sign in sign up
<<
Home , David Ray Griffin, Inclusivism, Sampradaya

Sanatana as a Whiteheadian ?

A presentation to the 6th International Whitehead Conference Salzburg, Austria July 3, 2006

Matthew Lopresti, Ph.D. Candidate Department of , University of at Manoa

Hindu Apologetics The statement “everybody is a Hindu” seems to denote a rather straightforward inclusivism on par with ’s Christian triumphalism. Instead of incorporating people of other traditions as “anonymous Christians” this statement would incorporate them as “anonymous .” The Whiteheadian-inspired, but distinctly Hindu, deep religious pluralism that Jeffery Long attempts to establish can, he claims,1 account for the statement everybody is a Hindu as being not only true but also a sincere pluralistic sentiment. To achieve this Long argues for two semantic distinctions that will distinguish this Hindu claim from the kind that Rahner makes.2 I argue, however, that the philosophical assumptions and implications that accompany Long’s use of Sanatana Dharma (SD) as the basis for this Hindu religious pluralism, will keep it from blossoming into a truly differential and therefore deep religious pluralism (DRP). In acting as an apologist for the claim that “everyone is a Hindu”3 Long must suggest that something other than a single denomination or cult is meant here by the use of the word “Hindu.” He begins by pointing out that “is not so much ‘a ’ [in-itself] as an architectonic structure incorporating the actual variety of religious paths that exist” (138), and through a further understanding of the term from this Hindu perspective one will come to see that “what is at issue here is ultimately a matter of semantics” (141), and that in the end, this claim that everybody is a Hindu is compatible with a deep religious pluralism. Long is not alone in this understanding of Hinduism and this partial definition can also be used to describe how people today understand what is known as Sanatana Dharma. Indeed, the term is frequently used by

1 In his article “Anekanta : Towards a Deep Hindu Religious Pluralism.” In Deep Religious Pluralism, ed. David Ray Griffin. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005 (130-157). 2 “Rahner claims that all people of good , regardless of explicit religious affiliation, are oriented salvifically towards Christ” (Long, 141). 3 And for others, such as, Hinduism is “the one religion of humanity” (141). M.S. Lopresti

Hindus to denote their own worldview when they do not wish to use the term Hinduism, and it is Long’s understanding of Hinduism as Sanatana Dharma that allows for him to defend the claim that “everybody is a Hindu” by arguing that this is actually a pluralistic statement. It is this understanding of Hinduism as Sanatana Dharma that constitutes Long’s first semantic distinction. The First Semantic Distinction In his article, Long bases his understanding of SD on Wilhelm Halbfass who writes: “Hinduism as the sanatanadharma is not a religion among ; it is said to be the ‘eternal religion,’ [the] religion in or behind all religions, a kind of ‘metareligion,’ a structure potentially ready to comprise and reconcile within itself all the religions of the world, just as it contains and reconciles within itself the so-called Hindu sects….”4 Despite Long’s criticism of this passage for its “triumphalist dimension” (148), he clearly shares the very same understanding of Sanatana Dharma as Halbfass. As such, Sanatana Dharma seems perfectly designed to serve as the foundation for a religious pluralism. As it stands, however, the term only seems to have a universal application by definitional fiat. This is because it is not explained how SD “reconciles all the religions of the world.” Unfortunately, Long does not take his reader’s understanding of it much further in this article beyond quoting Halbfass yet again in agreeing with him that SD is also like Hinduism in that it is “an amorphous conglomeration of sects” (146-7). Despite the fact that we need a more detailed explanation of what Long envisions Sanatana Dharma to be, his semantic distinction between the different types of Hinduism is very useful. In it he breaks down the word “Hinduism” into three general classes:

HinduismV, HinduismI, and HinduismSD. HinduismV, referring to the Vedic tradition and its philosophical and religious offshoots. The second, HinduismI, is broader in scope and incorporates the heterodox (or nastika) South Asian traditions in addition to the orthodox one’s that make up the first (hence the “I” as it is more broadly “Indian” in scope). The third, HinduismSD, or just Sanatana Dharma, Long translates as “eternal religion”(149).

