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KoGreat-Powerber Involvement and Israeli Battlefield Success inthe Arab-Israeli Wars

Great-Power Involvement and Israeli Battleªeld Success in the Arab-Israeli Wars, 1948–1982

✣ Avi Kober

During the , violence was channeled away from Europe to the peripheral areas of the Third World, where the superpowers became in- volved in local affairs, although they were reluctant to commit their military forces directly. They could not, and sometimes did not even want to, prevent the outbreak of regional wars, but each superpower was constantly on guard lest its respective clients collapse or lest the local conºict escalate to the global level. The superpowers tried to uphold their commitments to their regional clients while seeking to avoid all-out global confrontation. They were ready to defend the survival of their clients but did not want to become directly en- gaged in the clients’ military operations.1 Their efforts to exert some form of control over regional wars required cooperation alongside conºict, a logic that applied to the Arab-Israeli conºict. This article deals with one of the forgotten dimensions of ’s military accomplishments in its wars against the —great-power involvement and intervention.2 Alongside other dimensions that are overlooked, such as the dissolution of Arab coalitions against Israel before or during the Arab-Israeli wars, great-power involvement has been one of the important conditions in Israeli battleªeld success.3 The shadow of superpower intervention hovered over all of the Arab-Israeli wars, and Israeli leaders often feared that such in- tervention might undo Israeli achievements on the battleªeld.4

1. Benjamin Miller, When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conºict and Collaboration in World Poli- tics (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. 227. 2. For the distinction between involvement and intervention, see, for example, , The Cautious Bear: Soviet Military Engagement in Wars in the Post-1967 Era (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), pp. 6–11. 3. Avi Kober, Coalition Defection: The Dissolution of Arab Anti-Israel Coalitions in War and Peace (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), particularly pp. 59–85. 4. , Tomorrow Is Now (: Mabat, 1978), p. 249; and Haim Bar-Lev, “The War and Its Objectives,” Maarachot, No. 266 (–November 1978), p. 2. All Hebrew-language titles have been rendered here in English translation. Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 8, No. 1, Winter 2006, pp. 20–48 © 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Was great power involvement in the Arab-Israeli wars indeed a liability to Israel’s war efforts? Israel’s success in war should be attributed not only to mil- itary competence but to great-power involvement. Contrary to Israel’s early fears, external involvement in most cases either failed to prevent Israel from maintaining its military achievements or was an asset for two main reasons: a lack of will or ability on the part of hostile great powers to intervene against Israel; and the valuable support provided by friendly patrons, without whom Israel’s own military skills might not have been sufªcient to secure military success. When tested against the record of the Arab-Israeli wars from 1948 to 1982 this argument is conªrmed by the 1948 War of Independence, the 1956 Sinai War, the 1967 Six-Day War, the 1982 War, and in part by the 1973 October War. The in 1969–1970 is referred to only brieºy here because neither side during that conºict pursued a decisive mili- tary outcome. The article begins by discussing the relevant theoretical and empirical lit- erature and then examines the sterile nature of intervention threats by great powers hostile to Israel and the contribution of friendly great powers to Is- rael’s war efforts. Finally, it evaluates the impact of great-power involvement on Israel’s military record.

Literature on Great-Power Involvement

Three sets of relationships are germane to the study of great-power involve- ment in regional conºicts: horizontal inter-client relationships; horizontal inter-superpower relationships; and vertical patron-client relationships. This article focuses on the second and third types of relationships. Four theories, all in the realist tradition, offer powerful explanations for great-power involve- ment. Balance-of-power theory focuses on capabilities in explaining why and how great powers or regional powers affect and shape global or regional bal- ances, and how such balances in turn affect regional wars. As Benjamin Miller points out, great powers are well suited to affect regional balances of power because of their superior capabilities and the local actors’ dependence on them.5 When the global rivalry is especially intense, as in bipolar systems, great-power competitive balancing is extended to peripheral regions such as the Middle East. Balancing at the regional level might take place through the

5. Benjamin Miller, “Between Hot War and Cold Peace: The Middle East and Balance of Power The- ory” (paper presented at the “Balance of Power Project” conference, Center for Contemporary Conºict, Montreal, 17–18 May 2002).

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establishment of alliances between the great powers and local states, which are given diplomatic, ªnancial, and military assistance. In times of war, such as- sistance makes it easier for the regional states to continue ªghting. Patron-client theory, which focuses on the vertical great power–local actor relationship, considers the informal relations between unequal partners.6 The theory emphasizes the reciprocity of relationships between patrons and clients and characterizes them by different degrees of equality, beneªt, and manipula- tion.7 Whereas the client’s interests usually are limited to the regional context, the patron deªnes its interests from a global perspective. The priority the cli- ent gives to its local interests can result in unbridgeable conºicts with its need to preserve strategic ties with its patron.8 Although the imbalance between pa- trons and clients usually favors the patrons, the relationship is also shaped by the existence of alternative patrons and by the ability of clients to contribute to their patrons’ interests. When war breaks out between local actors, great powers may try to inºuence the adversaries’ freedom of action on the battleªeld and their sustainability.9 The more intense the inter–great power competition, the more autonomy the regional clients enjoy and the more leeway they have to manip- ulate the great powers as well as to extract military and economic aid.10 Apa- tron’s involvement would generally be an asset to the client as long as the two countries’ respective interests do not conºict. Friendly patrons usually affect the clients’ decisions more than the enemy’s patron, and pressures by the en- emy’s patron become most effective when delivered via the friendly patron.11 One could likewise expect that the superpowers not only would try to avoid any actual use of force against each other but would tacitly cooperate in re- straining their regional clients and in terminating the wars. This in turn might negatively affect the local actors’ chances of achieving battleªeld vic- tory. Also likely is that inter-patron or patron-client threats would be issued once major clients faced military defeat. The effectiveness of such threats would be inºuenced by the will and ability of the patrons to intervene by dis-

6. See, for example, Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conºict among Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 29, 442–443, 505. 7. Michael I. Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1990), pp. 131– 148. 8. Alexander George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), p. 26. 9. Fred C. Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 24. 10. Benjamin Miller and Korina Kagan, “The Great Powers and Regional Conºicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post–Cold War Era,” International Studies Quar- terly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (March 1997), pp. 51–85. 11. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel, the Superpowers and the War in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1987).

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patching troops overseas. Because military action would pose risks and costs, patrons normally prefer to support their clients short of ªghting; that is, via arms and logistical supplies rather than direct intervention. Intervention theory deals with coercive activities by one sovereign state on the territory of another.12 The theory, which focuses on the conditions that make intervention necessary, feasible, sustainable, and successful on both the state level (political, military, societal, and economic conditions) and the in- ternational level (structural and non-structural aspects), points to military ca- pabilities as the core source of overt military intervention.13 Although most of the literature on intervention is dedicated to particular case studies (e.g., Viet- nam, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Grenada), one can also ªnd comparative studies (e.g., Soviet intervention in post-1967 Middle East Wars;14 U.S. inter- ventions in Lebanon, the , and Grenada15), quantitative analyses,16 and discussion of the normative and legal aspects of intervention.17 Most analysts treat the intervening state as a unitary actor,18 but some are in- terested in the process by which decisions are made to intervene, to escalate,

12. See, for example, James N. Rosenau, “The Concept of Intervention,” Journal of International Af- fairs, Vol. 22, No.2 (Spring 1968), pp. 165–176; Neil MacFarlane, Intervention and Regional Security, Adelphi Paper No. 152 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985); Richard N. Haas, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post Cold War (Washington, DC: Carne- gie Endowment for International Peace, 1994); Edward N. Luttwak, “Is Intervention a Thing of the Past?” Harper’s, Vol. 289, No. 1733 (October 1994), pp. 15–17; Bruce W. Jentleson and Ariel E. Le- vite, “The Analysis of Protracted Foreign Military Intervention,” in Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson, and Larry Berman, eds., Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conºicts (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 1–22; Colin McInnes and Nicholas J. Wheeler, eds., Dimensions of Military Intervention (London: Frank Cass, 2002); and Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decision-Making: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions (Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni- versity Press, 1998), p. 114. 13. Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decision-Making, pp. 113–168; and Luttwak, “Is Intervention a Thing of the Past?” pp. 15–17. 14. Karsh, The Cautious Bear. 15. H. W. Brands, “Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 102, No. 4 (Winter 1987/1988), pp. 607–624. 16. Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decision-Making, pp. 3–5. 17. Ibid. When the intervening state is a Western democracy, and more so when its most vital national interests are not at stake, committing forces for missions other than national defense is likely to create a legitimacy problem. Sustaining the intervention might prove to be difªcult. To that effect, major tests have been developed by U.S. Secretary of Defense to be applied in advance. For a discussion of the Weinberger doctrine, see Michael I. Handel, Masters of War (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 307–325. The more powerful the state involved in local conºicts, the less important it is to ensure external legitimacy. The more democratic it is and the more prolonged the conºict, the more important it is to achieve domestic legitimacy. On normative and cognitive legitimacy, see Alex- ander L. George, “Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., Change in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), pp. 233–262. 18. For example, MacFarlane, Intervention and Regional Security; and A. M. Scott, “Military Interven- tion by the Great Powers: The Rules of the Game,” in William Zartman, ed., Czechoslovakia: Interven- tion and Impact (New York: New York University Press, 1970), pp. 85–104.

