THE OF TRUTH-CLAIMS IN THE GLOBAL MULTI-RELIGIOUS AMBIANCE

Ewere Nelson Atoi

Abstract The interpretations of truth-claims inherent in the of different world have a negative epistemic bearing on the religious systems of humankind and, as such, affect interreligious relations. This paper therefore, explicates the theological and philosophical issues in truth-claim discourse with a view to endorse a tenable approach for addressing the problem of ­conflicting truth-claims. The various notions of religious truth-claim, i.e.— , inclusivism, non-exclusivism, pluralism and , are explored and critically analyzed. The author submits that pluralist offers a better approach to curtail the problems emanating from conflicting truth-claims and promotes interreligious relations among the world religions. Unlike other notions which claim that truth is domiciled in one (exclu- sivism), other religions have partial truth (inclusivism), religious truth should be held tentatively (non-exclusivism), other religions should be merely toler- ated (relativism), pluralism advocates for energetic engagement with religious diversity, the—active seeking of understanding across lines of differences among religions.

Keywords Truth-claims, world religions, religious diversity, interreligious relations

Author Ewere Nelson Atoi, Ph.D. is a Lecturer at the Department of Religious Studies, Gombe State University, Gombe, Nigeria.

Introduction

The upsurge of hostile reactions from a particular group of religious practitioners towards religious adherents across religious divides, which is almost becoming a fundamental attribute of most religious traditions in the global multi-religious space, has continued to raise philosophical questions concerning the claims made by religious adherents about the

Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 28/1, 129-147 doi: 10.0000/SID.28.1.3285347 © 2018 by Peeters. All rights reserved. 130 EWERE NELSON ATOI nature of the religious ultimate1 or divine . Most religious traditions in the world make claims about the nature of the ultimate reality with each of them appealing to religious experience as evidence for their claims (Heim 2000:435; Atoi 2016:1). These claims, however, do not rest on evidences that could convince all reasonable people, thereby ­giving rise to the epistemic problem of religious diversity. In the episte- mological discourse of the religious ultimate, we often encounter reli- gionists who maintain that exclusive religious beliefs can be justified in the face of a multiplicity of religious traditions. However, this stance on religious truth statements is more theoretical than practical, because almost all religions have some common grounds in their beliefs and prac- tices. For example, almost all traditions will agree that unprovoked ­killing is wrong, and , , , and many believe there is an ultimate and personal . Although such similarities of religious truth statements exist, one frequently encounters claims such as; “no one outside my religion will be saved.” This issue of salvation becomes even more complex, because it occurs differently in different traditions and, the precise time of salvation is cloudy. For some religious traditions, such as we can find in Hindu and Buddhist beliefs, there can be an eventual salvation even if a previous opportunity was missed, perhaps after many reincarnations. For some other traditions, salvation occurs only once, precisely at an end-of-time judgment as in the case of Christian and Islamic eschatological theology (Smith 2007:336). The controversy emanating from truth-claims becomes more baffling in the domain of epistemology because various claimants have not been able to substantiate clearly that the statements purported to be about the nature of ultimate reality are actually the true state of affairs. Intrinsically, religious truth-claims have a negative epistemic bearing, not only on the beliefs that are outputs of a particular religious tradition but also on the total religious belief systems for which conflicting truth-claims are sourced (Quinn 2001:64). In this light, some pertinent questions readily come to mind: How does one know that something has been affirmed? What warrants one to make truth-claims? Can such claim or belief really be justified epistemologically? Is belief the same as knowledge? Can our human mind and knowledge accurately describe the nature of ultimate reality? What might be the possible epistemologically justifiable response to the reality of the religious ultimate? It is against this background that

1 Religious ultimate in the context of this paper refers to the supreme and final goal of religion. TRUTH-CLAIMS IN THE GLOBAL MULTI-RELIGIOUS AMBIANCE 131 the writer utilizes historical, analytical, critical and constructive methods to investigate truth-claims in the global multi-religious ambience with the principle aim of explicating the theological and philosophical issues inher- ent in truth-claim discourse and endorses a tenable approach for address- ing the epistemic problems of truth-claim in the global theological milieu.