4 Wilhelm Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection, 52-53 (quoted in Long, 147). Although in a personal correspondence with Long (May 29, 2006), he writes that he bases his own usage “largely on ’s. Originally,” Long continues, “the term… referred to, what in that article, I call HinduismV, and was meant to distinguish the ‘orthodox’ Brahmanical tradition (held to be eternal and apaurusheya) from rival, merely man-made (paurusheya) traditions such as , , Buddhism, and Jainism.” Nevertheless, for all intents and purposes, his use of SD in the article is very consistent with Halbfass’s.

2 M.S. Lopresti

This is the “all-inclusive worldview of general truths that encompasses all the world’s religions and … [it gives] expression to the larger vision and structure of that underlies all religious and philosophical diversity” (149). Therefore, if Hinduism means Sanatana Dharma, and Sanatana Dharma means “the all-inclusive worldview” then, naturally, everyone is a Hindu. I argue, however, that this claim is either an empty one or an inclusivist one and cannot serve as the basis for a deep or Whiteheadian religious pluralism. Long offers no explicit content for supporting the claim that the worldview offered by Sanatana Dharma “encompasses all the world’s religions and philosophies.” But by asserting it in different ways, he says plenty about its intended function (to serve as the basis for a religious pluralism) and its scope (as applicable to “all the world’s religions and philosophies”), but he says very little, if anything, about how it achieves either of these. Beyond the claims of its function and scope then, Sanatana Dharma, as Long presents it in this article, is empty of content. Were it to remain empty, it would actually only amount to a meaningless sentiment and a standardless . I do not think that this is what Long has in mind, however, as he is very keen to argue against relativistic positions throughout his article. What we are then left with for deciphering its content is Long’s pluralistic of religion, which takes SD as its foundation. (That is, we must ask how he uses this theory to talk about other religions.) From this we can see how Sanatana Dharma’s presumably “universal” worldview shows itself to be peculiarly Hindu in its characterization of reality: affirming such doctrines as , rebirth, and liberation (primarily through his referencing of the four as efficacious praxes).5 His use of SD as the basis for a pluralistic , therefore, reveals that the basic structure of reality, according to his theory, is properly captured by the Hindu worldview and that this in turn captures the meaning of all the world’s religions and philosophies. There are two problems with this. Conflicting truth claims aside, Long does not offer any ontological standards for determining the degree to which radically divergent philosophical and religious systems (either in whole or in part) measure up to SD. Which is to say, he does not offer a Hindu version of religious ultimates commensurate with

5 The four yogas being: karma, jnana, , and raja (139).

3 M.S. Lopresti

Cobb and Griffin’s Whiteheadian DRP. Sanatana Dharma, then, at least as Long describes it, is lacking any explicit determinational standards for how something counts as true or false. Therefore, if he is basing a Hindu religious pluralism on Sanatana Dharma merely because it denotes a meta-religion, and on the basis of this he is going to claim that all other philosophies and religions are fully explained, and presumably validated by this – contradictions and all – then this can only result in a relativism. On the other hand, if he declares that the standard for determining the veridicality of different traditions depends on the extent to which they participate in Sanatana Dharma, then this would result in a form of Hindu identism.6 An identism because it would deny the uniqueness of these different traditions by reducing all that is good and right in them down to a single religious worldview that privileges similarities over differences, even when these differences may be essential to the individual identity of the religions themselves. As already stated, it is not my opinion that he intends his theory to be a relativism, but it would be best to find evidence other than his supposed intentions to support a conclusion as to which side of this dichotomy Long is actually on.7 Either way, Long commits the fallacy of misplaced concreteness by reifying religion itself as some actual thing that serves as the single basis shared by all religions. SD is the form, the eternal meta-Religion; by this Long reveals himself to have an essentialist view of Religion itself. The philosophical fallout of essentialism severs his theory from the kind of Whiteheadian DRP developed by Cobb and Griffin from the start.8 This philosophical fallout being the sort of dilemma now facing Long’s theory,

