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Chapter 11 The Mutual-Opposition View 193 concern here is to understand this undeniable religious plurality in the \ world. This concern addresses both the religious and those who are not religious, for both live in the same world of religious plurality. Whether we ourselves are or Religious Plurality: The Mutual t are not religious, we can appreciate that an individual's religion can be significant in that individual's life. A religion presents a picture oflife and its meaning; it can guide Opposition View, Exclusivism, our actions and shape our feelings. So, if! am religious, how should I understand the relationship of my religion to other religions, and if! am not religious, how should I understand the relationship between the various religions of the world? If I notice Inclusivism, and Pluralism that lots ofpeople have different kinds ofcars, I can say, "Well, different people have different tastes and like different things in cars." But I cannot say this about different religions. Religions are not just a matter of taste. For one thing, there is no conflict between my having a Honda and your having a Ford. But different religions say dif ferent things about the deepest meaning of the world. The question is: How should we understand different religions and the relationship between them? Several different answers have been proposed to the question of how we should The Undeniable Phenomenon of Rei ious Plurality understand the religious plurality we find in the world. In this chapter and Chapter 12 we look at a range of answers to this question. Important among these answers are There are in the world many religions; in other words, there is in the world a exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism, and we examine these three major reactions to religious plurality. Sometimes, in order to emphasize that the world's religions are religious plurality in this chapter. significantly different from one another, this plurality is spoken of as a diversity of Exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism come from serious thinkers within religions. That there are in the world different religions has been appreciated for some religious tradition, but not all answers to the question of how to understand centuries. In the West, since the Middle Ages and before, Jews, Christians, and religious plurality come from within religion. Before we turn to a consideration of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism we consider an answer to the question of Muslims have been aware of one another's religions. In ancient India, Jainism, I1'1' Hinduism, and Buddhism existed together. Today in the various countries of Asia religious plurality that does not come from within religion. It is a view that may be Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity coexist. In the twenty-first century called the mutual-opposition view of religious plurality. all of these religions, and others too, are represented on all or many continents and thus are world religions. Moreover, as modern anthropology has made us aware, there is in addition a great multiplicity of geographically limited religions that are not world religions, although they may have many followers. Although it The Mutual-Opposition View is clear that the fact of religious plurality was not discovered in the twenty-first century, or even in the twentieth century, what has happened in the late twentieth Succinctly put, the mutual-opposition view holds that religious plurality Sh07VS century and is continuing to happen in the twenty-first century is that different that no religion is right, or at least that there is no reason to accept one religion over any world religions have increasingly come to coexist in single cultures around the other. The viewpoint of this answer is that of someone who is aware of the diver world. In Asia, this religious coexistence within a single culture has visibly been sity of religions in the world but who stands apart from them all. Some offering the case for centuries; now it is to be found in the cultures of Europe and the this answer may be anti-religious and opposed to religion in all its forms, Americas. In the twenty-first century many of us on various continents live in whereas others may not be anti-religious but can see no reason to adopt any communities where, within the radius of a few miles, there are synagogues, religion. churches, mosques, Hindu temples, and Buddhist temples. Many in today's world Among those who not only stand apart from religion but stand opposed to know people or have friends in religions other than their own. Religious plurality religion, some have the sense that the various religions cancel each other out in for many has in this way come to be something in their own experience, not just that what supports one tells against the others. For them the best view of the plu something they read about. Many others have come to experience religious plural- rality of religions in the world is that they are more than mutually opposed; they at least indirectly, through television reports and documentaries that make us mutually destroy each other. Those with this more extreme view-the mutual aware of different religious traditions and of the encounters between religious cancellation view, we might call it-may realize that religions differ significantly in traditions. For these reasons, the fact of religious plurality is now more acutely felt what they hold as orthodox belief. For Islam, Muhammad is "the Seal of the as something real. prophets," the final and greatest Prophet of God, but Muhammad is not given this l'
194 CHAPTER 11 Religious Plurality Exclusivism 195 position by Judaism or Christianity. For Christianity, Jesus Christ is the Son of used here, those are exclusivists who hold that their religion is right and all other God, but Jesus is not given this position by Judaism or Islam. For Hinduism, there religions that differ from it are not right. is a cycle of rebirth or being born over and over in a series of lives, determined by A question that comes up immediately is this: "Right" in what sense? One one's actions in prior lives, called kannic rebirth, whereas this is not so for the significant and obvious sense of "right" that can be applied here is true. Often when Western religions. In all these cases, it would be reasoned from this viewpoint, we say that what a person believes is right we mean what that person believes is whatever supports the orthodox beliefs of one religion would overthrow the true. This sense applies to religious exclusivism in a straightforward way. Using beliefs of the others. sense the exclusivist is saying that his or her religion is "right" in the sense of hav In the eighteenth century, the philosopher David Hume seems to have rea ing the right-true-religious belief..., and all other religions with other, incompat soned in this way about the different religions of the world. He said that "in matters ible, beliefs are wrong. lwo beliefs are incompatible when not both of them can be of religions, whatever is different is contrary." That is, the different beliefs of dif true; so if one is true the other must be false. If the exclusivist thinks, furthermore, ferent religions should be understood as contrary to each other so that if one is that all other religions have beliefs that are incompatible with the true beliefs of his right the others are wrong. And so, he thought, it is impossible that all the religions or her religion, then the exclusivist will conclude that all other religions are wrong. of the world should "be established on any solid foundation." Hume reasoned that Blaise Pascal, who accepted Christianity as the true religion, in effect said just this everything that support... one religion, as its proclaimed miracles are meant to do, in his Pensees when he said, "I see several religions contrary to one another and has "the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system" of therefore all false but one:,2 This first sense is the truth-claim sense of "right," and it religion. Thus, every "miracle" cited in support of one religion, he reasoned, would is a sense of "right" that is important for the exclusivist viewpoint. But there are tell again... t every other religion, "and," Ilume observed, "all of them abound in other senses of "right" that might be applied. Another sense that is significant in miracles:'l the