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E. M. Primakov. Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East From the to the Present. New York: Basic Books, 2009. 432 pp. $29.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-465-00475-1.

Reviewed by Dima Adamsky

Published on H-Diplo (April, 2010)

Commissioned by Sergey Radchenko

If one looks for the Russian equivalent of and all-encompassing analysis of the forces that (especially in Middle Eastern af‐ shaped the region for decades. The book ofers a fairs), then probably Evgeny Primakov--one of the tour d’horizon of Middle Eastern history since the leading scholars and practitioners of internation‐ end of World War II and presents a view from al relations in the Soviet and Russian eras--would Russia on the Cold War trends in the region. An come to mind. A student of the by excellent storyteller, Primakov ofers his account training, Primakov has been Middle East‐ of the superpowers; Egyptian, Syrian and Israeli ern correspondent, secret envoy for special politi‐ history; and regional interactions since early cal and intelligence missions, head of the Institute 1950. He pays specifc attention to the behind-the- of Oriental Studies and the Institute of World Eco‐ scene dynamics on the eve of and during the Six nomics and International Relations, the frst head Day and Yom wars, and describes the sub‐ of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (the sequent attempts to embark on the peace process, successor to the First Directorate of the KGB), for‐ both locally and globally. Separate chapters deal eign minister and prime minister of Russia. On with the political history of the Arab world, the scene and behind the curtains, for more than , the history of the Palestinian national ffty years Primakov has been at the epicenter of movement and ’s role in it, and the formulating and conducting Soviet and Russian political history of , with a focus on Saddam foreign and particularly Middle Eastern, policy. Hussein. Several chapters deal with the post-Cold It is difcult to overestimate the breadth, War international relations in the region. depth, and richness of Russia and the Arabs. With Primakov skillfully synthesizes descriptions his unique frsthand experience with every major of broad regional trends and superpower dynam‐ political fgure in the Middle East, Primakov ofers ics with colorful portraits of specifc political fg‐ a combination of personal memoir with thorough ures. The author is careful not to rely only on his H-Net Reviews memory and notes taken at the time, but also uti‐ the establishment of ofcial diplomatic relations lizes collections of documents from the Russian in December 1991. Until the publication of the Presidential Archive. The use of unique primary book, Cold War historians had only a very vague sources in most of the nineteen chapters signif‐ idea about Soviet-Israeli secret contacts. All the cantly multiplies the historical contribution of data related to this unexplored Cold War episode this book. Although based on Soviet and Russian are still classifed in the Israeli and Russian ar‐ sources, with some occasional reference to non- chives. As such, the book is a welcome addition to Russian materials, Primakov’s analysis is not only the existing classical works dealing with Soviet-Is‐ sound, but balanced and evenhanded. This brief raeli relations by Galia Golan and Yaacov Roi. summary cannot adequately describe the rich‐ During the Cold War, the Soviet leadership ness of the book and its contribution to the exist‐ frequently deployed loyal scholars and journalists ing knowledge of Russian policy in the Middle in non-ofcial diplomatic missions when ofcial East and Cold War historiography. contact was impossible but highly desired. After With the varying level of details many facts the breaking of of the diplomatic relationship and ideas presented in Russia and the Arabs with this became the case also with might be found in several previously published . In 1971 the inner circle of the Polit‐ books and memoirs, however they are out‐ buro decided to initiate secret negotiations with weighed by the new material and analysis. Specif‐ Israeli leaders, notwithstanding their terminated ically, I found two portions of the book particular‐ diplomatic relations. The back channel was an at‐ ly revealing and new. First of all, scholars of the tempt to compensate for Soviet inferiority vis-à- nuclear component of international security vis the , which Moscow sufered due might be interested in the last two chapters, in to its lack of diplomatic relations with Jerusalem. which Primakov outlines his views on the strate‐ This was a Soviet attempt to minimize the damage gic history of the Israeli, Iraqi, and Iranian nucle‐ of its own impulsive behavior during the 1967 ar programs, and shares his observations about war, overcome the American diplomatic monop‐ the emerging security regime in the Middle East. oly, and play the role of moderator in the confict. These refections are particularly valuable since In the longer run this was a frst step towards Primakov’s account not only reveals what the So‐ restoration of diplomatic relations. Yevgeny Pri‐ viets and Russians knew and thought about these makov and the KGB ofcer Yuri Kotov were cho‐ programs, but also presents the current view on sen by the Soviet leadership to establish this back these issues from Moscow. channel. The Soviet highest political level orches‐ The second contribution will probably fasci‐ trated this enterprise; the documents from the nate Cold War historians. Russia and the Arabs special fle were signed by , Yuri flls an important lacuna of knowledge related to Andropov, Andrei Gromyko, and Aleksei Kosygin. the Soviet decision-making process during the Since August 1971, as part of this exclusive Arab-Israeli confict. The book reveals for the frst channel which Primakov maintained personally, time the existence of twenty years of secret con‐ several high-ranking meetings took place clandes‐ tacts between the Soviet and Israeli governments. tinely in Israel and Europe. Primakov had been to This portion of the book is based on documents Israel twice to meet with , Moshe from the Politburo’s special fle (osobaia papka) Dayan, , Yigal Alon, Yitzchak Rabin, on secret talks with the representatives of the Is‐ , and . He had also raeli government, which started in 1971. This been to Europe several times to meet with other clandestine channel was kept operational until Israeli senior ofcials, including Shalheveth