Epistemology of Religious Truth-Claims

In its most general sense, epistemology has to do with “the theory of knowledge and justification” (Audi 1998:1). According to Kirk, episte- mology is simply a discipline which studies the articulated or unexpressed convictions which all people have about knowledge and how it is possible to know. As such, the discipline deals with the assumptions that underlie any assertion that people make about any aspect of life. In many ways, it concerns itself with the question of the meaning of truth and the criteria that must be adopted in order to be able to distinguish true and false ­statements. It is important to state that the study of knowledge and belief is a highly developed inquiry. Much of it focuses on particular beliefs or types of belief and criteria for truth. In other words, knowing something is equivalent to ascertaining its status as truth (Kirk 2004:132-133). “Truth-claim” on the other hand means any explicit or implicit claim to truth. That is, any statement which explicitly or implicitly upholds that a ­particular state of affairs is true (Netland 1987:93). In religion, truth- claim is the belief that one’s experience of the divine reality alone is entirely true while others are partially true or false (Atoi 2016:1). It is pertinent to state that there are a myriad of epistemological confu- sions confronting truth statements in diverse religious communities today because different religions have different experiential practices with ­systems of possible over-riders, which vary so much from one religion to another (Quinn 2001:61). In nearly every part of the world, we experience a multiplicity of religious traditions. Many of these traditions offer par- ticular and often conflicting perspectives on the nature of the religious ultimate, the human predicament, the path or paths to a resolution, and an eschatological vision of the idealized state (Lee 2012:64). These epis- temological problems are even more serious when not only the means but also the end itself is different. That there are differences among the different religions of the world is commonly accepted but how we are to make sense of these differences and how we are to live in the light of conflicting religious truth-claims and commitments is highly contested. 132 EWERE NELSON ATOI

A special category of truth statements are those which focus on the exclu- sively religious pursuit of salvation. These are in relation to the final ideal state of the individual or group and the prescribed method of attaining this goal. Many varieties of mode of achievement obviously describe what this salvation entails, ranging from heaven to (Smith 2007:335-336). Christians for instance, operate under assumptions such as the authorita- tiveness of Scripture and the soteriological normativity of God’s redemp- tive work through Christ (Lee 2012:65). According to Neill: The Christian claims for itself that it is the only form of faith for men. By its own claim to truth, it casts the shadow of imperfect truth on every other system. This Christian claim is naturally offensive to modern man, brought up in the atmosphere of relativism, in which tolerance is regarded almost as the highest of the virtues. But we must not suppose that this claim to universal validity is something that can be quietly removed… (Neill 1984:30).

It is most likely that Neill sees such Christian claims to religious truth as offensive to modern man because Christian practices have rivals which are on an epistemic par with Christian tradition on the issues of religious truth statements (Neill 1984:30; Quinn 2001:62). The heightened aware- ness of these conflicting truth-claims has created epistemological prob- lem for religious diversity in the global theological space. In this light, the big question before the theological community is: How can truth be determined, considering the challenges of contextualization, relativity, and historicity? A good number of possible explanations have been pro- vided within the scholarly arena; these include denial of truth statement, claims of misinterpretation or misunderstanding, among others (Lee 2012:64; Smith 2007:336). Smith reacting to truth statements opines that truth and falsity as generally understood are inapplicable to religious traditions. According to Smith: I would contend that man’s religious life is liberated, not devastated, when it is recognized that ‘‘a religion” cannot in and of itself be true or false. The notion that a given religion may be true, or even more, that it may not be true, has caused untold mischief. Again, that one religion is true while another is false is equally misleading… We must learn that this is not where religious truth and falsity lie. Religions, either simply or together, cannot be true or false as one rejoices to recognize once one is emancipated from supposing that there are such things in our universe (Smith 1962:322).

Smith that an appropriate epistemology can only be ham- mered out in the process of learning to live in a world of mystery, sym- bolized in various ways. Other scholars such as Knitter have advocated TRUTH-CLAIMS IN THE GLOBAL MULTI-RELIGIOUS AMBIANCE 133 for a model of relational truth, where one’s religious view of truth shows the ability to interact with truth statements in other religions (Race 1986:184). We are still, however, at the threshold of knowing how this might work in practice. Salvation is the core element of most religions and, as such, each religion must deal with it in a pluralistic understanding of the cosmos (Lee 2012:64-65). The kind of which will undergird this new venture in truth through dialogue has not yet been fully understood. For proper understanding of this discourse, let us turn to the different doctrines or theories of religious truth-claim in the global religious space. These include exclusivism, inclusivism, non- exclusivism, pluralism, and relativism.