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or to terminate intervention.19 Because intervention theory tends to reºect su- perpower dilemmas, its external validity is problematic.20 Finally, battleªeld decision theory offers a comprehensive approach to bat- tleªeld success with special emphasis on the conditions and strategies for its achievement. It reºects all three of the other theories, depicting great-power involvement as an external, systemic condition for the achievement of bat- tleªeld success and focusing on the material and political support provided by great powers to the local adversaries. Such support is especially important in protracted wars and can affect both the adversaries’ sustainability and the strategies they pursue on the battleªeld, including the choice of offense or de- fense and of ªrst strike or retaliation.21 Great-power involvement in the Middle East was extensively investigated during the Cold War. The literature focuses on the superpowers’ efforts to avert direct confrontation and at the same time to bolster their inºuence in the region.22 Two aspects, however, have not been thoroughly probed. First,

19. Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decision-Making; Brands, “Decisions on American Armed Interven- tion”; Herbert K. Tillema, Appeal to Force: American Military Intervention in the Era of (New York: Crowell, 1973); and Herbert K. Tillema, “The Meaning and Restraints of Superpower In- tervention,” in Karen Feste, ed., American and Soviet Intervention: Effects on World Stability (New York: Crane Russak, 1990), pp. 23–28. 20. Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decision-Making, p. 4. 21. Avi Kober, “Military Decision in War: A Framework for Research,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 22, No.1 (Fall 1995), pp. 65–81; and Avi Kober, Battleªeld Decision in the Arab-Israeli Wars 1948– 1982 (: Maarachot, 1995), pp. 97–100. 22. For superpower involvement and intervention in the Middle East in , see Milton Leitenberg and Sheffer, eds., Great Power Intervention in the Middle East (New York: Pergamon, 1979); Paul Marantz and Belma S. Steinberg, Superpower Involvement in the Middle East: Dynamics of Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985); Moshe Zak, Israel and the Superpower Game in the Middle East (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1986); Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel, the Super- powers and the War in the Middle East; Steven L. Spiegel, Mark A. Heller, and Jacob Goldberg, eds., The Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988); Nethanel Lorch, Israel in the Grip of Superpowers (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1990); Alan Taylor, The Super- powers and the Middle East (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991); and Miller, When Opponents Cooperate, pp. 125–127. For Soviet involvement and intervention, see Jon D. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959); Walter Z. Lacquer, The and the Middle East (London: Routledge, 1959); William Quandt, Soviet Policy in the War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1976); Galia Golan, Yom and After: The Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli Crisis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Robert Freeman, Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970 (New York: Praeger, 1978); Ya’acov Roi, ed., The Limits to Power: Soviet Policy in the Middle East (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, eds., The Soviet Union in the Middle East (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982); Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and the Israeli War in Lebanon (Jerusalem: The Soviet and East European Research Center, 1982); Karsh, The Cautious Bear; Uri Bar-Joseph and John Hannah, “Intervention Threats in Short Arab-Israeli Wars: An Analysis of Soviet Crisis Behavior,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (December 1988), pp. 437–467; and George Breslauer, ed., Soviet Strategy in the Middle East (Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1990). For U.S. involvement and intervention, see Bernard Reich and Arnon Gutfeld, The and the Arab-Israeli Conºict (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1975); William Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conºict 1967–1976 (Berkeley: University

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the role that great powers played in the Middle East before it became a theater of Cold War competition or during the Cold War’s early stages. Two signi- ªcant cases during the early post-1945 period have yet to be examined thor- oughly: Soviet involvement in the 1948 War; and the role of and Great Britain in the 1956 Sinai War. The second element of great-power involve- ment in the Middle East that has not been sufªciently explored is the impact of external involvement on the chances of achieving battleªeld success.

The Sterile Nature of Hostile Great Powers’ Intervention Threats

In four of the Arab-Israeli wars—those of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1982—hos- tile great powers threatened to intervene against Israel. These threats, how- ever, proved sterile, mainly because the hostile great powers were unwilling to intervene.

The British-American “Ultimatum” of 1948 In 1948 the Middle East was in transition from British dominance to U.S.- Soviet rivalry. By the time a second truce was achieved in the Israeli War of In- dependence in September 1948, the Arab military coalition opposing Israel was considerably weakened, as reºected in a report issued by the Arab chiefs- of-staff following their meeting in on 11 November. On the central front, was considering defection from the war coalition following Op- eration Danny in July. On the northern front, Israeli troops had captured much of the western during and had defeated the ir- regular . At this point , Jordan, and consid- ered negotiating with Israel to cut their losses, though Egypt still believed it could escape military defeat.23 Israel, for its part, expected a negative interna- tional reaction to any further military successes but mainly was concerned about the prospect of direct British intervention on behalf of the or the Jordanians in accordance with the British defense pacts with Egypt in 1936 and Jordan in 1946. Any such intervention might force Israel into direct

of California Press, 1977); Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1978); and Abraham Ben-Zvi, The American Approach to Superpower Collaboration in the Middle East, 1973–1986 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1986). 23. Behind the Curtain: Iraqi Parliamentary Committee Report on the War against Israel (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1954), pp. 173–174; and Abdallah al-Tal, Memoirs (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1964), pp. 297– 299.

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confrontation with British troops.24 Israel was also worried about losing American sympathy or suffering a diplomatic setback at the (UN) that might lead to the imposition of sanctions, denial of acceptance into the organization, and the eventual loss of international legitimacy. on the Egyptian front in was designed to be short enough to preclude intervention either by Jordanian and Iraqi troops or by the great powers. The operation was completed in less than a week. But the UN Security Council resolutions of 4 and 16 November, which called on Israel to return to the pre-operation lines, and U.S. insistence that Israel put an end to hostilities and withdraw from the territories it had captured during the operation caused Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to decide that Israel must defeat the as quickly as possible.25 In late Decem- ber 1948 Israel launched Operation Horev on the Egyptian front and crossed the international border, trying to envelop Egypt’s positions. On 31 Decem- ber, three days after the operation began, the Truman administration decided that Israel had gone too far. President Harry Truman delivered a message to the Israeli government, later to be known as an “ultimatum,” warning that if Israel failed to withdraw from Egyptian territory, Britain might fulªll its de- fense commitment to Egypt and the United States might reassess its relations with Israel and its support for Israeli admission into the UN.26 Nevertheless, the blunt wording of the message did not necessarily reºect a real willingness or ability on the part of the great powers to live up to their threats. When a great power is disinclined to intervene or does not possess the necessary military capabilities to do so, the local actor is likely to enjoy relative freedom of action during the conºict. Britain was too weak and probably too devoid of political will to intervene. U.S. support of British military actions against Israel also seemed unlikely because the United States was considered a friendly country.27 Nevertheless, Ben-Gurion decided against testing the great powers. Anticipating that U.S. support would be crucial in years to come, he deemed it a high priority to maintain good relations. No less important was his belief that operational convenience did not justify risking a conºict with the great powers and that pushing the Egyptians back to the international border could be achieved without operating on Egyptian soil. Ben-Gurion’s instruction to the Israeli troops to limit the territorial scope of the operation

24. As early as June, Ben-Gurion warned his colleagues in the Israeli leadership that Britain might try to deny Israel victory on the battleªeld. Gershon Rivlin and Elhanan Oren, eds., The War of Independ- ence: Ben-Gurion’s Diary (Tel Aviv: Israeli Ministry of Defence, 1982), p. 533. 25. Dan Schueftan, A Jordanian Option (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1986), p. 101. 26. Lorch, Israel in the Grip of the Superpowers, pp. 46–60. 27. Ibid., pp. 51, 77.

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was met with reservations on the part of the military but was obeyed.28 The operation ended with the total defeat of the Egyptian army, paving the way for an Israeli victory in the overall war.

Soviet Non-Intervention in 1956 In 1954 Israeli intelligence warned Israeli leaders that the United States might intervene against Israel in the next Arab-Israeli war if Israel were to invade the territory of an Arab state.29 In 1955, as tensions grew along the Israeli- Jordanian border, Israel feared that Britain might act on its defense pact with Jordan.30 When war broke out in October 1956, Egypt expected superpower support against the British-French-Israeli invasion. Because the Soviet Union had become Egypt’s patron and Britain was part of the war coalition with Is- rael against Egypt, Soviet intervention was deemed far more likely than U.S. action. The United States, like the Soviet Union, opposed the tripartite anti- Egypt coalition, which in their eyes had taken advantage of superpower pre- occupation with other pressing matters: the United States was in the midst of presidential elections, and the Soviet Union was faced with the Hungarian uprising. According to Israeli Chief-of-Staff , if the USSR had warned Israel against invading the before the war broke out, Israel would not have dared to attack Egypt.31 Both Ben-Gurion and Dayan were troubled by the possibility that the Soviet Union might send “volun- teers” to ªght alongside the Egyptians and that Soviet aircraft and pilots might bomb civilian and military targets in Israel.32 Soviet behavior in the initial stages of the war revealed that the Israeli ap- prehensions were unfounded. Because of horizontal, inter-superpower con- straints and lack of capabilities, the Soviet Union did not live up to its com- mitment to Egypt. As predicted by balance-of-power theory, the U.S. rivalry with the Soviet Union meant that the United States could not be expected to cooperate with Moscow in confronting two U.S. allies or even in confronting

28. Ben-Gurion’s Diary, pp. 914–918; John and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill: Britain and the War (London: Secker and Warburg, 1960); and Lorch, Israel in the Grip of Superpowers, pp. 17–147. 29. Ehud Eilam, The Doctrine and Force Development of the IDF between 1957–1967 (Ph.D. diss., Bar- Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel, 2003), p. 13. 30. See Stuart A. Cohen, “Still Stranger Aspect of : British Operational Plans to Attack Israel, 1955–1956,” International History Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 (May 1988), pp. 261–281. 31. Moshe Dayan, The Sinai Campaign Diary (Tel Aviv: Am Haseffer, 1965), p. 166; and Kober, Bat- tleªeld Decision, p. 251. 32. Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1977), p. 1273; and Lorch, Israel in the Grip of the Superpowers, pp. 155–157.

