CRITICAL PLURALISM: A NEW APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY _________________________________________________ A Dissertation presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of Missouri-Columbia ______________________________________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy _______________________________________________ by MATTHEW KONIECZKA Dr. John Kultgen, Dissertation Supervisor MAY 2007 The undersigned, appointed by the Dean of the Graduate School, have examined the dissertation entitled CRITICAL PLURALISM: A NEW APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY Presented by Matthew Konieczka A candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy And hereby certify that in their opinion it is worthy of acceptance. Professor John Kultgen Professor Matthew McGrath Professor Philip Clart Professor Robert Johnson Professor Donald Sievert To Melissa, my wife. Because of her unending support and selflessness I have been able to pursue my interest in philosophy. For that I will always be grateful. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would first like to thank Dr. John Kultgen for his helpful guidance and for providing me with detailed and insightful comments on early drafts. I am most grateful for his willingness to work as my advisor. He has certainly excelled in that role. Thanks also to the other members of my committee, Dr. Matt McGrath, Dr. Philip Clart, Dr. Robert Johnson, and Dr. Don Sievert for their assistance. I also owe a debt of gratitude to many others for their stimulating discussions that led to the production of this dissertation. I am especially grateful to Justin McBrayer, Alan Tomhave, Eric Roark, Jason Berntsen, Kenny Boyce, and Paul Nolette. Finally, I would like to thank those people who have helped develop and foster my love for philosophy in earlier years, specifically Thomas Gotsill, Dr. Robert D. Anderson, Rev. John R. Fortin, and Dr. Sharon Sytsma. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………..…...ii LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………………………vi ABSTRACT……..……………………………………………………………..……..…vii PART ONE: LAYING THE FOUNDATION Chapter 1. FOUR APPROACHES TO RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY………………………...…1 “True Religions” Salvation The Simple Picture Exclusivism Pluralism Inclusivism A Fourth Alternative Difficulties with the Simple Picture My Approach 2. SOME BASIC ASSUMPTIONS…………………………………………………32 Some Truth in Religion The Ultimate is Good Salvation and Justice 3. APPROXIMATE TRUTH………………………………………………………..45 The Need for Approximate Truth in Scientific Theories Popper’s Theory Other Content-Based Theories of Truthlikeness iii The Likeness Approach Language Invariance Assessing Theories of Truthlikeness PART TWO: CONSTRUCTING THE ARGUMENT Chapter 4. THEORIES AS MODELS OF REALITY………………………………………68 Summary Preliminaries Religious Belief Systems are Evolving Theories Religious Belief Systems are Approximate Models Approximate Modeling in Science Approximate Modeling in Religion A Questionable Analogy? Is One Religion a Full Description of the Truth? 5. INCLUSIVISM……….………………………………………………………...103 Is One Religion Very Close to the Truth? Apologetics Definitive Claims and Epistemic Distance A Common Objection Is One Religion Much Closer to the Truth Than All Others? Inclusivist Arguments The Evidence of Saints Religious Experience Conclusion 6. PLURALISM…………………………...………………………………………148 Preliminaries The Common Core Approach iv The “Neo-Kantian” Approach Is the Real Necessary? Formal and Substantial Properties The Possibility of a Real Without Properties The Aspectival Approach The Critical Pluralist Approach Egalitarian Pluralism Unlikely A Priori Broad Egalitarianism Less Likely than Narrow Egalitarianism The Benefits of Critical Pluralism Conclusion BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………….…….......191 VITA………………………………………………………………………………...….200 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1.1. The Simple Picture…………...…………………………………………………22 1.2. The Continuum Picture……...………………………………………………….24 1.3. The Double Continuum Picture………………...………………………………25 1.4. Truth-Dependent Soteriologies...……………………………………………….26 3.1. Spheres of Truthlikeness…...…………………………………………………...55 4.1. The Horizontal Continuum…...………………………………………………...69 4.2. One Possible Depiction of Critical Pluralism……...…………………………...70 6.1. Egalitarian Pluralism…...