DOCSLIB.ORG

O Smith Task Force Final Report.Pdf

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

DDeeffeennssee,, DDeeffiicciittss,, aanndd DDeeppllooyymmeennttss:: TThhee FFuuttuurree ooff UUSS MMiilliittaarryy PPoolliiccyy Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies University of Washington, Seattle ▪ Winter, 2012 ii Defense, Deficits, and Deployments Defense, Deficits, and Deployments: The Future of U.S. Military Policy Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies Task Force Report 2012 Task Force Advisor: The Honorable Congressman Adam Smith Task Force Evaluator: Under Secretary of the Air Force Ms. Erin C. Conaton Task Force Members: Mike Beckett Jessica Beers Tyler Emsky Dan Hollenbeck Gregory Johnsen (editor) Stefan Kaehler Jennifer Kang Jordan Laramie Erika Nicks Marc Quint Marcus Sweetser Zhenni Thomas (editor) Andrew White Meagan Winnie Cover photos courtesy of: US Department of Defense [http://www.defense.gov/multimedia/] US Army [http://www.army.mil/yearinphotos/2011/] US Navy [http://www.navy.mil/view_photos_top.asp] ii Defense, Deficits, and Deployments A special thanks must be given to The Honorable Adam Smith, Professor Wolfram Latsch, and Under Secretary of the Air Force Ms. Erin C. Conaton for making this task force report possible. iii Defense, Deficits, and Deployments Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 1 Section I: Strategy .................................................................................................... 3 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................3 Chapter 1: Asymmetric Threats .....................................................................................................10 Chapter 2: Cyber Warfare ..............................................................................................................15 Chapter 3: Afghanistan and Pakistan .............................................................................................25 Chapter 4: Iran ...............................................................................................................................43 Chapter 5: China ............................................................................................................................55 Chapter 6: North Korea ..................................................................................................................66 Chapter 7: Alliances .......................................................................................................................79 Chapter 8: Base Realignment and Closure ....................................................................................88 Notes ..............................................................................................................................................90 Section II: Budget................................................................................................. 102 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................102 Chapter 9: US Federal Debt .........................................................................................................104 Chapter 10: The Defense Budget, In Perspective ........................................................................119 Chapter 11: Auditing the Department of Defense .......................................................................133 Chapter 12: Acquisition and Procurement ...................................................................................143 Notes ............................................................................................................................................162 Section III: Force Structure ................................................................................ 168 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................168 Chapter 13: The Strategic Nuclear Forces ...................................................................................170 Chapter 14: Department of the Air Force ....................................................................................189 Chapter 15: Department of the Navy ...........................................................................................208 Chapter 16: Department of the Army ..........................................................................................226 Chapter 17: USSOCOM ..............................................................................................................242 Chapter 18: Military Personnel ....................................................................................................249 Chapter 19: Operations and Maintenance ....................................................................................263 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 271 Notes ............................................................................................................................................273 Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 292 iv Defense, Deficits, and Deployments Executive Summary | By Gregory Johnsen and Zhenni Thomas America’s economic strength and military might go hand in hand. Each is indispensable to the other. Thus, in times such as the present when America’s deteriorating fiscal position requires swift and reasoned attention, it becomes incumbent on the Department of Defense to evaluate how its own operations help or hinder the situation. Deliberate decisions by Congress have further entrenched this relationship vis-à-vis the Budget Control Act of 2011 which directly imposes cuts to DoD spending as part of a larger effort to bring the federal budget toward balance. Even if not for the fiscal circumstances, the present moment is a good one for reevaluating the trajectory of US military strategy. Now that Operation Iraqi Freedom has ended and activities in Afghanistan are waning, DoD will face very different demands on its resources than it has over the past ten years. Asymmetric threats to national security such as terror cells and cyber warfare also continue to pose novel challenges, requiring adaptation by the department. This task force report begins at a sensible point, by conducting a comprehensive evaluation of the present and projected threats to US national security. Only with an understanding of the threats faced can we begin to talk about the forces necessary to repel them. We examine asymmetric threats including terror cells, WMD, and cyber warfare. Next we examine unstable regimes such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. We also consider the growing military and economic power of China, which should not be viewed as an immediate threat, but must be taken into consideration. Finally, our review of strategy conducts an analysis of the role that basing and alliances have in US military policy. The second major section of this report is a careful evaluation of the budgetary matters at hand. We begin with a critical examination of the overall federal budget and projected trends. This includes thoughtful discussion of the interplay between economic and military might. A comprehensive review of our defense spending is then in order, to consider whether our present level of DoD funding is high or low. We conclude neither— that in truth, the appropriate way to judge a defense budget is by its ability to counter threats as efficiently but effectively as possible. Toward that end, we propose that two key actions DoD must take are ensuring auditability and reforming procurement practices. The third and final section of our report lays out a comprehensive vision for the future structure of our military forces. We cover the strategic nuclear arsenal, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, Army, and Special Operations. Our findings indicate that there are certainly efficiencies to be found, which can reduce DoD expenditures without gravely jeopardizing national security. We structure these proposals into three tiers, each suitable to different defense budget scenarios. Lastly we examine department-wide reforms to personnel and operations and maintenance. These expenditures continue to consume an increasing share of our national defense budget and cannot be ignored. In all of this, our effort is to show that cautious and prudent examination of American defense spending can find room for efficiencies without sacrificing national security. Indeed, in some ways it may improve it, as a strategic restructuring of the forces brings them closer into line with the contemporary threats of the world we face. Our approach is in contrast to the blunt instrument of across-the-board budget sequesters which loom as a result of the Budget Control Act. We hope that it inspires those in positions of 1 Defense, Deficits, and Deployments power to step back from their own narrow areas of interest and examine a greater picture— one of a twenty-first century American defense that is capable, accountable, and efficient. 2 Defense, Deficits, and Deployments SECTION I: STRATEGY Introduction | By Stefan Kaehler The United States Armed Forces are currently undergoing a dramatic paradigm shift in their approach to the mission of global security. Previous strategies, such as the “Two
Recommended publications
  • Afghanistan: the Consolidation of a Rogue State Zalmay Khalilzad, Daniel Byman