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Israel. On the contrary, the United States had to balance against the Soviet Union. The USSR, for its part, lacked any effective rapid deployment force that could be dispatched to the region. The need to quell the uprising in Hungary was of much higher priority. Under such circumstances, Soviet lead- ers counted on Dwight Eisenhower’s efforts to force an end to the war against Egypt. However, when the operation against Egypt continued, the Soviet Union on 5 November called for joint superpower military action to defend Egypt and tacitly threatened to attack France and Britain with nuclear weapons if they did not pull back.33 The Soviet Union threatened Israel as well. In a mes- sage to Ben-Gurion, Soviet Premier blamed Israel for col- laborating with France and Britain and warned that by doing so it was putting its existence in jeopardy.34 Although the latter part of the message could be in- terpreted as a nuclear threat, it was rather vague. On 10 November the Soviet Union threatened to dispatch “volunteers” to Egypt.35 This threat, however, was issued days after a ceaseªre had come into effect and after the Egyptian troops had already been defeated.36 The timing of the Soviet threats, their vague content, and the lack of accompanying military moves vindicated those who had believed that the likelihood of Soviet intervention was minuscule all along.37 In this case, then, superpower behavior had no effect on Israel’s bat- tleªeld success.

Unexpected Soviet Passivity in 1967 Three weeks before the Six-Day War, as skirmishes escalated along the Israeli- Syrian border, the Soviet Union warned the Syrians—citing intelligence that may have been concocted by the Soviet and East German state security or- gans—that Israel was planning to attack Syria and had already deployed as many as thirteen divisions on the border between the two countries. Four ex- planations have been offered for the role the Soviet Union played in the pre- war escalation. First, Soviet leaders were interested in presenting Israel as an aggressor to pave the way for military action against it.38 According to Oleg

33. Carsten Holbraad, Superpowers and International Conºict (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 21–24. 34. Christer Jonsson, Superpower: Comparing American and Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: St. Mar- tin’s, 1984), p. 154. 35. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, pp. 16–18. 36. Ibid., pp. 14–21; Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, p. 238; and Yaacov Ro’i, From Encroachment to Involvement: A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East 1945–1973 (New York: Wiley, 1974), pp. 186–188. 37. Miller, When Opponents Cooperate, pp. 141–142. 38. Isabella Ginor, “Top Secret,” Yediot Aharonot Weekend Supplement (Tel Aviv), 7 May 2004, p. 7;

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Grinevsky, who at the time worked for the Soviet foreign ministry, if leaders in Moscow had known that Egypt was planning a ªrst strike against Israel (in- cluding an attack on the nuclear reactor in Dimona), they might have ap- proved of it.39 Second, the Soviet Union feared that Syria might be tempted to initiate war against Israel that would end with a Syrian military defeat and the collapse of the Ba’ath regime. Hence, in this version, the “intelligence” from Moscow was supposed to deter Syria. Third, Soviet leaders were hoping that an Egyptian show of force in solidarity with Syria would help deter Israel from attacking Syria.40 Fourth, the Soviet Union was pursuing a rapproche- ment with . By offering Moscow lucrative trade relations, the Shah of Iran hoped to ensure that the Soviet Union would prefer his country to Egypt, co- operate with him in curbing Egyptian inºuence in the region, and pressure the Egyptians to pull their troops out of . Tension on the Israeli-Syrian border would thus induce the Egyptians to withdraw troops from Yemen in order to be able to stand by Syria.41 In any case, in early 1967 the Soviet Union undertook preparations to in- tervene in a future Arab-Israeli war, relying on amphibious landings backed by air support. This was only one feature of the unprecedented reinforcement of Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean starting in January 1967. From 3 to 20 May, Soviet warships were drawn from the and Northern Fleets and made their way to the Mediterranean from the Baltic and from an Arctic base. At least one Soviet nuclear was sent from the Barents Sea into the Mediterranean on the eve of the crisis. Another Soviet nuclear submarine, based at the Egyptian port of , received orders to ªre nuclear at Israel if the Israelis used nuclear arms against the Arabs. So- viet naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons were also dispatched to the before the hostilities started, ostensibly because Moscow feared that in an unfavorable turn of events Israel might resort to the use of nuclear weapons. (Although it was not known whether Israel actually had any nuclear weapons, the Israeli government had never denied possessing them.) On 8 June the So- viet squadron approached the shores of Egypt on the Red Sea.

and Isabella Ginor “The Cold War’s Longest Cover-up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War,” MERIA Journal, Vol. 7, No.3 (September 2003), pp. 34–59. 39. Ginor, “Top Secret.” 40. Miller, When Opponents Cooperate, p. 144. 41. Ami Gluska, Eshkol, Give the Order! Israel’s Army Command and Political Leadership on the Road to the Six Day War, 1963–1967 (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 2004), pp. 209–211. Because of strong resistance by the royalists, however, the Egyptians were compelled to keep their troops in Yemen. Israel for its part played an active role in the civil war by extending logistical support to the royalists from February 1964 to late 1966 at Britain’s request. When the 1967 crisis broke out, three to four Egyptian divisions were still stationed in Yemen, something that had dire consequences for Egypt’s war effort against Is- rael. Clive Jones, Britain and the Yemen Civil War 1962–1965 (Brighton, U.K.: Sussex Academic Press, 2004)

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Another ten Soviet ships passed from the Black Sea into the Mediterra- nean on 31 May. On 1 June the forty Soviet battle units in the Mediterra- nean, including ten , were put on alert. On 4 June they were or- dered to reach full combat alert within twelve hours. Also on 4 June, Soviet commanders ordered the deployment of a “regiment” of strategic bombers in vantage points along the USSR’s southwestern rim, from which they could reach the Sinai peninsula. The pilots had been assigned pre-determined tar- gets in Israel the previous day. On 10 June, all Soviet warships in the Mediter- ranean, including launchers, were ordered to steam to the Syrian coast under escort of submarines. This seemed to be a deterrent move to stop Is- rael’s subsequent onslaught on Syria.42 Eventually, though, the Soviet Union aborted any plans it may have had to intervene. During the initial stages of the war, Soviet commanders lacked a clear picture of developments on the battleªeld and were not approached by the Arabs for active assistance.43 Through the evening of 8 June, Egypt re- jected any proposal for a ceaseªre, insisting that Israel ªrst withdraw from the territories it had captured. But as the war continued, other factors contributed to Soviet inaction. Among these factors was the balance of capabilities be- tween the two superpowers: Forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) controlled the aerial and naval routes to the Middle Eastern bat- tleªeld, and the United States deployed its Sixth Fleet along the coast off Is- rael and Syria.44 The Soviet Union was not prepared to risk a military con- frontation with U.S. forces in the region.45 Another factor in Moscow’s calculus was the signiªcant upgrading of U.S.-Israeli relations that was under way. For the ªrst time since the founding of Israeli, the United States assumed the overt role of Israel’s patron.46 Furthermore, Israel did not threaten the sur- vival of the Egyptian and Syrian regimes, at least not directly.47 This meant that the threat to Soviet interests in the region, particularly to Moscow’s rela- tions with its regional clients, was not of the highest order. A ªnal factor was the Soviet decision-making process itself, which was slow and thus a hin-

42. Isabella Ginor, “The Russians Were Coming: The Soviet Military Threat in the 1967 Six-Day War,” MERIA Journal, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 2000), pp. 44–59; and Ginor “The Cold War’s Longest Cover-up.” 43. Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel, the Superpowers and the War in the Middle East, p. 134. 44. Quandt, Decade of Decisions, p. 63; Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, p. 64; and Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 298. 45. Oren, Six Days of War, p. 296. 46. Ibid., p. 252. 47. Aluph Hareven, “Israel in Face of a Protracted Conºict,” Maarachot, No. 200 (June 1969), p. 7; and Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, pp. 63–64.