……………………………………………………...180 vi CRITICAL PLURALISM: A NEW APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY Matthew Konieczka Dr. John Kultgen, Dissertation Supervisor ABSTRACT The world’s religions provide a wide range of competing religious claims. The problem of religious diversity is that, while many of these claims are inconsistent with one another, they often seem to rest on roughly equal evidence. For this reason, it is not clear which religion, if any, is true. My dissertation examines the various responses to this problem and proposes a unique solution. While some claim that the wide disagreement on religious matters is reason to discard all religious claims as false, I provide an extensive argument in favor of a particularly religious position I call “Critical Pluralism.” Critical Pluralism occupies a middle ground between those who claim that all major religions are somehow equally true and those who claim that one religion alone is true. On my view, religious belief systems often provide inadequate yet partially true accounts of a transcendent reality. Many religions approximate the truth to some degree. Some even do so a great deal better than others. Nonetheless, there is not a single religion that exclusively captures the truth. vii PART ONE: LAYING THE FOUNDATION CHAPTER 1: Four Approaches to Religious Diversity As a child of nine or ten, I remember first learning about the ancient Egyptians. I received a small book as a gift explaining their various achievements and customs. Of these customs, I was most drawn to their custom of mummification. The process was so intricate and involved, I remember wondering what it was that made them so interested in preserving the dead body. As I found out, the answer is simple. It was because of the afterlife. Because they believed that the dead would wake up in a different world, they made sure to give the dead what they needed. This involved stuffing the tomb with coins and treasures for the dead to use later on. While I marveled at this unique practice, I could not help but think how mistaken they were. Growing up as a member of a modern religion, I thought that the effort put into giving the dead their tools and instruments for the next world was a complete waste of time. The Egyptian notion of an afterlife was too far-fetched to be true. Then a very simple but profound thought occurred to me. What if it were not the Egyptians who were wrong, but I who had been mistaken? Perhaps all of my beliefs about the afterlife, about God and religion, were simply wrong and someone else’s religious beliefs were correct. For all I knew, the ancient Egyptians may have been right all along! This simple mental exercise was my first encounter with the problem of religious diversity. Being brought up to have certain religious beliefs, it had never occurred to me that I could be wrong and someone of another faith could be correct. In 1 fact, until this point I had never thought about the fact that there were people of other faiths. Once one has this thought, however, its consequences are unavoidable. No matter the religion, there are millions of people who have different beliefs. Just as I thought how foolish the ancient Egyptians were, millions of people think that my beliefs are just as foolish. Given this fact, how are we to assess various religious claims to truth? There are a number of possibilities. It may be that one religion is correct and that the others are wrong. It may be that no religion is correct, or it may be that many religions are somehow true. The proper answer to this question will depend on our answers to many other questions such as what we mean by religious truth and what notion of religious reality we are working with. This problem I will call the theoretical problem of religious diversity, or simply the truth problem. There is a further difficulty that arises out of the fact of religious diversity. Not only do religions make various truth claims, they often also claim to offer a unique path to salvation. Perhaps the Egyptians thought that only those who were properly mummified and supplied with treasures could pass on to the next world. Other religious people believe that certain beliefs or deeds allow one to achieve salvation. Whatever the case, religions can be characterized as offering a path to an ultimately desirable destination. But, just as with the truth problem, the fact of religious diversity causes one to pause over one’s beliefs about salvation. What is necessary for salvation? Does one need to belong to the correct religion? Are certain actions, beliefs, or spiritual states required? This second problem I will call the soteriological problem of religious diversity, or simply the salvation problem. 2 In response to both of the problems of religious diversity, there are traditionally three standard positions one can take: exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism. Although later these views will be more clearly defined, at this point I can give preliminary definitions of each. Exclusivism is generally understood as the view that only one religion is correct and that salvation is limited, at least for the most part, to members of that religion. Inclusivism is the view that, while only one religion is correct, salvation is possible for others. Finally, pluralism