6 Using the language of Platonic forms here is intentional as it is also the way that Long describes the relation between SD and the individual traditions that seem to either abide in or abide by it. 7 For evidence of his opposition to relativism see, 141. Elsewhere he acknowledges that a non-relativist worldview is needed in order to develop an adequate religious pluralism (132). Besides, if he were a relativist, there would be nothing more to say because he would have opted out of reason altogether. 8 As it violates the very first Whiteheadian assumption about religion and philosophy as outlined by Cobb in the final chapter of the Deep Religious Pluralism (243-262). In this and other articles (for example, see “Beyond ‘Pluralism’” in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions. Gavin D’Costa ed., pp. 81-95) Cobb shows that an anti-essentialist understanding of religion is necessary for any viable religious pluralism, and thus, that “we should avoid reifying ‘religion’” (243). Long’s failure to do this makes it impossible for his theory to be a differential pluralism like that of Cobb and Griffins because, “If ‘religion’ is defined as what is common to all the traditions that are thought of as religions, each tradition’s more distinctive elements tend to be depreciated” (Cobb, 244) and this tends one towards the kind of dilemma that Long’s theory now faces, viz., choosing between the two untenable extremes of pluralism: relativism or identism. This understanding of religions is the modus operandi of Long’s Sanatana Dharma and is anathema to the type of differential pluralism outlined by Cobb and Griffin, which takes as a guiding principle the respectful awareness and retention of the unique differences

4 M.S. Lopresti which finds itself between the two untenable extremes of pluralism: relativism or identism. The Second Semantic Distinction Having shown why Long’s theory cannot be properly called a DRP, his second semantic distinction can help us to identify where his theory fits-in amongst the various philosophical responses to religious diversity. This semantic distinction is between what he refers to as the soteriological inclusivism of Rahner and the epistemic inclusivism9 he apparently sees himself engaging in. The first of these, Long says is “rightly found objectionable” (140), and the later “is an inevitable outcome of holding any nonrelativist position” (141), which presumably Long’s is one of them. Unfortunately, Long’s invocation of epistemic inclusivism, (presumably to describe what he is doing) has little explanatory power for differentiating between these two theories. After all, as Long notes, “Virtually all of us are inclusivists in this sense” (141) and Rahner is one of them. Ultimately, epistemic inclusivism seems nothing more than a fancy way of talking about basic hermeneutical principles and it is unclear what work Long expects this differentiation to do here. I will revisit epistemic

between religious traditions on their own terms. Oddly, Long recognizes the importance of respecting the unique elements of different religious traditions for developing a Whiteheadian religious pluralism in his own article, acknowledging that “To privilege one kind of experience and reduce others to it is a failure of pluralism” (132). Yet the implications of his use of Sanatana Dharma force him to making this very same mistake. Cobb says further on this topic that “The term [‘religion’] can be useful if we understand that the various traditions grouped under it are related in terms of family resemblance rather than by participation in common ” (Cobb, 244) (Long seems to hint at this in his letter to me, writing about family resemblances between Indic traditions, rather than characterizing them as taking part in some grander meta- religion), also, it must be kept in mind that “Definitions are more or less useful, not true or false” (Cobb, 245) and thus we ought not get so hung up on trying to explain all the world’s religious traditions in terms of one religious tradition or another (as does inclusivism and identism) since such a view will inevitably reify “religion” either as a result, or will assume it from the outset. This would prohibit a truly deep appreciation for the veridicality and uniqueness of different traditions (or aspect of traditions) on their own terms in favor of some homogeneity across traditions in terms of some aspect that happens to appear in various forms across the wide spectrum of human spirituality. (For more on why this is a problem see Cobb, 243-248. In short, this explanation relies on the fact that such a focus on homogeneous aspects across traditions deemphasizes aspects of different traditions that these traditions themselves may consider of central or paramount importance in their own, or vice versa.) 9 Griffin coins the term “epistemic inclusivism” in his critique of Mark Heim’s use of the phrase “pluralistic inclusivism” to describe his own “post-pluralistic” position, which he means to move beyond classical inclusivism (see 36 and Heim, Salvations, 152). Griffin regards this term as an oxymoron, preferring epistemic inclusivism instead, since “Heim’s usage… no longer has a soteriological meaning” (36).