The Doctrine of Religious Exclusivism

Religious exclusivism refers to a position, which holds that the central claims of one’s own religious tradition are true, and that, where beliefs of other traditions appear to be incompatible with those of one’s own tradi- tion, the former are to be rejected as false (Netland 1987:78). In other words, it involves the identification of a particular religion as being the and substance of true universal religion, thereby excluding all other possibilities (Pratt 2007:295). In this case, the believer maintains that only one religion is correct while all others are incorrect. Religious exclusivism equally implies the falseness of contrary teachings to the teachings of one’s own religion. The doctrine of exclusivism is more than simply a conviction about the transformative power of the particular vision one has. It is a conviction about finality and absolute priority over competing views. The exclusivists believe that fundamental truth about the religious ultimate is found in only one religion. In essence, religious believers who hold exclusive beliefs affirm identity in a complex world of plurality by a return to the firm foundations of their own tradition, emphasized on the distinctive identity provided by that tradition (Eck 1993:174; Koehl 2005:395-396; Meister 2009:28). From this viewpoint, the exclusivist’s religion is the “Only One True Religion” because, according to the exclusivist thesis, there can be only one that is true or correct. Claims such as “Jesus is the only begotten son of God” and “there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we can be save except the name of Christ” in Christianity and “ is the only true way to Allah” and “ is the last and the greatest Prophet of Allah” in Islam certainly fit this description. Christian exclusivists 134 EWERE NELSON ATOI maintain the uniqueness and normativity of the person and work of Jesus Christ, the truth and authority of the Bible as God’s definitive self-reve- lation, and assert that where the claims of Christian Scripture is incompat- ible with those of other , the latter are not to be accepted as truth (Smith 2007:336). It is imperative to recognize that Christian exclusivism is a species of a more general belief regarding claims among adherents of world religious traditions. Religious exclusivism is generally based upon the idea that beliefs are integral to religious traditions and that religious beliefs are either true or false. Nevertheless, a number of recent thinkers have argued that this emphasis upon beliefs and their accompanying truth- value exhibits a profound confusion over the nature of religious faith and practice (Netland 1987:87; Koehl 2005:407). Knitter, reflecting on this subject matter, observes that even though exclusivism is a stance that claims unique superiority, adherents feel they are aiding those who are ignorant of the truth and think of it as a most compassionate attitude (Knitter 1985:95). It is pertinent to state at this juncture that religious exclusivism has four different dimensions, which include doxastic, hard or experiential, soteriological and doctrinal exclusivism. Doxastic exclusivism is the belief, which by itself or in conjunction with the rest of one’s exclusive beliefs, implies that many or most of the central beliefs of other religions are false. Hard or experiential exclusivism is the belief, which states that only adherents of one’s own religion can experience God or divine real- ity. Hard or experiential exclusivists argue that the religious experiences typically enjoyed by the adherents to their religion are mostly veridical and conflicting experiences typical of all others are non-veridical (Quinn 2001:58; Koehl 2005:396). In this light, adherents of hard exclu- sivism perceive their religion as the only true religion, believing other religions to be in error. This is the posture often assumed by those who believe strongly in the efficacy of classical forms of apologetics, using reasoned proofs to argue conclusively for the strong rationality of theistic beliefs. Today, this form of exclusivism is largely vacated by Christian philosophers but is notably concentrated within conservative or funda- mentalist sub-groups (Netland 1987:68). Soteriological exclusivism is the belief, which holds that only the path proposed by one religious tradi- tion leads securely to the ultimate religious goal, that of salvation or liberation. Doctrinal exclusivism is the claim that the doctrines of only ones own religion are mostly true while the doctrines of all the others, where there is conflict, are false (Quinn 2001:58). It is imperative to state that this kind of exclusivism exist mostly at the intra-religious level. TRUTH-CLAIMS IN THE GLOBAL MULTI-RELIGIOUS AMBIANCE 135

