Israeli Despite the distinct possibility of such an Defense Ministry Space Administration, occurrence , Iran’s space program has yet to boasted that “With the exception of the generate sufficient global concern. The Americans, we are superior to all other United States and its allies will certainly countries in two fields of satellite view the Iranian space project as a greater technology—resolution of photographs and threat once Tehran owns satellites that can picture quality.”(72) find and accurately guide missiles to their Israel further enhanced its satellite targets. Iran seeks spacecraft to achieve this technologies with the April 25, 2006 launch feat and to further enhance the military’s of its Earth Remote Observation Satellite capabilities. (EROS)-B photo reconnaissance system. Iran’s reentrance into space using an The EROS-B entered orbit onboard a indigenously-developed system would Russian SLV to capture imagery of Iran’s provide the country with an unprecedented military facilities. The satellite’s amount of national pride. Becoming a space

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Lee Kass power would unite the Iranian people and further legitimize the leadership’s policies. (FBIS ) FEA20051031011879, November 1, Achieving this technological feat would 2005. also significantly increase Iran’s global [ 5 ] “Russia-Iran Satellite Deal Seen position and create new concerns for the Removing Threat of US Strike,” international community. The United Kommersant, February 2, 2005, pp. 1, 9, States, Israel, and others have a great deal FBIS CEP20050202000292. to fear once Tehran unleashes its next [ 6 ] “International Cooperation in the genie. Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Activities of Member States in 2003,” United Nations * Lee Kass is a defense contractor in Office for Outer Space Affairs, McLean, Virginia . His focus areas are arms http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/natact/2003/i control, missile defense, nuclear strategy, ran.html, last updated January 27, 2004. conflict resolution, and the Middle East. [7] Remarks of Dr. HE Motamedi, Minister His publications include “Syria after of Communications and Information Lebanon: The Growing Syrian Missile Technology, Opening ceremony of the Threat,” which appeared in the fall 2005 “United Nations/Islamic Republic of Iran edition of Middle East Quarterly, and co- Regional Workshop on the Use of Space authored the cover article “Observation Technology for Environmental Security, From Orbit,” which appeared in the Disaster Rehabilitation and Sustainable December 2003 edition of Jane’s Development,” May 8-12, 2004, International Defense Review. http://www.gisdevelopment.net/proceedings /tehran/OpeningCeremony/Ahmad_MOTA MEDI.htm. NOTES [ 8 ] “International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Activities of Member States in 2003.” [ 1 ] Resolution Adopted by the General [ 9 ] “Iranian Cabinet Approves Assembly, 1472 (XIV). International Establishment of Supreme National Space Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Council,” Mehr News Agency, February 21, Space, December 12, 1959. 2005, in FBIS IAP20050221000034; Bill [2] “Interview of Dr. A.A. Amidian with Samii, “Iran to Have A Space Council,” Tehran Times Int. Daily on NOV-13-2002,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, V ol. 9, http://www.isa.ir/en/rs/. No. 34 (February 22, 2005), [ 3 ] International Cooperation in the http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2005/02/6- Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Activities of SWA/swa-220205.asp. Member States in 2002 National Activities [10] “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – of Iran (Islamic Republic of), United The Gulf States,” Security and Foreign Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Forces, Iran (Jane’s Defense Group, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/natact/2002/i January 13, 2006). ran.html, last updated Februar y 7, 2003. [11] “Aerospace Official Says Iran's Missile [4] “Iranian Minister Invites China to Help Technology Peaceful, Fulfils ‘Space Design, Build Small Satellites,” Tehran TV, Needs’,” Voice of the Islamic Republic of in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Iran Radio , in FBIS IAP20041020000094, October 20, 2004.

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[ 12 ] “Russia: Journal Details Iranian Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of Development of Diverse Missile State for Verification and Compliance,” Technologies,” Avia Panorama , December Testimony before the U.S.-China 15, 2004, in FBIS CEP20050419000292. Commission, Washington, DC, July 24, [13] “Iran: Shamkhani Announces Shahab- 2003, 4 Space Rocket Production,” The Islamic http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rm/24518.htm Republic News Agency (IRNA), February 7, . 1999 in FBIS FTS19990207000166. [ 22 ] “Treasury Designates U.S. and [14] Bill Gertz, “Iran Missile Test Fails Chinese Companies Supporting Iranian After Takeoff ,” The Washington Times, Missile Proliferation,” United States September 22, 2000, Department of the Treasury, June 13, 2006, http://nautilus.org/archives/pub/ftp/npp//000 JS-4317, 922IranBM.txt. http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/js43 [15] “Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems,” 17.htm. Offensive Weapons, Iran , Shahab 3/4 [ 23 ] “Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems,” (Jane’s Defense Group, July 19, 2005). Offensive Weapons, Korea, North, Taep’o - [ 16 ] “Germany: Western Intelligence dong 1 (Jane’s Defense Group, July 19, Services Confirm Iranian Missile 2005). Developments,” Deutschlands Neue [24] “Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems.” Nachrichtenagentur, February 6, 2006, in [ 25 ] Gordon Fairclough, “Politics & FBIS EUP20060206072006. Economics: Pyongyang Deepens Tehran [17] Kenneth Katzman, “Iran: Arms and Ties with Suspected Arms Exports,” The Weapons of Mass Destruction Suppliers,” Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2006, p. A4. Congressional Research Service, Order [26] Barbara Demick, “N. Korea-Iran Ties Number RL30551, Updated January 3, Seem to Be Growing Stronger ,” The Los 2003, Angeles Times, July 27, 2006. http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL3055 [ 27 ] Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s 1.pdf . Nuclear Weapons Program,” Order Code [18] “Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems.” IB91141, Updated April 7, 2006, [19] Ibid. Congressional Research Service. [20] Uzi Rubin, “Iran’s New ‘Baby Bottle’ http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/ Shihab,” Middle East Missile Monitor, 64417.pdf; Sharon A. Squassoni, “Weapons August 8, 2004, http://www.me- of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North monitor.com/docframes.asp?file=files/Irans Korea and Pakistan,” Order Code RL31900, NewBabyBottleShihab.htm. Updated March 11, 2004, Congressional [21] “Remarks to U.S.-China Economic and Research Service. Security Review Commission,” http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/ Stephen G. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary 30781.pdf. of State for Arms Control, Washington, DC, [ 28 ] “Pakistan: Report—Space Agency March 10, 2005, Asked To Manufacture, Launch Advanced http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/43277.htm; Satellite ,” The News, March 27, 2005, in “China's Record of Proliferation Activities, FBIS SAP20050327000006; “Qadeer Khan:

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