5 M.S. Lopresti inclusivism in a moment, however, to suggest an interpretation that might shed some light on how it can be a useful for him.10 Hindu Pan-Inclusivism The real difference to be had between Long and Rahner has nothing to do with their respective epistemic inclusivism and soteriological inclusivism; rather, it has to do with Long’s soteriological identism and Rahner’s soteriological inclusivism. Long acknowledges “the identist character of Hindu pluralism” (141-2) and it is important to note here that we now definitely have evidence for showing that Long is not a relativist, and therefore, by my dichotomy, he is an identist. Although he refers to his own theory as a soteriological identism he does not seem to recognize that there are still other types of inclusivisms that might still apply to his Hindu religious pluralism, particularly what I call “ontological inclusivism.”11 Not extending this classification to his understanding of the basis of reality being founded upon Sanatana Dharma he instead concludes (for reasons that remain entirely unclear to me)12 that it “is fundamentally identical to a Whiteheadian religious pluralism” (156). His overall position, however, is basically an identist one, though one that I think is most appropriately characterized as a “Hindu pan- inclusivism.”13 This is a peculiar term (especially considering that I have just claimed his

10 In a moment this distinction can be understood as having a very particular meaning for Long’s theory that, in the of interpretive charity, he may have meant, but which he does not make explicitly clear in his article. And I argue that this is what ends up distinguishing his version of “pluralism” as a truly unique because instead of his theory applying its inclusivist tendencies to different traditions, he ends up applying it from a variety of different perspectives, thereby achieving a sort of epistemic identism that was never intended by the original meaning, or I think imagined by either Heim or Griffin (see Griffin, 35-6, and Heim, 152ff). 11 Indeed, this nuanced division of the scope of the inclusivist response to religious diversity can have a broad or a narrow scope, applying to either soteriologies (like in Rahner’s), (like Long’s), religious praxes, etc. and can also be found in the entire range of philosophical responses to religious diversity: , identism, pluralism, and relativism. Individual theories tend to take up a variation of these different levels. For example, is an identist in regard to his notion of an ultimate, an identist in regard to soteriology, and a pluralist in regard to praxis. Cobb is an exception, as he is consistent throughout his theory: a pluralist with regard to religious ultimates, praxes, and even though he is a committed Christian and in salvation through Christ, he is able to recognize that there exists other divergent religious goals, and thus he is a pluralist with regard to soteriology as well. For the most part, however, it is not always the case that one is fully an inclusivist, identist, or pluralist. 12 It seems to have something to do with his reference to Mohandas Gandhi’s use of the Jain doctrine of relativity, which Long says that he has “argued elsewhere... [has arisen] our of a relational essentially identical to that affirmed by Whitehead” (145) – though he give no reference to where he has argued for this or what specifically (or generally) his argument is in this article. 13 “Pluralistic inclusvism,” a term coined by Mark Heim (Heim, 152) could also be an appropriate term, although Griffin rightly complains that it is oxymoronic, given the contextual meaning of “inclusivism” in the scholastic field of developing of religious diversity.

6 M.S. Lopresti theory is basically an identism), but I think that it is appropriate in that it best captures Long’s unique theory. To clarify this I will first break his theory into three areas of application: soteriology, religious praxis, and ontology.14 He is an admitted identist regarding soteriology, because he characterizes all forms of salvation as a matter of liberation from rebirth,15 otherwise known as the Hindu notion of moksa. This is nevertheless, what he calls a “soft” or minimalist identism because even though he characterizes salvation in terms of moksa, he proposes that “[i]t still allows for differential pluralism inasmuch as it is not only the means to such liberation that vary” – thus identifying him as a pluralist in regard to efficacious religious praxes – “but what constitutes liberation itself may vary as well… All of these ends involve liberation from rebirth, but the particular shape of that liberation varies with the means by which it is pursued and the ultimate religious object involved” (letter to the author, May 29, 2006). Were his theory to be judged on his understanding of salvation and religious praxes alone, it would seem well on its way towards being identified with a deep Hindu religious pluralism. However, when his meaning of Sanatana Dharma as the eternal meta-religion is included, his response to religious diversity takes a clearly inclusivist turn. Yet this inclusivism too gets “softened”, this time by his theory’s Jain-inspired open-endedness to making equally inclusivist determinations on truth from many different perspectives. Long writes at the close of his essay: “I believe it is perfectly legitimate for a Hindu to refer to the Sanatana Dharma as Hinduism, but with the self-relativizing understanding that a Christian can, with equal legitimacy call it Christianity…. Similarly, if by ‘’ a Muslim means obedience to the will of and holds that all human beings who follow the will of God… are thereby ‘anonymous Muslims,’ I have no objection. If this is what ‘Islam’ means, then I want to be a Muslim. If ‘Christianity’ means the primordial truth that ‘was never absent from the beginning of the human race’ [as Augustine wrote], then I want to be a Christian. And if ‘Hinduism’ means the Sanatana Dharma, the eternal order underlying all religions, then please, call me a Hindu!” (156)

14 I use “ontology” instead of “religious ultimates” because he neither names nor characterizes any within the context of SD. 15 See Long, 141-2 and letter to the author (May 29, 2006).