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drance on any timely action.48 Taken together, these factors prompted the USSR to do no more than warn Israel that the future of Soviet-Israeli relations would be imperiled if Israel failed to comply immediately with the UN Secu- rity Council resolution of 6 June calling for a ceaseªre. True, the Soviet au- thorities mentioned the possibility of taking “other necessary steps” against Is- rael, but they never speciªed what the nature of those steps might be.49 From Moscow’s point of view, horizontal, inter-superpower consider- ations overshadowed vertical, patron-client commitments. A Soviet ofªcial acknowledged that the USSR had encouraged the passions that precipitated the showdown but had then turned away from its Arab clients at their time of need.50 As one analyst put it: “Embarrassed by the poor showing of their weaponry, outgunned by the Sixth Fleet, the Russians wanted to end the war before it tarnished their reputation irreparably, and before Syria fell victim to it, too.”51 Disillusioned with the USSR, Egyptian President Gamal Abd al- Nasser believed that the Soviet Union and the United States had reached an understanding not to come to blows in the Middle East.52 The Jordanian Le- gion’s commander, John Glubb, offered a conspiracy theory, suggesting that the Soviet Union had wanted to see the Arab countries defeated because it would deepen their dependence on the USSR and fuel their hatred for the West.53 Although Israel did not dismiss the Soviet threats out of hand, it was not intimidated by them. To head off pressure on Israel to stop its operations, De- fense Minister Dayan urged the Israeli troops to advance on the Egyptian front as quickly as possible, taking into account that Soviet leaders, who were interested in keeping the open, might not tolerate an Israeli pres- ence on the canal bank.54 Dayan also assumed that an Israeli attack on Syria would spur the Soviet Union to intervene and that in this case the United States might refrain from acting against the Soviet troops.55 If this happened, Israel would not only be denied military success but would also suffer many casualties. Hence, on 8 June Dayan preferred to move Israeli settlements along the Syrian border ten to twenty miles away from the reach of Syrian ar-

48. Oren, Six Days of War, p. 296. 49. Ibid., pp. 252, 275. 50. Ibid., p. 296. 51. Ibid., p. 251. 52. Ibid., p. 251. 53. Samir A. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 74. 54. Oren, Six Days of War, p. 253. 55. Matityahu Mayzel, The Campaign, June 1967 (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 2001), p. 265.

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tillery rather than get caught up in a campaign on a third front that might lead to a clash with the Soviet Union.56 His eventual instruction on 9 June to the chief of the Northern Command, General , to attack Syria can be attributed to the Soviet Union’s continued low proªle and to U.S. de- terrence and unexpected commitment to Israel.57 Although it was unlikely that Israel would have pushed on to to overthrow the Ba’athist regime as some researchers have claimed, the Soviet Union did not take the risk.58 In a ªrm message to President Lyndon Johnson, Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin threatened to intervene if Israel failed to halt its advance.59 Although it is difªcult to ascertain the viability of the Soviet threat to use force, U.S. ofªcials did not exclude the possibility that Soviet commanders might send airborne troops to the region.60 Ultimately, however, the Soviet Union made no military moves to back its threats, and the United States did not have to exert any signiªcant inºuence on Israel to accept the ceaseªre.61 In any event, the Israeli forces by that point had already stopped their advance, having attained all their major goals.62 Thus, Soviet inaction helped Israel to achieve battleªeld success on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts.

Unexpected Soviet Inaction in 1982 Prior to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Israeli ofªcials were divided on the prospects of Soviet intervention. Chief-of-Staff Rafael Eytan believed that the Soviet Union was likely to intervene if the low-intensity operation against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) escalated to a high-intensity confrontation between Israeli and Syrian troops in Lebanon. Others were more skeptical and argued that the Soviet commitment to Syria was limited to

56. Oren, Six Days of War, p. 276; and Mayzel, The Golan Heights Campaign, p. 266. 57. Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1976), pp. 475, 485. 58. Lawrence L. Whetten, “The Arab-Israeli Dispute: Great Power Behavior,” in Gregory Treverton, ed., Crisis Management and the Superpowers in the Middle East (Aldershot, UK: Gower, 1981), pp. 47, 54; Aronson, Conºict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 388 n. 85; and Mahmoud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (London: Quartet, 1981), p. 17. 59. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency 1963–1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 302; and Oren, Six Days of War, p. 297. 60. A. R. Wells, “Superpower Naval Confrontations: The June Arab-Israeli War,” in Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, eds., Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon, 1979), p. 166. 61. Paul Jabber and Roman Kolkowicz, “The Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973,” in Stephens S. Kaplan, ed., Diplomacy of Power (Washington, DC: , 1981), p. 434; Wells, “Su- perpower Naval Confrontations,” p. 165; and Whetten, “The Arab-Israeli Dispute, p. 54. 62. Francis Fukuyama, “Nuclear Shadowboxing: Soviet Intervention Threats in the Middle East,” Orbis, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Fall 1981), p. 584.

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a direct threat on Syrian soil. The skeptics also believed that at a time when Soviet leaders were preoccupied with the conºict in , they would not intervene elsewhere.63 When the Peace for Galilee operation was launched in June 1982, the So- viet Union did little as long as there was no direct confrontation between Is- raeli and Syrian troops. The United States, which had been informed of the operation by the Israelis in advance, appeared to condone the attack on the PLO. Horizontal, inter-superpower as well as vertical patron-client consider- ations caused the United States to reinforce its naval presence in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean on the eve of the war as a deterrent against possi- ble Soviet intervention.64 On 9 June, following Israel’s attack on Syria’s Soviet-made air defense missiles and radars in the Bekaa Valley, Syria appealed for urgent Soviet help. In discussions with the United States, Soviet ofªcials threatened to intervene if the Israelis did not stop their attack. To lend credence to this threat, the So- viet Union put on alert the same units it had threatened to send to the region during the 1973 October War.65 In a message to Israel delivered before sunrise on 10 June, President mentioned that he had received a per- sonal message from the Soviet leader warning against any further expansion of the war. Reagan insisted that Israel agree to a ceaseªre and suggested that a failure to comply would have negative consequences for U.S.-Israeli relations. At this point, therefore, the inter-superpower relation- ship overshadowed the patron-client relationship. At the same time, the Israeli decision to agree to a ceaseªre was only partly spurred by U.S. pressure. Other considerations, explored below, created a situation in which Soviet threats had only a limited effect, if any, on Israeli battleªeld conduct.

Soviet Intervention in 1973 and Israel’s Battleªeld Victory In 1973 the Soviet Union was part of the war coalition against Israel. Soviet military support was crucial for the Egyptian-Syrian war effort for two main reasons.66 First, despite Egypt’s recent shift of orientation toward the United States, the U.S. government would not have backed any Arab war against Is-

63. Arye Naor, Cabinet at War (Tel Aviv: Lahav, 1986), pp. 55–56; , The Arab-Israeli Wars (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1983), p. 292; Amnon Sela, “A Silent Compromise: The USSR and the Peace-for-Galilee War,” Maarachot, No. 284 (September 1982), p. 58; Rephael Eytan, Story of a Sol- dier (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1985), p. 259; and Hanan Bar-On, “The Superpowers,” in Shmuel Meir, ed., The Lebanon War: A View from 1987 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies/University of Tel Aviv, 1988), p. 15. 64. Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 139. 65. Ibid. 66. Isabella Ginor, “The Red Army at ’s Service,” Yediot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), 5 October 2003.

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rael. Second, the armies of Egypt and Syria were using Soviet-made weaponry and therefore had to share their war plans, or at least the timing of the opera- tion, with Moscow. According to Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat, the war had initially been scheduled for the spring, but the Soviet Union asked Egypt and Syria to postpone their offensive until the autumn because a U.S.-Soviet summit was scheduled for June 1973 in San Clemente, California.67 Another explanation for the delay points to Syria’s need for time to absorb weapon sys- tems that were to arrive from the USSR, including T-62 , heavy artillery, Sukhoi bombers, and air defense batteries.68 Egypt’s and Syria’s military achievements during the initial stages of the war meant that neither country initially needed the Soviet Union to inter- vene. The Soviet government, however, started shipping weapon systems, am- munition, and military equipment to the Arab clients via air and sea shortly after the war broke out. Preparations for this logistical effort must have been made prior to the war. Egypt and Syria received thousands of tanks, 175 air- craft, 50 ªeld guns, 100 armored personnel carriers, hundreds of anti- and anti-aircraft weapon systems, a vast quantity of ammunition rounds, and other equipment. Soviet supplies were double the size of comparable U.S. shipments to Israel. Furthermore, unlike the U.S. deliveries to Israel, most of the Soviet supplies reached the battleªeld during the war and enabled the Egyptians and Syrians to keep reasonable force ratios despite the Israeli army’s military successes at later stages of the war. The shipments were especially cru- cial on the northern front, where the Syrians lost hundreds of their tanks, par- ticularly after the Israelis stopped the Syrian advance on 8 October and launched a counterattack three days later. The Soviet resupply effort enabled the Syrians to replace their losses with fresh equipment that had arrived by the sea from Hungary via Poland. Cuban crews manned many of the newly ar- rived tanks.69 On the southern front, Soviet assistance became most impor- tant after the Israeli crossing of the Suez Canal in mid-October. The Israeli advance on the Syrian front aroused great concern in Moscow. The Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatolii Dobrynin, warned Sec- retary of State that if Israel continued its advance, matters might get out of hand.70 On the evening of 10 October the Soviet Union

67. Anwar el-Sadat, interview by Moussa Sabri, in Shmuel Bar, The War in the Eyes of the Arabs (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1986), p. 28. 68. Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources (, Israel: Zmora-Bitan, 2001), p. 149. 69. Nakdimon, Svirut Nemuha [Low Probability] (Tel Aviv: Revivim, 1982), pp. 190–191; Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. 2, The Iran- War (Boul- der: Westview, 1990), pp. 102–103; Sa’ad al-Din al- Shazaly, Crossing the Canal (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1987), p. 200; and Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, p. 145. 70. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 508.

