KoGreat-Powerber Involvement and Israeli Battlefield Success inthe Arab-Israeli Wars Great-Power Involvement and Israeli Battleªeld Success in the Arab-Israeli Wars, 1948–1982 ✣ Avi Kober During the Cold War, violence was channeled away from Europe to the peripheral areas of the Third World, where the superpowers became in- volved in local affairs, although they were reluctant to commit their military forces directly. They could not, and sometimes did not even want to, prevent the outbreak of regional wars, but each superpower was constantly on guard lest its respective clients collapse or lest the local conºict escalate to the global level. The superpowers tried to uphold their commitments to their regional clients while seeking to avoid all-out global confrontation. They were ready to defend the survival of their clients but did not want to become directly en- gaged in the clients’ military operations.1 Their efforts to exert some form of control over regional wars required cooperation alongside conºict, a logic that applied to the Arab-Israeli conºict. This article deals with one of the forgotten dimensions of Israel’s military accomplishments in its wars against the Arabs—great-power involvement and intervention.2 Alongside other dimensions that are overlooked, such as the dissolution of Arab coalitions against Israel before or during the Arab-Israeli wars, great-power involvement has been one of the important conditions in Israeli battleªeld success.3 The shadow of superpower intervention hovered over all of the Arab-Israeli wars, and Israeli leaders often feared that such in- tervention might undo Israeli achievements on the battleªeld.4 1. Benjamin Miller, When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conºict and Collaboration in World Poli- tics (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. 227. 2. For the distinction between involvement and intervention, see, for example, Efraim Karsh, The Cautious Bear: Soviet Military Engagement in Middle East Wars in the Post-1967 Era (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), pp. 6–11. 3. Avi Kober, Coalition Defection: The Dissolution of Arab Anti-Israel Coalitions in War and Peace (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), particularly pp. 59–85. 4. Shimon Peres, Tomorrow Is Now (Jerusalem: Mabat, 1978), p. 249; and Haim Bar-Lev, “The War and Its Objectives,” Maarachot, No. 266 (October–November 1978), p. 2. All Hebrew-language titles have been rendered here in English translation. Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 8, No. 1, Winter 2006, pp. 20–48 © 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 20 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/152039706775212058 by guest on 29 September 2021 Great-Power Involvement and Israeli Battlefield Success in the Arab-Israeli Wars Was great power involvement in the Arab-Israeli wars indeed a liability to Israel’s war efforts? Israel’s success in war should be attributed not only to mil- itary competence but to great-power involvement. Contrary to Israel’s early fears, external involvement in most cases either failed to prevent Israel from maintaining its military achievements or was an asset for two main reasons: a lack of will or ability on the part of hostile great powers to intervene against Israel; and the valuable support provided by friendly patrons, without whom Israel’s own military skills might not have been sufªcient to secure military success. When tested against the record of the Arab-Israeli wars from 1948 to 1982 this argument is conªrmed by the 1948 War of Independence, the 1956 Sinai War, the 1967 Six-Day War, the 1982 Lebanon War, and in part by the 1973 October War. The War of Attrition in 1969–1970 is referred to only brieºy here because neither side during that conºict pursued a decisive mili- tary outcome. The article begins by discussing the relevant theoretical and empirical lit- erature and then examines the sterile nature of intervention threats by great powers hostile to Israel and the contribution of friendly great powers to Is- rael’s war efforts. Finally, it evaluates the impact of great-power involvement on Israel’s military record. Literature on Great-Power Involvement Three sets of relationships are germane to the study of great-power involve- ment in regional conºicts: horizontal inter-client relationships; horizontal inter-superpower relationships; and vertical patron-client relationships. This article focuses on the second and third types of relationships. Four theories, all in the realist tradition, offer powerful explanations for great-power involve- ment. Balance-of-power theory focuses on capabilities in explaining why and how great powers or regional powers affect and shape global or regional bal- ances, and how such balances in turn affect regional wars. As Benjamin Miller points out, great powers are well suited to affect regional balances of power because of their superior capabilities and the local actors’ dependence on them.5 When the global rivalry is especially intense, as in bipolar systems, great-power competitive balancing is extended to peripheral regions such as the Middle East. Balancing at the regional level might take place through the 5. Benjamin Miller, “Between Hot War and Cold Peace: The Middle East and Balance of Power The- ory” (paper presented at the “Balance of Power Project” conference, Center for Contemporary Conºict, Montreal, 17–18 May 2002). 