7 M.S. Lopresti

By use of the term “pan-inclusivism” then, I mean that while he seems to claim that the main thrust of each religion is somewhat varied, he nevertheless, declares that each is capable of making legitimate inclusivist judgments. I call this a “Hindu pan-inclusivism” because it is not only inclusive of all other traditions, but it is inclusive from their perspectives as well. In this sense, I suppose it could be called a “deep religious inclusivism” but ultimately what we have here is an identism. Despite this apparent openness, however, a hierarchy still remains, insofar as whichever tradition has the broadest or deepest scope in its religious concern will also have the greatest importance. Listen once again to how he describes the Islamic scope contra the Hindu: Muslim: “obedience to God;” Hindu: the “eternal order underlying all religions” – elsewhere he calls it the “universal structure of reality” (155). It is quite clear which of these has the wider scope and greater prominence in his theory.16 It does not matter how much Long says he wants to be a Muslim, because in this context Muslim’s are ultimately Hindus, and in the end, he is still engaging in Hindu apologetics and preferencing a Hindu worldview. Besides, if he is going to avoid an all-embracing standardless relativism, then it seems that he must retain a steadfast adherence to the Hindu religious worldview – absent further clarification of the central concept SD.17 That all of these different inclusivisms may be classified under the Sanatana Dharma worldview then helps explain why I call this pan-inclusivism an identism. 18 This pan-inclusivism finds its inspiration in the Jain tradition’s notion of (or the manifold theory of truth), which can arguably consider multiple, seemingly contradictory, perspectives to be simultaneously true. Because this is itself a HinduI tradition under Long’s schema and because this view of Santana Dharma is basically a depiction of a shared HinduI worldview, we can see this manifold of inclusivist claims from various

16 It matters little that he says we can just as well call it Christianity, because it is only be the assumption of an essence of religion that would enable him to call the same thing by two names that suggest utterly divergent and incompatible worldviews. 17 In the end he asks, can’t we simply call the truth the truth? Sure, we can call it anything we like, but what we cannot do is merely assume that their truths are equal and avoid a relativism, nor can we say that they are true only insofar as they participate in Sanatana Dharma, and avoid an essentialist identism. 18 Since he takes inclusivist claims from all other perspectives and grouping them under one called Sanatana Dharma. This is also the best way to make sense of Long’s peculiar title: an pan-inclusivist Hindu response to religious diversity that culminates in a view that the many world religions, in some way, participate as so many different manifestations (sampradaya) of the “one eternal meta-religion” which manifests itself in our world as an anekanta (or manifold) Vedanta.

8 M.S. Lopresti traditions as a logical extension of the Jain theory of anekantavada. (This is apparently the method for determining the truthfulness of the various traditions in Long’s SD theory.) What solidifies my argument that Long’s theory is a Hindu identism is that by subsuming all other religious and philosophical perspectives under this distinctly Jain theme, Long’s pan-inclusivism necessarily explains the truthfulness of any other tradition by virtue of its own.19 That is to say, only if SD is true can others partake in Truth itself.20

Conclusion Despite all of these difficulties, I do maintain that it is plausible to demonstrate that Hinduism entails a position similar to a Whiteheadian understanding of religious ultimates and what Long accomplishes in this essay does work towards its development. As it stands however, Long’s emphatic assertion that “Hinduism… entails a position that is fundamentally identical to a Whiteheadian religious pluralism” (156) is completely unjustified by his reliance on and presentation of Sanatana Dharma. What Jeffery Long has developed is a Hindu religious pluralism, but it is neither deep nor Whiteheadian in nature. But, even though his theory privileges a Hindu worldview, at least it avoids the imperialistic tone of Christian inclusivisms (or of Halbfass’s Hindu triumphalism).21 Corrective suggestions for making it more pluralistic include getting Long to admit that there may be other forms of salvation that cannot be fully captured under the Hindu notion of moksa. This would further “soften” his soteriological identism into a deep pluralism.22 From this it could follow that there are other forms of efficacious praxes towards the accomplishment of these goals – thereby making his theory a pluralism in