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alerted seven airborne divisions, and three days later one of the airborne divi- sion’s staff was redeployed to the Syrian military headquarters.71 On the southern front, the higher the probability of Egyptian defeat, the more in- clined the Soviet Union was to intervene. To this end, Soviet leaders put their strategic air force on alert and deployed on Egyptian soil two Soviet-manned units armed with nuclear warheads.72 Israel responded by de- ploying surface-to-surface missiles, leaving the nature of their war- heads for the Soviet Union to ponder.73 On 22 October, shortly before a ceaseªre went into effect, an Egyptian unit protected by Soviet advisers was apparently authorized by Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grechko to ªre Scud missiles against Israeli targets in the Sinai. Still unclear is whether the full Soviet Politburo approved this action (Soviet leaders at the time did not seem interested in escalating the extent of Soviet involvement in the war), but in any case the missiles missed their targets.74 The Soviet Union’s cautious pattern of military engagement in the Mid- dle East and its preference for demonstrative acts rather than direct military intervention, combined with Israeli and U.S. deterrent postures, account for Moscow’s failure to save the Egyptians from defeat.75

Friendly Involvement or Intervention

Intervention by friendly great powers was important in helping Israel not only to sustain protracted wars but to balance against hostile great powers.

The Soviet Contribution to Israeli Military Success in 1948 In 1948 great-power involvement in the Middle East displayed a certain sym- metry: Britain considered itself the patron of Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, whereas the Soviet Union acted as Israel’s patron. Both before the establishment of the

71. Barry Blechman and Douglas Hart, “The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: The 1973 Middle East Crisis,” in Steven Miller, ed., Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 1984), p. 277; Alan Dowty, Middle East Crisis: U.S. Decision-Making in 1958, 1970 and 1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 256; Jonsson, Superpower, p. 186; and Quandt, Decade of Decisions, p. 197. 72. Ginor, “The Red Army at Sadat’s Service.” 73. Amir Oren, “The Atomic Red Line,” (Tel Aviv), 23 May 1997. Oren cites Yuval Neeman, who participated in discussions at the highest governmental and military levels during the war. 74. Victor L. Israelyan, “The October War: Kissinger in Moscow,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 264–265; and Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, p. 139. 75. Phil Williams, Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age (London: Mar- tin Robertson, 1976), p. 109. For a fuller development of this theme, see Karsh, The Cautious Bear.

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State of Israel and after the 1948 war, Britain supplied weapons to its Arab cli- ents, and British ofªcers served in the Jordanian Legion. On 29 May 1948 the UN Security Council imposed an embargo on arms transfers to the Middle East. The British, who were among the sponsors of the resolution, must have assumed that the ºedgling Israeli state would collapse within a few weeks of the Arab invasion.76 By contrast, Soviet leaders hoped that the military suc- cesses of the newly established state would accelerate British disengagement from the region. In part because of the Arabs’ sympathetic attitudes toward Nazi and their close relations with Britain, as well as the anti-impe- rialistic struggle of the Jewish community in Palestine, the Soviet Union de- cided to give generous military assistance to Israel. To avoid openly violating the UN Security Council resolution, Soviet leaders relied on proxies in East- ern Europe, particularly Czechoslovakia. True, Czechoslovak arms supplies to Israel began before the February 1948 Communist takeover in Prague, but the shipments increased under the new Communist regime.77 The Soviet Union supported Israel diplomatically at the UN, justifying Israel’s seizure of territory in the Galilee beyond the Partition Plan borders and encouraging the Israelis to assert control of the northern edge of the Gulf of .78 The 1948 war developed into a protracted conºict in which both sides faced logistical constraints. Foreign supply of military equipment, weapon systems, and ammunition became crucial for both sides’ war efforts. The Arabs had neither a military industry of their own nor an acquisition system that could overcome or bypass the embargo.79 Logistical problems started af- fecting their armies as early as four weeks after their invasion of Israel, and these constraints forced them to accept the ªrst truce from 11 June to 9 July. The Israelis, on the other hand, compensated for their inferiority in weapon systems during the initial stages of the war by developing a military produc- tion capability of their own and an efªcient acquisition system to purchase weapons either legally or illegally. Many of the newly acquired weapons were of Soviet origin. Thousands of riºes and machine guns, twenty-ªve Messer- schmidt ªghters, and ªfty Spitªre ªghters were transported from Czechoslo-

76. Field Marshall told Prime Minister Clement Atlee that the new Israeli state would be defeated within two weeks. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Arab-Israeli_War. 77. Uri Bialer, “Czech-Israeli Arms Deal Revisited,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 1985), pp. 307–315. 78. For the Soviet position, see Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, pp. 146–150; Ro’i, From Encroachment to Involvement, pp. 51–66; and Leutenant-Colonel A, “The War of Independence in the Eyes of the USSR,” Maarachot, No. 294–295 (July 1984), pp. 69–73. 79. Israel Boer, “The Battles,” Maarachot, No. 96 (November 1955), p. 73; John B. Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959), pp. 148–149; Tal, Memoirs, pp. 179– 190; and Amin al-Nafouri, “The during the 1948 War,” Maarachot, No. 279–280 (May/ June 1981), p. 32.

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vakia in planes that had been purchased illegally in the United States by American . The acquisition list, however, also included weapons from other sources: ªeld guns of various calibers; thirteen tanks of various types (Sherman, Hotchkiss, and others) from West European sources; communica- tions and transportation equipment; explosives; and old Canadian corvettes, which had brought Jewish immigrants to Palestine under the British Mandate and were now converted into battleships to become the backbone of the small Israeli naval corps.80 These weapon systems enabled the Israelis to build up a people’s army with a small and a small air service. The air service carried out various missions, including intelligence, logistical support for settlers and troops in the besieged desert, and bombing raids (especially by B-17s). During Operation Hiram on the northern front and Operations Yoav, Horev, and Uvda on the southern front, the air service achieved air superiority. The small naval corps, which for the ªrst time during Operation Yoav operated in conjunction with Israel’s ground forces, helped cut the Egyptian troops off from the sea. Glubb, the Jordanian Legion commander, was thus at least partly right when he attributed the Arab defeat in 1948 to superpower in- volvement.81

The 1956 Sinai War: Great Powers as Coalition Partners Before the outbreak of the 1956 war, when the Americans realized that Israel was mobilizing reserve troops, President Eisenhower sent ªrm messages to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, demanding that Israel refrain from any military action.82 The fact that the Israeli attack took place during the presidential election campaign deeply angered Eisenhower and his advisers. They threat- ened to suspend economic assistance to Israel and insisted that Israel commit to withdrawal once the destruction of the fedayeen bases was accomplished. But they also promised to reward Israel if it complied. Because Ben-Gurion believed that U.S. pressure would be of little consequence as long as France and Britain were standing by Israel, he rejected the U.S. demands. Strategic cooperation with France and Britain bore some diplomatic beneªts. The two European powers, which had planned to invade Egypt

80. Amitzur Ilan, Embargo, Power, and Military Decision in the 1948 Palestine War (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1995), pp. 184–194; , Weapons Acquisition in the United States 1945–1949 (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1987); History of the Israeli People (Jerusalem: Keter and Yad Ben-Zvi, 1983), pp. 214–216; and Zeev Schiff and Etan Haber, Israel, Army, and Defense (Tel Aviv: Zemorah, 1976), p. 256. 81. Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, p. 142. 82. Bernard Reich and Arnon Gutfeld, The United States and the Arab-Israeli Conºict (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1975), p. 33.

