REGIME TYPE OR POLITICAL INSTABILITY? WHY DE-ESCALATES OR ENTERS WARS

Vasabjit Banerjee and Department of Political Science Prashant Hosur Fletcher Hall University of Tennessee Chattanooga, Tennessee 37403 USA Vasabjit Banerjee is an Assistant Professor at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga and a Research Associate at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. His research interests are social movements, political violence, conflicts, regime formation, and foreign policy in South Asia, Latin America, and southern Africa. Prashant Hosur is a Ph.D. student at Indiana University, Bloomington. His research inter-

distribute ests include strategic rivalries, international conflict, determinants of conflict escalation and foreign policy in Asia. not The recent anti-government demon-

Do The Indo-Pakistani rivalry is among Copy - the most hostile in the world strations in Pakistan, coupled with today. This paper provides a new increasing instances of ceasefire viola- explanation for why we observe Proof 2015 variation in hostility levels in this tions on the border with India (July- rivalry. This article studies the September 2014), beg the classic

IJWP effects of different regimes—civilian,

Author question: Does regime stability affect military, or mixed—and political stability in Pakistan on the decisions inter-state conflicts? With different to enter into or de-escalate from political groups calling for the resigna- crises with India. The findings tion of the current Sharif government demonstrate that Pakistan de- and asking for fresh elections, one Copyrighted escalates from crises if politically stable and enters wars if politically wonders whether the corresponding unstable. However, the effects of escalation in border conflicts with India regime type, civilian, military, or has domestic objectives or international mixed, are inconclusive. The paper shifts the focus from regime type to objectives. regime stability. Much of the work on inter-state conflicts between India and Pakistan has been studied within the context of their enduring rivalry. The rivalry between India and Pakistan has witnessed four wars and a series of crises under the shadow of nuclear weapons. The rivalry

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threatens more than a billion people in South Asia with nuclear holocaust, terrorism, and state failure. It has repercussions on the two states’ relations with other regional and great powers, such as China, Russia, and the USA. Yet, there have also been variances within this rivalrous relationship: some bilateral crises1 were peaceably resolved (1951, 1984, 1987, 1990, and 2001-2002), and others escalated to war (1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999). These differences give rise to an important question: If the rivalry between India and Pakistan has been a constant for so many years, what explains the variances within it? In other words, what explains why some crises escalate into war while others de-escalate into peaceful (albeit far from amicable) relations? This paper presents trend lines using the Polity IV dataset and subse- quently presents studies of the individual Our findings show that events to demonstrate that differences Pakistandistribute enters wars with in regime type (military or civilian) dur- Indianot when facing political ing the above-mentioned events does not affect Pakistan’s decisions to make Do

Copy instability threatening - war or de-escalate. Given that India has regime change from remained a democracy during the stud- Proof a2015 civilian to a military ied events, the finding that the nature of regime and vice versa. the Pakistani regime—whether it be civil- IJWP

Author ian, military, or mixed—has no observ- able effect on its decisions to enter conflicts challenges the applicability of the “democratic peace” theory to the Indo-Pakistani rivalry.2 Rather, our findings show that Pakistan enters wars with India when facing political instability threatening regime change from a civilian to a Copyrighted military regime and vice versa. Our explanation is based on Thompson and Tucker’s insight that regime change, both toward and away from popular participation in politics, increases a state’s propensity to make war.3 Their explanation, in turn, improves on Mansfield and Snyder’s insight that regime change towards democratization increases states’ propensity to make war.4 This paper contributes to explanations of wars and crises between India and Pakistan because, despite a substantial body of inter-state level explanations on the topic, current explanations focusing on domestic fac- tors inadequately explain Pakistani decisions with clear predictive capacity.5 Furthermore, other than policy applications, the paper extends theoretical

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research on why oscillations in hostility occur within such protracted rivalries.6 The next section presents the research design and explains the particular methods utilized in the studies. The following section explains why prior research using international and domestic level factors inadequately explains Pakistani behavior. Then this paper attempts to address such weaknesses. The subsequent empirical section first presents a set of trend lines that appear to support our hypothesis, and subsequently in-depth studies of the selected events to demonstrate that variation in political stability affects Pakistani behavior.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND DEFINITIONS: The paper first tests the posited explanations by presenting trend lines

distribute using the Polity IV dataset that shows covariation, which suggests a pat- tern. While a regression framework is unsuitable for the purposes of this not paper due to insufficient data points, the covariation justifies the deeper Do Copy

- study of the phenomena at hand. Consequently, we conduct a qualitative event-centric comparison of Pakistan in the context of the Indo-Pakistani Proof 2015 rivalry. In chronological order, the analyzed events are: the wars of 1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999; and the crises of 1951, 1984, 1987, 1990, and

IJWP 2001-2002. This within case comparison reduces the number of possible Author causal factors.7 Furthermore, it combines minimal variance in the control variables and maximal variance in the causal factors (Political Instability and Regime Type) and outcome factors (war and de-escalation from crisis).8 The event analyses present the evidence that help support the hypothesis Copyrighted by organizing and comparing extant data to support a new holistic insight. The event analyses primarily utilize research available in scholarly books and articles on the Indo-Pakistani rivalry, which provide extensive cover- age of Pakistani political dynamics and foreign policy decision-making, and supplements them with media reports and memoirs. Moreover, these sources were read with an eye towards the relative salience of factors internal to Pakistan, specifically political instability and regime type vis-à-vis decisions to make war or de-escalate crises. Consequently, the individual studies do not aim to provide a comprehensive picture of each particular event. Inter-state dynamics, such as variation over

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time in the balance of power between India and Pakistan, and insurgencies in contiguous Indian provinces like Punjab and Kashmir are largely ignored.9 In terms of definitions, due to the frequent changes of political institu- tions in Pakistan, this article utilizes a broad definition of democracy and authoritarianism. In the vein of Dahl’s typology, this paper defines civilian (democratic) regimes as those arising from extending political participation and competition to greater numbers of people, and military (authoritarian) regimes as those arising from restricting political participation and competi- tion to fewer people, specifically the Army and allied elites.10 Also, a “mixed” regime type is identified in Pakistan, wherein the military remains a veto player under civilian rule and colludes with civilian politicians.11 This paper defines political instability as, “events or developments that pose a serious extra-parliamentary or extra-institutional threat” to state institutions governing political participation and competition.12 These distribute events and developments “will almost invariably be accompanied by some

violencenot as well as public disorder,” but “need not necessarily be successful 13 Do

Copy in…toppling a government or regime.” - Perhaps, to some, this paper’s approach would appear to unfairly

Proof underscore the salience of domestic Pakistani factors vis-à-vis international 2015 factors. However, although this article’s findings are insufficient for wide- ranging conclusions, by utilizing and reinterpreting extant research this IJWP Author article redresses the relative under-theorizing in accounting for Pakistani domestic politics to understand variations within the Indo-Pakistani rivalry.

OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO EXTANT EXPLANATIONS ThisCopyrighted article evaluates two domestic level explanations for variations in Pakistan’s decision to enter wars or de-escalate from crises: first, Pakistan enters wars when the government is controlled by the military, and de- escalates from crises when controlled by civilians; second, Pakistan enters wars when undergoing political instability and de-escalates when it has political stability. Our domestic level explanation contributes to existing research on the topic, which largely focuses on international level explanations that either look at opportunity structures offered by the international system or focus on theories of deterrence to assess why deterrence succeeded or

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failed. Paul, most notably, argues that Pakistan is incentivized to continue its rivalry with India because India’s military and economic dominance are mitigated by local factors.14 From this perspective, Ganguly had earlier posited that the Pakistani leadership saw a window of opportunity in 1965 to initiate a military cam- paign to control Kashmir.15 India was recovering from the military defeat against China and, in response, had begun the process of military modern- ization. This period of “weakness” was Pakistan’s best chance to impose a military solution on India on the Kashmir issue. Such a line of thinking is further elaborated in Pakistani General Mohammed Musa’s account of the 1965 India-Pakistan war.16 While this argument may have its merits, it is difficult to know whether General Musa was making a post-hoc justification and, Our domestic level more importantly, how independent explanation contributes distribute researchers can identify such windows of to existing research on

not opportunity or opportunity structures, the topic, which largely except in retrospect. Furthermore, it Do

Copy focuses on international - becomes difficult to predict when such level explanations that windows of opportunity emerge and,

Proof either look at opportunity 2015 furthermore, under what other inter- structures offered by active conditions do decision-makers

IJWP the international system

Author avail the benefits of such windows of opportunity. In short, this theory is not or focus on theories of predictive because it is both difficult to deterrence. identify windows of opportunities and verify their causal effects. Copyrighted A second strand of argument that seeks to explain Indo-Pakistani con- flict escalation—or lack thereof—comes from the literature on nuclear and conventional deterrence. One of the problems that one faces with these arguments is the fact that while nuclear weapons are supposed to reduce the likelihood of escalation of conventional war, they can also encourage sub-conventional or indirect, low intensity warfare. This is often referred to as the stability-instability paradox.17 Ganguly, in this vein, explains that India did not open a second front in Punjab in response to Pakistan’s mili- tary attack in Kargil in 1999, as India did in the 1965 war, because of the presence of nuclear weapons in 1999, as opposed to its absence in 1965.18

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However, such explanations also inadequately explain variation in Pakistani behavior. The classification of the Kargil conflict as a sub-conven- tional or indirect conflict is suspect because there was a direct confrontation between India and Pakistan. Moreover, although the point of a lack of horizontal escalation by India can be noted, it only partially supports the deterrence hypothesis because it does not explain the vertical escalation to direct confrontation between India and Pakistan in 1999. Additionally, recent scholarship has argued that conventional notions of deterrence from the Cold War period are less relevant to regions like South Asia, and one must also consider particular nuclear postures of states —India and Pakistan in this case—to understand the effectiveness of deter- rence arguments. Postures refer to the type of nuclear weapons delivery systems used, whether nuclear weapons Domestic level theories are assembled or not, whether states usingdistribute religious and have deployed tactical nuclear weapons, nationalnot identity, as and what their stated policy is on the use of nuclear weapons.19 Do

Copy well as resource scarcity - However, domestic level theories insufficiently explain using religious and national identity, as Proof

specific2015 Pakistani foreign well as resource scarcity, insufficiently policy decisions. explain specific Pakistani foreign policy IJWP

Author decisions. In terms of religious and national identities, two sets of theories use the incompatibility of such identities as the causal factor. The first argues that the rivalry and wars are an outcome of a Hindu India facing a Muslim Pakistan because of incom- patible primordial identities.20 Fair offers the most sophisticated extension Copyrighted of this argument by utilizing the Pakistani Army’s internal documents to demonstrate that it perceives itself as the protector of Islam, “the founding logic of the state and the ideology… used to achieve a degree of national coherence across a multi-ethnic country and to garner support for the army’s endless conflict with India.”21 The second posits that the rivalry and wars are caused by the two states’ overlapping nation-building projects, centred on the region of Kashmir: Pakistan, as a homeland for sub-continental Muslims, and India, as a secular nation representing all faiths.22 However, although such explanations can explain the origins of the broader Indo- Pakistani rivalry, because religious and national identities are largely constant

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factors, their causal logic cannot explain variations within the rivalry, such as Pakistani decisions to make war or de-escalate from crises with India. A new set of explanations considers the dispute over the province of Kashmir as a resource race to control water flows to the breadbaskets of India and Pakistan.23 However, this theory is empirically undermined by the fact that Pakistan and India have respected certain common norms regarding the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 that governs water sharing during times of total war in 1965 and 1971 and limited war in 1999.24 Due to the above-mentioned weaknesses of the international and domestic level explanations, this paper tests two theories that centre on competition between Pakistan’s civilian and military elites: the first posits that Pakistan enters wars with India under authoritarian rule and de-escalates during civilian rule, and the second argues that Pakistan enters wars in periods of political instability threatening regime change (from civilian to

distribute military rule and vice versa) and de-escalates under conditions of political

not stability. The explanation based on the nature of Pakistani regimes posits that Do Copy - military and religious elites and militants profit from keeping Pakistan a security-centric state.25 Some authors further point out the complicity of Proof 2015 the United States in fostering this alliance because it has served short-term foreign policy goals.26 Other scholars argue that the Pakistani military has IJWP