    Afghanistan: the Consolidation of a Rogue State Zalmay Khalilzad, Daniel Byman

    Afghanistan: The Consolidation of a Rogue State Zalmay Khalilzad, Daniel Byman The Washington Quarterly, Volume 23, Number 1, Winter 2000, pp. 65-78 (Article) Published by The MIT Press For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/36511 [ This content has been declared free to read by the pubisher during the COVID-19 pandemic. ] Zalmay Khalilzad and Daniel Byman Afghanistan: The Consolidation of a Rogue State Afghanistan has gone from one of Washington’s greatest foreign policy triumphs to one of its most profound failures. During the Cold War, U.S. support to the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance resulted in a debacle for Moscow, humiliating the vaunted Red Army and discrediting the Soviets throughout the Muslim world. After the Soviets withdrew, however, Af- ghanistan has become a disaster for U.S. policy. The master terrorist ‘Usama bin Laden has taken shelter in Afghanistan, using it as a base to indoctri- nate and train militants who strike at the United States and its allies. Af- ghan women face a horrifying array of restrictions, among the most repressive in the world. The country is now the world’s leading producer of opium, which in turn is used to produce heroin. These problems, however, are only symptoms of a more dangerous disease. Though policymakers are loathe to say it openly, Afghanistan is ruled by a rogue regime, the Taliban. The outrages that draw headlines in the West stem from its misrule and will continue as long as the movement dominates Afghanistan. If anything, the danger is growing. “Talibanism”—a radical, backward, and repressive version of Islam similar to the Saudi “Wahhabi” credo but rejected by the vast ma- jority of Muslims worldwide—is gaining adherents outside Afghanistan and spreading to other countries in the region.
  • Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban

    Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban

    Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban A thesis submitted to the Miami University Honors Program in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for University Honors with Distinction by, Brandon Smith May 2005 Oxford, OH ABSTRACT AFGHANISTAN, 1989-1996: BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE TALIBAN by, BRANDON SMITH This paper examines why the Afghan resistance fighters from the war against the Soviets, the mujahideen, were unable to establish a government in the time period between the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan in 1989 and the consolidation of power by the Taliban in 1996. A number of conflicting explanations exist regarding Afghanistan’s instability during this time period. This paper argues that the developments in Afghanistan from 1989 to 1996 can be linked to the influence of actors outside Afghanistan, but not to the extent that the choices and actions of individual actors can be overlooked or ignored. Further, the choices and actions of individual actors need not be explained in terms of ancient animosities or historic tendencies, but rather were calculated moves to secure power. In support of this argument, international, national, and individual level factors are examined. ii Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban by, Brandon Smith Approved by: _________________________, Advisor Karen L. Dawisha _________________________, Reader John M. Rothgeb, Jr. _________________________, Reader Homayun Sidky Accepted by: ________________________, Director, University Honors Program iii Thanks to Karen Dawisha for her guidance and willingness to help on her year off, and to John Rothgeb and Homayun Sidky for taking the time to read the final draft and offer their feedback.
  • Introduction

    Introduction

    NOTES Introduction 1. Robert Kagan to George Packer. Cited in Packer’s The Assassin’s Gate: America In Iraq (Faber and Faber, London, 2006): 38. 2. Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004): 9. 3. Critiques of the war on terror and its origins include Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (Routledge, New York and London, 2004); Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America At the Crossroads (Profile Books, London, 2006); Ira Chernus, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin (Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, CO and London, 2006); and Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (Doubleday, New York, 2008). 4. A report of the PNAC, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, September 2000: 76. URL: http:// www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf (15 January 2009). 5. On the first generation on Cold War neoconservatives, which has been covered far more extensively than the second, see Gary Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture and the War of Ideology (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1993); Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America’s Politics (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1979); Murray Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005); Murray Friedman ed. Commentary in American Life (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 2005); Mark Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars (Madison Books, Lanham MD; New York; Oxford, 1997); and Maria Ryan, “Neoconservative Intellectuals and the Limitations of Governing: The Reagan Administration and the Demise of the Cold War,” Comparative American Studies, Vol.
  • WTH Is Going on with the Retreat from Afghanistan? Amb. Ryan Crocker On

    WTH Is Going on with the Retreat from Afghanistan? Amb. Ryan Crocker On

    WTH is going on with the retreat from Afghanistan? Amb. Ryan Crocker on withdrawal, and the consequences for US national security Episode #115 | September 1, 2021 | Danielle Pletka, Marc Thiessen, and Amb. Ryan Crocker Danielle Pletka: Hi, I'm Danielle Pletka. Marc Thiessen: I'm Marc Thiessen. Danielle Pletka: Welcome to our podcast, What the Hell Is Going On? Marc, what the hell is going on? Marc Thiessen: I've never been more disgusted in my life with what's happening with what America is doing than I am right now watching the last planes leaving Kabul, leaving behind American citizens, thousands of Afghans who risked their lives to help us, the blood of 13 dead Americans and hundreds of Afghan civilians. It is the most shameful thing I have witnessed in my entire career in Washington. I'm shifting between absolute abject pain and rage as I watch this happen. Dany, what are your thoughts? Danielle Pletka: It is the worst thing in the world that a country like ours, we've suffered defeats, we've made mistakes, we've done terrible things. Never, I hope willfully, but by mistake, we've done terrible things. And we have betrayed allies before. We've not done enough for people who need us. We've let down the Kurds in Iraq, we've let down the Syrian people, but we have never actually gone in and rescued a group of people who in turn sacrificed all for us and for our security as Afghans did, because make no mistake, we were not in Afghanistan for the Afghan people.
  • Congress and the United Nations How to Build a Better Relationship and Move Forward on Needed U.N

    Congress and the United Nations How to Build a Better Relationship and Move Forward on Needed U.N