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shortly after the Israeli attack, managed to delay the convening of the UN Se- curity Council. When the Security Council ªnally met, it failed to adopt a resolution on the Middle East because of the French and British vetoes. The issue was handed over to the UN General Assembly, where discussions were held until 4 November—that is, until the Israeli army had already completed its military operations.83 Thus, the sting of UN criticism was blunted, and Is- rael gained time to defeat the Egyptian troops in the Sinai and capture the en- tire Sinai Peninsula.84 Diplomatic cooperation with the great powers cut both ways, however. Because Israel was committed to rewarding them for their dip- lomatic backing and wanted to allow them to continue their intervention un- der the pretext of imposing a ceaseªre and bringing about an Israeli with- drawal, Israel had to announce on the morning of 4 November that it was continuing its military operations.85 The French and British launched their attack later than originally scheduled and conducted it more slowly than ex- pected. Unlike Israel, the great powers failed to complete their missions before the allotted time ran out. The United States found it inconvenient to demand that sanctions be im- posed against Israel without making a similar demand with regard to its West- ern allies. Although Eisenhower resented the French and British invasion of Egypt, he knew that the United States, as the leader of the Western world and the senior member of NATO, had no choice but to oppose any Soviet threats against the allies. Eisenhower warned the Soviet Union that any attack on France and Britain would leave the United States no choice but to retaliate. To back up this warning, Eisenhower put the Sixth Fleet, the Strategic Air Command, and the Continental Air Defense Command on alert.86 In addition to the diplomatic payoffs, Israel beneªted militarily from its strategic cooperation with the European great powers. France had provided most of Israel’s military equipment and weaponry prior to the war. The arms supplies included dozens of Mystère 2 and Mystère 4A aircraft, several MD 450 Ouragan ªghter-bombers, dozens of AMX and Sherman tanks, and other items.87 On the eve of the war, an additional shipment of tanks, artillery, ar- mored transport vehicles, and combat trucks arrived in Israel.88 Once France

83. Ro’i, From Encroachment to Involvement, p. 177. 84. Mordechai Bar-On, The Gates of Gaza: Israel’s Defense and Foreign Policy 1955–1957 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1992), pp. 310–311; Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel, the Superpowers and the War in the Middle East, pp. 49–56; and Kober, “Israeli War Objectives into an Era of Negativism.” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (July 2001), pp. 257–279. 85. Dayan, Story of My Life, p. 278. 86. Ibid., p. 132. 87. Ibid., pp. 183–184. 88. Ibid., p. 243.

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and Britain entered the war, they destroyed Egypt’s air capability by attacking its airªelds.89 French Mystère 4A squadrons that arrived in Israel on 30 No- vember to protect the Israeli rear ºank against a possible Egyptian air raid were soon carrying out interdiction missions in the Sinai. French naval forces patrolled along the Israeli coast to prevent attacks on Israel from the sea. A French destroyer attacked the Egyptian frigate Ibrahim al-Awal off the shores of , and a French cruiser took part in the bombardment of the defended locality of before Israeli troops raided it.90 This military cooperation, positive though it was for Israel, also entailed some drawbacks for the Israelis, as is typical of the unequal relationship be- tween patrons and clients. The agreement between Israel and the European powers limited Israel’s use of certain types of weapons. The was instructed by Chief-of-Staff Dayan not to carry out missions relating to grand strategic or strategic operations. Consequently, Israel was unable to de- liver an aerial ªrst strike against the during the initial stages of the war, and the task was left in the hands of the French and British. Throughout the war, the Israeli air force also was not allowed to attack targets west of the Suez Canal. Because it was uncertain whether the French and Brit- ish would live up to their commitments to join the war, Israeli leaders decided to refrain from using their armored units during the initial stages. If the French and British had reneged on their commitments, Israel’s abstention from the use of armored forces would have allowed it to depict the operation as merely a large-scale retaliatory action from which Israeli troops could re- treat without losing face.91 Some Israeli ofªcials, including Dayan, believed that Israel should carry on with the operation even if it had to act alone, but in the end this proved a moot issue.92 Despite all the constraints created by be- ing part of a coalition with stronger partners, Israel achieved battleªeld vic- tory within 100 hours.

The 1967 Six-Day War: The United States as Israel’s Patron From the mid-1950s until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the superpowers were deeply involved in the Middle East. Israeli policymakers believed that in

89. Kenneth Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp. 525–528. 90. Bar-On, The Gates of Gaza, pp. 300–301. 91. Meir Pa’il, “The Kadesh Campaign as a Landmark in the Development of the IDF,” Skira Hodshit, No. 10–11 (1986), p. 67; , “The Sinai Campaign: The IDF’s First Test as a Regular Army,” Maarachot, No. 306–307 (December 1986–January 1987), p. 3; and Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, pp. 1269–1271. 92. David Ben-Gurion, As Israel Fought (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), p. 264; and Yigal Alon, Wise Counsel in War (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1990), p. 268.

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the future the superpowers might not permit their clients to achieve over- whelming military success and might even be prepared to intervene to impose a ceaseªre. They also believed that superpower intervention would be a func- tion of Israel’s achievements on the battleªeld—the more extensive such achievements, the greater the chances of intervention—and would also be af- fected by the time required for the superpowers to deliberate and act.93 When the 1967 war broke out, the Soviet Union was still the patron of both Egypt and Syria, whereas France, Israel’s closest ally for more than a dec- ade, had abandoned its commitment after concluding that the Israelis were going to attack Egypt. On 3 June, two days before the ªghting erupted, France declared an embargo on arms shipments to the Middle East, ensuring that French weapons would not reach Israel during the war. Unlike France, which tried to prevent the outbreak of ªghting, Soviet behavior was a major factor in the prewar escalation. Syria, which must have been hoping to drag Egypt into a war against Israel, manipulated the “intelligence” that came from Moscow in early May regarding alleged Israeli military concentrations along the Syrian-Israeli border. When Syria passed on this information to Egypt, the purported threat had grown to ªfteen Israeli divisions, and the speciªed D-day was 15 May. Believing that Moscow was the source of the intelligence, Egypt acted on it as if it were true. President Nasser ordered Egyptian troops to enter the Sinai and shortly thereafter closed the Straits of Tiran.94 Conª- dent that an Arab war coalition would be strong enough to face Israel on the battleªeld, Nasser did not fear war.95 He anticipated that Israel’s military achievements, if any, would be limited and would likely be reversed by either the UN Security Council or the superpowers. Under such circumstances, Egypt would not be forced to reopen the Straits of Tiran or to allow the pres- ence of UN troops in the Sinai.96 From Israel’s point of view, the United States proved to be a far more reli- able and effective substitute for France. But under the U.S. umbrella, Israel became part of the global Cold War rivalry. Once the U.S. government real- ized that it would not be able to live up to the commitment made in 1957 to reopen the Straits, it gave Israel a green light—or at least a yellow light—to at-

93. Haim Bar-Lev, “The War and Its Aims,” Maarachot, No. 266 (October–November 1978), p. 2. 94. Aharon Neumark, The Ba’ath Regime in Syria, 1966–1970 (Ph.D. diss., Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel, 2002), pp. 127, 134–135. 95. This self-conªdence is reºected in the ambitious Arab war objectives. Avraham Ayalon, The Six- Day War Lessons (Tel Aviv: IDF Training Department, 1989), p. 13; and Daniel Dishon, ed., Middle East Record 1967 (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1971), pp. 205–207. See also Mohammed Heikal’s comments in al-Ahram (Cairo), 26 May 1967, p. 4; and Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, p. 119. 96. Ayalon, The Six-Day War Lessons, p. 14; and Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, p. 119.

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tack the combined Arab forces.97 Israel, however, still feared that the Soviet Union might decide to come to its clients’ aid. Chief-of-Staff believed that international constraints would not allow Israel to achieve bat- tleªeld victory. He foresaw no more than a limited and controlled military confrontation, heavily affected by superpower involvement.98 Israeli political and military decision-makers shared the view that Israel would enjoy freedom of action for at most two or three days in its military operations. During that short period of time the United States would adopt a neutral stand, whereas the Soviet Union would not have enough time to intervene.99 To minimize the chances of Soviet intervention, Defense Minister Dayan ordered a num- ber of deceptive measures.100 In practice, though, during the initial stages of the war the Arabs became victims of their own exaggerations regarding their alleged military “suc- cesses.”101 If the Arabs were “effective” on the battleªeld, the Soviet Union had no reason to come to their help. Israeli military achievements, on the other hand, meant that the United States did not need to intervene either to open the Straits of Tiran or to defend Israel—options that the United States, with its military assets deeply committed in Vietnam, tried to avoid.102 Israeli bat- tleªeld achievements allowed the United States to focus its efforts on deter- ring the Soviet Union from intervening. On 7 June the U.S. National Secu- rity Council expressed its satisfaction with the way the war was developing. Not only did Israeli successes spare the United States from the dilemma of in- tervening, they delivered a blow to Soviet prestige and seemed to open up new opportunities for Arab-Israeli negotiations. At this point, Israeli Foreign Min- ister predicted that the White House would welcome Syria’s de- feat.103 But Dayan feared that U.S. ofªcials might oppose an Israeli attack on the Golan Heights. As it turned out, the United States did nothing to stop Is-

97. This happened following a visit by the head of the , Meir Amit, in Washington on 29–30 May. Meir Amit, “The Road to the Six-Day War,” Maarachot, No. 325 [0](June–July 1992), pp. 11– 13. According to Quandt, it was a yellow light. William Quandt, “Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What Color Was the Light?” Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), p. 228; and Oren, Six Days of War, pp. 114–115. 98. Yitzhak Rabin, “The Six-Day War: Characteristics and Achievements,” Maarachot, No. 256 (June 1977), pp. 2–6. 99. Eytan Haber, Mahar Tifrotz Milhama [Tomorrow a War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987), p. 208; and Zeev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army (New York: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 130– 131. 100. Yaacov Erez and Ilan Kªr, Talks with Moshe Dayan (Givatayim: Massada, 1981), pp. 50–51; and Schiff, History of the Israeli Army, p. 131. 101. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War, p. 441. 102. Quandt, Decade of Decisions, p. 40. 103. Oren, Six Days of War, pp. 262, 276.