Author a distorted view of its external security environment—overestimating both threats and its own capabilities to deal with them—that shapes its foreign policy with India when the military is in power.27 Despite these differences, the common underlying argument is that aggressive policies against external security threats garner domestic political Copyrighted and economic support for Pakistan’s military; consequently, military rule causes wars with India and, implicitly, civilian governments create more peaceful policies like de-escalation. Because this explanation provides both variance in the causal factor and appears to be supported by evidence, the event analyses presented here evaluate whether the nature of the regime (military or civilian) affects Pakistani decisions to make war against India or de-escalate. The explanation forwarded by this article, however, is that political instability causes war and stability causes de-escalation from crises with India. Specifically, Pakistan’s decisions to make war or de-escalate from crises with

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India are caused by political instability due to competition between military and civilian elites. Such an argument is based on Thompson and Tucker’s extension of Mansfield and Snyder’s theoretical insight that states under- going regime transitions toward or away from authoritarian to democratic regimes are prone to starting wars.28 Our argument brings together insights from various scholars who have alluded to how political instability in Pakistan has contributed (directly or indirectly) to the fraught relations between India and Pakistan. Malone notes how political volatility has “bedevilled” its relationship with India. Ahmed notes that Pakistan’s “military-guided democracy” is a source of many problems because civilian administrations are unable to operate outside the shadow of the Pakistani army, while the army has used anti-India sentiments when needed, in order to consolidate its domestic political position.29 Most notably, T.V. Paul argues that one of the reasons why weaker distribute states initiate war with a stronger adversary is to shape changing domestic

powernot structures.30 Specifically, war initiation by the weak is greater when Do

Copy “an insecure, militaristic group assumes control of the decision-making - process.” In the context of the India-Pakistan case, Paul demonstrates how

Proof a small group of civilian and military officials was able to convince Ayub 2015 Khan—himself a risk-averse person—to take the decision to send guerril- las into Indian Kashmir in 1965. The studies of individual events in the IJWP Author following section, which reveal the role of domestic political dynamics in Pakistani foreign policy, dovetails with such an explanation.31

PAKISTAN’S CRISES AND WARS: REGIME TYPE AND

POLITICALCopyrighted INSTABILITY This section demonstrates that, aside from the war of 1947-1948, Pakistan has declared war on India when facing political instability, albeit for different reasons and in tandem with inter-state dynamics. In particular, it faced such conditions in 1965, 1971, and 1999: loss of the military’s popularity in East Pakistan in 1965; competition between the West Pakistani-dominated military and civilian elites’ with East Pakistani civilian elites in 1971; and, competition between civilian elites and the military in 1999. Furthermore, the nature of the Pakistani regime—civilian or military—does not appear to affect its decisions because crisis de-escalation in 1984, 1987, 1990, and

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2001-2002 occurred under military rule, while Pakistan declared war in 1947-1948 under civilian rule. As shown in the individual case studies, political instability in Pakistan—extending from coup attempts to popular protests and violent insurgencies—has been caused by recurrent competition between civilian politicians and the military. The four graphs below seek to show the change in Polity IV scores of India (Figure 1); the covariation between change in MIDs (Militarized Interstate Disputes) between India and Pakistan, and the change in India’s Polity IV scores (Figure 2); the change in Polity IV scores of Pakistan (Figure 3); and, the covariation between change in MIDs (Militarized Interstate Disputes) between India and Pakistan, and the change in Polity IV scores of Pakistan (Figure 4). What must be noted is that the graphs do not show the actual value of the polity scores and MIDs per year; rather, they show the distribute annual change in these scores. Political instability in

not With regards to Figure 1, the change Pakistan—extending

Do from coup attempts to

Copy in the polity scores of India demon- - strates only minor variance over time, popular protests and which suggests relative stability of its violent insurgencies—has Proof 2015 regime type. Indeed, outside of the 21 been caused by recurrent months between 1975 and 1977 that competition between IJWP Author witnessed an abrogation of democratic civilian politicians and freedoms, India’s boisterous politics has the military. been framed by democratic regimes from its first general elections in 1951-1952.

Copyrighted As a result, Figure 2 shows significant variation in MIDs between India and Pakistan, but almost negligible variation in the Polity scores of India over time. It is reasonable to infer with regards to India that regime volatility has nothing to do with MIDs with Pakistan. This does not automatically suggest that India has never initiated a conflict—at a lower level than the threshold for MIDs—with Pakistan. However, with the possible excep- tion of 1971, when India responded to a massive influx of refugees from then-East Pakistan into the insurgency-wracked province of West Bengal, scholarship suggests that wars and conflicts were initiated by Pakistan.32

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Figure 1: Regime Variation in India India's Regime Volatility 15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -6 Changein Polity Scores -9 -12 -15 distribute 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007

not Year Do Copy - Source: Polity IV Figure 2: Covariation of Polity and Militarized Interstate Disputes Proof 2015

India's Regime Volatility and MIDs IJWP Author 15 12 9 6 Copyrighted 3 0 -3 -6 Changein Polity Scores -9 -12 -15 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 Year

HiAct D.polity

Source: Polity IV and Correlates of War

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However, in terms of Pakistan we see that barring the initial period after independence, there has been significant variation in Polity scores over time (Figure 3). Moreover, as elucidated by Figure 4, the most dramatic changes in hostility levels are preceded by changes in the Polity scores that suggest regime volatility. Because Figure 4 shows a high degree of volatility in both series, it gives us reason to believe that regime instability in Pakistan does contribute to changes in the levels of Indo-Pakistani hostility.

Figure 3: Regime Variation in Pakistan

Regime Volatility: Pakistan 15 12 9 distribute 6 3 not 0 Do Copy - -3 -6 Changein Polity Scores Proof 2015 -9 -12 IJWP Author -15 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 Year

Source: Polity IV Copyrighted

While the individual studies below demonstrate how regime instability in Pakistan caused inter-state disputes in particular episodes, the graphs presented underscore a more general point. Specifically, the graphs show that dramatic changes in regime scores in Pakistan can lead to dramatic changes in levels of Indo-Pakistani hostilities. This is a slightly different argument than explaining particular events, but which lends further sup- port to the explanation that as regime instability increases, the likelihood of inter-state conflict increases.