21 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/152039706775212058 by guest on 29 September 2021 Kober establishment of alliances between the great powers and local states, which are given diplomatic, ªnancial, and military assistance. In times of war, such as- sistance makes it easier for the regional states to continue ªghting. Patron-client theory, which focuses on the vertical great power–local actor relationship, considers the informal relations between unequal partners.6 The theory emphasizes the reciprocity of relationships between patrons and clients and characterizes them by different degrees of equality, beneªt, and manipula- tion.7 Whereas the client’s interests usually are limited to the regional context, the patron deªnes its interests from a global perspective. The priority the cli- ent gives to its local interests can result in unbridgeable conºicts with its need to preserve strategic ties with its patron.8 Although the imbalance between pa- trons and clients usually favors the patrons, the relationship is also shaped by the existence of alternative patrons and by the ability of clients to contribute to their patrons’ interests. When war breaks out between local actors, great powers may try to inºuence the adversaries’ freedom of action on the battleªeld and their sustainability.9 The more intense the inter–great power competition, the more autonomy the regional clients enjoy and the more leeway they have to manip- ulate the great powers as well as to extract military and economic aid.10 Apa- tron’s involvement would generally be an asset to the client as long as the two countries’ respective interests do not conºict. Friendly patrons usually affect the clients’ decisions more than the enemy’s patron, and pressures by the en- emy’s patron become most effective when delivered via the friendly patron.11 One could likewise expect that the superpowers not only would try to avoid any actual use of force against each other but would tacitly cooperate in re- straining their regional clients and in terminating the wars. This in turn might negatively affect the local actors’ chances of achieving battleªeld vic- tory. Also likely is that inter-patron or patron-client threats would be issued once major clients faced military defeat. The effectiveness of such threats would be inºuenced by the will and ability of the patrons to intervene by dis- 6. See, for example, Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conºict among Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 29, 442–443, 505. 7. Michael I. Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1990), pp. 131– 148. 8. Alexander George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), p. 26. 9. Fred C. Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 24. 10. Benjamin Miller and Korina Kagan, “The Great Powers and Regional Conºicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post–Cold War Era,” International Studies Quar- terly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (March 1997), pp. 51–85. 11. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel, the Superpowers and the War in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1987). 22 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/152039706775212058 by guest on 29 September 2021 Great-Power Involvement and Israeli Battlefield Success in the Arab-Israeli Wars patching troops overseas. Because military action would pose risks and costs, patrons normally prefer to support their clients short of ªghting; that is, via arms and logistical supplies rather than direct intervention. Intervention theory deals with coercive activities by one sovereign state on the territory of another.12 The theory, which focuses on the conditions that make intervention necessary, feasible, sustainable, and successful on both the state level (political, military, societal, and economic conditions) and the in- ternational level (structural and non-structural aspects), points to military ca- pabilities as the core source of overt military intervention.13 Although most of the literature on intervention is dedicated to particular case studies (e.g., Viet- nam, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Grenada), one can also ªnd comparative studies (e.g., Soviet intervention in post-1967 Middle East Wars;14 U.S. inter- ventions in Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and Grenada15), quantitative analyses,16 and discussion of the normative and legal aspects of intervention.17 Most analysts treat the intervening state as a unitary actor,18 but some are in- terested in the process by which decisions are made to intervene, to escalate, 12.