context of religions is: being "right" in the sense of being the exclusive or one Some with the viewpoint of the first answer, the mutual-opposition view, may true path to religious attainment. This is the religious-attainment sense of "right." not be opposed to religion but only aloof and reserved about religion (and Hume, Both of these senses of "right" are important for this position, and both have been on one reading, can be construed as having this stance). Those who follow this a part of the Christian discussion of exclusivism.3 Obviously the two senses can go alternative of the first answer see no reason for anyone religion to be chosen over together and be made to complement one another. An exclusivist might claim that any other. They have what we may call the mutual-doubt view. It may strike them his or her religion is exclusively right in the religions-attainment sense precisely that people are in the religion they are due to the accident of the place of their because it is exclusively right in the truth-claim sense. birth. As they look upon the plurality of religions in the world, it might seem that it The history of exclusivism in Christian thinking goes back centuries. Seven would be arbitrary to them for to choose any religion. So, it seems to them, the best hundred years ago the then Pope declared that faith required all to believe there stance is not to commit to a particular religion, or to take up religious belief in any was one Church, outside of which there is no salvation (or eternal life after death), form, but to reserve belief and commitment. If those following the first variant of and that submitting to the Roman Pontiff (or Pope) was a necessity for salvation. It the mutual-opposition view, the mutual-cancellation view, are "atheistic" regarding all was believed that "outside the church there is no salvation."4 On the Protestant religions, those following the alternative form of this viewpoint, the mutual-doubt side, going back to the early days of the Reformation, there was a similar belief that s view, are "agnostic" regarding all religions. outside Christianity, and accepting Christ, there was no salvation. However, most contemporary Roman Catholics have rejected the old doctrine that outside the Church there is no salvation in its traditional understanding, and it was repudiated by Pope John Paul II. In an encyclical, or letter, Pope John Paul IT said in 1979 that Exclusivism "every man without any exception whatever-has been redeemed by Christ, and ... with each man without any exception whatever-Christ is in a way united even Exclusivism is the view that my religion alone is right and other religions that differfrom when man is unaware of it." Although Pope John PaullI continued to see redemp mine are excluded from being 1'ight. Many who belong to a particular religion and feel tion or salvation as coming through Christ, his encyclical allowed that membership deeply committed to that particular religion may feel this way. Often exclusivism is in the Church is not necessary. Similarly, John Hick observes, although a number associated with Christianity, and it is true that the underlying idea has been of modern fundamentalist Protestants subscribe to the idea that accepting Christ is advanced in Christian circles as a way of viewing Christianity. Still, although many necessary for salvation, this form of exclusivism has been set aside by many Christians in the past have been exclusivists, and many Christians are today, not all Protestants.6 Christians have been or are exclusivists, and, viewing exclusivism broadly, it is Of course, many individual Christians may subscribe to some form of exclu possible for there to be exclusivists in other religions as well. In the broad sense sivism even if exclusivism has been rejected by "official" Christian thinking for the most part. Individual <;:h!'!~~i!!!!~ may £Qnt!ny~ to hnlrl thllt nn1'\! rhristi~ninr ,.... ~I IRI I Lti I I Religious Plurality Exclusivism 197
or their version of Ch~is~ianity, is "right" in o~e.or both of the senses :W~ id:n~ informal version of exclusivism Christians might feel that Christianity is the "one fied. One way for a Chflstian to be an excluslVlst and hold that ChrIstIamty IS true religion," and it alone is "right," but leave it unspecified what makes "right" in the truth-claim sense is to hold that Christianity's key or core beliefs are Christianity the one true religion or what one must accept to be a Christian. true and all other religions with other, incompatible, beliefs are wrong. Alvin Exclusivism in this informal version could be held by members ofvarious religions. Plantinga has defended this form of exclusivism. He finds himself, he says, with To the extent a Buddhist or a Muslim held that her or his religion was the one true religious beliefs that he realizes are not shared by many. For example, he says, he religion, she or he would be an exclusivist. believes both: Plantinga has defended his truth-claim exclusivism against several objections. One objection that Plantinga considers is the "moral objection" that his exclusivism (1) The world was created by God, an almighty, all-knowing, and perfectly is arbitrary in a self-serving and arrogant way, because it assumes a privileged posi good personal being (one that holds beliefs; has aims, plans and intentions; and tion regarding religious truth. 10 this objection Plantinga replies that one making can act to accomplish these aims) such an objection is himself being arrogant. Such an objector to exclusivism who (like Plantinga and Hick and many others) is aware ofvarious religions, recognizes and genuine piety or spiritual development in them, and knows of no argument that would prove to others the correctness ofone's own religion, and who then counsels (2) Human beings require salvation, and God has provided a unique way ofsal abstention from believing Plantinga's previously mentioned beliefs (1) and (2) is vation through the incarnation, life, sacrificial death, and resurrection of his arrogant in his own way, Plantinga reasons, for he presents himself as having a priv divine son.7 ileged status in seeing it is better not to believe (1) and (2).9 In other words Plantinga is saying that if it is arrogant to think one has a privileged position in He goes on to say that it Intlst be conceded that if an exclusivist "believes (1) or (2), believing (1) and (2) to be true, it is arrogant to think one has a privileged position then she must also believe that those who believe something incompatible with in seeing it is better not to believe (1) and (2). them are mistaken and believe what is false."g We should make two observations at In addition to this moral objection, Plantinga considers several "epistemic this point. First, Plantinga is affirming a form of exclusivism because his (2) makes objections." One epistemic objection, very much like an objection made by John a unique~ess claim (th~ o~lyway to salvation is through the incarn~ti?n,. death~ and Hick (noted subsequently), is that Plantinga's exclusivism is intellectually arbi resurrectIon ofJesus Chnst). Since every religion other than ChnstIamty belIeves trary when it involves believing (1) and (2) are true (and that all other religious that this uniqueness claim is not true, every other religion believes what is incom beliefs incompatible with them are false). This objection is like the moral objec patible with (2) and so every other religion must be believed by Plantinga to be tion of arrogance, but different in that it focuses on the epistemic matter of mistaken. Second, to the extent that these two beliefs are deeply held religious belief-holding rather than the moral matter of having a morally objectionable beliefs that Plantinga is "confessing" in the religious sense, or "bearin~ witness" t~, attitude like arrogance. Plantinga replies to this epistemic objection in the fol and to the extent that he deems them essential to his religious commItment, he IS lowing way: Say that an exclusivist recognizes that religious believers in different expressing an identifiable form of religious sensibility. For this sensibility a deep traditions have "internal epistemic parity," so that they are equally convinced of expression of faith, or religious commitment, requires an affirmation of an essential their beliefs and they have the same interior "markers" regarding their beliefs religious claim or belief-(I) and (2) for Plantinga. That Christ is our