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Figure 4: Covariation of Polity and MIDs

Regime Volatility and MIDs 15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -6 Changein Polity Scores/MIDs -9 -12 -15

1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007

distribute Year

HiAct, D D.polity2 not Do Copy - Source: Polity IV and Correlates of War The table below demonstrates the findings on the two tested hypotheses Proof 2015 from the qualitative studies of individual events. The type of regime does not appear to have a discernable effect on Pakistani decisions. However, IJWP Author Pakistan’s decision to declare war or de-escalate appears to vary with politi- cal instability. The only partial exception is the war of 1947-1948; it occurs under civilian rule, which supports our argument regarding the irrelevance of regime type, but it contradicts our argument that war is contingent on politicalCopyrighted instability. The First Kashmir War of 1947-1948 was fought over the erstwhile princely state of Kashmir. The princely states of India were remnants of the pre-colonial order that were being forced to accede either to India or Pakistan. After the partition of British India based on religion, the decision of the 562 princes to join India or Pakistan was mainly based on grounds of demography (majority Hindu or Muslim subjects) or location (non- contiguity with India or Pakistan). Thus, the Muslim prince of Hyderabad, despite presiding over a sizable minority of Muslims, was forced to accede to India.33 However, Kashmir abutted both India and Pakistan; the majority

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of the prince’s subjects were Muslim, while the prince was a Hindu. The prince used these circumstances to parlay for independence or better terms for accession. A division in the Opposition movement against the prince further complicated this situation: the Opposition was divided between a pro-Pakistani and a pro-Indian wing. In the autumn of 1947, tribal ele- ments and irregular Pakistani forces invaded Kashmir, though the prince had signed a standdown agreement with Pakistan. As the under-equipped, ill-trained and badly officered princely army started to collapse, the harried Prince signed an accession agreement with India.34 By the end of the year, the Pakistani and Indian armies had fought to a stalemate conflict in the inhospitable Himalayan terrain. India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, approached the United Nations with the problem, which established a cease-fire line.35

distribute Table 1: Regime Type, Political Stability, and Pakistani Decisions not Year of Incident Political Stability Regime Type De-escalation or War Do Copy - 1947-1948 Stable Civilian War (Partial Exception) Proof 2015 1951 Stable Civilian De-escalation 1965 Unstable Military War IJWP

Author 1971 Unstable Military War 1984 Stable Military De-escalation 1987 Stable Military De-escalation 1990 Stable Mixed De-escalation Copyrighted 1999 Unstable Mixed War 2001-2002 Stable Military De-escalation

More importantly, why did Pakistan, then under a democratic civilian leadership, enter the war? This is, in fact, the one exception where the political instability explanation presented here may not apply. Although the dislocative effects of the partition and the post-independence euphoria had not yet subsided, there was veritably no opposition to the Pakistani regime. What is evident, according to Owen Bennet Jones’ study, however, is that although the civilian leadership was eager to capture Kashmir, it was

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overburdened with the tasks of setting up a new state, and tackling a mas- sive demographic influx. Consequently, it was in no position to undertake further escalation.36 Ganguly’s alternative explanation that the Pakistani military officers overestimated their capabilities and underestimated that of the Indians also overlaps with Jones’ analysis. Although covert support and military aid continued at the initial stages, the leadership also could not assign the task of a full scale conflict to the military commanders. The senior level military officers of India and Pakistan, who were British, would not allow British officers to fight a war between the then-dominions.37 Thus, on an issue fundamental to the raison d’etre of the Pakistani state, the separation of Muslim majority provinces from a predominantly Hindu India, the civilian leadership was first, willing to start a war, but was blocked by the military commanders; and, second, realized the state’s economic incapacity to commit to an overt war.38

distribute It is important to mention here that, right after the war, the inefficacy

ofnot the civilian regime in wresting Kashmir from Indian rule became the rallying cry for sections of junior officers and some senior commanders Do Copy of- the Pakistani military. The combination of these elements with radical leftist intellectuals39 fomented an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1951.40 Proof However,2015 the coup was thwarted because senior officers of the Pakistani military remained loyal toward the civilian government.41 IJWP

Author Again in mid-1951, whereas the civilian leadership wanted war, the commander of the armed forces asserted that the Pakistani army was too weak to fight against India, which forced Prime Minister to back down.42 Therefore, the democratic leadership in Pakistan was in favour of war; ironically the cautious and sometimes insubordinate military Copyrighted commanders prevented further escalation.43 In essence, the balancing of Pakistani civilian and military institutions led to de-escalation and preven- tion of conflict with India. The 1958 coup that brought Pakistan’s first military dictator, General Mohammed , to power was ostensibly directed against the ineptitude of the civilian politicians. The civilian leadership had been deeply divided on economic and religious lines. In terms of economic policy, the representatives from East Pakistan were at loggerheads with representatives from West Pakistan. In terms of religion, no agreement could be reached on the exact relationship between Islam and the Pakistani state.

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The 1958 coup was popular in West Pakistan because the Army was manned by and representative of landed interests in the Punjab.44 It also helped bolster the civilian bureaucracy manned by the émigré elites from India. Finally, as it demobilized popular demand for more redistributive measures, it won the support of most feudal elites in West Pakistan. Yet this West Pakistani Army-bureaucrat-landlord coalition blocked all channels of peacefully achieving power from the majority of the population, which was located in East Pakistan.45 The Second Kashmir War of 1965 started a pattern that was to fol- low. It was declared by a military regime that justified it on the basis of self-defence, but the war may have also served the purpose of a “patriotic diversion” to silence domestic political opposition to the regime. Pakistan fought over the control of Kashmir. The central reason propelling war was the rapid rearming that India underwent after the disastrous 1962 war with

distribute China, which was accompanied by the growing integration of Kashmir to 46

not the Indian federation via a series of legislations. The preventive nature of the Second Kashmir War can be considered a Do Copy - classic case of “balancing” a would-be hegemonic power.47 However, though being planned since the previous year, the War found the Pakistani army Proof 2015 was unprepared to conduct it.48 Scholars have indicated that a preventive war in which the initiator is unprepared can signal three factors. First, the IJWP