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raeli operations apart from insisting that Israel withdraw forces that had al- ready crossed the on 7 June and stop the advance of its troops on the Syrian front. These two demands came as a reaction to Soviet concerns, but they did not deny Israel battleªeld victories. Both the new U.S. role of pa- tron and the U.S. global rivalry with the Soviet Union played into Israel’s hands by forcing Moscow to remain on the sidelines, thus creating favorable conditions for Israeli battleªeld success.104

The 1973 War: U.S. Involvement and Israeli Military Achievements When the United States took a ªrm stand in early 1973 against the initiation of war in the Middle East, Israeli Prime Minister promised that Israel would refrain from launching a ªrst strike.105 On the morning of 6 Oc- tober, when war was imminent, Israel repeated its earlier assurances to the United States that the Israeli army would not launch a preemptive attack.106 The logic behind this decision was to escape any responsibility for the out- break of war that might prompt the United States to cut off weapons supplies or limit Israel’s freedom of action on the battleªeld.107 Meir also hoped that the United States would reward Israel for its “good behavior.” When she in- formed U.S. Ambassador about the government’s decision, he was taken by surprise.108 Kissinger, however, praised Israel, stressing that the decision had been made independently.109 Israeli behavior was in line with the tenets of patron-client theory. A cli- ent state—in this case, Israel—is, as Michael Handel argues, likely to “make decisions regarding its foreign policy with one ear to the wishes of the great power. These wishes do not have to be explicitly or formally presented to the client. On most occasions, patron-client relations...arecharacterized by the tacit understanding of the client state, which knows what is expected of it by the great power and adjusts its policy accordingly.”110 The same applies to re- strictions a client may impose on its own actions in the expectation of being

104. , A Curtain of Sand (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1968), pp. 387–388. 105. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 477. 106. Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p. 459. 107. Hanoch Bartov, Dado, Vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), pp. 12–13, 22; Dayan, Story of My Life, p. 576; Yishai Cordova, The Policy of the United States in the (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1987), p. 33; Golda Meir, My Life (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1975), p. 310; and Haber, Mahar Tifrotz Milhama, p. 26. 108. Dayan, Story of My Life, p. 576; Arie Braun, Moshe Dayan and the Yom Kippur War (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1993), p. 77. 109. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 477; and Aba Eban, Chapters of Life (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), p. 495. 110. Handel, Weak States in the International System, pp. 134–135 (emphasis added).

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rewarded for good behavior.111 Other factors, however, also spurred Israel to forgo a ªrst strike. Having been caught by surprise, Israel found that its only preemptive option was an aerial strike along the Syrian front, which was closer to population centers. In addition, the expected utility of a preemptive strike was thought to be limited. Among other things, it would not prevent Syrian artillery and tanks from attacking on the ground.112 Hours before the war started, Israeli leaders put their faith in U.S. and Soviet diplomatic efforts to prevent the outbreak of ªghting.113 Once the war began, the superpowers sought to avoid a direct confronta- tion with one another. To this end, they had to maintain a certain level of co- operation and keep developments on the battleªeld under close control. The superpower interaction was tricky, however, because both countries believed that Israel was capable of defeating the Arabs. When the war started, the Soviet Union launched a massive effort to replace Arab losses. Soviet lead- ers also tried to arrange a ceaseªre as soon as possible to secure their clients’ hold of the territories they had captured during the initial stages of the war.114 Following the deterioration of Syria’s military situation in the aftermath of Israel’s offensive in the Golan Heights on 11 October, the Soviet Union accel- erated both its diplomatic efforts and its shipments of military hardware to the Arabs. In the United States, meanwhile, when senior ofªcials realized early in the war that Israel was in great trouble and that the Soviet-backed Arab coalition was on the verge of success, they set out to redress the situa- tion. Not only were U.S. ofªcials prepared to balance Soviet arms shipments by supporting Israel logistically; they also declined to halt Israel’s advance be- yond the purple line (the post-1967 border) in the Golan Heights. In addi- tion, the United States initially avoided cooperating with the Soviet Union on a ceaseªre. By 13 October it became clear that Israel had already managed to tilt the outcome in its favor along the northern front, but that Israeli troops were still on the defensive on the southern front. The superpowers deepened their com- mitments to their clients, and their involvement in the war intensiªed. Up to this point, Egypt had resisted Soviet and Syrian recommendations to launch another attack on Israeli forces in order to ease pressure on the northern

111. See David A. Baldwin, The Power of Positive Sanctions,” World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (October 1971), pp. 19–38. 112. Braun, Moshe Dayan and the Yom Kippur War, p. 120. 113. , “The Morning before the Outbreak of the Yom Kippur War” (lecture presented at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, University of Tel Aviv, 3 June 1986); Aryeh Yitzhaki, “Tal Ob- scures, Tal Renovates,” Hadashot (Tel Aviv), 31 October 1986; and Kenneth W. Stein, Heroic Diplo- macy (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 71. 114. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, p. 145; and Cordova, The Policy of the United States in the Yom Kip- pur War, pp. 52–54.

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front.115 When Egypt made the mistake on 14 October of launching a new at- tack, the Israeli army contained it, inºicted heavy casualties on the Egyptian troops, and followed up on its success by crossing the Suez Canal. As Israeli troops surrounded and prepared to destroy large elements of the , the Soviet Union stepped up its pressure on the United States to agree to a ceaseªre. At this point, Secretary of State Kissinger—who had been blamed early in the war for denying weapons and ammunition to Israel in order to bring about a relatively even outcome that would facilitate peace talks and reduce the Arabs’ humiliation and desire for revenge—now played an important role in creating favorable conditions for Israeli military achievements.116 Before leaving for Moscow on 20 October, a few days before the expected ceaseªre, Kissinger tacitly indicated to Israel that it could have an additional forty-eight hours to complete its encirclement of the Egyptian .117 During a visit to Israel on the way back from Moscow, Kissinger learned that the Israeli army needed two or three addi- tional days to complete the mission. He promised to help once again. This time, though, Kissinger stressed that Israel would have to make do with a shorter period of time.118 When Soviet leaders realized that Israel was violating the ceaseªre, they threatened to intervene. Kissinger warned Israel that the United States would not risk a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union.119 One observer has re- cently claimed that the Soviet Union was on the verge of sending 150,000 troops via air and sea to save the Third Army and that Soviet naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean were preparing to launch a ªrst strike on the U.S. Sixth Fleet.120 Israel had no choice but to agree to another ceaseªre on 24 Oc- tober. The United States, for its part, pursued a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, it insisted that the besieged Egyptian Third Army be provided with food and medication. On the other hand, it declared a global military

115. Avraham Ayalon, “The 14th of October: Why Was It Erased from History in Sadat’s Memoirs?” Maarachot, No. 266 (November 1978), p. 12; Bar, The Yom Kippur War in the Eyes of the Arabs, p. 93; Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 208–212; and Mohammed Heikal, The Road to (London: Collins, 1975), pp. 214–215. 116. The Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur War (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1974), p. 254; and Dowty, Middle East Crisis, p. 251. 117. Nakdimon, Svirut Nemuha, pp. 213–215; and Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 541–543. 118. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 561; and Mati Golan, The Secret Talks of Henry Kissinger (Tel Aviv: Shocken, 1976), p. 82. 119. Golan, The Secret Talks of Henry Kissinger, p. 83. 120. Lyle Goldstein and Yuri Zhukov, “The 1973 Standoff in the Mediterranean” (paper presented at the “Cold War at Sea” conference, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 7–8 May 2004). For numerous sources on Soviet threats to intervene and the preparations they made for such intervention, see Miller, When Opponents Cooperate, pp. 135–136.