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Freier and Mordechai Gazit. In 1978 Primakov to reassess the conventional view of Israeli-Soviet transferred the maintenance of the back channel relations during the Cold War, to examine the im‐ to other Soviet ofcials. Responsibility for the pact of this channel on the formulation of the So‐ meetings, communications, and operational ar‐ viet policy, and to reexamine several Soviet, Egyp‐ rangement was entrusted to the KGB. tian, Israeli, and U.S. foreign policy initiatives be‐ Based on his notes and the archival materials, fore and after the War. (Primakov is Primakov delivers picturesque and detailed de‐ positive that Moscow regularly updated Egyptian scriptions of his encounters with each and every president Anwar about these meetings, and one of the Israeli leaders. The initial encounters in it is reasonable to expect that the information ar‐ Israel are particularly fascinating, because in the rived to the White House as well.) An inclusion of background there was still a real danger of direct a small collection of the most relevant archival Soviet and Israeli military confrontation. The frst documents as an appendix to the book would be a bilateral meeting took place exactly one year after welcome addition to this work. That being said, the ceasefre of the ,when the So‐ Russia and the Arabs is probably one of the most viet army was fghting with the Israeli Defense illuminating contributions to scholarship on Rus‐ Forces for the frst (and last) time during the Cold sian involvement in the Middle East published in War. For the and the Soviet Air recent years. Defense units deployed in the vicinity of the Canal, in spring and summer 1970, turned into a hot battlefeld of the Cold War. When Pri‐ makov met Golda Meir and , thir‐ s teen months after the dogfght when the Israeli pi‐ lots shot down fve Soviet MIGs, tension was still authors’ in the air. Although Dayan assured Primakov that ing Israel “was anxious to avoid any kind of con‐ hip frontation with Soviet military personal in Egypt ere and that the Israeli air force have been given di‐ rect orders to that efect,” Golda Meir lost her the calm demeanor at some point in the heated con‐ versation: “‘If there is a war, we’ll fght that war,’ she said. ‘If any aircraft get in our way, we’ll shoot them down’... I asked her: ‘Could you clarify whose aircraft you intend to shoot down?’ ... Meir could tell from my reaction that she had gone too far. Hurriedly, she reiterated the importance of Is‐ rael’s dialogue with the ” (pp. 271-272). This is just a glimpse into Primakov’s ability to provide a fascinating sketch of the views of the most important Israeli decision makers on many subjects of peace and war in the region. Primakov’s revelation of the back channel adds a previously unwritten chapter to Cold War history in the Middle East. His account enables us

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Citation: Dima Adamsky. Review of Primakov, E. M. Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East From the Cold War to the Present. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. April, 2010.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=25854

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

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