savior is an (they equally have the sense they can point to evidence, their beliefs feel uplift essential belief, not only for Plantinga, but for many other Christians with this ing, and so on), still the exclusivist must think that there is an "important epis religious sensibility, for whom embracing this belief is essential to their faith in temic difference." The exclusivist will think that others who do not accept (1) and God. In a similar way in Islam Muslims express this religious sensibility when they (2) have made a mistake, have a blind spot, haven't been attentive, have not confess their, fait~ by reciting the shahada: "There is no G~d but, Allah; and received some grace that those who believe (1) and (2) have been given, or are in Muhammad IS hIS Prophet." For forms of Buddhism in whIch thIS stram of some way "epistemically less fortunate." If the exclusivist is right in this assess religious sensibility is found an essential belief may be that Gautama was the ment, then his exclusivism is not arbitrary. If the pluralist says that the proper Buddha. For those with this ~eligious sensibility, it may well seem that religious thing to do when there is "internal epistemic parity" between people in different exdusivism is required by their religious commitment itself. religions is not to believe (1) and (2), then he has a dilemma. Plantinga observes If a Christian holds that Christianity is right in the religious attainment-sense of that for all such a pluralist knows, his pluralist belief has "internal epistemic parity" "right" so that it is the exclusive or one true path to religious attainment, then he or with the exclusivist's belief in (1) and (2). In that case, Plantinga reasons, if the she may hold that in order to be "saved" or accepted by God one must (1) accept pluralist continues in his insistence "he will be in the same condition as the the teachings ~f"the chllrch," (2) accept the key or core teachings of"th~ church," exclusivist" (open to the accusation of arbitrarily holding his own belief) or, (3) accept Chnst as one's savior, or (4) some combination of these. Or III a more if he does not continue in his insistence, "he no longer has an objection
L JA;.\ I 198 CHAPTER 11 Religious 1;Ii Inclusivism 199 to the exclusivist."10 Boiled down, Plantinga is saying that there is as good a Critical Examination of Exclusivism reason for saying that the belief that one should withhold belief in (1) and is arbi trary as for saying the beliefin (1) and (2) is arbitrary. John Hick and others have observed that for most who are religious, the religion Plantinga considers other epistemic objections as welL objection that , they have is a matter of the religious community into which they were born. 13 exclusivism is intellectually arbitrary he considers under the heading ofjustification. Every religion has some kind of religious experience that it draws upon, and Hick Another objection under this heading (or another variant of the objection that \ maintains that there is no good reason to claim that the religious experience of exclusivism is epistemically unjustified) that he considers is that the exclusivist is not one's own religion is valid whereas that of every other religious tradition is delu 4 within his "intellectual rights" in holding his exclusivist view. But, Plantinga replies, sory. It is arbitrary to do so, he holds.1 William Alston is in essential agreement. this would be true only if the exclusivist is violating his "epistemic duties," by which Alston, as we saw in Chapter 4, allows that those in religious traditions other than he means our duties regarding our beliefs (which, again, is what Clifford andJames Christianity, following their own internally validated forms of belief-forming prac had in mind, as was discussed in Chapter 4). The best way to understand our epis tice, would be as rational in following their own practice as Christians are rational temic duty, Plantinga suggests, is as a duty "to try one's best to get into and stay in /.1 in following their belief-forming practice. On this thinking one's religion is an acci the right relation to the truth." And, Plantinga asks, wouldn't the exdusivist be con dent of birth, and the different religions are equally rational in forming and hold forming to this duty if he or she still held that (1), say, is true "after careful, indeed ing their conflicting beliefs. Why, then, should one affirm one's religion as the only prayerful, consideration"? 11 right religion? Under the heading of irrationality, Plantinga considers the charge that the Often, the effort to convert or proselytize others is sustained by exclusivism. If exdusivist is irrational in holding his exdusivist view. In reply, Plantinga identifies exclusivist believers regard their religion as the one and only way to salvation or five different related senses or varieties of rationality. They range from Aristotelian eternal life, irrespective of any religious duty to seek converts, they may seek to Rationality (being rational is having the ability to "look before and after," hold convert others out of concern for them and their ultimate welfare. However, exclu beliefs, make inferences, and have knowledge) and The Deliverances ofReason (being sivism need not lead to a proselytizing effort, and, moreover, missionary activity rational is being able to know self-evident beliefs; and in a closely related sense a need not be tied to religious exclusivism. 10 the extent that missionary activity has belief is rational if it is self-evident and irrational if it is contrary to what is self the purpose of providing medical attention to those in need, it does not presuppose evident) to Rationality as Sanity and Prope1' Function (in which irrationality is the dys exclusivism, and establishing a mission in the sense of an externally supported place function of our faculties, as in a psychological disorder). Plantinga argues that his of worship among those already in one's religion does not presuppose exclusivism. exclusivism is not irrational in any of these senses, Similarly commitment to one's religion need not be tied to exc1usivism. The pro In addition, Plantinga considers the epistemic objection that his exclusivism nouncement of Pope John Paul II makes it clear that he and the Church for which does not have enough warrant for knowledge (where a warrant is an epistemic sanc he speaks do not hold an exclusivist view regarding redemption or salvation. tion or authorization). Many pluralists hold that the exclusivist "can't know" that his In contrast, Plantinga has defended his form of exclusivism against the objec exdusivist views are true, Plantinga observes. But he argues that this is wrong: An tion that it is arrogant to hold this view. And he has argued that there is no more exdusivist could know that his views are correct, specifically that (1) and (2) are true. I reason to say exclusivism is arbitrary than for saying pluralism is arbitrary. h Plantinga argues that there are several epistemological views about what would Furthermore, he has argued, exclusivists may well respect their "epistemic duties" give a warrant for knowledge that provide ways of understanding how the exclu and not be irrational in holding their exclusivism and, on more than one epistemo sivist could have adequate warrant. One he cites is reliabilism. Chapter 4 discusses logical theory, exc1usivists could have enough warrant for knowledge. Ifexclusivism William Alston's re1iabilism; however the fornl of reliabilism that Plantinga draws can meet all of these objections, Plantinga might ask, why shouldn't one with deep attention to owes more to John Calvin. If(1) and (2) are true, his belief in them, he religious commitment to his or her own religion be an exc1usivist? says, "could be produced in me by a reliable belief-producing process." What Calvin called the "Sensus Divinitatis" could reliably produce his belief in (1) and what Calvin called the "Internal Testimony of the Holy Spirit" could reliably pro- his belief in (2). Alternatively, under the view of "proper functionalism," Inclusivism if (1) and (2) are true, his belief in them could be produced by properly functioning "cognitive faculties" (including Calvin's Sensus Divinitatis and Internal Testimony Inclusivism is the view that m,Y religion alone is right but otber religions may pa1ticipate of the Holy Spirit). In either case there would be enough warrant for knowledge. in its rigbtness and so