Author Pakistani Armed Forces were incorrect in their comprehension of Indian capabilities. Second, the Pakistan Armed Forces were expecting high lev- els of local support.49 Third, it considered a short war with international intervention, from the USSR and USA50 or China51 that would allow it to keep its gains.52 Copyrighted Along with the above factors, a fourth one—staving off political oppo- sition to the military regime by the population in East Pakistan—may have forced the autocratic elites to undertake a patriotic diversion. In fact, Pakistan had indirect elections in January 1965 to bolster the military con- trolled executive with a popular mandate. Yet, despite favorable electoral rules, Ayub nearly lost in East Pakistan because of resentment against West Pakistani control over politics and economic inequality between the two wings had been increasing since the 1958 coup.53 The deep-seated nature of such opposition is evident because it occurred despite the central gov- ernment’s infusion of massive developmental funds in certain areas of the

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Eastern Wing to divide and co-opt segments of the East-Pakistani popu- lace.54 However, according to accounts of West Pakistani business execu- tives and government officials working in East Pakistan, the Ayub regime’s popularity demonstrably increased when the war began later that year.55 Furthermore, there was considerable opposition from sections of the West Pakistani population. An officer in the US Air Force stationed in West Pakistan, who also noted Ayub Khan’s electoral manipulation, witnessed pre-electoral riots and public demonstrations.56 The Times of London reported on post-election riots in between émigrés to Pakistan from northern India in 1947 who supported , and loyal to Ayub Khan.57 Subsequent complaints alleged that Ayub Khan’s son Gohar Ayub Khan and nephew Ashraf Khan were personally involved in instigating the riots.58 Nevertheless, the fact that East Pakistan was left unfortified had major

politicaldistribute ramifications. The reasoning provided by the federal government

fornot this strategy was that the defence of the East lay in the West: an Indian attack on East Pakistan would be neutralized by an attack on India’s western Do Copy front.- 59 However, the war revealed Pakistan’s incapability to successfully attack India’s western front.60 Moreover, after the war, Bhutto stated that the Proof East2015 was protected by China’s presence across the chicken’s neck connecting mainland India to its northeastern provinces.61 The running of the war, its IJWP

Author outcome, and Bhutto’s statements further aggrieved the economically and politically marginalized East Pakistani populace, while the stalemate with India exposed the overall weakness of the Pakistani military.62 Ayub’s resignation in 1969 and the assumption of power by General came after rising domestic turmoil in both East and West Copyrighted Pakistan. The Awami League headed by Mujibur Rahman led East Pakistan and the Pakistan People’s Party headed by led West Pakistan. Mujib represented a cross-class coalition in East Pakistan, rep- resenting urban intellectuals and professionals, the landed farmers called jotedars (the largely Hindu landlords having fled to India in 1947), and the peasantry. What obfuscates the socioeconomic/class dimension of the election result was that the Awami League forwarded an autonomist and Bengali nationalist agenda.63 Unlike the Awami League, the Pakistan People’s Party led by Bhutto was unable to present a similarly unifying cross-class coalition in West Pakistan;

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he received the support of urban professionals, students, and labourers in West Pakistan,64 but faced competition from conservative parties backed by landlords in the rural areas.65 Facing an untenable situation of repressing political mobilization in East Pakistan and possibly intending to return the army to the barracks, Yahya Khan called for independent Pakistan’s first general elections based on universal adult suffrage.66 The elections resulted in what had been expected: the Awami League used its uncontested control of East Pakistani (with the majority of the Pakistani population) to win the majority of seats in the National Assembly.67 Yahya Khan’s subsequent decision to repress the popular mobilization in East Pakistan, combined with Bhutto’s refusal to have an East Pakistani prime minister based on the principle of a democratic majority, made the situa- Political instability tion ripe for a secessionist movement.68 caused by repression distribute The combination of these issues led to of democratic elections

not riots and killings of non-Bengali civilians and officials by local mobs and armed most clearly propelled Do Copy - secessionists, and indiscriminate retal- Pakistan to declare war iatory strikes against minority Bengali against India. Proof 2015 Hindus, intellectuals, and communities suspected of disloyalty by the West Pakistani dominated military.69 IJWP

Author This time, political instability caused by repression of democratic elec- tions most clearly propelled Pakistan to declare war against India. The collapse of law and order in East Pakistan, exacerbated by the Army’s repres- sion, caused a huge outflow of refugees into India through late 1970 and 1971. India’s resulting covert and overt support to the secessionist militia, Copyrighted the Mukti Bahini (freedom fighters), and to achieve a first-strike advantage, led Pakistan to declare war on the 3rd of December 1971.70 However, the Pakistani Army was defeated in East Pakistan, which subsequently became the independent state of Bangladesh. The secession of East Pakistan permitted Bhutto to become the first truly popular and the most powerful civilian head of government in Pakistan. Despite his feudal background, Bhutto forwarded, if only in rhetoric, a socialist agenda of more equality in terms of wealth and land.71 He also undertook a programme to nationalize certain heavy industries and redis- tribute land.72 However, such policies angered the religiously-oriented and

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urban middle class, as well as the feudal elites, and the Army.73 Consequently, after recouping its self-esteem by 1977 because of successes in suppressing a rebellion in the province of Baluchistan, the Army led by General Zia ul Haq used the pretext of a failing economy and deteriorating law and order conditions to conduct another coup.74 A series of crises followed the 1977 coup. The crisis of 1984 centred on a possible preventive strike on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities by India. In the background loomed two active insurgencies in India and Pakistan. One insurgency and mass mobilization was based in the Pakistani province of Sindh, which Pakistan accused India of supporting. The second insurgency was occurring in the Indian province of Punjab, which New Delhi accused Islamabad of supporting. The situation was exacerbated by the recent Indian military occupation of an inaccessible glacier north of the line of control that delineates Indian-administered Kashmir from its Pakistani counterpart.75

distribute However, the most noticeable element from the perspective of domes-

ticnot politics in both India and Pakistan was the overall stability of the two governments. Whereas a democratically-elected government in India had Do Copy two-thirds- of the seats in the parliament’s lower house, General Zia ul Haq’s military government was also stable. A verbal pact was made in 1985 to Proof rule2015 out future preventive attacks. Again, in 1987, India undertook the largest military exercise in its IJWP