    CONGRESS AND THE UNITED NATIONS How to Build a Better Relationship and Move Forward on Needed U.N. Reforms Spencer P. Boyer Center for American Progress September 2007 [A]n effective United Nations is in America’s interest…. As one of the principal architects of the United Nations, the United States placed at the foundation of the U.N. certain fundamental purposes and values—preserving peace, promoting progress, and advo- cacy of human rights. It is therefore vital for the United States to enable this institution to make the greatest possible contribution to advance those founding objectives. –Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations1 www.americanprogress.org Center for American Progress Introduction he relationship between the United States and the United Nations is in desperate need of repair. Although the United Nations owes its existence to the post-World TWar II leadership of America and its allies, in recent years the U.S.–U.N. rela- tionship has spiraled downward into one that is too often dysfunctional. While the rela- tionship has never been without tension, having endured Cold War-related polarization and other political disagreements, much of the breakdown has happened over the past decade—with the U.N. Secretariat, U.N. member states, and the U.S. executive and legislative branches all deserving a share of the blame. A significant part of the prob- lem, however, has been the failure of the United States to provide sufficient support and leadership for the world body. Unfortunately, the timing couldn’t be worse. The United States needs the United Na- tions more than ever to help tackle a range of transnational challenges that directly threaten U.S.
  • “Benevolent Global Hegemony”: William Kristol and the Politics of American Empire

    “Benevolent Global Hegemony”: William Kristol and the Politics of American Empire

    Gary Dorrien “Benevolent Global Hegemony”: William Kristol and the Politics of American Empire by Gary Dorrien ear the end of the Cold War a group of neo-conservative intellectuals and Npolicy makers began to argue that instead of cutting back on America’s vast military system, the United States needed to use its unmatched power to create a global Pax Americana. Some of them called it the unipolarist imperative. The goal of American foreign policy, they argued, should be to maintain and extend America’s unrivaled global dominance. The early advocates of unipolar dominance were familiar figures: Norman Podhoretz, Midge Decter, Charles Krauthammer, Paul Wolfowitz, Joshua Muravchik, and Ben Wattenberg. Their ranks did not include the godfather of neo-conservatism, Irving Kristol, who had no interest in global police work or crusading for world democracy. Though he later clarified that he was all for enhancing America’s economic and military preeminence, Irving Kristol thought that America’s overseas commitments should be determined by a classically realist calculus. His son William Kristol had a greater ambition for America, which he called “benevolent global hegemony.” In 1992, the New York Times revealed that Wolfowitz, then an undersecretary for defense, was drafting a new policy plan for the Pentagon that sought to prevent any nation or group of nations from challenging America’s global supremacy. President George Bush disavowed the controversial plan, and for the rest of the 1990s establishment Republicans did not speak of grand new strategies. But the neo-cons continued to argue for “American Greatness,” founded new institutions, and made alliances with hard-line conservatives such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld.
  • Lessons-Encountered.Pdf

    Lessons-Encountered.Pdf

    conflict, and unity of effort and command. essons Encountered: Learning from They stand alongside the lessons of other wars the Long War began as two questions and remind future senior officers that those from General Martin E. Dempsey, 18th who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound Excerpts from LChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: What to repeat them. were the costs and benefits of the campaigns LESSONS ENCOUNTERED in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what were the LESSONS strategic lessons of these campaigns? The R Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University was tasked to answer these questions. The editors com- The Institute for National Strategic Studies posed a volume that assesses the war and (INSS) conducts research in support of the Henry Kissinger has reminded us that “the study of history offers no manual the Long Learning War from LESSONS ENCOUNTERED ENCOUNTERED analyzes the costs, using the Institute’s con- academic and leader development programs of instruction that can be applied automatically; history teaches by analogy, siderable in-house talent and the dedication at the National Defense University (NDU) in shedding light on the likely consequences of comparable situations.” At the of the NDU Press team. The audience for Washington, DC. It provides strategic sup- strategic level, there are no cookie-cutter lessons that can be pressed onto ev- Learning from the Long War this volume is senior officers, their staffs, and port to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman ery batch of future situational dough. The only safe posture is to know many the students in joint professional military of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and unified com- historical cases and to be constantly reexamining the strategic context, ques- education courses—the future leaders of the batant commands.
  • 08.30.2Comms PAO and News Orgs Interim Part 2