are included. The essential informing intuition of this reaction Plantinga is not arguing that the exclusivist does know (1) and (2), but that he could to the religious plurality in the world is twofold: There is the basic idea that one's know them to be true, and so the pluralists he cites are wrong in saying that the ,I own religion is right (in the truth-claim sense, the religious-attainment sense, or in exclusivist can't know. 12 both senses), but also the idea that other religions are not utterly wrong. In some 200 CHAPTER 11 R91i910", P',co"1y T Inclusivism 201 way they are to be "included." For many holding this view, their own religion is Rahner, it is best to suppose that every human being is exposed to the influence of right in both the senses we have distinguished. The doctrines, or the central supernatural grace by which God communicates himself "whether the individual religious beliefS, of their religion are true, and their religion is the true path to reli takes up an attitude of acceptance or ofrefusal towards this grace." For God desires gious attainment, to God or to Religious Reality. However, inspiring this view is the salvation of everyone. So, for Rahner, there may be individuals in non-Christian the desire to reach out to other religions and in some way to include them in the traditions who participate in grace. Yet salvation remains "specifically Christian" and circle of acceptance. finally "there is no salvation apart from Christ." Accordingly, for Rahner, there may As the exclusivist view goes back centuries in Christian thinking, so too does be in non-Christian religions individuals who perhaps have never heard of Christ the inclusivist view in some form. Early in the history of Christianity, questions have implicitly accepted grace given on account of Christ and, in this way, by were raised about the patriarchs of the Old Testament, who lived hundreds of virtue oftheir having implicitly accepted grace though they do not proclaim Christ's years before the birth ofJesus. Were they, from the standpoint of Christianity, sacrifice, have become anonymous Christians. 17 saved? Were they excluded or included? It was held that they were included. For Although for Aquinas it is implicit beliefthat can bring non-Christians to salva St. Augustine, who wrote in the fifth century of the Common Era, Old Testament tion, for Rahner it is implicit acceptance ofgrace that can bring non-Christians to figures like Noah and Moses were still "heirs ofGod and joint-heirs ofChrist," even salvation by making them anonymous Christians. What would indicate such an though they lived before the binh ofJesus.15 In the thineenth century, St. Thomas implicit acceptance of grace? The implicit acceptance of this grace will not be seen Aquinas had the same concern and came to a view similar to Augustine's. Aquinas in a proclamation of Christian belief, of course. It will be seen in a person's life and asked whether it is "necessary for the salvation of all that they should believe explic her or his decisions about how to live. One indication of the implicit acceptance of itly in the mystery of Christ." He replied that although it was necessary for all to grace could be "the radical love of neighbor."18 Rahner's inclusivism in a way keeps believe in the mystery of Christ-and that Christ is the one Mediator of God-it in place the "outside the church there is no salvation" doctrine, but it liberalizes it was not necessary for all that they believe this explicitly; for some it was enough to so that it no longer is exclusivist. believe it implicitly. For some, Aquinas allows, "though they did not believe in Him However for, say, a Buddhist or a Hindu to be an anonymous Christian, there explicitly, they did, nevertheless, have implicit faith through believing in divine is a further condition. It must be that they have not truly understood the Christian providence."16 Implicit belief in Christ (or in God) is different from explicit belief message of the Gospel and rejected it. For Rahner it is not enough for such true in that implicit belief does not require a conscious acknowledgement of Christ (or of understanding that Buddhists or Hindus, or others, have merely heard the central God) as the object of belief. (We might say that before the discovery of gravity as an propositions of Christian belief articulated. It must be that Christianity has reached attractive force, people implicitly believed in gravity, for they were aware that them "in the real urgency and rigor of [their] actual existence" so that they have objects fall when dropped; but after the discovery of gravity in the eighteenth cen come to the point of existential and historical encounter with Christianity that tury people explicitly believed in gravity.) Aquinas' way of thinking clearly expands understanding requires.1 9 For Rahner, then, many who have in some way heard the circle of religious inclusion (in this case, Christianity's), so that many persons what the beliefs of Christianity are and have then vigorously denied them may still who have not proclaimed themselves to be believers may be included. The concern be anonymous Christians. of Augustine and Aquinas was with the inclusion of pre-Christian individuals, not However, for Rahner, those who are anonymous Christians are nevertheless in with religious plurality and the relationship of Christianity to other religions. a state of essential incompleteness. In "Anonymous Christianity" there "is some However, it is not difficult to extend their thinking to the contemporary question of thing missing from the fulness of its due nature."20 What is missing is an explicit religious plurality and to a form of religious inclusivism that applies to other acceptance of Christianity. Finally, for Rahner, there is a "basic duty of every man religions. to become a Christian in an explicit ecclesiastical form of Christianity."21 For In effect this is exactly what happened following Vatican II, the ecumenical Rahner's Christian inclusivism Christianity remains the one true and right religion, council called by Pope John XXIII in 1962. Ecumenical means 'Working toward the and those explicitly outside Christianity are saved only by their implicit partici unity of Christian churches and better inte'ljaith understanding. Invitations were pation in Christianity. The same or analogous point holds for whatever inclusivists extended to Protestant and Orthodox Eastern churches to attend Vatican II. Karl there may be in other religious traditions. Rahner is a Catholic theologian who, following Vatican II, developed a form of Inclusivists, then, do not deny that their religion alone is right in the truth inclusivism that would not deny that Christianity, or more specifically Catholicism, claim sense or the attainment-sense. But they allow that those explicitly outside their is the one true way to salvation and yet would include those in other non-Christian religion may still be included by virtue of implicit belief or implicit acceptance. In religions. Rahner's chief contribution to Christian inclusivism is his category of the this connection we might revisit Plantinga's exclusivism. Plantinga believes both "anonymous Christian." Rahner maintains that non-Christian religions include not that the world was created by a personal God and that God has provided a unique only "a natural knowledge God," but also "supernatural elements arising out way of salvation through the sacrifice of his divine son (Plantinga's (1) and (2)). the grace which is given to men as a gratuitous gift on account ofChrist." In fact, for Believing both (1) and (2) to be true, Plantinga defends the exclusivist position. 202 CHAPTER 11 Pluralism 21