It is extremely important to note that exclusivists claim to religious truth have been seriously criticized and objected to from both scholarly circles and ecclesiastical communities in recent times. Criticisms of reli- gious exclusivism usually fall into several categories: there are those who argue that exclusivism is intolerant or otherwise morally blameworthy, those who argue that exclusivism is somehow epistemologically defi- cient, and those who hold that exclusivism is not demanded by the data of ­Scripture (Netland 1987:78). In considering these positions, we must begin by admitting the fact that, throughout history, religious exclusivists have often acted in highly barbarous and intolerant ways to those of other faiths. Not only is this the case in Christian history but it is true of Islam, , and as well. It is not uncommon to encounter arguments which suggest rejecting exclusivism because it is epistemologically naive, or because it is based upon outdated “Western” concepts of truth and belief that are inappropriate within the of religious diversity. When one really appreciates what religious truth and faith are all about, it becomes clear that maintaining the beliefs of other religions as false is simply inappropriate (Netland 1987:82). In this direc- tion, Koehl evinces that some believers hold exclusive beliefs because they are naive, stubborn, dishonest, lazy, and irresponsible. According to him, they have wrongheaded epistemic attitudes, little religious genius, scant religious experience, poor argumentative support, and no resources for dealing with significant evidential challenges, no explanation for diversity, and a small degree of conviction, among others. When such epistemically impoverished believers are confronted with religious diver- sity, their beliefs will be defeated (Koehl 2005:408). It is necessary to note that one of the conceptualized objections labeled against religious exclusivism in more recent times is the “myth of neu- trality.” The basic idea in this objection is that there are no religiously neutral or objective criteria with which to determine whether one religion or worldview is true or false or whether one has more truth or falsity than another (Meister 2009:28). Therefore, to claim that one religion is true, or offers the only way to salvation is inappropriate and perhaps even morally offensive. Another objection raised against religious exclusivism is that adherents are committed to a position that is unjust. The issue has multiple folds, however, one dimension of it is that there are many people, currently and historically, who are or were completely unaware of religious traditions beyond their own. Exclusivists are therefore, accused of creating a situ- ation whereby people who are unaware of religions beyond their own are 136 EWERE NELSON ATOI held morally and/or epistemically responsible for other people’s religious truth-claims. This objection is typically leveled against monotheistic reli- gions such as Christianity and Islam, which include a final judgment in the . For instance, how could the God of Christianity or the God of Islam, as the case may be, deny salvation to countless numbers of peo- ple who have never even heard of the Christian or Islamic faith? It seems unjust that God would condemn people to eternal punishment in hell sim- ply because they lack knowledge of Jesus Christ or revelation given to Prophet Muhammad at a cave in Mount Hira. Certainly, there are good, sincere, devoted people in all world religions. Exclusivists have offered responses to the justice objection. For example, they sometimes draw upon the notion of God’s middle knowledge and the counterfactuals of freedom to explain how a loving, omniscient, and omnipotent God could allow the “unreached” to miss the soteriological mark (Meister 2009:30). Another objection raised against religious exclusivism is one which scholars have designated a “scandal of particularity”. This phrase is ­generally applied to the Christian view that God became man uniquely in Jesus of Nazareth. This claim is considered “scandalous” because it seems incredible and even troubling that one particular, isolated over 2,000 years ago would be the way in which God revealed Himself to the world. As noted earlier, many religious devotees are unaware of Christianity or any other religion beyond their own and know nothing about the God of the Christians or the incarnation theology of the ­Christian faith. In this wise, are we to believe that only those within one religion are correct? Alternatively, do Christians alone have the absolute truth about God/Ultimate Reality and salvation/liberation while everyone else is completely wrong? In this light, Meister maintains that the view whereby only one religion offers the true soteriological goal seem arro- gant, imperialistic, and perhaps even immoral and oppressive (Meister 2009:30-31). In this connection, Netlamd argues that exclusivism is to be rejected because of its narrow mindedness and unwillingness to learn from, and be informed by other religious traditions (Netland 1987:83-84).

The Doctrine of Religious Inclusivism

In response to the search for a theological solution to the conflicting truth-claims occasioned by religious exclusivism in the global multi-reli- gious terrain, theologians and ecclesiastical authorities are increasingly embracing the position known as Religious Inclusivism (Race 1986:178). TRUTH-CLAIMS IN THE GLOBAL MULTI-RELIGIOUS AMBIANCE 137

Inclusivism in the context of religious truth-claim means the elevating of one’s own religion to a privileged position among the world religious traditions but also provides for the possibility that other faiths could share some of the territory (Smith 2007:336). It accepts the idea that God wants salvation for all people of all times and places and that His soteriological will can take many forms. For this reason, one cannot reject all other religions in advance. A renowned catholic theologian, first developed this thought in his seminal work titled “­Theological Investiga- tion” which was later adopted by the church fathers during the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). According to Rahner: If it is true that a person who becomes the object of the church’s efforts is or may be already someone on the way towards salvation, and if it is at the same time true that this salvation is Christ’s salvation, since there is no other salvation, then it must be possible to be an anonymous Christian (Rahner 1964:75-76). Following the thought of Rahner, D’Costa also advocates for inclusiv- ism, which he delineated as affirming “the salvific presence of God in non-Christian religions while still maintaining that Christ is the definitive and authoritative revelation of God” (D’Costa1986:80). Pratt, quoting from the Nostra Aetate declaration of Vatican II, made the following observation about the concerning the doctrine of inclu- sivisim: The Catholic Church rejects nothing of what is true and holy in these reli- gions. She has a high regard for the manner of life and conduct, the precepts and doctrines which, although differing in many ways from her own teach- ing, nevertheless often reflect a ray of that truth which enlightens all men (sic). Yet she proclaims and is duty bound to proclaim without fail, Christ who is “the way, the truth, and the life” (John 14:6). In him, in whom God reconciled all things to himself (cf. 2 Co. 5:18-19), men (sic) find the ­fullness of their religious life (Pratt 2007:303). Pratt citing another document of Vatican II, Lumen Gentium, notes that the salvific relevance of other religions, especially Islam, was given due recognition, albeit within a framework of theological inclusivism. Accordingly, the Secretariat for Non-Christians, since renamed the Pontifical­ Council for Interreligious Dialogue, was established to oversee relationships between Catholics and non-Christian religions (Pratt 2007:303-304). Moreover, remarking on the Nostra Aetate declaration of Vatican II, Braybrooke asserts that such declaration certainly “marks the beginning of a fresh approach of the Catholic Church to members of other faiths” (Braybrooke 1992:247). 138 EWERE NELSON ATOI