    08.30.2Comms PAO and News Orgs Interim Part 2

    O'Malley, Devin (OPA) From: O'Malley, Devin (OPA) Sent: Thursday, November 2, 2017 7:19 PM To: (b)( 6) - Alex Pfeiffer Cc: Sutton, Sa ra h E. {OPA) Subject: Tomorrow's Backgrounder Attachments: 171102_ EOIR_Caseload_ Reduction_Plan_ Backgrounde r. pdf; 171031_OOAG_ EOIR_MEMO.pdf H ey Alex- ~econtents ofthis email and tomon:o,,-'s backgrounder are embargoed until the conclusion of tomorrow's meeting. Kone. ofthe documents attached can be published in any way. Just so you know, we uill be hosting a larger background \\"'ith D OJ beat reporters and some immigration reporters. Those reporters are not gettfr1g the memo, nor will they be getting some additional info I'll se.tid to you later tonight. They will be subject to an embargo until 2:00 pm.** I'm looking fot\t:'ard to tomot:ro\.'\'s backgrounder. You'll be speaking withJames .McHenry (Acting Director, Execufa·e Office for Immigration Re\.·iew) and Gene Hamilton (Counselor., Office of the Attorney Gene.cal), and both can be cited as "D OJ official.." Offthe record, you'll notice one line in there about the current space and hm,· many courtrooms it fits; since the memo was published, ,ve've been able to increase that number, so it's outdated and I'd avoid using it. I'm probably going to send you one or two more background items. for your piece later tonight. I',;,-e copied some additional background belm.v: As noted in early August, the Executi\Te Office for Immigration ReYieW has seen anincrease in key statistics under this .Administration_ This trend has continued through September 30th (2/1/ 2016- 9 130/ 2016 n.
  • STRATEGIC APPRAISAL the Changing Role of Information in Warfare

    STRATEGIC APPRAISAL the Changing Role of Information in Warfare

    STRATEGIC APPRAISAL The Changing Role of Information in Warfare Edited by ZALMAY M. KHALILZAD JOHN P. WHITE Foreword by ANDREW W. MARSHALL R Project AIR FORCE The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under contract F49642-96-C-0001. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The changing role of information in warfare / Zalmay M. Khalilzad, John P. White, editors. p. cm. “Prepared for the United States Air Force by RAND's Project AIR FORCE.” “MR-1016-AF.” Includes bibliographical references (p. ). ISBN 0-8330-2663-1 1. Military art and science—Automation. I. Khalilzad, Zalmay M. II. White, John P. UG478.C43 1999 355.3 ' 43—dc21 99-24933 CIP RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and deci- sionmaking through research and analysis. RAND® is a registered trademark. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opin- ions or policies of its research sponsors. © Copyright 1999 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopy- ing, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permis- sion in writing from RAND. Cover design by Eileen Delson La Russo Published 1999 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1333 H St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-4707 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Internet: [email protected] PREFACE The effects of new information technologies are all around us.
  • Naval Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942