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alert (Defcon 3) and reassured Israel that it would consider sending troops if the Soviet Union intervened on the Egyptians’ side.121 When the ceaseªre came into effect, the Egyptian army had already been defeated. According to Defense Minister Dayan, the only country that was ready to provide Israel with arms was the United States. Hence, in his view, those who were suggesting that Israel should avoid relying on the United States were in fact arguing that Israel should accept defeat.122 Although one of the reasons for Israel’s decision to forgo a ªrst strike in October 1973 was its expectation of receiving U.S. logistical support, the United States withheld military ship- ments to Israel until 13 October, despite urgent Israeli appeals.123 Shortly after the war began, Israeli equipment losses were so heavy that the Israeli govern- ment believed it was approaching a dangerously low level of aircraft (some 220 in total) and ammunition. Prime Minister Meir even considered ºying to Washington to convince the administration to resume the weapons shipments immediately.124 U.S. ofªcials had initially believed that Israel would be able to subdue the Arab military challenge quickly and effectively, but within a day or two they realized that this was not the case. Nonetheless, the equipment slated for Israel, including 9,000 tons of aircraft, tanks, ammunition, and spare parts, was held back for a full week after the war started. When the shipments ªnally resumed, this was apparently because Kissinger feared that Israel, fac- ing defeat, might resort to nuclear weapons.125 True, the American resupply operation via air bases in (the

121. Golan, The Secret Talks of Henry Kissinger, p. 86; Bartov, Dado, Vol. 2, p. 345; Dayan, StoryofMy Life, p. 672; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 590; and Nakdimon, Svirut Nemuha, p. 226. 122. Golan, The Secret Talks of Henry Kissinger, p. 98. 123. One could speculate about the reasons for the delay and for the release of the shipments. Expla- nations might include a systemic realist account, a bureaucratic-organizational analysis, and a psycho- logical assessment of individual decision-makers. The systemic explanation would focus on a deliber- ate American scheme to prevent any of the adversaries from achieving a decisive victory, presumably on the grounds that an indecisive outcome would be more conducive to a political settlement. See The Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, p. 254; Dowty, Middle East Crisis, p. 251; Elmo Zumwalt, On Watch: A Memoir (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), p. 443; Edward Sheehan, “Nixon and Brezhnev’s Scheme,” Maariv, 7 March, 1976; and Cordova, The Policy of the United States in the Yom Kippur War, pp. 59–87. The unit-level explanation would stress the alleged rivalry between the secretary of state and the secretary of defense and their respective organizations, with each side blaming the other for the delay. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 495–496, 501–502; and Kalb and Kalb, Kissinger, pp. 465– 478. The psychological explanation would focus on President Nixon’s failure to realize the implica- tions of the Middle Eastern developments for the global and regional rivalry because of his depression and preoccupation with the and the ignominious resignation of Vice President Spiro Agnew. Golan, The Secret Talks of Henry Kissinger, p. 48; and Quandt, Decade of Decisions, p. 183. In any case, the Americans deliberately refused to supply bridging equipment, which implied that they disapproved of transferring the war to the heart of Egypt. Cordova, The Policy of the United States in the Yom Kippur War, p. 104. Israel, nevertheless, managed to cross the canal, using both Egyp- tian and Israeli bridging equipment. 124. Braun, Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War, p. 132. 125. The Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, p. 282.

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Azores) had almost no impact on the Israeli war effort. The number of tanks delivered by giant C-5A cargo aircraft was limited when the war was still un- der way. The Phantom ªghter-bombers and Skyhawk attack planes that ar- rived before the adoption of a ceaseªre carried out fewer than 300 sorties—a minuscule fraction of the total sorties ºown by the Israeli air force during the war.126 Psychologically, however, the shipments had a huge impact: Israeli troops crossed the Suez Canal and maneuvered on the canal’s with- out fearing a shortage of arms, equipment, or ammunition. Despite the lim- ited military effect of the American supplies, President Sadat used them as an excuse for defecting from the war coalition with Syria. He later presented the United States as an active party to the war because of its support of Israel and expressed reluctance to ªght against it.127

1982: U.S. Pressure on Israel In 1982, for the ªrst time in Israel’s conventional wars, the Israeli high command preferred the achievement of its war objectives to battleªeld suc- cess. Although Israeli troops inºicted military defeats on the in Lebanon and translated these military achievements into political advances, the situation facing Israel soon became more complicated. As the conºict evolved into an Israeli-Syrian confrontation, Israeli decision-makers sought mainly to deny Syria military and political control of Lebanon. The Israeli army thus set out to reach the -Damascus highway, the key to such control.128 The Israelis were conªdent that the United States would welcome the idea of uprooting the PLO in Lebanon and putting an end to Syrian control over the country, thus dealing a blow to Soviet prestige.129 From late Decem- ber 1981, however, the U.S. government warned Israel not to initiate any large-scale operation in Lebanon, for fear that hostilities there might impede the last stage of the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, provoke Soviet interven- tion, impede Lebanon’s rehabilitation, and even destabilize the entire re- gion.130 In a series of visits to Washington, DC, by senior Israeli ofªcials—the

126. Dov Tamari, “Offense or Defense: Is There a Choice?” Maarachot, No. 289–290 (October 1983), p. 6. On the limited impact of the , see also Quandt, Decade of Decisions, p. 184; and Col- onel Trevor Dupuis, International Symposium on the 1973 October War (Cairo: Egyptian Ministry of Defense, 1976), p. 68. 127. , In Search of Identity: An Autobiography (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 197. 128. Kober, Battleªeld Decision, pp. 420–422. 129. Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, p. 292; and Meir Pa’il, “The Military Operations and the Political Objectives,” in Meir Pa’il, ed., The Lebanon War (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1983), p. 55. 130. Yair Evron, “The U.S. and the War in Lebanon,” in Pa’il, ed., The Lebanon War, pp. 99–114; and

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head of Israeli military intelligence, Yehoshua Saguy; the director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, David Kimche; and Defense Minister —in January–May 1982, as well as in contacts with the Israeli ambas- sador to the United States, , the Israeli and U.S. governments ar- rived at an understanding: Israel would refrain from initiating a large-scale preventive war against the PLO in Lebanon, but the United States would give the Israelis a green light to launch a quick, surgical attack on southern Leba- non to destroy the terrorist infrastructure up to 40 kilometers north of the Is- raeli-Lebanese border.131 The Reagan administration even considered deploy- ing troops in subsequent to the Israeli attack.132 After Israel completed its withdrawal from the Sinai in April 1982, the United States be- came less concerned about the possibility of an Israeli operation in Lebanon. Israel, for its part, perceived the reinforcement of U.S. naval units in the east- ern Mediterranean as a sign of American readiness to deter Soviet interven- tion in Lebanon.133 Following the Israeli strikes against Syrian air defense batteries in the Bekaa Valley on 9 June, the Soviet Union threatened to intervene if the Israe- lis continued to attack Syrian positions within the 40-kilometer zone. As ten- sions increased, the United States exerted heavy pressure on Israel to put an end to the confrontation. President Reagan even sent a message to Israeli Prime Minister warning of negative consequences to U.S.- Israeli relations. Israeli leaders were not prepared for such a reaction, having relied on the support of Secretary of State Haig, who was Israel’s staunchest supporter in the administration and had personally given approval for the Is- raeli operation against the PLO. The Israeli government did not anticipate that a coalition of advisers to Reagan, consisting of Vice President George H. W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Chief of Staff James Baker, and National Security Adviser William Clark, would convince the president to pressure Israel in order to avoid further escalation, forestall damage to U.S. relations with Egypt and , and bolster the chances of forging an anti Soviet regional defense front.134 Israel’s decision to agree to a ceaseªre,

Alexander M. Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 332–335. 131. Zeev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s War in Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Shocken, 1984), p. 89; Shimon Shiffer, Snow Ball: The Story behind the Lebanon War (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1984), pp. 89–90; and Haig, Caveat, p. 335. 132. Arye Naor, Cabinet at War (Tel Aviv: Lahav, 1986), pp. 40–42. 133. Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 139. 134. William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conºict since 1967 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 342–343; Abraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel: The Limits of the (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and Haig, Caveat, p. 334.

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however, was only partly spurred by American pressure. Among the other fac- tors that played a role was the Israeli government’s concern that Haig’s status would be harmed because of his strong support of Israel. No less important was the Israeli army’s promise that its troops would reach the Beirut-Damas- cus highway by the time a ceaseªre took effect, thus giving Israel political con- trol of Lebanon. In addition, many Israeli ofªcials believed that the war had already exceeded its original objective.135

Conclusion

During the Cold War, the Middle East was a forum of superpower rivalry and competition. Although the United States and the Soviet Union could not and sometimes did not want to prevent the outbreak of regional wars, they were consistently on their guard lest their clients collapse or the local conºict esca- late to the global level. Not only did the regional clients sometimes entangle their patrons in war, they were also able to manipulate the patrons’ behavior to their own advantage, occasionally causing them to turn against each other and extracting arms and ammunition from them. Israel did not conduct even a single war without enjoying the support of a friendly great power. As long as the patron’s interests and Israel’s interests were compatible, the involvement of the patron proved to be an asset for Israel rather than a burden. In addition to providing material support, the patron balanced against hostile great powers. The hostile powers’ unwillingness or in- ability to intervene against Israel was much to Israel’s advantage. Thus, great- power involvement in the Arab-Israeli wars often created favorable conditions for the attainment of battleªeld success. This does not mean, however, that Is- rael disregarded great-power constraints. On the contrary, the external con- straints posed dilemmas for Israel about the best strategy for achieving bat- tleªeld success, such as the choice between offense and defense or between a ªrst strike and retaliation. Friendly great powers usually had a greater effect than hostile powers did on Israel’s decisions and behavior. Pressure from hos- tile great powers was most effective when it was delivered via Israel’s friendly patron (or patrons). In some cases, Israel managed to launch a blitzkrieg, de- priving the great powers of enough time to intervene, but in the other cases Is- rael’s wartime policies were signiªcantly affected by patron-client relations.

135. Naor, Cabinet at War, pp. 76, 82; Yehuda Ben-Meir, lecture presented at the “Strategic Decisions in War” symposium, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, University of Tel Aviv,1985); Ariel Sharon with David Chanoff, Warrior: The Autobiography of Ariel Sharon (Tel Aviv: , 1989), pp. 467–469; and Haig, Caveat, pp. 338–341.

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