However, keeping in place his strong belief that (1) and (2) are true, Plantinga religions. Some have seen this insistence on the unique rightness ofthe inclusivis could take an inclusivist position. He would if he allowed that non-Christians own religion as a weakness ofthe inclusivist position. might implicitly believe (l) and (2) or if he allowed that Christ's unique salvation There is a related problem with inclusivism. Say that two inclusivists from diffe extended to those in other religions by virtue oftheir implicit acceptance of Christ ent religious traditions meet. would regard the other as religiously saved, b as savior through God's grace, even though they did not explicitly accept Christ as each must regard the other as being mistaken about the religion through which he their savior. she is saved. Karl Rahner once had a conversation with Keiji Nishitani, who was t Those in other religions may also take an inclusivist position. In the Qur'an leader of the Kyoto School of Philosophy in Japan. Nishitani knew that Rahn Jews and Christians are recognized as "People of the Book," people who in their regarded others in non-Christian traditions as anonymous Christians by virtue own tradition have a sacred scripture. Over time Muslims included those in their implicit acceptance of God's grace given on account ofJesus Christ. Nishital communities with a sacred scripture, such as Zoroastrians and HindusP Although however, asked Rahner what he would say to his treating Rahner as an anonymo people in these religious traditions have not accepted Islam, or Muhammad as the Zen Buddhist.25 Rahner replied that he would be honored, although he confessl seal of the prophets, they are traditionally regarded as "protected" by Muslims. that he was obliged to regard Nishitani as being in error. The problem here wi In Buddhism there is a natural avenue that leads to inclusivism. This is because inclusivism is that, though it is a reaching out to other religions in an effort to in Buddhism every human being, and every sentient being, is a potential Buddha. them, those in other traditions cannot accept the extended offer ofinclusion with, Many human beings may fail to attain enlightenment in their present life, and the at the same time renouncing their commitment to their own religion. road to Buddhahood may be long for many, winding through a series or reincarna tions. Still, for each and every person, finally, there is the potential of Buddhahood, whether one is a Buddhist or not. I once had a Buddhist student, a monk, who allowed that I too was on the Buddha path. Pluralism In one of the oldest Hindu scriptures this question is addressed: to shall we offer our oblations or sacrifices? The answer given is: it must be Prajapati, Pluralism, like exclusivism and inclusivism, is a view about religious plurality a who is the one God above all gods. But in the Hindu tradition this was understood the relationship between different religions. In its barest form, it is the view that as meaning that any god could be worshipped on a given occasion as long as he or the great religions ofthe world are right. John Hick is the foremost proponen t ofpI she was seen as "the one god above all gods."23 The practice of worshipping the ralism and has done the most to develop this view in recent years. Hick identifies one God through the worship of several gods is one form of what is called the "central insight" 'of pluralism the idea that "the great world faiths are differe henotheism, and it is embraced by Hinduism in its devotional form (as we responses to the one ultimate transcendent reality." He observes observed in Chapter 1). Moreover the practice is commonly recognized by Hindus, ancient roots. For instance, in the ancient scriptures of the even those without formal education, so that it is understandable to them that dif Vedas, there is the teaching that Real (sat) is one, but the sages name it va ferent persons will have different ishtadevs (different forms through which they " Hick cites leaders and thinkers in a range of religious traditions who have worship God).24 Allowing that, for Hinduism, a Christian concept of God, or a one way or another expressed the central idea of pluralism, including Mahat Judaic or Islamic concept of God, can be an Hinduism naturallv accom Gandhi, who said, "We are all children ofthe same God," and the Quaker Willi modates a form of Penn (the founder of Pennsylvania) who said that "The humble, meek, merci just, pious, and devout souls are everywhere of one religion."26 An implication of pluralism is that no religion is more right than others; no Critical Examination of Inclusivism is in the favored position of being the one true religion. And here is the main d ference between pluralism and both exclusivism and indusivism. Pluralists Ii For an inclusivist one's own religion is the one right religion, and persons in other Hick are happy to accept this key imolic-ation of religions are included only by virtue of the inclusivist doctrine of one's own reli the light ofthe undeniable gion. So, while inclusivism does include other religions and those in other reli ~; about religions is a radical shift-a "paradigm-shift"-like the Copernican sh gions, it affords them a "second-class citizenship." For inclusivists, in order for the universe as earth-centered, with all the other planets and the s those included in other religions to fully embrace the whole truth they rotating around it, to seeing it (or our solar system, anyway) as sun-centered, explicitly accept the inclusivist's own religion, as with Rahner's helio-centric, with the earth rotating around the sun. This astronomical sh sivism. This point holds for Hindu and other inclusivists. \¥bile Hinduism can followed the development of Nicolaus Copernicus' helio-centric theory in the si those who worship God in a Judaic, Christian, or Islamic conception it is teenth century. Today Copernicus' theory forms the basis of modern astrono by virtue of bringing a Hindu understanding to worship in these other -and is accepted as commonplace by most educated people. In religious thinki 204 CHAPTER 11 Religious Plurality Pluralism 205
Hick suggests, we must stop seeing the universe of religions as centered on our reli in a Buddhist religious culture, he will not experience the Real as God, whereas if gion, with all the other religions arranged around it, and begin seeing the universe another person is raised in an Islamic religious culrure, she will. of religions as "Reality-centered," with all the religions, including our own, Hick suggests that across the spectrum of the world religions there are "two arranged around a central religious reality.27 In this way a theological Copernican very different ways of conceiving and experiencing the Real." In theistic traditions, revolution in religious thinking is needed, Hick suggests. the Real is experienced as God. In non-theistic traditions, the Real is experienced as There are two main elements in Hick's pluralism. The first is essentially the an Absolute. In Judaism, Christianity, and Islam the Real is experienced as a personal "central insight" of pluralism, that the great world religions are different responses God, whereas in Buddhism and nondualistic Hinduism, the Real is experienced as to one religious reality or the ReaL The different religions embody different per a nonpersonal Absolute. WIthin these two main ways ofexperiencing the Real, there ceptions and conceptions the Real, and thus different responses to it. Some reli are finer distinctions, Hick wants us to appreciate. A traditional Jew will experi gions, like Christianity and Islam, interpret Reality as a personal ultimate, as a deity ence the Real as the God ofIsrael, whereas a Christian might experience the Real as or God, and some, like Buddhism and forms of Hinduism, interpret Reality as a the Holy Trinity. A Mahayana Buddhist may experience the Real as Nirvana or non personal ultimate or Absolute.2s In addition to this central idea, there is a second Dhannakaya, and a nondualist Hindu may experience the Real as Brahman. Thus, crucial element of Hick's pluralism: that the transformation from self-centeredness at the theistic end of the spectrum, there are a number of personae (or personal to Reality-centeredness--called variously liberation, enlightenment, salvation, or manifestations of the Real), and at the non-theistic end of the spectrum, there are a fulfillment in different religious traditions-is taking place in all the major tradi number ofimpersonae (or nonpersonal manifestations of the Real).32 tions.29 Hick's pluralism is the view that all the great religions ofthe world are right In this way, for Hick, there are in the different religions of the world different in that they all are related to religious reality or the Real and they all provide a path phenomenal experiences of the Real, none an experience of the Real-in-itself and for human beings to attain the religious goal ofReality-centered ness. each an experience of a manifestation of the Real. This does not mean that the dif Hick elaborates and explains both of these main elements of his view. The first ferent ways humans experience the Real are illusory. It would be a mistake to element