Inclusivists therefore maintain that other religions also contain impor- tant truths. This is not to say that all claims by other religions are true but that they could be true or false. Adherents of inclusivism typically hold that true religious seekers from whatever tradition will at least, find salvation/liberation at the end of earthly existence. Theistic inclusivists affirm that God is present and working in and among all of the religions, even though God is most clearly manifested in one religion. They affirm that other theistic religions are correct about the existence of a unlike Buddhism, but they disagree with other religions on different issues, such as the means for obtaining salvation/liberation. Non-theistic inclusivists affirm that truth seekers from all world religions can find and understand the ultimate reality, but it is most clearly understood and articulated in the one privileged religion (Meister 2009:28). It is necessary to note that by taking this stance, practitioners of one religious tradition ascertain the validity of some aspects of other religions by comparing it with their own beliefs and practices, which they take as the ultimate measure of truth. Soteriologically, this means one can reach the desired end without belonging consciously or permanently to the home religion (Smith 2007:336-337). According to Race: …both growing friendships with members of other religious communities revealing to us the depth of religious enlightenment and transformation ­taking place in other religious contexts, and a firmer intellectual awareness of the historical nature of all religious belief, have initiated a shift away from the Protestant neo-orthodox stress on the discontinuity between ­Christianity and the other world religions and the Catholic pre-Vatican II platform that ‘outside the Church there is no salvation’. At root, inclusivism attempts to combine the traditional hold on the uniqueness of Christ, though often expressed less stridently in the term ‘decisiveness’, with the equally valid assertion that God must be at work for salvation in the non-Christian religions (Race 1986:178).

Accordingly, the inclusivists believe that either the potential for future entry or an assumption of unintentional, unknown membership may exist. For instance, Rahner’s concept of ‘‘anonymous Christian’’ in Catholic theology of redemption, allows salvation to those who were not capable of knowing Jesus (Knitter 1985:143). Dupuis is of the opinion that the saving power of the divine word of has been in operation since before the incarnation. He asserts: the transcendent, illuminating power of the divine Logos, operative through- out human history accounts for the salvation of human beings even before the manifestation of the Logos in flesh (Jesus Christ)…The divine Logos continues even today, to sow his seeds among peoples (Dupuis 1997:320). TRUTH-CLAIMS IN THE GLOBAL MULTI-RELIGIOUS AMBIANCE 139

This statement may or may not mean all people will be saved. ­Frequently, inclusivism raises doubts about why membership in any tra- dition is necessary and whether or not rituals and doctrines are significant if non-followers are still capable of the ultimate rewards (Smith 2007:337). Religious inclusivism has also been criticized because it would be a position that is not open to the reality of the other. Funda- mentally, the central criticism labeled against inclusivism is the fact that it does not adequately take into account the religious self-understanding of the other as other. In this connection, Hick (1993:84) observes that inclusivism still rests upon the claim to Christianity’s unique finality as the locus of the only divine revelation, and the only adequate saving event. Non-Christians can be saved because unknown to them, Christ is secretly united with them. Ariarajah argues that Nostra Aetate “did not deal with the theological issues involved in relating to people of other faiths, but it advocated openness to other religions” yet, at the same time, it proclaimed “an uncompromising stand on the uniqueness of Christ” (Ariarajah (1991:29). It is pertinent to reiterate that the position of inclusivists does not imply that all religions were equally valid. The qualification from above relates to the axiom that Christ is the author of salvation for both ­Christians and non-Christians. Thus, the incarnation, as the sine qua non, of the saving presence of God in all religious traditions functions to inclusively link Christianity with the other traditions. What is experi- enced openly in Christianity is knowingly hidden in the non-Christian traditions. Citing Kling, Race observes that Christianity in this regard, presents itself as the extraordinary way of salvation and other religions as ordinary ways of salvation. Race further cites Senay who contends that inclusivism is often seen as a form of Christian imperialism. In this direction, Senay writes, “it is not Buddhism that saves, but Christ in Buddhism, and Hindus are not saved by their beliefs…” (Race 1986:179). The pertinent question that readily comes to mind is, would Christians accept being called ‘anonymous Muslims’ or ‘anonymous Buddhists’? If the answer is negative, why then are they calling believers in other religious traditions ‘anonymous Christians’? Another question facing inclusivists is whether their position has accepted the full implications of the factors of growing friendships and the awareness of historical condi- tioning attached to all beliefs. This is the point at which the proponents of inclusivism have fallen short in their attempt to provide a theological solution to the epistemological problem emanating from religious truth- claims in the contemporary world. 140 EWERE NELSON ATOI