    Naval Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942

    Battle of the Eastern Solomons 24 August 1942 Japanese Combined Fleet: Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (aboard IJN Yamato) Battleship: IJN Yamato - Captain Takayanagi Escort Carrier: IJN Taiyo Destroyer Division 7: Captain Konishi IJN Akebono - LCDR Nakagawa IJN Ushio - CDR Uesugi 3rd Fleet (Main Body): Vice Admiral Nagumo (aboard IJN Shokaku) Carrier Division 1: Vice Admiral Nagumo IJN Shokaku - Captain Arima Embarked Strike Group: LCDR Seki 26 Zeros 27 Vals (Aichi D3A1) 18 Kates (Nakajima B5N2) Embarked Strike Group: Lt. Takahashi 25 Zeros 27 Vals (Aichi D3A1) 18 Kates (Nakajima B5N2) Destroyer Division 10: Captain Abe IJN Kazegumo - CDR Yoshida IJN Yugumo - CDR Semba IJN Makikumo - CDR Fujita IJN Akigumo - CDR Soma Destroyer Division 16: IJN Hatsukaze - CDR Takahashi Unattacked: IJN Akizuki Close Support of Carriers (Vangaurd Force): Rear Admiral Abe (embarked IJN Hiei) Battleshp Division 11: Rear Admiral Abe IJN Hiei - Captain Nishida IJN Kirishima - Captain Iwabuchi Cruiser Division 7: Rear Admiral Nishimura IJN Kumano - Captain Tanaka IJN Suzuya - Captain Kimura Cruiser Division 8 IJN Chikuma - Captain Komura Destroyer Squadron 10: Rear Admiral Kimura (embarked IJN Nagara) IJN Nagara - Captain Naoi (Flagship) IJN Nowaki - CDR Kora IJN Maikaze - CDR Naksugi Destroyer Squadron 17 IJN Tanikaze - CDR Katsumi 1 Detached Carrier Strike Force: Rear Admiral Hara (Embarked IJN Tone) Light Carrier: IJN Ryujo - Captain Kato Embarked Strike Group: Notomi 23 Zeros 9 Kates (Nakajima B5N2) Heavy Cruiser: IJN Tone - Captain Anibe Destoyer Division 16:
  • Major Fleet-Versus-Fleet Operations in the Pacific War, 1941–1945 Operations in the Pacific War, 1941–1945 Second Edition Milan Vego Milan Vego Second Ed

    Major Fleet-Versus-Fleet Operations in the Pacific War, 1941–1945 Operations in the Pacific War, 1941–1945 Second Edition Milan Vego Milan Vego Second Ed

    U.S. Naval War College U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons Historical Monographs Special Collections 2016 HM 22: Major Fleet-versus-Fleet Operations in the Pacific arW , 1941–1945 Milan Vego Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-historical-monographs Recommended Citation Vego, Milan, "HM 22: Major Fleet-versus-Fleet Operations in the Pacific arW , 1941–1945" (2016). Historical Monographs. 22. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-historical-monographs/22 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Special Collections at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Historical Monographs by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS Major Fleet-versus-Fleet Major Fleet-versus-Fleet Operations in the Pacific War, 1941–1945 War, Pacific the in Operations Fleet-versus-Fleet Major Operations in the Pacific War, 1941–1945 Second Edition Milan Vego Milan Vego Milan Second Ed. Second Also by Milan Vego COVER Units of the 1st Marine Division in LVT Assault Craft Pass the Battleship USS North Carolina off Okinawa, 1 April 1945, by the prolific maritime artist John Hamilton (1919–93). Used courtesy of the Navy Art Collection, Washington, D.C.; the painting is currently on loan to the Naval War College Museum. In the inset image and title page, Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance ashore on Kwajalein in February 1944, immediately after the seizure of the island, with Admiral Chester W.
  • The Battle of the Coral Sea, May 1942

    The Battle of the Coral Sea, May 1942

    INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS The Battle of the Coral Sea, May 1942 An address to the Institute on 27 June 2017 by Peter J. Sweeney Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, New South Wales Special Interest Group on Military History1 The Battle of the Coral Sea, 4-8 May 1942, was fought between combined United States and Australian naval forces and the Imperial Japanese Navy. It was the world’s first sea battle between aircraft carriers – literally ‘fought in the air’. It was also the first naval battle in which opposing ships neither saw nor fired on each other. It resulted in the Japanese Port Moresby invasion fleet being turned back to Rabaul. Key words: World War II; Australia; Japan; United States; Coral Sea; Imperial Japanese Navy; Royal Australian Navy; United States Navy. The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first joint Aust - confusion by a surprise bombing raid on Japan on 18 ralian/American military operation after John Curtin’s April 1942 carried out by Lieutenant-Colonel Jimmy article ‘The Task Ahead’ was published in The Herald Doolittle of the United States Army Air Force. (Melbourne) on 27 December 1941. In that article, Lieutenant-Colonel Doolittle's daring bombing raid, Curtin wrote: besides raising American morale so soon after Pearl “The Australian Government, therefore, regards Harbour, caused great consternation for Japan’s senior the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the military leaders. As a result, instead of invading India at United States and Australia must have the fullest say this time, they decided first to expand eastward across in the direction of the democracies’ fighting plan.