contains two "postulates": (1) that there is an ultimate transcendent divine Hick says, just as it would be a mistake to think any of the ways a mountain in reality or Real, and (2) that in human experience, within the different religious tra the distance appears to several viewers differently placed is illusory.33 Moreover, for ditions, the Real is experienced differently. In his development of(1), Hick explains Hick, all the religions are rational in their different interpretations because each that what he means by the Real is a religious reality that is beyond human concep truly experiences the Real, even though each does in a different manifestation. tion and experience as it is in itself. The Real is experienced and conceived of in the Still, for Hick, we have no warrant to apply the phenomenal characteristics of various religions ofthe world, but it is not experienced or conceived as it is in itself. the Real experienced in any religious tradition to the Real an sich. 34 Here we might Hick, then, presents a distinction between the Real-in-itself, or the Real an sich, as recall Plantinga's argument against the pluralist contention that it is not possible calls it, and the Real as humanly experienced. In identifying this distinction, that an exclusivist could have enough warrant to know that his exclusivist claims are Hick is drawing in his own way upon the thinking of Immanuel Kant (the same true. Remember thatPlantinga argues that in the light of more than one epistemo eighteenth-century philosopher who criticized Anselm's Ontological Argument). logical view, the exclusivist could have enough warrant to know that there is a per Kant distinguished between the world or things in themselves (a Ding an .rich or sonal God and that the sacrifice ofhis divine son provides a unique way to salvation thing in itself) and the world as it appears to and is experienced by humans. The (Plantinga's (1) and (2)). Hick would say in response that our conceptions of the world we experience, he thought, depends on our modes of perception, whereas the Real belong to the phenomenal realm of our human experience and cannot be world as it is in itself is never experienced by us. Kant's view is a general view about applied to the Real-in-itself. It is for this reason, for Hick, that we can never have all human experience of everything. Hick does not appropriate Kant's general view sufficient warrant to "know" that the Real an sich is as any religion conceives applies the Kantian distinction specifically to religious experience and concep Religious Reality. tion of the Real. Hick acknowledges, however, that he does so in a way that Kant Let us now turn to the second main clement of Hick's pluralism: that the himself would not. 30 movement toward Reality-centeredness-called variously liberation, enlighten Given Hick's understanding of the Real as the Real an sich in this Kantian or ment, salvation, or fulfillment in different religious traditions- is taking place neo-Kantian sense, we can see why he proposes his second postulate that humans in equally in the various religious traditions as far as we can tell. Put in other words, different religious traditions experience and conceive of the Real differently. For this second point is that the movement toward saintliness, spiritual development, Hick, although Buddhists, Christians, Muslims and Hindus experience the same or religious attainment is taking place equally in the world's religions. For Hick the Real, they do not experience the Real as it is, the Real-in-itself. They all experience great world religions have different and distinctive beliefs about the Real, but they "different manifestations of the Real," as determined by their different modes of are not so much systems ofbeliefs as they are ways to salvation or liberation, to reli human consciousness, these modes themselves being fashioned in great part by gious development and attainment, which Hick characterizes as transformation their religions and culrures.31 In this way, Hick would point out, if a person is raised from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness.35 206 CHAPTER 11 Religious Plurality Pluralism 207
Hick, we should appreciate, is not maintaining that the transformation from differently. And it explains how there can be progress toward religious attainment self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness occurs in all the religious movements of in different religions: Each religion in its way is in touch with the Real and provides the world. The concept of religion is broad and covers many forms of belief and a path to religious attainment. Furthermore, it is the simpkst hypothesis. His plu practice (as was discussed in Chapter 1). In fact, Hick allows that Nazism and the ralistic hypothesis, Hick observes in one place, does not postulate many different Jones "phenomenon," for example, can be counted as "religious movements." religious realities (not all of which could be ultimate), but one ultimate Reality, (Hundreds ofJim Jones's followers in the church he founded committed mass interpreted differently in different religious cultures.43 suicide.) But these movements, Hick is clear, are not "salvific," that is, are not ways 36 Still, since pluralism is a hypothesis, Hick must allow that there could be other to salvation or liberation through a turning toward Reality-centeredness. hypotheses that might be brought forward to explain religious plurality, and he must Hick suggests that, broadly speaking, there are two main patterns of religious concede that the pluralistic hypothesis has not been confirmed. Hick holds that the transformation to Reality-centeredness in the world's religions: In one pattern pluralistic hypothesis, if true, may be "indirectly" and "progressively confirmed" in there is a focus on prayer and meditation and withdrawal from the world, as in a the eschaton, in a life after death. It is not open to direct confirmation, even in the monastic life; in the other there is a focus on changing the world for the better, as eschaton, because the Real will not be verified by a simple observation the way "there in medical missionary work. In the different religious traditions of the world there is a chair in the next room" is verified.44 And, iftrue, the pluralistic hypothesis will be have been individuals greatly advanced in religious transformation in both patterns. progressively confirmed because its verification will require survivors going through Such individuals Hick calls "saints." He mentions Julian of Norwich, whom he stages of development in the eschaton, which will progressively allow them to see counts as a more contemplative saint, and Mahatma Gandhi, who is a more active that pluralism best fits the observed phenomena ofthe diversity ofworld religions.45 and political saintY We could as well mention Mother Teresa of Calcutta as If the pluralistic hypothesis is in this way finally confirmed, Hick holds that it will another saintly person following the active pattern. confirm or verify religious belief over naturalistic belief, naturalism being the view For Hick there is an "ethical criterion" that applies to both patterns of trans that all that exists is "natural" and there is no transcendent religious reality. But Hick formation from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness. It is not a criterion that thinks that it will "probably" not resolve whatever "conflicting truth-claims," or con belongs uniquely to Islam, to Buddhism, or to anyone religion but is a common flicting beliefs or doctrines, there are between the different religious traditions.46 criterion in the world religions, Hick claims. It is the criterion of love/compassion Hick believes a further indication that his pluralistic hypothesis is a genuine (or agapelkaruna, as Hick sometimes expresses it).38 Agape is the form of love asso hypothesis is that it is open to falsification or being shown to be false. Hick of ciated with Christianity, and karuna is the form of compassion, or feeling for oth course does not think that his hypothesis is false, but he does identify conditions ers, associated with Buddhism. It is by virtue of this common criterion that saints that would show his hypothesis to be false if they were discovered to obtain in the can be identified in all the great religious traditions. It is embodied in the Golden eschaton. For instance, if a particular version of Christianity should turn out to be Rule