It is imperative to note at this point that religious inclusivists and exclusivists agree on a number of issues related to religious diversity, including the belief that there is an objective reality to which religious truth-claims point or correspond. They agree that one religion is in some sense closer to the truth than other religions. They also emphasize the fact that the different religions contain within them seemingly incompat- ible truth-claims. While inclusivists and exclusivists agree that the differ- ent traditions contain incompatible truth-claims, they disagree about whether religions outside their own also contain fundamental truths, and whether adherents of the other religions can obtain salvation/liberation (Meister 2009:28). According to Pollefeyt (2007:220) Burggraeve criti- cizes exclusivism and inclusivism by confronting these paradigms with the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, asserting that dialogue starts by resisting the inclination to exclude the other (exclusivism) or by reducing the other to ourselves (inclusivism). Moreover, exclusivists and inclusivists have reacted to the challenges of religious diversity with some lines of differences. The exclusivists are less concern about religious diversity. Schilbrack (2003:100-101) observes that often their lack of concern about religious diversity is put forward as the natural response, “If the wheel does not squeak, do not oil it.” To an exclusivist, it would be a serious violation of one’s relation with God to consider for a moment that some other religion might be true. They even add a certain level of confidence to their position, – ­saying things such as it is no accident that they were born into the only true religion. Consequently they insist that they are under no epistemic obligation to question their religious beliefs. In other words, the only task they recognize is to defend the right to their exclusivism. Whereas inclu- sivists have, to some degree, bothered about religious diversity which is why they accord other religions partial recognition and value in the larger aim of religious life.

The Principle of Non-Exclusivism

Some scholars have advocated for another approach addressing the epistemic challenges of conflicting religious truth-claims. This approach known as non-exclusivism in scholarly circles can be expressed through various ways such as or suspension of judgment, and tentative faith, among others. Non-exclusivists reject the possibility that any one religious tradition is superior to another. Since no particular TRUTH-CLAIMS IN THE GLOBAL MULTI-RELIGIOUS AMBIANCE 141 religion ought to be elevated to a privileged position, religious belief is often privatized or relegated to the realm of preference (Lee 2012:65). Some non-exclusivists maintain that one important issue in conflicting truth-claims is that there are reasonable numbers of people of integrity involved in the controversy, advocating that religious faith should be held tentatively. To hold belief tentatively is to recognize that beliefs may be mistaken and may need to include an attitude that is open to change (McKin 2001:142). Runzo, arguing in this connection writes, “All faith commitments must be held with the humbling recognition that they can be misguided, for our knowledge is never sure” (Runzo 1993:236). Sweet opines that more experiences or new experiences of a believer will certainly affect his or her religious belief. Indeed, as a believer gain expe- rience, they may speak of having not only a more mature belief or faith, but sometimes realize that one’s religious beliefs really do change and they may even be rejected. Contending for the reality of religious ambi- guity, McKim (2001:145) endorses the appropriateness of tentative forms of religious belief, and conversely, the inappropriateness of dogmatic forms of faith. He maintains that when a disagreement about an issue is between people of integrity, the disagreement provides a reason for each side to take what he calls the “Critical Stance” toward their own beliefs. The Critical Stance notion involves two principles: that one examine one’s beliefs about the issue and that one hold one’s beliefs about the issue tentatively. To examine beliefs is to attempt an assessment of the evidence for and against those beliefs as well as for and against opposing beliefs. Quintessentially, it is to reject the idea that being religious means holding on to religious beliefs unquestionably. Mckim further observes that “religion in accordance with the Critical Stance is one that is con- ducted more in the mode of longing and aspiration than in the mode of confident declaration” (McKim 2001:142). In addition, he argues that since there is a strong disagreement about the issue and we probably do not have direct voluntary control over our level of conviction, religious believers should therefore strive towards tentativeness. Hence he asserts, “I take the fact of religious disagreement to be a strong reason to hold one’s beliefs tentatively” (McKim 2001:142). According to Ward (1990:13), by parity of reasoning we may think that our own tradition, even the present experience within our tradition is liable to contain many mistakes even though we will not know what they are. What is expected of a believer in this light is a humble presumption that there could be possibility of error in his/her religious experience or belief system. Ward appositely states: 142 EWERE NELSON ATOI