Author history: Exercise Brass Tacks. The exercise, held in the Thar Desert on India’s western front, was organized on an East-West axis rather than the usual North-South axis, which increased fears that the exercise could turn into an operation against Pakistan. However, after a series of escalatory moves, both sides deescalated.76 In 1990 the same situation occurred in Copyrighted reverse, with the Pakistani Army conducting an exercise that India feared was a prelude to an invasion. In the backdrop was a raging insurgency in Kashmir that had started in 1989.77 However, this time there was a civilian regime in Pakistan. The crises of 1987 and 1990 are comparable because, despite democra- tization during this period, there remained underlying authoritarian policy enclaves. The Army in Pakistan had acceded power after General Zia ul Haq’s death, yet it had retained certain policy enclaves that it considered fundamental to national security.78 This included Pakistan’s nuclear pro- gramme and foreign policy toward the great powers and India.79 In short,

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the crises were directly within the purview of the military’s policy domain. In 1990, an inexperienced prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, facilitated the military’s control of the situation by being incapable of shaping foreign policy priorities.80 Furthermore, she even attempted to outbid her domestic military and civilian rivals with nationalist rhetoric regarding Kashmir.81 Consequently, though a mixed system, the Pakistani regime was stable. The same mixed regime undertook nuclear tests to counter the domestic pressure from India’s nuclear tests in 1998. The fear of a preventive attack on its own facilities again created a crisis similar to 1984, yet Pakistan did not initiate war. In contrast, 1999 was a tumultuous year in the domestic politics of Pakistan. The aforementioned mixed regime depended on a troika of institutions. A president representing the civilian bureaucratic interests existed The War of 1999 to check the prime minister, and the was used as a policy distribute president could dismiss prime ministers instrument by the Army

not and dissolve parliament. The Prime Minister represented popular interests. to outmaneuver the Do Copy - The Army retained policy dominance on civilian leaders. issues pertaining to national security and Proof 2015 related foreign policy. Although the exact decision-making leading up the War of 1999 or IJWP

Author the Kargil Conflict remains unclear, there are three possible explanations for the role of civilian versus military elites. First, the Army kept the civil- ian leadership in the dark about the operations. Second, the Army did not inform the civilian leadership of the full extent of the plans. Third, the civilian leadership was fully aware of the plans; the peace process had been Copyrighted an elaborate façade to facilitate Pakistani strategy. Our research suggests, however, that it may have been a combination of the first two explanations, since it was wholly against the civilian leadership’s interests to support a military adventure that would either bring defeat at a time when it was at the helm of affairs and/or increased credibility for a competing institution. In short, the war was used as a policy instrument by the Army to outmaneuver the civilian leaders. Specifically, in line with our argument, then-Prime Minister was on a two-pronged drive to bring the president’s and military’s power under civilian oversight and control. As he faced off with the

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President who was indirectly backed by the Army, Sharif used his parlia- mentary super-majority to repeal Articles 112(2) (b) and 58 (2) (b) of the constitution that empowered the President to dismiss elected govern- ments.82 Moreover, he enacted Article 63 (A), which created insurmount- able barriers to conduct a no-confidence motion in the Parliament to oust the Prime Minister.83 He also threatened the Armed Forces dominance in key policy areas, including attempting to dismiss the Chief of Army Staff.84 Sharif’s actions were reminiscent of a previous civilian leader. From 1971 to 1977, Bhutto had undertaken two major changes in Pakistan’s security policy. First, he had jump-started a nuclear weapons programme under the control of civilian leadership, which reduced his dependence on the military for national security.85 Second, he created a paramilitary unit (the Federal Security Force), accountable to the prime minister, to reduce dependence on the military for matters concerning internal security. After

thedistribute coup of 1977, the military took over the nuclear weapons programme.

not With the non-conventional weapons and para-military paths blocked, Nawaz Sharif exploited another strategy to neutralize the military’s domi- Do Copy nance.- He attempted to do so by signing the Lahore Declaration with India to bilaterally reduce tensions, increase economic cooperation, and Proof stop2015 intervening in each other’s internal affairs (by supporting insurgent groups).86 However, even at the onset, the senior military officers refused IJWP

Author to participate in these negotiations, boycotted the welcoming ceremony of the Indian Prime Minister at the border87 and harassed guests at the official reception ceremony in Lahore via Islamic proxy groups.88 It is apparent that, during the peace process started after the 1998 nuclear tests, the Pakistani Army had planned a salami tactic move into Copyrighted Indian-administered Kashmir. A combination of regular Pakistani Army and irregular Kashmiri insurgent forces would occupy strategic heights that threatened India’s only all-weather highway to the northern areas of Kashmir under its control.89 Due to the high altitude and severe weather conditions in the upper reaches of the Himalayas, the Indians vacate these outposts during winter. The military leadership thought that an Indian retaliation would invite international intervention because the dispute could become nuclear.90 After patrols in the early summer of 1999 were ambushed in that area, India quickly realized the gravity of the occupation. India applied both

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diplomatic and military pressure on the occupied areas. However, unlike 1965, the Indian Army did not cross into the Pakistani-occupied areas of Kashmir. After the US and other great powers took India’s side on the issue, Pakistan’s untenable position became clear.91 Although it remains unclear if India had already dislodged all of the Pakistani forces, the Pakistani Army retreated due to international pressure. Nevertheless, despite the loss of the war, the peace process between India and Pakistan decisively ended. The civilian leadership, which had staked its credibility on the peace process, was consequently also faced with negotiating the humiliating agreement reaffirming the territorial status quo that was indirectly brokered by the United States.92 The double setback was compounded by Sharif’s own rivalry with the Chief of Army Staff, . Faced with growing opposition by civilian politicians based on the Kargil debacle and having failed to successfully dismiss Musharraf (and threatening his life by distribute denying landing rights to his plane),93 Sharif was ousted in a peaceful coup

not d’état in October 1999.94 Do

Copy During the subsequent 2001 and 2002 crisis, India’s army under- - took a full mobilization on its western front. This was a case of coercive