that in one expression says "it is good to benefit others and evil to harm confirmed in the eschaton (such as the Augustinian version, in which a minority are them." And Hick finds the ideal of "generous goodwill, love, compassion," epito 39 allowed into heaven and most humans are consigned to the fires of hell, to use an mized in the Golden Rule, to be universal among the world religions. In applying example Hick uses in one place), then, Hick allows, this would show that his plural this criterion to the religions of the world, Hick comes to the tentative judgment istic hypothesis is falseY It would because the ultimate religious reality would then that, although vicious and evil behavior is found among the religious in all the not be beyond human conception, but exactly in accord with a particular version of world religions, it appears that all the great religious traditions are equally produc Christianity. In fact, Hick allows that it is logically possible that in the eschaton tive of love/compassion, and this holds both at the personal level and at the level of survivors will discover that the doctrines of any of various particular religions are large-scale religious efforts. In this way, Hick concludes that, as far as we can tell, true down to the smallest details, such as the specific beliefs of Shia Islam, no one religious tradition is superior to the others in transforming human con Theravada Buddhism, or a particular form ofChristianity. Although Hick concedes 40 sciousness from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness. this is logically possible, he believes it is more likely that in the eschaton it will be This, then, is Hick's pluralistic view of the world's religions, according to found that the doctrines of all of the world's religions will "undergo correction or which all the great religious traditions are right. However, Hick emphasizes that enlargement or transformation.,,48 his pluralism is a hypothesis, that is, a proposed idea that explains religious plurality, 41 Hick seeks to understand different religions, not in terms of their truth-claims as opposed to a thesis that has been proven. Hick denies the charge that he arro or doctrines, but rather as different paths to salvation or religious attainment. Hick, gantly claims that he "sees the full truth" about religion; his pluralism is in fact only 42 however, is very much aware that religions make truth-claims, that important issues a proposed hypothesis. Nevertheless, although Hicks sees his pluralism as only a for a religion can turn on the truth of a religion's truth-claims, and that between hypothesis, he believes it is the best hypothesis to explain religious plurality. It religions there can be conflicting truth-claims. In thinking about such conflicts, explains why there are different religions in different cultural settings: Different Hick suggests that we must distinguish different kinds and levels of doctrinal religious cultures with different experiential backgrounds interpret the Real conflict. At one level there are doctrinal differences over different conceptions of CHAPTER 11 Religious 208 Summing Up and Going Further 209 the religious ultimate arising from the different ways the Real is experienced and she continue to accept her Christian beliefs as true? Can she continue to have com conceived. At this level, using Hick's examples, in Judaism the Real is experienced mitted belief to the literal truth of the particular Christian belief that Jesus Christ is as J ahweh (the God of Israel), whereas in Christianity the Real is experienced as the the Son of God? "When faced with this kind of question, Hick says Christianity's Holy Trinity and in Buddhism the Real is experienced as the Dharmakaya. But at understanding of itself is not static, and as both a pluralist and a Christian theolo this level, Hick maintains, there is no real conflict of belief, because the beliefs of gian, he tries "to contribute to the on-going development of Christian thought in different religions, like the Christian belief and the Buddhist belief, are not about the light of our knowledge of the wider religious world."52 the Real-in-itself, but about different manifestations of the Real. Being about two A related criticism is that Hick's pluralism contradicts the self-understanding different manifestations they are about two different entities. And there is no con of each particular religion, for no religion understands itself as being one way flict between Christians believing that one manifestation of the Real is the Holy among several of "perceiving the divine."S3 As mentioned previously, there is an Trinity and Buddhists believing that another manifestation of the Real is the element of Hick's pluralism that derives from Kant's philosophy, according to 49 Dharmakaya. To use an analogy, there is no conflict between believing the mani which no religious experience or conception can be of the Real an sich or the Real festation of the moon as a full moon is a shiny disk and believing the manifestation in-itself; rather, the different religions experience or "perceive" different manifes of the moon in the first quarter is a shiny crescent. tation of the Real. Thus when a Christian conceives of God or experiences God as But at the second level of doctrinal differences, there can be true conflicts of loving, it is not the religious reality that is loving but a manifestation of that Reality. belief. At this level there are metaphysical beliefs about the Real and its relation to So, for Hick, although it is literally true of the Christian God that God is loving, the material universe. Two examples provided by Hick are the belief that the uni this is a literal truth that holds only for the Christian manifestation of the Real; and verse was created out of nothing (ex nihilo) and the belief in reincarnation. The it is not literally true of the Real that it is loving. It is "mythologically true," or first is a Christian belief; the second is a Hindu and Buddhist belief. These issues metaphorically true, of the Real that it is loving, for Hick. But for Hick a myth is a are important, Hick observes, for they have implications for how religious believers religiously useful "story" and by "mythical truth" Hick means only "a practical understand themselves and live their lives. But, he suggests, regarding them we truthfulness, consisting in its capacity to orient us rightly in our lives," that is, a should simply confess that we do not know and follow the advice of the Buddha capacity to help us move from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness.54 Here when he advised his followers not to concern themselves with questions it was not Hick's pluralism contrasts with that of another pluralist, Keith Ward. In Ward's necessary to answer in order to attain Nirvana. Hick echoes and extends the advice pluralism the Real or the ultimate is a reality of compassion and bliss, "a supreme of the Buddha when he says that having a correct opinion on these metaphysical reality of value, love, and power," which is "one, perfect, the cause of alL"S5 Hick, questions is not necessary for salvation or religious attainment. so however, criticizes Ward's pluralism on the grounds that in making the Real a per The third level of doctrinal differences is over historical beliefs. At this level we sonal God, it does not take full account of the non-theistic religions for which the find Jewish beliefs about the history of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and the people of Real is experienced as a nonpersonal Absolute.56 Israel; Christian beliefs about the death and resurrection ofJesus; Islamic beliefs about the life of Muhammad; and Buddhist beliefs about the historical existence of Gautama and his enlightenment. Although there can be real disagreements about these historical beliefs, if these disagreements can be settled, they can be only by Summing Up and Going Further historical evidence. In any case, Hick says, here too knowledge is not necessary for 51 salvation or religious attainment. There is more than one way to try to understand the undeniable fact that there is a plurality ofreligions in the world. This is true for those who stand outside religion as Critical Examination of Pluralism well as for those who are religious. For some of those outside religion who hold the mutual-opposition view, the fact ofreligious plurality shows that no religion can be cor For Hick pluralism is