Humility is certainly in order; it does sound arrogant to say “my religious experience is perfectly correct; all others are totally false.” But we can say: “My religious experience is correct in important respects, though it may contain many errors. The experiences of others may contain many veridical elements but there are important misinterpretations too”… (Ward 1990:13-14).

Citing Berger, McKim emphasizes “an ‘open-endedness’ that ‘frus- trates the deep religious hunger for certainty,’ one that substitutes hypoth- esis for proclamation” McKim (2001:142. Gutting (1982:108) contends that decisive assent is called for by religious commitment but, given diversity, one can justifiably give the specific creeds of one’s religion only interim assent. The non-exclusivist approach appears to be a good option on the sur- face and one that might protect adherents from charges of intolerance, arrogance, and narrow-mindedness. However, regardless of appearances of charity and altruism, asking a religious believer to hold his faith ten- tatively or relegating religious faith to the domain of mere preference and private conjecture can prove liberating to some and offensive to others who are devoted to their faith and see it as normative. Griffiths accurately observes; playing by epistemic parity rules actually devalues religious faith by keeping them from “being taken seriously as elements in com- prehensive accounts of the way things are” and something around to which “your entire life is organized” Griffiths (2001:87).

The Philosophy of and Religious Relativism

Pluralism and Relativism are other two ways of responding to the con- flicting truth-claims of the various religious traditions in the world. is the most prominent exponent of the pluralistic philosophy of reli- gion. He made use of Kant’s epistemological distinction between the phe- nomena world and the noumena world. The former applying to God as imaged from within particular cultural and historical circumstances and therefore known in human response, and the latter to God in his/her/its inner being and therefore strictly unknowable (Hick 1997:279). Hick con- tends that there is a plurality of paths to salvation and each of the great world religions offers such a path. He denies the positions widely held by atheists, agnostics, exclusivists and inclusivists about religious­ truth. Relying on Kant’s position, Hick argues that one’s experiences and descriptions of the ultimate reality depends on the interpretive concepts through which one sees, structures, and understands them. Thus, some TRUTH-CLAIMS IN THE GLOBAL MULTI-RELIGIOUS AMBIANCE 143 experience and understand the ultimate reality in personal, theistic catego- ries, others do so in impersonal, pantheistic ways, while some others experience and comprehend the ultimate reality as completely non-per- sonal. According to Meister (2009), Hick illustrates this position with the aid of the Hindu parable of the blind men and the ­elephant thus:

God is like a large elephant surrounded by several blind men. One man touches the elephant’s tail and thinks it is a rope. Another touches the trunk and thinks it is a snake. Another touches the leg and thinks it is a tree. Yet another touch the elephant’s side and thinks it is a wall. They are all experiencing the same elephant but in very different ways. The same goes for God and the various religions (Meister 2009:31).

The central idea of the pluralistic is the validity and equality of all religious traditions. The pluralists are of the view that all religions are partial expressions of the same ultimate reality. All these religions offer parallel ways to salvation as far as they can transform human beings from egoism to an orientation towards the ultimate reality (Hick 1989:4). In his seminal work- God Has Many Names, Hick writes “the Copernican revolution in theology must involve a shift from the that Christianity is at the center to the thought that it is God who is at the centre and that all the religions of mankind, including our own, serve and revolve around him” (Hick 1982:36). It is very important to state here that religious pluralism does not merely refer to the reality of religious diversity but also refers to an ideology. The granting of parity is extended in a more positivistic and affirming manner by contending that the major religions are, in fact, in touch with the same reality, albeit in alternate ways. To his credit, Hick affirms that the varying divine projections, while certainly constrained and limited, must have some positive correspondence to reality otherwise religious experiences would be entirely delusional (Lee 2012:65-66). It is imperative to note that Hick’s argument rest on the fact that the religious beliefs of sincere and intelligent people contradict the religious beliefs of some people with similar traits, yet their beliefs appear coherent and equally well grounded. In addition, a strong correlation exists between one’s culture and religious beliefs (Koehl 2005:395). Hick asserts:

It was not so much new thoughts as new experiences that drew me, as a philosopher, into the issues of religious pluralism. … Encounters with remarkable individuals of several faiths, people whom I cannot but deeply respect, and in some cases even regard as saints, have reinforced the reali- zation that our very different religious traditions constitute alternative human contexts of response to the one ultimate transcendent divine reality (Hick 1993:141). 144 EWERE NELSON ATOI

From the foregoing, it seems that experiences like Hick’s could con- tribute to a significant defeater for soteriological and experiential exclu- sivists beliefs, and for the views of many doxastic exclusivists who cannot extricate these soteriological and experiential exclusivisms from their other beliefs (Koehl 2005:403). Relativism on the other hand, is a concept that has risen among schol- ars in recent times. The central idea in this approach is that each faith traditions should remain committed to the truth of its own religious teachings while at the same time agreeing with some of the central con- cerns raised by pluralism (Meister 2009:35). In other words, relativism is the view that all beliefs are proportionate to particular circumstances. No belief can claim to be universally valid, because there are no gener- ally agreed standards for ascertaining truth. Only transitory and localized consensus is a claim to knowledge about a reality open to examination (Kirk 2004:132). The relativist approach takes either the form of all religious faiths as relative truths, which are thus equal or specific religious belief which are right and appropriate for certain individuals. For example, Christianity may be right for Christians and Islam right for Muslims, but there is no ultimate religion for all. According to the relativists, all religious faiths are equal because they all arise from one truth which the native culture then colours (Netland 1987:82). Joseph Runzo, however, is perhaps the most prominent advocate of relativism. Runzo presented a version of religious relativism which he calls “heno ”, derived from the Greek word heno meaning one and the Latin term fide meaning faith, whereby the correctness of a religion is relative to the worldview of its community of adherents. Meister commenting on Runzo’s relativistic position, made the follow- ing observations: Runzo grants that different religions are constituted by different experiences and mutually incompatible sets of truth-claims, and that the different ­religions and experiences are themselves rooted in distinct worldviews that are incompatible with, if not contradictory to the other religions and world- views. But he maintains that these differing experiences and incompatible worldviews emerge from the plurality of phenomenal divine realities ­experienced by the adherents of the religions (Meister 2009:35).

Against this backdrop, it is understood that a person’s worldview determines how one understands and experiences ultimate reality. In addition, corresponding to differences of worldview, there are mutually incompatible yet individually adequate sets of conceptual-schema-­relative TRUTH-CLAIMS IN THE GLOBAL MULTI-RELIGIOUS AMBIANCE 145 truths. In other words, the truth of a religion is determined by its ade- quacy to correspond appropriately to the worldview of which it is a part. However, like Meister rightly observed, religious relativism is logically incoherent since it cannot consistently maintain that truth is individual- istic (Meister 2009:35 & 37). Some scholars have demonstrated that pluralism­ has great advantage over relativism. According to Eck (2001:71), ‘‘Pluralism is not simply relativism”. It does not displace or eliminate deep religious commitments or secular commitments for that matter. It is, rather, the encounter of commitments.’’ From another dimension, Smith (2007:337) contends that instead of just tolerating all traditions as advocated by relativists, pluralists maintain that religionists should embrace other religions and expect to find value beyond that which is not present within the home religion.

Concluding Remarks

Having explored the various notions of religious truth-claims, this paper submits that pluralist philosophy can be viewed in a more favour- able light because it provides the most satisfactory explanation for reli- gious diversity among the available theories. Unlike exclusivism which excludes members of other religions from the scheme of salvation in an enclave of religious diversity, the Pluralist notion presents an approach that gives all religious adherents the ability to obtain salvation or libera- tion irrespective of one’s religious affiliations. Whereas inclusivists hold that one’s own religious faith contains all possible truths, pluralists are of the opinion that there are essential truths that other traditions proclaim and it is worthwhile to learn those truths. Moreover, unlike relativism which advocates for mere tolerance of other religious traditions, plural- ism advocates that religionists should embrace other faiths and expect to find worth beyond that which is not present in the home tradition (Koehl 2005:409). Quintessentially, pluralism actively seeks to understand the lines of differences among the various faith traditions. This is the reason why pluralism or theocentricism, as an option in the spectrum of theories now available in the domain of religious epistemology, ought to be viewed in a more favourable light. It does not, however, mean that the pluralist position is devoid of a few weaknesses. The knowledge of ­metaphysical truth is a phenomenon that no individual or particular group could establish alone. Without any misgiving, the pluralist approach to truth-claims can be used to set agenda for interreligious dialogue. 146 EWERE NELSON ATOI

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