Proof diplomacy after an attack on the Indian parliament by the Lashkar-e-Taiba 2015 terrorist group sponsored the Pakistani Army’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence.95 This time the was General Musharraf; IJWP Author the military was in unchallenged control of Pakistani domestic politics. Thus, despite initial confusion and the presence of terrorist groups not fully controlled by either side, the crisis was met with a carefully calibrated Pakistani response that was open to de-escalation and negotiations.96 The

Copyrighted result, according to some, was perhaps advantageous to Pakistan vis-à-vis India.97

CONCLUSION This article demonstrates the effects of Pakistani domestic politics on its relationship to India. Except for the war of 1947-1948, the other crises and wars show no observable variance contingent on whether civilian and/ or military elites control Pakistan. In fact, following military takeovers, we witness that a number of crises did not lead to war. During the crises of 1984, 1987, and 2001-2002, the military was fully in power. Rather, despite

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variations in the causal path, a pattern has developed from 1965 onwards, wherein political instability is a pre-condition to Pakistani willingness to make war with India. However, the role that war plays within the politi- cal arena has varied: in 1965, new evidence from elections suggests war could have been a diversionary tactic to stem growing opposition to the military regime in East Pakistan; in 1971, it was an inadvertent outcome of the repression of the Bengali political opposition; in 1999, it was used to undermine the civilian leadership and retain the Army’s security and foreign policy prerogatives. This article attempts to show that political instability rather than the nature of particular regimes affects Pakistan’s decisions vis-à-vis India. However, political instability depends on changes in broader socioeconomic and institutional conditions. Thus, accurate understandings of when and how changes in these underlying structural conditions cause political insta-

bilitydistribute will require further measuring the effects of factors such as inequality

ofnot wealth and legitimacy of political institutions on political stability and, in turn, the initiation of conflict. This article takes the first step in this direc- Do Copy tion- of creating a new theory that considers the effects of domestic level political dynamics on Pakistani decisions towards India. Proof 2015 IJWP Author Notes

1. “An international crisis is a sequence of interactions between the govern-

mentsCopyrighted of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war.” Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 7. 2. Bruce Russet, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). James L. Ray, Democracy and International Conflict(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995). Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Sean M. Miller (eds), Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).

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3. William R. Thompson and Richard Tucker, “A Tale of Two Democratic Peace Critiques,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41:2 (1997a): 428-454. William R. Thompson and Richard Tucker, “Bewitched, Bothered, and Bewildered: A Reply to Farber and Gowa and to Mansfield and Snyder,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41:3 (1997b): 462-477. 4. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International Security, 20:1 (1995): 5-38. 5. Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Seattle: University of Washington Press). P. R. Chari, Pervaiz I. Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007). Zachary S. Davis (ed), The India Pakistan Military Standoff Crisis and Escalation in South Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

distribute 6. Karen Rasler, William R. Thompson and Sumit Ganguly (eds), How

not Rivalries End (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), p. 5. 7. Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science Do Copy - (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 47. 8. Van Evera (1997) p. 68-69. Proof 2015 9. Paul S. Kapur, “Peace and Conflict in the Indo-Pakistani Rivalry: Domestic and Strategic Causes,” in Sumit Ganguly and William R. Thompson (eds), Asian IJWP

Author Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two-Level Games (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 61-78. 10. Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972). 11. Christine Fair, “Why the is here to stay: prospects for civil- Copyrighted ian governance,” International Affairs 87:3 (2011): 571-588. 12. “Political Instability Index Vulnerability to Social and Political Unrest,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, available at: {http://viewswire.eiu.com/index. asp?layout=VWArticleVW3&article_id=874361472}accessed 25 September 2014. 13. Ibid. 14. T. V. Paul, “Why has the India-Pakistan Rivalry Been so Enduring? Power Asymmetry and an Intractable Conflict,”Security Studies, 15:4 (2006): 600-630. 15. Ganguly (2001). 16. Mohammed Musa, My Version: India-Pakistan War, 1965 (Lahore: Wajidali’s, 1983).

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17. Michael Krepon, “The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation in South Asia,” in Rafiq Dossani and Henry Rowen (eds), Prospects of Peace in South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004). 18. Ganguly (2001). 19. Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace,” International Security, 34:3 (2009/2010): 38-78. Vipin, Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). 20. John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1974). 21. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 5. 22. Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: The Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

distribute 23. Sundeep Waslekar, The Final Settlement: Restructuring India-Pakistan

Relationsnot (Bombay: International Centre for Peace Initiatives, 2005), pp. 47-80. 24. Niranjan D. Gulhati, The Indus Water Treaty: An Exercise in International Do Copy Mediation- (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1973). 25. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, Proof DC:2015 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). Fair (2011): 571-588. Shaun Gregory, “The ISI and the War on Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and IJWP

Author Terrorism, 30:12 (2007): 1013-1031. 26. Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2005). 27. Julian Schofield, “Militarized Decision-Making for arW in Pakistan: 1947- 1971,” Armed Forces and Society, 27:1 (2000): 131-148. Copyrighted 28. Thompson and Tucker (1997a), pp. 428-454. Thompson and Tucker, (1997b), pp. 462-477. 29. David Malone, Does the Elephant Dance? (Oxford University Press, 2011). Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan at Fifty: A Tenuous Democracy,” Current History 96: 614 (1997), pp. 419-424. 30. T. V. Paul, “The Pakistan Offensive in Kashmir, 1965,” in T. V. Paul (ed), Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 143-180. 31. Paul (1994), pp. 143-180. 32. Paul S. Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and

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Islamist Militancy in South Asia,” International Security, 37: 1 (2012): 111-141. Fair (2014). 33. C. H. Philips, The Evolution of India and Pakistan (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1962). 34. Ganguly (1997), pp. 9-11. 35. Ganguly (1997), pp. 15-31. 36. Owen B. Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 56-70. 37. Ganguly (2001), pp. 67-68. 38. Ganguly (2001), pp. 137-138. 39. Talat Ahmed, “Writers and Generals: Intellectuals and the First Pakistan Coup,” Indian Economic Social History Review, 45:1 (2008): 115-149. 40. Hasan Zaheer, The Times and Trial of the Conspiracy, 1951: The First Coup Attempt in Pakistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

distribute 41. Askar R. Hasan, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1997 (Lahore:

not Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2000), pp. 79-81. 42. M. Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Do Copy - 1967), pp. 60. 43. Schofield(2000), pp. 131-148. Proof 2015 44. Tan Tai Yong, The Garrison State: The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005). IJWP