19 Having this peculiarly inclusivist at its heart, therefore, makes Long’s SD-based theory a religious identism. Identism because of the precedence for such a unique application of epistemic inclusivism in the HinduI tradition. This shows Long’s theory to be much more than just a Vedic inspired worldview, but one that draws on notions that are particular to a nastika tradition as well, thus making it broadly Hindu in nature, not being reducible to any one denomination. (By “Hindu” here I mean that it draws broadly from the “South Asian” religio-philosophical tradition). 20 This matters because it is a top-down distribution of truth, which labels one religious worldview as having the Truthfulness of ultimate reality in which all others must participate (and endorse) if they are also going to be true. 21 Even so, it either undermines itself and all the other religions by lacking concrete standards for their inclusion, or it moves to a sort of identism due to its essentialist assumption of religion itself. 22 One example that might work here would be a soteriological project that seeks its goal in this life and not as a post-mortum release. Certain understanding of enlightenment can fit this bill, but I suspect Long could then just as easily incorporate such eschatology under his notion of moksa, as the jivamukti or enlightened would nevertheless also be freed from rebirth. I think that other possibilities are still available here though for him to admit other possible soteriologies outside that of moksa, thus making it a differential pluralism.

9 M.S. Lopresti regard to religious praxes as well. These are relatively easy things to admit; however if he wants to go pluralist in the third area of ontological ultimates, this will prove a harder task. To begin this task he must first forswear his essentialist view of religion, for it is this very view that has lead his pluralism astray in the first place. It is my humble aspiration in a later version of this paper to articulate the concepts that a deep Hindu religious pluralism could be based on. Let me end by suggesting that the Hindu notion of reality as being simultaneously one of ‘fixed eternality’ (kutastha- nityata) and ‘dynamic eternality’ (pravaha-nityata) employs concepts that show great potential for similarity (in function and perhaps in content as well) to Whitehead’s categories of God and Creativity, which, according to the DRP hypothesis, can be found in varying forms as the spiritual and ontological foci of religious traditions around the world.23 The purpose, in the end, is not simply to locate concepts within the classical religio-philosophical traditions of South Asia that resonate with Whitehead’s categories, but more importantly, to demonstrate that the DRP hypothesis proposed by Cobb and Griffin has genuine applicability to original concepts that are foundational to the early Hindu tradition. Successfully applying this Whiteheadian pluralistic schema to this and other major traditions is a necessary step in establishing it as a truly catholic theology of religious pluralism.24

Jeffery Long’s Response Having shared this paper with Jeffery Long, he responded by saying that this paper is a fair response to the article given in Griffin’s book, however that the article itself is “deficient as an explanation of my total position.”25 To contextualize this article in his larger body of work, as well as to provide content to SD, Long refers me to his very recent article, which I was unaware of at the time of writing this paper, “A Whiteheadian Vedanta: Outline of a Hindu .”26 Dr. Long also has a book coming out (September 27 in the UK and November 28 in the USA) on this same topic. It is entitled A Vision for Hinduism: Beyond . It is being published by I. B. Tauris.

23 Also these concepts seem to be more philosophical than religious. (unlike nirguna and ), hence their potential use for doing work similar to Whitehead’s ultimates. For the importance of this distinction see Griffin’s section on “Philosophy as a ” in Chapter 2 of Deep Religious Pluralism (56-7). 24 Locating a set of concepts such as this can better serve as the ontological bases for a deep Hindu religious pluralism. Not only could they complement his “soft” soteriological identism and his pluralistic view of religious praxes, but also they enable him to establish something that can resonate with the Whiteheadian ultimates and therefore, arguably, with the major religious traditions of the world. 25 Long, Jeffery. Letter to the author. 2 July, 2006. 26 “A Whiteheadian Vedanta: Outline of a Hindu Process Theology” in Handbook of Process Theology. Eds., Jay McDaniel and Donna Bowman. Danvers, MA: Chalice Press, 2006. 262-273.

10