an explanatory hypothesis and it is the best explanation of the rect. For others with this view, some religion could still be correct, but each religion plurality of religions. It provides a better understanding of the relationship between is doubtfuL For those who are religious, there are three main views of religious plu religions than exclusivism and inclusivism in that it avoids making the claim that rality that may be taken: exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. The existence of the one's own religion is the one true religion, which seems to Hick to be arbitrary. pluralistic view of religious diversity shows that one can be religious and not claim A pluralist would maintain that her or his religion is a true path to religious attain that one's own religion is the only true religion. In this chapter we discuss pluralism ment but would also allow that other religions in their own right provide other true as John Hick has developed it. Hick's formulation is the most carefully thought out paths to religious attainment. and developed form of pluralism, but there are other forms, such as Keith Ward's. As At the same time, however, pluralism faces some problems regarding religious explained in Chapter 12, there are yet other ways ofunderstanding how the basic idea commitment. Say that a religious believer-a Christian-becomes a pluralist. Can of pluralism-that all the great world religions are right-could be correct. 210 CHAPTER 11 Religious Questions for Chapter 11 211
One issue between exclusivism (and inclusivism) and Hick's pluralism is over "wrong" in the further sense that our following it cannot lead to religious attain having enough warrant for religious knowledge of the character of religious reality. ment? We get into these issues in Chapter 12, where we discuss other ways that we Plantinga points out that it is not obvious that we can infer anything at all about might understand religious plurality or diversity. who has warrant from the apparent fact that for any of us, ifwe had been born in a different place or time, we would have displayed a different pattern of religious belief.57 For Hick, to think that one's own religion has vaJid religious experience and all other traditions have delusory experience is to assume a baseless and arbi Questions for Chapter 11 trary stance. The issue here between exclusivism and pluralism is not over the rationality or reasonableness (or epistemic propriety) of religion or of any particu FACTUAL QUESTIONS lar religion. NeitherJohn Hick, from his pluralistic vieV'.'}Joint, nor Alvin Plantinga, from his exclusivist view point, denies the rationality of religion of believers in any 1. Within the mutual-opposition view, what is the difference between the of the various world religions. The issue examined in this chapter is not how reli mutual-cancellation form of that view and the mutual-doubt form ofthat view? gious persons should regard their own religious belief (as reasonable or not), but 2. \\'hat is the main difference between exclusivism and inclusivism? how they should regard the relationship between their own religion and other 3. \\'hy does John I-lick consider his pluralism a hypothesis? religions, and, regarding the nonreligious, how they should regard the plurality of religions in the world. There may be no way here and now to prove that exclu INTERPRETIVE AND EVALUATIVE QUESTIONS sivism, inclusivism, or pluralism is true and correct. To prove that either exclu sivism or inclusivism is correct, one would have to prove that one's own religion 1. Faced with the plurality of religions in the world, it seems to some to be arbi was "right." In the case of both exclusivism and incIusivism, this would entail prov trary to commit to one. Does the plurality of religions give us a reason not to ing that at least some important and essential beliefs of one's religion are true (and commit to anyone religion, or a reason to adopt the view ofreligious pluralism, so right in the truth-claim sense) or that one's religion was the exclusive path to sal or is it neutral regarding the various reactions to it discussed in this chapter? vation or religious attainment (and so right in the religious-attainment sense). In 2. Say that a religious believer "confesses" a key belief of her or his religion the case of Hick's pluralism, to prove that its hypothesis is correct, one would have "Jesus Christ is our savior"). Must that religious believer hold the exclusivist to prove that there is a Real an sich above human conception and beyond direct view? Explain your answer. human experience, which the different religions of the world differently conceptu 3. Is it arbitrary to hold the exclusivist position? Does Alvin Plantinga adequately alize. Given that the Real an sich is both above human conception and beyond defend exclusivism against this charge? direct human experience, both a logical proof and an experiential verification are 4. One criticism ofJohn Hick's pluralism is that it contradicts the self-understanding ruled out. of each particular religion, for no religion understands itself as being one way Finally, a further word about possibly conf1icting truth-claims of religions and among several of "perceiving the divine." Does Hick have an adequate reply to their significance: Plantinga is right that ifwe hold that key beliefs of our religion this criticism? are true, then we logically must hold that incompatible beliefs held by other reli gions (or anybody) are false. This is a simple logical point, as Plantinga observes, and as such it is one that pluralists and inclusivists can hardly deny. But this much Notes does not tell us which beliefs are incompatible. John Hick, as discussed here, 1. David Hume, Enquiry Conceming Human Understanding, Part II of Sec. X, "OfMiracles." regards the different beliefs of different religions about the nature of the Real as In Introduction to Philosophy ofReligion: Readings, Chapter 7. not really mutually conf1icting or incompatible because they are beliefs about dif 2. Pascal, The Pensees, translated by]. M. Cohen (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961), p. 137. ferent manifestations of the Real. Thus, for him, there is no real conf1ict between 3. John Hick identities this distinction in terms of "truth-claims" and "salvation-claims" the belief that the Real is a personal God and the belief that the Real is an imper in A Christian Theology ofReligions (Louisville, KY: WestminsterJohn Knox Press, sonal Buddha nature or Dharmakaya. \\'hat would happen, though, if we set aside 1995), pp. 18-19. lEck's Kantian or neo-Kantian distinction between the Real-in-itself and its phe 4. The Pope is Boniface VITI, who declared this in a papal pronouncement in 1302. "Outside the church there is no salvation" is a translation of the Latin "extra ecclesiam nomenal manifestations? Still, we might wonder, Is the belief that God exists nulla salus." John Hick, God and the Universe ofFaiths (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 120. incompatible with the belief that there is a Buddha nature or Dharmakaya? Could 5. Hick, A Ch1·istian Theology ofReligions, p. 21, n. 8. On the Protestant side, Hick cites they both be true, or might they be so different that they cannot be compared? Calvin, Commentary on the Catholic Epistles. Say that the belief that there is a God is incompatible with the belief there is a 6. Pope John Paul II, his first encyclical Redemptor Hominis (On Redemption and the Buddha nature. Is this enough to show that at least one of these religions must be Dignity of the Human Race), 1979, Para. 14. Quoted hy John Hick, A Christian 212 CHAPTER 11 Religious Plurality Questions for Chapter 11 213
Theology ofReligions, p. 19. Hick observes that the exclusivist position was even earlier 28. Hick, Problems ofReligious Pluralism, p. 36, and Hick, An Intelpretation ofReligion, "implicitly rejected" by Vatican II in 1962. p.234. 7. Alvin Plantinga, "Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism," in The Rtltionality 29. Hick, Problems ofReligious Pluralism, pp. 36-37. the Plurality afFaith, ed. Thomas D. Senor (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 30. Hick, An Interpretation ofReligion, pp. 241-43. Press, 1995) p. 173. In Introduction to Philosophy ofReligion: Readings, 31. John Hick, "Religious Pluralism and Salvation," Faith and Philosophy, 5 Chapter 11. "Religious Pluralism and Salvation" is in Introduttioll to P],ilfl