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to only give “moral support,” but possibly refused to actively engage the India Army fearing retaliation from Western powers. 53. Craig Baxter, “The Ayub Khan Era,” in Peter R. Blood (ed), Pakistan a Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division), pp. 44-53. 54. Khalid B. Sayeed, “1965—An Epoch Making Year in Pakistan—General Elections and War with India,” Asian Survey 6:2 (1966): 76-85. 55. Mumtaz Iqbal, “The 1965 War: A View from the East,” Rediff (5 October 1999). {http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/feb/20bus2.htm} accessed on 25 September 2014. Syed A. Mahmood, “The September War as Seen from the then East Pakistan,” The News (6 September 2013) {http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2- 200314-The-September-war-as-seen-from-the-then-East-Pakistan} accessed on 25 September 2014.

distribute 56. George L. Singleton, “Pakistan’s Brief 1965 Presidential Election and

Relatednot War Agitation,” Cold War Times 10:4 (2010): 17-20. 57. “Karachi Curfew Imposed After Riot Deaths,” The Times (5 Jan. 1965). Do Copy - 58. “Court Complaints,” Reuter (17 Jan. 1965). 59. Hamoodur Rahman, Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report Proof (Government2015 of Pakistan, 1974: 69). 60. Sumit Ganguly, “Deterrence Failure Revisited: The Indo-Pakistani War IJWP

Author of 1965,” Journal of Strategic Studies 13:4 (1990): 76-85. David V. Praagh, Greater Game: India’s Race with Destiny and China (Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 2004). Devin T. Hagerty and Herbert G. Hagerty, “India’s Foreign Relations,” in Devin T. Hagerty (ed), South Asia in World Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Copyrighted Littlefield, 2005), pp. 11-48. 61. G. W. Choudhury, “Bangladesh: Why it Happened,” International Affairs 48:2 (1972): 242-249. 62. Ian Talbot, “Pakistan: A Modern History’ (London: Hurst and Co., 1998), pp. 188-189. 63. Robert W. Stern, Democracy and Dictatorship in South Asia: Dominant Classes and Political Outcomes in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), pp. 49-74. 64. Craig Baxter and Shahid J. Burki, “Socio-Economic Indicators of the People’s Party Vote in the Punjab,” Journal of Asian Studies, 34:4 (1975): 913-930.

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65. Wolfgang-Peter Zingel, “Pakistan,” in Dieter Nohlen, Florian Grotz and Christof Hartmann (eds), Election in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook, Vol. 1 Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001 and 2004), pp. 661-696. 66. Owen B. Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 272. 67. Zingel (2001 and 2004), pp. 661-696, 678. 68. G. W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan (London: Hurst and Co., 1974). 69. Sarmila Bose, “Anatomy of Violence: Analysis of Civil War in East Pakistan in 1971,” Economic and Political Weekly, 40:41 (2005): 4463-4471. 70. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), p. 230.

distribute 71. Matthew McCartney, Pakistan—The Political Economy of Growth,

not Stagnation and the State, 1951-2009 (New York and London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 150-151. Do Copy - 72. Eric W. Gustafson, “Economic Problems of Pakistan under Bhutto,” Asian Survey, 16:4 (1976): 364-380. Proof 2015 73. Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). IJWP

Author 74. Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press), pp. 81-83. 75. Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), pp. 68-81. Copyrighted 76. Ganguly (2001), pp. 83-88. 77. Ganguly and Hagerty (2005), pp. 68-81. J. N. Dixit, India and Pakistan in War and Peace (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 271-276. 78. Cohen (2006), pp. 146-153. 79. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 199-206. 80. P. R. Chari, Pervaiz I. Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 30-33. 81. Shekhar Gupta and , “Benazir Under Siege: Benazir

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Bhutto’s Sudden Dismissal Plunges Pakistan’s Fledgling Democracy into a Crisis,” India Today (31 August 1990). 82. Furqan Mohammed, “Exploring Power Politics and Constitutional Subversion in Pakistan: A Political and Constitutional Assessment of Instability in Pakistan,” Loyola University Chicago, International Law Review 7:2 (2010): 229-240. 83. Mohammed (2010), pp. 229-240. 84. Mahar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State (London: Routledge), pp. 89-91. 85. Feroz H. Khan, “Pakistan: Political Transitions and Nuclear Management,” Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy Education Centre (27 February 2012). {http:// www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1156&rid=6} accessed on 25 September 2014. 86. Cohen (2006), pp. 149-152. 87. George Iype, “Pakistan Military Chief’s Boycott Wagah Welcome,” Rediff

(20distribute February 1999) {http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/feb/20bus2.htm}

accessednot on 25 September 2014. 88. Vali Nasr, “National Identities and the India-Pakistan Conflict,” in T. Do Copy V.- Paul (ed), The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 178-201. Proof 2015 89. Rajesh M. Basrur, “Kargil, Terrorism, and India’s Strategic Shift,” India Review 1:4 (2002): 39-56. IJWP

Author 90. Paul S. Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia is Not Like Cold War Europe,” International Security, 30:2 (2005): 127-152. 91. Bruce Riedel, American Diplomacy and the Kargil Summit at Blair House (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, Center for the Advanced Study of India), pp. 130-143. Copyrighted 92. P. R. Chari, Pervaiz I. Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 137. 93. Tim Weiner, “Countdown to Pakistan’s Coup: A Duel of Nerves in the Air,” New York Times (17 October 1999). 94. Ahmed A. Rashid, “Seeds of Conflict Lie in Summer’s Kashmir Crisis,” The Independent (13 October 1999). 95. Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai,” Development in Radicalization and Violence, April/May (2009): 1-29. 96. Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, “US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis,” in Z. S. Davis (ed), The India Pakistan Military Standoff Crisis

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and Escalation in South Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 143-187. 97. Sumit Ganguly and M. R. Kraig, “The 2001-2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” Security Studies, 14:2 (2005): 290-324. distribute not Do Copy - Proof 2015 IJWP Author Copyrighted

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